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Type AMNESTY HEARINGS
Starting Date 23 February 1998
Names PROF HEINZ KLUG - WITNESS
PROF KLUG: Because I was involved in the Student Press a lot of our publications were banned because we were making allegations about apartheid and about deaths in detention etc., and as a result I was getting a lot of attention from the Security Police in Durban. That is partly the reason why I decided to go to Cape Town, I thought I would avoid that. And in Cape Town my deferment was cancelled from the military. I was on student deferment at the time and I was called up and my call-up was changed from Services School in Lentz to the infantry, as happened to a number of Nusas leaders at the same time, and we at the same time were objecting to military conscription into the apartheid army. I realised that I was either going to have to object publicly and face the consequences which would have been prison, which I incidentally was happy to do, but the Nusas leadership at the time felt that this was not the way to go, some were getting deferment and so I was left with little choice but to leave the country, the combination of Security Police attention and military conscription.
PROF KLUG: Sure. I had let very few people know that I was preparing to leave the country, in fact two close friends. And somebody had asked to meet me at a bar in Cape Town one evening and I was there, and I ran into a gentleman by the name of Carl Edwards who was sitting in the bar, and I had known him, I'd met him before in Virac, the Environmental Student Organisation in Durban, and so he greeted me and he beckoned for me to come over to his table, and the person I was due to meet wasn't present, so I walked over and said good-day and he said to me; oh, sit down, I believe you're planning to leave the country, and I was somewhat shocked to hear that because I hadn't let anybody know I thought, and I said; well, I'm not sure, he said; well if you continue with these plans he'd like to speak to me because there was something called the Southern African News Agency, Sana, in Gaberone, Botswana, that needed somebody to run it and he was in contact with the people internationally at the International University Exchange Fund who were funding and running this operation and they would like me to take this over if I was prepared to do that.
PROF KLUG: I did not overlap in the student movement, to my recollection, with Craig Williamson, he was slightly ahead of me, so I only knew him by reputation. There were however many rumours about whether Carl Edwards was necessarily to be relied upon or trusted. So what I did was before I committed myself to this, I went and asked a number of Nusas leaders at the time what I should do about this, what do they think about these two characters. I received contradictory advice. I was told by some that they really didn't trust Edwards, they weren't sure about Williamson, some thought, who knows he may be working for some foreign intelligence agency, they weren't sure whether he was connected to the South Africans, but it was unclear. I had had contact with the African National Congress, and basically the advice I received was to take the position in Botswana, so I accepted.
PROF KLUG: When I arrived there, Patrick Fitzgerald was already there. He had left the country a couple of weeks before I did, and he was in the house, and I said to him well I'd arrived supposedly to take over this thing called Sana and he said right, he would immediately put me in contact with Marius and Jeanette Schoon who were the ANC contacts to talk to.
PROF KLUG: Well, I had - as I said, I'd had this brief contact in London before, but now I formally was, I wrote out a biography in which I detailed the various contacts I'd had in the country, I detailed the various conversations I had had with various Nusas leaders about the possible problem with both Edwards and Williamson and the different versions that I'd received from that, which as I say at this point was still quite contradictory, and that I gave into them and they passed that on.
PROF KLUG: To Marius and Jeanette. At that point Marius and Jeanette - I was brought into a structure which was basically Marius and Jeanette and Patrick and I, as this Sana unit if you like, whatever it was called.
PROF KLUG: That was part of the wider internal political reconstruction work that was going on at the time. So on the one hand our role was to run this Sana operation, to work out what to do with that, and on the other we began making active contact with people inside the country to build ANC political structures.
PROF KLUG: Well, from '79 to '81 they were working, I know in the unit that we were part of. Jeanette was also connected with Sactu and basically with the political reconstruction unit, initially reporting through Henry Makgoti to the senior organ and later after he left Botswana, through a man by the name of Steve who is Shahied Rajee, directly to the senior organ.
After 1981 there was a reorganisation of the structures in Botswana and we were put into area structures. I was no longer working directly with them, but remained a close friend. I used to baby-sit Katryn a great deal and so remained very close to them over the remainder of the period they were in Botswana.
PROF KLUG: Well the Sana operation as we began to understand it, was that, and the way it had in fact been explained to me by Carl Edwards inside the country, was that Carl Edwards was supposed to gather information inside the country that wasn't available in the regular media or whatever, get it to us in Botswana where we were to write up stories and those stories were then to be sent to the IUEF, to Craig Williamson at the IUEF in Geneva, where they would be published in a little Sana bulletin, a little A4 four pages or eight pages bulletin which would then be distributed to anti-apartheid organisations all over the place.
Then there was an occasional publication we put together, a lot of information on a particular subject. The particular one I can recall was about forced removals, and that publication would be put together. Most of the information that we actually worked on was culled directly out of the South African Press, which was available in Gaberone the morning it was published in Johannesburg, so there was easy access. We could listen to the South African radio broadcasts and later there was TV as well, and gather information that way.
What happened was, in these first few months in Botswana, because not only of the information that I brought out, the concerns about Edwards and possibly Williamson, but also the concerns that Marius and Jeanette already had about those two, there was concern about what to do about this internal network and how to find out what in fact was going on.
So what we did was we basically stuck to the media and wrote up little stories and sent them along, which then Craig Williamson published in Geneva, and one or two of those came out in the time that we were there. At the same time we were put under demand, Williamson wanted to know what was going on in Botswana, give us stories about refugees etc., and why weren't wasn't there more information about what was going on inside South Africa.
Edwards at the same time said to us, look we need to give him the names of people in organisations in South African that you could contact on our behalf in order to get information for us. We absolutely refused from the beginning to actually provide names of people in organisations inside South Africa, because we said we just weren't sure about the structure of the whole organisation of what was going on. At the same time we kept on saying to Williamson, look we're supplying the stories you want and that's how it works.
What happened was we, the unit, Marius, Jeanette and the two of us, and we were already working under Marius and Jeanette's guidance, said look we had to come up with some way of working out what was going on. So we started demanding to have a meeting with Edwards, we wanted Edwards to come up and meet with us so we could try and ask him some questions.
PROF KLUG: He came to Botswana, but his behaviour was extraordinary. He arrived with a vehicle outside the Sana house, he refused to get out of the vehicle, he said we must come meet him at the Holiday Inn, which was a place that was known to be frequented by many South Africans, including security people, so we were rather reluctant, but no, that's where we had to meet with him, he wouldn't meet anywhere else.
We agreed to meet with him and we said look, how do we get this information that you're supposed to supply us, and he said well the only way he can now do it would be to set up a dead-letterbox on the border as a way for us to actually communicate.
MR BERGER: Marius and Jeanette, you and Patrick. Marius and Jeanette are in Malepaloli, how was their contact between you and Patrick, on the one hand, Marius and Jeanette? Did they ever come down to Gaberone?
PROF KLUG: They would come down every weekend. They would drive, they would drive directly to the Sana house in Bontleng. So their presence was very visible in Bontleng. We would travel often, once or twice a week up to Malepaloli to meet with them, so our connection with them was extremely visible. And I used to wonder around town with Katryn, who as I say I baby-sat often if they came down during the week etc., so our connection with them was clearly well-known.
PROF KLUG: I can only surmise that he would have because you know, we were clearly photographed quite often in the streets of Gaberone by the South African networks, we were clearly being watched at different times, so it would have been extraordinary if they were unaware, and I do not know exactly what was passed onto Williamson in Geneva.
PROF KLUG: What he would have possibly known is that Chris Woods and Julian Sturgeon, my predecessors at Sana, had also had very close contact and friendly relations with Marius and Jeanette and I believe that when he visited Botswana he would have been aware of that as well.
PROF KLUG: Yes, Patrick and I were concerned that because we were clearly not playing ball in the way that was being expected of us, that there was a possibility that if there was a police link here, that the setting up of a dead-letterbox was one way to try and grab us at the border.
PROF KLUG: Well because Edwards was demanding names of people to see in the country, we were refusing to do that, Williamson was asking for stories about what was going on in Botswana, we were declining to do that, so things were getting a little tense and it wasn't clear. You know either we just weren't doing out jobs right as Sana or else there was something else that was wrong, and it was on that basis that we were a little neurotic. We met with the group and Marius and Jeanette said, look there's an opportunity here. We'd been looking for an opportunity to try and, to find out what was going on and there was some potential here.
PROF KLUG: Edwards, first of all Edwards. We couldn't -we didn't see Craig Williamson so there was no ways we could work out what was going on there, but at least with Carl Edwards in South Africa this was somebody we were concerned about.
So what we did was we said, the arrangement with Edwards was that we would set up a dead-letterbox by taking photographs of a particular point and by writing a description, those would be mailed to a post-box in Johannesburg and then we'd be able to operate it from there.
PROF KLUG: Myself and Patrick. ... which is out towards the border, and we made as if we were taking photographs, the camera had no film in it. We returned to Gaberone, I wrote a long description of the various photographs that I supposedly had taken down to what supposedly the dead-letterbox, and we mailed that description to the post-box in Johannesburg and in it said that we had mailed a film under separate cover.
PROF KLUG: To a post-box that he had given us. What happened as a result of that is that somebody was sent to us in Botswana, an African man drove to Botswana, and came to the house, again refused to get out of the vehicle, was extremely nervous. You must realise that at the time we were having contact with a lot of people coming in and out of the country in ANC work, where we could gage their nervousness at having contact with people outside, and there was no comparison between how both Edwards and this guy behaved and how the others were behaving. So they immediately raised our suspicions about exactly who they were and why they distrusted us so much in this interaction.
And this man came out and he had a letter from Edwards saying where on earth is the film, he had the description, he wanted to set up the dead-letterbox, what games are we playing. I wrote, well it was a hysterical letter back, according to the plan by Marius and Jeanette, saying well it's clear that the police must have intercepted the film and therefore there's no ways we can go anywhere near this dead-letterbox, we worried that Edwards' network had clearly been uncovered by the police, and in fact we advised that maybe he should leave the country immediately otherwise there's a chance that the Security Police would grab him. And that we sent back with this courier that had been sent to us.
The next communication we got from Edwards was to tell us not to be silly, he was perfectly fine, that there was nothing wrong with the communications, that there was no ways that he could have been infiltrated by the police.
PROF KLUG: Well to us that meant there was something very, very wrong, there was no ways that the people we were working with in ANC political structures would have responded in any way like that if told that we were concerned that their security had been breached. And his absolute assurances that security had never been breached, we had a little more respect for the South African Security Police than to be believe they could never breach our security. And on that basis we decided that in fact he was possibly linked to the police, that in fact given all the other bits of evidence that had come in over the years, we had to make a decision that in fact he was with the police.
PROF KLUG: Marius, Jeanette, Patrick and I. That was immediately in each case communicated through Marius and Jeanette up to the senior organ and on to Lusaka. At this point Mac Maharaj had been down to Botswana on a number of visits, had taken an interest in this matter, and the communications would have gone on to him.
PROF KLUG: Having come to a conclusion that whatever was the reality, we could not trust Edwards. I then phoned Geneva and spoke directly with Craig Williamson and said, look we - this "we" as Patrick and I in Sana, were desperately concerned that there was something wrong with Edwards, that we believed he might very well be a policeman and that we therefore want to both meet with Williamson, we want him to come down to Botswana and meet with us, and we wanted to cut off links with Edwards.
Williamson's response, which is what we were, this was designed to elicit, was that in fact there was absolutely nothing wrong with Edwards, that he doesn't believe there could be any problem whatsoever, that we were just being a bunch of nervous nellies down there in Gaberone, and that really we're being ridiculous.
PROF KLUG: This was - Marius and Jeanette and Patrick and I in the unit had discussed that if Williamson was prepared to accept from us that there was something wrong with the Edwards network, then this would tell us nothing about Williamson, but if he'd attempted to protect the Edwards network without taking any concern then exactly the same way that we were concerned that Edwards could be so sure of his security, that if Williamson could be so sure, there must be a link between the two of them.
Now there had been a link in student days that we'd heard about, that they had been friends, that there'd been a connection, but we didn't know that meant they were both policemen. So this was a way for us to try and work out what exactly the nature of that link was.
PROF KLUG: After that the Botswana senior organ at the time decided that there were a number of tasks that were necessary inside South Africa, political tasks, and in addition to the fact that some of, there were people we were concerned about that Edwards may be trying to contact in our name in order to elicit information about internal political organisation, and therefore that I should be sent into the country in order to make contact with some of those people and to do a number of other political tasks for Jeanette and Marius.
PROF KLUG: Pass messages. I had to carry a message from Jeanette to a Sactu organiser inside the country, I had to recruit people from political structures into the ANC, to make the links with people.
PROF KLUG: Well what we noticed, because there was no direct reaction, he just told us that it was fine and that we were being ridiculous. He did promise that he would come down sometime in the future to see us in Botswana, which again we communicated.
We noticed that the funding - we had received a periodic funding from the IUEF from Williamson through the IUEF in Geneva for the Sana operation in Botswana, we noticed that we didn't receive our next set of funding at all. We didn't know at that point exactly what that meant, it showed displeasure.
PROF KLUG: Myself on the telephone, sorry, but for Patrick as well, the two of us. We didn't have a telephone in the house in Bontleng, I used to have to go to the Holiday Inn and use the public phone to call - it was a very crude operation as you can see. I called Geneva, spoke to Williamson and he said look, he offered us, in the context of this exchange about Edwards, he offered us IUEF bursaries anywhere in the world, to go and study, for Patrick and I. And Marius and Jeanette said oh yes, we've seen this before. A similar thing I believe had possibly happened with both Woods and Sturgeon. When they'd become uncooperative or weren't doing what they should do, Williamson basically offered them bursaries overseas.
So it was clear to us that as far as he was concerned we had no future in Sana and that you know, we should go and study abroad. What he was unaware of at the time is that the Sana had not been set up completely legally, and I had gone into the lawyer's offices in Botswana, in Gaberone and I had discovered that although some of the papers had been drawn up for the establishment of the company, it was registered as a company in Botswana, they'd failed to put in the names of the directors or the managing director and so we proceeded to put our names in there. I in fact had the original letter that Edwards had given me saying that I should take over Sana and I used that letter then to put our names in. So effectively we captured Sana, it became our company.
So subsequently even when the IUEF, after Williamson left there, when the IUEF tried to close it down we could say we're very sorry, but it's not yours, it actually belongs to us and you can't touch it.
PROF KLUG: As I said, because the funding was fairly erratic there wasn't an exact date. What we'd noticed by the end of November is that what would have been a next amount of money to arrive just did not arrive and we didn't, we couldn't be sure at that point whether it was late or whether we were in fact being cut off. He did not ever actually communicate or say to us that we were being cut off.
PROF KLUG: I asked Patrick well, what had happened in my absence, and basically Williamson had cut off all communication with us at that point. So from our perspective we were convinced that there was something very, very wrong and we had notified Lusaka through the senior organ of that.
PROF KLUG: We immediately, again in consultation with Marius and Jeanette, but Patrick and I because we were journalists who were running a news agency, we immediately contacted the newspapers in Johannesburg directly by phone and said that we would also like to confirm that Carl Edwards is part of this particular operation.
MR BERGER: No, no, the date is the 29th of January or 28th of January 1980. You'll see, Mr Visser, on the top there is a note under date, it says 80/01/29. That would be the date on which it was filed, but the date of the article seems to be the 28th.
"Security Polices spy, Captain Craig Williamson, and undercover boss agent, Mr Carl Zack Edwards were working in cahoots according to exile sources in Botswana. There is definite evidence they were working in collaboration. - a top source told the Rand Daily Mail yesterday.
He said however, that is was the suspicions of exiles in Gaberone which had eventually led to a situation in which Mr Williamson had been forced to blow his cover. 'there was such a massive of circumstantial evidence that both were spies, that exiles here fed their information on the pair to organisations overseas and Captain Williamson was being put under pressure as a result of the information which was being passed on.' 'At first he tried to make out that he was spreading these stories himself but eventually so much information had built up against him that he had to blow himself' - the source said.
Sources said exiles operating the South African News Agency, Sana in Gaberone, had begun to destroy Mr Edwards' information network operating in South Africa because of their overwhelming suspicion about him.
The sources confirmed that Captain Williamson is in a position to name many people in South Africa whom he provided with funds for projects in his capacity as the Deputy-Director of the International Universities Exchange Fund."
PROF KLUG: Well no, in fact we set up an office separate from the house, that was the old Sana house. We set up offices in a building that housed a petrol station downstairs and offices upstairs, in Gaberone.
PROF KLUG: Well we had learnt from the Sana experience that Botswana was a good place to gather the daily news from South Africa and keep people abroad informed both what was going on in South Africa with our particular political slant on it, and we could in addition obtain information from people we were speaking to all the time, who were travelling to and fro and in that way put together what was essentially anti-apartheid news and SNS distributed that in a number of different ways. The first mechanism was we had a telex machine and we would telex daily news briefings both to the ANC in Lusaka and to a number of international anti-apartheid organisations.
In addition to that, every two weeks we put out a little flyer of four to eight pages which wasn't printed as well as the old Sana one because we didn't have that kind of printing capacity, but which was basically again a news briefing which was stories that we wrote both out of the press and other contacts that we had. And eventually we in fact had a number of journalists inside South Africa who would telex us information as well directly. Because we were using the telexes this was all open information that could be very easily monitored by anybody who cared to see what we were doing.
PROF KLUG: Early 1980. A Sana bulletin was suddenly - in fact what happened was I was called in by the Security Police in Botswana, the Botswana Security Police, who then took me to the permanent Secretary to the President of Botswana at the time, and I was led into his office and I was presented with this bulletin. They were very angry because the front page of the bulletin called for revolution in every Southern African country and in Botswana, against the cattle barons.
I can remember him stomping around him going: "cattle barons, cattle barons, you're calling us cattle barons", and I said well, I've never laid my eyes on this document before and he said yes, but this is Sana and you are Sana, is that correct? I said, yes well we run this little thing called Sana and this ... but I was able to point out to him that the printing that was done on that Sana bulletin was not actually available in Botswana and that we could not have printed it in Botswana, and it could not have come from us.
What had happened was it had been printed wherever and had been put into all the various post-boxes in Botswana where the old Sana bulletin used to go, all except ours, which was the old Sana box, so we were unaware of it. It made various outrageous claims and that's, how we understood it was clearly it was an attempt now, because we wouldn't leave voluntarily, to get us to close shop and get out of Botswana, but in fact Botswana recognised that this wasn't us and let it go.
PROF KLUG: Well I can tell you about the lead-up to the raid. What was happening was that the Botswana authorities had notified the ANC, and in fact because I was Sana, SNS at the time, brought me in separately and said to me that the South African Government was making threats against us and that they could no longer secure our safety in Botswana and they would like me to leave. That had been going on from late 1984.
I negotiated with them and said, look I'm running a news agency here and there seems no reason why this news agency should be a target and they said yes, but my name had been put on some list that had been produced for them by the South Africans, and I said well, they also knew that I was linked with the ANC political machinery and I said yes, but I would consider leaving but I needed to pass the news agency on to other individuals to keep it running because the Botswana were quite friendly to the existence of this anti-apartheid news agency, they were not against it.
I prepared to do precisely that, I was in and out of Botswana over time. I believe on the afternoon of the raid that somebody phoned the office and asked for me, claiming they were family who needed urgently to contact me, seeing as my parents at that time were in Europe and I only have a brother, there's no ways that any member of my family was trying to contact me, and I can only surmise later that in fact they were trying to locate my exact physical presence at the time.
The raid took place that night. The SNS offices were entered. They botched it at first, they went into some neighbouring borehole company's offices and ...(indistinct) all their files, but when they realised it was wrong they found this SNS office. They went in, they shot up the telephone, the telex machine and the printing press that we had in that office, and they ran off with a number of files containing copies of the South African Government Gazette that we had there, and they took a computer, a Sanyo 555, a floppy disk, 128K computer, which I believe later was displayed on South African TV by Mr Williamson as containing all this important information about the ANC underground, which could not have possibly have been the case seeing as it did not have a hard drive.
MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, Visser on record, may I be permitted just to say something. I am not sure in my own mind how this evidence is relevant, to which of the applications it is relevant. In fact it's very difficult to see any relevance here of this evidence at all in regard to what we are supposed to be busy with, but the problem goes a little further. This witness is now giving evidence about the Botswana raid, in regard to which there are some applicants for whom we appear, Mr Chairman, and who will apply for amnesty.
Now we cannot sit by idly and allow this witness to give evidence without, Mr Chairman, taking proper instructions and taking him properly under cross-examination about an issue which is totally irrelevant before you at the present time.
MR VISSER: Because, Mr Chairman, we can't be seen to be sitting around idly while this witness is giving evidence about matters which we may very well have disputes with. And the predicament in which we are is that we could never have foreseen this evidence, we could never had taken instructions beforehand, we haven't discussed it with ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: No, but the problem is as I see it, and it is one of our problems, I will concede it, that the Amnesty Committee does not because it hears evidence in one application, have regard to that in another application without the parties concerned being given an opportunity to deal with it. The fact that this witness is now saying things which might, if it was led at your client's application, be relevant. It does not mean that anything he says now will be excepted at such an application. If it is desired to make use of it you will have to be given an opportunity to deal with it then when it is relevant information.
MR BERGER: Chairperson, if my learned friend, Mr Visser, would just bear with me for a few more minutes he will see the relevance of this evidence, and he will see that it doesn't in fact effect any of his clients in this application.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, one of the troubles is, Mr Visser, that having you and Mr Wagener before us we really can't hear anything about anything of what the Security Forces did because you represent all of them.
PROF KLUG: That's correct. In fact from my perspective what happened was I was called in the early hours of the morning where I was at that time, which was in California in the United States, I'd just arrived there, and I was informed that a number of friends of mine had been killed, and that 12 people had been killed and that our offices had been raided.
I was unaware at that time - later in the day we received communications from friends in South Africa who believed because of a newspaper report that was reported, the first edition of the Star of that morning, of the South African Defence Force news conference that was held, some claim that indicated that I might have been killed in the raid and so suddenly we got these messages of condolence, and we had to say, look this is just not the case and our concern was really with the people who actually did get killed.
"General Viljoen said his men believed one of those killed today was a white man, but it had been difficult to be sure of this. Identifying the targets, Brigadier Herman Stadler of the Security Police said one of them was the office of the Solidarity News Service. He gave the name of Mr Heinz Klug as a resident of the building, which he said was a major intelligence gathering centre. Mr Klug was well-known in South African student circles until he fled into exile several years ago."
PROF KLUG: That was the newspaper report that people were made aware of. It was corrected shortly thereafter in another report which said that I was in California. What was extraordinary to me at the time and has become so since, is if one reads the report of the TRC, the official report on the raid in Botswana, it is now claimed by the evidence that was given to the TRC that that raid was about attacks targeting ANC military targets in Botswana and that somehow the targets that were actually hit was a mistake, which is extraordinary given the actual reportage at the time, the claims by the South African Defence Force at the time and in fact targeting of the houses that they targeted, which were primarily the political structures of the ANC and including the number of people that they killed.
PROF KLUG: The claims at the time were as you just read out, that they had attacked this Solidarity News Service which was supposedly this intelligence base for the ANC. There's no question that a number of us who worked in the news agency were at the same time political operatives for the ANC underground, the political structures. There was absolutely no military link between that office and the ANC military structures, and if telexed open information, news information is intelligence then every newspaper in South Africa was also engaged in an intelligence, which I don't believe is the case.
PROF KLUG: That's correct. I found it extraordinary that in the report in the TRC, which as I say has only this particular version of what supposedly happened, it was reported that Craig Williamson was in the command centre and therefore it became very clear to me exactly why Solidarity News Service, previously Sana, had been targeted.
PROF KLUG: My belief, and it goes to a number of the incidents that are at issue here, is that Williamson was somehow personally involved with the notion that this entity he had created had been taken away from him, had been turned against him, had been involved in his exposure, and therefore was completing the job of destroying it.
MR BERGER: Where would the information have come from that you were a possible target of the raid, or a possible victim of the raid? - the information that was given up by the police on the morning after the raid.
PROF KLUG: Well I - my only conclusion on that is as they said, they did kill a young white man at the time by the name of Michael Hamlin, who was a draft dodger or a draft resister who had refused to serve in the South African Defence Force. He was living in Gaberone. He was not in any way linked to ANC structures. He was killed at the same house where a Dutch, a guy of Somali descent who was Dutch was killed, and that the returning troops must have reported that. As the newspaper says they reported a white man, and I was the only non-African who was listed on the list that the Botswana had been given, that they were targeting. That's the only conclusion that, I assume on that basis they had decided they could confirm my name.
CHAIRPERSON: Well I give you the choice, Mr Levine. It's now eight minutes past eleven, we will be adjourning at the latest at quarter past eleven. Would you prefer to commence after the adjournment so you don't get interrupted after a few minutes, or would you prefer ...(intervention)
PROF KLUG: The purpose was threefold, it was to warn a number of people that they should not have contact with Edwards, that we'd come to the conclusion that Edwards was somehow linked to the South African State. Secondly, to recruit a number of people to ANC political structures, and thirdly to pass messages on from Jeanette Schoon to trade unionists in the country.
PROF KLUG: That's makes the assumption that political activities just, political activities in furtherance of democracy in this country justified elimination and the ANC at least never believed that that would be the case, therefore no political leadership of the National Party was ever targeted for assassination.
PROF KLUG: No, I was not, I was writing news articles that we made available on a daily basis to the ANC by telex in Lusaka, which is an open public medium. Exactly the same articles were made available to anti-apartheid organisations in Sweden, in London and elsewhere.
PROF KLUG: Recruitment into the ANC. And that recruitment of people into the ANC was at the time in the late, after 1979, in the early '80's, it was the building of a political network within the country.
PROF KLUG: That's correct, I would provide information on a regular basis to the ANC about political structures in the country that we were working with, information on what was going on in political organisations that we were in contact with. If you call that political intelligence, you may call it that, but it was information.
PROF KLUG: I base it on the fact that there were numerous people engaged in political activity for the ANC in Botswana, in Lesotho, in Swaziland, in Europe, and most of those political operatives for the ANC were not targets for assassination and yet there seemed to be a concentration on a group of people who happened to have been involved with Sana at the time that we took it away from Williamson and used it to expose him. That is why I believe that in part what was going on was not merely a political question, but in fact a personal animosity.
PROF KLUG: I assume that if as you said the South African authorities at the time believed that political assassination was part of its attempts to prevent democracy in this country, that that could be a possible reason as well.
PROF KLUG: I can only - as I said to you before, if I look at who was targeted, the targeting of SNS in Gaberone, the targeting of Jeanette and Marius when they were way out of political activity and in Angola years after, sorry, months after their activities in Botswana, what was considered a forward area by the ANC, I can only read into that animosity because I see no justifiable political reason for targeting such people.
PROF KLUG: From my understanding, from Marius directly and from everybody else that was involved in the ANC at the time who I have spoken to, they were teaching English at the University of Lubango and were not involved in political, even political activity at the time, let alone in anything else.
MR BERGER: That's not correct, Chairperson. He didn't travel once a month to Luanda to advise the ANC, he travelled once a month, alternating with Jeanette Schoon, to Luanda to work on a development project and to buy groceries.
MR LEVINE: I see. Well the purchasing of groceries is a remark which I heard from my left-hand side and wasn't intended by me to be a serious remark, merely a repeat of what was said during the question to you. However, Mr Klug, the animosity you have spoken of was merely an assumption of yours to the effect that there was some animosity by Mr Williamson towards the Schoons.
PROF KLUG: A pattern of behaviour, the cutting off of the resources to Sana, the acknowledgement in a way that we were engaged in his exposure and the subsequent attack on SNS as this great big intelligence organisation which it wasn't etc.
MR LEVINE: Yes. And it has been Mr Williamson's submission that he was exposed as a result of McGivern and as a result of no other conduct either by yourself, by the Schoons or by Mr Fitzgerald. How did you bring about the exposure of Mr Williamson? - by "you" I mean the four people that you have mentioned.
PROF KLUG: From our point of view there was two issues at stake, the first was our own position in this relationship between Williamson and Edwards where we were supposedly the conduit between them, and our concern initially that Edwards was compromised or a policemen that we had to deal with.
But secondly, it was that within the ANC structures there were questions about exactly who these two individuals were and so as part of our activities within the ANC we saw it as important to try and clarify who Williamson in fact was working for. That being the case, as far as I am concerned, the way that exposure worked was to supply increasing circumstantial evidence directly to, through Marius and Jeanette through Mac Maharaj who would have had to make the decision whether in fact he was a spy or not.
PROF KLUG: Well all we could do was report on his reaction to our information that Edwards was in fact, as far as we're concerned, a policeman because when we told him that we thought his links to us had been exposed by the police he said he could assure that there could be no such thing.
PROF KLUG: We believe that we gave the ANC information that would have allowed the ANC to come to the conclusion that he was a policeman, and that given our, my conversation with him from Botswana where I told him that we were convinced that Edwards was a policeman, that he must have realised that we were very close to coming to the same conclusion about himself.
PROF KLUG: No, on the strength of a pattern of behaviour where we had refused to comply with his requests for certain, where we had refused to supply Edwards with the names of people in the country, where we were increasingly becoming non-co-operative in their operation and that clearly we were not, we had come under some other influence, not just theirs ...(indistinct) with the ANC's.
PROF KLUG: That was supposedly what Sana was about and we did that straight out of the newspapers, we didn't feel in any way that we were compromising ourselves or anybody else by writing anti-apartheid stories for the news, for Sana.
PROF KLUG: We don't - I cannot tell you. Certainly we assumed at the time that it was Williamson. He would have had access to that, the typeface etc., that he knew exactly what was used in publishing it because he had published it before.
MR LEVINE: Again you're assuming that the only two top sources could have been yourself and Mr Fitzgerald, but you do not exclude the possibility of discussions between Marius Schoon and the journalist?
PROF KLUG: It's hard to tell. At the time I believe that it was running ant-apartheid information, it wasn't being explicitly pro-ANC in its particular perspective. I remember that I covered the funeral of David Sibeko in Gaberone, Botswana and that information would have been sent on and used. That was the PAC leader at the time. It was run more as a direct kind of news operation.
PROF KLUG: No, I said that I couldn't tell exactly, we didn't know exactly what date it would arrive, and what it would do is every couple of months an amount would arrive by telex to the account in Botswana, by telegraphic transfer to the account in Botswana.
PROF KLUG: That's because it didn't come on any particular date, but it was always enough for us to cover the operations of Sana. And what happened at the end of 1979, it stopped coming and we no longer had the money to run Sana.
PROF KLUG: All I could do was call from the public box at the Holiday Inn in Gaberone and we also used to call reverse charges or collect, and we would call to the IUEF office and if he wasn't available they wouldn't take our call.
MR LEVINE: Well that's what Mr Levine is putting to you, that perhaps he wasn't available, and you're saying now that if he wasn't available they wouldn't take your calls. Doesn't that merely indicate that he wasn't available, not that he wasn't prepared to communicate with you?
PROF KLUG: Because we had come to the conclusion that there was something very wrong with - and we had communicated to Lusaka that we considered at this point that his protection of Edwards meant that he was possibly a spy for the South Africans.
MR LEVINE: I want to put to you, Mr Klug, that all of the evidence you have given is based purely on assumptions and is unsupported by any concrete facts other than what you have yourself described as circumstantial evidence.
PROF KLUG: Sir, I'd have to disagree with you to the extent that my reportage of events, exactly how they happened is absolutely correct, and from that series of events we were in a position to make conclusions, to draw conclusions.
MR VISSER: You said during your evidence-in-chief led by Mr Berger that you noticed that, on two occasions that you gave evidence about, that a courier who had arrived at the Sana office with a motorcar was extremely nervous, wouldn't get out of the car and insisted to see you at the Holiday Inn, have I got that correct?
PROF KLUG: I said that we had contact with people inside South Africa who would come out to see us in our ANC work, in our political reconstruction work, and so we could compare their degree of nervousness where they knew they were potentially at risk with the nervousness that we saw in the case of Edwards and his courier.
MR VISSER: Did such persons only make contact with you or did they also make contact with Marius and Jeanette Schoon? - as far as your knowledge goes. And please, I don't want you to speculate about anything, if you don't know from your own personal knowledge just feel free to say so.
PROF KLUG: That would have depended on the particular timing. In the period while I worked directly with Marius and Jeanette in the political reconstruction, they would often had contact with Marius and Jeanette as well.
MR VISSER: Yes. Would it be fair to say, Mr Klug, that Marius Schoon was an important cog in the ANC structures in Botswana with special regard to establishing and upholding networks, infiltration networks between South Africa and Botswana, would that be a correct statement to make from your personal point of view?
PROF KLUG: No, it would not be, because you used the word "infiltration networks". We were not engaged in infiltration, we were engaged with meeting with people who part of political organisation inside the country, often legal political organisation who were committed to the ANC, to getting the view of the ANC publicised and available to the people inside South Africa. That is not an infiltration network as you say.
PROF KLUG: I would agree that Marius Schoon was an important individual working in ANC political structures in Botswana, talking to people about the ANC and getting the ANC's message into the country, yes.
MR VISSER: And would it be correct to say that Marius Schoon established a sophisticated and professional intelligence network in Botswana as regards information or intelligence between South Africa and Botswana?
PROF KLUG: I don't know what you refer to when you talk about intelligence. If it is information about political organisation, I would agree with you, but there are different forms of intelligence, and I don't believe they were doing anything but providing political information to the ANC.
MR VISSER: Well perhaps I should read to you the words. Page 3290 of the record, Mr Chairman, in the cross-examination of my learned friend, Mr du Plessis. That was the evidence of Mr Maharaj whom you might know. He is the Minister of Transport of the present government. At page 3290, Mr du Plessis says to Mr Maharaj
"Well Mr Maharaj, do you agree with Mr Schoon's evidence that he established a very sophisticated professional intelligence network in Botswana, between Botswana and South Africa?
And it was drafted at the request and for Mr Craig Williamson. If you have regard to page 1 of Exhibit RR. I want to read to you for your comment, from page 8. Well it's marked 8 and 5, Mr Chairman. I'm not sure how - I've forgotten how the pagination works, there are two sets of pagination. You might remember there was confusion, but I'll give both the page numbers, it's 5 and 8. One of the two must be right, Mr Chairman. It starts at the top with paragraph 1 in the initial report.
Perhaps if you will forgive me, I've just been given - just to go back to the previous question relating to intelligence which you qualified, I just want to also tell you that insofar as Mr Maharaj was referred to the evidence given by Mr Marius Schoon, for the sake of clarity that evidence appears at page 2912 and it reads as follows - that is the evidence of Mr Marius Schoon. And again it's Mr du Plessis that is cross-examining him. All I want to tell you for the sake of the record, from page 2912 to 2913, Mr Marius Schoon also did not choose to draw the distinction as far as intelligence gathering is concerned that you chose to draw. I just want to place that on record.
MR VISSER: It's at page 5. There's a paragraph marked paragraph 1 and then there's another paragraph unnumbered, which is a quotation, and if you'll look at the third sentence of that paragraph. It's a quotation
"A new ANC committee has been formed called the Internal Reconstruction and Development Department. People on this committee include the following people: Oliver Thambo, Alfred Nzo, Ray Simmons, Moosa Gee who is the Deputy ANC Treasurer, Indris Naidoo, Thom Gobe etc."
"This department is charged with the reconstructing and developing of ANC internal networks and includes the creation of intelligence and Sactu organisation structure."
MR VISSER: Yes, but do you agree that in Botswana there was a new, we're talking about 1979, perhaps even late 1978, but '79/1980 there was a new ANC committee which was called the Internal Reconstruction and Development Department.
PROF KLUG: He would have been recruiting individuals in South Africa to set up networks of ANC sympathisers. If I can recall correctly, for instance in 1980 we were very active in publicising the Freedom Charter because that was the 25th anniversary and would give ourselves credit for instance in encouraging the creation of an advert in the newspaper here with the Freedom Charter in it.
It was that kind of political work, to recruit people who were active in, or who we would encourage to create political organisations. Eventually the political organisations in their own right came together as the United Democratic Front. Many of those little organisations would have been encouraged by the political reconstruction process.
MR VISSER: Isn't it a fact, Mr Klug, that the total strategy of the revolution waged by inter alia the ANC, consisted in the main of the political objectives, but also of a military component which was there in support of attaining the objectives which were the political objectives? Would you agree with that statement?
PROF KLUG: My understanding as an active ANC member at the time, was that there were four pillars to the struggle and that that included internal political organisation which is what we were engaged in, it included mass mobilisation which the internal organisations were doing, it included the armed struggle which Umkhonto weSizwe was engaged in, and it included international mobilisation which the international anti-apartheid movement was engaged in. And in that degree yes, this was part of a whole struggle for democracy in South Africa.
MR VISSER: Yes. Oh, I see, I thought you might have been aware of the fact that Mr Oliver Thambo said in one of his New Year's messages, that the idea was to be that every factory worker, every worker, every compatriot was a soldier and every soldier a compatriot. I thought you ...(intervention)
"MR DU PLESSIS: But you played an important role in Botswana and Jeanette played an important role in Botswana.
"Secondly, there would be the question of being involved in mass mobilisation through the organisations to which people belonged. Thirdly, there would be the question of establishing functional propaganda units for the distribution of leaflets and ANC information at home, which is in South Africa, and fourthly, there would be suggestions about possible other recruits to the ANC."
"MR SCHOON: We were involved in intelligence gathering, even though we were not an intelligence unit."
"MR DU PLESSIS: And that intelligence that you gathered in such a way, would that have been passed on to the higher echelons in the ANC?
"MR DU PLESSIS: Yes. And Mr Schoon, you eventually succeeded in setting up a network of people with whom you had contact and from whom you got information?"
Referring to Exhibit RR. So what Mr Schoon told this Committee, Mr Klug, is that his network was considerably more extensive than what appears from Exhibit RR. And now I want to read to you what Exhibit RR inter alia says. It says inter alia - page 11, Mr Chairman, under paragraph 3. It's headed:
"In 1977, shortly after the arrival of the Schoons in Botswana, Chris Wood reported that the ANC were looking for underground routes into the RSA. This included methods of cross-border (incorrectly spelt) travel such as illegal routes through the fence, the use of aircraft, private yachts etc. The purpose of such routes was for the conveyance of arms, explosives, pamphlets and receiving sets."
PROF KLUG: Excuse me, Sir, I'm not understanding. This is a report written by the police receiving information one Chris Wood, who was at that time the Sana man in Botswana, precisely confirming the role that I said that Williamson was expecting Sana to play in Botswana, gathering local information, but this is not a report from within the ANC. You seem to imply that because this says what it claims to say, that this is the truth and I would query that.
MR VISSER: Well I took great care in leading up to the point where I've arrived at now, in first showing you what Mr Marius Schoon himself said, and Marius Schoon having said rightly or wrongly, that his networks were more sophisticated than what is referred to in this document.
PROF KLUG: And I believe he was referring to his political networks and I think that's absolutely correct, and I believe that it wasn't Marius alone but that many of the ANC's operatives in front line areas and in London and in other parts, had similar types of networks inside the country, political networks, and that was the nature of the political reconstruction. The jump between that and saying that you're setting up an infiltration route for arms explosives, pamphlets and receiving sets, I believe is a jump that has been made by this document and I don't believe that Marius Schoon said that this was the case.
MR BERGER: No, but you put the question first. You put the question first that Marius Schoon said his network was more extensive than that, than that importation of arms, and Marius Schoon specifically denied that there was any importation of explosives and arms.
MR VISSER: Mr Klug, before we were interrupted I was going to say to you that this point was put to Mr Marius Schoon, and in fairness to you and to him he also denied, as my learned friend has pointed out and as I was just going to point out to you, that he had anything to do with the infiltration of firearms and ammunition and that kind of thing.
MR VISSER: Okay, I've got no problem with that, Mr Klug, I've got no problem with that. The point however is that what is clear from the evidence is that infiltration routes were set up and were kept up by Mr Marius Schoon, be it for purposes of conveying documentation to dead-letterboxes and from dead-letterboxes or be it for purposes of routes to be used for people who wanted to leave the country illegally or to infiltrate the country illegally. I put it to you that much on the evidence is clear.
MR VISSER: Would it be correct that if Mr Schoon, Mr Marius Schoon during 1979/'80/'81 were to disappear in the sense that his influence were to disappear or his availability to the ANC, in whatever capacity he was working at the time, was to disappear, that it would have been something which would have disrupted the ANC, which would have hurt the ANC, would you agree with that?
PROF KLUG: I would agree that the loss of any member of the ANC who was in active duty serving at that time would be a loss to the ANC. However, I must also point out that when Marius and Jeanette left Botswana in 1983, those networks that they had established continued and therefore in that sense it wasn't any immediate break that you seem to suggest.
MR VISSER: And would you agree that because of what Marius Schoon, and I may add Jeanette Schoon, were doing in Botswana would have made them a target for a elimination by, let's call it the Security Forces?
PROF KLUG: What interests me about that statement is, if it's true that political activity made somebody a target for elimination then the system that they were supporting had gone to levels of moral degradation that I'm even surprised at.
PROF KLUG: I will enlighten you to the fact that if I look over the history of that time, I don't believe that all political operatives were equally targets that you seem to suggest, because there were many, many political operatives inside the country and out who were active, who clearly were not targeted in the same way. That is why I come to the assumption that there something extra about the targeting of these particular individuals.
PROF KLUG: What I'm suggesting is that there were many others that the South African Government was also aware of in Botswana, in London, in Lesotho, in Swaziland, who were also engaged in the same activities, who threatened if you like the South African regime in the same way, that were not targeted immediately for assassination. And that is in the political structures I'm talking about. And that is why I wonder why these particular individuals even once they were disengaged from the immediate political engagement remained targets.
MR VISSER: Okay. Well let me read to you what Mr Marius Schoon himself says at page 2926 of the record. Towards one third of the page my learned friend, Mr du Plessis still cross-examining, and I'm not going to pick it up from the previous page, I'm simply going to read from one third down at 2926
"MR SCHOON: We knew that we were targets in Botswana because of what we were doing. We were not killed in Botswana for whatever reason. As from the point of the Security Police as regards our Botswana activities we could have perhaps have been regarded as legitimate targets."
PROF KLUG: And what I'm saying to you, Sir, is that I disagree with that sentiment. Marius and Jeanette were aware that they were targeted, many people in the front line areas felt they were targeted, but I do not believe they were legitimate targets.
So it draws a very clear distinction between the activities of himself and his late wife, Jeanette in Botswana as opposed to those activities of them in Angola. And he says in Botswana he thinks he can understand why they would have been legitimate targets.
PROF KLUG: I can understand why Marius made that distinction, because in Angola they were engaged merely in teaching English, while in Botswana they were engaged in the political struggle against the South African regime. However I must say to you that as a Professor of International Human Rights Law, that I still do not believe that that kind of activity would ever be proportional and therefore justified as a legitimate target.
"MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, and we will speak Angola now. And it was because of the fact of what you did in Botswana posed considerable difficulties and dangers to South Africa?"
"And it was because of the fact that what you did in Botswana posed considerable difficulties and dangers to South Africa."
MR VISSER: I'm not going to argue with you about that, Mr Klug, all I'm putting to you is that Mr Schoon was honest enough with this Committee to tell this Committee that he recognised the fact that both him and Jeanette Schoon, because of the work they were doing and because of the effect that it might have on the South African Government, they would have been legitimate targets.
MR VISSER: Lastly, Mr Klug, I just want to put to you that the evidence by Mr Willem Schoon for whom I appear for amnesty for an attempted murder on Mr Marius Schoon, was that he studied a file on Mr Marius Schoon which was kept at Security Head Office in Pretoria. You can't deny that such a file existed?
MR VISSER: And from that file he gathered that they were, the two Schoons were very important cogs to the ANC and that he came to the conclusion that it would upset the ANC, the organisation of the ANC from Botswana and the infiltration into South Africa by trained terrorists if Mr Marius Schoon were to be eliminated. Now is there anything that you know of, even speculation, why you could say that what Mr Willem Schoon said in that regard cannot possibly be true?
MR BERGER: Chairperson with respect, my learned friend did not put the full version of Willem Schoon, Willem Schoon said that the information, reliable information that he got, and I'm reading from page 84 of his amnesty application, was that Mr Marius Schoon was involved in acts of terror. That was his evidence as well.
MR VISSER: The question that I'm putting to you presently is simply this that Mr Willem Schoon who was a Brigadier in the Security Police in Pretoria, at a certain point in time took the file or more than one file on Mr Marius Schoon and studied it and came to the conclusion that Mr Marius Schoon was a very important element in the organisational structure of the ANC in Botswana and that if he could be eliminated, that it would hurt the ANC, that it would upset the ANC organisation and it would probably help to curb infiltration into South Africa by trained terrorists coming into South Africa. That is what I'm putting to you.
PROF KLUG: I find that very important because in fact by having them removed from Botswana in 1983, because in 1983 Marius and Jeanette were forced to leave Botswana, that aim was in fact achieved that didn't require their elimination and that's precisely my problem. I see them achieving their political aim of removing them from Botswana and therefore hurting the ANC yes, hurting the ANC, but that does not require their elimination which happens later in Angola.
MR VISSER: I would suggest to you as a reply to your answer to me, the obvious reason is because you are speaking with the benefit of hindsight which Mr Willem Schoon didn't have at the time when he considered the proposition. Would you be prepared to accept that?
PROF KLUG: No, because I believe that they were watching us closely in Botswana and were aware over time, and in fact somebody was in the room, I don't see him now, but there was a pattern in Botswana where the Botswana, the South African authorities would put pressure on the Botswana authorities to remove certain people who were ANC people and tell them they must leave Botswana. And over time that pattern was repeated.
Mr Henry Makgoti who I believe is here, was in fact, left Botswana in early '80 under exactly those same conditions, and in fact my departure from Botswana in 1985 was precisely under the conditions where the Botswana authorities said to us we do not want you around anymore, we're under pressure from the South Africans to get you out.
So the South African authorities were completely aware of this pattern of behaviour and therefore once they'd applied it and successfully to Marius and Jeanette, they had achieved their immediate aim of removing them from the political scene. Therefore, the subsequent sending of a parcel bomb to them in Angola I think is grossly disproportionate.
MR VISSER: Yes, but I thought I made it absolutely clear that I was not going to talk to you about Angola, I was only going to talk to you about Botswana. And certainly I haven't given you any indication that I'm talking to you about the Schoons in Angola as opposed to the Schoons in Botswana.
PROF KLUG: I agree, Sir, but you asked me whether I believed that they were legitimate targets, you've asked me that in numerous different ways and I'm explaining to you why I do not believe that that is the case, and that's how come Angola comes into it.
CHAIRPERSON: The question was "in Botswana". What he is asking is while they were still in Botswana, not after they had left. Had they been targeted while they were in Botswana is the question as I understand it.
Professor Klug, I have not listened for quite a while to your evidence, and before I start asking you questions I want to appeal to you and ask you the following. I am not interested in your views on the legal position pertaining to legitimate targets, I'm not interested in your views about proportionality, I am not interested in your views about any legal question in this matter at all, and I don't think the Committee is. I'm also not interested in deductions, in suppositions, in speculation, I am simply interested in facts.
PROF KLUG: Because what I'm recalling is specific attacks on ANC people in Lesotho, in Mozambique, in Swaziland and in Botswana, and I do not personally have knowledge of any direct South African military attack on an ANC target in Angola.
CHAIRPERSON: But were many people targeted there, Mr du Plessis? The question put was that he said many people were targeted in the front line States. Were many people targeted in Angola to your knowledge?
MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, he didn't say that many people weren't targeted in Angola, he was - Mr Chairman, if you'll just give me a chance. There was a whole war going on between Swapo and the South African ...(intervention)
MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, I have in cross-examination previously referred you to the submission of the ANC to the Truth Commission, of ANC members killed in the conflicts in Angola. We have heard evidence and we have had agreement on that, that the ANC sometimes fought against the South African Forces in Angola.
MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, later than these time, but there were also battles in Angola in 1978, 1977, 1979 and there were skirmishes all through the 1980's. So my question not specifically relates to targets, Mr Chairman, it relates to what Mr Klug understands as front line States. That was what I was coming to, about the fact that there was a war situation there. That was what I was coming to, Mr Chairman, with respect.
MR DU PLESSIS: Right. Now that means, and I'm putting this to you, that means that the deduction that you made in your evidence that there must have been some other reason why the Schoons were eliminated because of the fact that they were eliminated that they were eliminated but not other people were eliminated just doesn't go up, it just doesn't stand. The fact that other people were not eliminated and the Schoons were eliminated doesn't mean that there is any distinguishing factor between different targets.
PROF KLUG: I agree that they were leading figures to the extent particularly that for instance young Afrikaners in this country would have looked up to Marius as somebody who stood for democracy from that community, yes.
MR DU PLESSIS: Yes. Alright. And the elimination or attack in Angola against the Schoons, do you agree with me that that would have served a purpose of intimidation of the Security Forces against the ANC? - because that is what the evidence was.
MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, the speech made by my learned friend could be criticised, but the function of counsel is to ask questions not to make speeches, nor to pass judgment on the witness, Mr Chairman. If he wants to set down rules for a witness, and I was tempted to object then and say that nobody needed any tutorials from him as to how proceedings should be conducted, he must refrain from commenting himself. And the comment that he has just made is completely unfair, in breach of his own rules and should not have been made.
Now Mr Klug, the network that the Schoons set up between Botswana and South Africa, that network, there was testimony by Mr Maharaj that if information pertaining to military matters would pass through that network it would have passed through that network to the higher echelons of the ANC. There was also testimony by Mr Maharaj that if they needed to get information quickly to somebody in South Africa, they would have utilised Mr Schoon's information network. Do you agree with that?
PROF KLUG: As I said in my evidence that when we were made aware of the fact that Mr Williamson had appeared in Johannesburg as a policeman, that our response to that was to call the papers inside South Africa and to say that we had additional information that Mr Edwards was part of the network with Mr Williamson.
MR DU PLESSIS: Because I find it quite strange, Mr Klug, that in this regard - excuse me, Mr Chairman, I have some bug in my throat. Mr Klug, I find it quite strange that you would phone the newspaper and specifically speak to Mr Sterling. I - to me that's something strange. Isn't there some other explanation for that?
PROF KLUG: As I say I wasn't aware then and in fact I wasn't aware until you now said it, that he ever was. We phoned the newspaper and we asked to speak to a reporter because we had information from Botswana we thought they may be interested in. I'm not even sure that we actually spoke to Mr Sterling. We spoke to reporters there and the story was written by Mr Sterling according to the newspaper, but I do not recall that we actually spoke with him, we might have.
PROF KLUG: I left Botswana a week before the raid because for some months beforehand the Botswana authorities had told me that my name was on a list that they had been given by the South African authorities that I should not be in Botswana, that they felt they could no longer secure my safety in Botswana and therefore they wanted me to leave. Seeing that I was there as a resident, I was faced with the option that they could possibly just make me a prohibited immigrant and I didn't wish that to happen and so I left.
PROF KLUG: I do not know who else left of how people's movements, we were all moving quite regularly. I in fact had been out of Botswana on numerous occasions in early 1985 and back in again, so my departure wouldn't have been anything extraordinary.
PROF KLUG: That is not true, we all were warned. The Botswana authorities had actually spoken to the ANC and the ANC had told all of us and we had made the decision that we were not leaving. My position was that over time the Botswana authorities made it clear that unless I left I would be pushed out, and so I made preparations and left.
MR DU PLESSIS: No, no, no, in all fairness to you I don't want to let this hang in the air. The question arises in my mind as a result of the fact that you left just before that, the fact that you had discussions with Mr Sterling the question arises in my mind, if you didn't have more contact and connections with the Security Forces than you want us to believe today.
MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, for counsel with the greatest respect, to say that he has no basis for this and to make an accusation against a witness is an abuse of the procedure and I would ask for the protection of a witness, Mr Chairman, from such a disgraceful allegation.
MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct) of the probabilities were made, Mr Chairman. And having regard to the reputation that people that worked with the Security Forces have in this country, one could never think of a greater insult to a witness from a member of the Bar who starts off by saying that he has no basis for saying it.
CHAIRPERSON: Gentlemen, I know how much pressure you are all under working here, but I hope that this afternoon we can all be a little more patient, and I include myself in that, and just try to get ahead with what we have to do.
PROF KLUG: Excuse me, Judge Wilson, may I say something before we go further? I came to this hearing in the belief that the TRC and its Committees' task are to discover the truth, and for that purpose I've done my best to present the truth as I know it, and I am appalled that a member of the profession, the profession of which I'm part of should use it in an attempt to defame a witness particularly, or anybody else for that matter. Thank you.
MR JANSEN: And it would be true to say that without political education one would not have masses mobilising, without political education one would not have had the international community mobilising?
PROF KLUG: I believe that many people, whether in the masses or in the international community, could look at the apartheid system in their own right and come to their own conclusions without specific political education.
MR JANSEN: Yes. And would you go with the notion that separating the activities of political education and separating the activities of an armed struggle is to some extent possible but it's very interrelated activities in the liberation struggle?
CHAIRPERSON: On the question of political education, I have read an article in the last few days which suggests that in some ways a situation very similar to apartheid is still in existence in certain countries without any suggestion of an armed struggle there, but that it is still something that people have to be educated to to work against. Do you agree with that?
PROF KLUG: As I said before I had from late 1984 been informed by the Botswana authorities that the South Africans had indicated to them that they'd wanted me out of Botswana and as a result I had consulted with people in the ANC and it had been agreed that over time I should slowly withdraw from Botswana. The specific timing was related to two factors.
The first was that I had planned to get married in California and was travelling for that purpose. The second was that Mac Maharaj actually arrived in Botswana in early June I believe it was, and came to where I was staying at the time and said look, you're being clever hanging around here, they're going to kill you, you should get out. It was in that context that I made plans to actually leave. The exact day was just when I managed to get a flight and finish my business. Thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: Once again I would like to thank you on behalf of all those of us present for having come here to give evidence and to lay what information you could before us, we are grateful to you for that. Thank you.
MR TLADI: Yes, I jumped the bail, I gave my lawyer the undertaking that I will not, because he came to my cell and he really wanted to know if I do get the bail whether I'm going to skip the country and I said I'll never do that and it's part of my political conviction that if there's anything to be changed one has got to be here and I'm not a coward, I will not do that, but I knew that I'm going to skip as soon as he did so. So I was given conditions to and report at the Sharpeville Police Station I think about twice a day or something, and one of the days, the last time I reported I left immediately and I skipped the country.
MR TLADI: Well because I suspected very strongly that he was not asking for himself, I thought he was part and parcel of the system. In fact I thought he was sent by the Security Branch as to sort of get whether I'm going to skip the bail or not.
MR TLADI: Well I belonged to what they called "non-aligned" because the strong feeling in the Black Consciousness Movement then was, we had the ANC and the PAC who were banned in 1960, but indeed we don't see any indication of their presence in the country.
MR TLADI: No, not that I know of. Of course I knew later that George Paghle who was my greatest friend and comrade there, who was also like non-aligned, was actually an ANC activist and some such people, but not belonging to any structure that I knew of.
MR TLADI: Well the soldiers of the ANC, MK, essentially they've got to understand the vision of the ANC to know why they've got to fight, why they are doing what they are doing and armed struggle is merely a tactic of achieving what we want to achieve, and that's a political objective and it can be abandoned any moment.
MR TLADI: At the end of '83 I changed my position, I was given another task and that task was to be the office of the African National Congress in Luanda, which was the diplomatic mission of the ANC in Angola.
MR TLADI: Our major - the core business of the office was diplomatic work of the ANC, so we were representing the NEC, the National Executive Committee of the African National Congress in Angola and hence we had easy access to the President's office, the President.
MR TLADI: Yes, that was a core business, being a member of, because we were accredited diplomats, or our office was that kind of office that was accredited by the Angolans as a diplomatic mission so we were to participate fully into the lives of what diplomats do.
MR TLADI: Well the first person I met was Jenny. Jenny had come to the office and I had to attend to - I must say that problems such as that of Marius Schoon and Jenny was the primary task also of the office of the ANC such as the one that we had there, because they had come there to go to Lubango and in Lubango they were attached to a university, they were to teach at the University of Angola and that was then our mission because that request had come through us that we passed to the NEC of the ANC that it was the request of the Angolans to have people such as the Schoons who could assist them in the teaching of English.
MR TLADI: That's the only route that I can imagine. I wasn't there by then when the request came but definitely I had to process the request. And when Marius Schoon came it was that kind of response of the NEC of the ANC, to the request of the Angolan MPLA party or the Government of Angola.
MR TLADI: I think this was really a very modest way of responding to a request of people who have sacrificed everything, and a government that was sacrificing everything to assist us with the armed struggle when no any other government that I know of could have done so in the fact of South Africa saying it can ruin anyone into the stone age if they do so.
MR TLADI: Jeanette and the family as a whole which included family I must mention, there was Katryn and Fritz, little Katryn and little Fritz, they had come to the office among other things for us to facilitate their going to Lubango but secondly, also the whole question that has to do with their welfare.
MR TLADI: Well Angola what we eat there are kind of soldiers' food if you like, some biscuits of the second world war given to us by the Dutch people and these are called soldiers' biscuits, and those kinds of things. Also for instance Italians, Italian people who would send tinned stuff and things, and this from time to time might not be available and also if they are available they might no be really as good for kids as they are for adults.
MR TLADI: Well two basic things, one is the one that I've just mentioned, it has to do with welfare which again it didn't help being in Lubango and secondly, it was the developmental problem that they were involved in. They took interest in a little facility, a vocational facility that was just outside Luanda and that was again what they wanted to contribute to.
MR BERGER: There's been a lot of talk about why Marius and Jeanette were sent to Lubango, Lubango being a garrison town I think it's been described by some, in the middle of a war, a war zone and it's been suggested that the ANC was fighting alongside the MPLA in Lubango, what's your comment on that?
MR TLADI: Well the fighting was in the eastern front, that's what we call the eastern front. It was in fact in the east of Angola, and Lubango is in, not just the south but deep south towards Namibia.
MR TLADI: Never ever that I know of, and the office would have known. In fact it would have been the responsibility of the office to raise this political problem where we could take our soldiers to a place such as the south. Uwambo is in fact north of Lubango and Uwambo was Savimbi's headquarters.
MR TLADI: It was important - I was sent by the office to go to Lubango to make the local inspection and really assess the situation as Marius and Jenny had been sending reports verbally to the office on the, on their welfare in Lubango. So it was important for the office to really have the feeling of this kind of conditions that were kind of serious, especially in the light of the kids.
MR TLADI: Well the issue of food, and they were getting a little salary there. I don't know, it was kind of stipend you know, from the university, but I think it was not sufficient. But not only that but also just availability of commodities in Lubango was a big problem, no different from Luanda.
MR TLADI: Well it could have been a weekend, but it could have a couple of days really before the weekend, and I spent the whole day with the, the whole period of time with the family and at the end of that visit I then planned with Marius to leave for Lusaka, for Luanda as just one of the other things that Marius would have done to come down.
MR TLADI: That was almost that kind of visit that would relate to the vocational facility as well. So as I was about to leave - as I was about to - well, maybe we should just go back a bit and say we celebrated Marius' birthday as a family, but little Katryn felt strong that I shouldn't actually leave as planned the following day and I appealed to Marius that we should actually just concede to that because it wouldn't really make any big difference, but it would really be a nice thing to sort of satisfy that kind of little need of the little girl, but Marius just felt no, he ruled it out so we left. Before we left I went to Lubango University to get some flowers.
MR TLADI: No. ... which I left on her bed. Then a few days later, after we left with Marius the following day, a few days later the Chief of Mission again gave me the news that Jenny and Katryn have died and I had to go and inform Marius about this. So that's it.
MR LEVINE: I don't know, Mr Chairman, why it is alleged that I am dealing with something completely at cross-purposes. My understanding was that Mr Maharaj freely and openly conceded the connection between political and military functions.
CHAIRPERSON: This man is being asked about what he did at a military camp. He is explaining that his function was limited to political instruction, other people gave military instructions. There may have been others who taught them how to make food. They were all separate instructions. He is not being asked of the global figure which is what Mac Maharaj was.
MR TLADI: Every time they were there because I've got to report to the office every morning. So when they come they wouldn't go the same day, they would go after some time, so I would meet them there.
MR TLADI: Well remember that it was really after Operation Protea, South, SADF operation, and Lubango had been, was already part and parcel of Fapla, so it was taken by Fapla. But indeed you would, when I was there occasionally you would get some shootings going on somewhere in the mountains in the background of Lubango and elsewhere.
MR TLADI: Well I - well there was definitely - Lubango was that kind of time with lots of soldiers in the streets all the time and in the background of Lubango you would not miss to see that presence, but the same can be said about Luanda.
MR TLADI: It wouldn't have just been some commander just deciding to take soldiers to the south, it would have been a political decision taken and that kind of decision would have been a matter that the office would have known.
MR TLADI: Well maybe one has got to explain that the ANC or MK was a political wing of the ANC, therefore decisions are actually being made at the highest level and decisions such as those to move to the deep south of a country such as Angola, not far from Uwambo, the headquarters of Savimbi who was a big brother of Pretoria.
MR TLADI: No. I was saying MK, the decisions of MK are being taken as, decisions such as those would be taken at the highest level and that highest level will be the mother body, the ANC, its NEC of the ANC would take such a decision.
Mr Tladi, just on the last-mentioned evidence, may I read to from page 86 of the ANC's first submission to the Truth Commission, and I just want to know how you reconcile that with your evidence. It says:
"Umkhonto weSizwe is the fighting arm of the ANC and its allies. Our armed struggle is a continuation of our political struggle by means that include armed force. The political leadership has primacy of the military. Our military line(?) derives from our political line. Every commander, commissioner, instructor and combatant must therefore be clearly acquainted with the policy with regard to all combat tasks and missions. All of must know clearly who the enemy is and for what we are fighting. The MK cadres are not only military units they are also organisers of our people."
"This combination of political and military functions is characteristic of all popular revolutionary armies, especially in the phase of guerrilla warfare."
MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, it does, but it doesn't accord with his evidence where he draws a clear distinction between military functions and political functions. I'm just putting this to him, Mr Chairman, if he wants to react ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Mr du Plessis, in any army you have military functions, you have a government that decides what the army is going to do. What he has been telling us is that the ANC employed similar tactics, that political decisions were taken as to what military steps should then be taken. Do we want to waste any more time on this?
MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, what he has also told us is that a political instructor is not a military instructor, a political instructor has got nothing to do with the military, and it doesn't seem to me to accord with this but I will bow to your views, Mr Chairman, and then I will not ask further questions about this.
MR DU PLESSIS: And really, if one looks broadly at the picture the South African Defence Force, the South West Africa Territory Force and Unit were really fighting alongside each other at various stages during the 1980's against Swapo, against the MPLA, is that correct?
MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Now the sending of Jeanette Schoon and Marius Schoon to Lubango you testified was an act of solidarity. Now do I understand you correctly, does that mean that the ANC wanted to show that they support the fight of the MPLA against Unita and therefore that they support them to such an extent that they are willing send, in this case teachers, to assist the MPLA with their struggle?
CHAIRPERSON: What he is not liking is your continual reference to "against Unita". As I understand the witness he is saying; we were keen to support the MPLA Government who had supported us in the past.
MR TLADI: On the eastern front, yes. And also in the northern front against FNLA, but in fact it was not even, Fapla was not there, it was just MK cleaning up there because we were to be based there and we had to sort of ...
MR DU PLESSIS: Now Mr Tladi, that's long past, those times. The point I'm trying to make is, at the end of the day wasn't the sending of Marius and Jeanette Schoon, and I'm trying to come back to the word "symbolic", perhaps you don't agree with the use of the word, but it was an act to say to the people; here we are, we are with you in the struggle, we are with you in this fight against Unita, against the people who are fighting in this war against us, and against the people with them, that means the South African Defence Force, isn't that so?
MR TLADI: Well it was not really that whole long thing, it was just a simple request of MPLA Government that was processed by the office, given to the NEC, National Executive Committee of the ANC, and we were responding to that.
MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, really, I have put up with this laughing in these proceedings now for a long enough, Mr Chairman. If it's not my learned friend, Mr Bizos who is laughing it's the people in the audience who is laughing, and really it doesn't befit the dignity of these proceedings for people to keep on laughing. If I'm funny I will speak to them afterwards then they can laugh at me afterwards, but really, please, Mr Chairman, I have had enough of this.
CHAIRPERSON: The question as I understand it is if someone had come to your office and said I'm going there to Lubango, I want to talk to someone, who should I talk to? Who would you have told them to talk to?
MR TLADI: Well there are ANC people there. It depends what they want to speak to them about, because otherwise we would actually be very sensitive as to what is it that you want to talk to the ANC people in Lubango. That's the point I'm trying to make. We don't just say okay, you can go to Lubango, you will find some ANC people there, we want to know what is it that you want to discuss with the ANC people, because that's the mission of the ...(indistinct)
MR DU PLESSIS: You wouldn't disagree with that. Alright. So it is clear that the ANC operated in a certain way in a military way with the MPLA against Unita, you don't disagree with that? You don't disagree with that?
MR LEVINE: Mr Chairman, I'm mindful of what you've had to say from inception, and that is it is difficult enough to prepare under the circumstances that have presently, up to now prevailed, but to call a witness who hasn't even been listed would seem to accord with your dissatisfaction as previously expressed and that as previously expressed by the other legal representatives. There is not a tittle of detail in regard to the present witness and I must make it clear, Mr Chairman, that from my part I would want to if necessary, consider my position before embarking on any cross-examination. Obviously it will be done if there's something of relevance that attaches to the evidence of this witness, but one cannot run any form of procedure on this basis. As you've made clear yourself from time to time, this becomes unfortunately a trial as it were by ambush and it's a most unfortunate situation to find oneself in. One would have expected if this gentleman was going to give evidence, that the least one would have been told was this morning by our learned friends, well by the way we are going to call Mr X.
MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, apparently not, and I would like to give the reason why. We were not certain in our own minds whether to call Mr Makgoti or not, it depended to a very large extent of what was put by our learned friends. Also I must be quite frank as to how we were doing with time, Mr Chairman.
We decided during the lunch hour in view of what has happened here, that we would call him. I should perhaps just before we assembled, have informed our learned friends of our decision but we had other matters to attend to. I am likely to be the better part of the ordinary time, Mr Chairman, in evidence-in-chief. That his presence here and the evidence-in-chief will enable counsel for, attorney for Mr Williamson to take instructions.
The position of Mr Makgoti cannot be unknown to Mr Williamson. He was on the - you recall, Mr Chairman, the person when it was put was the chairman of the senior organ in Botswana. He was referred to by Mr Maharaj, Mr Schoon on a number of occasions and also his name is in the document that our learned friends make use of.
ADV DE JAGER: Mr Bizos, I'm not objecting to you calling the witness, but really, let's try and keep to the rules. We've made a rule and it's no use making rules and nobody would seem to keep to any of our rules. It makes us very difficult for us to proceed in this way.
MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct) Mr Chairman, I have given an explanation. We had no reason to keep the name back or to call a surprise witness to take anyone by ambush, he has been on the stage throughout these proceedings, Mr Chairman.
MR BIZOS: Mr Makgoti, I noticed that you put your jacket on in deference to the Committee to no doubt. Before you came there you had it off whilst you were at the back. I'm sure that if you feel more comfortable without a jacket, the Chairman and Members of the Committee will not object, so it's up to you how you feel comfortable.
MR MAKGOTI: I was trained at the University College of Fort Hare as it was called then. I took the Bachelor of Arts Degree in 1950, and I trained as a teacher at the same college, but this time I took a UED Diploma, University Education Diploma under the University of Rhodes.
MR MAKGOTI: Yes, actually I joined the African National Congress, the youth section of the African National Congress when I was still at high school, and I was a member of the ANC when I was at Fort Hare, and even subsequently when I left Fort Hare and I came to work as a teacher I continued to be a member of the ANC.
MR MAKGOTI: Yes, by virtue of my position as the President of the African National Youth League I got onto the National Executive of the ANC and subsequently in 19, it must have been around 1961 or '62 I was also formally co-opted into the National Executive of the ANC.
MR MAKGOTI: Well when I came out of prison I was served with, immediately on my, when I finished my sentence I was served with banishment orders. In fact I was served with two orders, one was a banishment order and the other one was a restriction order.
MR MAKGOTI: Yes, the initial order of my banning was for two years but then I was not allowed to go back to Johannesburg to my home in you to call it, because under, the Security Police explained to me that there was some other law which prohibited, under which I could not go back to Soweto. I was now a person who belonged to a homeland.
MR MAKGOTI: Yes, I reported my presence on my arrival to the Chief Representative of the ANC, Mr Makopo and subsequently I met many other people who were there, refugees. And in the course of time I also met Marius and Jenny.
MR MAKGOTI: Yes, almost immediately on my arrival I became a member of a formal structure in Botswana. In any case I had been active here, even during my banishment I was active in an underground way, so on my arrival there I was integrated into the structures of the ANC.
We had for instance a Political Committee and I was, shortly after I arrived I was appointed Head of the Political Committee. Then we had also people who were doing security and intelligence. A the time well we did not make, security was intelligence, and also there were people who were doing military work amongst the ...
MR MAKGOTI: Well there was quite a lot of work to be done. There were a lot of students for instance in Botswana at the time, lots of students, and there was work to be done there amongst the students, giving guidance to the students, their political guidance. That is to students who had elected to come under the ANC, and also to teach them something about the ANC, the policies of the ANC.
Of course this was a function which was really carried out by the office of the Chief Representative there, and I think he had given the task to a gentleman called Bernard Molewa but we all assisted in that task.
MR MAKGOTI: I left Botswana because the, as I was told by the Chief Representative and also by somebody, I think it was the Secretary in the Office of the President. While we were refugees in Botswana we really came under the direct supervision of the Office of the President. And they told me or they told the Chief Representative in my presence that the South African Government had told them that unless they got rid of me, well they would act themselves and get rid of me, eliminate me ...(indistinct).
MR MAKGOTI: Shortly after my arrival there as I say, I was sent to Tanzania because there was an urgent matter there, we had to build a school for South African children who were refugees. I couldn't have stayed long, I think it was, towards the end of 1980 I was already on my way to Tanzania.
MR BIZOS: As an old teacher and a person interested in education, were you ever asked to make any recommendation for any person or persons to take, connected with the ANC, to take a position in Angola to teach?
MR MAKGOTI: Yes, I was now Head of Education in the ANC, and I got this request that the Angolans had a, there was this part of the University of Angola in Lubango and they were appealing to the ANC to assist them with people who could teach English at the university. And I did recommend that Marius Schoon should be asked to take on the assignment.
MR MAKGOTI: Well I knew Marius, I'd known Marius for a very long time, I've know Marius since 19 ... we were very close. And Marius was a person, he was, I thought he was the right kind of person, he had the academic qualifications when one thinks of teaching university students, and he was a committed person insofar as the ANC's work is concerned. I'd worked with him over a fairly long period, even when I was in Botswana and I had no doubt that Marius would be a very suitable person for such an undertaking.
CHAIRPERSON: You may remember that I was requested the other day, and I spoke to all of you about it, whether we should adjourn for the day after we'd completed the evidence, to enable everybody to prepare their arguments and we would then carry on with argument the next day. Those of you who have written arguments could present them and amplify them as you wish if you wish to do so with oral argument. We have as you know this week and the whole of next week, so we should have ample time even if you give full vent to your views.
MR VISSER: I hasten to support Mr Berger, Mr Chairman, in this matter. May I perhaps in supporting him, place before you the consideration, Mr Chairman, that we have had a number of days of hearing here, we've got a record of over 3 000 pages ...(intervention)
ADV DE JAGER: Mr Visser, you had a number of days to prepare it and we've warned you in December, and we've only had two days of hearing now with a few witnesses, and honestly, we can't, Mr Visser we're pressed to finish this work by the end of June and it's impossible ...(no microphone). Please help us and let's do as much as we can. It's not - we're available next week but we're also booked in Cape Town to proceed with decisions we've got to write, with paperwork we've got to do there, paper decisions. So we're really pressed as far as time is concerned.
MR VISSER: Yes, Mr Chairman, we certainly do have a very keen understanding of the problem which Mr de Jager is putting. The only point that I was going to make in supporting my learned friend, Mr Berger, is this Mr Chairman, it may very well be that allowing us a day extra may give us the opportunity of preparing written argument which will in fact shorten the oral proceedings, Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: No, Mr Visser, we want a chance of appreciating your argument and questioning you on it if we have questions, not of merely being handed written argument, adjourning the matter and then finding that there's all sorts of matters we would like to raise with you. The written argument is merely an amplification, we want to hear argument.