CHAIRPERSON: Good morning. The Panel is constituted as before. I assume the representatives are the same, are there any changes?
MR VAN VUUREN: I beg your pardon, I am Gustav van Vuuren and I'm appearing today on behalf of Insp Coetser.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes Mr van Vuuren.
MR VAN VUUREN: Adv Toweel appeared for him previously, but he's no longer available and I will be here for him today, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: The pervious time that we appeared here we decided that he was a necessary witness and I think that there was a subpoena for him. What is the position?
MR VAN VUUREN: Chairperson, he had been subpoenaed indeed, and upon the previous occasion, Adv Toweel argued that there was sufficient grounds for him not to testify. The arrangement was that we would be notified as to when you would be in a position to make a decision on the matter. We were notified to be here today in order to hear that decision.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr van Vuuren, our attitude and decision is that he is indeed a necessary witness and as a result of this, he has to be here. Naturally, he has the right to decide not to be here and not to give evidence, which will have other consequences. Mr Toweel is indeed aware of this. Do you know what his attitude would be?
MR VAN VUUREN: Chairperson, my instructions are that he does not wish to give evidence.
CHAIRPERSON: Regardless of our decision?
MR VAN VUUREN: That is correct, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Then under the circumstances, I will ask the Leader of Evidence to take the entire matter to the A-G, for his attention.
MR VAN VUUREN: Chairperson, may I then be excused?
CHAIRPERSON: Yes.
MR VAN VUUREN: Thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: Who was at the stand on the last occasion?
MR LAMEY: Chairperson, Mr Nortje was under cross-examination. I think that it is Mr Berger's opportunity for cross-examination.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Nortje, I think too much time has passed to expect of you to remember your former oath. Do you swear that the evidence that you will give will be the truth and nothing but the truth, raise your right hand and say so help me God.
WILLEM ALBERTUS NORTJE: (sworn states)
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, you may be seated. Mr Berger?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BERGER: Thank you, Chairperson.
Mr Nortje, I want you just to try and think back to that time and answer the questions that I'm putting to you, to the best of your ability. I know it's been a long time, but I want you to try and just clear your mind of things that have happened in-between and try and go back to that time.
You told the Committee when you gave evidence the last time, that you and a number of members of, or Vlakplaas members had been working in the Ladybrand area, I think it was for the second half of 1985, would that be correct?
MR NORTJE: That is correct.
MR BERGER: And that the general practice was to go down from Pretoria to Ladybrand, say during the first week of the month, to work there until about the 25th of the month and then to come back to Pretoria for a couple of days. Would that be right?
MR NORTJE: That is correct.
MR BERGER: You would remain in Pretoria from the 25th until the start of the next month and then you would go back down to Ladybrand.
MR NORTJE: That is correct.
MR BERGER: Now when was it that you first became aware that Mr de Kock had a source in Maseru, that he was using?
MR NORTJE: I knew that the source was working for Ladybrand, he wasn't working for us. It was only later during that time that we actually got to deal with him, as far as I can recall. I'm not certain whether at the end of the previous month we first returned to Pretoria or whether we stayed there. I really cannot recall whether we returned or whether we remained there, but I believe that the information would already have been available before our departure, there must have been some talk of some action. I'm assuming this.
MR BERGER: Mr Nortje, I'm sorry you're being a bit vague, are you talking about the end of November, beginning of December? That's when you're not sure whether you went back to Pretoria or whether you stayed in Ladybrand?
MR NORTJE: Yes.
MR BERGER: And by the end of November 1985, would you have, or did you know of the existence of Mr McCaskill? Not the fact that there was a source, but did you know of Mr McCaskill as a person?
MR NORTJE: I really cannot tell you, I cannot recall whether we knew about him specifically already at that stage. It is possible that I knew about him, that I knew about the existence of such a source, but I cannot recall anything that would remind me that we had contact with him already.
CHAIRPERSON: Let us put it as follows then. How else would you have been able to decide if you were not in contact with a person?
MR NORTJE: Well if I think about it that way, then we must have had a measure of information and we must have known that the source was in place.
CHAIRPERSON: We all know that that source was Mr McCaskill.
MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct, I'm just allowing my thoughts to wander. It does make sense to me ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Don't let them wonder too far, let us stay with the aspect of the source.
MR BERGER: Well let me ask you the question differently then. What work were you doing in Ladybrand towards the end of November 1985?
MR NORTJE: We were doing the regular patrols, we patrolled the area with the askaris, that was basically our work. We ourselves didn't handle sources as such, not that I can recall at present, perhaps there were one or two, but we were busy with the normal border patrols, because there were regular infiltrations. We were monitoring the border posts, we had people stationed at the border posts and that was basically the work that we were doing.
MR BERGER: The word that you were doing towards the end of November 1985, was the same work that you had been doing since June/July 1985?
MR NORTJE: Yes.
MR BERGER: But there came a time when you started working on a specific operation, am I correct?
MR NORTJE: Well if you say specific, then it occurred when we prepared for the operation 10 days before the time.
MR BERGER: Because prior to that 10-day period, you were not working on any particular operation, am I right?
MR NORTJE: Not that I can recall.
MR BERGER: It was general work, the work that you've just described.
MR NORTJE: Yes, as I recall.
MR BERGER: If you - I know in cross-examination of you the last time, several of my colleagues attempted to narrow that, to shorten that 10-day period down to seven days, down to five days, down to three days, but this morning you've gone back to the 10-day period.
MR NORTJE: Yes.
MR BERGER: Why is that?
MR NORTJE: Well that is what I still recall in my mind, that it was 10 days.
MR BERGER: Yes, because if you would turn to your amnesty application in volume 1, page 19 - do you have it?
MR NORTJE: Yes.
MR BERGER: You'll see in the fourth paragraph on that page you say there
"Approximately 10 days after we arrived in Ladybrand, we launched the operation."
That is still how you remember it, is that correct?
MR NORTJE: Yes.
MR BERGER: This amnesty application was launched in November of 1996, is that right?
MR NORTJE: Yes.
MR BERGER: So this was how you recalled it towards the end of 1996.
MR NORTJE: Yes.
MR BERGER: Then there's another reference to 10 days, if you have a look at page 37, also of volume 1, you'll see there paragraph 9A.4, under "Aard en Besonderhede", numbered paragraph 2, you say
"Members of Unit C1 from Vlakplaas, under the leadership of de Kock, arrived at Ladybrand approximately 10 days before the operation was launched. During this period the source provided daily information to us with regard to the movements of the relevant MK members."
Is that still the way you recall the situation? Do you confirm that?
MR NORTJE: That is how I recalled it, yes.
MR BERGER: And then you go on to say
"The objective was to create a situation by means of this source, that everyone would be together upon one occasion in a specific house in Maseru, in order to launch an attack successfully."
Do you confirm that?
MR NORTJE: Yes.
MR BERGER: Now then in the next paragraph, 3 ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Could you please tell me from whence that plan originated?
MR NORTJE: Chairperson, I compiled my affidavit according to my recollection of the events, there must already have been information when we were still in Pretoria, so I'm assuming that the information came from there. I was not always present with the liaison between Mr de Kock and the people from Ladybrand, I wasn't aware of all arrangements. This is just my recollection of the events.
CHAIRPERSON: But with regard to you, who came forth with the plan to organise a party so that all the persons whom you had targeted would be there together, in order to facilitate the entire operation?
MR NORTJE: There may also have been other discussions, but this is ultimately what took place and I think that that was what the focus was on. At least that was in my mind. There may have been other arrangements, there may have been other discussions.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I accept that there may have been such a consultation, but ultimately the final plan was for a party to be held so that all the people would be together in order for you to shoot them dead. Who came forward with that plan?
MR NORTJE: I think it was during discussions between Mr de Kock and the source that the final plan originated, during the final phases of the operation. That must have been the final plan.
CHAIRPERSON: Were you not part of that planning?
MR NORTJE: I may have been present, I was definitely present during certain discussions during the final planning stages.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Isn't it more probable that you would have been part of the plan?
MR NORTJE: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: And that you agreed that this should be the plan with which the operation would proceed?
MR NORTJE: Yes, I agreed with that.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes. And then the decision was taken that this would be the plan and this would be what would happen, correct?
MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.
CHAIRPERSON: Now when did this take place?
MR NORTJE: As far as I can recall it was during the last few days, the last three to four days before the operation, because the circumstances were not suitable, as I can recall. The source was in place but there were problems with the people in getting them together in one place. Mr de Kock was suspicious regarding the source, he still didn't trust him completely and he made dead certain that it would be the right place and the right time and that is why it took place on that evening.
MR BERGER: Thank you, Chairperson.
Mr Nortje, you will recall a little while ago I questioned you about how your work had changed from general patrolling of the border to focusing on a ...(tape blank) and you said that right from June/July until the end of November, your work was of a general nature and it was only subsequent to that that you focused on a specific operation. You remember that?
MR NORTJE: Yes.
MR BERGER: The operation that we're talking about is the attack on Maseru, am I right?
MR NORTJE: Yes.
MR BERGER: This specific attack with which this incident is concerned, that is the operation that we are talking about.
MR NORTJE: Yes.
MR BERGER: Now it appears from what you've said and from your amnesty application, that the operation, the attack was carried out approximately 10 days after you arrived in Ladybrand. Am I correct?
MR NORTJE: Yes.
MR BERGER: Now if you look at paragraph 3 on page, numbered paragraph 3 on page 37, you go on to say
"Along with myself who was involved in the planning and execution of this operation under command of de Kock, there was also Steve Bosch, Nick, Snor Vermeulen, Joe Coetser, the deceased Anton Adamson, Douw Willemse and approximately 10 black members from Vlakplaas."
Now I know that in your earlier evidence you've already said that Douw Willemse wasn't involved, I'm not concerned with that, but then you go on to say:
"The planning of this operation indeed began at Vlakplaas before we departed for Ladybrand."
Now correct me if I'm wrong, but my understanding is as follows, that already when you were at Ladybrand, before this 10-day period, it must have been immediately before the 10-day period, you and de Kock and the others were already planning this operation. The plan started at Vlakplaas, you then moved down to Ladybrand and 10 days after arriving in Ladybrand, you launched the operation. Am I correct?
MR NORTJE: Yes.
MR BERGER: And so therefore, already at Vlakplaas the target of the Meyer group was already being discussed. The whole operation of how you were going to eliminate the Meyer group, was already being discussion and planned at Vlakplaas.
MR NORTJE: I cannot believe that we had such detail at that point. We may have prepared for an operation, because I'm assuming that we brought our equipment with us from Vlakplaas, but regarding the details I don't believe that we were in possession of all the particulars at that point.
MR BERGER: Well let me just ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: You must have been in possession of sufficient details to make the trek to Ladybrand and to have decided look, the Meyer group must be attacked, not so, otherwise you wouldn't have gone to Ladybrand from Vlakplaas.
MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.
MR BERGER: You see, Mr Nortje, I'm trying to make sense of what you say in your amnesty application, because that was at a time much closer or closer to the actual incident than now, and you're clear that most of your work in Ladybrand was of a general nature and it was only at a certain point when you began to focus - when I talk about you I mean you plural, began to focus on a specific operation. And there was only one operation planned and that is the attack with which we are concerned, am I right?
MR NORTJE: Yes.
MR BERGER: Now dealing with - you'll see at page 36
"The Lesotho operation, December 1985"
you say in paragraph 3 on page 37, that the planning of this operation indeed began at Vlakplaas before we left for Ladybrand. So it's clear from what you've written here, and that's why I ask for your comment if I'm misreading it in some say, it's clear from what you've written here, that already when you were at Vlakplaas, you, de Kock and the others were planning this operation, the operation to eliminate the Meyer group in Maseru. Perhaps the detail of how, you know, exactly how you were going to do it, by way of rubber boats and crossing and the reconnaissance, maybe that detail hadn't yet been worked out, but the planning of an operation to eliminate the Meyer group began already when you were at Vlakplaas. Is there any other way to read what you have written here?
MR NORTJE: It makes sense, yes, it may be so.
MR BERGER: Is there any other way to read what you've written here?
CHAIRPERSON: Would you agree that it must have been that way?
MR NORTJE: I assume that it was that way, Chairperson, that we already may have had that information, but as I've stated regarding the specific details ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: No, no, we are just referring to basic information.
MR NORTJE: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: The Advocate is referring to a decision, not information as such and the planning to execute this decision already began at Vlakplaas, before you departed for Ladybrand. I think that he will still come to the information itself.
MR NORTJE: I beg your pardon, Chairperson, I think we must view it in the light that when we prepared for operations, we always went to the extremes, we provided for everything. So this would have been the ultimate or the ultimate objective to be achieved, but a lot could happen in the meantime. We may have decided to do something else at the eleventh hour, but I'm sure that it was in our minds that we were going on a raid, it would be foreign and that we would be shooting people.
CHAIRPERSON: Especially the Meyer group?
MR NORTJE: Well I assume that in that case it must have been, I didn't know everybody, but their names were already known to us.
MR BERGER: And when you say "alreeds", you're referring to already at Vlakplaas?
MR NORTJE: Yes, I'm assuming so. I cannot recall it pertinently, but I assume that those names must have been known to us because I know that we had the photo albums and their photos were in the photo albums.
MR BERGER: I understand completely what you're saying about how things could have changed when you got to Ladybrand and you needed more detail, but my question is really directed at this, and that is that already when you were at Vlakplaas you had the instruction to launch a cross-border attack to kill certain ANC operatives in Maseru. That was already the position at Vlakplaas. Am I correct?
MR NORTJE: I don't know whether we already had permission, and I'm referring to the situation among us based upon the information that we already had. The final decision and the permission for that only came later when the matter was taken to the people on the higher levels. I am now referring only to our group there.
CHAIRPERSON: Would you have gone to Ladybrand without knowing that authorisation had been given? Would you then have taken all that equipment with you as well?
MR NORTJE: Yes, I believe that we would have gone.
CHAIRPERSON: But why would you go to all that trouble if you didn't know that authorisation had been given? Because you'd be taking a chance in transporting all that equipment from Vlakplaas to Ladybrand.
MR NORTJE: The only explanation that I can offer is that we believed that the information was correct and that is how we operated at that stage. I cannot think of any other explanation.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I can understand that, but let us just leave the information for now. The information based upon which the decision was taken, let's leave that aside for a moment. I want to know, when you left Vlakplaas you certainly must have known that there was authorisation to enter Lesotho.
MR NORTJE: I cannot state pertinently yes or no.
CHAIRPERSON: Then let me assist you. Would you have taken the risk in taking the equipment from Vlakplaas to Ladybrand, if it would have been unnecessary? Because that would be a chance that you would be taking, isn't that so? However, if there had been authorisation, then you would know that the risk was worth it.
MR NORTJE: Well there must have been a certain measure of authorisation, because we couldn't all pile into a vehicle and drive all the way down there without knowing that we were supposed to go there. But whoever extended that authorisation at that stage, it is impossible for me to say.
MR BERGER: Surely you wouldn't have been planning this operation, "hierdie operasie" at Vlakplaas, if someone higher up, maybe unknown to you, but someone higher up hadn't already given an order that such an operation be ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Hasn't he conceded as much?
MR NORTJE: If I may respond. I went on what Mr de Kock said, we responded to his instructions, I wasn't concerned with the higher levels because I accepted his word and we responded to that.
MR BERGER: What sort of planning was carried out at Vlakplaas, in relation to this operation? Can you remember?
MR NORTJE: I cannot recall the details, I cannot see that there was any specific planning, because if I refer to planning then it would be about the weapons, who would be driving where, who would go along on this trip, that sort of decision.
MR BERGER: For the purposes of this cross-border raid.
MR NORTJE: Yes.
MR BERGER: Then you arrive in Ladybrand, this is now 10 days before the attack, so we're talking about round about the 9th of December 1985.
MR NORTJE: Yes.
MR BERGER: And then there's a lot of planning that needs to be done in that 10-day period.
MR NORTJE: Yes.
MR BERGER: One thing that happens, you've told us, is that there's almost daily contact with the source, Mr McCaskill, is that right?
MR NORTJE: Yes.
MR BERGER: There are other things that need to be done, for example the purchasing of the rubber boats, is that right?
MR NORTJE: Yes.
MR BERGER: And that was when you went to Bloemfontein.
MR NORTJE: Yes.
MR BERGER: How far is it from Bloemfontein to Ladybrand, in time, by car?
MR NORTJE: 45 minutes drive, perhaps an hour.
MR BERGER: And that was the time when all of you went into Bloemfontein.
MR NORTJE: I wouldn't say all of us, but I know that I was there, I think Mr de Kock was there, I think Steve was also there and other members as well, but not all of us went with. I don't believe so. We drove only in one car.
MR BERGER: And that was the time when you came back via the Thaba'Nchu Sun and you saw the members of Special Forces?
MR NORTJE: That is my recollection, yes.
MR BERGER: And then there was another trip, there was the trip to Ficksburg.
MR NORTJE: Yes.
MR BERGER: In that 10-day period.
MR NORTJE: Yes.
MR BERGER: And that was the time when you had to go and fix the doors of one of the cars.
MR NORTJE: Yes.
MR BERGER: How far is Ficksburg, in time, from Ladybrand?
MR NORTJE: It is approximately 50 kilometres away, according to my estimation.
MR BERGER: And how many of you went then?
MR NORTJE: We went with a specific purpose because the two vehicles, the two Jettas that we used, I cannot recall whether they went down with us or whether someone brought them down, but these vehicles arrived there at a certain point and they had mechanical faults and if I recall correctly, Bosch and I went to Ficksburg to a place which sold vehicle parts and we replaced the hinges of the doors. We went to purchase these hinges.
MR BERGER: Oh you went to buy the hinges?
MR NORTJE: Yes.
MR BERGER: And then you brought them back to Ladybrand?
MR NORTJE: Yes, and we repaired it there.
MR BERGER: In Ladybrand?
MR NORTJE: Yes.
MR BERGER: And the cars? You say these two Jettas, they didn't come down with you to Ladybrand, someone else arranged for them to come down.
MR NORTJE: I would recall that someone brought them down, yes. Someone phoned or Mr de Kock phoned and said to bring the vehicles. There were other things that we needed as well. That's why I have stated that the planning went along these lines every day and as we made adjustments, we did so.
MR BERGER: And then there were other things you had to do, for example, there was reconnaissance.
MR NORTJE: Yes.
MR BERGER: You went down to the river, is that right?
MR NORTJE: Yes.
MR BERGER: In fact you crossed over the river, you crossed into Maseru.
MR NORTJE: Well I believe that we entered via the border post during that time, in order to familiarise ourselves with the roads and so forth, because to the northern side of the border post we were also looking for places at which to cross. Ultimately however, we decided that this would be the place where we would cross.
MR BERGER: And this reconnaissance of going to the river, going through the border post, going to Maseru, was that all done in one day or was it done on different days?
MR NORTJE: No, it had to have been on different days, so that we could get an idea of the movements of the military on the other side, so that we could determine whether or not there were patrols.
MR BERGER: And also the trip to Ficksburg and the trip to Bloemfontein, was that done one day and then the next day or was it done, were there days in-between?
MR NORTJE: I am not certain, I cannot tell you pertinently.
MR BERGER: It wasn't done on the same day?
MR NORTJE: No, I don't believe so.
MR BERGER: Alright. And then over this 10-day period the plans got more refined and more refined until eventually you got to a point when you were ready, and in fact, am I correct that you were forced to act when you acted on that Friday night, because you got information from McCaskill that he had been approached by the Leon Meyer group to bring them into the country the very next day?
MR NORTJE: Yes.
MR BERGER: So you were forced to act when you acted, because if you had delayed any longer they would already have been in the country?
MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.
MR BERGER: So it wasn't even as though your plans had got to their logical conclusion and now you were ready to act?
MR NORTJE: No.
MR NORTJE: The attack was precipitated by the information that you got that they were coming in?
MR NORTJE: The circumstances led to it.
MR BERGER: Okay. Mr Nortje, then I want to ask you about the night of the attack. When was it that you got the information that Leon Meyer was no longer at the house where the party was being arranged?
MR NORTJE: As I said, we went across the river, Mr de Kock was along with Mr McCaskill, he and Mr Adamson, and we waited at a point after Vermeulen and I and Bosch waited in the car, in the Jetta, and we were standing in a lane in-between houses, but Mr de Kock and them knew where we were, they came to call us and then they said it's fine we can go and then we arrived at the T-junction where he says it's the garage. I say it's the post office, but I believe ...(intervention)
MR BERGER: When you say "he says", who are you referring to?
MR NORTJE: McCaskill. We stopped there and there I heard for the first time that Meyer had already left the house ...(intervention)
MR BERGER: Who did you hear that from?
MR NORTJE: Mr de Kock must have told me because he spoke to McCaskill. And then he said - now I'm not sure whether he had already sent the guys or whether he climbed into the car and told us and then we drove away. That is how I believe it happened. We then drove to the house where McCaskill's house was and Coetser and the others went to the other house.
MR BERGER: Were you present when Coetser and Adamson and McCaskill were sent to the Meyer house?
MR NORTJE: I did not speak to them, no, I can only recall, I think it was in the car there, I did not get out of the car.
MR BERGER: Did you hear the instruction?
MR NORTJE: No.
MR BERGER: You knew that Leon Meyer was - well you knew that Leon Meyer had left the party.
MR NORTJE: Yes.
MR BERGER: You got that information, you think from Mr de Kock.
MR NORTJE: Yes.
MR BERGER: And you understood why it was necessary for Coetser and Adamson and McCaskill to go to the Meyer House, because Leon Meyer was a target.
MR NORTJE: Yes.
MR BERGER: Did you know that Jackie Quinn, his wife, Leon Meyer's wife was with him?
MR NORTJE: I can tell you now that yes, I knew, but then I'm saying it because afterwards I knew the whole story. I cannot pertinently recall whether I knew it at that stage.
CHAIRPERSON: You must have accepted it as a very strong possibility.
MR NORTJE: Yes, I shall agree with that, and it was not a problem for us, I believe it was not a problem for us because I cannot pertinently recall that we said we shall not shoot the woman or something like that, that was not discussed.
MR BERGER: In all your planning of attacking the Meyer group, was Jackie Quinn ever mentioned as a target?
MR NORTJE: Her name only came about afterwards. There may have been talk of his wife, but the names that I can recall that we were busy with ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: But Mr Nortje, the evidence up till now is that the persons that had to be killed were the persons who were identified and persons who used to come to South Africa, is that not so?
MR NORTJE: The woman Jackie was never amongst them.
CHAIRPERSON: Is that not so?
MR NORTJE: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: Because she at that stage was not a target because she shouldn't have entered into South Africa, do I have it correctly?
MR NORTJE: Yes.
MR BERGER: As I understood your evidence - remember we were talking about the attack being precipitated, your evidence as I understand it, is that the targets of your attack were the people who were, on your information, about the enter South Africa to carry out their own attack.
MR NORTJE: Yes.
JUDGE KHAMPEPE: And that has been your evidence, Mr Nortje, that has been your evidence throughout your evidence-in-chief, that the primary objective of the attack was to eliminate those who intended infiltrating the country.
MR NORTJE: Yes.
MR BERGER: Now when you had carried out your attack and you then met with Coetser, Adamson and McCaskill, you then got a report-back on what had happened at Leon Meyer's house, is that right?
MR NORTJE: Yes, they could have said that they shot the people. I think already there they said that they had shot Meyer and his wife, but they left the child. I assume during that time, up to the time that we met and the time that we left across the border, it had to be discussed.
MR BERGER: And was this both Joe Coetser and Adamson who were reporting this to you?
MR NORTJE: I cannot say which one of the two it was, it could have been both of them, it could have been Adamson. I'm not sure, Sir.
MR BERGER: It could have been Adamson, it could have been Coetser?
MR NORTJE: Yes.
MR BERGER: But what you are certain about is that they were both together when one or both of them was relaying what had happened.
MR NORTJE: Yes, I shall assume so.
MR BERGER: And what was the reason given for killing Jackie Quinn, for killing the wife of Leon Meyer?
MR NORTJE: The story about the fact that she had grabbed the weapon, I think that was the reason and ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Which weapon?
MR NORTJE: The silent weapon.
CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible - no microphone)
MR NORTJE: Yes, Coetser or someone had it and this person then shot her when she pulled off the silencer and then they went into the house and then I think they found Leon in the bathroom and he apparently had a firearm with him and they shot him.
MR BERGER: So the impression you got from Coetser and Adamson was that they hadn't intended to kill Jackie Quinn, but that they had killed her because she had mixed in, she had grabbed the silencer.
MR NORTJE: Yes.
MR BERGER: From the gun.
CHAIRPERSON: Can I get some clarity here because it's important for us, and I apologise for asking you because Coetser has refused to give evidence. I would just like to get some clarity, the child and the woman who looked after the child were not shot, am I correct?
MR NORTJE: No.
CHAIRPERSON: And Meyer's wife was shot because she interfered by grabbing the firearm and she was shot then. Is that the only thing that was said? Did the person who fired the shots, the person who killed this woman, did he act out of self-defence or did he shoot just to shoot everything that would have stopped him from shooting Meyer?
MR NORTJE: I think, Sir, if I have to draw an inference here, the circumstances went wrong when she grabbed the firearm and then they started panicking and I think this had a reaction, or this caused the reaction.
CHAIRPERSON: So the reaction, would that have been self-defence?
MR NORTJE: I believe that it would have been what one had to expect there.
CHAIRPERSON: Specifically if she was not on the list of targets?
MR NORTJE: Yes.
MR BERGER: Thank you, Mr Nortje, I've got no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR BERGER
MS PATEL: Thank you, Honourable Chairperson, I have no questions for the witness.
NO QUESTIONS BY MS PATEL
CHAIRPERSON: Has everybody had a chance to cross-examine? Then we must go back to Mr Lamey. Mr Lamey, have you got any questions?
MR LAMEY: I've got no re-examination, thank you Chairperson.
NO RE-EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY
ADV BOSMAN: No questions.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Nortje.
MR NORTJE: Thank you.
WITNESS EXCUSED
MR LAMEY: Chairperson, the next applicant is Mr Steve Bosch.
