Amnesty Hearings

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR LEVINE: Mr Makotla - Makgoti, I'm sorry - there's a problem again with the tape that comes on and off incessantly.

Mr Makgoti, during the period you were in Botswana you were the Chairman of the senior organ of the ANC, certainly between the years 1980 and 1983, is that correct?

MR MAKGOTI: I was in Botswana from, around the end '76 up to 1980, Sir.

MR LEVINE: Well, I wonder if you'd be good enough to have a look at the ANC's Further Submissions of the 12th of May and particularly to page 43.

ADV DE JAGER: That's Exhibit N?

MR LEVINE: Yes.

Let me show you this exhibit.

MR MAKGOTI: I see it.

MR LEVINE: Do you see there you're referred to Chairman and then you're succeeded by another gentleman?

MR MAKGOTI: Yes, Sir, by Mr Lambert Moloi as I indicated yesterday.

MR LEVINE: And who are the other people as reflected in that document as being members of the senior organ?

MR MAKGOTI: As reflected on this?

MR LEVINE: Yes.

MR MAKGOTI: Well the document mentions

"Leading figures in this s.o.(?) during this period were Billy Masetla, Keith Mokwape, Dan Kume, Marius and Jenny Schoon, Patrick Fitzgerald (3) were forced to leave Botswana during this period."

MR LEVINE: Yes.

MR MAKGOTI: And it mentions Wally Serote, Thabang Makwetla, Hassain Ebrahim.

MR LEVINE: So the Schoons were reflected on that ANC submission?

MR MAKGOTI: Yes, Marius and Jenny Schoon.

MR LEVINE: Yes, thank you. Now you were also the Chairman of the Political Sub-Committee of the ANC in Botswana, is that correct?

MR MAKGOTI: That is so, Sir.

MR LEVINE: Now obviously the Political Sub-Committee was a very important organ itself in the make-up of the ANC in Botswana?

MR MAKGOTI: Yes, I think that is fair to say.

MR LEVINE: Yes. And the Schoons were also on that sub-committee, were they not?

MR MAKGOTI: On the Political Committee, yes.

MR LEVINE: Yes. So it is quite clear that the Schoons played a very important and significant role in the ANC in Botswana.

MR MAKGOTI: Yes, both and Marius and Jenny were very hardworking and committed people. They worked very hard there.

MR LEVINE: And played a very significant role?

MR MAKGOTI: They were hardworking people, yes, they did their work thoroughly.

MR LEVINE: Did they play a very significant role in the affairs of the ANC in Botswana?

MR MAKGOTI: Sir, if you mean that we appreciated the hard work which they did, yes. I mean if that is what you mean.

MR LEVINE: Now we've heard some talk and some evidence that this reference to the Schoons belonging and being members of the senior organ was not correct, do you recall that evidence?

MR MAKGOTI: Yes, yes, certainly I would say that during the time I was there, neither of the Schoons were on the senior organ and I doubt if even in the subsequent period they were.

MR LEVINE: Now these submissions were I take it compiled by responsible and senior parties in the ANC.

MR MAKGOTI: I suppose so, yes.

MR LEVINE: Mm?

MR MAKGOTI: I suppose so, yes.

MR LEVINE: You would agree with that?

MR MAKGOTI: Yes.

MR LEVINE: So even they were confused as to what the precise role and functions fulfilled by the Schoons was?

MR MAKGOTI: I don't think we could take it that far and say they were confused, the Schoons during the time they were there and when I was there certainly, reported to the senior people in the organisation through me and so I don't think it is to say that they were confused ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Well is the position that we are talking about the time prior to 1980, when you were there?

MR MAKGOTI: I believe that ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: And shortly thereafter. And the submissions that Mr Levine is referring to were prepared for submission in 1997. That is, they were prepared by somebody some 17 years later, is that the position?

MR MAKGOTI: That appears to be the position.

CHAIRPERSON: And is it possible that a responsible senior person 17 years later would not really know what had been going on in Botswana in 1980?

MR MAKGOTI: Well it does appear that it's possible, but have heard here evidence given by Mr Maharaj, who is a very senior person and the person to whom I reported personally. I do not know to what extent he was involved in compiling the information here. I would like to know what his view was about the accuracy of the information contained therein.

ADV DE JAGER: You yourself didn't give any information in connection with this report? Nobody asked you about information?

MR MAKGOTI: No, Sir, I did make any input into that document.

ADV DE JAGER: And you were not present when this submission was laid before the TRC?

MR MAKGOTI: No, Sir, I was not.

MR LEVINE: And was there anything to illustrate that when the Schoons left Botswana and went to Lubango, they had changed their functions within the ANC?

MR MAKGOTI: To the best of my knowledge, even after I'd left Botswana in 1983, Marius and Jenny continued working on the political side of matters in Botswana. And I had contact with them even after I left, I'd left Botswana. I'd left Botswana yes, for Lusaka and Tanzania, and during the contact I had with them there was nothing which suggested to me that they changed their roles, right up to the time they got to Lubango. In fact in 1983 I think it was, Marius and Jenny came to work with me. I was then Head of Education in Lusaka, and there was not indication that after I had left, they'd done other work other than the work which I left them doing.

Of course there was some indication that after I'd left they had not been as active in that work as they had been when I was there because they had since, they were now - I think after I left, they joined some, they found work with solidarity organisation.

MR LEVINE: Sorry I didn't quite hear the last sentence.

MR MAKGOTI: I say, after I'd left Botswana, some time after I'd left Botswana, they'd found work, they were no longer working as teachers in Molopulule, but they had found work with a solidarity organisation which was operating in Botswana.

MR LEVINE: Yes. Now there's - if we could just go back to the question I'd put to you, and that is was there anything to illustrate that when the Schoons left Botswana via Lusaka for Lubango, they were not doing the same work within the ANC that they had been doing in Botswana?

MR MAKGOTI: Well after they were in, after they had left Botswana they came to Zambia as I've said, and they were awaiting there, they worked with me. I asked that they should work with me in the Education Department of the ANC, and they worked with me. And that is at that time when we received this information that the Angolans wanted assistance. It was more-or-less around that time. And I, well knowing them as well as I did, suggested that they could be given this assignment to go and teach in Lubango.

CHAIRPERSON: Then can I go back a moment on what you said a few minutes ago. Is the position that when you were in Botswana, in Gaberone, they were working as teachers at a place called Molopulule?

MR MAKGOTI: Molopulule, that is so.

CHAIRPERSON: How far away is that from Gaberone?

MR MAKGOTI: It is some distance, Judge, I would not be able to say. I would something a little over 30 kilometres, I'm sure it's ...

CHAIRPERSON: But nevertheless while they were working as teachers in this other place, they were serving on the Political Sub-Committee of the ANC?

MR MAKGOTI: Yes, that is so.

CHAIRPERSON: So anybody who would have seen them working as teachers and who knew that they were also still politically active, could have continued to believe that when they became lecturers?

MR MAKGOTI: Yes, I should imagine. I know Mr Williamson visited them there and he found them teaching there, and he knew that they were doing political work, so I should imagine he could also corroborate that.

MR LEVINE: There was nothing to disabuse the minds of anybody who had known the Schoons and the work they were doing for the ANC in Botswana, that when they went to Lubango they had changed their work responsibilities within the ANC?

MR MAKGOTI: What I'm trying to say, that they went to Lubango to teach and I am not aware that they went there to participate in the type of work they were doing in, they had been doing in Botswana. Perhaps I don't quite understand ...

CHAIRPERSON: You were on the inside and you knew that they hadn't gone there to do any other work, you knew they were sent there purely as teachers.

MR MAKGOTI: Yes, that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: But somebody else could well have believed that they could still be working with political sub-committees and other bodies, couldn't they? - as they had been in Gaberone?

MR MAKGOTI: Yes, well I suppose that is possible, but being in Botswana and being in Lubango is quite, these are very, very different areas.

CHAIRPERSON: But we've been told that they visited Lusaka on a regular basis.

MR LEVINE: Luanda.

CHAIRPERSON: Not Lusaka, Luanda, on a regular basis.

MR MAKGOTI: Yes, and they visited Luanda on a regular basis for the reasons which were outlined yesterday, to buy and to help with the project which we had there.

ADV DE JAGER: Did you ever visit Lubango?

MR MAKGOTI: No, Sir.

ADV DE JAGER: Do you know exactly where Lubango is?

MR MAKGOTI: Well I did enquire where Lubango was situated, I mean whereafter I made this - before I made this recommendation because I only heard that, at the time I heard it was in Angola and I was rather anxious that well, I should not recommend that Marius would go to a dangerous area. And I was assured that it was in the South, far away from the military, the place where there was military activity. That it was - well, as far as things go in Angola, it was a safe place.

ADV DE JAGER: Were you informed that it was ...(intervention)

MR MAKGOTI: It was a university town I was told.

ADV DE JAGER: Only a university town and soldiers stationed there?

MR MAKGOTI: Well I didn't enquire whether soldiers were stationed there. I must have imagined that Angola being as I knew it, I mean there would be soldiers all over the place.

ADV DE JAGER: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes?

MR LEVINE: So there was nothing to illustrate to anyone that the Schoons were doing any other work other than what they had been doing in Botswana at the time they left Botswana?

MR MAKGOTI: Certainly in Lubango they were teaching, that is all they were doing as far as I'm concerned.

MR LEVINE: I think that the answer is clear. And of course, would you agree with this broad submission that one of the goals of the ANC was to achieve a take-over of South Africa, both by force and by way of a struggle, as also politically?

MR MAKGOTI: Sir, we conducted the struggle for freedom. We tried to conduct it through political means. I think the record of the ANC is clear on this matter. And when we did resort to other means, violent means, it was after a very, very searching process, but we really tried to conduct the struggle in a civilised way.

MR LEVINE: And the political and the military functions overlapped from time to time.

MR MAKGOTI: Well I don't know what you mean when you say "overlap". In the actual prosecution of the struggle we tried to keep these functions, these two areas apart. We tried to keep them as far apart as possible. But as you say, I mean insofar as we did political work we found ourselves also having to probably intervene in military activity, yes.

MR LEVINE: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR LEVINE

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, can I just clarify something in my own mind. When you speak about "in military matters", these were in no sense ordinary straightforward military battles, one armed force against another?

MR MAKGOTI: No, certainly not, certainly not.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr Makgoti, there seems to be perhaps an attempt, perhaps I'm putting it too high, but there seems to be an attempt to divorce the political portion, if I may put it that way, from the military portion of the struggle, as it was defined in the four pillars of the struggle of the ANC. And perhaps it might be as well that we read what the ANC itself says about the political element and the military element, and perhaps you can tell us whether you agree with that, so that hopefully we can put this ghost to rest once and for all.

CHAIRPERSON: Can you tell us what you're reading from before you ask him to agree with it.

MR VISSER: Exhibit N, it's the statement of the ANC to the TRC, dated August 1996, Mr Chairman. I'm referring - oh, I'm sorry, it's not Exhibit N, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: No.

MR VISSER: You'll have to have the document in front of you. It's the white one which has been handed in as Exhibit A1 at a previous hearing of the Committee. Page 49, Mr Chairman, paragraph 5.3.

This is not necessarily the only reference, Mr Makgoti, but it is one of the references to the interaction between the political and the military aspects of the struggle, I would suggest. And it says this in paragraph 5.3 under the heading: Towards people's war and people's power, 1979 to 1990:

"The strategic emphasis which shaped struggle from 1979 onwards, was the necessity for an organised underground political presence to compliment armed activities."

Do you agree with that?

MR MAKGOTI: Yes, yes.

MR VISSER: Yes. It then says

"It was considered essential that ANC operatives should link up with different forms of popular members from the generation of activists in youth and student bodies in the trade unions, in township civics whose protest campaigns were redefined anti-apartheid politics. The armed propaganda of MK attacks would serve as a secondary means to deepen mass mobilisation."

In other words "mass mobilisation", as I read it and please tell me if I'm wrong, has everything to do with armed resistance. Do you agree with that?

MR MAKGOTI: I don't know what you mean by "everything to do with armed resistance". ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: Well it's not divorced from armed resistance.

MR MAKGOTI: ...(indistinct) everything to do with armed resistance.

MR VISSER: Do you agree that ...(intervention)

MR MAKGOTI: Yes, look I mean I think you should understand that when the students in 1976 protested against the system of Bantu education, they were met violence and subsequently to that, I mean the young people, you know, responded also with violent acts. I think that is well-known. And the ANC felt that it was necessary to guide this type of, you know, resort to violent struggle by young people, and to guide them within the channels of the ANC.

MR VISSER: Alright, I hear what you say. I continue on the question of where the political aspect should be seen as being divorced from the military aspect in the ANC's struggle. I continue

"The watershed 1978 Political Military Strategy Commission Report under O R Tambo (also known as the Green Book Thesis/Thesis on our strategic line) again stressed the primacy of political mobilisation."

And it's a quote within this quote:

'the armed struggle must be based and grow out of mass political support and must eventually involve all our people. All military activities must at every stage be guided by and determined by the need to generate political mobilisation, organisation and resistance, with the aim or progressively weakening the enemy's grip on the reigns of political economic, social and military power by a combination of political and military action.'"

Have you heard of the thesis on the strategic line, and have you heard of this theory which I've just read to you?

MR MAKGOTI: Yes, the strategic line was developed at a conference of the National Executive of the ANC, I think in 1978 in Tanzania. I happened to be present there, yes, so I know.

MR VISSER: Yes. And it's quite clear is it not, and the rest of that is also relevant, I'm not going to read it all to you, but isn't it quite clear that the four different pillars of the armed struggle of the ANC were integrated? They weren't separated as it where, in the sense that if one were involved in one of the aspects of the struggle, that it could be stated that you were not really involved in the struggle at all because you were only involved in a political capacity.

MR MAKGOTI: No, no, I don't think that the leadership certainly of the ANC, has ever distanced itself from acts of you know, of a military kind, they have tended to accept full responsibility for acts of a military what you call it, which were done in accordance with ANC policy, yes.

MR VISSER: Thank you, thank you for that answer, Mr Makgoti. Now Mr Schoon gave evidence, Mr Marius Schoon, the late ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Before you go on. On the next page of that document, page 50, Mr Tambo makes it clear does he not, about the avoidance of civilian casualties in the conduct of the armed struggle?

MR MAKGOTI: Yes, this - Judge, this is what I'm ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: And this goes on elsewhere. There's talk about taking the war to the white areas in 1985, but by late 1988 they were condemning the attacks on civilian targets. The ANC policy was not to attack individual civilians, was it?

MR MAKGOTI: Yes, Judge, that has been ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Is that so?

MR MAKGOTI: That is so.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR MAKGOTI: That is so where - as I said, when we did resort to violence it was after very, very careful consideration and we wanted to make sure that it was kept in check.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, with respect, it deals with another aspect, and that is target selection of the ANC, where I was dealing really with the issue of whether political and military activity should be considered to be completely separate. Of course what you're saying is quite correct.

CHAIRPERSON: What I'm trying to distinguish is that military activities are of a limited nature, that the ANC was not embarking on a full-scale war as we have seen elsewhere, like the second world war and things where there was no regard whatsoever for civilians. The bombing of Dresden and the bombing of London showed that.

The ANC did not, when they used the term "military", - in fact I don't think do they, they don't use the term "military", do they, they talk about the armed struggle.

MR VISSER: Yes, Mr Chairman, perhaps tomorrow I could address part of that if you're interested in that. It is an interesting part and sometimes it is described as a military battle and sometimes as pseudo war. You will recall that General van der Merwe described it as not a declared war, but for all practical purposes a war without the normal martial law which would regulate. Yes, it's an interesting aspect, and we can certainly address that once we present out argument to you, Mr Chairman.

At this stage I was dealing with the issue of the interrelationship between the military as well as the political, without thereby - and I hope I did not succeed in confusing anyone, without thereby suggesting anything more than I was trying to distinguish, Mr Chairman.

Mr Marius Schoon, Mr Makgoti, gave evidence here, and in fact he said that he supported the armed struggle. That would be in line with a person in the political side of things, supporting the struggle. He would support the armed struggle where necessary.

MR MAKGOTI: Where necessary. Well I mean he was a member of the ANC, he supported the principles of the ANC and he understood fully well why the ANC took the armed struggle, yes. So ...

MR VISSER: So you see, to say - for anyone to come into the witness box here, before this Committee, and to say "oh, but you know, Mr Marius Schoon didn't plant bombs, he wasn't involved in violence etc.", that really doesn't say anything because it doesn't say anything as to what the Security Forces should have thought of Mr Marius Schoon, do you agree?

MR MAKGOTI: Well I would have expected that they knew what Mr Marius Schoon was doing in Lubango, they knew what he was doing in Lusaka. So I don't quite appreciate what you ...

MR VISSER: You see, just to indicate to you what I'm talking about, at page 2890, my learned friend, Mr du Plessis asks Mr Marius Schoon

"MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, you agreed with the armed struggle, you identified.

MR SCHOON: I agreed that the armed struggle was a component necessary for the liberation of the country.

MR DU PLESSIS: You identified therewith, Mr Schoon.

MR SCHOON: I identified with it.

MR DU PLESSIS: And Jeanette as well.

MR SCHOON: Jeanette as well."

And then at page 2893, at the bottom of the page:

"MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, and you also believed that the actions taken by members of the ANC, where people were killed in the process, were justified as part of the armed struggle.

MR SCHOON: I did."

Now I'm going to cut a long story short, Mr Makgoti, by putting to you what the evidence has been. Mr Willem Schoon, Brigadier Willem Schoon is applying for amnesty to this Committee for an attempted murder of Mr Marius Schoon, and he told this Committee that he drew the file which existed on Mr Marius Schoon at Security Head Office in Pretoria and he studied that file.

Now what he says is that from that file he can recall that he read that Mr Marius Schoon was a very important member of the ANC and did important work for the ANC in Botswana. Would you agree with that statement?

MR MAKGOTI: Yes, Marius was on the Political Committee.

MR VISSER: Yes, as a general, yes. And that Mr Marius Schoon was involved in the establishment and the upkeep of infiltration routes between South Africa and Botswana. Do you have any knowledge of that?

MR MAKGOTI: No, I think that, no, that is, that can hardly be correct. I think that - no, no, I would say no.

MR VISSER: You say ...(intervention)

MR MAKGOTI: He was not in control of any infiltration routes.

CHAIRPERSON: It didn't say he was in control of, it said he established or helped to establish routes.

MR MAKGOTI: You know the way we operated in Botswana, the way Marius operated in Botswana, was either to invite himself people to come to Botswana or people would come to Botswana. And in most cases these people came through perfectly legal channels. This was his style of operation. So this business about, was not the manner in which really he operated.

CHAIRPERSON: As I recollect we heard evidence here yesterday about this organisation, Sana was it, S-a-n-a, that he was one of the four people running and that they established routes into South Africa to obtain information about what was happening in the country. Some of the people came out legally, some did not. But they established routes into the country to get the information. What do you know of that?

MR MAKGOTI: I don't know of their establishing routes ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: We did hear that evidence didn't we?

MR VISSER: ...(indistinct)

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, I do remember Professor Klug say that they did come into the country and I remember his precise words

"you'd be surprised that most of the way in which we came back to South Africa was officially through the gates."

That was his evidence, but that they did come back to South Africa in order to obtain information, is clear in his evidence, and that was the group that Mr Schoon and Jeanette Schoon were members of, but for the purposes of, the evidence is clear, for the purposes of obtaining information in order to transmit it as a news agency, not for military or other purposes.

CHAIRPERSON: Now but what is being put from the file is not that he established routes for military purposes, it was simply that in the file it said that they established routes. And I'm suggesting that that is clear they did.

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct)

MR MAKGOTI: Yes, and to add onto that, we did you know, when we sent Mr Klug into the country, it is true that in that particular instance he did not use the established, you know the legal ways of going through into South Africa. That is true.

MR VISSER: If I may continue, Mr Chairman, may I say, and I find it significant that Mr Marius Schoon had sufficient courage himself to admit that he was instrumental in establishing a sophisticated network of routes whilst now it's being played down. May I refer you Mr Chairman to a piece of evidence, I was just looking for it, and I must confess that I forgot to ask Mr Klug this when he was in the witness box. Mr Marius Schoon, I have a note, on the 4th of November 1998 gave evidence, I can't tell you whether this is in cross-examination or in chief, where he stated words to the effect, and I'm paraphrasing: We sent Heinz Klug to the RSA and we sent him so that (or words to the effect) that he entered illegally). So there's no question ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct) what you've just been told.

MICROPHONE NOT ACTIVATED - CHAIRPERSON INAUDIBLE, MR VISSER INAUDIBLE

MR VISSER: ... there's no question that there were routes established and maintained, Mr Chairman, to infiltrate people illegally in and out of the country. And that is what I'm putting to Mr Makgoti.

MR MAKGOTI: Could I explain, Sir, that this intricate network of routes, in my understanding I understood that he, well it was probably an intricate network of contacts in the country. I did not understand that ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: I'm sorry, could you speak up, I can't hear you.

MR MAKGOTI: I say that I did not understand - well when he spoke about, if he did speak about networks, in my understanding it was a network of quantex rather than a network of routes leading people inside and outside South Africa.

MR VISSER: We'll leave that for argument. Was it your understanding that Mr Marius Schoon considered it his function to instruct operatives in the Republic of South Africa, to establish dead-letterboxes?

MR MAKGOTI: Yes, Sir, that is so.

MR VISSER: You would agree with that?

MR MAKGOTI: ...(indistinct) means of communication, yes.

MR VISSER: Yes. Are you aware that Mr Marius Schoon was, I believe it was in 1964, was convicted under the Sabotage Act and sentenced to 12 years imprisonment?

MR MAKGOTI: Yes, yes, yes, I knew Marius by then, I knew that he had been convicted under sabotage and that he spent 12 in Pretoria. Yes, I knew.

MR VISSER: Would you agree ...(intervention)

MR MAKGOTI: I was in jail at the time, but I got to know about it.

MR VISSER: Yes. Would you agree with the general statement that Mr Marius Schoon considered one of his duties while he was in Botswana, to activate or to be involved in political mobilisation, mass mobilisation within the Republic of South Africa?

MR MAKGOTI: That is so, Sir.

MR VISSER: And that Jenny Schoon similarly was so involved, but more on the side of the trade unions?

MR MAKGOTI: Oh yes, she was very knowledgeable about trade union matters.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, there has been agreement. The references, perhaps if you're interested in it I can just give you the references to jot down, it's the record, page 2911 and 2912, Mr Chairman. And Mr Chairman, as regards the infiltration routes, I neglected to give you that reference, that's page 2914 of Mr Marius Schoon's evidence, and there's also a reference to the extensiveness thereof at page 2917.

Mr Makgoti, I'm going to try to complete what I want to ask you. Did you regard Mr Marius Schoon and Mrs Jeanette Schoon as targets for the apartheid government while they were in Botswana?

MR MAKGOTI: Well I could not very well rule out the possibility that they would be killed by the Security Forces of the government while they were in Botswana.

MR VISSER: Yes, Alright.

MR MAKGOTI: The Security Forces in my experience, operated in a manner which, as it they were a law unto themselves and so.

MR VISSER: That's page 2926, Mr Chairman, of the record.

Do you know whether Mr Marius Schoon received any training of whatever nature in Angola?

MR MAKGOTI: Yes, we discussed this matter, I think with our chief, Mr Maharaj, to send Marius to receive training in, you know, to make him more effective in the type of work which he was engaged in. For instance, you know distribution of leaflets because this style of you know, leaflet bombs and that sort of thing.

MR VISSER: Yes, pamphlet bombs, yes.

MR MAKGOTI: Yes, and there were other things also, secret writing. We thought that it would improve his work if he ...

MR VISSER: Any training in firearms?

MR MAKGOTI: ...(indistinct) come back and help others too.

MR VISSER: Any training received by him in firearms, the use of firearms?

MR MAKGOTI: Well he did confide to me that when he was there he took advantage to learn how to use a firearm and ...

MR VISSER: Yes. Was that at Camp Funda?

MR MAKGOTI: It must have been, yes. To the best of my knowledge, yes.

MR VISSER: Thank you. Mr Chairman, the reference to that is at page 2490 and 2537 to 2538, Mr Chairman. But the witness has conceded that.

I have no further questions, thank you, Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER

CHAIRPERSON: Any questions, Mr du Plessis?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr Makgoti, where were you based in Botswana at the time Jenny and Marius Schoon were there, were you in Botswana? You were also in Botswana at the same time?

MR MAKGOTI: Yes, I was with them from 1977 to 1980.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes. How often did you see them?

MR MAKGOTI: Oh, very often.

MR DU PLESSIS: Very often.

MR MAKGOTI: Very often.

MR DU PLESSIS: Right. Now Makgoti, Mr Schoon testified, and I'm just going to deal a little bit more in detail with the information network of Mr Schoon than Mr Visser did. I'm not going to ask you the same questions. Mr Schoon also testified that they set up a communication channel between Botswana and people inside South Africa, using couriers and letters to dead-letterboxes. Do you agree with that?

MR MAKGOTI: Yes, that is what we did.

MR DU PLESSIS: He testified that they were also involved in intelligence gathering. That's on page 2912 to 2913. That's what he testified.

MR MAKGOTI: Yes, sometimes we use this work "intelligence" in a rather free way. I mean sometimes we use it to mean simply information ...(intervention)

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, yes, you said yes. I'm coming to that.

MR MAKGOTI: ...(indistinct) but I would say that not all information is intelligence, I mean.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes. Well he said - the question was on page 2913

"And you were involved also in respect of gathering intelligence about what was happening in South Africa."

"Yes, Sir."

"And that intelligence that you gathered in such a way, would that have been passed to the higher echelons in the ANC?"

And he says:

"It would have been passed on to our own structures and from there it would have been passed on to Lusaka."

Do you agree with that?

MR MAKGOTI: Yes, yes, that was what we did, we reported to Lusaka.

MR DU PLESSIS: And then he also testified, I asked him "If you would receive important information from a person that action was going to be taken by ANC supporters, a mass rally or something that's planned, you would have passed that on?"

And he said:

"Yes."

Do you agree with that?

MR MAKGOTI: Well he said yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: Ja, but do you agree with that?

MR MAKGOTI: Yes, yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: Was that part of the function of the information channel?

CHAIRPERSON: You should be made clear, because I understand that this was not an ANC information channel, this was the Sana channel and it was only after he had received intelligence and information that he would decide whether it was in the interests of the ANC to pass it on. The ANC would not get all the information they got about was happening in South Africa, which they used for their pamphlets.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, Mr Chairman, although if you read the cross-examination, my cross-examination of Mr Schoon, he never drew a distinction between the two. But I won't ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Well he kept on talking about us, and you kept on assuming that was the ANC. That is why there's no distinction, you were both thinking of different things.

MR DU PLESSIS: Well, yes, Mr Chairman, but I don't think it's an important distinction, with respect Mr Chairman. I take your point.

Now Mr Makgoti, he also testified that the network that he had was an extensive network, do you agree with that?

MR MAKGOTI: Yes ...

GAP BETWEEN TAPES

MR DU PLESSIS: ... if he was requested from the higher echelons to obtain certain information, and the question was

"Did you receive a task saying 'could we use your network in ascertain this for us or that for us?"

And then Mr Schoon said:

"Yes."

Is that your experience of it too?

MR MAKGOTI: Yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. And then - Mr Chairman, if you'll just bear with me. Then on page 2921, I asked Mr Schoon

"It wouldn't be unfair of me to say that you in your position had a fair amount of control over people in South Africa and what they were doing to further the struggle in South Africa?"

And then he answered, he gave a long answer, but he didn't answer it straight, the question. And then the next question was:

"Alright Mr Schoon, but let's say for instance the ANC had a very, at that time, a very important message which had to go to important trade union leaders in South Africa, they would have utilised your network?"

And Mr Schoon said:

"They would, Sir."

Would you agree ...(intervention)

MR MAKGOTI: Jenny was actually you know, working with the trade unions.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes. But would you agree that that network would have been used for important information going from the ANC to leaders in South Africa?

MR MAKGOTI: Yes, yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: Inter alia trade union leaders.

MR MAKGOTI: Yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: It could have been any other leader as well?

CHAIRPERSON: Well he had contact with trade union leaders, so he said trade union, didn't he? You can't from that infer that he had contact with leaders of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange or other organisations, it's what he had contact with that he could be used to make contact with. Isn't the tenor of his evidence there?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, Mr Chairman. I actually should rephrase the question. The question was a question in addition to Mr Makgoti. I want to know from Mr Makgoti if this could be interpreted as if the channel was used by the ANC not to contact simply trade union leaders, but other leaders of the ANC or the liberation movements within South Africa. That's what I want to know from you, Mr Makgoti.

MR MAKGOTI: Look, Marius was involved in a particular field, and there were people who were doing, you know, working in other fields. If it was relevant, if it was the best possible way for Marius to convey whatever or to be used in that way, I mean they would use him, but there were other channels which could be used for different fields of activity.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, that I understand, I'm not saying that was channel. ...(intervention)

MR MAKGOTI: And trade unionism fell directly under you know, trade union work came under the work of the Political Committee.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, but you wouldn't limit your answer in that regard, simply to trade union leaders. If there was a possibility that some other leader could have been contacted and the easiest way would have been through his channel, it would have been done, isn't that so?

MR MAKGOTI: I don't know what you mean by any other leader, but I can only say what I've said, that Marius was doing political work, he was, probably if we may use words in a loose way, he was an expert in that field and he would be the best person to, through the channels of the organisation, to get that information or to convey that information.

ADV DE JAGER: I think there was evidence that he would have served the ANC in whatever way he would have been able, if required to do so.

MR MAKGOTI: Certainly I'm sure. I mean he was a loyal person and if they asked him to do things, he would do it. He was a very committed man.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, thank you, Mr Makgoti. Now if I can refer you to the ANC's first submission to the Truth Commission. I think that is Exhibit N, Mr Chairman. And I want to refer you specifically to certain parts thereof pertaining to this attempt to distinguish between political functions on the one hand, and military functions on the other hand. And I want to ask your comment thereto, because it seems to me that, from this document, that that distinction is not as clear as your evidence wanted to make it. Page 47 it is stated

"With more specific reference to the ANC's approach to the role of armed actions in the struggle for democracy and which targets it considered legitimate, two continuous threads in all ANC policies and public statements on this issue have been that armed struggle is only one of a range of interrelated methods of struggle, with the political leadership at all times directing armed struggle."

CHAIRPERSON: Where is that?

MR DU PLESSIS: Page 47, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Of Exhibit N?

MR DU PLESSIS: Of the first ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Well the first was Exhibit A1 I think.

MR DU PLESSIS: That would then be A1, I beg your pardon, Mr Chairman. I think N is the second one. It's my mistake, Mr Chairman.

MR MAKGOTI: ...(indistinct)

MR DU PLESSIS: Page 47, the second last paragraph on the right-hand column. And then if you turn over to page 48, Mr Makgoti, I'm going to read to you all the excerpts and then you can react to that. It says

"When we talk of revolutionary armed struggle, we are talking of political struggle by means which include the use of military force."

That's the second column, second paragraph from the top, Mr Chairman.

And then on page 49, the right-hand column, the second last paragraph. It states:

"In line with this approach, the Revolutionary Council formed in 1969 and Chaired by OR Tambo was restructured to consolidate not only the supremacy of political leadership, but also to ensure that the task of mass mobilisation and underground organisation receive the necessary emphasis.

The senior organs formed in neighbouring countries consisted of senior leaders and specialists in the building of the political underground and mass mobilisation, as well as commanders of armed units.

Within the country this translated into an effort to form Area Political Committees which would take ultimate responsibility for both political and military work. Later these were transformed into Area and Regional Politico Military Committees."

Politico Military Committees. So the committees were called Politico Military Committees.

ADV DE JAGER: But that was inside the country.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, Mr Chairman. Then on page 50, the second paragraph from the top left-hand column

"In 1983 the Revolutionary Council was disbanded and the Politico Military Council created, with a Military HQ and Political HQ falling under it. The details of these structures are later outlined."

And then if we turn to page 57, the third-last paragraph on the second column, the right-hand column of that page, it says:

"A conference of all front commanders and commissars was held in Maputo in April 1983 to address the growing problem of a lack of effective co-ordination between the military and political aspects of the struggle. The Revolutionary Council was replaced by the Politico Military Council."

It's one council.

"... which became the most senior structure after the National Executive Committee. The PMC consisted of a Secretariat, an Intelligence Political Committee, a Military HQ and Intelligence ..."

CHAIRPERSON: Internal, not Intelligence.

MR DU PLESSIS

"... an Internal Political Committee, a Military HQ and Intelligence, also known as NAT, consisting of intelligence, counter-intelligence, security sections. The PMC was charged with implementing decisions of the NEC with regard to political and military aspects of the struggle and with providing overall political military leadership."

Now - and the heading of this paragraph is called:

"The Politico Military Chain of Command."

Now Mr Makgoti it seems to me, reading from this, that the political and the military functions were always coupled together, especially later, from 1983. That is why some of these committees were called Politico Military Committees, and that you cannot really draw a line between political functions on the one hand and military functions on the other hand.

MR MAKGOTI: Well I'm afraid I'll have to, I can only reply in a general way to this, but you have raised specific questions there. This question of keeping the political separate from the military, well I could possibly sympathise with the impression which you have appeared to have gained, but I think you will recall that in the evidence which the gentleman gave before me yesterday, yesterday, he did say that he was a political instructor of soldiers. He instructed soldiers in the political. So that the type of soldiers which we were developing were really soldiers, but soldiers with a very distinct political orientation.

I'm not denying that we had soldiers, we had soldiers, we trained them in Angola and other places. That is clear. But we always tried to make sure that these soldiers were following the political line of the ANC, even in their operations. That is what we ...

And when you talk about, you talk about senior organs operating in the country and PMC's, well possibly I was not very much engaged in the military, what you call, side of the ANC's work, but to the best of my knowledge the senior organs which we were developing in Botswana were organs which we hoped after they shall have been properly developed, and as we saw the struggle unfolding, they would be planted within the country, because you can imagined, I mean when a struggle develops and it, to have very long lines of communication as we had before, it would not help the struggle as we ... So as far as I am aware these political military were established at headquarters, but to the best of my knowledge they did not exist as such inside the country.

ADV DE JAGER: You referred to the senior organs you were developing in Botswana, how many people were involved in a senior organ?

MR MAKGOTI: As I say, as I said it was principally the leaders of the various arms. I was in the Political Committee, I was there in the senior organ, I was a member of the Political Committee as Chairman. Then we had also people who were doing military work ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: Yes, how many people were there, 10, 20, ...(intervention)

MR MAKGOTI: It could have been about four, it wasn't a big ...

ADV DE JAGER: Four?

MR MAKGOTI: It wasn't a big committee, yes.

ADV DE JAGER: So you said you wanted to organise them later into South Africa, is that correct?

MR MAKGOTI: Well that was the perspective, that was the perspective. As the struggle develops it may very well be necessary to have such operating in the country, and then you don't have ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: Yes. But then I - if you could kindly explain to me then, if it was only sort of four people, would it only be four people sent into South Africa or would they be training say 20 or 30 other leaders to infiltrate later and to organise within South Africa?

MR MAKGOTI: No, these are - senior organ is a command structure, it's a command structure. I don't know what you mean by they will be organising 20 or 30 other people there. It's the way we saw how the struggle ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: Yes, I think I've misunderstood your answer about the infiltration into South Africa.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you going to be much longer, Mr du Plessis?

MR DU PLESSIS: I've got a few questions, Mr Chairman. If we could perhaps take the adjournment, with respect Mr Chairman.

ADV DE JAGER: Would there be any other persons after the adjournment asking questions?

MR BIZOS: So far we will have one question in re-examination.

ADV DE JAGER: We won't be able to finish within a ...

MR DU PLESSIS: Probably another 15/20 minutes, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well, we'll take the short adjournment now.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

HENRY GORDON MAKGOTI: (s.u.o.)

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS: (Cont)

Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr Makgoti, who exactly was responsible for the decision to send the Schoons to Angola, was it Mr Maharaj, or were you involved in that decision too?

MR MAKGOTI: The request was made by the MPLA, as it has been explained, for assistance, for people to go and teach English in Lubango in Angola. And this request reached me as Head of Education in Lusaka, and I made this recommendation that I thought Marius was a suitable person for this assignment.

MR DU PLESSIS: Why did you decide on Marius and Jeanette Schoon, why they, why not anybody else?

MR MAKGOTI: I considered them very suitable people, from the point of view of their, because they wanted people to go and teach in a university, I thought they were the calibre of people who could teach in a university. As for teaching experience, Marius had, you know Marius was a very good teacher, I mean he taught at Molopulule and people spoke very, very highly of Marius as a teacher when he was in Molopulule, as well as Jenny. So I thought they would, and they were committed people whom I thought the ANC would take in pride in having people like that and helping he Angolans.

MR DU PLESSIS: Would you go as far, and I'm asking you the same question as two previous witnesses, would you go as far as saying that they were really a symbol of the ANC in Angola?

MR MAKGOTI: They were members of the ANC and they were committed people.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Now Mr Makgoti, ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I think you can take that further. You were responsible, you recommended them, they were going to go there as the people whom the ANC had chosen or sent.

MR MAKGOTI: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Wasn't it important, and I think that's the point Mr du Plessis made, that the people should be somebody whom the ANC could take pride in, that the people in Angola would think what good people these were?

MR MAKGOTI: Certainly that was my motivation, Sir.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Mr Chairman, you've formulated my question much better than I could, thank you very much.

Mr Makgoti, and when you sent them it was really an order which they had to obey as part of the organisation, isn't that so?

MR MAKGOTI: No, no, no, that is not the way we operated in the ANC, no, certainly not. I mean they had every right to say no, we're not going to ...(intervention)

MR DU PLESSIS: But they didn't have a problem with that? They didn't have a problem to go?

MR MAKGOTI: No, they were quite willing to go, I mean voluntarily, yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. Did you know at the time that you sent them, that not one of them could speak Portuguese?

MR MAKGOTI: Yes, yes, I knew that they didn't speak Portuguese.

MR DU PLESSIS: You see the reason why I'm asking you this is, I find it strange that you say they were suitable people and you send them to a teaching post to teach English in a country where the language is Portuguese, or one of the main languages is Portuguese.

MR MAKGOTI: You find it strange?

MR DU PLESSIS: I find it strange. How would they have communicated with their students?

MR MAKGOTI: Well I mean they - I don't know, the Angolans don't seem to have had a problem with that, I mean they asked us to send people, and even subsequently I mean, Marius did a fine job there as far as I know. So I - no, I - well that might have been something to consider, whether they knew, but at the time that was not my main, my main what you call, when I, were these questions which I've raised and also the question of their safety and ...

CHAIRPERSON: I take it that people ...(intervention)

MR MAKGOTI: Marius had been teaching in Botswana which was a Tswana-speaking country and he had no difficulty in teaching the Botswana children English.

CHAIRPERSON: I take it that people who were studying English at university level would have had some knowledge of the language before they got there.

MR DU PLESSIS: That's a probability, Mr Chairman, I don't know. I don't know about that, that's why I won't pursue this point further.

Mr Makgoti, and then in Exhibit N, that's the second submission of the ANC to the Truth Commission, page 43. We have dealt with that now, with your evidence that you say the Schoons were not part of the senior organ, but do you agree with the statement there that leading figures, it says in the senior organ, but let's accept that's wrong:

"Leading figures during this period were Billy Masekla, Keith Mokuape, Dan Klume, Marius and Jenny Schoon."

Would you regard them in the same category as these people, Wally Serote, Thabang Makwetla, Hassain Ebrahim?

MR MAKGOTI: Yes, Wall Serote was - to give you an example, I mean Wally Serote was the person who organised the cultural side of activities, and to that extent he was an important person. So these people that you mentioned were people of you know, some significance, yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: People of stature within the ANC, isn't it?

MR MAKGOTI: Yes, I would say yes, in Botswana certainly.

CHAIRPERSON: I think it goes further than just within the ANC doesn't it, they were people of stature in the community.

MR MAKGOTI: In the community? Yes, I mean, yes, Wally Serote was a person well-known I mean, a person in the community, to give you an example.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR DU PLESSIS

CHAIRPERSON: I gather we have already been given an undertaking by those sitting further down the table. Do you wish to change?

MR JANSEN: No, Mr Chairman. Jansen on behalf of Mr Dirk Coetzee, I have no questions.

NO QUESTIONS BY MR JANSEN

MR CORNELIUS: Cornelius. I'll honour my undertaking, I've got no questions, thank you.

MR BIZOS: I only have two questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Wait, wait, wait.

MR BIZOS: I beg your pardon.

MS PATEL: Same here, thank you, Honourable Chairperson.

NO QUESTIONS BY MS PATEL

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR BIZOS: I only have two questions, Mr Chairman.

Mr Wally Serote, was he then and is he now a writer with a world reputation?

MR MAKGOTI: Oh yes, Mr Serote is a very well-known writer.

MR BIZOS: Now Mr Levine asked you questions about whether there could be any difference in perception between what was happening in Botswana and what was happening at the place that the Schoons were sent to teach English. Do you remember those questions?

MR MAKGOTI: Yes, I do.

MR BIZOS: Now ...(intervention)

MR LEVINE: Sorry, Mr Chairman, I don't want to interrupt my learned friend, but that was not the tenor of my question. My question was, was there anything done or did anything happen to disabuse the minds of anyone as to whether the functions being fulfilled by the Schoons in Lubango were different from the functions being fulfilled in Botswana.

MR BIZOS: You've heard the lengthier version of what I thought I was asking. That is what I want to ask you questions about.

We've had evidence that there were only four South Africans, four ANC members at the place where Marius and Jeanette Schoon were teaching.

MR MAKGOTI: That is so, that is so.

MR BIZOS: How many ANC people were there in Gaberone?

MR MAKGOTI: ANC people in Gaberone in my time?

MR BIZOS: In your time.

MR MAKGOTI: We had a very large group of people.

MR BIZOS: Hundreds?

MR MAKGOTI: Well probably not hundreds, but ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: A few hundred?

MR MAKGOTI: A few, I would say a few hundred people, yes.

MR BIZOS: And you told us that there was a senior organ. Now could you please have a look at 4.6.4 - may I ask one of my colleagues to make a copy available to the witness please. Yes, Exhibit N. Page number 43. You see the Botswana senior organ at 4.6.2. Now I want you to please go through 4.6.4 where the structures of Angola are set out, and 5.3.7 where the structures in Angola are set out for the second period.

MR MAKGOTI: 5.?

MR BIZOS: If you have a look at 4.6.4

"Angola - 1980 to 1983"

Have you got that?

MR MAKGOTI: Yes, I have that.

MR BIZOS: And then again - well if you have a look at the structures there.

MR MAKGOTI: That's 4.6.2 and 4.6.4?

MR BIZOS: Yes. 4.6.2 is Botswana, you were shown that.

MR MAKGOTI: Yes.

MR BIZOS: Have a look at

"4.6.4 - Angola"

MR MAKGOTI: Yes, Sir.

MR BIZOS: Have you looked at those structures?

MR MAKGOTI: Yes, I've looked at them.

MR BIZOS: And have you looked at the - will now please turn to page 49 of that document?

"Angola - 1983 to 1985"

You see 5.3.7, do you see that?

MR MAKGOTI: Yes, I see that.

MR BIZOS: Right. Now for the sake of completeness, do you see

"Botswana 1983 to 1985"

Also on page 49, 5.8.2?

MR MAKGOTI: Yes, I see that.

MR BIZOS: Was there any comparison between the structure that existed, or structures that existed in Botswana in the first period or the second period, and the structures that are described in Angola for the first period and the second period, or are they different?

MR MAKGOTI: In Botswana in ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: No, I'm asking you to compare Botswana and Angola, were the structures the same or different? For instance, was there a high organ in, a senior organ in Angola?

MR MAKGOTI: No, they did not operate in that way in Angola.

MR BIZOS: Yes, I'm not unmindful of my ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: But they don't say there's a senior organ in Botswana either.

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct) did, Mr Chairman. I merely wanted to draw attention to the differences, Mr Chairman. We will argue what it actually means. The witness has said that there were differences in the structures between Botswana and Angola. That's all for my purposes.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I didn't hear the witness say that. I've been listening very carefully as to what he was going to say ...(intervention)

MR MAKGOTI: No, I said they didn't work that way ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: ... to find out whether there were differences or not.

MR MAKGOTI: ... the same way as the did in Angola.

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct) in Angola. He did say that, clearly. Thank you. Thank you, Mr Chairman, I ...(indistinct)

WITNESS EXCUSED

CHAIRPERSON: Right, we agreed yesterday gentlemen that you can have an adjournment till tomorrow to prepare your oral argument and any written submissions you wish to make. We have received certain written submissions, some extremely lengthy, some very short, but if any of wish to make any more, you have till tomorrow morning and we will then hear oral argument.

MR LEVINE: Mr Chairman ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct) two aspects that ...(indistinct).

MR LEVINE: I'll defer to Mr Bizos, he can put what he wishes to put to you, Sir.

MR BIZOS: Yes. Mr Chairman, we had indicated that we were going to call a further witness, the evidence, whose evidence was put to Mr Williamson. I want to place on record why we have not called that witness, very briefly lest anything, any adverse inferences sought to be drawn from our failure to do so.

Mr Chairman, on the 11/11/1998 we wrote to Mr Roelf Meintjies, who was and we believe still is, Mr Jaap van Jaarsveld's attorney, and it reads:

"As indicated to you, we run out of time (that's during that period) and was not able to lead all the witnesses. It was for this reason that we did not have to call your client during this session. This matter has now been postponed to the 22nd of February 1999, and we would request that Mr van Jaarsveld be available to give evidence on either the 22nd or 23rd of February 1999."

We consulted with him before the November session. He expressed a willingness to give evidence, Mr Chairman. He also has given evidence, led by me in the Goniwe applications and a copy of his evidence is available to us, and I believe to our learned friends. Various messages were left, Mr Chairman, during the last week of January and the first week of February to Mr Meintjies, to which there was no response.

A letter was written on the 11th of February 1999 in which we said that we refer to the messages and that could he please revert to us so that we can have another brief consultation so that we can call him on the 22nd of February. That is a letter dated the 11th of February, Mr Chairman.

Messages were left on the 12th of February and the 15th of February, which were not responded to. Our instructing attorney wrote a letter on the 19th of February, saying that :

"We forwarded a letter to you during November 1998, in which we indicated to you that your client, Mr Jaap van Jaarsveld will be required to give evidence at the hearing during the week of the 22nd of February 1999. Since that letter my secretary and I have left at least 10 messages for you to telephone me as you did not respond to correspondence from us. We find the conduct in this regard as being both discourteous and unbecoming. We must now advise that should we not hear from you by the close of business of today, Monday we are issuing a subpoena against your client for his appearance."

There was a telephonic response, Mr Chairman, that if any subpoena was issued and served, a notice would be, it would be opposed or rather an application would be made to set the subpoena aside. The grounds were not formulated, but we assume presumably on the ground that it was served too late.

We had to make a decision in relation to the matter, Mr Chairman, and we decided that in the circumstances it was, no useful purpose would be served in pursuing the matter and creating side shows, Mr Chairman. That is the reason why we did not call Mr van Jaarsveld.

We have been given some explanation in relation to his attitude that's got something to do with his job. But anyway, that is the reason why we ...(indistinct).

Now this leaves one other matter, Mr Chairman, and that is that there is no point in our making any further efforts to resolve the dispute about those tapes. Again, Mr Chairman, due to no lack of effort on our attorney's part, who wrote a letter on the 11th of December 1998.

"We refer to the above-mentioned matter, in particular your objection to the transcription of the tape recordings of conversations between Ms Gillian Slovo and your client, Mr Craig Williamson."

I don't want to read the whole letter, except:

"The parties undertook to attempt to come to an agreement as to what the correct version of the transcriptions of the tape, ...(indistinct). In this regard we must advise that the original tapes had been made available to you and to Mr Raven's attorneys who have not requested the delivery of the original tapes. These tape recordings are still available at our offices should you wish to listen to them, or to have them forensically tested. "

You will recall, Mr Chairman, and Members of the Committee, that it was suggested at an early stage that these tapes may have been tampered with. Mr Levine, during conversations this morning, he sevows(sic) any responsibility for that suggestion that says that another member of the people representing applicants here said it.

But be that as it may, Mr Chairman, we did not leave it there, we wrote further letters on the 3rd of February, there have been telephone calls and - no, there have been only letters. Very recently, Mr Chairman - we wrote on the 3rd of February 1999, Mr Chairman, there was no response, we again wrote on the 9th of February 1999 and a discussion took place on the 10th and a letter was written thereafter.

But Mr Chairman, the nett result is that we have no agreed, no agreed transcript to place before you as an agreed transcript. It is unfortunate, Mr Chairman, but we do not want to lose any advantage that may inure to us as to the contents of those tapes.

We are not concerned with the whole story on the tapes. Three or four passages were put to Mr Williamson from those tapes in cross-examination. He stated that he had no difficulty with them. We are happy to confine ourselves, Mr Chairman, to that answer.

May I remind the Committee that although allegations were made that either Ms Gillian Slovo or our attorneys or us may have in some way tampered with these tapes, have not been pursued. Ms Slovo was not cross-examined on it. She gave evidence that although they may have been poor recordings in some instances, they were nevertheless not interfered with and they are genuine. And insofar as they are audible, they have been correctly transcribed.

I don't want to take the matter any further, Mr Chairman, ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I don't know what the attitude of the applicants are in this regard, are any of them objecting?

MR VISSER: Well speaking for myself, Visser on record, Mr Chairman, certainly we don't suspect that my learned friend, Mr Bizos is suggesting that he sent any of those letters to us because we've seen none of them. We are certainly not part of that fight as it were, Mr Chairman, and therefore we're really neutral about them.

CHAIRPERSON: You don't mind the transcript of the tapes going in?

MR VISSER: ...(indistinct)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr du Plessis?

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, I can remember that my client was mentioned in those documents and that I did deal with it at that time. However, as far as I know, we were not sent any of the letters. My attitude has been that I make no admissions in regard to that, and if necessary I will leave that whole situation for argument, Mr Chairman. I'm not going to make ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: But you don't object to the transcripts now, if you want to object later during argument you can do so.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, that's correct, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

MR JANSEN: No, Mr Chairman.

MR CORNELIUS: It has no bearing on my case.

CHAIRPERSON: I gather Mr Levine has indicated to you that he has not made these allegations ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct) reservations. But may I say, Mr Chairman, in relation to the statement that emanated from Mr du Plessis, I am instructed that we did write to his attorney and there was a response that they do not wish to take the matter any further. The letter ...(intervention)

MR DU PLESSIS: No, that may be so, Mr Chairman, that my attorney didn't give it to me or present it to me. If that is so then I accept it. Then ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Levine, are you happy with him?

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct) a letter from Strydom Britz on the 19th of January 1999.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. I wasn't aware of that letter, Mr Chairman, I'll accept that.

MR LEVINE: Mr Chairman, we responded to the second of those letters and a meeting was held, indeed I believe two meetings were held between my candidate attorney, Mr Nel and Mr Bizos' attorney. The nett result was that agreement could not be reached in regard to the transcripts as being accurate and that left one of two situations, either we agree to it or reluctantly the Committee would have to be burdened with having to listen, which I would at all costs like to avoid. I don't object to the transcript as settled to the best of its ability by my candidate attorney and Mr Bizos' attorney going in, subject to it being clearly noted that these are the areas of dispute. But ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: You are not admitting to it being an accurate transcript, but you are not objecting to us having reference to it rather than having to listen to the tapes, is that the position?

MR LEVINE: I would like to avoid that, Mr Chairman, but we have been also promised that the transcriber would give evidence, the secretary would give evidence. I'm not insisting ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: Could we try and solve it this way? Mr Bizos is going to refer to four extracts I believe ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: Four or five.

ADV DE JAGER: Four or five. I presume he would notify us as to what part of the record that would be. Could you kindly have a look at those specific extracts and see whether you object to them or not?

MR LEVINE: Provided I'm notified in advance.

ADV DE JAGER: I hope ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: They will be in the heads of argument, Mr Chairman. There will be ...(indistinct)

ADV DE JAGER: Ja, Mr Bizos, but your heads of argument, when would that be submitted?

MR BIZOS: We're working harder ...(indistinct)

CHAIRPERSON: They can deal with that in their reply.

MR BIZOS: We can deal with it in reply, Mr Chairman.

MR LEVINE: Mr Chairman, there is one further aspect in which I would seek your indulgence, and that indulgence would not take longer than five minutes.

MR LEVINE: There was a direct reference to my client, Mr Williamson's amnesty application presently being heard before this Committee, in an SABC programme at 7 o'clock yesterday morning. It is vitally important because comments were made on a matter that is sub-iudice. We have the tape and the tape will take I am advised, not more than three to four minutes to be shown, and it is in my respectful submission extremely important to my client's amnesty application. I would ask you, Mr Chairman, for a two minutes adjournment ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: Isn't it important that we shouldn't see it?

MR LEVINE: It is important that you should see it.

ADV DE JAGER: Couldn't it influence us?

MR LEVINE: I beg your pardon?

ADV DE JAGER: Couldn't it perhaps influence us?

MR LEVINE: It could, yes.

ADV DE JAGER: Now why should we see it then?

MR LEVINE: Because the tape contains comments which are of a matter which are sub-iudice, and it is vital in my submission, that you do see it at the earliest possible opportunity. It will only take a couple of minutes, and I'm asking for permission to have the video recorder brought down and it being played to you now, because it is of some importance.

CHAIRPERSON: The problem is, Mr Levine, none of us have seen it, I talk now on behalf of the Members of the Committee. You are now saying it might influence us, it might effect us, therefore it's surely undesirable that we should see it? We have not seen it as yet, we have not been influenced by it in any way. I can quite understand your objection to any practice of commenting on matters that are sub-iudice, and that could be raised at the end of the hearing.

MR LEVINE: Well, Mr Chairman, it would be more convenient insofar as my client is concerned, if this tape was heard and observed today. It wouldn't ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Why? How is it going to effect our decision? We're not here to score cheap points for anybody. Tell us why it is in your client's interest that we should see and hear it now.

MR LEVINE: Because my client has been described, and it has been said of my client that certain parties would be very upset if my client was to be given amnesty. And I am given to understand that a question was asked as to what would be the results of Mr Williamson not getting amnesty, and the answer was to the effect that he would take this on review and that he would have no chance on review. Now that, Mr Chairman, is a remarkable statement to have made and ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: But how is that going to effect us in reaching a decision, Mr Levine?

MR LEVINE: In the interests of hearing both sides and in the interests of the fair conduct of a matter, I would submit to you that it would be proper to hear that very short interview ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Levine, we haven't heard any other side, how can you say in the interests of hearing both sides? We have heard nothing about this at all till you have now introduced it.

MR LEVINE: Well ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: What do you mean "be hearing both sides"?

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, may I perhaps just come in here. It is a matter of some concern to me. I heard about this yesterday and I've been informed of the contents of the statements which were made. It is a matter of some concern, Mr Chairman, that Mr Bizos found it necessary to go on national television commenting on the merits of an application, amnesty application before you, commenting it seems to me, on some parts of the evidence, the desirability of certain applicants to obtain amnesty etc. The ethical part of that is something that I'm not going to comment on now, one can deal with that in another and a different forum.

But it should be of some concern, Mr Chairman, that certain parties to this process are viewing their views and making statements on public television, where we're dealing with a public hearing, where we are dealing with a situation where everybody is here, where people can watch television and see what is going on. It is with extreme discomfort that I heard about this. I'm not sure how one should deal with it, Mr Chairman, but I think it is of extreme importance that you are notified of this and that you give us an indication how this should be dealt with.

We don't know if we put on the television tonight, if there is not going to be another interview with my learned friend, Mr Bizos commenting on maybe my behaviours, maybe Mr Levine's behaviour, maybe the evidence of a witness, maybe your own behaviour. I don't know, Mr Chairman.

It's of grave concern that the dignity of these proceedings and the way these proceedings should be dealt with is now placed in a position that there are questions marks over it.

CHAIRPERSON: I think that is a different matter, Mr Levine. If you ask us to comment on the desirability or otherwise of public comment being made on hearing while they are continuing, that is quite a different matter, but that does not mean we should see the film and hear comments which might be biased, which might create an unfair impression. But it seem to me, and I think I can speak on behalf of both Members of the Committee, that we consider it highly undesirable that anyone, particularly someone appearing before us at the time, should comment on the evidence led and the possible outcomes or results of a hearing while that hearing is continuing.

I have been alarmed to see in the last few days in one of the newspapers similar comment about an application which is not been decided. And it appears to me, and I say this, Mr Bizos, with respect to your vast experience, that is extremely undesirable that you should be making public comments on television when you are appearing in a matter where we still have to make findings on the credibility or on the results, that you should be commenting on matters which may influence us and may influence the public.

MR BIZOS: May I respond, Mr Chairman, and personally I have no objection to you seeing it, may I by way of personal explanation say what happened?

Mr Chairman, the public, according to the people who write for newspapers, who show matter on television, I was told were perplexed by the apparent inconsistencies in findings by the various Committees. I considered it my duty, Mr Chairman, not as counsel in this case, but as a member of the profession who has had some experience in the matter, to go in defence of the Committees to explain, to explain the apparent conflicts.

And if I may say so, I think that I went out of my way in order to defend the Committees and saying they should look what was in the judgments before they make adverse comments in relation to the Committees. I have been very careful to avoid expressing views about pending matters.

As far as I remember, what happened yesterday, Mr Chairman, I was asked to try and explain the difference between the Biko matter and the Benzien matter. And as is the want of people, Mr Chairman, if I remember correctly a question was popped; would I be happy or unhappy if amnesty was granted to Mr Williamson and I said that I would be singularly unhappy.

Now I don't think that it influences the Committee or public opinion to a very large extent as to how counsel appearing for, against a party, would be unhappy if the result was contrary. If I remember correctly, and I think maybe that my memory has been refreshed, that I said something about a review. I don't remember whether I said it specifically in relation to this case, or generally, I have no recollection. I said that there is a form of review which is available, which if I did not say it I clearly would have indicated, is of a very restricted nature.

I don't think that I have erred in taking part, Mr Chairman, in a public debate where there are lots of criticisms in relation to the process, to give the benefit of my view to the public in South Africa. I will defend my right to do so, Mr Chairman. And I have already said that in a country in which freedom of information prevails, we should not shirk away from that duty, provided we express honest, informed I hope, and honest opinions, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos, I think I disagree with you if you express opinions as to outcomes before they are given. But I think I should place on record that I read Mr Bizos' earlier interview and I have already expressed my thanks to him on behalf of the Amnesty Committee for his endeavours to explain the difference in various decisions and how they are arrived at, because the previous report on the subject was hopelessly incorrect. I have not as you know, seen this video that we are being asked to look at. I had understood from what I was originally told, Mr Bizos, that you commented at some length on the present proceedings, but you have assured us you did not. Is there any point in seeing ...(indistinct). Is there any point in us seeing the video?

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct) minutes, Mr Chairman. ...(indistinct)

MACHINE SWITCHED OFF

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, may I just make a point, I find it very strange. I was informed by people who watched the video this morning that Mr Bizos inter alia said that he does not believe that Ruth First was a legitimate target. Now I find it strange that Mr Bizos doesn't address you about that, that he doesn't tell you about that.

CHAIRPERSON: Well let's not have any argument now on the contents, let's have a look at the thing rather than having people giving me ...(indistinct)

MR BIZOS: No, I have no objection whatsoever, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Right.

MACHINE SWITCHED OFF

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct) statements that I made here. I have no problem with that.

CHAIRPERSON: Well if you have no objection, if everyone says so, we'll see it then.

MR BIZOS: Yes, let them see it.

MR LEVINE: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

MR PATEL: Honourable Chairperson, we need to make arrangements for the facilities to brought down, so it will take a few minutes.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well, we'll adjourn till ...(inaudible).

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

CHAIRPERSON: Gentlemen, we have had an opportunity as Members of the Committee of discussing Mr Levine's request that we should now look at a video of something that appeared on television tomorrow morning ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct)

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, not tomorrow, yesterday morning. It appears to us that this cannot assist us in any way in arriving at a decision in the present application. The question that may arise is one of ethics. We have no power to make any rulings in that regard, that if Mr Levine wishes to take the matter up with a professional body, it is open to him to do so, or anyone else present here.

There is certainly nothing that we can do it and we are of the view that it can possibly, I say no more than possibly, prejudice us to see comments which we have not heard in evidence, which has not been made on oath, and if the practice is undesirable as has been indicated and as I indicated I thought it was, it is equally undesirable that the presiding body should be aware of such comments. And we are accordingly not prepared to see this video. We are not prepared to hear anything further as to what was said on it, and leave that open to any interested party to take such proper actions that they may think fit.

MR LEVINE: Mr Chairman, may I merely place on record that I find it remarkable that a decision was taken to spend a few minutes looking at this particular video and it is now changed and you come back into the room and say you are not going to hear it. My client has been prejudiced in ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: We have not seen this, your client has not been prejudiced before us at all, Mr Levine. What you are seeking to do is to possibly prejudice your client by having us see matters that is not evidence.

MR LEVINE: Mr Chairman, I did not say my client has been prejudiced before you, you interrupted me in the course of a sentence when I said my client has been prejudiced in the eyes of a host of television viewers in South Africa, by improper remarks on something that is sub-iudice.

CHAIRPERSON: And it is not our function to safeguard your client's interests between the television viewers. If you wish to do so, Mr Levine, I have no doubt the television programme would be very happy to give you the opportunity to rebut what was said.

MR LEVINE: I don't need to seek that sort of publicity, Mr Chairman, but I would have thought that having decided to hear this and to read, and to look at the television, that you would have kept to that, but there is nothing I can do.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Levine, if this is to the prejudice of your client and we'll be seeing it, then we may prejudice your client. We do not wish to prejudice anybody and that is why we, after discussion, have decided not to see it. We've got no power - suppose we see it and it's to the prejudice of your client, what should we do then?

MR LEVINE: Well there's certain machinery in this particular Act which would entitle steps to be taken and if necessary by this Committee.

ADV DE JAGER: And in the end, what may be the result, would there be any remedy to your client? If there's a remedy the Courts should decide on it and it's open for anybody to take it to the Courts, if there's any prejudice.

MR LEVINE: Well may I conclude ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: But we can't make an order on this, we've been created by this statute, we haven't got any powers there, as far as possible prejudice to your client is concerned, and things being introduced here that could influence us. And we wouldn't like to hear anything that could influence us in order to take a decision that may be influenced by something that wouldn't be admissible.

MR LEVINE: Well may I conclude by saying that on the television last night the words spoken by the television announcer were: "All hell broke loose at the hearings yesterday when Mr du Plessis, Advocate du Plessis was accused of improper conduct and reference was made that he would be reported to the his Bar Counsel." Now if that sort of news can be published in that manner, then there's every justification for looking at and commenting on this particular video. But you've made a decision one way, you've made a decision another way, and I don't wish to take the matter any further in these proceedings.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, may I just comment on that. I'm not going to comment on what was said on television last night, that is a matter between Mr Bizos and myself, which we will deal with in the proper forum. Mr Chairman, in respect of this video my view is that we are in your hands pertaining to looking at the video. The concern however is a concern that I have raised, and that is the concern that we do not know if this sort of thing is going to happen more frequently in future, if we're going to be faced with this tomorrow and the day thereafter. As I read the Act in terms of Section 39, you can deal with it, and if you decide not to deal with it, Mr Chairman ...

CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct)

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, you will see that that makes provision for certain offences in terms of the Act, inter alia one of Contempt of Court. Now I am not sure and I haven't prepared argument to you about the question if you as a Committee have the same powers as a Court in terms of the Section or the Act to deal with such issues under these circumstances. I'm merely making this point, Mr Chairman. I'm in your hands in this regard and pertaining to your decision about this. My view is however, Mr Chairman, and that's my submission, that this is something of quite an importance and has an important impact on the future of these proceedings, and for ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: As I read Section 39, it creates a criminal offence which should then be prosecuted criminally. ...(indistinct) constitute us as a criminal Court.

MR DU PLESSIS: As I say I haven't prepared argument, I'm not going to argue that to you, Mr Chairman, I'm merely making a point. I'm going to leave it there.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well, we will now adjourn till tomorrow, but there is one matter I had forgotten, which you have not reminded me of, Mr du Plessis. As I understood there were problems with you on Friday and the question was in that regard, you've told others I think, whether we should change the order of argument and whether that would cause any problems with anybody. Mr Levine, would you object to Mr du Plessis arguing first?

MR LEVINE: No, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Would you Mr Visser?

MR VISSER: Not at all, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well, then you could start tomorrow, Mr du Plessis, which will solve your ...(indistinct) professional problems on Friday.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you very much, Mr Chairman, I appreciate it.

MR BIZOS: Could we have an indication from the parties as to how long, the applicants, as to how long they are likely to take so that we can plan our response to it, Mr Chairman.

MR DU PLESSIS: Well Mr Chairman, from my ...(indistinct)

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct) estimate so that we can actually decide. It's not a - it may be that one of us may come to listen and another be drafting our response in Johannesburg. It's not just an idle enquiry, we merely want to arrange our lives in a manner to put as much of the argument in writing in order to ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Well we I think ask Mr Levine who has taken the trouble so far to file heads, to have done a great deal of the donkey work if I can call it that. How long do you think you'd be, Mr Levine?

MR LEVINE: Mr Chairman, it depends on the old saying: how much injury time is there likely to be, and I cannot say, my heads are about a hundred pages, the documentation being references, are probably 500 pages. I'm certainly going to refer to the documentation, the reports, the articles. A lot of that I must say I certainly cannot take the credit for, a lot of that has also been done by Mr du Plessis. But Mr Chairman, it depends on what questions the Committee might have for me, it depends on what the attitude of the Committee will be, whether they would like me to go through those heads point by point or deal with them on a very, very wide basis. So I'm in the Committee's hands. I have prepared heads on the London bombing, which I will now certainly supplement and then there's a set of heads on the Schoon/Slovo issues, and those will probably be equally as long, but I'm certainly not going to add another set of authorities which are the same. So I cannot say, Mr Chairman. It may well be one day, it may be less.

CHAIRPERSON: It seems to me I have the same problems as you, I don't know if we'll ask any questions or whether we'll sit bemused by the argument, but if one has regard to all of you, that will probably take, I think two days would be a reasonable estimate. I don't know what you think, Mr Visser or Mr du Plessis.

MR VISSER: Yes, I do have the same as both yourself and Mr Levine, Mr Chairman. I would imagine that I could possibly be a day, it might be longer, again depending on what you become interested in what we have to say and what you disagree with. So two days at least.

CHAIRPERSON: Could we say to Mr Bizos that we're unlikely to require his services till next week.

MR BIZOS: ....(indistinct - no microphone)

MR VISSER: If I may be allowed to be so bold as to ask, Mr Chairman, we have various precedents about Friday afternoons and I have chosen in the past to blame it on people who want to go back to their hometowns and want to catch flights and so on, Mr Chairman, you will remind yourself but could I ask, Mr Chairman, for any indication as to whether ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: As I have booked accommodation for two weeks in Pretoria, I'm afraid I'm of no assistance to you.

I am not prepared at this stage to say that we are going to adjourn for Friday afternoon or anything of that nature, it depends entirely on how the argument progresses. But if we finish early on Friday, we'll finish early because Mr Bizos will not be here till Monday.

MR BIZOS: ...(inaudible)

CHAIRPERSON: But we will, otherwise we'll go on. We'll try to not keep you as late as possible, we will bear in mind that you wish to depart elsewhere, but I am not prepared at this stage to say. We're adjourning early today, we have to get through this work as Mr de Jager explained to you earlier in the proceedings. Just bear in mind that you want to get away earlier on Friday afternoon, when you're preparing your argument.

ADV DE JAGER: May I make a request. Would it be possible for you to file, if not the whole argument, as much of it as possible by Friday afternoon, then at least we could also have a look at it during the weekend?

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct - no microphone)

CHAIRPERSON: When you say "you", I take it you will include the legal advisors of the applicants so if they want to prepare any reply they have an opportunity to do so.

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct - no microphone)

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, may I just ...(no sound) gratitude about Friday to you and to my fellow colleagues here.

CHAIRPERSON: 10 o'clock tomorrow morning, gentlemen.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS