Mr Chairman, the requisite notices in terms of Section 19(4) were issued to the implicated persons. There's no appearance on behalf of implicated persons. There were substantial notice given to victims and there are several victims in attendance today, the names of which will later be furnished to the Committee. There is no legal representation on behalf of victims at this stage.
As evidence leader I've explain the process to the victims present and they are happy to go along with the evidence leader representing them in a fashion, up to a certain point. They would also require, as in the other applications, for the Committee to allow them an opportunity to ask questions and/or address the Committee at the relevant stage.
MR PRIOR: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, before we proceed with the applications proper, may this be an appropriate time to introduce the documentation onto the record, which I understand has been agreed to by my learned friend, Mr Mbandazayo?
Mr Chairman, I have provided the Committee with a bundle of documents, may I first refer to the PAC Submissions, with respect, or the APLA submissions made at the HRV Hearings in October last year. I don't intend to refer at all to the hearings or the submissions made in August Mr Chairman, but the bundle that commences with the small type which relates specifically to the evidence given from the 7th of October.
MR PRIOR: But for the purposes of these hearings, yes Mr Chairman. Could we mark that Exhibit A? Mr Chairman, Exhibit B, I would request the Committee to accept at this stage the bundle of documents which is headed Truth and Reconciliation Commission Amnesty Hearings with the comprehensive index, if that could be marked Exhibit B?
Copies were handed to my learned friend, Mr Mbandazayo. At this stage we accept that the documents are what they purport to be and may be referred to in the bundle as Exhibit B. That is confirmed by my learned friend.
MR PRIOR: Mr Chairman, this morning the Committee was also handed a separate bundle of documents, it is actually affidavit with annexures from Thobela Dlambisa. May we conveniently refer to that as Exhibit C?
MR PRIOR: As the Committee pleases. Mr Chairman, an additional document is the bundle of photographs that is available, the master copy is available and copies are presently being prepared. If we may just at this stage mark it Exhibit C, that is with the exception of the photographs which the Committee didn't think necessary, thank you Mr Chairman.
Mr Chairman sorry, there's just one other matter regarding a notice. Given the large number of persons affected by this matter in King William's Town at the time and given the difficulty in tracing all the persons from records that were available, it was felt desirous to make publication in the local newspaper, the Daily Despatch, which I understand was arranged by Mr John Allen of the Media Departments of the TRC which had run an article about the King William's Town attack, the fact that the amnesty application be running this week, the 6th to the 9th of April.
I unfortunately do not have a press clipping but one is available I understand at the East London office. In addition thereto, the club captain was contacted at the King William's Town Golf Club and a general notice was pinned up on the notice board of the clubhouse two weeks ago, which set out in general terms that all persons having an interest in this particular matter had to contact the TRC as a matter of urgency.
MR MBANDAZAYO: Mr Chairman, both applications, there's no major difference, there's no difference in those applications Mr Chairman, but we would request the Committee to rely on the typed one which I think will be the second one and we start from page 7 Mr Chairman.
MR MBANDAZAYO: Mr Chairman, that's the reason - I've noticed that Mr Chairman. Also I've gone through with the applicant Mr Chairman, regarding this application and also he is of the view that the second application which should be referred to by the Committee because it was never sworn in, he just appended his signature Mr Chairman.
MR MBANDAZAYO: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, I will be leading the applicant and I'll be reading from his affidavit. As we go on I will request him to expand on some of the issues which are being raised by him in his affidavit.
"I, the undersigned, Thembelani Tandekile Xundu do hereby make an oath and say that I am the applicant in the King William's Town Golf Club attack. Having submitted by application in December 1996"
CHAIRPERSON: I don't think it's necessary for you to read the whole of the affidavit. I take it your client has read it and he can confirm the correctness of it? And then I think you should lead him on the points where you wish him to amplify or explain.
"I rose through the ranks of APLA up to the level of Regional Commissar and ultimately to regional commander"
MR XUNDU: Okay, if I may explain. What I was trying to say here is that I started off as an ordinary force within the Azanian People's Liberation Army and rose through the ranks as per the hierarchy which existed and noticeably changed from time to time, up until the position of Regional Commissar. And ultimately, when I say ultimately I mean just before 1994's general elections, I held the position of regional commander.
MR XUNDU: Okay. To start with, being a regional commander was a position or a responsibility that was given to a particular person because of whatever reason, It was not a position that made somebody to be area bound.
In may case particularly, I was regional commander in the Eastern Cape. When I say the Eastern Cape, it started from across The Kei up until the former Eastern Cape, as it was demarcated in the previous apartheid system.
MR LAX: When you say: "across the Kei", do you include what was formally called the Transkei or how far up towards that area and so on, just so that we can be clear about this because it's getting bit vague?
MR XUNDU: Although, if I'm at Transkei, I don't cease to be a regional commander but I don't have control over the forces and the programmes that were carried out in the Transkei, there was a regional commander for the area. So my area of responsibility started across the Kei.
MR XUNDU: It's seems as if I will have to revisit my geography but I think it should make some sense to you when I say across the Kei up until the former Eastern Cape in as far as the demarcation of this country was concerned during the apartheid era.
"I was part of the APLA unit which attacked the King William's Town Golf Club in November 1992. In respect of this operation I received instructions from comrade Leklapa Mpashlele"
I mean comrade Leklapa was the director of operations and it is common sense and common knowledge that it should be the person who sanctions the operation if it is an APLA operation. In this case particularly he sanctioned the operation or he approved the operation, that is what I'm trying to say.
Mr Xundu, I notice that at paragraph 8, immediately before the one you are on at the moment, you say that units were only formed for specific operations. Was a specific unit set up for this operation? Would you like to tell us about that?
MR XUNDU: Not necessarily. I mean to - why I saw the point being relevant to be mentioned for the consumption of the TRC, was simply for the reason that we - or I put you in light of the modus operandi of the Azanian People's Liberation Army.
MR XUNDU: I think I'll have to say: "Yes", given the way the command structure was structured. Right from the director of operations he had two deputy directors. From the two deputy directors there were regional commanders. From the regional commanders, regional commissar, area commanders, area commissar, the list goes down.
Now in the case of Ekudu detachment, in the area of responsibility that it was given, it means an operation that is to be executed within the area of the Ekudu detachment are of responsibility. The regional commander is playing and the regional commissar, the two of them, the command structure is playing a pivotal role and he reports directly up to the deputy directors or reports straight up to the director of operations. In that way the director of operations is aware and the operation, if it is and APLA operation, has his blessings.
MR LAX: Perhaps you could share Mr Mbandazyo. There is a breakdown of the Sobukwe regiment, I think it's been correctly prepared. I'm not quite sure on what base it was prepared but are you saying that above that there would then be your area commander, are there your area commanders, district commanders and above that, your two deputy directors of operations and the director of operations? That is what is not reflected on that organogram, if you can call it that.
MR XUNDU: Okay. This particular organogram, I don't know whether the SAC, SAP managed to get hold of this thing, but in as far as the operation of King William's Town Golf Club's timing is concerned, this is outdated, this one. I think ...[intervention]
MR XUNDU: And then regional commanders. Now regional commanders would be regional commanders in different departments, intelligence, logistics, repossession units, commanders for the operations department. It then runs down to area commanders down to a cell.
MR XUNDU: Okay, there isn't that much difference but I understand there is a difference, conventional speaking, but that's not the point for today. The emphasis between a unit and a cell, you say that a cell is relatively smaller than a unit. It may be a cell of two people of three people but when we are talking about a unit it would be a commander, a commissar and a logistics officer, ordinance officer, depending on the tasks and the purpose of setting up that unit.
MS GCABASHE: So it depended on the complexity of the mission whether you'd have just a small number, which I'm assuming would be the cell, or the larger logistics, intelligence whatever or the components making up a unit, is that what we determine?
MR LAX: Well, this operation, the target was chosen presumably, then a reconnaissance of certain intelligence must have been carried out and then a decision was taken to execute the operation. At what stage was the director involved and at what stage would his permission have been required? That is what we would like you to explain to us.
MR XUNDU: I will start with the last part. The approval from the director of operations for an operation would be obviously before the operation is carried out, where the political objectives for the operation have been discussed thoroughly and it has been established that it will not run out of the mandate of APLA, as given by the PAC and it did not have adverse political effects on the image of APLA and the image of the PAC.
MR XUNDU: I think to put the record straight and so that you are clear in any questions that you may ask, let us just confine ourselves into the run-up of the golf club attack until it was carried out.
MS GCABASHE: If I might just interject. I understand the applicant simply to be saying that it's easier for him to relate how questions to this specific application that is before us ...[intervention]
CHAIRPERSON: Do I understand, and I'm looking at your affidavit now, the original suggestion came from comrade Leklapa, he gave you instructions and identified the target and then you had discussions after that?
"The armament used in the operation was very true the efforts of comrade Skumiso Nxunuba who was my immediate senior"
MR LAX: Just answer my question. Was there any difference between, is there a difference between an M26 offensive grenade or an M26 defensive grenade or is the only reason they are listed differently because of the purpose for which they were intended to be used? It's really a very simple question, I'm not emphasising anything.
"On my capacity of regional commissar charged with getting the ball rolling operationally and intelligence wise, I recommended that the personal in the name of comrade Bheki, Vido and Togela Mlaswisa must be deployed in my area of responsibility. Due to the fact that comrade Skumiso was my commander, he received recommendation directly from me, after which he did the necessary consultation and later approved it for execution"
"On my capacity as regional commissar charged with the task of getting the ball rolling operationally and intelligence wise"
was- merely tries to say, as the regional commissar part of my functions included logistic functions, included the intelligence function like the information collection or data collection, as you may call it in civilian terms, and the ...[indistinct] of the security situation in my area of responsibility.
MR XUNDU: It was a small division. There was a lot of other targets that we had so it was my duty to collect information from them and keep my senior commanders up to date with regard to the developments operationally and security wise.
At some stage it was my responsibility, when I saw it appropriate, to make a recommendation such as that equipment must be deployed in the area for this and that, personnel must be deployed in this area, looking at the challenges that we have operationally speaking, looking at the logistical resources that were available to our present organisation.
MR XUNDU: Okay. Regarding the golf club, the method of information collection that I did was that I went to the golf club, was there playing golf for practices and as I was one of the bagmen I used to converse with them, build up the cover story that I was a student, I was a student five years back, my parents couldn't manage fees so I'm in a drive to collect some fees for me.
And then, there were a lot of other black guys who did that there, we were given 50c, some paid 20c, ridiculous enough, R2. So I got to know everything, every development and I was giving feedback to my commanders almost after every two days. Used to go the Transkei or comrade Skumiso used to come to this side if I have information that I cannot relate over the telephone. That is how we managed, that is why the information we had was accurate.
In fact, if I may add, after some time, because I presented interesting stories, comrade Lester, if it is worth mentioning for the conjunction of the TRC, but comrade Lester could not believe for instance, when I tell him: "Comrade you see I was given 20c for having carried that bag the whole day", he couldn't believe it.
He came down to King William's Town and then we went together, the two of us, and if - but I don't know if it's Mr who?, but there was a certain gentlemen there if I remember very well, what I understand is that he was either an official or secretary or what but he had an office right in the club there.
He used to come there and we used to talk to him. That's the person from which we got that there will be a party on such and such a day and that is how we got that information. So he came down and I remember his first payment was 25c.
MR XUNDU: Okay. There mere fact that they are here, it means that they have not applied for amnesty, that is the first point. The second point is that the names I can recall, know about them, I don't know if they are real names and I have just recalled that comrade Bheki was also Jerry and Vido, it ends there, there's nothing else that I know.
Perhaps if the administration of APLA at that point in time which was under the late comrade Power or the former captain Ngigelani, he died in certain conditions in Cape Town, I mean, if I look at this big file there is also something which he alleges. Ama policeman forced him to write at a time when he was ...[intervention]
MR XUNDU: Now he was a person who was in charge of administration, who had record of the names and what and what or even perhaps some other intelligence, I mean officers, for one reason or another they could have that, I don't know.
MR XUNDU: Comrades Skumiso Nxunuba was also my friend, close friend so through that we knew each other, he was even known by my parents and I'm even known by his parents. And Togela Mlangwesa, I once lived at his home, I think for something like a month ...[indistinct]. That is how it is possible that I know them.
"After we had found accommodation we had frequented, frequently at various places, comrades Skumiso was the commander of the unit and I co-ordinated and arranged these meetings. I was assisted in finding accommodation by Longsumzwonk Entindele"
MR XUNDU: Okay. When opening in a new area, because I was the first person from the department of operations to be deployed there, you would be given by some other APLA members who had done some sort of ground work, a contact, some person to work with who can, let me say, guide you in as far as certain things which are of critical importance are concerned.
"before the attack we went to see the target in order to acquaint ourselves, that is myself and Skumiso, and later on took the rest of the unit on the day of the attack, for final reconnaissance"
"and later took the rest of the unit, on the day of the attack, for final reconnaissance or the area"?
"The strategy is quite normal, give the modus operandi of APLA, in order to secure the operation, operatives and the target.
Now, we didn't inform our forces anything about the target so that we can prevent information leaking, I mean it is quite normal within the APLA. Now the way that I designed the plan for the operation, if I may come to that so that your question is at least answered, by that we had three elements which I will explain when we are at paragraph 18, the reconnaissance party, the security party, execution party.
Now at the end of the day, although we had to secure information from leading, we also had to be fair to our forces so that they can see the place which they are going to attack, confirm deployment areas and see the practicability and workability of the whole operational plan.
Now we took them in the last hours, just on the day of the operation, for final reconnaissance. Now to acquaint them with the place - well, like you see here is how the golf club stands and after that we will present the plan, did you see on that particular spot, that's where you will be deployed, you would be required to this, this and this, that is actually in a picture of what is going to happen, where what is expected of you.
And also the question of - one of the things which APLA saw as very, very important, which is retreat. We used to have about three or four options for retreating. So the forces must be, for purposes of command and control during the operation, the forces must know thoroughly that is we take option A, they do not go that way and that way and that way, we do one uniform thing, option B etc.
CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, before you go on, am I right in understanding you to say that the unit was also given an opportunity to discuss and confirm the practicality of the plan, they could make suggestions as to different methods of doing it?
CHAIRPERSON: If you're at the scene, looking at the thing, they can have an input, they can make suggestions but they have not final decision, it is the person in charge of the operation who has the final decision?
"As I have indicated in paragraph 10, the arms and ammunition used in this attack was supplied to me by comrade Skumiso. I arranged for their transportation route from Umtata to Thembasa. They were brought to me by comrade Malusi Morrison"
MR XUNDU: Okay. As part of my functions as a regional commissar by then, it was my duty to see that the movement of personnel, the movement of arms, was through the safe channels and through the safe route. So the route that I established was via, I think it was the turn just before you reach Queenstown to Cathcart, Cathcart, Stutterheim and then Thembasa.
And then to say I arranged for that transportation, is that it was myself who put in a requisition with comrade Power, the administrator by then, that I would need transport and recommend the type of transport, a bakkie or a sedan car to do this and that so that he can spare one bakkie for me if I want a bakkie on that particular day.
"We disclosed on the day of the attack, that we were to attack the King William's Town Golf Club. A day before I commanded a crack unit consisting of comrade Bheki and Togela Mlangwesa which went on a mission to take a car to be used in the operation, which was found in Butterworth. We took the car by force, we did not harm the owner and we promised to bring it back. The car was a white Jetta"
MR XUNDU: If we take a closer look into the way APLA operated, obviously there was supposed to be some transport used for the operation, and it could not be for instance, a car that we know is known by the police, those cars which moved around Umtata and Butterworth, it must be a car which was not known that it was being used by APLA operatives. So it was in that light that we went to Butterworth.
We couldn't take that car from King William's Town, we couldn't take that car from East London for obvious security reasons. You see, we regarded King William's Town, East London, as the heart of the security forces in the Eastern Cape. I mean, the situation security was a witness for me, there was, I think their headquarters were based in East London, there was also group 8 which was the army base here, so there was a heavy concentration of security forces.
And to take a car in East London or in King William's Town, we will just be alerting the security forces that they must be hunting for that car and then we couldn't operate in that particular area where they are busy looking for the car. So those are the facts which drove us to go to Butterworth and find the car.
MR XUNDU: Yes, we took the car by force, in the sense that it was not through the concern of the owner, it was unexpected but because we are not criminals we were doing that for the sake of getting transport so that we can be in time with the operation of the golf club.
MR XUNDU: Okay. I pointed a firearm at him and asked for the key, he gave me the key, took him into the car, ordered the drive to drive, which was comrade Togela Mlangewesa. Then at some point in time, I can't remember, we dropped him off. We made sure that he had enough coins to take the nearest transport to Butterworth and off we went.
MR XUNDU: Okay. I don't whether you want me to give an eight figured reference of the DLB which, because I do not have a map of the area, it will not be possible but the arms were kept right in the location. A DLB, I think everybody here is acquainted with the language, DLB, the letter box where you dig up, make it safe so that you can store some arms there. That is where the arms were kept and constantly checked for ...[indistinct].
MR LAX: Sorry, the last part of what you said was very indistinct because you were quite far away from the mike, just repeat it please. You explained what a dead letter box was and then you just said something at the end which I couldn't hear at all.
"For the first time on the day of the operation I presented the plan, briefing the members of the unit on the target. The operation was as follows: We were a unit of five operatives, Bheki was appointed as a commander and was carrying an AK47. He was deployed outside the building within the hearing distance of comrade Vido. Vido was deployed outside the building at the back and was armed with molotovs and an Uzzi submersion gun. Myself and comrade Skumiso deployed inside, comrade Skumiso at the bar and myself at the party hall. I was carrying an R4 assault rifle and on offensive M26 grenade and defensive M26, all reinforced. Comrade Skumiso carrying an R5 rifle and same types of grenades and the drive, Togela Mkangwesa was at the car"
Now my first point will be, how was it possible - can you explain to the Committee, that as you have explained the organogram of APLA that there was a regional commander and comrade Skumiso according to you was a senior member and also you were senior, how was it possible that you were commanded on this operation by comrade Bheki? And also that the driver of the car, comrade Togela Mkangwesa, can you explain how he was armed? Can you take the Committee through that paragraph and explain the details of the operation as you brief them?
MR XUNDU: Okay. Let me rather take the Committee through in this format. The way I drew up the operational plan was as follows: There was a reconnaissance party and the commotion of the reconnaissance party was all the operatives although they were to go there in different timings and we had to consider the security of the operation or the security of the target, but every operative, all the operatives were part of the reconnaissance party.
I have already indicated that they only became part of the reconnaissance party during final reconnaissance. Then there was also a security part. The security party were those people where there was also a command post, a command post, that means that was the commander for the operation had to be stationed, somebody who can be able to have a full view of whatever development is happening during the operation and be able to give commands.
That composed of comrade Bheki, he was appointed commander, comrade Vido and the driver. Then there was also lastly the execution party. I think that is where you get it finally. The execution party actually composed the most senior people, myself and comrade Skumiso.
The reason why we appointed or the reason why I think comrade Skumiso appointed comrade Bheki as the commander is that we were building our forces for leadership and the fact that, I think some 5 months thereafter, he was promoted from the position of being an ordinary force into an area commander. It's quite indicative of the fact that we are right on track.
And simply because we had trust and confidence over the plan, operationally speaking and that each and every force understands the role that is going to be played by each and every operative in the operation. And therefore, equipped with that knowledge, equipped with that information and coupled with the training that he had received from APLA, it was possible that given a change, he can command. And the success or the failure of the operation, I think it proves me correct.
So if I may add, comrade Bheki was to command, as soon as we entered the gate he takes over the command and as soon as we go out of the gate I take over the command, went to the RV, as soon as we reached the RV comrade Skumiso takes over the command. That was the circumstances.
MR XUNDU: Okay. According to the execution party, would be the people who enter the two entrances - if you have a picture of the golf club, under the command of comrade Bheki who was positioned in the security party and who was expected to give a signal for withdrawal at an appropriate time.
As soon as we get off the vehicle, went through the entrance of the golf club and as per the plan, comrade Lester went to the right, to the bar if I remember very well, I haven't been to the place since then, then myself to the party hall.
The plan was as follows and we adhered to it, that to first to catch the inning with the element of surprise, create confusion, we must first throw the grenades and I think I must have thrown the reinforce offensive grenade. I'm saying reinforced because it is the way that, apart from its original form from the factories, we glued in quite many nails to reinforce the shrapnel effect so that it can cause much more damage.
So it means that an offensive grenade, we could make if a defensive grenade in terms of the shrapnel effect and a defensive grenade, we could make it something more. So I threw that grenade, waited for it to explode. I made sure that I threw it in-between the -okay right in the passage, in the middle of the passage, so that it can injure or kill as many people as it possibly could.
After that I fired some shots. Now the reason I fired shots was, it was appreciated that if there is such a senior National Party member, Mr Radoo or Radu or whatever you call it, then it means there will be his VIP team, there will be senior police officers, senior army officers and national intelligence, the CIS and in fact right on that note, the information that we received from the man that I do not know, I cannot recall his name but he is the person I referred to earlier on as the person who was either the secretary or the person maintaining the club, but I understand he had an office there, he said, he described to us the way - it was historic, I mean that occasion, senior citizens would be there and he said in his own words: "Learned people" because he knew we were hungry for education,: "Learned people, senior army officers, senior police officers".
So we expected that some member of the security forces would be conscious enough, in light of the confusion that is made by the grenade, to respond or to fire back. So I shot some, a few shots so that I can actually pin down that particular person. I think comrade Lester did the very same thing on the other side and then the withdrawal signal as planned, then we withdraw.
Now the manner in which we were going to withdraw was as follows: The car, whilst the grenade is going off and some shots are being fired, was idling, moving very slow, prepared for moving at any time and as soon as we withdrew, the car moved very, very, slowly, idling. The other comrades got into the car and then I was to be the first person, I mean the last person to get into the car so that I can cover the back because now we are facing the other side and the target was this side so we had to make sure that nobody comes out and gives us some problems whilst we are going away.
MS GCABASHE: Can I just ask, you talk of the gate, and I know we will be given photographs later of the scene, was there a barrier at the gate or where they gates that opened and shut? Could you just describe that?
MS GCABASHE: Thank you. Sorry, before you continue Mr Mbandazyo, the other point was, the presence of Mr Radu and the security people, the senior people of East London, do you know if in fact they were there?
MR XUNDU: Yes. And in fact, away from that gentleman being the source, there were many other sources. I mean today we used to serve this particular boss, today this boss, today this boss, we were collecting information and when we do a debriefing at the end of the day we compare the information received from that Mr and that Mr and then it made one thing.
"On Tuesday I ordered comrade Lugesa Ntintili to assist us to dispose the car and it was for the first time that he had some knowledge about the operation. I ordered him to drive the Jetta and I drove his maroon rover. We disposed the car on the road between Fort Beaufort and Grahamstown. Comrade Ntintili was in the Jetta and myself and Vido were in the Rover"
Now can you explain to the Committee how - you told the Committee that comrade Ntintili provided you with accommodation, how was it possible that he did not know that you were going to attack the golf club, in view of the fact that in paragraph 22 you already said that you have given to him weapons? Can you explain that to the Committee?
MR XUNDU: Okay. As I have indicated earlier, there was no way that somebody who has nothing to do with the operation could know about it before the operation, even after the operation, there was no way that they could go to him and say: "We have done this, and that", for obvious security reasons.
So he only got an indication when the situation demanded so because we had to dispose the car. I mean that is what the situation operational demanded otherwise you get caught by the enemy forces. So comrade Ntintili knew absolutely nothing about the operation until I ordered him to accompany us so that we can dispose of the car.
And I think, if I remember very well, he asked: "What for"?, because a Jetta that could take us from point A to point B within a short space of time and he knew that we had problems with regard to transport. So I told him that: "This car is a most wanted car in the Eastern Cape", at the time. To him, as I could look to him, I mean ...[indistinct] did not have given him enough signal that it was the car used there.
MR MBANDAZAYO: Now, can you explain to the Committee, you wanted to dispose the car, the reason why you wanted to dispose the car, as you indicated earlier on that you promised the owner that you will bring back the car?
MR XUNDU: Okay. It is worth mentioning that in that point in time, 1992 November or let me say, right from June, that was the time marked by a high level of tension between the people and the security forces and that was at the height of the conflict brigadier Gqozo and the ANC.
And subsequent the that the apartheid system reinforced Gqozo through providing him assistance, we noticed the deployment of the SADF and if I remember very well, they had three patrol bases, one right in town, one in Zwelitsha, one behind Xnesha which served, I mean which used to take some small detachment and do mobile patrols in Thembasa, Thembisa.
So given that heavy presence of the security forces, we had to get rid of the car as soon as possible. But furthermore, when we took the car, we initially intended to drive it as far as Queenstown and just drop it near a police station with the key in because we knew that at the end of the day the owner was going to get it.
Now we drove off and as we drove off Thembasa right to King William's Town - brigadier Gqozo had what was it called? a peace force, a certain paramilitary click that wore a black uniform, if I remember very well, so as soon as we were on the national road we were noticed by these gentlemen. And also there was another chap driving a Monza, it was part of the apartheid spies that was stationed or deployed in the Ciskei system, the chap was driving a Monza and he was staying in Thembisa.
He spotted the car and I think I can confirm because he could provide a little bit of information to his bosses the SAP, so those chaps could not give us enough chance to do as we have planned. In fact they tried to stop us, we couldn't stop and we were not armed so we had to drive very fast, get into one of the locations, I think it was Mzanzi location.
Then we disappeared away from their scene and went back to Thembasa and then when we went back to Thembasa, ...[inaudible] so that he must assist us, I wanted him to drive the car and then we organised, we armed ourselves for any eventuality because it seemed that contact was inevitable at that time.
And we were not prepared to be caught, those were one of the principles we agreed upon as a unit, the ...[indistinct] detachment, so under those operational circumstances we went into the Alice line and we passed Alice there was a hastily prepared roadblock by the SAP. I mean the - it was pretty obvious it was a roadblock hastily prepared for a specific reason and I mean, we were the guilty party but they let us pass through them, but as we passed they must have realised that okay, these are the people that we are looking for. I mean the purpose of a hastily prepared roadblock, it's for a specific reason. If the police want a certain vehicle, they have the registration, what, what, what, they would make it just a hastily prepared roadblock for that specific purpose, so it was very clear that they were after us, they tried to chase us. We went as far as Fort Beaufort and then on the way to Grahamstown we saw that they were closing up and there was a police station in front, I think it was Tamaga I don't know, but we decided no, there is no way you must dispose the car right here.
MR XUNDU: Okay. We got it off the road and I think the terrain was slopey and then we opened the petrol tank and we had some ...[indistinct] with us, we just ignited one and threw it in through the window inside the vehicle and off we went.
CHAIRPERSON: But I understood you to say that: "on the way to Grahamstown they were catching up and we then decided we had to abandon the car", surely it would have drawn their attention to you immediately when you started burning a car by the side of the road while they were catching up with you?
CHAIRPERSON: As I understood your evidence, you said that after going through the roadblock they tired to chase you and you went to Fort Beaufort and on the way to Grahamstown they were catching up, so you could see them if they were catching up, and you then decided to abandon the car, you pushed it by the side of the road and set it on fire. Surely this must have drawn the police's attention to you if they were coming along behind you?
MR XUNDU: They were quite a distance from us, that is what you must understand. Because the road was at an angle, this way, so when the siren is on you actually see from a distance when they are actually on ...[inaudible] yes, on the right. Okay, you hear the siren going on and you can actually judge the distance, how far they are from you. It's normal, you ...[indistinct]
MR XUNDU: Yes, I can confirm what is in paragraph 27 because paragraph 27 puts into context the whole action carried out by ...[indistinct] detachment on the 28th of November 1992. It just puts it clear that this was part of the national liberation struggle as seen by the PAC.
And it further puts it clear that, if I may take you back to certain historical factors, that peaceful means to wage a struggle have been exhausted by the African people for three centuries, the 17th, the 18th and the 19th century.
And after the 19th century, the African people were totally disarmed. And if we remember, the last war of resistance must have 1912, and that in 1912 the oppressors continued to use violence against the African people who were using peaceful means to protest against the political system. That is evidenced by the 1912 march by the women which was crushed violently by the security forces who were on horseback.
The mowing down of innocent Christians were led by Enock Nkijema in Queenstown. The brutal crushing of the strike of the mineworkers in 1946. It served to reason Mr Chairman, that violence against peaceful protest, African people was the standard practice of the security system. And that violence against African people undoubtedly had legacy.
But it was to intolerable levels in 1960 when our, 69 people were killed by the security forces. It is worth mentioning that in the formation of the PAC in 1959, no provision by its leaders like Mangusuto Buthelezi was made for an armed revolution, it was never an option that our people could think of right from the beginning despite the facts that they have been killed from time to time, 1912, 1922 and you name the African wars of resistance.
Those, Sobukwe indicated that the political situation in our country was pregnant with untold possibilities but this possibility of ...[indistinct] an armed revolution was not in the line at the time. Now the killing of our people or the time when our people were killed, I mean, it means the clouds of war were looming the horizon.
In 1961 APLA was formed and APLA, you must understand that it was formed out of these objective conditions, out of a sheer demand for revolutionary violence against settler colonialists. And for those people who always chose to beat the mountains out of the words settlers.
I refer to them as settlers because if we can visit history, history tells that some people outside the continent of Africa came here to colonialise our country but the colonialisation of our people, particularly in the occupied Azania, had a unique character from the rest of the African people. It was not the same one which happened in Kenya, it was not the same one which happened Guinea ...[indistinct].
The colonialists colonised Azania and then settled here, hence they are called settler colonialists or settlers. So the words derived from history itself. But the PAC have further chosen to give it a ...[indistinct] definition and said: even all those who worked for the perpetual existence of that evil system.
And it is also worth mentioning that the white people in this country are very proud of being settlers and I think nobody, not even a professor can nullify that fact because the erection of the settlers monument which is still called settlers monuments in Grahamstown, is indicative of the way that they are attached, or they attach importance to them being settlers.
And furthermore, the task of directing the armed action against the settlers was given to the revolutionary council in 1961 by the presidential council of the PAC. That on its own is indicative of the nature of the violence that we had to direct to the white people, it was revolutionary violence.
Now the golf club incident is no exception from that revolutionary violence. And I want to put it to you Mr Chairman, that they members of Ekude detachment moved from those premises and that mandate given by the PAC. And it is also worth mentioning lastly that in 1992 the PAC congress resolved to intensify the armed struggle and subsequently the commanders of the Azanian People's Liberation Army launched a campaign, Operation Great Storm. And Operation Throw Stones, as the operation of the golf club was named, was an integral part of Operation Great Storm.
"In 1992 the PAC was not taking part in the constitutional negotiations that were taking place in the country because you had no confidence in that process"
"The operation was carried out in light of the negotiations which were happening between our sister organisation, the ANC and the apartheid colonial government"
But I've also mentioned that in the same breath it must be appreciated that the PAC was not part and parcel of the negotiations and not just out of the negotiations, was consciously not part of the negotiations for political reasons. ...[indistinct] reservations about a negotiated settlement. I also as an individual had reservations a negotiated settlement.
The mere fact that we have more than 300 cadres of ...[indistinct] still languishing in jail for actions they committed or for their contribution in bringing about this product, this democratic dispensation and at a time when we have a democratic government in power, voted in power by the majority of the people. I cannot reconcile that, I'm really failing to reconcile.
And the mere fact that I myself Thembelani Xundu, I'm here in front of you gentlemen to ridicule myself, say that I've done that and to ask why I've done that, why? I mean I would expect myself, in the shortest or the longest political imagination that I've had, that by now I'll be in front of the information department of the PAC or the information department or the intelligence department of the Azanian People's Liberation Army, perhaps let me say Colonel Mzamba, relating the experiences of the revolution.
Or even in front of historians, relating the experiences of the revolution and the contribution that, as a force, as a soldier or as cadre of APLA, I have done, in a relaxing situation, not in this situation. This is certainly not a mechanism that I've ever foreseen in my thinking. It clearly vindicates the suspicion that the PAC had over a negotiated settlement because I'm asking myself, what is it that is blackmailing the Government so that they cannot release our cadres.
What concession have they made to say: we'll keep them in jail but you must do this for us? What is it? You see, de Klerk being a product of the oppressive system, took a bold step to really spoil our prisoners. In the light of that I cannot understand why our government cannot have the courage to release their comrades, not just people, their comrades.
The liberation movements, the broad liberation movements was composed of the PAC, the ANC, Azapo, but our government cannot be courageous and strong and bold enough to take the cadres of the PAC out of jail. Now it seems successfully our ...[indistinct] have been criminalised and that is why today, I mean, somebody has the audacity to ask me: why did I do that.
MR LAX: Let me remind you, let me remind you Mr Xundu, that you are here voluntarily, at your own request. If you want to withdraw this application and go home you're welcome to do so. If you're going to be here, then with all due respect, you should remember that you are here voluntarily.
No-one asked you to come before us, you chose to come here, it's your choice. I would be very careful about my choice of words if I was, this is not a political grandstand. Let's get on with the work we are here to do.
MR XUNDU: Okay. It must be appreciated first that after the 28th November incident, I mean the police were after me, they had my photo by hook or by crook, so I could not even go to or try and trace the owner of the Jetta and try to make some peace with him. I mean, I concentrated on my hiding.
The circumstances operationally demanded so. But I've stated here that the incident is one that my conscience cannot come to terms with, that was the whole drive why I did that. I went to the family of the owner of the car together with the director of operations, because this was reported to him and he knew very well about it, and together with some other PAC leaders like comrade Sneki and others, where we - where I gave them a full account of all that happened and apologised to them. That is how I reached them.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR PRIOR: Mr Xundu, I am a leader of evidence for the Amnesty Committee and because victims who are present here today, people who were injured and who lost loved ones in your attack, are not regally represented and they are relying to a large extent on the evidence leader to put questions to the applicants in this matter. Do you understand that position?
MR PRIOR: I want to lay a foundation for asking specific questions. Political decisions weren't always popular amongst the members, for example the agreement or the decision to participate in the constitutional negotiations and the ultimate suspension of the armed struggle. Those political decisions were not always popular amongst the soldiers, is that correct?
MR PRIOR: Mr Chairman, I indicated it and I qualify that the question, it was a genuine question, a genuine proposition. I certainly don't mean to include each and every member. I said there were certain instances where political decisions were made which were not popular among for example, the soldiers. I don't know how to qualify the ...[intervention]
MR LAX: Maybe I can help Mr Prior. Let's try and direct the question to Mr Xundu on the basis that he commanded certain people, his experience would entail those people and the people he was in contact with. So if the question is specifically directed to encompass people he was in contact with and were under his command, were there instances in your knowledge and in your experience where aspects of the political programme were not accepted by the cadres that you had contact with?
MR PRIOR: Was there ever the situation that operations were carried out without the political mandate and then were simply, because of the psychological impact of those attacks or those operations, they were then embraced by the PAC as being sanctioned by them? Do you understand what I'm getting at?
MR XUNDU: Okay. I think he directed straight to comrade Sabelo and I think also comrade Dan because Dan was a chief political commissar and therefore the second in command. MR LAX: Can I just clarify for the record, you refer to comrade Subs and then you said Sabelo, you're referring to Sabelo Pama, the late Sabelo Pama.
MR PRIOR: I just want to make it abundantly, absolutely clear, it wasn't a situation where you as the local command or as a local commander on the ground had come up with the idea, it was passed on and it was then approved? It was quite distinct from that, the order came from above?
MR PRIOR: You see, why I'm asking that question is because I have some difficulty with the submissions made on behalf of APLA before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and I refer to page 81 of Exhibit A. I don't if your legal representative has taken you through these submissions at all.
MR XUNDU: Chairman, I think your leader will help us because we have the original bundle, I don't think we have this one because it was too big. When he's referring it will be difficult for us to get to the page, actual page.
"The APLA forces who carried these operations followed the directives from their commanders and these directives were from the highest echelons, that is the high command of the military leadership and we do not regret such operations having taken place and we are taking the full responsibility"
MR PRIOR: Then I want you to look at page 81 because this passage of the submissions causes me particular problems and maybe you can explain that for the Committee. If you can, please do and if you can't then you must indicate that you cannot explain.
At the top of the page, and perhaps before I quote, this quotation or this evidence was given against the background of a question by the then leader of the Investigation Unit, Advocate Goosen, where he was seeking to ...[indistinct] or understand the difference between soft or hard targets and I think the reply from APLA was that at some stage there was no difference between the two.
"So in the '90's a new form of emphasis or adaptation of the thrust or struggle did emerge and did take us a little off guard. We were surprised and we did discuss. And I'm sure that initially, with the question of King William's Town for instance, we were completely at a loss. And we discussed and certain explanations were made to us by the high command. Some of those explanations and the context of the changing environment, and they needed to carry with us the constituencies that were the main pillars of support of APLA, did, those explanations filtered through to us and we understood"
Now the sense that I get from that is that when the King William's Town Golf Club operation occurred and had taken place, it seems to me that the APLA high command, those structures, the people in the leadership as it says here, were at a loss as to that operation. Would I be correct in suggesting that it seems that this had not been sanctioned, this attack had not been sanctioned, the operation had not been sanctioned by the military high command?
MR MBANDAZAYO: Sorry Mr Chairman, just before the applicant answers, I think Mr Prior, if you can put perspective who was saying that because my understanding is that that passage was said by Mr Mlambo and Mr Mlambo, to my understanding, was not a member of the high command, he was a member of the military commission and a leader of the PAC there. So there is a difference between military commission and high command.
MR PRIOR: I'm indebted to Mr Mbandazayo. Yes, there was - the understanding that I have is that this was submissions made by the, it was a security force hearing so APLA was represented. But I also understand, from what he now tells me, that Mr Mlambo was the military commissioner.
MR PRIOR: Alright. Maybe I can put the question, that according to Mr Mlambo at least, the military commission or a member of the military commission was taken aback at the news of the attack on King William's Town Golf Club.
MR PRIOR: I understand that if it goes beyond your personal knowledge, obviously I can't press you for an answer but maybe just for your comment, are you able to maybe put that piece of Mlambo's evidence in a context or you can't?
MR XUNDU: Okay. It is on record here that comrade Mlambo said he was lost, was surprised, taken aback many ...[indistinct] but if we have to take into account what I've said initially, I've tried to give historical factors that prompted the PAC to form, to adopt the concept of an armed revolution against the system as appropriate and legitimate.
And in that regard it received national and international acclamation. Now that was dictated by the concrete material conditions, objective conditions in that the pace was set by the inning and therefore, as it indicates here, in the '90's the ...[indistinct] there was yet another dynamism in the political situation of the time, militarily speaking and therefore APLA had to adapt to that.
MR XUNDU: Yes, the military commission is the one initially I referred to as a revolutionary council. It was changed in 1978 to be military commission and that was a link between the PAC and the APLA as an armed organisation. Members of the national leadership of the PAC were part of the military commission. Members of the high command were members of the military commission, so it was a combination of the two.
MR PRIOR: Would I be correct in enquiring that during that time, August, September, October of '93, of '92, was there any diversions of opinion between what the PAC were saying and what APLA was saying?
MR XUNDU: Not to my knowledge. Not to my knowledge because I think one of the things that bring us here is the question of the armed struggle and 1992, as I have earlier indicated, that the congress of the PAC resolved to intensify the armed struggle. Now in light of that I don't see any possible contradictions, conflict whatsoever. There was some sort of political immunism.
MR PRIOR: Alright. The reference further at page 82 of Exhibit A, I don't think it would be fair to ask you because that evidence is not given in any time frame or any context of that time frame so it could well have been after 1992 but the sense of what is said at page 82, the top of the page, beginning
"This instruction never came to APLA to say you were wrong and therefore reveal all your operations"
Just to ask you around that, was that - did you ever receive any indication that anyone in the PAC was unhappy with the way APLA was conducting itself, specifically in 1992 and more specifically in respect of King William's Town attack?
MR XUNDU: That's why I asked you - you say proportionality with regard to what, because I think if I'm reading, if I have read this correctly, the proportionality that they are referring to is, for instance we had our people, so-called civilians dying every day, then we could proportionally have the white people so-called civilians dying.
Now my understanding is that if the conflict or ...[indistinct] had gone to the extent that the white security forces or if the white people could hit at lower primary schools where our African children are attending, then we would have to respond in the same way. That is the understanding that I have about proportionality in this sense. I don't know whether we are moving on the same frequency.
MR PRIOR: Yes. And do you agree with what was said at page 82 about, in fact you're bringing your answer as in accordance with what was stated there as a legitimate reprisal, is that what you're embracing in your answer?
MR PRIOR: In other words the security forces, if they attacked a black school for example then it would be an attack on a white target or a white civilian target and in APLA eyes it would be proportional to that attack, it would be justified. Is that what you're ...[intervention]
MR XUNDU: But be that as it may, I mean if we can even then try to dig that proportionality, there are incidents like the Umtata, I mean how many massacres have we talked about since the political history of the country?
MS GCABASHE: Paddy, if I might just interject here. Just to clarify, for me certainly, the question of reprisal. The King William's Town Golf attack had nothing to do with a specific reprisal, did it? We are just talking generally, it was a mission that was conceived and executed. It was not a payback for a particular incident?
MR PRIOR: I need to understand what you mindset was and it's important for the Committee to understand. Was the intention simply to destroy or wipe out every living person on that property on that evening?
MR XUNDU: Okay, the intention was to inflict maximum loses, to kill as many people as we possibly could. Now to say we could kill or destroy everybody in the party, I don't think it would make logic otherwise we would have organised to get, let me say, LMG's or RPG's. I mean, it was not possible.
MR XUNDU: Okay. The white community in this country are the one people I have never considered as civilians, pure civilians, in the true sense that I could just point at that old man there and find out that he doesn't know anything, absolutely nothing or anything about a weapon.
The militarisation of the white community was something which was, let me say, legalised or institutionalised, I don't know what is the appropriate word there, but the true conception for instance, we know every white adult man at the age of 18 or above have undergone military training and right from there you ...[indistinct] the distinction between the African people and the white community in terms of training.
You can easily refer to the African people as civilians because you will not attach anything that is military but with the white community it is a different concern, it's a different situation. They have undergone military training and after having undergone military training they are part and parcel of ...[end of tape]
MR XUNDU: Cadets. You see I've seen those boys, they can shoot perhaps more than many of the soldiers you can get in the national defence force, in the SAPS. They can shoot, they have been shooting. Now when they reach that level of being conscripted they quite know everything.
MR PRIOR: Sorry, can I just ask you where you got that information from, that every white child at primary school level had, knew about the difference between an R1 or an Uzzi or a 9mm pistol, where did you get that information from?
MR PRIOR: Alright, I don't want to engage in a debate with you about that, we're talking about the situation in 1992 but I accept your answer. You see, with the generalisation that every white person, and particularly, I'm coming back to the King William's Town Golf Club, do you concede that there were possibly many people there that did not have military training, that were not members of a commando, that had not had cadets at school? Or does your perception exclude that possibility?
MR XUNDU: Caddie. So I did converse with a lot of them. I mean, when we were there with comrade Xumiso this day he used to take this side and I take the far and then after that we ...[indistinct] that we have received.
MR PRIOR: So part of your intelligence gathering was enquiring from members who played or people who played at the gold regarding their military experience, is that correct? It was one of the information gathering exercises that you conducted, is that what you're telling this Committee?
MR PRIOR: Alright. The other bit of information, did you know that there was - you said there was the Nationalist Party member, Mr Radu, his VIP core with security policemen and army officers, did your intelligence gathering indicate that any other people would be there at the club on that evening, other than military or security personnel?
They talked about the members of, hiring members of the military, hiring members of the security forces, the SAP. Okay, like for instance there was a certain mention of a certain Lieutenant Colonel, I've just forgotten the name sorry.
MR XUNDU: But he was busy in East London. And subsequent to the attack, he was Gerring Inhaus(?) or something or something like that, but it was the person after the attack who was, who got a new appointment as the head of whatever division of the SAP. And I vividly, I just remember one picture of him holding something which looked like a device, I think they were looking for cartridges at the back side of the golf club, as I could see them in the printed media. So his a mention, his name was mentioned there. Now I could recall after they said he got an appointment and he's facing that challenge to apprehend or whatever, and stabilise the security situation ...[indistinct]. So that is the extent to which we were informed.
MR XUNDU: Can I, because for the purpose of your question, after each and every day we were there we used to gather around as these black people, show each other somebody has got R2, 25c and what but the two of us, either myself some of the days or comrade Lester, would got to that chap, the man that I've said I've forgotten his name and just have a chat with him you see and ask for extra money.
MR PRIOR: You see - I don't want to belabour this aspect, but you've referred to it three or four times in your evidence, the 20c and the 50c, did that cause a particular anger in you or an embitterment in you towards the golf club, the fact that you were treated so badly as a caddie?
MR XUNDU: Ja. But of course, I mean, it proved a point to me that, okay real here in our own country we are being treated as underdogs. I mean you could - the way even they were speaking to us or generally to those black caddies.
MR XUNDU: Let me say, because it was them they undermined us too much. Sad that I remember, I remember one time comrade Skumiso telling me about one of the campaigns of the PAC, the status campaign, saying: "You see comrade, Sobukwe saw this thing that status campaign".
MR PRIOR: Can I just stop you there? Do I understand you that you were being prepared to wage a war against the white people, the black people against the white people? Was that the idea behind this status campaign?
MR XUNDU: The idea behind the status campaign was to remove the inferiority complex from the African people. I mean to remove the very idea that when they see you, they see you as a bas.... I mean from that position it would be very difficult to ...[intervention]
Mr Xundu, may we just move on. The information that I have and the evidence that will be led is that on that particular day that you planned the King William's Town operation, the golf club operation, there certainly was a golf day that been arranged by Mr Radu, who was the Nationalist Party member of Parliament for King William's Town but that had come to an end towards the end of the afternoon and that the function which had continued, which had in fact commenced in the evening was the Wine Tasters Club which consisted predominantly of senior citizens of the area and which had nothing to do with the Nationalist Party or the South African police services or the army or whatever.
If I could just explain to you the words: "senior citizens", it has particular meaning in English, which is people who are elderly, people who are retired, not high ranking people, that's is the meaning of the word: "Senior Citizens" in English, just so you understand that.
Do you understand what I'm putting to you? It seems - sorry, first of all, do you understand the question? It's that the factual position on that day was that there was a golf club organised by this Nationalist Party figure, that that golf day came to an end, the function which was on the go when you made the attack was in fact the Wine Tasting Club that were having their annual Christmas party, their end of the year party.
MR LAX: Maybe I can help you, it's really quite simple. There were two separate functions on that day, one was a golf day which Mr Radu had organised then that was finished, in the evening the Wine Tasting Club had a function. Now the Wine Tasting Club was a different organisation from Mr Radu, that's what he's putting to you. So he's saying, do you realise there were two different functions on that day?
The one involving Mr Radu was already over at the time you launched the attack and in fact the people who were present in that room you attacked were not Mr Radu's connections, it had nothing to do with him, it was a separate group of people who were part of a Wine Tasting Club.
MR XUNDU: Okay, whatever it ...[indistinct] to be, but what we knew was that the function at the golf club that day would start in the afternoon and proceed to the evening. In fact on that day I must have gone with comrade Lester but could not enter the club, just to see the situation from a distance.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Prior, both you and Mr Lax have confidently said that the one function was over. If you look at photograph 15 which seems to be a photograph of the bar, it would look as if it were very busy at the time.
MR PRIOR: Yes Mr Chairman, I was trying to limit and explain the question as it went on. The golf day was at an end, I'm not suggesting that no-one who participated in that golf day was not in the bar but the bar in the dining room where the wine tasting function was held were two distinct parts of the premises.
MR PRIOR: Could you maybe just - I didn't want to mislead you in any way. There might be a suggestion that that is what is happening but what I wanted to demonstrate to you by my question was, the impression I got from your evidence was that your target was the Nationalist Party with their VIP bodyguards, with the police and with the South African defence force present at that gathering and I wanted to draw a clear distinction that the dining room in which you threw the handgrenade was the Wine Tasting Club, they were having their year-end.
The gold day, which I understand was held or organised by Mr Radu, the NP, the golf had come to an end, there certainly may have been or probably were members having a drink in the pub but they were certainly not all concentrated and gathered in the diningroom as seemed to be suggested by your evidence, that that was the object of your attack.
MR XUNDU: Okay. The afternoon session we were told, it's the one which was going to be formal, I mean we received firsthand information. And then the informal part where people would be enjoying themselves was going to be the one in the evening and that is exactly why we saw it, that this is an appropriate time to, appropriate time to launch the attack, I mean, to achieve the element of surprise.
MR PRIOR: Yes, I follow what you're saying. So you saw the distinction, that there was a formal golf day and after those formalities had been - after the golf had been completed, there was the functions afterwards?
MR PRIOR: Alright. When you arrived at the golf club, did it surprise you that there were no guards or security at the premises, given the fact that your understanding, that there were military personnel in attendance there?
MR XUNDU: One thing we were sure of, that the people there were not expecting to be attacked and because of that element there was no way - I mean, even in the military you will find a situation whereby there are no guards, were there is no threat or where senior commanders have made their appreciation so that there is no - in their threat analysis, there is no threat.
MR PRIOR: I'm asking you, were you not surprised to see that there was no security outside the premises, given your intelligence that fairly highranking military and police personnel were in attendance there that evening?
MR PRIOR: But that wasn't the question, with respect. The question, with respect, was: "Did it not surprise you that there was no security outside, given the fact that you believed and your intelligence that there were senior military and police personnel attending that function?
MR LAX: Sorry Mr Prior, I think he's answered your question because he said earlier that these people weren't expecting to be attacked, that's why he didn't even think they would have set up any guards in the first place.
MR PRIOR: My understanding is that there were two employees that were injured, a Mrs Xediswa Kaiele and Mrs Tlamata, were injured in the attack when the grenades and/or the shooting occurred, are you saying you expected those persons or those employees to be in the kitchen?
MR PRIOR: And you accepted them obviously? Now, I want to refer to the report at page 63 of the bundle. There's a typed copy and then page at 65 onwards is a hand-written report, it's an "operation record" and it says: "Lebene regiment". Was that written in your own hand, that report?
MR XUNDU: Ja, first of all I understand this was part of the document that legitimately belonged to the PAC and APLA that the SAP ...[no English translation]. That is what I understand about these things.
MR PRIOR: No. Please, without giving a comment Mr Xundu, the question is: "Was this report written up by you"? How the police got it doesn't really concern us at this stage, but was that report written in your hand?
MR PRIOR: I just want to direct your attention to the unit composition, and before I get to that, the Lembede regiment, was that - how did that tie up with the Ekude battalion or the Ekude regiment? Was it one and the same thing or?
MR PRIOR: I want to turn to page 104 of the bundle, and to identify it, this was a part of a - page 104 Mr Chairman, it's a TRC research document which was extracted from CIS files Eastern Cape and I want to refer to page 104 of the bundle, to the 14th of December 1992. I'm going to put this to you at the level of asking your comment on this note.
"Adam Eric Gavusa said APLA claimed responsibility. MK responsible for Bisho car bomb attack but we don't have any reason to bomb golf clubs and restaurants. MK Adam and MK Bushi (Petrus Vantju) involved with attacks of 18.12.92"
that's not really relevant here. The question directly, was there any MK, Umkhonto weSizwe assistance or support to APLA in the King William's Town Golf Club operation, and if so, are you able to supply any details of that?
MR XUNDU: No, not at all. Mr Chairman, if - I always have a problem about the SAP as it was you see. Now if we can base our argument based on their findings and speculations then we will miss the track because those people were, they were not informed.
MR PRIOR: Alright. Can I just ask you finally on this aspect, was there at no stage during 1992, prior to the King William's Town Golf Club operation, any co-operation, assistance, support given to APLA by MK?
MR PRIOR: I just want to ask you finally, just to come back to the question of legitimate reprisal, I think Ms Gcabashe actually clarified the question somewhat. Do I understand the King William's Town Golf Club operation to be a purely - Let me rephrase that, a directive or command from Leklapa Mpashlele? In other words, he identified the target and the order was to attack that target in the best possible way you could.
MR XUNDU: Ja, but one correction - one perception that I should mention, is that perhaps you expect comrade Leklapa to have gone through physically himself but the fact of the matter, I mean as director of operations he must be informed and that such intelligence sources ...[intervention]
MR PRIOR: I understand that. I don't mean by the question that he should have been there. Do I understand from that that you were acting in King William's Town Golf Club on orders, you were carrying out the orders of your operational, of your director or operations, Leklapa Mpashlele?
MR PRIOR: And do I understand also, and maybe you can correct me if I'm mistaken, would it have made any difference to your operation if, when arriving at the golf club, that you at that stage discovered that it was senior citizens in the sense that Mr Lax has explained to you, that were at a wine tasting function and they were not part of the military machine? Would it have made any difference to you whether you would have gone or would you have desisted from your attack if that information had been brought home to you at that time?
MR PRIOR: I'm just asking now, thinking back, would it have made any difference if the intelligence that you had received had been corrected in the following way: there's now a mistake, these are now people who are unrelated to the military, these are senior citizens having a wine tasting function, a Christmas party?
MR PRIOR: The question simply, if your information before you commenced that attack was that these are now senior citizens at a wine tasting, it was their Christmas function, that these people weren't now part of the military structures, they weren't part of the army structures, they were basically just there to enjoy themselves, would that have made any difference to you carrying out the operation?
We have heard from your affidavit that your primary reason for the attack was to kill Nationalist Party members and members of the military. In what you've spoken about this morning, you've also indicated that members of the white community, militarised members of the white community could also be seen as valid, legitimate targets. How do you feel about women at that meeting, were they also a legitimate target?
MR XUNDU: I can answer that questions by talking back a question that, do you take them, do you ...[indistinct] from the rest of the system or do you take them as the ...[indistinct] of an oppressive system?
You must remember, the white apartheid circular government was put in place by its electorate, its constituency and part of the constituency was unfortunately the women who were there, so it really does not make an issue.
MR LAX: You must answer the question please. Do you consider that? He's saying that it seems from your answer, that what you're saying is that anyone who participated in an election is a legitimate target. The answer is: "yes" or "no".
MR XUNDU: Anyone who gave thumbs up for our people to be subjected into the brutality and the misery that they were. And unfortunately Mr Davis, it happened to be the white community, that was by the design of history not Thembelani Xundu.
I would like to tell you that my parents were not members of any military establishment, my parents had not been trained in any military in any sense, they did not know how to use a gun. My parents had never voted in a South African election, let alone vote for the National Party and yet they were unfortunate victims of that night.
MR XUNDU: Okay. To answer the first part of your question, you simply speak with authority that your parents did not vote for the National Party. I mean, I find it very strange because I may not be sure that my father, in the last general elections, voted for the PAC because I'm PAC or voted for the ANC because of whatever reason because it was done to a secret ballot and now ...[intervention]
MR XUNDU: Okay. And then just remove the fact that they did not vote for the National Party. But be that as it may Mr Davis, you will agree with me that I couldn't have the time to ask each and everybody that was there whether he voted or not.
MR XUNDU: Okay. I'm going to try and answer you now. You have heard about a person or the testimony to the TRC, by the name of Joe Mamasela. You have heard about the testimony to the TRC about the deeds of people like Colonel Nieuwoudt.
You have heard about the agony and the pain and in fact the brutal manner in which the PEBCO 3 was executed. What do you think of the people who were killed in numbers in night vigils where we have pain in double.
MR LAX: Sorry, you haven't answered his question, with all due respect. He's saying, what do you feel about that and all you're doing is quoting history? We understand the context, please try and help this man by making ...[intervention]
And lastly, I want to refer you to - before answering your question, to refer you to one of the quotations by comrade John Jati Pogela that: "It is high time that the white people must also bury their dead".
Now in doing all - in quoting all those facts historically and relating all those, I'm not trying to ridicule you, I'm not trying to but I want you to wear my jacket and understand me from my position.
I understand that it must have been traumatic for you to lose your two parents at the same time but that was the level to which the conflict in the country was, it was painful. And in my application, at the end of the last sentence I said:
And I'm just sorry that it had to be your mother and your father. Much as I think we are also sorry that we lost our people in Boipatong, in Sharpeville, the Pebco 3, the twins at the Umtata Massacre - so if you can wear my jacket I can wear yours.
MR DAVIS: I was struck when I read your affidavit of the regret you expressed about having stolen somebody's car. I would just like to know how that compares with your regret at the loss of my parents' lives.
MR DAVIS: This is not a question, I would just like to tell Mr Xundu that the last five have been incredibly difficult five years for myself and my family. It's not made any easier by having to revisit things now five years later. One of the reasons why I came here was I hoped that this process could lead to some sense of reconciliation. I'm not convinced yet whether that reconciliation will be between myself and the perpetrators or whether it will just be reconciliation between myself and my parents' death. That's all I'd like to say, thank you.
ROBERT STANFORD: My name is Robert Stanford. I am and have been for a long time a member of the King William's Town Golf Club. I was present on the evening of the 28th November when this attack took place in the lounge of the club. There are certain portions of your evidence which sound to me somewhat strange and it's those portions that I want to deal with now, if I may Mr Chairman. You said that you infiltrated the caddies in the Golf Club and got information from them, didn't you?
MR STANFORD: That I want to tell you is not true. I want to tell you that in the club at that time we had, I think it was twelve or thirteen black members of the club. We were and have been a completely non-racial club for many years. I want to tell you that by Club Resolution in 1992 the caddie fees payable were R15.00 per round. I want to tell you that if you tell......[intervention]
MR XUNDU: I have talked about debriefing - debriefing is where we compare information. In other words the information that we have received from different sources, process it until we get one final product then if there are still some hassles - go underground and confirm it.
MR STANFORD: The caddie fees are paid by the individual player to the caddies as the game ends and if any caddie is underpaid he has an immediate right to complain to the Captain or Committee of the club and they all know what they're supposed to be paid.
MR STANFORD: Okay, thank you. Are you aware that in 1992 when you got your information, King William's Town Golf Club was a non-racial club and we had active black, as you call them and white members playing golf together?
MR STANFORD: One name? Yes I - it's not fair to give his name here, I'm not prepared to announce his name in public here. I don't think that's fair - or any of their names but it could be on the list which I will hand in to the Committee later on.
MR STANFORD: I understood in your evidence, if we were to say, that you went into the clubhouse itself because saw an office in the corner where he came from or where he worked and you spoke to him in that area, am I right or wrong?
MR XUNDU: Ja I don't remember myself getting into the office but I remember at one instance I managed to get in where I could see that there is an entrance on the left, there is another entrance on the right and if you can see, you can see the bar, the make of the room which is a bar - then I saw that this is a bar.
MR XUNDU: The very act of coming in after the practices there, when the other people are going to get into their cars I mean was common sense that this person had something to do with the ...[intervention]
MR XUNDU: Ja because we were conversing since just before he could enter the premises and in fact he stopped and faced me this way whilst just before he could enter the left entrance then I was right inside having passed the glass entrance and further on that even comrade Tumiso have gone in with that person.
MR STANFORD: I'm just putting that to you just to support my statement that the club is a completely non-racial club. In your planning of this operation, before I come to - sorry Mr Chairman, I haven't got the photographs here but I think there is a photograph which was taken - I'm sorry Mr Chairman, I'm looking for the photograph. If you look at photo 26 - that is a picture of the lounge - isn't it? Taken from the position from where you threw the bomb, am I right?
MR STANFORD: No, you're wrong, it's to the left, I'm telling you, I know it better than you do. If you look ahead on the far end you'll see curtains hanging on the right hand side. Look there and you'll see them. You see them?
MR MBANDAZYO: Mr Xundu - I think he has explained that because this man, they saw him come in again when they are there, going inside that building so they understood that he had an office, he was working there, not that he was inside the office himself, he knew where the office - where it was located.
MR PRIOR: Mr Stanford, just let me help you here, he's using the military term "appreciate". That is a term which implies that they did intelligence work and as a result of that they were able to confirm that something is in fact so. It's just jargon.
ADV SANDI: He's trying to say here he didn't know as a matter of fact that there was an office there but this is the conclusion they came to that if this gentleman keeps on going that direction, surely there must be an office.
MR PRIOR: Mr Xundu, your previous evidence was to the effect that when you stood on the inside of the door at the entrance when you were speaking to this man, you could see his office, that's what you said earlier in your evidence, while Mr Stanford has been questioning you, that was what you said. However, your earlier evidence didn't say that at all.
MR XUNDU: I just hope that you can rewind this thing, I didn't say I saw the office because by then when I was answering that - when I was saying that I was answering the question, you wanted to establish whether I was in the office - then I said, as I entered I only passed the glass door entrance and then he stood to face me whilst he was just about to enter the entrance on the left, entrance to where the party was.
MR PRIOR: You see, we're getting bogged down on a point, we're getting bogged own on a point. All Mr Stanford's trying to establish, if I understand him correctly, is that you went into the premises, into the building, that's all he's trying to establish and that no one gave you a hard time about being there, that's what he's put to you previously and you've confirmed that. I think we can move on.
MR PRIOR: Just answer the question. Did the thought come from you or did it come from somebody else? If it came from somebody else then he might go on to ask you who? But just answer the question, it's really not a difficult question. Please, you don't have to spar with the man, just answer the question.
MR PRIOR: Sorry, you're not understanding the question, he's saying what day did you originally intend to carry out the attack, did you plan it to happen on? You see how you're missing each other? He's saying what date did you set for the attack to happen on?
MR XUNDU: What I was saying that we must have set another date or planned - or let me say the attack was on the pipeline and then we planned perhaps for an earlier date but then on receipt of the information that there'll be a party - but I can't remember very well, really.
MR STANFORD: Am I right in saying that you only planned the attack after you heard, as you said in your evidence, that there were going to be high dignitaries of the police and army security personnel present?
MR XUNDU: Ja, okay, that is why I'll say this particular report must not be a final product and I thought perhaps you, the Commission wanted to take me for a surprise and produce another final report from the SAP where we have a report that has been signed and that is final. I don't think that this is..[intervention]
MR STANFORD: The players of King William's Town Golf Club, there's then the names of five members, I think Mr Lax asked you earlier on who some of them were if I remember correctly because these are obviously alibis in the names here and then you carry on length of planning : 2 days, postponement : once.
You say because of weather conditions the enemy could not avail himself. Now, that's obviously from you and I want to know why you're not speaking, why didn't you tell us about the other attack earlier on or the other planned attack? Now it comes out that there was another planned attack and it was postponed and you even give the reasons for postponement here.
MR XUNDU: Okay, let me start by saying I've indicated earlier on that we cannot work or base ourselves entirely on these reports that were taken by the SAP because I have in mind of this particular report, this is not a complete report, this is not the final product. Things like - I know how the proforma for a report of an operation looked like. For instance the units here, ...[inaudible] Regiment was a very big regiment but the unit in particular which took, which participated in the coup detachment is not mentioned here.
MR XUNDU: And also, for instance, as far as I can relate, I've read this thing and we have tried, together with my colleagues, to try and recall one operation which was postponed, that I know of, was the operation where we were going to attack the SADF which was on sport, just on the grounds. Okay as we go to the - as we go from King William's Town to Bisho, there is, I think there are two playing grounds here and some sort of a stand which looks like a stadium on your right.
MR XUNDU: Mr Chairman, there's also another one, the stadium which is outside when you are going to ...[inaudible] Grahamstown Road which is just there. There is another one which is - I don't know whether it's a school grounds which he's referring to which is just on the middle when you go to Bisho. When you coming from King William's Town is on your right but when you're coming from Bisho it's on you left.
MR PRIOR: Can we try and stick to this report and this operation because that's really what we're trying to deal with here and the question's really around, if I understand Mr Stanford correctly, you did postpone your operation, there's no question that you didn't postpone this particular operation "Throw Stones" that's correct isn't it?
MR MBANDAZYO: Mr Chairman, what he's trying to explain is that he does not remember at postponing this one but there's another operation they were going to execute. The one his remembering that they postponed because of weather is what he's trying to get at.
CHAIRPERSON: So he wrote on his report "we postponed once". This report was dated the 28th November 1992 and was handed in and signed for by the administrator on the 2nd December 1992. So let's not have talk about the police doing this or that - this is the report he drew up, isn't it and the report you handed to the administrator and he added a note at the foot of it.
MR XUNDU: This report, Chair, I mean just a point of correction, this report I must have handed in to Comrade Tumiso because I just - it seems I was drafting it on his behalf and therefore it was - I mean - common practise that he would look at it, make some corrections and then the final product would encompass his signature. I don't deny the fact that this is my handwriting, even my father can confirm that, it is my handwriting and - but what I was trying to explain one dimension here that as far as I can recall, I mean, recalling an incident as they happened, that the operation we once postponed here was an operation which we were going to conduct in those playing grounds and then in the end we could not because of weather conditions.
CHAIRPERSON: Well how could you have written in this report that you made on the - you wrote it - on the 28th November and you said we postponed once because of weather conditions - the enemy could not avail himself and it was then corrected - "could avail himself" it was corrected to read "could not avail himself." So you wrote this on the 28th November relating to this operation, didn't you?
MR XUNDU: Okay, because it's written per operation record, what we did arrange for this operation but this particular information does not relate to this Golf Club incident, not at all. That is why I'm saying this is not the final product and I don't think we should be bogged down on this one.
MR XUNDU: I'm explaining myself - that is why I'm saying this one is not the final report and I thought honestly that perhaps you have another report which, I mean which is the final product. You just chose not to put in the package.
MR PRIOR: Well you see, this is the final product for this reason and this reason alone, that if you look on the third page of the report, there's a note in the administrator's own handwriting that says "this report received on the 2nd day of December 1992" and he goes on to say "what is admitted is that four whites are reported killed and seventeen are injured" by the administrator, 2 December 1992. You see, that he - it's a different handwriting. So clearly this report went to the administrator and he added certain information, obviously once those facts became known. So this is the report that the administrator had in his possession.
MR XUNDU: Okay, let me make one point clear. Then if there is these corrections or points made or omissions then it means that Comrade Lester would have, I mean, would draw another report that would be final product and honestly I don't remember postponing the Golf Club.
MR PRIOR: In your own mind there is a doubt that this was actually was postponed and the only operation you can remember postponing is a different operation that related to an attack on the SADF? That's why we got it bogged down on that one and where the stadium was and all that stuff. So basically he's saying and it's not really going to help to canvass it any further, he doesn't remember postponing it, even though it's written here.
MR STANFORD: The only point that I want to make is it's extremely important from all our point of view that a false statement like that could occur in a report of this kind which purports to be a report to his senior as to events which did happen and surely it's very unlikely that a report written on the same day as the event occurred would could possibly be incorrect. The probabilities are that this report is correct and he is wrong and that in fact there was an earlier date fixed for this attack and it was in fact postponed. May I put that to him?
MR XUNDU: Okay, one other dimension Mr Stanford, this is all possible that I could have written the report on this very same day. Yes, I might have been relating the events of the incident after, I mean, it had already happened..[intervention]
MR XUNDU: And also it was not my duty to write a report, it was the duty of the Regional Commander, but the Regional Commander asked me to write a report and therefore it is simply and common sense that you are supposed to look at the report and make the necessary adjustments if he has to adjust it, omissions or additions and then sign it.
MR PRIOR: Sorry, he's saying to you the probabilities, the probabilities - he's saying it is more probable that this report is correct and that your memory is failing you than the other way around. That's all he's saying to you. You can either agree with it or disagree with it.
MR XUNDU: It is also most probably that we did not postpone because that - and that this information in this particular paragraph in question related to another operation. That is also possible so let us put them on the same footing. However, if you want to, I mean, convince yourself the way you want to convince, I mean then I cannot help you I'm sorry.
MR STANFORD: I'm not convincing myself, I'm putting something to you which you have given to us as the truth. I'm telling you that it's either true or untrue and if it's untrue it reflects on your whole credibility obviously.
MR PRIOR: Let me just try and help you here. Look, it's really very simple. If you can't recall whether it was postponed or not then you can't recall that. It may well have been postponed, you simply can't remember it, that's all. I think we should just leave it at that.
MR MBANDAZYO: Mr Chairman, just to come again on this point. Mr Chairman, I think the applicant has put it clearly on this point that there's one operation he remembers postponing but he can't remember the Golf Club.
MR STANFORD: I accept then I won't take it further. I just want to make that point because it's a very important one. Now from whom do you get - rather let me rephrase it this way - in your earlier evidence you said that the - didn't know his name - that the person in the King William's Town Golf Club who you thought was an official there, told you that there were going to be high ranking people there at the party, high ranking officers, police personnel because the party was to be hosted by Mr Radie, a member of parliament, a Nationalist member of parliament, is that right?
MR XUNDU: Okay, because we're receiving it from the people who had at least an experience about the events or the occasions of the nature, therefore we considered the information could be coming from, what you call an A type of source. An A type is very reliable.
CHAIRPERSON: I have trouble understanding this. ...[inaudible] Application, which you have sworn to is correct, and you say at page 10 "as the National Party Government was the architect of our oppression and their supporters approving of it's policy, their party at the Golf Club was a legitimate target as the members of the National Party will realise that the policies of their government is a crime against humanity and they are not safe if it continues with their polices." You see that? So you are aiming the whole attack according to your Application for Amnesty, was aimed at National Party supporters who were having a party at the Golf Club and they were the legitimate target?
MR XUNDU: I really do not see any contradiction here because the information we received is that there'll be presence of the security forces - is really, really confirmed, becomes logical when a senior member of the National Party of the Government in power, then is going to be present ...[intervention]
CHAIRPERSON: But we know there weren't National Party supporters there. We know that none of what you said took place and we know that this wasn't a party for members of the National Party so all your information as to the target was incorrect, not just one aspect, the whole lot.
MR XUNDU: Okay, with due respect Mr Chairman, we have talked about the presence of the National Party, we have not said everybody here was particularly a supporter or a member of the National Party but I mean I think it is logical to draw that conclusion that if the National Party is there, I mean at that level of Mr Radie, then it means his supporters as well and even the protagonist...[intervention]
CHAIRPERSON: You have said here that it was a party for members of the National Party who were legitimate targets. Their party at the Golf Club was the legitimate target, that's the party for members of the National Party, that was your - you have said yourself, and please don't keep evading, you have said yourself that was the legitimate target. We have learned that there was not a party there for members of the National Party so the target you hit was not the legitimate target that you write of in your application so doesn't that indicate that all your information was incorrect?
MR XUNDU: Let us just try and re-examine what you have written here - "As the National Party Government was the architect of our oppression and their supporters approving of it's policy, their party at the Golf Club was a legitimate target as the members of the National Party will realise that the policies" whatever, whatever, whatever. Now of primary concern here is their presence.
MR XUNDU: Ja, what was here was the presence of the National Party at the party and therefore we expected that people, his friends, the protagonists of the system would gather around on such an occasion...[intervention]
CHAIRPERSON: But we have accepted it that you were wrong, but you won't admit, that's your trouble, you won't admit that the information you got was wrong and it was not a Nationalist Party party. You may have expected it to be, I'm not arguing with you about that. What we are arguing about is what actually happened. It was not a Nationalist Party party but you for some reason don't want to accept that you might have just been mistaken - the information you got was wrong.
CHAIRPERSON: Their supporters approving of it's policy, their party at the Golf Club, you say that's not Nationalist Party? Are you now trying to change your version? A few moments ago you were saying it was the Nationalist Party and their presence there justified the attack. Now you're saying it doesn't mean that, are you?
MR PRIOR: Well you see that's not what it says at page 10 of your application which is the fundamental basis upon which you start. It says "we were advised that the National Party and it's supporters were going to have a party at the Golf Club and that the members of parliament, Mr Radie, would be there. So that's what your own papers say but look, I don't know, I think we've flogged this dead horse.
MR STANFORD: I'll leave that point then Mr Chairman. I just want to say to you that - I want to confirm to you - I want to put to you the question that you now realise or should now realise that the party was, one, for elderly people gathered at a pre-Christmas function for social gathering. By coincidence Mr Radie that afternoon had sponsored personally a Golf Tournament. That evening he stayed on because his wife, Pam, is an excellent musician and she was playing the piano for the people at the party. That's how it came about that Mr Radie and his wife were at that wine tasting festival. Can you dispute that in any way? You can't, thank you.
The next thing I want to come to is your somewhat extraordinary story about your escape after this attack on elderly people which caused so much harm and damage. I want to say straight away that I sympathise very much with your cause to a certain extent but I don't like some things that has happened in this particular occasion but still, the point is that when you left the party, you told us you all got in the white golf and I think if I remember correctly, you drove to Alice, you drove through a roadblock, is that right?
MR STANFORD: On Tuesday, my apologies Mr Chairman. So when you decided to dispose of the vehicle on the Tuesday, it was three days after the attack, you went through a ..[inaudible] or structured roadblock in Alice, that's right?
MR STANFORD: And did the other car chase you, the police car which was about four minutes behind you, did it make no attempt to try and catch you up, seeing a car burning on the left hand side of the road, I assume?
MR STANFORD: When you reported the result of your successful attack on these unfortunate people having a party at the Golf Club, when you reported on the success of your attack on the unfortunate people at the Golf Club to your head office or your seniors was your report - or your report indicated a successful operation?
MR STANFORD: Now, it was put to you earlier on, by one of the members of the Committee I think, that your policy really was, if a school was attacked, you would attack the school. If a church was attacked, you would attack a church and if you were asked for what was this attack in reprisal form, I don't think you ever answered that question? I've no recollection of you answering it.
MR MBANDAZAYO: Mr Chairman, just before he answers, I don't think that's correct what was put. It was regarding the question of pro-personality and he explained how he perceived pro-personality and actually he did not say that it was this one, particular one, was regarding any pro-personality.
MR STANFORD: If I'm wrong in my phrasing then forgive me but the gist still remains that your policy was, which you definitely stated, that where a hospital was attacked you could attack another hospital and so on. Is that not right?
MR XUNDU: Okay, once again Mr Stanford, we talked to you about that when my perception about pro-personality was being asked and then I answered and explained my perceptiveness as far as pro-personality is concerned, in my own perception it was - we didn't say - and we put it that we are generalising. We didn't say that we are talking particularly about this Golf Club incident.
MR STANFORD: I wont pursue that one then. I've studied your affidavit, Mr Xundu, in this very carefully indeed and your supporting documents and I see no indication of any remorse or regret at the fact that you not only picked the wrong target but of the indescribable damages that you did and which was occasioned by wrong information being supplied to you. I see no kind of regret for that at all.
Yes you do in paragraph 27, right at the end, you mention about you're sorry for the loss of lives but don't you think that in applying for amnesty you should express a sense of regret and a sense of real sorrow and not merely recite facts which don't touch or border on any feeling or regret that a mistake was made?
MR MBANDAZAYO: Mr Chairman, I think the act is clear that there must full disclosure, there must be full disclosure in that it must coming from a recognised political organisation. There are the aspects, but there's no question that he must show remorse or he must apologise or what. That can be done separately but I cannot see that it should be, that should be a requirement here that because he has not put it there, so it does meet the requirements of the act. That's not the case.
The crux of the issue really is that you must concede in the overall that having made the mistake that contents of a large part of your affidavit and your application is incorrect and the Chairman pointed out to you certain parts of it.
MR XUNDU: Okay, Mr Stanford, you must understand one thing, I have come here to give full disclosure as well as to give my ...[inaudible] for the operation. If you agree with it, you agree, if you disagree, you disagree. I cannot, I cannot - I don't see any way that I can make you agree with me if you don't want to agree.
MR PRIOR: Sorry, the question that Mr Stanford is putting to you, sorry just listen carefully, the question Mr Stanford's putting to you is to say, do you concede that there are factual inaccuracies in your application and in your affidavit based on the questions which he and Judge Wilson put to you, that's what he's saying. It's not a question of whether you can convince him of the rightness or wrongness of your application, so let's not get bogged down in that. It's a simple matter of do you concede there are factual inaccuracies in your application and in your affidavit? Yes or no, it's quite simple.
MR STANFORD: Are you aware that at the time of the attack in the bar there were a few members there and there were two black - two of our black playing members who were actually in the bar at the time?
You have been asked questions regarding that portion paragraph (b) and you have indicated in this Committee that you received information that Mr Radie will be there and also when you were a caddie there and also that high ranking military officers will be there. Is it true that because you heard that Mr Radie, who was a member of the National Party, a Member of the Parliament, if I'm not mistaken he was a Deputy Minister there, you came to the conclusion that this is a National Party gathering?
about there and I want to follow that up just so that you know I'm tying it in with paragraph 12 on page 16. If you just quickly look at paragraph 12 on page 16 you talk about "personnel was deployed approximately two months before". So I'll ask another question in relation to that but I'll be tying the two in. Personnel was short, or there was a shortage of personnel?
MR XUNDU: Ja, that is why I myself having been the originator of this document, I question it's validity and that is what leads me to believe that it's not the final product because I don't understand why we can complain of the shortage of personnel because as far as I can look in to see into the Golf Club Operation and the fact that, I mean, the person who drew the operational plan and who knew the requirements in terms of equipment and personnel would then again complain of shortage of personnel.
ADV. GCABASHE: Right, specifically at that paragraph 12: "the personnel was deployed approximately two months before the Golf Club Attack". Now I've go a few questions relating to that paragraph and it ties in a bit with what Mr Stanford asked.
MR XUNDU: Really, I can't remember but I think in as far as the paragraph is concerned, I mean I can explain that the deployment of personnel two months before - the personnel, I mean the Golf Club was not the only target and therefore as a matter of operational requirement we, I mean, prefer to help personnel deployed in the area because there were lot of targets in the area.
MR XUNDU: No, no. I didn't issue any commands but the - our - my senior commanders were quite aware of the recognisance of the situation here because I mean, I was the person who was on the ground, I knew the composition of the patrols of the SADF, I knew the ...[inaudible] of the SAP, so to that effect they were quite convinced in what is happening there though I was not there.
MR PRIOR: The original question of my colleagues still stands then, which was - maybe she can re-put it to you. It was a question of these people were deployed two months ahead of time and she was canvassing that in that context what - it was in relation to the postponement as well, if I remember correctly, but I trying to get some explanation from you - well what did these people do for two months? Maybe that's a better way of putting it?
MR XUNDU: Ja, okay, now I understand now. I think I understand now. I mean, as a command practice or as a routine of APLA during the - you must have noticed there were so called Molotovs thrown in, those concentrated petrol bombs which were thrown in that day in the Golf Club. It takes some ...[inaudible], because you must cut the sticks put it in a certain part and all those mixtures there, so that we call production and also political work that is things like political versus reviewed political situation, I mean that was led by myself as a commissar and also cadres on their own could give me a hand for logistics supplies that they could get. If for instance they can get a file on somebody who can supply us with arms, I mean, they would exploit and explore that avenue. So the cadres - and also the training - so the cadres already had something to do.
MR XUNDU: What they knew that - from the briefing that they were given I'm sure in Umtata and the briefings that I gave them as soon as they arrived this side I told them "Gentlemen you are here for operations". So what they knew is that they must be battle ready.
ADV. GCABASHE: Then again in relation to your own part in information gathering, over what period did you gather this information? So the question really relates to for how long were you a caddie? One day, two days, a week? I must have missed that somewhere. Over what period?
ADV. GCABASHE: That's what I needed clearing up. Then we come to the participation of your colleague, your Comrade Ntintili, Lungi Ntintili, I just lost you again somewhere because you talked about trying to dispose of the Jetta, going through that - having difficulty with doing that and then coming back to ask Mr Ntintili to assist you. Is that, did I get that right? You first tried on your own, couldn't do it, then you had to come back and get him to follow you with the Rover so that you could actually dispose of this vehicle?
MR XUNDU: And then we met at the obstruction that we met there, the Khoso Peace what you call them, that Ciskei Security Man and then we drove off firstly, we went to Lizanzi Location, Lizanzi Location just behind the ....[inaudible]
MR XUNDU: And then get into the location, Vito and myself stayed there for something like ten minutes, then we when we are sure that those Peace Force vans have drove past to King William's Town and then we went back, back to Tembisa and where we took up arms and then there was Comrade Ntintili so he wanted it, I mean, it was very strategic, if he's driving the Jetta then the police stopped him, right where - issued orders with the ...[inaudible] right, when they stopped him, immediately when they come out of their vehicles I know policemen they use, our people who have films, immediately they come out of their vehicles, we take them, I mean the lot, the plan, we take them so that we are able to continue with our - I mean until we reached the objective.
MR PRIOR: Mr Chairman, sorry, through the Chair, there's one matter that Mr Stanford raised with us, it's one point I wish to get clarity in my mind. It's about the note itself, about the postponement, if I may be permitted through the Chair?
MR PRIOR: Mr Xundu, just one aspect. If the attack on King William's Town Golf Club was postponed which seems to be the impression created by the note, in other words it wasn't -it was planned for a day before the 28th November, then the presence of Mr Radie at the Golf Club then wasn't the issue there was it? Was the target someone else and I think that's what Mr Stanford was driving at.
CHAIRPERSON: I have no questions but I have an enquiry I wish to make. Mr Mbandazayo, we have received a letter addressed to us, written on behalf of your client by Mr Letlapa Mphashlela, I take it you have seen a copy of it?
CHAIRPERSON: And we do not consider that the letters as such are of any assistance to us, they are not affidavits, the signatures not confirmed - it could be anything. But we do think it would be of great assistance to us and to your client why Mr Letlapa Mphashlele to come here and give evidence, to tell us as well as the more senior members of APLA what the views of APLA were, what their plans were and matters of that nature. We have throughout these hearings heard junior ranking people who tell us what they've been told by others but I think and I think I speak for the whole Committee, it would be of great assistance to have a more senior responsible person, who from the letters he writes, obviously still takes a keen interest in these people, to come and assist us and the applicants by telling us what the position is and I don't know if you can make arrangements in that regard?
MR MBANDAZAYO: Mr Chairman I have spoken to the leader of evidence, we are working on that and I'm definitely, Mr Chairman, will arrange a date with the Amnesty Committee. Definitely I will take it upon myself to do that and that will be - I can say to this Committee that I will make sure that it's possible.
CHAIRPERSON: Good, that I think will be of great assistance to your clients or maybe and to the other persons in other matters because once we have got a picture from the top down, it is so much easier for the people lower down and we would be very obliged if you could make those arrangements, consult with Mr Prior and we'll get a suitable date.