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Amnesty Hearings

Type AMNESTY HEARING

Starting Date 01 July 1997

Location PIETERSBURG

Day 2

Names NICHOLAS STEPHANUS COETSEE

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ADV VISSER: Mr Chairman may I be permitted to call Brigadier Coetsee. You will find his evidence in your folder, B, at page 20. I take it Mr Chairman that in view of the fact that the victims might wish to put questions, as I understood the position to be, to these witnesses they can't be excused until we adjourn the application. I'm not pressurising you, there hasn't been a request but there may be one.

CHAIRMAN: Well I don't exactly know what that means actually because normally, and that's why we have the leader of evidence, normally he would consult with them and then the leader of evidence would put questions on their behalf. But I suppose we will discuss that with Mr Black. Normally people don't, I mean as I say, they consult with the leader of evidence, that's what he's there for, put questions on their behalf,

ADV VISSER: If a request is directed, we will convey it to you Mr Chairman but at this stage we take it that everybody must remain in attendance.

NICHOLAS STEPHANUS COETSEE: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY ADV VISSER: Mr Coetsee, you're a Coetsee with an s?

MR COETSEE: That is correct yes.

ADV VISSER: Do you have a copy of your amnesty application and of Mr Erwee's application in front of you?

MR COETSEE: Correct.

ADV VISSER: And you ask for permission to refer to that to refresh your memory?

MR COETSEE: That's correct, yes.

ADV VISSER: What is your rank?

MR COETSEE: I retired from the service as a brigadier.

ADV VISSER: So can we address you as Sir?

MR COETSEE: Yes you're welcome.

ADV VISSER: Could you sketch your police career for the Committee as it appears on page 22 or page 43?

ADV DE JAGER: I think he can perhaps just confirm it.

ADV VISSER : Could you then just confirm that the facts as set out on pages 22 and 23 are correct and contain the crux of your police career?

MR COETSEE: Yes.

ADV VISSER: You read it and it is correct?

MR COETSEE: Yes that is how it appears in my application on pages 1 and 2.

ADV VISSER: In 1986, what was your position in the Police at that stage, where were you, where were you stationed and what was your rank?

MR COETSEE: I was attached to the security branch of the police station in Pietersburg and I was second in command of the division in Northern Transvaal.

ADV VISSER: And how long did you spend in Pietersburg?

MR COETSEE: I was transferred to Pietersburg in 1973 and I was here until the end of 1988.

ADV VISSER: So it was 15 years.

MR COETSEE: Yes it was more-or-less 15 years.

ADV VISSER: You were present in the audience when Colonel van der Merwe testified this morning?

MR COETSEE: Yes that's correct.

ADV VISSER: And I assume that you heard what he was testifying about, the general situation of unrest which prevailed in the Far Northern Transvaal as he described it and the borders as he described it, do you agree with him in principle?

MR COETSEE: Yes it's correct.

ADV VISSER: And is the situation such that although there were incidents it was also your impression that this area wasn't perhaps such a flash-point area as some of the other areas in South Africa in 1986?

MR COETSEE: I think we were fortunate in that aspect that that was indeed the case, yes.

ADV VISSER: Can you sketch the position for the Committee relating to intelligence gathering and making use of informers, firstly the importance of it and secondly more specifically relating to this particular incident? Could you sketch the background?

MR COETSEE: Yes our activities were aimed at gathering information and in the process we made use of informers. Some were used only occasionally, they would convey information to you on a specific occasion and then we would have registered informers who provided us with information on a regular basis.

ADV VISSER: In your division and under your command there was a Koos van den Berg.

MR COETSEE: Correct.

ADV VISSER: And in 1986 what was his rank, can you remember?

MR COETSEE: If I remember correctly it was warrant officer.

ADV VISSER: And also a person by the name of Matthew Sehlwana?

MR COETSEE: Correct.

ADV VISSER: Now could you tell us what you know about the run-up to this incident. How did the information first arise?

MR COETSEE: Koos van den Berg and Matthew Sehlwana served under my direct command. I was actually their father as far as their work was concerned, and I think it was the beginning of May that they came to me with information indicating that they'd extracted information form an informer in Botswana which indicated that there were three people who were intending to infiltrate the country.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Coetsee you said they came to me. Could you please help us here, did they both come to you, were they there at the same time, did they come to you one by one, because there is a dispute in this regard about whether they came to you simultaneously or who was present and at what stage, so could you please mention them by name?

MR COETSEE: I apologise Chairperson, I can't tell you that they both came to me, that they were in my presence simultaneously, I referred to Matthews and van den Berg, it might be that they came to me separately but that they both came to me, that is true.

ADV VISSER: And you said that the information conveyed to you was that there were three people who were intending to infiltrate the country?

MR COETSEE: Yes.

ADV VISSER: Did you know where the information was obtained from?

MR COETSEE: Yes they told me this was information that they'd extracted from an informer in Botswana.

ADV VISSER: Now the informer, was Matthew this informer's handler or was Koos van den Berg the informer's handler or were they jointly the handlers of the informer?

MR COETSEE: They were jointly this person's handler.

ADV VISSER: Very well, continue.

MR COETSEE: The information, as I said, indicated that there were three people who were intending to infiltrate the country and that they were looking for transport. And with this information at our disposal, when I say we, I mean Koos van den Berg, myself and Colonel Willem van der Merwe, we consulted and discussed the matter and we decided that we would provide the transport to bring these people in. Matthews Sehlwana would act as the driver of the vehicle.

ADV VISSER: What kind of vehicle was it which you had in mind, initially?

MR COETSEE: It was a Toyota sedan, if I remember correctly it was a 1.3, it was a small car.

ADV VISSER: Can you remember the colour?

MR COETSEE: I think it was a biscuit coloured vehicle, brownish.

ADV VISSER: Not that it's important but continue.

MR COETSEE: We discussed the possibility of monitoring these people upon their entry into the Republic to the point where they were to stay over so that we could also trace their sympathisers or safe-houses and identify those.

ADV VISSER: Was that regarded by yourself as part of the campaign to obtain information in order to control the situation in the country?

MR COETSEE: Correct, yes.

ADV VISSER: Now that was in May. What happened afterwards? Were you then notified that the people were intending to enter at a particular stage? Take it from there.

MR COETSEE: Yes at some stage in June if I remember correctly, I think it was towards the end of June, I received information via Koos van den Berg that the three people were ready to enter the country and that we should help them with transport.

Arising from that, Koos van den Berg and I along with Colonel van der Merwe undertook a planning session to monitor these people on their journey into the RSA. What it amounted to was that we would place certain people from the Security Branch on certain strategic points along the route from Alldays as far as Pietersburg to do the monitoring.

On this specific day for which the infiltration was planned these people were deployed but there was in fact no infiltration.

ADV VISSER: Just by the way, on this particular day was the Defence Force involved and was the ABS involved and if so, in what capacity?

MR COETSEE: Chairperson the Defence Force was involved in the sense that they would provide a plane to help with the monitoring function, the ABS was involved also in helping to monitor at a specific point and they would later be utilised if there was a need for arrests to be made.

ADV VISSER: Yes I apologise Mr Chairperson, ABS is the Division of Internal Stability, that is the ABS.

Now I think that Lourens Pretorius was placed at the exit of the farm Eendvogelpan on the Breslau-Alldays road and Lourens Kruger was placed at Dendron.

MR COETSEE: Joggie Kruger it was Joggie Kruger?

ADV VISSER: It was Joggie Kruger, correct. And then Fuchs was placed on the showgrounds about a kilometre from the Seshego turn-off ...(intervention)

MR COETSEE: Thata's right.

ADV VISSER: And Koos van den Berg was on the farm Kruitfontein. I'm going to do it through your evidence even though you don't have personal knowledge of it. Reference has been made to a farm Alldays, it's actually a reference to Kruitfontein, the place where the people infiltrated was actually the farm Kruitfontein, is that how you understand it?

MR COETSEE: Kruitfontein is on the Republic side, on the point where the infiltration took place.

ADV VISSER: And from Kruitfontein you had to drive through the farm Eendvogelpan to get the Breslau-Alldays road?

MR COETSEE: Correct yes.

ADV VISSER: Now you said, you mentioned the placing of these people. Nothing actually happened on that day. The next day they were deployed again and once again nothing happened. Now we come to the last event before the incident itself, can you recall what happened?

MR COETSEE: There was a third occasion on which there would have been three people who were intending to infiltrate. At the beginning of July, I think it was round about the 6th of July, that incident once again did not materialise and during that incident this vehicle, the Toyota Sedan which I referred to, became defective in some way, had to be towed away, I think from the Alldays side.

Shortly afterwards we received information via Koos van den Berg that there were now six people who were planning to infiltrate and they would be armed.

Obviously we then realised that the vehicle was now no longer operational and that we'd have to provide another vehicle to convey these people and arrangements were then made to make available a police combi for transporting these people.

ADV VISSER: Did that make any difference to your planning Mr Coetsee?

MR COETSEE: Yes if I recall correctly we at that stage already made use of Defence Force personnel in the sense that they could relay radio messages and conversations for us because we were experiencing problems in radio communications with each other. When we received the information that there were now six people, six armed people planning to infiltrate, we went back to the Defence Force and they promised us reinforcements.

ADV VISSER: As far as the initial plan was concerned that the people would be allowed to be transported to wherever they wanted to go what actually happened to that plan, did it change and if so what?

MR COETSEE: Yes because the number had now grown to six armed people, the planning changed and we wanted to arrest them as close as possible to the crossing point.

ADV VISSER: Mr Coetsee, as far as the specific planning was concerned, inasfar as it was to do specific planning beforehand, could you say something about that, how was this done and what was the thinking behind the planning? What was the Defence Force supposed to do?

MR COETSEE: In brief, what it amounted to was that Sehlwana would still be the driver of the vehicle that the Defence Force would be assisting our members at certain observation points that a casspir of the Defence Force would be made available to be used at the road blockade.

ADV VISSER: Members of the Defence Force, which Commando Unit were they from?

MR COETSEE: Five Reconnaissance Command from Phalaborwa.

ADV VISSER: On this occasion did you meet an officer from Five Reconnaissance?

MR COETSEE: Yes, if I remember correctly it was Mike Bourne, Captain Mike Bourne.

ADV VISSER: According to your planning what would have been his function?

MR COETSEE: His function would have been as follows

Where these people entered the roadblock he was then to say to them, "Look you are surrounded, you must surrender"

ADV VISSER: Yes. Was there any discussion as to how he should be dressed?

MR COETSEE: Yes, if I remember correctly, it was specifically said that he should be dressed in Army uniform.

ADV VISSER: The previous witness testified that the idea was to intimidate these people by a show of force and to discourage them from putting up a fight and turn violent.

MR COETSEE: That is correct yes.

ADV VISSER: Do you agree with that?

MR COETSEE: Yes.

ADV VISSER: What was the purpose of the planning at this stage? Mr Coetsee, what do you intend to do with these six people?

MR COETSEE: We wanted to arrest them.

ADV VISSER: And what would have been the purpose of arresting them, apart from the fact that as policemen you were obliged to arrest them? What would have been the purpose of arresting them?

MR COETSEE: To question them after arrest and thereby extracting information from them about infiltration routes, planning etc inside the Republic of South Africa.

ADV VISSER: It is also correct that part of the final planning also entailed the involvement of members from other security branches and offices to come and assist with the operation, correct?

MR COETSEE: Yes.

ADV VISSER: Mr Coetsee what do you know about the specific preparation relating to the vehicle itself and what was supposed to happen on the scene to ensure that no loss of life took place?

MR COETSEE: During discussions where Colonel Willem van der Merwe, myself, Colonel Erwee and Captain Mike Bourne were present and involved we tried to establish broad guidelines as to how the operation should take place. It was, amongst other things, decided that the right rear window of the combi would be removed, that one of the Defence Force men would then throw a gas grenade into the combi at the point where it was brought to a halt. This was aimed at dazing the occupants of the combi and also to give Sehlwana the opportunity to jump out of the combi and to escape.

ADV VISSER: Did your prior planning also include an escape route for Matthew Sehlwana?

MR COETSEE: Yes that's right.

ADV VISSER: Were you involved in the incident of the 10th of July?

MR COETSEE: No.

ADV VISSER: Was a report made to you as to what happened there?

MR COETSEE: Yes, that's correct.

ADV VISSER: Could you tell us what reports you received?

MR COETSEE: On the same day, that's the 10th to which I'm referring, I can't remember whether I received the phone call or whether it was Colonel van der Merwe who received the call, but the information was relayed during this phone call was that the operation was disposed of, that.....

ADV VISSER: Just a moment please. Please continue.

MR COETSEE: That five people had died in the process, that one had been wounded and he had been transported to Alldays, that the Defence Force Captain, Captain Bourne had also been wounded and he'd been taken to Pietersburg.

We were also told or information which ...(intervention)

CHAIRMAN: Sorry to interrupt you there. Mr Visser I think the witness should tell us from whom he got this report, because if he

ADV VISSER: (...indistinct)

CHAIRMAN: Well let him give us the name first, because I don't think it would be correct to go on getting this information if he doesn't tell us from whom he got it.

ADV VISSER: Certainly Mr Chairman. From whom did you receive this report?

MR COETSEE: According to my knowledge it came from Captain Piet Dreyer.

ADV VISSER: You may continue.

MR COETSEE: I'm not exactly sure where I was.

ADV VISSER: Let's start from the beginning. He said that five people had been killed and one wounded person was taken to Alldays?

MR COETSEE: That's correct, and that Captain Mike Bourne had also been wounded during the incident and he was taken to Pietersburg.

According to information received these six terrorists had been on their way to Pietersburg Railway Station where they were to meet a person who would have been wearing a yellow shirt or yellow scarf.

As a result of this information, Colonel Willem van der Merwe and I and there was one other person present, I can't remember who it was, it might have been Captain Manie van Staden, we then went to the railway station where we kept observation for a long period to identify this person but we couldn't.

ADV VISSER: There was no such person?

MR COETSEE: No there wasn't.

ADV VISSER: Some of what you've just said could also be information which you received afterwards because you also received reports from Erwee?

MR COETSEE: Yes we did receive reports later on.

ADV DE JAGER: Just before we come to the later reports, after the chairperson told you to mention the names of the people you said, as far as my knowledge goes it was Captain Dreyer. Is that correct?

MR COETSEE: Yes that's correct.

ADV VISSER: Now what do you mean by, as far as I know? Did he speak to you himself, who did he speak to, how did you know it was him?

MR COETSEE: As I said originally I can't remember whether the phone call was put through to myself or Colonel Willem van der Merwe with the information about the outcome of the events but it was definitely Captain Piet Dreyer who had made the call but I don't know whether he spoke to me personally or whether it was just conveyed to me.

ADV VISSER: And afterwards you received further reports or not?

MR COETSEE: There was a discussion afterwards, after the incident, during which there was a full sketch of what had happened.

ADV VISSER: Now who were present at this discussion meeting?

MR COETSEE: It was Colonel Erwee definitely. I can't remember the other people present.

MS KHAMPEPE: Mr Vissser, when did this discussion take place?

ADV VISSER: Could you answer that question, was it on the same day, was it the next day or was it when?

MR COETSEE: No it could have been the next day or a couple of days afterwards, it was definitely not the same day.

ADV VISSER: Was it also reported to you that something had been found in the combi that the passengers had had something with them in their possession?

MR COETSEE: Yes Chairperson.

ADV VISSER: What exactly did the report say?

MR COETSEE: There were AK47's, there were limpet mines and also handgrenades.

ADV VISSER: You personally handed over an amount of money to Mr Matthew Sehlwana, can you remember that?

MR COETSEE: Yes an amount of money, an amount of R2 000 was handed to Matthew. I can't tell the Committee that I handed it to him, that could have been the case.

ADV VISSER: I'm sorry I actually made a mistake by putting it to you as a fact, but Mr Matthew says on page 10 paragraph 12 of his statement that it was in fact you. You won't deny that that could have been the case?

MR COETSEE: No I won't deny that.

ADV VISSER: Can you remember that it was R2 000?

MR COETSEE: Yes it was R2 000, I remember that well.

ADV VISSER: Matthews says that you called him to your office and said that he had done good work. Would that more-or-less have been the gist of that conversation when you handed over the money to him?

MR COETSEE: I would agree with that.

ADV VISSER: And the money was then handed to him as a reward for a courageous deed, for a courageous deed performed?

MR COETSEE: Correct yes.

ADV VISSER: Mr Coetsee if I ask you, did you according to your insights then and now, did you do anything wrong?

MR COETSEE: No Chairperson.

ADV VISSER: You're sitting here today and you're asking for amnesty, why is that so?

MR COETSEE: Chairperson there was a shooting incident here in which people were killed. I can't play judge in my own case and decide whether I acted correctly or incorrectly in this respect, and after Archbishop Tutu's call to people to apply for amnesty if they were in any doubt that I think was my main motive for applying for amnesty. Information came to my ears that the Attorney General was actually doing a criminal investigation into this matter.

ADV VISSER: Yes, were you personally approached by any representatives of the Attorney General's office or not?

MR COETSEE: No.

ADV VISSER: And are you saying that what you did you did in the execution of your duties as a policeman and in terms of standing orders which existed and which were applicable to yourself in the Police Force at the time of the incident?

MR COETSEE: Correct yes.

ADV VISSER: As regards the fact that we know, especially now with hindsight, that there was a political connotation to what happened in 1986 in your attempts to combat sabotage, insurgence, violence etc, and also as regards people with different political convictions.

MR COETSEE: Correct.

ADV VISSER: If you could perhaps sketch your political motivation for the Committee, how would you express that?

MR COETSEE: Our actions or my actions were aimed at protecting the state. It was one of the ANC/SACP Alliance's objectives to violently overthrow the government of the day.

ADV VISSER: On page 24 Chairperson, on typed page 3 of the report, paragraph 10A and 10B you set out your motivation, do you confirm that that was indeed the motivation in terms of which you acted?

MR COETSEE: Correct.

ADV VISSER: And in your report you also mention the statement made by Mr Andre Johannes Gerhardus Erwee in respect of the facts of the incident, the incident where you were not present, and you also request the Committee to look at that.

MR COETSEE: That is correct.

ADV VISSER: And lastly, I actually forgot to put this to Colonel van der Merwe, but on page 27 paragraph 10, you also ask that the submission that the Foundation for Equality before the Law and General Jan Velde van der Merwe's submission on the 21st of October of last year also be made applicable to your amnesty application, the content of that insofar as it is relevant?

MR COETSEE: That is correct yes.

ADV VISSER: I have no further questions at this stage Chairperson, thank you.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY ADV VISSER

CHAIRMAN: Mr Rossouw.

MR ROSSOUW: Thank you Mr Chairman.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Rossouw, just to get clarity on your position, are you opposing the application? What precisely is your position, what role are you playing with regard to these applicants? What is your status here?

MR ROSSOUW: Chairperson thank you for this opportunity, I've found myself in the unfortunate position that I feel I am involuntarily put in the position of a prosecutor. I am not opposing the applications.

I think as far as the facts put forward by Mr Sehlwana is concerned and in the manner that it differs from what is said here or the deductions that were made, I should point it out, but whether there was as full disclosure or a political objective to the various applicants now testifying before this Commission is really, with all due respect, none of my concern and I do not intend to put that before the Commission.

If the committee would allow me, I think it would be proper that I think Mr Black should proceed to first start with cross-examining the witness and if there are further aspects which I feel might specifically deal with the issues raised by Mr Sehlwana I would then request the Committee to afford me that opportunity.

ADV DE JAGER: I think it is correct that you should point out any differences between your client's testimony and his. I think it is correct that you should proceed to do so now. I've got no trouble, I only wanted to have clarity about your position, whether you oppose it or not.

MR ROSSOUW: As the Committee pleases.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR ROSSOUW: Mr Coetsee the vehicle that was provided to Mr Sehlwana, initially to collect the people, you mentioned that it was a Toyota vehicle?

MR COETSEE: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: You heard that Mr Sehlwana denied that he had any knowledge of this biscuit coloured vehicle and during cross-examination there was referred to a beige vehicle.

MR COETSEE: Just being fair to Mr Sehlwana, he didn't say that he wasn't aware of this vehicle, he said that he was driving a 4 X 4. I don't know whether one can take it as far as saying that he didn't have knowledge or wasn't aware of this vehicle.

CHAIRMAN: Of course I mean you have defined your own limits of cross-examination, nobody envisages that you would be a prosecutor. The only reason why we give you the opportunity is whether you have questions to ask. If you don't have questions to ask you don't have to ask any questions. But the correct procedure would be to be that you should put questions first before Mr Black as far as we are concerned and not the other way around, for very obvious reasons. Therefore as I say you're very correct, you've defined your own limits of cross-examination. If you have no questions to ask, say so and we will proceed to Mr Black.

MR ROSSOUW: Thank you Mr Chairman.

Mr Coetsee in relation to that vehicle in your argument in-chief, it was the first time that we heard that this vehicle broke down. Is that correct?

MR COETSEE: Yes it broke down.

MR ROSSOUW: And it wasn't put to Mr Sehlwana that this vehicle broke down and that was also one of the reasons why this vehicle couldn't be used?

ADV VISSER: Mr Chairperson with great respect, that wasn't the reason.

CHAIRMAN: Why is this question important?

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Chairman I'm just pointing out that this is the first time that - that it was not put in cross-examination to Mr Sehlwana.

CHAIRMAN: How does it affect the client's position?

MR ROSSOUW: The fact is that it might have, to some extent, he said as far as that vehicle is concerned, I'm not going to say he didn't have recollection but he didn't use it, now surely if a vehicle breaks down, you must surely, somehow remember it, that would just be a further point which might prompt his recollection.

CHAIRMAN: Well I'm not sure I understand you but any way, did I interrupt you Mr Visser?

ADV VISSER: No Mr Chairman I think I'm not going to make any objection.

CHAIRMAN: Let's hear you, I mean proceed with your questioning.

MR ROSSOUW: You also said that just after the vehicle broke down you said that the 6th of July you received information from Mr van der Berg that it wasn't going to be three people anymore but six.

MR COETSEE: Yes that is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: Did he give you an indication of where he got the information from?

MR COETSEE: I can't remember whether he gave me an indication. The deduction that I made was that he got it from Sehlwana.

MR ROSSOUW: After the operation you say that later in the same day you received a telephone call, you cannot remember if you got it yourself or Colonel van der Merwe?

MR COETSEE: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: And you say that the information from that telephone call was that five people were killed and one was wounded of the occupants?

MR COETSEE: Yes that's correct.

MR ROSSOUW: You heard that Mr van der Merwe said that the information to him was that six people were dead?

MR COETSEE: Yes I heard that.

MR ROSSOUW: You said that that's not how you received it, that's not correct?

MR COETSEE: That's how I can remember it, five people were killed and one was wounded.

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Chairman I have no further questions at this point.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR ROSSOUW

CHAIRMAN: Mr Black.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BLACK: Thank you Mr Chairman. Perhaps if we just start off where Mr Rossouw left off. Your information was that five were killed at the scene and the wounded cadre was taken to Alldays. Now what does it mean by taken to Alldays, was he taken to hospital there, was he treated there, was he taken there for hospital treatment?

MR COETSEE: The deduction that I made was that he was taken to the Alldays Hospital.

MR BLACK: Did you follow that up at all?

MR COETSEE: Later I heard that the person died on the way.

MR BLACK: Who told you that the person died on the way while being transported?

MR COETSEE: I can't remember precisely who told me that.

MR BLACK: Do you know who took him to Alldays, who was in charge of the vehicle in which he was taken to Alldays?

MR COETSEE: No I don't know.

MR BLACK: Do you know in what type of vehicle was he taken there?

MR COETSEE: No I don't .

MR BLACK: Surely according to your evidence one of the main objects was to extract evidence from these six parties and here was the one who had survived this operation and incident, you make no enquiries as to the details of how he died on the way to Alldays, or who was in charge of him at the time, or in charge of his welfare, let's put it that way. Is that how I understand your evidence?

MR COETSEE: Chairperson, I don't know who the person is who transported him.

MR BLACK: In fairness to you, did I understand that you did not make enquiries and investigate that issue?

MR COETSEE: I don't understand your question.

MR BLACK: You say that a survivor of the six was transported to Alldays, you've told the Committee that you don't know how he was transported, who transported him, who was in charge of his welfare and who made the report to you that he had died on the way.

ADV DE JAGER: Well if he died on the way to the hospital, surely he can't be interrogated later on, so..

MR BLACK: Mr Commissioner what I'm getting at is I want to enquire as to whether or not the Brigadier made enquiries about these issues after he had received a report that this wounded person had died on the way to Alldays. Did you enquire about these issues which I've raised? When you say that you don't know in reply to each of those questions, did you make any investigation or enquiry after receiving the report?

MR COETSEE: No I did not do any investigation.

MR BLACK: Just to get this issue clear for my own clarity, you say that you deployed initially various people mentioning Mr Pretorius, Kruger, Fuchs and van den Berg at strategic observation points when you first expected three persons to infiltrate South Africa from Botswana, do you recall that?

MR COETSEE: Yes that is correct.

MR BLACK: And nothing happened. Then the next day were the same persons deployed again at various strategic observation points?

MR COETSEE: That is correct.

MR BLACK: And then in your evidence you say later on there was a third occasion when three people were expected to infiltrate on the 6th of July and that also did not materialise, is that so do you remember?

MR COETSEE: That is correct.

MR BLACK: When you refer to that as a third occasion was it the same three people you were always expecting?

MR COETSEE: That is correct, the same three people.

MR BLACK: These names which you mentioned initially, Mr Lourens Pretorius, Joggie Kruger, Mr Fuchs and van den Berg, were they the only security personnel posted at observation points on the first occasion if I may refer to it as that?

MR COETSEE: On the first occasion yes, as far as I can remember those were the only people.

MR BLACK: I realise this happened some time ago but these names and your remembering the names of the personnel and the exact observation points they were placed at, did you have to have reference to any records or did you, how do you recall that?

MR COETSEE: Chairperson, I remember it from my own memory.

When this whole situation was discussed during the amnesty application, it came back to me that this is how this operation took place.

MR BLACK: Now you've heard the evidence that one of the factors that aroused the suspicion of the Security Branch that the people who were going to infiltrate South Africa from Botswana, that those people were in fact South Africans and not illegal immigrants and probably members of Umkhonto weSizwe, was because some or one or more used a Black language when speaking to your informer, a Black South African language, I should imagine when speaking to your informer, did you hear that evidence?

MR COETSEE: Yes I heard that Chairperson.

MR BLACK: Do you recall any such information being given to you, passed on to you, let's put it that way?

MR COETSEE: Yes I remember.

MR BLACK: Now your evidence is that Captain Bourne was to stop these people and address them and warn them that they were surrounded and that they should give themselves up, is that correct?

MR COETSEE: Yes that is correct.

MR BLACK: Captain Bourne according to my information, is a British Citizen, or an Englishman. Is that not so?

MR COETSEE: That is correct.

MR BLACK: Was he familiar with any indigenous vernacular in this country other than English?

MR COETSEE: Not that I know of Chairperson.

MR BLACK: Now after you received this report-back at a later stage and you received this information that it had been determined from the wounded cadre that they were to meet a person wearing either a yellow shirt or a yellow scarf at the station, were you told who were the parties that had interrogated this cadre and obtained this information from him?

MR COETSEE: No.

MR BLACK: Thank you. Mr Coetsee, do you recall, oh yes I'm sorry, you say, do you recall who gave you this information about - was this the same Captain Dreyer?

MR COETSEE: It was Captain Dreyer who gave it to me telephonically.

MR BLACK: Now you say that either a day or a few days after this operation you discussed the further details with persons who had participated in the operation?

MR COETSEE: That is correct.

MR BLACK: As to what was found allegedly in the combi, and at that discussion or at any time after this operation, were you ever handed a tape recording or a recording of events which took place either during the course of the operation or after the operation or in respect of an interview with the wounded party?

MR COETSEE: No Chairperson.

MR BLACK: Now you're aware of the fact that while the, or rather you've heard the evidence of Mr Sehlwana, that while the wounded man was being questioned, interrogated, he was being tape recorded. His answers were being tape recorded.

MR COETSEE: I heard that he said that Chairperson.

MR BLACK: Right. So that has not been denied and would you have expected such a recording to have been handed over to either yourself or Colonel van der Merwe?

MR COETSEE: Yes Chairperson if something like that existed it would have been handed over to us.

MR BLACK: I just want to again put it to you just to clarify. If what may be referred to as the third, no not the third incident, the incident which we are now concerned with involving the six parties, had you received information prior to going out there for the 10th of July, that all six infiltrators would be armed, had that been firmly confirmed? Or did you simply suspect?

MR COETSEE: Chairperson that was information that we received that these people would be armed.

MR BLACK: From whom did you receive that information?

MR COETSEE: From Koos van den Berg.

MR BLACK: I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR BLACK

ADV DE JAGER: In your application on page 27 paragraph 9 you say that,

"I believed and understood that all the actions against the enemy would have been justified bona fide and was also authorised".

Now I do understand that this phrase occurs in all the applications and it is something that the legal advisors compiled, but all acts against the enemy was fully authorised, you understood it and you believed that, based on what, based on what information, did you believe that all actions against "the enemy" was authorised?

MR COETSEE: Chairperson, actions against the enemy that amounted to arrests and also incidents where people were killed under specific circumstances, I saw that as being justifiable action.

ADV DE JAGER: In this incident six people were killed.

MR COETSEE: That is correct Chairperson.

ADV DE JAGER: And you had just said that you see that in certain circumstances that you see that as justifiable actions, how did you see this?

MR COETSEE: I saw it as justifiable action.

ADV DE JAGER: Why?

MR COETSEE: Because the first confrontation according to my information came from the side of the terrorists and there was no other recourse as to use violence.

ADV DE JAGER: Who gave you this information that it came from their side?

MR COETSEE: Colonel Erwee. I will mention his name as the person, yes.

MS KHAMPEPE: Mr Coetsee, Mr van der Merwe has already testified that there were previous occasions when arrests were made by members of your division of cadres who were crossing into the Republic, would you confirm that information?

MR COETSEE: Yes that is true.

MS KHAMPEPE: And were these arrests made with the assistance of informers? I would imagine that the majority of them would have been.

MR COETSEE: That is correct. Some of them would have been based on information from informers and others from incidental information.

MS KHAMPEPE: Was Mr Sehlwana actively involved in those arrests as well?

MR COETSEE: Chairperson no, I cannot give you an answer there, I don't think he was involved with other arrests.

MS KHAMPEPE: Was this the only incident where he was involved, if he was never involved in other arrests?

MR COETSEE: I believe that to be the case. If I remember correctly that was the only one that he as involved with.

MS KHAMPEPE: Were these arrests effected as a result of the information received from your informer, Mr Mabena? The previous arrests that we have referred to?

MR COETSEE: No Chairperson.

MS KHAMPEPE: Can I just ask another question. With regard to the previous arrests referred to by Mr van der Merwe was there ever any payment made to the informers, no, to the people who assisted, members of the police who assisted in effecting such arrests? Was there any payment made to members of the police?

MR COETSEE: No not to members of the police, no, not as far as I know.

MS KHAMPEPE: Now was this incident the first incident where a member of the Security police was paid a special bonus in assisting to execute an operation?

MR COETSEE: As far as I know, yes the only one.

MS KHAMPEPE: Now what was so special about this operation that warranted a special payment to a member of the security force?

MR COETSEE: Chairperson I think there are very few people sitting here in this hall who would have had the conviction and the courage to do that, what Sehlwana did, and that was the reason why he was rewarded.

MS KHAMPEPE: Wasn't it part of his duties to collect information from informers as was also part of Mr van den Berg? I thought Mr van den Berg also assisted a great deal in the collection of the information that led to the identity of, that led to the information that six cadres would be infiltrating the country?

MR COETSEE: Chairperson Sehlwana wasn't rewarded for the information that he forwarded, he was rewarded for the deed he did to actually physically transport the people while his life was in danger.

MS KHAMPEPE: Was it reasonably expected by the security people who were involved in the planning such as yourselves that there might be a loss of life in the execution of this operation?

MR COETSEE: Chairperson that was always foreseen that that might happen.

MS KHAMPEPE: Thank you Mr Coetsee.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Coetsee we heard earlier that two of the security policemen died when they arrested people.

MR COETSEE: That is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: Who were they?

MR COETSEE: The one was Warrant Officer Theuns Gerber and the other one was Sergeant Joggie Nel. They were stationed at the Security Branch at Messina.

ADV DE JAGER: Did that occur before this incident?

MR COETSEE: No it was after this incident.

ADV DE JAGER: Did they die after this incident?

MR COETSEE: They died in December '86.

JUDGE NGOEPE: Mr Visser.

RE-EXAMINATION BY ADV VISSER: Thank you Chairperson. There was a court case following this where they were prosecuted, do you have any knowledge of this court case, a criminal prosecution at Messina?

MR COETSEE: I wasn't involved myself with the court case.

ADV VISSER: Do you have knowledge of the issues on which they were charged, can you tell us?

ADV DE JAGER: I think you will get that information from Advocate Black because he actually acted in that case.

ADV VISSER: Do you suggest that I should put him there as witness!! (Laughter)

MR COETSEE: They were convicted and sentenced yes.

ADV VISSER: And it was members of the Security Branch who apprehended the guilty parties after the murder on these two policemen?

MR COETSEE: It was only Ngulube who was involved in the death of Gerber Nel and he was arrested by members of the security force.

ADV VISSER: Can you remember by which members of the security force he was arrested or can't you remember that?

MR COETSEE: No those were people from Messina, I cannot remember who they were.

ADV VISSER: Can I just take you to task on something else? You would have thought that if a tape recording was made that it would have handed it to you, is that youR evidence, a tape recording of the discussion that was held with this wounded person at the scene?

MR COETSEE: Yes.

ADV VISSER: Can I just put it to you, if someone makes a tape recording because he doesn't want to take notes and then there is nothing to take notes, why would the tape recording have been handed to you?

MR COETSEE: No then there's no reason for that.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY ADV VISSER

JUDGE NGOEPE: I am not sure I understand you, why would the tape recorder not be necessary?

MR COETSEE: If there's nothing on the tape recording, if there's nothing of importance.

JUDGE NGOEPE: Well the mere fact that there is a voice on the tape supposedly made by somebody who was injured in confrontation with the security force, no matter how unintelligible that conversation may be, isn't that in itself enough to cause that tape recorder to be kept safely and be handed over?

MR COETSEE: That is correct Chairperson but I have no knowledge that there was any such recording.

MS KHAMPEPE: If I remember your evidence Mr Coetsee, you were given a report, a verbal report by the officers concerned and no mention was ever made of the tape recording, is it not so?

MR COETSEE: There was no reference made to any tape recording.

JUDGE NGOEPE: Thank you Mr Coetsee you are excused. You may stand down.

MR COETSEE EXCUSED

ADV VISSER: Mr Chairman I note that it's five to four. I hope that we have been able to do a job's work today. Perhaps we can adjourn until tomorrow.

JUDGE NGOEPE: Yes I think we should adjourn until tomorrow at half past nine.

And we appeal to the relatives if they can to try to be on time so that we can start at half past nine.

HEARING ADJOURNS

 
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