Amnesty Hearings

MR VISSER: May it please you Mr Chairman, and members of the Committee, may I refer you Mr Chairman, to an affidavit, brief affidavit, which I handed up before lunch and which I would ask you to mark Exhibit E, if it pleases you Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, allow me to explain the reason for this affidavit being placed before you. Brig Schoon, as you know, has applied for a number of incidents for amnesty to the Amnesty Committee, he set out in his affidavit, Mr Chairman, exactly what Gen Erasmus had told you earlier today and what you had heard on many occasions beforehand, and that was the doubt under which members of the Security Branch of the police laboured at the time when the amnesty process was introduced and was getting off the ground. We know Chairperson, from the evidence of Gen Johan Coetzee in the London bomb matter and in other matters, especially also the Bopape incident, how he went about obtaining undertakings, if not guarantees, from the Chairman and the vice-Chairman of the then TRC, Bishop Tutu and Dr Boraine, with which he allayed the fears of members of the Security Branch. At the end of the day, the result Chairperson, is a matter of record, and that is that a large number of members of the Security Branch, ex-members and even present members, still of the Police Services, applied for amnesty. At that stage, Mr Chairman, as Brig Schoon explains in paragraph 5, that when a decision had been reached for amnesty to be applied for, there wasn't sufficient time. Now, we know Mr Chairman, and may I deal with that point immediately, it has been suggested before when an issue like this was raised before a Committee, but you were then the maker of your own urgency, well, of course that is true in a sense, but Mr Chairman, I would ask you to have some sensitivity of the important step it was for these people to take the decision to apply for amnesty and I would submit with great respect, that it is quite understandable that they wanted as many assurances beforehand as was humanly possible. Be that as it may, the fact of the matter is Mr Chairman, that against this background, the Attorney who is now my Instructing Attorney, did not have sufficient time to deal with more than 100 ...

CHAIRPERSON: Isn't the problem Mr Visser, that for reasons best known to themselves, a number of the senior police officers relied on your Attorney's services? They were convinced that your Attorney knew precisely the best way of handling the matter, and understandably in those circumstances, they all wanted to use him so a great burden was put onto him and they didn't do as they could have done, go to some other Attorney, but they might have had to spend so much time explaining to the other Attorney, that it wouldn't have been in time any way? I think as members of the Committee, we have discussed that, we appreciate the pressures that Gen Schoon was under at the time, and the reasons therefore, you needn't bother any further on that.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I am indeed indebted to yourself and the members of your Committee for having that insight against the background. Mr Chairman, what happened here at the end of the day and we have attached to your affidavit, extracts from the amnesty application of Brig Schoon, and if you would look at that document Chairperson, page 59 thereof, not the whole amnesty application has been included, but there is a typed page 59, it in facts starts ...

CHAIRPERSON: Page 73 and he couldn't even get the two of them right, so close together?

MR VISSER: That is the point. Chairman, really in my respectful submission, it is quite clear that but for the dates and for the substitution of Col Lodewyk de Jager, with Brig Oosthuizen, really this application would have been in order, and quite clearly where he intended to apply for two incidents, the one incidentally is the one that is going to be heard by you next week Chairperson, and that is the one that is dealt with at page 72 under Incident 15, where you will see at page 74, he actually mentions the name Pantsu, Sipho and Buzi. That is the application of next week. At page 59, under Incident 12, Chairperson, if it had said February 1989, and instead of Col Lodewyk de Jager, Oosthuizen, in our respectful submission Chairperson, and if no reference was made as is as page 59 to September machinery in Swaziland, because that is the Glory Sidibe matter which is coming on next week, then it would have been in order, but it isn't strictly in order before you and that is the reason why we apply Chairperson, and may I motivate it on this basis, it is not as if he is applying for an additional incident for which he hasn't applied before. The simple fact is he intended as he says in his affidavit, to apply for both these incidents, they appear to be a duplication the one of the other, and we would ask you Chairperson, and we have agonised on what order we have to ask you, but in the end, the order I would assume with respect, is for you to accept that he intended to be an applicant in the present application, and to allow his application to be heard.

CHAIRPERSON: The only problem we have is that you haven't put up an amended application. Before we hear the application, we must have the wording of the application, which is I think - it would have been easier to change page 73, but if you want to change page 59. If you changed page 73, you only have to change the date and the name, don't you?

MR VISSER: Chairperson, not if you have regard to 74, because there the names of Pantsu, Sipho and Buzi are specifically mentioned.

MR VISSER: You've got to change both. Well, change one or the other.

MR VISSER: Well, 12 has to be changed.

CHAIRPERSON: How do you change it?

MR VISSER: Simply Chairperson, under Section 9(a)(ii) which says ...

CHAIRPERSON: And what about (i)?

MR VISSER: Sorry, (i), that is to be changed Chairperson, in line with the amnesty which is being asked on behalf of the other applicants, and that will be application for amnesty for any deed. Chairperson, in fact I may save you a lot of trouble by handing up his affidavit to you because it is already contained there.

CHAIRPERSON: Where?

MR VISSER: Not the affidavit, his evidence Chairperson. Apparently it has been placed before you, the evidence Chairperson. If you look at page 1, between the tramlines, Chairperson, just under the name of Schoon, we would submit that that is the correct prayer for the application by Brig Schoon.

CHAIRPERSON: Well it is the deed that we are supposed to be putting in in 9(a)(i), which should be the ...

MR VISSER: It should be the murder of three ANC activists.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VISSER: And their names Chairperson, being Louis Mohale, Derek Mashobane and Portia Shabangu and then perhaps Chairperson, if under (ii) the date of 12/13 February 1989, could be inserted Chairperson, Swaziland would be correct and then under (iv), I am sorry, I only referred to de Jager, but it is Lt-Gen G. Erasmus and Brig A. Oosthuizen, the previous witness Mr Chairman, Alfred Oosthuizen. Chairperson, that would bring it in order although at page 60 Chairperson, under (i) at that page, the names are now known and those could be, the same names should feature under (i) and that would take care of it, Mr Chairman. Oh yes, I am sorry, and then at page 61 Chairperson, page 61 Mr Chairman, you will see under 11(b) that Gen van der Merwe gave the instruction. That applies to next week's case, not to this one, here Brig Schoon himself gave the order. (b) would have to read "I myself (perhaps together with Lt-Gen Erasmus) ..."

CHAIRPERSON: Well, no ...

MR VISSER: It is not really necessary, but "I gave the order myself" would be sufficient Chairperson. If you are satisfied Chairperson, I would respectfully move for ...

CHAIRPERSON: Well, let me read them out and see if you agree. We are now going to amend Exhibit E in the following way, at page 59 we are going to strike out the words "optrede teen September masjinerie Swaziland 1986" from paragraph 9(a)(i) and replace them with the words "the murder of three ANC activists", and then it goes on "and any other deed, act or omission."

MR VISSER: That would be in order.

CHAIRPERSON: Paragraph 9(a)(ii), the date is struck out and the substitute therefore is 12/13 February 1989, paragraph 9(a)(iv) the names Lt-Gen Ignatius Coetzee and Col Lodewyk de Jager are struck out and substituted therefore the names Lt-Gen G. Erasmus and Brig A. Oosthuizen. On page 60, paragraph 9(c)(i) the word "unknown" is struck out and the names Louis Mohale also known as Tabo, Derek Mashobane and Portia Shabangu are inserted and at page 61, paragraph 11(b), the words "I understand that the operation was approved by Gen J.B. van der Merwe" and substituted therefore the words "I myself gave the order"?

MR VISSER: May it please you Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, under those circumstances, may I then call Brig Schoon to give evidence before you Mr Chairman. His statement of evidence, will then be F if it pleases you, Mr Chairman.

MR SIBANYONI: Your full names please?

WILLEM FREDERICK SCHOON: (sworn states)

MR SIBANYONI: Please be seated, sworn in Chairperson.

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson. Brigadier, on previous occasions, on various Amnesty Committees, you have given evidence and you have also testified before the Human Rights Violations Committee of the TRC, is that correct?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

MR VISSER: Over and above the opportunities which have been indicated in paragraph (b)(ii) on page 1 of Exhibit F, being Cosatu House, Khotso House ... (tape ends) ... I beg your pardon, that was in Johannesburg, the Pillay abduction from Swaziland, the incident regarding Mbali who was abducted from Lesotho, the murder of two unknown ANC terrorists at Kopfontein, the murder of two PAC terrorists in the Eastern Transvaal, the incident regarding Messrs Pule and Take Five in Botswana and the Cosas 4 group which was eliminated in Krugersdorp, is that correct?

MR SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Previously, you have incorporated Exhibit A into your evidence, regarding the amendments which have been brought to A, have you studied this?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

MR VISSER: And do you still wish that the content of Exhibit A be confirmed and do you request that this be incorporated with your amnesty application?

MR SCHOON: Yes, I request that.

MR VISSER: Mr Schoon, with the permission of the Chairperson, I will simply lead you to the point where you become personally involved. During this incident, you were the Head of Group C at the Security Head Office in Pretoria, is that correct?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Before you go on, you have named a number of incidents, were all these heard as separate incidents, didn't quite a number of them fall under the Marius Schoon application?

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, the recollection of both my Attorney and myself is that they were all separate incidents. It may be that when some of them ...

CHAIRPERSON: What was the Marius Schoon application? What was he applying for?

MR VISSER: For attempted murder Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Of whom?

MR VISSER: Of Mr Marius Schoon, and I see that we have left that out.

CHAIRPERSON: No, you've got Marius Schoon.

MR VISSER: No, it is in the typed version, yes. Yes, but Mr Chairman, although they were heard in succession after or before after other, they were all heard separately.

CHAIRPERSON: Were they?

MR VISSER: Yes, yes Chairperson, and the ones that we have just given you, were all heard in Johannesburg in any event, and not before you, I may add, yes. It won't be necessary to take that any further Chairperson, you have heard the evidence of Brig Schoon prior to this date, and he gave no different evidence in the other matters, so you can accept that. Gen van der Merwe was at the stage February 1989, the Deputy Commissioner of the South African Police, is that correct?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

MR VISSER: And Gen Basie Smit was the Security Head?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And as we have heard, Gen Gerrit Erasmus was at that stage the Head of Group D?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And we have heard that Group D was the Intelligence section?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR VISSER: You state that your recollection regarding the events is quite vague, and you also state in paragraph 4, perhaps you should address the Committee from paragraph 4 onwards regarding your recollection of the incident please, Brigadier.

MR SCHOON: My recollection regarding the events is very vague. I recall that Gen Erasmus discussed the matter with me, in my office. The matter regarding the Sansco members. I cannot recall when it took place, but I infer from the evidence from the other applicants, that this must have been early 1989. Unfortunately I can also not recall the full detail of the discussion, however I believe that the background as testified to by Colonels W. Coetzee and A. Oosthuizen, was discussed in depth during my discussion with Gen Erasmus. Gen Erasmus assured me that he had previously requested the facts and the information regarding the proposed visit of Louis Mohale and members of his group to Swaziland - were requested by him and that he was satisfied that the information was reliable.

MR VISSER: This morning you have listened to the evidence given by Coetzee, Oosthuizen and Erasmus. Are you prepared to accept the correctness of their recollection regarding the background of this incident and the events leading up to this incident?

MR SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Would you proceed with paragraph 7?

MR SCHOON: The revolutionary struggle was still on a very high level of intensity during this period of time and much political violence appeared all over the RSA, during which many persons were killed and injured and property was damaged. In 1989 the position of the former government and the National Party hung in the balance, and the ANC/SACP alliance was successful in its propaganda campaign against the government, particularly abroad. Pressure from abroad which was exerted by the international community on the government, to leave its policy of apartheid, became unbearable. In their struggle to render the country ungovernable and to commit political violence, the ANC/SACP alliance had since the late 1960's recruited more and more scholars and students to participate in the struggle. Particularly on the tertiary educational level. The activities of students were quite alarming. Due to the above-mentioned circumstances, it became clear that we as members of the Security Branch who were the final line of defence, would have to do more and make greater sacrifices in order to maintain the status quo and particularly to prevent that the attempts of the ANC/SACP alliance, to create ungovernability within the country, succeed in placing the country in a state of total lawlessness and anarchy. Against the background of these conditions, I was of the opinion that the Security Branch could not allow the establishment of a new underground combat unit under the leadership of MK in the RSA. We had already experienced much problems to combat the tide of infiltration of terrorists and weaponry from neighbouring States.

MR VISSER: You have heard the evidence of Col Coetzee and Brig Oosthuizen regarding the background and the events leading up to the situation, you state that you were brought under the strong impression that the situation was critical. Was this as a result of the fact that the information indicated that these persons were definitely going to Swaziland?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And you have also summarised the same evidence given by Gen Erasmus and that would be that the Mohale group intended to establish an underground structure of Cosas members and MK members in the RSA and that this structure would be established by students in Cosas, Sayco and Sansco and that they wanted to send or channel members of these structures abroad for the purposes of military training and for the purposes of arming the cell structures so that they could in so doing, enter the armed struggle whereby the revolutionary climate would be intensified, do you agree with that?

MR SCHOON: Yes, I do.

MR VISSER: Very well, please proceed with paragraph 13.

MR SCHOON: I was convinced in the light of certain assurances given by Gen Erasmus, that the group had not been enticed in any way and that it had been their own decision to (a) go to Swaziland, (b) in order to establish contact with MK structures already in existence, and (c) in order to receive military training and weapons there.

MR VISSER: Now did Gen Erasmus inform you that the idea was to maintain control over their movements by means of making a vehicle available to them?

MR SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And that the arrangements would be made for the informer to attempt to establish contact with them, so that they would contact him as soon as they arrived in Swaziland?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Very well, please proceed with paragraph 15.

MR SCHOON: Both Gen Erasmus and I were in agreement that once the group was in Swaziland, and once they had made contact with MK structures there, and had received weapons and training, it would be more difficult to monitor their movements after that. We were in agreement that the group had to be eliminated in Swaziland.

MR VISSER: Very well. One of the witnesses here was asked why exactly in Swaziland and I want to put it to you like this, you state here that you and Gen Erasmus were in agreement that once they were in Swaziland, it would be a done deal, is that exactly what you said?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

MR VISSER: But it is conceivable that on the way to Swaziland, before they had crossed the border, they may have re-thought their actions and turned around?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And what would then have happened to them?

MR SCHOON: Nothing.

MR VISSER: Very well, proceed, paragraph 16.

MR SCHOON: Gen Erasmus and I were also in agreement that in the light of the circumstances of the matter, there was no other exit other than to eliminate them. Arrest and court oriented action was not possible because it was dubious whether or not they had committed any crime before their departure, and furthermore if they had committed an offence, the informer would necessarily have had to be used to give evidence against them, in which case the life of the informer, would be jeopardised and the Security Branch would then be deprived of a well-placed source's services within the various student organisations. Furthermore, on the presumption that they had already committed an offence for which they could be prosecuted and if there was a usable witness, the high intimidation of witnesses and the fears of informers and police officers, had to be borne in mind. Mere detention in terms of Emergency Regulations under the State of Emergency or in terms of Section 29 of the Internal Security Act, were also not viable. Against popular public opinion, persons could not simply be detained for unlimited periods of time, there were strict regulations and requirements which had to be fulfilled in both cases. Furthermore, it was the experience that detention of "relatively unknown" activists would give them a status of honour and fame among the black masses, consequently they would not be detained for very long, based upon the evidence at our disposal. Should they be released, they would be able to negotiate with authority with MK in Swaziland, due to the probable familiarity and status that they would have achieved.

MR VISSER: The point that you are trying to make is locking them up and automatically he would obtain status which would give him better access and conviction with regard to the organisations themselves?

MR SCHOON: That is correct. After the discussion between me and Gen Erasmus, I gave Col de Kock an order to act as the Operational Commander during this action. I tasked him to liaise with the people from Group D in order to obtain the relevant information and to undertake the necessary strategic and operational planning and to execute this in co-operation with those from Group D. After I had conveyed the action to de Kock, I contacted Gen Erasmus and informed him that the operation was to go ahead. Later I was informed that three or four persons had been lured into an ambush in Swaziland and had been killed.

MR VISSER: You were not present during the ambush?

MR SCHOON: No.

MR VISSER: Because it now appears as if there were only three persons within the vehicle, so would this be in agreement with your recollection of what you were informed?

MR SCHOON: I cannot dispute that.

MR VISSER: Very well, proceed.

MR SCHOON: As far as I can recall, I took this decision on my own, without reference to any higher authority. With regard to Col de Kock's amnesty application, I wish to make the following remarks - Col de Kock is mistaken in his opinion, in his recollection that I attended any planning session at Vlakplaas.

MR VISSER: Is that with regard to this matter?

MR SCHOON: Yes, with regard to this matter. He is correct in his recollection that Gen Erasmus and I were indeed at Vlakplaas to hold discussions with Colonels Oosthuizen and Coetzee and himself with regard to a problem which had originated when the motor vehicle which had been made available to the group, was later traced back to the SAP. He is also correct in his recollection regarding what the meeting decided to do in order to solve the problem. In so far as Col de Kock remarks that he is not certain why the persons could not be arrested, reference is made to what has been said above.

MR VISSER: Yes. Brigadier, when Gen Erasmus spoke to you and shared the facts and information with you, and you decided that there was no other way but to eliminate these persons as soon as it appeared that they were in Swaziland, let me just ask you the following, did you prescribe to any person how this operation was to be executed, or what is the situation?

MR SCHOON: No, not at all. I tasked Col de Kock and all the accompanying arrangements were left over to him personally.

MR VISSER: You have paragraphs 25 to 28 of Exhibit F before you and you have studied this and this is also a reflection of the information that you gave to us as your legal team. Do you confirm the content of these paragraphs and your insight and political motive with regard to your participation in this incident?

MR SCHOON: Yes, I confirm that.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, if you are satisfied with me doing it that way, in order to conserve time, I would then move for amnesty to be granted to Brig Schoon in terms of his amended application, as has been amended by yourself and your Committee, for any offence or delict committed by him before, during or after the incident in Mbabane or near Mbabane, Swaziland, on the 12th to 13th of February 1989 in which Louis Mohale alias Tabo, Derek Mashobane and Portia Shabangu were killed. Thank you Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Thank you Mr Chairman, Hattingh on record. Brigadier can you recall with reference to paragraph 19 of your statement, as to when you gave instructions to Mr de Kock and where you gave the instruction to him and where you were when you gave the instruction to him?

MR SCHOON: I do not recall that Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Is it possible that it was at Vlakplaas where you gave him the instruction?

MR SCHOON: I cannot recall Chairperson, whether I discussed this matter with him at Vlakplaas, but that is not excluded.

MR HATTINGH: The instruction was clear that these activists had to be eliminated?

MR SCHOON: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Can you recall whether you supplied him with the political objectives and political motivations, did you tell him why the decision was taken?

MR SCHOON: I do not recall that Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you Mr Chairman, we have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HATTINGH

MR BOOYENS: Booyens, no questions, Mr Chairperson.

NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS

MR CORNELIUS: Cornelius on record, no questions, Mr Chairperson.

NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR CORNELIUS

MR NEL: Thank you Mr Chairman, Nel, I've got no questions for Brig Schoon.

NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR NEL

MR ROSSOUW: Rossouw Mr Chairman, I have no questions.

NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR ROSSOUW

MR BOTHA: Botha, Mr Chairman, I've got no questions.

NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BOTHA

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VAN HEERDEN: Van Heerden, Mr Chairman, I've got some questions. Brigadier, what was Tabo Mohale's role in Sansco?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, I had nothing to do with the persons themselves. The operation was only submitted to me and that is as far as my participation reaches, when I gave permission. Their roles were sketched to me by Gen Erasmus, but what it exactly entailed, I cannot recall any more.

MR VAN HEERDEN: And does the same apply for Portia Shabangu?

MR SCHOON: Yes Chairperson.

MR VAN HEERDEN: And Derek Mashobane?

MR SCHOON: Yes Chairperson.

MR VAN HEERDEN: At this stage you cannot recall what their roles were?

MR SCHOON: Except that it was conveyed to me by Gen Erasmus.

MR VAN HEERDEN: Paragraph 12 of the application, you mention that

"... I understood from Gen Erasmus that the members under Mohale had intended to do certain things."

Can one infer from there that Mohale had played a leadership role?

MR SCHOON: Yes Chairperson, I believe so.

MR VAN HEERDEN: Paragraph 13, you mention there that there were certain assurances by Gen Erasmus that the group was not enticed. Was it a problem that someone may have enticed them to go to Swaziland?

MR SCHOON: No Chairperson, he gave me the assurance that they out of own motivation, wanted to go to Swaziland and that they had not been lured there.

MR VAN HEERDEN: Was this aspect specifically addressed by yourself?

MR SCHOON: I think he mentioned it to me Chairperson. You know we are here talking of things that happened 10 years back.

MR VAN HEERDEN: Would you have questioned him about this aspect?

MR SCHOON: I may have questioned him.

MR VAN HEERDEN: Paragraph 18 of your application, approximately the final sentence there, you say they would have been able to liaise with authority in Swaziland because of the status which they would have had because of their detention. Would this have bettered their position if they went to Swaziland?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, after a person had been detained and was released, he leaves the place of detention with a greater stature than what he had when he was detained in the first place. In other words, his status has risen, he has done something for the liberation struggle.

MR VAN HEERDEN: Would they have negotiated with minor authority in this regard?

MR SCHOON: I don't know Chairperson, but they would have definitely arrived there with greater stature and they could have said "listen, I was detained, I spent 14 days or 28 days in detention on behalf of the struggle."

MR VAN HEERDEN: I have no further questions, Mr Chairman, thank you.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VAN HEERDEN

ADV STEENKAMP: No questions, Mr Chairman, thank you.

NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ADV STEENKAMP

MR SIBANYONI: No questions Mr Chairperson.

ADV SANDI: Just one question, Mr Chairman. Mr Schoon, how often did it happen that your colleagues came to you to ask for permission to eliminate a certain person for whatever reasons they are giving you?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, could you please repeat the question a little louder? My hearing is not of the best.

ADV SANDI: Can I ask the question now? Can you hear me now Mr Schoon?

MR SCHOON: Yes, I can hear you sir.

ADV SANDI: As I understand you, you say in this particular case, you were approached for permission that these people be eliminated, am I correct?

MR SCHOON: That is correct Chairperson.

ADV SANDI: And you did give the permission that they be killed for the reasons that were supplied to you?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, Gen Erasmus came to me with this proposal that these persons be taken to Swaziland where an ambush would be set up for them and in which they would be killed. He supplied reasons as to why they thought this and I accorded with it.

CHAIRPERSON: I don't know if it was a slip of the tongue, but you said Gen Erasmus came to you with the suggestion that these people be taken to Swaziland?

MR SCHOON: No Chairperson, he came with the proposal that they be eliminated, and I accorded with it.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, you were correct, I heard the same, it was obviously a slip of the tongue.

ADV SANDI: My question Mr Schoon, is how often did it happen? Was that something that would happen regularly that people who worked under you, people like Mr de Kock for example, that they would come to you and say "we are asking for permission to kill so and so and these are the reasons why we want to kill him"?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, as far as I know, this was an isolated case and I think why I took the decision that day, there was no one else at Head Office to whom Gen Erasmus could speak and I was just about the senior man.

ADV SANDI: Thank you. Thank you Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: The same did not apply to the other three people who were killed in Swaziland?

MR SCHOON: No Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Or in any of the other occasions for which you have asked for amnesty, this was the only occasion people came and asked your permission to eliminate someone?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, there was one other incident which was handled in Johannesburg, where Potchefstroom's people telephonically contacted me, I think a day before Christmas where there was also no one else who could give them permission and I gave them permission that they launch a cross-border operation to Botswana. These are the two instances that I can recall where I was involved where I personally granted permission.

ADV SANDI: ... incident which you might have forgotten Mr Schoon?

MR SCHOON: I didn't hear the question properly Chairperson.

ADV SANDI: Okay, you can just leave it Mr Schoon.

RE-EXAMINATION B] MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman. My Attorney and I have an uneasy feeling that Mr Sandi is correct. We had been looking at the list and as far as we can recall Chairperson, the case of Pule and Take Five who were killed in Botswana, may have been such an instance, but the one I remember is MK George and MK Brown. If my recollection is correct, that is a matter in which Mr Schoon gave the authority, or the order.

MR SCHOON: No.

MR VISSER: He seems to disagree with me Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, we can check up on those.

MR VISSER: We can check Mr Chairman. In fact I will check tonight, and I will let you know tomorrow.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that all?

MR VISSER: Yes, thank you Mr Chairman.

NO RE-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER

CHAIRPERSON: Where is Mr Schoon at the moment? No ...

MR VISSER: He lives in Pretoria, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Because if you come back with information tomorrow, we may wish to recall him then.

MR VISSER: Yes, yes certainly.

CHAIRPERSON: So perhaps he can be released now, but come back tomorrow morning.

MR VISSER: Come back tomorrow morning, yes, he will be here in any way, thank you Mr Chairman.

WITNESS EXCUSED