hrvtrans
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION HEARINGS
1996-11-20
PIETERMARITZBURG
WILLIAM BASIL HARRINGTON, BENSON VULINDLELA NSIMBI, DANIEL JOHANNES MEYER
http://sabctrc.saha.org.za/hearing.php?id=56218&t=&tab=hearings
http://sabctrc.saha.org.za/originals/hrvtrans/hrvpmb/pmb7_1.htm
(incomplete) ... client is Mr David Ntombela, and he has ... (incomplete) (Pause) Please let us continue! Please let us continue!
MACHINE SWITCHED OFF
The attorney came up front here to talk to us, but you did not express as to whether you don't want the attorney, or the letter must be read from David Ntombela. I can't hear you. Don't scream, don't shout, don't make any noise. Please hush. Keep quiet, because we do not know what you want because you simply burst and make noise. What is it that you want? (Pause) If you had given us a chance because you wanted Ntombela to be present. Now you are not even giving us a chance as to hear whether Ntombela will be coming. That is what democracy is all about. You should forward your request so that we know what you want, then we move from that point onwards, but you are not giving us a chance. Could you please keep quiet so that we may hear one person as to what you require or what you want, because we will not be able to have a report back. So we urge you to tell us what you want. We want to hear from the attorney as to where David Ntombela is, whether he is coming or not, but at this juncture you are not giving the attorney a chance.
MACHINE SWITCHED OFF
We are still trying to arrange for Mr Ntombela to come, together with his attorney, and the attorney and Ntombela will read a letter or a report that they have compiled, but you must promise that you will be quiet for the rest of the proceedings, because we will not be able to hear what they are here to say if you do not keep quiet. Please do keep quiet. Give them that chance to read that document that they are bringing with. Please do promise us that you will act accordingly, you will behave yourselves, because it does not help to be rowdy. You are just wasting time, so we urge you to be quiet and afford him a chance to say whatever he has to say.
MACHINE SWITCHED OFF
Please be quiet, we don't need any noise, because if you do make noise they may just leave everything and go back, and what will we benefit as a Commission? Please be quiet. I can't hear you, you are making noise. People we will leave you alone. If you are this ungovernable we will leave you alone. We'll tell them to leave the hall. If you continue making noise we will ask them to kindly leave the hall.
MACHINE SWITCHED OFF
Please let's be quiet. Let's be quiet.
Mr Coetzee, can you hear me now? Thank you. Can I have your full names please.
/PETRUS
PETRUS COETZEE (Sworn, States)
Do you have copies for the Commission of the document? --- I have made.
Will you distribute those before you read the document? (Pause) Thank you. Please proceed in your own time, and perhaps just explain the background as to why you are reading the statement and not Mr Ntombela. --- Those are my instructions. May I also just state if I am going to be interrupted I am not going to proceed, I am going to leave.
I am pleading with you, please be quiet. Let's maintain order. I have told you before that if you carry on making noise they will leave, because they do have that right to leave us. ---
"(Inaudible) ... Mr David Ntombela and Phillip Zondi. We record that we attempted to contact your Mr Lyster on 19 November 1996 at approximately 14:00. We were unable to speak to him. We further refer to the telephonic conversation between the writer and Mr Lyster this morning, and confirm having been advised by him of the following
1. that our clients were not subpoenaed to appear before the Commission;
2. that the Commission only as an afterthought and late in the day decided to invite Phillip Zondi to appear before the Commission;
3. that Mr Zondi was notified to appear before the Commission by letter, the said letter having been sent to Mr Ntombela;
/4. that
"4. that the Commission only came into possession of Father Smith's statement and the statements of the two special constables who testified during yesterday's hearing "late last week";
5. and that the other victims who testified during the hearings did not incriminate Mr Ntombela in their written statements supplied to the Commission, but incriminated Mr Ntombela during their oral testimony before the Commission.
/"reasonable
In your aforesaid letter of 12 November 1996 you advised our client, "Your name has been mentioned by a number of people who have knowledge of this event as being someone who has intimate knowledge of the incidents which took place at that time from the Inkatha perspective." Our client is therefore of the view that at the time of inviting him to appear before your Commission your Mr Lyster, and/or the Commission's investigators, were in possession of statements incriminating and/or referring to our client. Despite our client having requested your Mr Lyster in his letter of 13 November 1996 to indicate to him who had mentioned his name as an individual who had
/"intimate
We have only this morning managed to obtain a copy of Professor Aitchison's submissions to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which he delivered on 18 November 1996. From a perusal of Professor Aitchison's aforesaid report it is respectfully submitted that the reader thereof would appreciate the fact that both our clients have been mentioned and incriminated. We are therefore instructed further to record that our clients find it totally unacceptable that they were invited to testify before the Commission at such a late stage, and without having been furnished with copies of statements which are instructed must have been in your possession or the
/"Commission's
"Commission's investigators'.
and I am now quoting the report in the Natal Witness,
"The incident was triggered by the stoning of buses carrying IFP supporters from a rally in Durban on March 25 1990. It later emerged that the day after the stoning a large group of heavily armed IFP supporters met at the home of a well known warlord, where a revenge attack was planned."
I end the quotation from the Natal Witness.
"Regardless of whether reference is being made to my client as a well known warlord this statement clearly indicates that an official
/"of your
"of your Commission had already made up his mind about the facts, and made this public in the name of the Commission. In the light of numerous newspaper reports initiated by your Commission our client instructs us that he is justified in believing that he, Mr Ntombela, is being referred to in this press statement as the well known warlord. Should this be the case our client instructs us that he fails to comprehend how such a statement could have been issued on behalf of your Commission, creating the impression that this was a fact, prior to any evidence being heard by the Commission, which only commenced on 18 November 1996. Our client further instructs us that the contents of this aforesaid media statement attributed to Mr Lembede further tends to show that your Commission and/or your investigators were in possession of evidence implicating Mr Ntombela as far back as 14 October 1996. If this is indeed the case our client fails to see why he was only invited to testify before your Commission at such a late stage, and not having been furnished with copies of statement incriminating him, either expressly or by way of innuendo.
In conclusion our clients instruct us that, although they are prepared to assist in giving their version of the events, they do not see their way clear to do so before this Commission as constituted at present. Our
/"clients
"clients therefore in conclusion instruct us that they are of the view that they will not receive an objective and fair hearing. Our clients have instructed us that they will be writing to the Commission requesting that the present Commissioners of this inquiry be relieved of their positions if this inquiry is to continue and they are to testify before it."
Thank you.
Thank you, Mr Coetzee. --- May I be excused?
Yes. --- Thank you for the opportunity.
/PIERRE CRONJE
PIERRE CRONJE (Sworn, States)
Mr Cronje, you are a member of Parliament, that's a member of the National Parliament, and you are a member of the ANC, is that correct. --- That is correct.
Can you just briefly tell us what you were doing at the time of the Seven Day War, and then go on to tell us about your experiences during that period? --- Ja. I think perhaps I will follow the brief and try and be short if you allow me, Mr Chairman.
Yes, thank you. We would ask you to try and cover as much ground as you can as briefly as possible, because we are running extremely late. --- All right. I just want to say that I was elected as a member of the old Progressive Federal Party to the constituency of Greytown in 1981, and ever since then I have been a Member of Parliament. My particular interest in politics stemmed from - my particular interest in politics stemmed for my desire for change in South Africa, and I had a particular interest in the modalities of change. As such then I became increasingly involved in studying the increasing violent conflict between the State and the black resistance movement in the early 80s. I travelled extensively in all the provinces to see the patterns of this emerging violence. After the formation of the UDF in 1983 the tension between the IFP and progressive community organisations in Natal led to ever more increasing violent oppression by the State, and also by the IFP to try and drive out ANC activists and UDF-aligned organisations from communities. As such then I became involved in some of the earliest acts of violence in Ambonathi, Mpumalanga and Imbali, and increasingly became involved in monitoring the violence, and also in mediation efforts at local level. By the mid-80s I had a very extensive network of contacts and informers in most townships in Natal, and also in the rural areas in the Midlands, where violence had manifested itself. From these sources I would get lots of information about imminent attacks, and it often placed me in a position to be at those events even before they started unfolding. Now, with particular reference to the Seven Day War, I would concur with some observers that the hugely successful rally addressed by Mandela in Durban, and the subsequent low turnout of IFP supporters to the Buthelezi rally at the same venue, had created an unbearable tension in the region, and especially so for the embattled IFP in the greater Pietermaritzburg region, where they have seen their sphere of influence continually shrinking, until it was finally reduced to a few strongholds in the upper Vulindlela and Sweetwaters.
Thank you, Mr Cronje. We'll just ask a couple of questions.
Thank you, Mr Cronje. There's one question I have to ask you arising out of Brigadier Swanepoel's evidence yesterday. He told us that there was a plan that had been arranged by the joint planning command in relation to these events. He said that the designated role of the SADF was to keep the Edendale road open at all costs. He said they had no other planned function in this process. Now, he was commanding officer of Group Nine at that time, and what you've told us seems to contradict that, in the sense that you have told us that they were ready, willing and able to enter the area and deal with the situation, but that the police prevented them from doing so, in that they were under the police's control, as you well know. Just your comments on those two versions. --- Well, I would concur with him that they had perhaps relegated them to that role. In fact when I returned on the Friday I was quite surprised to see that the army was in fact still pinned down in Edendale road, where none or very small incidents of violence had occurred. But the role of the army, when you look at the area between - let us say from Taylor's Halt towards KwaShange, where an impi had to traverse kilometres of open ground in broad daylight, that that is where the army could have been and should have been deployed, and not even in large numbers, to really stop the events from unfolding as they did. So, while I concur with him, and we all know that that is the procedure, and that they had confirmed to me that they will only come in when the police call them, and, as I say, that again leads to the conclusion that whatever plans there may have been it would not have been a plan to prevent the war, but in fact a plan to make the war succeed, as it did.
/The other
The other contradiction arising out of his evidence is that he gave us the distinct impression yesterday that they were totally under-resourced. They did not have enough troops to deal with the situation, and the statement you've made in your submission is that you were assured they did have enough troops. --- The word "enough" obviously depends on the task at hand. On Monday when I spoke to him - or, sorry, on Tuesday, they said yes, they had indeed called up - I think they had said that the Carbineers had just been called up, that there were other units deployed now, and he said that he is ready and able to go and assist. Now obviously, and if we talk about a war zone now that stretch over perhaps 25 kilometres, maybe they would have not been prepared for that. But I would still say that the army - or the SADF has got many units. They are placed all over Natal. Any unit from Durban or from Ladysmith could have arrived here by Wednesday or Thursday if they had really meant business, because the war stretched over a long period, and whatever - you know, so what I am saying is in relation to the task.
Thank you.
Comrade Cronje, just one short thing here I need to understand. On your presentation here when you met with Minister Vlok, appealing to him to intervene, you say here that, "He replied in his usual inane way that I should call off my combatants, that that will get some repose of the situation." Can you say any more about that? --- I would perhaps reply that I excluded some other part of the sentence - of my submission because of brevity and the /problem
problem of time, but the relationship that we had with
Minister Vlok was one of really playing games about the security situation. Now, part of it may have been a sense of humour, but part of it I think was also that he had a political agenda, and he had an agenda which we could not crack. I refer in particular, for instance, to the time that we tried to intervene - that was Peter Gastrer and myself - with regard to the UDF activists that had been detained shortly after an agreement had been reached in this peace initiative in Pietermaritzburg. Now, at that time we went up to see Minister Vlok to plead for the release of these UDF negotiators, and he said to us, "Do you really believe that I could stand it politically to allow the UDF to be seen to be negotiators and peace-makers?" and for that reason he is afraid he cannot allow them to be released. So that on the one level - and the other point that I mentioned here is because I had many sources of information people would often tell you about attacks before they were going to occur. People who live in Sweetwaters and other IFP strongholds would tell you that they have been mobilised, ordered to take part in attacks. Sometimes when these were to be large attacks I would, for instance, phone the Minister simply to tell him that I know that something was going on. What I suspect would have happened that he would then call the police and tell them to call off that particular attack, and then as I say, in his jocular way he would say to me, "See, your information was wrong. It did not happen." Now, to me it was fine because I know some lives were saved if he called off attacks that were planned simply to play games with
myself. The last one again is your contact with de Klerk
when he referred you to Hernus Kriel, who also said that you should work with the provincial administration to see what immediate relief measures would be required. What was meant by that? --- No, I think that was more a question of how the organisational - or how government works, in other words that the provincial government was the channel for any funding for relief type work, and also being in charge of civil defence, and Minister Hernus Kriel was the Minister of Provincial Affairs at the time.
leaders were, and you will find that in many cases there
were, you know, cases outstanding against those. In other cases they were certainly not leaders. I can recall that at times when I served on the peace committees that we asked the IFP to identify leaders in a particular community, and they said, "We don't know who the leaders are. There is no structure." And then suddenly when somebody is killed their names appears on the list as ... (incomplete) ... terminated internally, IFP people who were killed by other IFP people because of internal fights within the organisation. More often than not people who preached peace.
Mr Cronje, thank you very, very much for coming to talk to us today. I think a notable feature of this period was the number of influential people like yourself, Professor Aitchison, Radley Keys, Khaba Mkhize and many others, who desperately attempted to intervene to try to force the authorities, the police, the army to intervene in the situation and to prevent the death and destruction which happened. And notwithstanding those attempts by yourselves, the situation in fact got worse and worse. And in these circumstances it's very difficult not to come to the conclusion that the authorities and the police saw this so-called Seven Day War as a sort of final solution to the Edendale valley in order to place it under IFP control. It is very important that people like yourself and the others that I have mentioned, whose integrity is beyond question, have all independently concluded from observing the conflict that there was open co-operation between elements of the IFP and the police during that period, and it certainly assists us in drafting a report
which accurately reflects those tragic times. So we thank you very much for coming to talk to us. --- Thank you.
/WILLIAM BASIL HARRINGTON
WILLIAM BASIL HARRINGTON
(Sworn, States)
Mr Harrington, will you be speaking in English or Afrikaans? You may speak in either language. --- Afrikaans.
Your evidence will be translated directly into Zulu. Can you hear me through the earphones? Are you hearing me in English?
INTERPRETER
The speaker's mike is not on.
Are you hearing me now, Mr Harrington? And now are you hearing me? --- Ek kan, ja.
Mr Harrington, just by way of background, is it correct that you are presently serving a prison sentence in Grootvlei Prison in the Free State? --- That's correct.
And you are serving a sentence with your co-accused, Mr Frans Erasmus. --- That's correct.
And Mr Philemon Madlala. --- That's right.
And all three of you were sentenced in 1991 following your conviction on a charge of murder, is that correct? --- That's correct.
Now, at the time of your sentencing you were a policeman. --- Yes, that's right.
And is it correct that you were serving with Riot Unit Eight in Pietermaritzburg? --- That's correct.
And you were in the police service during the period which we are examining now, that is March/April 1990? --- That's correct.
Now, can you tell us, during that period did you work together with special constables? --- Yes, we worked with them in the Riot Squad.
Can you give us some background on the special constables, who these people were, where they came from, and how they were deployed in the SAP? --- There were four shifts at the Riot Unit, A shift, B, C and D shifts, and on each shift there were about 20 - between 20 and 50 special constables. They came from Inkatha areas, acknowledged Inkatha areas. They were mostly used as guards on trucks and vehicles, as well as at certain control points, and also at Inkatha chiefs' homes.
The other accused in your matter, Mr Madlala, was he in fact a special constable? --- That's correct.
Now, you said earlier on that you worked with special constables. Were they deployed on the Riot Unit vehicles with Riot Unit staff? --- That's correct.
Can you tell us something about the method by which you and the special constables operated, the modus operandi during that period? --- If I could just ask the Committee, yesterday I made a new statement. I would like to start afresh and explain to you, and then perhaps you will understand the full picture.
Please - all right, please then proceed in your own time and according to the statement that you have made. --- I am 27 years old. I matriculated in 1987 in a Transvaal school. Directly after school I went to the Police College, and after six months' training I was stationed at the Riot Unit here in Pietermaritzburg. I am currently - I have been in prison for about 15 years, serving a sentence of 18 years for the murder of an ANC supporter. I was employed at the Riot Unit between 1988 and 1991. Until my arrest I was then between 18 and 21 years old.
Could I ask you to speak a little more slowly, because we're having a double translation from Afrikaans to English and English to Zulu. --- I understand that.
So if you could just ... (incomplete) --- The section head of the A shift.
Sorry to interrupt you. We've just been informed that there's a very, very large crowd outside who want to hear the evidence today, and the police have asked us to the police outside have asked us to adjourn your evidence so that we can try and rig up some speakers outside. If you can just stay there on the stage we'll just ... (incomplete)
MACHINE SWITCHED OFF
Now, the evidence which you gave, you said that you were with special constables in the Table Mountain area, and you were invited by an Inkatha group to join them in a braai and to have drinks with them. Did I understand you correctly when you said that when you were braai-ing and having drinks with them another Inkatha group launched an attack on a nearby UDF or ANC area? --- That is correct, Chairperson.
And the Inkatha people that you were with told you not to worry, and that you did not take any action to prevent or even investigate the attack, but that you continued to braai and drink? --- That was the case, yes.
Now, would you say that was typical of the manner in which the Riot Unit and the special constables behaved during that period? --- Yes, it would appear so.
Mr Harrington, you fell under various senior officers at the unit, Lieutenant Meyer and others, Lieutenant van der Heever. Were they aware that the Riot Unit and the special constables were being deployed in this fashion and that they were behaving in this fashion? --- That is difficult, it's difficult to say yes or no, but it was so generally done and openly done that none of us were reprimanded about this. It wasn't seen as wrong.
You said also that you saw on the application forms which people had to fill in to become special constables that they contained the - or included the signature of IFP chiefs, is that correct? --- That's correct.
Now, what is your understanding of that? Are you saying that before people were accepted as special constables they had to be approved by the IFP? --- Definitely yes.
You also mentioned that you used your army vehicle to transport IFP people to certain areas. Could you just elaborate on that? What was the purpose of transporting them, and to what areas were they transported, and what was their aim when they went to those areas? --- I often came upon groups of Inkatha specials, about between 10 and 20 people, at night, where they were on their way to specific areas to attack an ANC home. I then thought it a good idea to convey them in my own vehicle and to take them to such a house or area. I never specifically took part in these raids myself, because my objective was to stand back, to keep my distance, to prevent ANC supporters from running away from this area. My other objective was to - after the shots that I had heard, to escort the special constables back to where they had come from.
You also said that you were under orders not to disarm any IFP people whom you caught with illegal or home-made weapons, is that correct? --- No, these were traditional weapons. We were told not to confiscate traditional weapons.
And what about guns, firearms? --- If I came upon groups and they had firearms in their possession - such an incident took place in the city. I noticed that there were firearms involved, that people were carrying firearms. We didn't confiscate these firearms from the people.
Were these specific standing instructions which came to you from your unit? --- No, I wouldn't say they were specific instructions, but the fact that an officer was in the vicinity or at the scene, you know, for that reason it was authorised.
But if you saw UDF or ANC people with weapons of any sort you would disarm them? --- That's correct, yes.
/BENSON VULINDELA NSIMBI
BENSON VULINDLELA NSIMBI
(Sworn, States)
Reverend Nsimbi, you are a minister in the Methodist Church, is that correct? --- Yes.
And at the time of this so-called Seven Day War is it correct that you were stationed or that you were posted in this Pietermaritzburg region? --- That is correct.
And is it correct that during this period you had a lot to do with the aftermath of the conflict, that is with the refugee crisis? --- That is correct.
suspecting that why did we accept and accommodate these people in the churches. But by God's grace we don't know how it happened that the church was not divided into two, having one group saying, "We will go to church, to our church, because we are Inkatha," and the other group saying, "As UDF we will go to our own church." I say this because in our church the church was predominantly Inkatha than UDF. One other thing that people had in mind at the time was the Apostle Church was working hand in hand with UDF. I don't even know what was wrong in that even if it was so. Truly speaking I did encourage people to take one side instead of being neutral, because there are many people who died who did not even know what was happening, because those who died knowing what was happening at least they died satisfactory. But it is pathetic to know that many people who died are people who died not knowing whether they were going or coming, no direction at all. I do like in closing to highlight on this, that after the refugees in the attacks that took place on Tuesday there are people who were killed in KwaMnyandu on Thursday. One was shot and died just towards our church building. That boy did lie there since Thursday up to Sunday morning. One of you Commissioners up front there went with him, were trying to locate the corpse, dead bodies of the people around the area. We found out that Sunday morning there were bodies that were already beginning to spoil and getting rotten lying there. We tried to ask the police to come fetch all the corpses and dead bodies lying around the neighbourhood. I do believe that people who were resident in the places they had left now, and those who witnessed how people were killed brutally, that I believe
that even today they don't wish to go back to their places. One other thing that adds to this. One of the chiefs who's now late, who said he will plough in KwaMnyandu sugar cane. Even today when you pass by that place you see trees more than houses, because people were so scared, they were traumatised about that, that they don't wish to go back to those places. I do believe that even when this is all said and done now, and in the past, it will take a long time for sure that those people's minds and their souls get back to a normal state of a normal person. There are people who will say - who were hiding in those churches, when you say to them, "Hey, there is Ntombela," they will run and almost want to get out through windows. When you say, "There is Nsikiza," they will look for a door so they can run away as fast as their feet can carry them. Some others I do believe that even at night they do have those dreams, scary dreams, nightmares that make them shout at night, and cry. I think the healing of those people who were exposed to that will take time. Now we are happy that you in front here are putting so much effort that all the things which took place should come out into open, that the healing should start and proceed. I am one of those who will take time to be fine, and this is why I said, "Please clean the chair before I sit," and do forgive me for that. It is because of the things I had seen, and also my upbringing has a lot to do with this. I think it will be my grandchildren who will see the Canaan land. I just think I will die here, here in this wilderness.
Reverend Nsimbi, I want to thank you very, very much /for your
for your evidence. Had it not been for the hard,
dedicated work of people like yourself, and the many others from the churches, from the Pietermaritzburg Crisis Co-ordinating Committee, doctors and others, the terrible suffering of those people who were victims during that week would have been even more unbearable. It should not have been the responsibility of churches and NGOs to care for these people, it should have been the responsibility of the Government, but as we heard yesterday the Government said that it would only provide monetary relief if it was equally distributed amongst both sides, and as a result of that not one cent of the ... (incomplete - end of Side B, Tape 2) ... the churches, Crisis Committee and others, and we want to thank you, and those others who are here today, for their hard work and their dedication, and to thank you for your submission today. Thank you very much indeed.
/DANIEL JOHANNES MEYER
DANIEL JOHANNES MEYER
(Sworn, States)
Inspector Meyer, we understand that you have been instructed by the police to give the official SAP version of this event which became known as the Seven Day War, is that correct? --- That's correct, Mr Chairman. I am actually Director Meyer, not inspector.
Sorry, I apologise. Director Meyer, sorry. Can you then prepare to read from your statement which I understand that you have prepared, and you have made copies available to the Commission. --- That is correct, Mr Chairman. I would like to ask - after the submission I would like to change to Afrikaans. I am reading the submission in English because the whole documents were prepared in English.
Please settle down. Please proceed. ---
"Submissions by the South African Police Service regarding the incidence of public violence in Edendale and surrounding areas during March 25 to April 1990, also referred to as the Seven Day War.
"Introduction. This report endeavours to set forth this Department's ..."
(intervention)
INTERPRETER
The interpreter is struggling to hear the witness.
Could you speak a bit louder and sit a bit closer to the microphone please? ---
"This report endeavours to set forth this Department's version of the events as accurately as possible in the absence of several official records relating to the
/"period
"period in question. Unavailable records which were kept by the former Riot Unit Eight, Pietermaritzburg, are SAP15s, section sergeants' reports, which contains the details of all members as deployed in their sections during the period, and SAP280 radio incident report forms, on which all incidents reported to Riot Unit's operational room were recorded. Departmental prescriptions for the destruction of the ephemeral records relating to these forms is a period of one year, and the present commander of Public Order Policing Unit No 8, Superintendent O'Connell, states that these records were in fact destroyed in terms of the relevant instructions. The other official records are the pocket books of individual members, and eight occurrence books relating to that period, and the crime registers, and these were removed by Mr Cockett of your investigation unit on 96.10.25. Notwithstanding a request that the documents in question be returned to enable us to scrutinise same they have not been returned. This office report is thus based on the recollection of individual members involved and the accuracy thereof can thus not be guaranteed. The following members were consulted: Director McDuling, Director Meyer, Senior Superintendent Upton, Superintendent van den Heever, Superintendent O'Connell, Captain Brookes, Captain van Huysteen.
/"Director
"Director Meyer was the officer from Unit Eight most directly involved in dealing with the matter on an ongoing basis, and has therefore also been assigned to present the official account of the matter to the Commission.
Background
. Edendale township is bordered by rural areas occupied by several tribes, who resorted under traditional authority with chiefs and headmen. These tribes are Mpumuza, Inadi, Mafunze and Nxamalala. The bulk of these tribes are comprised of members of the IFP. Edendale on the other hand did not resort under the tribal authorities, and the bulk of the township's inhabitants were UDF/ANC aligned. Since 1987 unrest began to break out in several of the outlying areas such as Taylor's Halt, Gezabuso, KwaShange, Mpumuza, Xaluza, Sweetwaters, Nxamalala and Elandskop. As UDF/ANC stepped up recruiting campaigns in these rural areas IFP members in Edendale were driven out of the area, and clashed between rival groups frequently took place. Inhabitants of areas had to state their alliance either to the one or to the other of the opposing political parties, and large scale intimidation took place. No go areas for members of opposing political parties became established, and incidents of violence only persisted in those areas where no clear domination by a particular grouping had been established. Because the main route
/"to
"to Pietermaritzburg goes through Edendale rural IFP supporters who worked in town were compelled to make use of the routes, and frequent attacks began to take place on commuters in buses and taxis. Between 1987 and 1990 the conflict escalated and the UDF/ANC gained support and control in certain of the rural areas. During the period industrial labour actions and strikes were intensified. These were mainly spearheaded by UDF/COSATU alliance. IFP supporters who did not want to participate and wished to continue working were prevented from going to work as they would be attacked en route. Bus drivers were also influenced to participate in the strike action and stay-aways were initiated, resulting in no transport being available. This again resulted in counter actions or boycotts of the bus transport by IFP members. It also resulted in heightening of the tensions. Bus drivers who ignored the call and drove through Edendale were attacked, and several buses were damaged by stones and petrol bombs, and they were shot at. Commuters were also injured and killed. As a result of these attacks there were large scale mobilisations of IFP members bent on launching attacks on the inhabitants of Edendale. It was only through the proactive intervention of members of Unit Eight that these large scale attacks were averted on three occasions, when
/"IFP
"IFP members who had mobilised were persuaded not to carry on. During certain of the periods when attacks were intensified members of Unit Eight and the SADF patrolled and lined the route through Edendale to prevent attacks on buses and taxis.
"The Seven Day War. On Sunday the 25th of March 1990 there was a big IFP rally in Durban, where Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi was to address IFP supporters. On the way to the rally the buses which travelled through Edendale were attacked. The police had anticipated that there would be such an attack because these attacks on buses occurred regularly. Director Meyer spoke to Mr David Ntombela and requested that the buses use another route. Mr Ntombela, however, insisted that they would use the route through Edendale in the morning because it would be early in the morning and therefore there shouldn't be any trouble. They would then use the Howick route when they come back in the afternoon. This was a detour of about 20 kilometres. According to Director Meyer Mr Ntombela was quite adamant about using Edendale road in the morning. There were approximately 100 buses in the convoy. The police did escort the buses, but because there were so many buses the policemen were widely dispersed among them. SADF members were also deployed along the route together with SAP members. Despite
/"these
/"through
"through Edendale. He and about six to seven members tried to stop them and turn them back. While the SAP were trying to turn them back shots were being fired at them and the passengers from houses in the township. At the same time people at a nearby shop were also firing shots. Two members approached the shop to apprehend the shottists. One was arrested with an unlicensed firearm. The groups of passengers insisted that they wanted to walk through Edendale. Presumably they wanted to demonstrate a show of strength. The police refused to let them through. Director Meyer was compelled to hold their firearms at the ready, and this persuaded the passengers to re-embark. The police blockaded the road and told the bus drivers that they could not go through Edendale, they had to turn around. None of the buses from the rally therefore went through Edendale. However, other buses which came through Edendale not connected to the rally, especially empty buses with just the driver, were attacked. These buses were badly damaged. At this stage the police came under heavy attack. Every vehicle through Edendale was a target. Policemen were put at Imbali robots and at Gezabuso on the Edendale road to stop all vehicles from going into Edendale. Police vehicles were continuously attacked. Police worked until midnight and then withdrew so fresh people could be
/"deployed
"deployed the next day, because virtually all their resources had been utilised during the afternoon and evening. During the planning it was planned that the SADF would be placed at various strategic points on the main road. They generally performed patrol duties on the main road. Their manpower was also somewhat limited as the assistance which they could offer was limited. On this particular day Director Meyer cannot remember if the SADF were at their positions where it had been planned that they would be. On the same day at Marawa House, the KwaZulu Government offices and IFP offices in Edendale, was attacked and building damaged.
On Monday 26th of March no buses were running, so no IFP people could go to work. Blockades were still erected on the roads. A few taxis tried to go into town. A petrol bomb was thrown at a taxi near Georgetown, forcing it into the gutter and resulting in one passenger being badly burnt. On Monday morning Nsikayezwa Zondi's vehicle was attacked at Thulani's Garage in the Moscow area. He was chief of the Inadi tribe."
Mr Chairman, correction. It's not Inadi tribe, it's in fact Mpumuza tribe.
"The IFP supporters who were unable to go to work were already mobilising at Elandskop as news of the attack on the chief's vehicle was received, which incenses them even more. At
/"this
"this stage Mr Ntombela was not in the area. He went directly from the rally to Ulundi, since he was a member of KwaZulu Parliament. He only returned on the Monday evening after he had heard about the trouble.
On Tuesday 27th March IFP supporters from Sweetwaters mobilised and marched towards Edendale. Police stopped them on the border of Xaluza and Mpumuza boundary. Director Meyer spoke to Philip Zondi, IFP leader for Sweetwaters, and the brother of Chief Zondi. He undertook to take his people back. The IFP supporters had traditional weapons with them. No firearms were observed. Whilst these discussions were taking place a group broke away from the main group and went into Xaluza, where Detective Sergeant Nene's house was attacked, and he was injured and later died of his injuries. Stun grenades were used by the police to prevent the break-away group from going further into Xaluza. Another group also broke away and went into Xaluza over the hill. They were cut off my police and SADF and forced to retreat to Mpumuza area. On the other side of the hill, on the Mpumuza side, an attack was also launched on Ashdown residents. During the attack several houses were burnt down. During the day the police had their hands full trying to prevent IFP groups from several areas forming and marching to Edendale. On Tuesday night an IFP leader,
/"Poswa,
"Poswa, was shot dead and burnt in his car at KwaShange turn-off. The hostility from the people in the area as UDF supporters was such that the police could not go in and remove the body immediately. The following day the Riot Investigation Unit, under Senior Superintendent Upton, went and retrieved the body.
On Wednesday 28 March attacks started early in the morning while it was still dark. News was received of several attacks at: Botswana, IFP area, houses burnt; Ashdown, UDF area, houses burnt; Mpumuza, IFP area; Xaluza, UDF area; Sweetwaters, IFP area; Simero, UDF area. All available manpower was mobilised in these areas. Elandskop people mobilised because of information received concerning Poswa's death. They then launched the attack on KwaShange, Gezabuso, and the bottom section of Vulisaka. Police had to try and deal with all these attacks. There was simply not enough manpower to cope with the magnitude, and consequently reinforcements were requested from Durban Riot Unit. The attacks on the two prominent IFP leaders was an aggravating factor that exacerbated an already tense situation, and which appeared to have sparked off the intensity of the confrontation. Attacks on KwaMnyandu, a UDF stronghold, also took place on Wednesday and several people were killed. The terrain in several of these areas was such
/"that no
"that no vehicles could traverse, and it could only be reached on foot or by helicopter. The helicopter was deployed on more than one occasion to disperse groups of attackers, and also to assist members under siege under the command of Superintendent O'Connell. In the Ziboveni/KwaShange area a group of looters were cornered with the help of the helicopter and Riot Investigation Unit members. They were caught into a tent. Several people were arrested and charged for possession of suspected stolen property because complainants could not be identified. IFP groups also mobilised at Sweetwaters, Ezimbomvini and Umvundleweni. On nightfall attacks had subsided and reinforcements had arrived.
On Thursday 29 March and Friday 30 March sporadic incidents still occurred in several areas, resulting in some deaths and damage to property, but the intensity of the attacks had subsided. The violence also spilled over to the Imbali and Mpophomeni areas on these days. In one incident in Simero area Superintendent van den Heever and three other members responded to a request for assistance from a member of the Riot Investigation Unit who was trapped in the area. They were ambushed and involved in a shoot-out with heavily armed men before they could extricate themselves. A foreign reporter and Natal Witness reporter also got caught in the same situation and also
/"managed
"managed to escape unharmed.
On Saturday 31st March the violence had abated substantially.
Police investigations into the Seven Day War
. Investigations of reported cases arising from the conflict were done by the Riot Investigation Unit under the command of Senior Superintendent Upton, consisting of 27 members. It is clear from the number of incidents that took place that only a very small percentage were reported to police for investigation. During the period 25th of March to 4 April 1990 87 cases were reported for investigation by this unit, of which approximately 49 were murder cases. From newspaper reports it would seem quite apparent that far more people were killed whose deaths were not reported to the police. The investigation team experienced tremendous hostility from both parties involved, and there was very little, if any, co-operation whatsoever with the investigations ... (incomplete - end of Side A, Tape 4) ... by the Riot Investigation Unit to assist, but notwithstanding not much success was achieved. During the investigations members of the Riot Investigation Unit were ambushed, fired upon and petrol bombed. On Wednesday 28 March members of the Riot Investigation Unit arrested several suspected looters of property, during which shots were fired by the
/"Investigation
"Investigation Unit whilst the attacks on Ezibomvini/KwaShange areas were in progress. Due to the non-appearance of complainants looted property could not be identified, and several of the culprits were acquitted due to lack of evidence, although a few convictions for possession of suspected stolen property did ensue.
/"also
"also did not have many available members, and at most were able to field one company, comprising between 90 and 120 persons. Given these limitations it is submitted that the police played a significant role in minimising and quelling the violence. To illustrate this I wish to quote the following extracts from newspaper reports. Natal Witness, 28 March 1990: "Police moved in again. The attackers were eventually herded out of Xaluza. Residents mobilised to defend the area and a sporadic gun battle ensued. Police again moved in and warded off the attackers." Daily News, 28th of March: "Yesterday at Xalusa, near Edendale, a group of about 2 000 were fighting in fierce battle until Riot Police got into the crowd to disperse them. The fighting soon started in another area close by. The police moved in again and the attackers were persuaded to leave Xaluza. Later a crowd was seen to move to Mpumuza, but the police warded off the attackers." A quotation by Democratic Party MP, Pierre Cronje, commended the way in which the police had dispersed the crowds. The Echo, 29 March 1990: "The police move their Casspirs up the hill which divides Xaluza from Simero. It is with relief that I see those minute figures in blue more than 1 000 metres away dash down between the groups and head off the attack. On the main road between Xaluza and
/"Sweetwaters
"Sweetwaters we see the police form a barricade and drive the impi back towards Sweetwaters." The Natal Witness, 29 March: "Police arrived on the hillside, cutting off the attacking group. Police eventually mounted a preventative exercise, warding off the attacking group and herding them back onto the road. The attack began, but bloodshed was averted when the police arrived."
Finally I once again refer you to the introductory remarks, and wish to emphasise that our task in presenting as full as possible a report has been hampered to a large extent by the lack of available records, but I trust that the report has served to place the Commission in a position to understand the police perspective of the events of that period."
Mr Chairman, we've got a further submission on the questions that was asked by Professor Aitchison which we prepared, which I would also like to read out.
Thank you. Do you have copies of those, Director? --- Mr Chairman, I am sorry, this is the only copy. What I'll do, I'll hand it in straight after this.
Please go ahead. ---
"The Police response to submission of Professor J J W Aitchison, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, on the 18.11.96.
2.1 The police take note of the allegations that they aided IFP in counter attacks in Vulindlela in early 1988. The police are,
/"however,
"however, not aware of any aid to Inkatha in successful counter attacks. However, the fact that the learned professor refers to counter attacks presupposes that there were attacks on Inkatha members by the so-called non-Inkatha refugees, to whom we will henceforth refer to as the UDF/COSATU alliance. This is in keeping with the SA Police submissions that unrest commenced in the rural areas bordering on Edendale township during 1987, when the UDF/ANC started recruiting campaigns in the rural areas and clashes began to occur. 1. The suggestion that the security forces should guarantee the rights of people to live in safety is a reference to utopia. It is impossible for the security forces in any country, let alone KwaZulu Natal, with its history of violence, to guarantee the rights of people to safety. We can only strive to do our best in this regard, and it is our submission that the SA Police members risked their lives on daily basis prior to, during, and after the events of the Seven Day War. Anyone with any understanding of the nature of the conflict existing in those days would realise that it would be an impossibility for the SA Police and other security forces to have maintained a daily presence at the houses of thousands of refugees, who had fled the rural areas and moved into the Edendale and surrounding townships to avoid the counter
/"attacks
"attacks referred to by Professor Aitchison.
2. To suggest that the SA Police was not serious in their efforts to prevent vehicles from being stoned is ridiculous. Police were engaged on an almost daily basis in patrolling the area, and the SADF were requested to assist by placing vehicles on strategic places along the route through Edendale township. This road spans a distance of plus/minus 12 kilometres from Vulisaka to Imbali robots. From 1988 to the period in question incidents of stone-throwing occurred sporadically. Incidents of stone-throwing increased substantially during stay-aways, mass protests and ...
(inaudible) ... sorry, I can't pronounce the word.
"... on these days, but it was virtually impossible to determine beforehand where such incidents would occur. Apart from the main route referred to incidents of stone-throwing also occurred on the route to Gezabuso to Sweetwaters, especially in the KwaShange and Nxamalala area, which stretches over 10 kilometres. At times when stone-throwing was anticipated the police did their best to escort vehicles through these areas given the limited manpower and logistical resources.
3. It was the practice of the SA Police under chairmanship of the commander of the Riot Unit to meet on a daily basis with other role players, namely the Security Branch and the
/"SADF
" SADF, for the purpose of sharing information and planning operations. Obviously the planning depended on the nature of the information received and the reliability thereof. Naturally the police did anticipate the possibility of further mobilisation of people during this period as it was clear from intelligence reports that tensions remained extremely high in the areas concerned. Regular police patrols were mounted in identified flash point areas, and it is naturally impossible to say what effect these patrols had in preventing further mobilisation, but we are convinced that these patrols played a vital part in containing many outbreaks of violence. With particular reference to the situation immediately prior to the outbreak of the Seven Day War, the police did anticipate that buses could be stoned en route to the IFP rally in Durban, and this is dealt with in paragraph three of our submission.
5. The members involved in the present submissions to the Commission have no personal knowledge of the Security Police in this matter and cannot respond to this question.
6. The Commission is referred to paragraph three of our submission. There were allegations by both parties that the other party launched attacks on them first.
7. This aspect is also dealt with in
/"paragraph
"paragraph three of our submission in detail. The police, however, find it amazing that there should be a suggestion that they, with the awesome firepower at their disposal, should contemplate shooting at attackers of the buses when it is a well known fact that security forces pursue a police of minimum force. At all times the police endeavour to avoid armed confrontation with groups by negotiations and mediation.
Day three, 27th March 1990. In regard to the allegations of involvement with people dressed in "kits konstabel" uniforms, we wish to draw the following aspects to the attention of the Commission. The uniform worn by special constables was blue overalls, which was commonly available in many shops and also worn by many workers at various places of employment in the city. In addition many of the special constables had been discharged from the SA Police, inter alia for desertion, and many had not returned their uniforms. The SAPS, however, do not discount the possibility that several of these special constables may have become embroiled in the violence since they also resided in the areas wrecked by violence. If they did so, however, they were embarking on a mission of their own and did not have the sanction of the SA Police. The Commission is respectfully referred to paragraph 5 (1) and 5 (2) of our submission.
/"These
"These newspaper reports directly contradict the allegations that police did not halt attacks, and this is in any event disputed most strongly by this department. We maintain that we did everything in our power to stop the attacks.
8. If some policemen on various occasions supplied Inkatha forces with weapons and ammunition this was most certainly not done with the knowledge and/or collusion of the officers in charge of the operations at the time. Such actions would never have been tolerated, and, given the strict control over the use of ammunition and firearms, could hardly have gone undetected. We therefore express serious reservations as to the accuracy of such allegations.
9. Fourth day. In paragraph 3 (4) of our submissions we have pointed out that several attacks in at least six areas already occurred early in the morning prior to daybreak, and all available personnel were despatched to these various areas to attend. It was specifically because of the magnitude of the violence that additional security forces were brought in from Durban during the course of the day. The attacks were spread over an extremely wide area, and it was impossible to mount police surveillance teams everywhere to monitor the movements of groups of people. The four SAP vehicles deployed in Taylor's
/"Halt
"Halt were the only available vehicles to despatch to that area. The SA Police is unaware of the role or the reasons for the presence of the two KwaZulu Police vehicles.
10. The SA Police are not aware of the transporting of warriors from Cato Ridge in KwaZulu Government trucks. We are also unaware of any conspiracy with regard to the planning of the attacks. There are conflicting versions before the Commission as to the origin of these trucks. Some say Eshowe, which is Taylor's Halt area, and others refer to KwaMnyavu in the Camperdown area. The aerial survey referred to would very likely have observed 25 police vehicles since the police were deployed all over the larger Edendale area. The police emphatically deny the allegations that they ignored the Inkatha attackers and only took actions when the youth defended their homes. I once again respectfully refer the Commission to the newspaper reports referred to in our submission, which contradicts this allegation. It should not be lost sight of that the police themselves were frequently the targets of attacks where firearms were used and had to defend themselves, whilst at the same time trying to contain the situation. It is no secret that the SA Police were the subject of intense distrust and animosity from the UDF/ANC alignment, and mostly came under
/"attack
"attack when operating in these areas. On the other hand the tribal structures in Amakhozi were the legitimate structures of the day, and tended to co-operate more willingly with the security forces. In most circumstances it is little wonder that there was a common perception of collusion between the security forces and the IFP.
11. We have already endeavoured to outline the magnitude of the violence occurring on that day. Whilst the groups were advancing from Taylor's Halt an extremely serious confrontation was taking place in Ashdown and all the other areas mentioned in paragraph three of our submission, which warranted the attention of the bulk of the security forces deployed on that day. It was simply impossible to concentrate on all the areas at the same time.
12. We have already responded to the special constables, but cannot answer the KwaZulu Police, who fell under separate command structures at the time.
13. The magnitude of the attacks only became apparent on Wednesday morning, at which time reinforcements were urgently requested from Durban. Due to the unavailability of police records regarding manpower deployments we cannot give accurate figures of the numbers of reinforcements. We have already referred to the fact that there were only a limited number
/"of SADF
"of SADF members available, and these members were deployed along the main Edendale road according to the joint planning for the day. It is easy with hindsight to say ... (incomplete ... end of Side A, Tape 5) ... need to be understood within the context of what was taking place throughout the province at the time, where there were several areas of conflict. At national level similar situations prevailed in various provinces, and the National Riot Unit 19 had already provided 50 men some time prior to the outbreak of the Seven Day War.
14. We have already referred to the limited SADF personnel available and the operational planning provided for their deployment along the main route through Edendale, which provided access to the Edendale Hospital for the many injured persons, and to keep the route open due to several road barricades erected by the residents. It is not correct to state that the SADF was not requested by the SAP to assist, since joint planning took place with them on a daily basis.
15. The police were engaged in several areas at that time, trying to prevent attacks or to separate attacking groups. We have already pointed out that there was no manpower available for surveillance of the groups moving in various directions, and this was no doubt also the position with regard to the
/"group
"group moving over the bridge to KwaShange. By the time the police became aware of this group they were already launching attacks in the KwaShange area, and several huts were already burning. The only policemen in the area at the time were the Riot Investigation Unit, who had gone to retrieve the body of Poswa, which is referred to in paragraph 3.3 of our submission.
16. The police had no prior warning that an attack was to be launched on KwaMnyandu, and were still concentrating their efforts on various of the flash-point areas of the previous day, where violence had subsided, but could have broken out at any time. The KwaMnyandu area does not have a proper infrastructure and there are few access roads. It is situated on a hillside and access by vehicles is difficult under normal circumstances, let alone the muddy conditions which prevailed due to the heavy rains at the time.
Day Five. While it is correct that action was taken to disperse the protesting women it is emphatically denied that the police adopted a soft-line approach to the impis, and this fact is supported by several newspaper reports. Given the prevailing situation in the area the potential for violence by any group remained a serious threat, and the dispersal of the women was aimed at averting
/"a possible
"a possible attack on these protestors. It was also the women's refusal to disperse at the request of the police which compelled the police to warn them of the use of force if necessary. We also wish to point out that the attack in KwaMnyandu took place during the early morning, whilst the protest march occurred much later in the day. As regards to allegations that repeated attempts to deploy members of the SADF were frustrated by the police, this department wishes to place on record that it is totally unaware of, and denies, that it frustrated the SADF in any way from deploying in Imbali. We also question the accuracy of Professor Aitchison's statement that a 10-platoon convoy of SADF members were deployed outside Huletts Aluminium. One platoon consists of 30 men and three vehicles, and it is the recollection of the department that the entire contingent of SADF members available at the time in Pietermaritzburg area did not exceed four platoons and a total of approximately six vehicles. The SAPS wish to record that we find these allegations extremely strange since no complaints of this nature were ever recorded at the meetings of ... (inaudible) ... on the Friday the 30th of March, at which the SADF was represented, and at which incidents of this nature would be raised. Furthermore it needs to be pointed out that
/"the SADF
"the SADF did not fall under the command of the SAP, but operated under their own command structures in support of the SAP. This allegation is also starkly contradicted by the testimony of Mr Radley Keys, according to whom SADF reinforcements only arrived on the 10th of April.
Day Seven. Although official police records are not available the SAP members have no recollection whatsoever of having shot three people at Mpophomeni. Whilst opposing groups were attacking each other in the area the police arrived and were immediately shot at themselves. The police responded with tear gas grenades and shotguns and the groups were dispersed. The bodies of two males were found at a private dwelling which was not in the vicinity or the direction in which the police had fired. It is assumed that these persons were killed during skirmishes between the opposing groups. As far as the allegation relating to the wounding of 35 people at Table Mountain is concerned, the SAP emphatically denies that they were ever involved in a skirmish in which they wounded 35 people in Table Mountain area. We have previously pointed out that the SADF acted in support of the police, and it is inconceivable that the police would be involved in fomenting the violence and handing out firearms and ammunition in Imbali as alleged, and
/"thereafter
"thereafter call in the SADF in order to quell the violence which the police themselves were allegedly involved in. If one has regard to the previous allegations of Professor Aitchison, which are in any event denied, then it would seem that the SADF would never move into an area unless requested to do so by the SA Police. We are referring to the allegations relating to the 10 platoons waiting fruitlessly outside Huletts Aluminium. It cannot therefore be contended that the SADF vehicles which allegedly later moved into the Imbali area did so of their own accord.
18. It is true that informal inquests were held in respect of the victims of the Seven Day War. It must, however, be pointed out that the authority and the prerogative to decide whether a formal or informal inquest is to be held vests in the Attorney-General, and the SA Police are not in a position to dictate or to influence the Attorney-General in this regard. It needs to also be pointed out that the SAP received very little, if any co-operation at all from the affected communities in their investigations in this regard. The Riot Investigation Unit, under command of Senior Superintendent Upton, even approached attorney firms such as Cheadle Thompson & Haysom and others to request their assistance in persuading members of the community for whom they were acting to provide
/"the police
"the police with sworn statements identifying culprits. Requests were also directed to leading political figures such as Mr Radley Keys to assist in this regard, and despite this very little information was provided to the police. The investigation team also published details of property recovered from looters in the local media in an effort to identify owners to ensure successful prosecution against offenders, and even this report met with no success.
19. The SA Police dispute that the persons named were not questioned about their knowledge or role in the attacks. However, the same problems relating to witnesses who were willing to identify the persons referred to, and describe their role in the attacks, was encountered by the investigation unit. If witnesses had come forward and given this information to the police it is quite possible that prosecutions could have been instituted. It needs to be pointed out fear of reprisal and fear of intimidation probably played a significant role in the reluctance of witnesses to come forward. The SA Police can hardly be blamed for this, however.
20. The SA Police are not in a position to comment on the alleged role of Major General Buchner in regard to the Seven Day War. It is not known which senior officers Professor Aitchison is referring to, nor exactly what
/"actions
"actions or inactions he is referring to. If he is prepared to provide details the SAPS undertakes to look into these allegations."
Mr Chairman and Commission, I would like to ask permission to continue in Afrikaans please.
Thank you, Director Meyer. I've already said that any questions that will be put to you, and which you may answer, will certainly be in Afrikaans, but we have decided that, because it's already 5.30, everyone's had a long and stressful day, we're going to ask you to come back in the morning to answer the questions which we will put to you then. So we will adjourn now and meet tomorrow morning at 9.00 am. --- Thank you very much.
Thank you very much. Could you let us have copies of that document tomorrow morning?
PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED TO 1996/11/21
/PROCEEDINGS
PROCEEDINGS HELD AT
PIETERMARITZBURG
ON 21 NOVEMBER 1996
[VOLUME 2 : PAGES 92 - 176]
PROCEEDINGS RESUMED ON 1996/11/21
(Incomplete) ... last day of the public hearings of the Truth Commission. We left off yesterday with Director Meyer of the South African Police Services, and we will resume with his testimony this morning, if he can please come up onto the stage.
DANIEL JOHANNES MEYER
(Through interpreter)
(Inaudible) ... questions, and you have the right to reply in Afrikaans. --- Thank you, Chair.
Director, I want to take you back to what you described as JOC yesterday. That is the planning body that - what did JOC stand for, just for the record? --- JOC is Joint Operations Centre.
Who sat on that operation centre? --- Chairperson, the normal people on this panel, the chairperson was the commanding officer of the unit.
Sorry, just for the record, who was that person? --- I am not sure who it was. What I do know is that the commanding officer of Group Nine wasn't always the Chairperson. He mostly sent an operational officer involved in planning. The Security Branch was also represented there, the Detective Branch also represented, sometimes the NPA Traffic were there as well, and other members, co-opted members for these meetings.
Who would - just give us examples of what sort of people would be co-opted, by which departments and so on. --- These would have been people such as Civil Defence people, Ambulance Services. I think in brief that's about it.
Now, at that time the head of Civil Defence was
/Mr Kock,
Which Mr Shaw would that have been? --- I can't remember his first name, but I know he was a former policeman - he was a policeman.
Now, you've said that the chairperson was usually the unit commanding officer, or some other delegated officer. --- The chairperson was usually the commanding officer of the unit, and ... (intervention)
Which unit are we talking about? Sorry, just so we can be clear, which unit are we talking about? --- (Inaudible) ... riot unit.
And that was Riot Unit Eight at that time. --- That is correct, Mr Chairman.
And the vice-chair would have been the commanding officer or his designate of Group Nine. --- Of Group Nine, the Defence Force.
Now, I want to just - you can see how crucial it's been in the whole process, this question of planning. --- I can see that, Mr Chairman.
And so I'd like you to try and help us understand how the planning worked and what you guys actually did in that regard. --- I understand that.
So let's try and take you back to round about the 23rd of March, say, which is two days before the rally in Durban. --- Yes.
And by then you knew the rally was going to happen, and you would have known there were arrangements, and buses, and - it was a public rally, it was well announced. --- The normal route which we would have followed in our planning is the following. During these JOC meetings there would have been discussions regarding the availability of manpower for the occasion, information regarding the rally, and also what kind of problems there might possibly be. After such a meeting the operational officers involved in that kind of planning would have then sat down and worked out all the finer detail of the plan, and they would also commit the planning to writing. The parties involved would then be consulted.
Now, just for the record, where are the minutes of those planning meetings and where are the written plans, the records and so on, at the moment? Do you have any idea where they are? --- No. I believe most of these documents were destroyed, but I am not sure.
In the submission you say that quite a number of documents were destroyed in the normal course of regulatory getting rid of records that are not required to be kept. --- I think I should just correct something there. The Archives Act provides for the period of time that documentation must be kept for, and during that period we didn't have computerised systems to keep our records. Everything was done by hand and filed, and certain documentation was destroyed after about a year, others after three years, and others after five years. I am not familiar with the provisions of the Act regarding periods of time. That's fine, I really understand that. What sort of intelligence reports would you have relied on in your planning? --- I think the circumstances surrounding the rally. In the specific instance we would have looked at previous meetings and rallies, the problems which we experienced during those meetings, whether there was any information available regarding attacks on buses, the areas involved, and also the number of buses to be used. Because during that time we experienced a lot of problems with attacks on buses, and also attacks launched from the buses on the communities.
No, I am asking you specifically about intelligence reports that your own intelligence officers would have gathered at that time. People like the present Captain Brookes, for example, was very active in the Edendale valley, and he's told us that, and we want to know - he would have made reports to you about the situation in the valley, about his discussions with Mr Ntombela and others. --- That is correct. That is the type of information which we gathered.
So you personally would have been aware of the exact number of buses involved, what their proposed route was going to be, and all the logistical arrangements in relation to that rally. --- That is correct.
Now, obviously it's easy to be wise after the event, and one understands that the benefit of hindsight always helps, but looking back now how would you describe the situation that subsequently unfolded, in the sense that certainly for someone like myself, looking at this period six years later, your members seemed grossly inadequate for the purpose at hand? --- Yes, I agree with you. I think, to give you a little bit of background, this was not the first time that a rally of this kind was to be held. If am confusing the events on the 25th with previous events it's possible, because I experienced several such rallies and events, so I might, for instance, say the buses stopped at a particular place when it wasn't the case. For that particular day, for instance, to take the buses through Edendale in the morning with an escort, and presence during the day, I think we had sufficient manpower. But, on the subsequent days we definitely did not have enough manpower.
I want to just deal with the events of the bus coming through Edendale in the morning. You, as the officer on the ground in charge at that point in time, and I am assuming that from the nature - from the comments made in the submission. Is that correct? --- That is correct.
Now, in the submission you are reported to have had discussions with Mr Ntombela in the upper Edendale valley somewhere. It's not clear exactly where you were, but it's somewhere round about the Taylor's Halt, probably at the bus depot before the buses left. --- No, that's not correct. Perhaps I should just say before this occasion the IFP was specifically approached to avoid Edendale road. On the morning of the occurrence itself I went to Mr Ntombela's home - and during all these events and occasions the buses would always first meet at his home beforehand - and during this talk with Mr Ntombela I tried to persuade him once again not to drive through Edendale.
Why didn't you just order him not to go that way? You were a police officer, you had the authority to do that. Why didn't you just order him not to do it? --- That is a difficult question to answer now. I think any policeman on the ground must sometimes make decisions, right or wrong. Ultimately he has to account for what happens. If things turn out well then he made a good decision and nobody would ever refer to it again, but mistakes are sometimes made. And I think at that stage the political climate and events were so focused on political access routes and so forth that - well, I don't know whether you are interested in a specific newspaper report in which Mr Mvelase - I think it's V B Mvelase from the IFP - made specific statements regarding public roads, and he said these roads were not IFP or ANC roads, so I think the whole matter was a very, very sensitive one at that stage. And I think that my approach was that the buses would drive through early in the morning, and normally in the mornings we didn't experience too many problems, and I thought we would more than likely get the buses through without problems.
The question I then have, you see - and this is what we find very hard to understand, and I recognise all the political factors you've mentioned, but at the end of the day as a police officer your duty was to prevent damage and problems, potential loss of life, which you knew was a real possibility. --- Mr Chairperson, if we look at the alternative, the statement was made to me that the buses would be attacked. The statement was made to me that the same route could not be used in the morning and in the afternoon. From the IFP's side it was perhaps a strategy to use different routes, but the threat regarding attacks on buses was a fact. Edendale was not our only problem area. If we look at the route round Mpophomeni, buses had been attacked there on previous occasions, so the possibility and the threat of buses being attacked was significant. If I had forced them to go past Mpophomeni and there had been an attack then there would have been as great an onslaught from the IFP side.
I want to take you to the issue of the military, and your submission refers to two days of news reports, wherein which you have shown articles which tend to indicate that the police effectively prevented attacks. That's correct? --- Chairperson, the statement is correct to some extent. I think, however, that it is more of an indication to say that everything wasn't bad. In the same newspaper reports we were also strongly criticised. I only pointed out those certain reports to try to show that we were making attempts to prevent the whole thing from happening. It was certainly not all moonshine and roses.
Well, I am pleased that you at least have the frankness to admit that to us. However, the situation goes much further than that. By your own admission in this submission there were at times more than 14 000 people mobilised. --- I think it was 12 000. These were also statements made in the newspapers. If we look at the extent of the whole event, in the document Seven Day War written by Professor Aitchison he makes it very clear what his sources were, and these were UDF sources. It was not information obtained from the SAP, and it was not information obtained from the IFP side. In his document he refers to about 500 incidents, and I think that if we add IFP incidents and we add the SAP incidents, and we then look at the events surrounding - more less three days, not seven days but three days, then I think we'll start to see what the true extent of the whole thing was. Mr Pierre Cronje made a statement in Parliament, and he also mentioned a newspaper report, and he said - let me just find his exact words, I don't want to misquote him. "(Inaudible) ... outnumbered, and the reports he received from the area yesterday indicate that the police were once again not able to control the situation." That was a newspaper report on the 29th of March. He did criticise us as well, but this was simply to give you an indication of the magnitude of the whole thing.
That's precisely the point I am trying to make, with all due respect, Director. Whether it was 14 or 10 is irrelevant. The fact of the matter is that your personnel were grossly and totally outnumbered, and the fact of the matter is that you were simply unable to contain the situation. In a few places you were successful. You couldn't be everywhere at the same time. We understand that. --- I agree.
The issues is, why didn't you call the military in immediately? --- Chairperson, on day one we were more or less in control of things. On day two we were still reasonably three. On day four we were no longer in control. Apart from that - I am talking now of Monday morning, the 26th, the 27th and the 28th - on those mornings. In the mornings the Defence Force and police had joint meetings, so there was definitely consultation between the two groups. The specific reason for not calling in the Defence Force I would say is not correct, because we did use the Defence Force. But we must also realise that if we are talking about a company of Defence Force members we're looking at about four platoons. We're looking at 120 members ... (intervention)
We've heard 100 people maximum that was available. --- That is so.
But the point I am trying to make is this. Ladysmith is an hour up the road. You've got a battalion at Ladysmith. You've got Civil Defence - you've got Commando units situated all around Pietermaritzburg - Umkomaas, Umvoti, Camperdown area, further down towards Kloof, Pinetown, you have civilian force units. Estcourt you have civilian force units. Not one of those units was mobilised to come in and prevent what in reality was a major emergency. --- I hear you.
You can't give us a single explanation. Why? --- I can't speak on behalf of the Defence Force, but as far as the calling up of the forces is concerned that is not for the police to decide. That would have been a Defence Force decision, not a police matter. We did have contact with the Defence Force to call up more people, and that request and report did go through. I don't know who the contact person was, so unfortunately I can't comment any further.
You see, what Brigadier Swanepoel told us was that they weren't called upon to go into the area other than patrol the road. He said the only role designated to them was to patrol the road, they were not required elsewhere. He made that absolutely clear. The other thing he made absolutely clear - if you'll just let me finish the question - is that the Defence Force was under your control at that time, so the prerogative to call them in was your prerogative. And when I say call them in I am not talking about patrolling the road, I am talking about calling them in to contain the hundreds of acts of violence that were going on around you that you couldn't control. --- I hear what you say. As far as liaison between the police and the Defence Force was concerned I didn't have that much to do with it, but what I can say is that when I was operating in the field and needed manpower I did make use of the Defence Force. Once again the Natal Witness, 29 March ... (incomplete - end of Side A, Tape 1) ... mostly concentrated on Edendale road. I don't deny that
I want to move to another area, and that is just the last issue of the specials. Your submission and your replies to questions indicate that the specials under no circumstances formed part of the Amabutho. That's correct? --- No, I don't think that's correct.
(Inaudible) ... the point I am trying to make. No, no, the issue is that you conceded they may have been there without your consent, but under no circumstances was it sanctioned. --- It wasn't police policy, but I don't think it's a state secret that special constables was one of the single biggest mistakes made by the police in KwaZulu Natal. I don't think that's a secret.
(Inaudible) ... happy to hear that admission as part of an official police submission. It doesn't appear in your actual submission here. --- Chairperson, once again I just want to rectify something. A lot of what I am saying now is my own personal opinion. You must understand this is a submission from the police. I was there on the ground, I worked with these people, and I think my views might be different to other peoples' views, and in my opinion it was a huge mistake.
I just want to take you back to Mr Shabangu's evidence, and - you heard that evidence? --- Once again - I heard his evidence, but once again there was a specific lie which he told, and I will point that out later.
That's precisely why I am putting it to you, so we can hear whether you have another version, because we want to hear the truth. Chairperson, I'll leave it to other people to ask further questions.
Director, you said that the deployment of special constables was one of the biggest mistakes the police ever made. Now, you heard evidence yesterday, and evidence has been given to this Commission by other policeman, about the role of special constables working together with the Riot Unit. And we heard evidence yesterday from Constable Harrington, Madlala, Shabangu, saying that they were deployed with the Riot Unit. They always moved around with Riot Unit members. You heard Constable Harrington say that it was commonplace before, during and after the Seven Day War, for Riot Unit vehicles to be used to transport Inkatha people into UDF areas to launch attacks; it was common for the Riot unit and the special constables to confiscate weapons from UDF areas and to give them or to sell them to IFP people; that it was common for shots to be fired at passers-by in UDF areas by the special constables, not knowing whether those people were left alive or dead, and so on. What is your response to that? --- If I could elaborate on that I would like to do that. You see, it wasn't police policy at all to use these people for these kind of acts, but I think that many of these people went off on their own missions. And there were many reason for that. If I tell you that the first 300 special constables which we got, their conditions of service stated that they were entitled to take their firearms home. On the first day we discharged 16 when they returned, and we then drove around trying to collect their firearms as a result of problems which they caused. So we threw out - tried to use other methods to control these people. The main reason why they came to us was to take over guard duties, to guard IFP leaders' homes, and also to man strongpoints. When they started working with members on shifts, and forming part of the vehicle crew, I can see how Harrington perhaps went astray. You see, we placed young policemen in positions of power, and in which they exercised control over about, say, 10 special constables. And I believe that in some cases the special constables could also have constituted a threat for the policemen. I might also mention that our command structure at the time was pathetic in the unit.
So do you concede what I've said, that Riot Unit members operating with special constables engaged in very, very serious criminal acts such as the ones I have described during that period? --- I agree with you, but I must say that it wasn't police policy. We weren't all like that. I certainly wasn't like that, and I wasn't aware of these things. But as a result of certain cases for which people were prosecuted I did take note of these things, so I can't deny it.
Of course you can't deny it, and we thank you for making that concession. Constables Harrington, Erasmus, Madlala were convicted for that very thing. They were driving around in a Riot Unit vehicle with special constables. They picked up a passer-by. They murdered him by strangling him with Constable Harrington or Constable Erasmus' belt, and once he was dead they then ordered a special constable to shoot the body with a shotgun, and then they tried to pretend that it had been an incident of unrest. So it's impossible to deny that these things happened. --- I agree, Chairperson.
Now, you have tried to portray the role of the South African Police as being impartial, unbiased during the Seven Day War, and working as hard as possible to try and bring the unrest to an end. That's the picture you've painted to us, or that's the picture that the submission that you read out painted to us. --- That is so, Chairperson.
Why then does the second part of your submission, the answers to Professor Aitchison's questions, why does it say that the South African Police were the subject of intense dislike and mistrust from the residents of the Edendale valley, which the submission refers to as the ANC/COSATU alliance for some reason? How do you reconcile those two? You were an impartial, hard-working force, and yet you were the subject of intense dislike and mistrust from one side. --- I don't want to delve in history now, but once again I am a policeman like all policeman, and from our college days we were told about the threat which the ANC constituted, and our training in riot control was focused on the onslaught against us from the ANC side. That was the biggest threat at the time. During the period, I think perhaps because the IFP were authorised, the indunas and the Amakhozi, they were legal organisations and institutions.
(Inaudible) ... so were the ANC. UDF, ANC, they were all legal organisations at the time of the Seven Day War. --- That is so. I hear what you say. The same question which you asked, namely why were the communities at Edendale so opposed to the police, that question I asked myself many times. Maybe I was stupid, and maybe I was being naive, but, you know, through the years you pick up a lot of what's happening, and even things which I heard at this very Commission are things - I've learnt new things. It's made it far more clear why the communities hated us so much.
A couple more questions, Director. Several witnesses have said that this event, this Seven Day War, so-called Seven Day War, was not a war at all, it was - one witness said it was a cleansing. Another witness said it was an armed invasion from one side into another side. Do you agree with that? --- Yes, I agree with that, because all the indictions regarding the attacks from Ashdown to Henley, all these happened on the borders of the UDF areas, although in areas such as Mpumuze, just above Ashdown, in that area Inkatha homes were also attacked.
So do you agree that the overwhelming - the vast, vast majority of people killed, houses burned, property looted, were from - were non-Inkatha, ie, UDF areas? --- Yes, I agree with that.
Finally, Director, you said that the views that you were expressing here, now, were different from the submission that you made because you were there at the time and you knew what was going on. --- That is correct.
Who wrote the submission that you presented? --- It was prepared by a group of people, and people's views differ, and that is why I would like to say that my opinions are my own personal opinions, and I would not like to pass them off as police prescriptions or police policy.
Thank you.
Director, I think many questions have been asked which I wanted to ask by my colleagues. Just to follow up on Richard's question, which you have also conceded that the many places which were attacked and houses burned were the houses belonging to the UDF. What kind of methodology did you use in dealing with this situation, because according to Mr Harrington's presentation it is said that when there was that situation the people who were always dealt with first were those who were defending themselves, that is UDF. Would you concede to that? Did you first deal with the attackers, and if you dealt with the attackers what did you do? Did you disarm them when they attacked these areas, or you concentrated on the defenders? --- Harrington wasn't even there. I don't think it was police policy to attack the defenders. We should also bear in mind that it wasn't only attacks from IFP on UDF. The police were also a target. There were specific occasions at which I tried to deal with a group, such as the group walking through Indobo. Whilst I was trying to defuse the situation I was shot at from behind. So there are two sides to the story.
Let me ask you the question again. From these police sources you say that some of the people who made presentations here they were giving the sources from the UDF side, and then from the South African Police sources it is said that the people who were always disarmed were the UDF people. Did you ever disarm the Inkatha people? If not, why? --- Yes, we did. Inkatha persons were arrested - mostly arrested for this. On one such an occasion we arrested at least 100 people at once. I am not talking about the Seven Day War, I am talking about a period before that.
I am concerned about the Seven Day War. Did you ever during the Seven Day War disarm the Inkatha people? --- No, I didn't. I don't know whether other policemen did so.
Why did you not do it? --- There could be many reasons for that. On that specific day we were so busy - I am now talking about the Tuesday. I just had to run from one scene to the other to attend incidents of shooting.
You were so busy that you could not disarm the people who were going to kill other people and burn their houses? You were busy doing what? You were running up doing what, if you could not disarm the people who were going to take lives of the people? --- I hear you. Chairperson, once again from my side I am quite sure that the circumstances, even on the Tuesday, would have been far worse. Unfortunately what you might have prevented can't be measured. One can never measure anything which you prevented, and nobody can afterwards criticise you or say that you did good work. But to say we did nothing is simply not true.
Last question. So are you surprised that the UDF people hated you as you have just said? Are you surprised that the UDF people hated you as you have just said yourself? --- No, I am not surprised. I am not surprised, especially not after all the evidence that I have listened to.
Thank you.
Director Meyer, I am not going to be very specific in my questions. I will just ask questions related to conduct. Firstly you have just said there two sides of the - to a story. What I would like to say is that there is one truth, one and only truth. In your presentation you are almost discordant or inconsistent with the presentations that have been made by many other people yesterday, on Monday and Tuesday. You are almost at odds with them. I am beginning to wonder what is your conception of truth. We are a Truth Commission here. So the big question in your conception of truth. Number two, with regard to the specials, you clearly and loudly say most of them were on their own missions. I completely disagree with you. The specials were recruited, were brainwashed, were trained to kill, by somebody. Probably you know who that person was. Who was behind that? They were not trained to be guards, they were trained to kill. Can we hear from you who was responsible for that training? --- As far as the first question is concerned, during this hearing, where the truth has to emerge, we are trying to find out the entire truth, but as it relates to a period of about six, seven or eight years of our lives. Now we want to use bits and pieces and try and present that as the truth. Perhaps I should just ask, the second part of question one, if it could perhaps be repeated.
Question one or question two? --- Question one.
I said I am beginning to be confused about the conception of truth and your own conception of truth. --- Further as regards question one, for this specific hearing of the Truth Commission we are searching for absolute truth, and it is expected of the police to answer to allegations which were never put to the police. Two weeks ago we were told that a hearing was to take place, and that we should start preparing something for the Commission to give answers as to what we did during those times. I think that in any democratic system, where certain allegations are made against a person, a person must surely be in possession of the allegations to be able to prepare a defence or a submission. So to say to me - comment on answers given by previous witnesses, it's not very easy at all. As far as training and indoctrination is concerned, and everything surrounding the special constables, these issues were not my decisions, and I don't think that those decisions and training - those decisions weren't made on our level, and I think that those answers must be sought with the government of the day. Our policing today is such that we work for society, we work for the communities, but in those days we worked for the Government.
The last question related to this is that if you look at lines of authority and accountability you are accountable for the atrocities - for all the atrocities and gross violations that were committed by the specials. You agree with me there? --- I agree, as long as it happens in a just way, and if my personal involvement in it was such that I committed any offence then I agree with you.
If you are accountable for those commissions I do think it's unfair for the specials to take the flak, to be considered responsible for all the atrocities, because if we look at what has been happening people sitting in high positions have got away with murder, while the people who were in lower positions, who have taken directions from them, have been treated as scapegoats. This is my analysis of the situation. That is why I think you are accountable in a way for these atrocities. --- Very probably I was, because I was part of the Government and the structures of the day.
And my last question. Having said all this do you feel comfortable occupying the position you are occupying today, having been partly accountable for all the atrocities that killed hundreds of blacks, thousand hundreds of blacks? And also sitting in a position where you are not trusted by the majority of blacks in this country. Thank you. --- Firstly I am happy with the position in which I am at the moment. I know what I did, and I can tell you that I did not commit murder. I didn't. And I think there are many ANC people today who will testify on my behalf to say that I wasn't involved in murder. But once again there were certain people who went off on their own missions, and those specific people must come and explain.
Thank you.
Director, I just want first to make a comment on the alleged impartiality. It's just a note, you may not respond to it, but I just want to say that I would argue against your claim that ... (incomplete - end of Side B, Tape 1) ... your submission makes it clear that the attackers were only local people. People in the bus only disembarked to chase away the attackers. At no stage are they referred to as aggressors, they were always defending themselves, and I am finding it difficult to believe that, because some witnesses have referred to instances where the buses would stop, and the passengers will do some unpleasant things like urinating at other people's fences, which to me is provocative. That's observation number one in relation to impartiality. And also you have admitted meetings between yourself and Mr Ntombela, which was good, but what I am trying to say here is that I am not hearing you telling us of similar meetings between yourself and with leaders of UDF or ANC to demonstrate impartiality. And also the manner in which Mr Ntombela seems to have been handled by yourselves. I am not going to go into details because Mr Lax has thrashed this point thoroughly with yourself, but the fact that he ignored your advice about the road, and he was not confronted, he was not reprimanded. That reminds me of what some witnesses said about how Inkatha leadership was treated softly by police force. And the question now. Those were just notes. On page six you made reference to arrests, that people who were looting were arrested. Were they convicted? --- As far as the first question is concerned I would like to refer you to the same report further on, where we say that during these occasions allegations were made from both sides - if you continue reading - and it's not always easy to say who started it, because the parties accuse each other. As far as I'm concerned, and my own impartiality is concerned, as far as the peace at Nxamalala is concerned, I played a big role in that. I don't want to go into detail, but there are people who will be able to vouch for me on that. I'd like to go further and mention Imbali before the Seven Day War. I had talks with UDF leaders. I had the UDF leaders in the Unit Eight hall and we had talks with them. We were trying to make peace, to stop the factions from fighting. At that stage the specific leaders would have reported back to their communities on the Sunday. On that Sunday our State President, Mr Mandela, was released and the meeting never took place. And the process was actually to some extent thwarted at that stage. So, to say that I only consulted with one side is not correct.
Thank you. The convictions, were those people convicted? --- Some of them were convicted for possession of presumably stolen property, but I think the detectives might be able to give more information on that.
Yes, I think it will be interesting to get documents, because at some stage we were told that the same stolen items were transported in a police vehicle, so one questions justice under those circumstances. So I think it will be in the interests of everybody concerned to know what really happened, whether any convictions emanated from that. --- That specific statement was made by Mr Shabangu. In the same statement he said that Constable de Wet was there. I have documentary proof here which makes it clear that he wasn't there. Once again witnesses say things which aren't always true, or perhaps they're not quite sure of certain facts. If we, for instance, look at one particular witness, he said how the police had attacked the house with R4 guns. Once again R4 guns were never used by the police. R5s, the first instruction which started taking place in R5s only took place in 1991, and I have here a certificate which proves when the first instructor in R5s was trained. And this particular lady has to be very well trained, because anybody who can see the difference between an R4 and an R5 rifle at a distance must be very well trained. I can't do that. So I think if all the evidence is properly tested the truth will out.
Thank you.
Director Meyer, I just have one question to ask. Yesterday Mr Harrington, when he made his submission he clearly indicated that they had instructions that they should not arrest IFP people. I would like you to make a comment on that. But following onto that my other question is, you have tried to paint a picture of sincere impartiality of the police. I would like to ask whether you remember that during this unrest during this period there was an attempt to set up a peace committee by business, IFP and UDF/ANC members, and we have also heard that the ANC members, UDF members who were part - who formed part of that committee were arrested just at that time. Could you explain why, when this was such an important thing to try and bring peace in such a strife-torn area, that those who were involved in that had to be arrested at that time? --- As far as Harrington's evidence is concerned, he and his men were on a mission of their own. He yesterday mentioned that I had told him that he seemed to think that he was a little god. What he neglected to mention to the Commission was that I told him that there were many stories doing the rounds, and that Harrington would go to prison if the didn't watch out. As far as arrests are concerned, I don't know anything about this specific arrest or arrests, but I think what must be mentioned is something which perhaps contributed to the community's opposition to us, and that is the emergency regulations in force at the time. You know, the emergency regulations were there to suppress the communities, for the same reason as these arrests were performed. If we got back to the records, if they are available, it was mostly UDF people detained under the emergency regulations. I agree wholeheartedly. But these specific arrests referred to, I am not aware of those.
Thank you, Chairperson. Just two last questions for you. You're aware that during the evenings on all those days the vast majority of the combatants camped at the chief's residence. You're aware of that? --- I can't remember that specifically, but let me put it this way. Now I have certainty about it, but I can't remember whether it was so at the time, I really can't.
Well, from the evidence we've heard so far, and other witnesses, it's clear that that's what happened. Now, the question I have to you is, why didn't you just arrest those people right there and then at those places? Or if not arrest them, disarm them and send them home? It was nightfall, you had people, you could have surrounded them. It would have been absolutely a simple matter to do at that time. --- I don't have an answer for you. Unfortunately I don't know.
My last question, and it's probably an unfair question to ask you, but I am going to ask it. If the violence on that scale had happened in a white area you wouldn't have tolerated that at all, surely. --- During those times more than likely no, we wouldn't.
Director Meyer, thank you for making the submission on behalf of the South African Police, and thank you today for departing from that official submission and giving us the benefit of your own personal views which you formed from your experience at the time. Thank you. --- Thank you, Chairperson. Thank you, Commission.
/BONGINKOSI EMMANUEL NZIMANDE
BONGINKOSI EMMANUEL NZIMANDE (Sworn, States)
everybody here can also get it from the horse's mouth.
/"(Inaudible)
"(Inaudible) ... Seven Day War has been given to the events that took place in Pietermaritzburg and surrounding areas from 25th of March to 31st of March 1990. The events took the form of attacks on communities on a scale not previously experienced in this area, if not the province as a whole. Whilst the Seven Day War was to some extent a repeat of previous attacks on communities, but on a larger scale this time, it is our submission here that it was to a greater extent a turning point in the conflict in the Pietermaritzburg area. Why do we say this? It seems to us that the strategy of detention of UDF and COSATU leaders, and small scale attacks on communities in Pietermaritzburg, had failed to stem the rising tide of the people's legitimate struggle against apartheid in Pietermaritzburg townships."
and speak the truth as is, and tell the people as to why they committed these deeds, who were they working with, who were they working for, and what were they working for. We also hope that, as the members of the ANC, this is the only thing that will create peace in this place so that the people could be at peace with themselves. We believe in peace as members of the ANC. We've shown that several times. We were the ones who initiated peace talks in 'Maritzburg, but what we always say is that we cannot build peace on top of lies. We should first reveal the truth so that was have a basis or a foundation for peace, because we cannot shake hands whilst there are certain things we are sweeping under the carpet. Lastly, in conclusion, we were requesting this Commission to try and assist us that there should be some certain mechanism by which these people who left their homes and became refugees should be brought back to their places, so that they could even go to the graves of their ancestors as well as their loved ones. We should also take into consideration that there should be democracy in 'Maritzburg. But what we want to say is that democracy, as far as politics are concerned, is the revealing of the truth so that we know who the perpetrators were. This is what I have brought before this Commission today as being sent by my group, the African National Congress.
We thank you, Mr Nzimande. There is one question that I would like to ask which places us in a problem as the Truth Commission. Those people who are listed here - as I am speaking to you I am glad, because you are a member of the Parliament, you are not just an ordinary ANC
member. Those perpetrators, together with their assistants, are still occupying very high positions in this region, especially in the police force. Do you believe that they have stopped their deeds as we are striving for peace? What makes me say this is you remember that even though there's this new government you know what happened in Shobashobane in Port Shepstone, and the very same people, the very same government is still keeping them in those high positions. They are directly involved in the killings. How are we going to broach the subject? How do we deal with those people who are occupying high positions and being killers? How sure are you that they won't continue with their deeds? --- I thank you very much for that question, Reverend. It troubles us as members of the ANC that there are still people who were involved, or previously involved in criminal acts during the apartheid area, but these people are still occupying high positions. What I wish to explain to this honourable Commission is that as we are the ANC members we are the government. That is why we were the ones who tried to initiate some means or mechanisms so that the truth may come out. That is why the Parliament passed this law which created this Commission. Because what we were trying to avoid, as our President always says, is that people should not point a finger at us and say we are using our position to retaliate. It is better that a certain mechanism be implemented that will be acceptable to each and every person, so that those who are not willing to come forward, as they have been given a chance to come and say whatever they know, then they will have to be arrested. The ANC
Government is very much prepared that those who want to come before the Commission should come and testify, and those who think that they will run away from the whole matter we are very much prepared for them. We are going to investigate them and take all the evidence that we can gather, and that they could be formally charged. The second aspect, just adding to your question, is that the ANC Government formed investigation task units, and a lot of them are within the province of KwaZulu Natal. We also have one in the 'Maritzburg region so that they can investigate. We should not wait for the answers from the Commission, but we should also implement other means from the government sector that they should investigate these independently. Now, in conclusion, even though I may not say or name that police station, you find that there might be 3 000 cases or more of attacks and killings, and the files have remained there in those cupboards and many years have lapsed without anything being done. Now, we have got a report from these investigators that they have already started investigating some of the cases, and some of the people are already appearing in court as a result of these investigations. Now, we want to do everything legitimately so that people will not blame us at the end.
Dr Nzimande, we've heard evidence of some counter attacks during this period by ANC, or by people from non-Inkatha areas, let's say, and you've partly answered the question, but I'd just like you to give it a direct answer. It would obviously help us if - to the extent that some of those people involved in those counter attacks may have been ANC or UDF members, would your party be willing to encourage those people to come forward and testify to us, so we could get a picture of what their motivations were? --- Thank you. In an attempt of answering the question, first of all is that it won't be right to say there was a counter attack coming from ANC. I will be putting that wrong. I am prepared to say this with no fear at all, and also prepared to say this over and over again. It has never happened before seeing ANC gathering together, going to attack the Inkatha areas. I will stand for that. We've never done it before. All the time it has been Inkatha gathering and coming to attack the ANC areas. If the community was being attacked what happened also still even during this Seven Day War, the community itself, because of the attacks, especially the youth, would gather and create committees to prevent this. We also agreed when we were making an agreement of peace accord in the Parliament that those committees are allowed, and should take place all the time people were being attacked. Besides this there is nothing that ANC has done, because there's no one who will just fold his arms when he is being attacked. Those committees were trying to prevent this, and also trying to defend themselves when the Inkatha and the police were coming to attack. One other thing I would like to make mention of is that if there are ANC members who would gather together and plan to launch an attack at Inkatha areas, that definitely is not according to the constitution of ANC. That will obviously mean they were up to killing, and we've never had people in the past who would have those intentions. If there were people with those intentions instead of preventing and defending the communities, but plan and launch an attack like this Seven Day War attack,
definitely the law will have to take them into task. We are prepared also, and we are behind these committees, because those committees were doing a good job, and we are not ashamed of them. And maybe they should be called upon to explain as to how they used to operate the very committees of preventing and defending the communities in case the Commission is interested of that, because we take those people to be the community police, because the community police and the SAP was the direct opposite. Thanks.
Dr Nzimande, your report is clear, such that one cannot - there is nothing ambiguous with your report. I would like to get your view and your perspective. Maybe you were not there when Mr Radley Keys gave his own perspective, but amongst the things that he has made mention of he does agree with you that the Seven Day War was not a war as such, or probably a war from the two groups, but this was planned by the apartheid government. But there is one other thing that he said, and I think that is of fundamental importance with regard to UDF in 1983, that some of the things that took place and transpired it's known that UDF took people who were serving under the government, like the police, civil servants, and so forth as enemies, first. Secondly, fighting with the apartheid government UDF used weapons like boycotts, or means like boycotts, stay-aways. To make that even more successful they used to discourage people who were not complying with the arrangements. It even got to the time where the Inkatha got devastated and they started retaliating. Now, my question to you,
Dr Nzimande, I have one question for you. Maybe ti's deviated. I ask this because I am ... (inaudible) ... scheme of things, so you have looked at things very broadly. In your presentation you do mention that one of the things that led to these attacks in Pietermaritzburg started in the companies here in Pietermaritzburg. I do wish to know from you the stand of the companies. It is difficult for me not to look at - it's confusing for me. /I can't
I can't place the companies as to where their stand was at the time, or if they had anything to do with these attacks
and so forth, and also that as companies have authorities and powers they could have probably had some way of getting people to come to work, or what? --- Thank you, Commissioner Magwaza. What you have talked about now, it is important nationwide, especially here in Pietermaritzburg. If I go back to the discussions of 1987, the businessmen did take part in those discussions. I will say without doubt or hesitance that some of them did try to prevent these attacks, because they were the ones who suffered the most because people could not go to work. In other words I would wish - I don't know whether that I have missed some other thing since I did not attend before. We know about Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce then, and Chamber of Industries, that should come. We know about those, and should come forward and present, and especially that they were there when the police came to arrest the members of COSATU and UDF. They have witnessed everything and have seen everything. Especially COSATU was the one which helped at all times to push and put pressure to the companies to play some role in light of solving the problem. I will briefly say that I would wish for the Commission to call the companies to come and open up and disclose what they know, because they were also directly affected by this.
Dr Nzimande, thank you very much for coming and talking to us today. It is very important to have the official account of the ANC to what was a major event in the history of the Midlands. Unfortunately we have not had the benefit of a similar submission from the IFP. A letter was sent some weeks ago to Premier Mdlalose, and to
/CLIFFORD MARION
CLIFFORD MARION
Thank you, Inspector Marion, for coming in today. You are currently an inspector in the South African Police Services, and ... (intervention) --- No, that's not correct. I'm a superintendent in the SAPS.
Sorry, I apologise. Superintendent. --- That's correct.
And you are presently employed by the Investigation Task Unit in Pinetown. --- That is correct, I'm the unit commander of the Investigation Task Unit.
Sorry, just repeat that. --- I am the unit commander of the Investigation Task Unit.
Now, at the time that is under examination here, March/April 1990, where were you stationed and what rank were you holding? --- During that period I was a lieutenant in the South African Police and I was second in charge at the Riot Investigation Unit at Edendale.
Now, you've given us a short statement. Can you please just tell us of your experiences during this period, using your statement as a basis from which to proceed. --- Yes, I'll do that, Mr Chairman. Thank you. During the period of violence in the Edendale area, which was then commonly known as Death Valley, I served as a lieutenant in the South African Police, and second in charge to the commander of the Riot Investigation Unit at that time. During that period 87-91 I regard as the worst outbreaks of violence in the Pietermaritzburg/Midlands area. The incident referred to as the Seven Day War during March/April 1990 was in fact in my experience the most serious series of violence during that period. Prior to the Seven Day War I was on investigation in the Natal Midlands. I looked at my diary, and the date was the 23rd of March 1990. Whilst in the New Hanover area I saw approximately six bus loads of people coming from the direction of Greytown. The buses were fully laden with people, and they were armed with weapons. At that stage I used to conduct inspections and investigations throughout the Natal Midlands as far afield as Greytown and Wartburg. Being curious I stopped the lead bus and inquired as to what was going on. I learned that they were IFP supporters that were en route to a meeting in Edendale. I then contacted the Riot Unit and informed them of the situation. I was asked at that stage to allow them through.
Do you recall who you spoke to at the Riot Unit? --- Mr Chairman, unfortunately, you know, I would be taking a guess if I say that I remember. I cannot really remember who I spoke to.
And when you made the report to the Riot Unit did you advise them that this was six bus loads of heavily-armed people? --- That is correct.
And you said that you were asked, or - were you instructed or were you asked by your unit to let the vehicles through. --- No, I was informed to allow them through. You see, at that stage whenever the police had seen anything with regard to crowds or people in groups or large gatherings we reported it to the Riot Unit. And because of this peculiar incident of six buses coming towards 'Maritzburg it had raised my suspicion and therefore I had contacted them. During the investigation at the Riot Investigation Unit we experienced a number of problems with regard to investigation. There was no co-operation from people, from both the UDF and the IFP sides. During the Seven Day War I myself attended a number of scenes of murders. The areas in which the murders had occurred were deserted at that stage, and we had received no information from the people when called upon to do so. During that period, 1990, shortly after the Seven Day War, I investigated a number of killings, numbering about between 20 and 24 murders and attempted murders, where a serial killer was convicted and sentenced to seven life terms of imprisonment. During the same period, the same year in October, I also investigated the killing of Ololo Lombo, who I knew at that stage was seen in the vicinity of the Seven Day War killings, and arrested the - the suspects or the killers of Mr Lombo were arrested on the same day and appeared in court. They subsequently escaped and went abroad. Mr Chairman, ironically I have re-arrested them two weeks ago and they are now awaiting trial. Soon after these incidents of investigation I was called up to at that stage regional headquarters in Durban, and paraded before the then General Steyn, who was the head of the Security Branch in KwaZulu Natal. When I introduced myself to him he called me a communist dog, and he informed me that I was being followed, and that the Security Branch had been keeping surveillance on me for about a year. He told me that I should refrain from arresting members of the IFP. If I did not refrain I would commit suicide.
Just to interrupt there, Superintendent. Are you saying that he called you a communist dog because you had been involved in the investigation and arrest of IFP people? --- That is correct, Mr Chairman. Is that what he told you, or is that what he implied? --- Yes, Mr Chairman.
And he told you that you should stop arresting IFP people. --- That is correct, Mr Chairman.
And that if you didn't that you would commit suicide. --- That is correct, Mr Chairman.
What did you understand by that? --- Well, at that stage I was not a little child in the police, and I know from experience that people mysteriously committed suicide in custody, and I was under the impression that somebody would come along and murder me.
And then they would disguise it as a suicide. --- And then it would be made to look as a suicide.
Now, is there anything else that you want to add about the activities of the police during, before, or after that period? I understand that you were not directly involved in the Seven Day War other than the incident which you advised us about earlier on in your testimony. --- During that period, Mr Chairman, I was busy with the investigation of that case which I referred to, which was in court and the accused had got seven life terms of imprisonment. I had in fact visited certain scenes of crime on the Seven Day War, and did initial investigations there, but as I explained the difficulties that the police experienced during that time.
Just a few questions. By the way, Brigadier Bertus Steyn, is he retired or is he still an active member of the force? --- Sorry, Mr Chairman?
Brigadier Bertus - you have mentioned here in your statement - Steyn, is he still an active member of the force? The one you reported the incident. --- No, I am given to understand that he had since retired.
Let me just ask you a very pragmatic question. You say that you were one and there were six buses. You were just alone, but you managed to stop one bus, the leading bus. What was the reaction of these people because you were just by yourself? --- Your Worship, I put on my blue light - sorry, Mr Chairman, I put on my blue light on the top of the vehicle and made it known that I was a policeman, and when I stopped in front of the lead bus the buses stopped, and there was no reaction from them in respect of confrontation or anything of that sort. They stopped and I questioned them.
So in your own opinion you think that the police - they could stop the people if they were moving to a direction if they wanted to? --- Well, if I stopped it myself they could have stopped - a whole squad of policemen could have stopped people and turned them back.
You say that when you reported the matter to the Riot Unit you were told to let them through. What did you think about that? --- Well, at that stage, you know, I didn't think anything about it. I was under the impression that they were going to a meeting, and that's why, you know, they were allowed through.
So it didn't say anything to you at that time? --- It didn't mean anything to me at that time.
It's only now that you see what it means. --- Well, I don't know whether the same buses were involved in any attacks in the KwaShange area, but obviously there seemed to be people streamed into the Edendale area from other areas.
This man who called you a communist dog, and he said you were going to commit suicide, and you reported the matter to your attorney. Did your attorney do anything about this? --- Well, I requested him not to do anything about it, but just to bear knowledge of it that if anything does happen he should know in what direction to go.
And then something happened. --- Well, yes, my house was petrol-bombed.
What did you do about it? --- Well, I registered a charge. It was investigated and - well, nothing came of it.
Thank you.
Superintendent Marion, in your statement you say that you were selected to the Goldstone Commission. Could you say why you declined that? --- Well, at that stage I basically wasn't too well because of the trauma that I worked in, the unrest situation and the violence, and I elected not to be involved in violence for a time.
The second question. You noticed that these people who were travelling by bus were heavily armed. Do you remember what kind of arms did they have? --- Well, they had spears, assegais, pangas - weapons, traditional weapons. I didn't notice any firearms.
Thank you.
Inspector Marion, thank you - sorry, Superintendent Marion, thank you very much for coming in. I think that your evidence is instructive from two points of view. It indicates that a single policeman driving a motor vehicle could, by the authority that he represented, could have stopped a large convoy of armed men. Because the story that we have heard from the other policemen here is that they were completely unable to do anything to halt the movement of armed people during that period, and other people have said that there was a great unwillingness on the part of the police to stop those armed groups. And you have indicated that it could be done. Secondly the remarks made to you by the head of the Security Branch at the time also go a long way to showing the views held at the time by senior policemen such as Brigadier Bertus Steyn. So, again than you very much for coming in and sharing that information with us. --- Thank you very much.
/CYRIL BONGANI NXUMALO
CYRIL BONGANI NXUMALO (Sworn, States)
Inspector, you are presently a Detective-Inspector attached to the Criminal Investigation Services at Camperdown, is that correct? --- That is correct.
And during 1987 you were working with the Murder and Robbery Unit in Pietermaritzburg. --- That is correct.
You were then transferred to the, at that time, Riot and Unrest Investigations Unit. --- That is correct.
Your commanding officer was Captain Upton at that time. --- Yes, that's correct.
What was the job of that unit at the time? --- The unit was charged with the investigation of political- related incidents in Pietermaritzburg area.
It also dealt with unrest-related matters as well. --- That is correct.
You can talk in Zulu if you want to, and we will have the translation. --- I am pleased.
Now, during 1987 and thereafter, particularly during March 1990, you ended up doing much of the investigation arising out of what has come to be called the Seven Day War. What was your rank at that time? --- Then I was a constable, the first rank in the police.
How many dockets were you required to investigate at that time approximately? --- I had then about 80, 8-0 dockets, as a result of many cases and things that were happening.
What was the average amount of dockets that a detective would carry at that time? --- It's not easy for me to answer this question because it differs, depending on the area where you will be working, how many cases you will find and how many people to be investigated. So it differs, making me - putting me in a position of not answering your question.
But you yourself were carrying 80? --- It may be possible that it was even more than 80.
Now, were the majority of those cases related to the violence that had taken place - in the Vulindlela valley that week we are talking about. --- There are not so many of those which have to do with the Seven Day War.
Tell us about those that you were dealing with in relation to the Seven Day War. --- The one that I remember is the case where Brian Sihle Zondi was killed, and one other lady from Zondi family. That incident took place on the day when the rally took place in Durban. The buses which were coming from Durban passed by Mnyandu by Mabeza's store. That is exactly where the late Sihle and the lady from Zondi family met their untimely death.
Just by way of background, you were a constable, you were the most junior rank in the police at that time. --- That is correct.
What sort of supervision did you get to try and help you cope with such a huge amount of work? --- At that time things were in such a way that when the investigating officer gets a case we would go and investigate on it, so that the following day you give it and hand it over to the superior, and the superiors will inspect and peruse through it and give guidelines thereafter for him to carry on investigating. That is the first guideline that was given to us. One other thing that used to happen, at least once a month one of the investigating officers in chief will call all the dockets so he can go through the dockets one by one. In that was the investigating officer /will be
will be granted some direction as to which way to go now to furthermore investigate on the issue.
On the Wednesday - that is a couple of days after the 25th - you were at KwaMnyandu. Tell us what you found. --- What drove me to go to Mnyandu, we were stationed in Sweetwater in fact. I therefore heard about the outbreak of violence. When we were in Sweetwater, looking on the other side, what I will refer to as Mnyandu direction, we saw houses burning and we rushed there. When we got there we found out that many houses were set alight and burning, and the residents already had vacated the area.
(Inaudible) ... when you got there? --- When I got there the attackers and those who were being attacked were no longer there.
Carry on please. --- I therefore went around in the area with the intention of seeking more information as to what happened. That's where I discovered that there were many people who had already been killed lying around. That day I discovered corpses, dead bodies of the old and the young ones, about 10 corpses. I therefore requested for the mortuary vehicle to be called in, and as well as all other necessary helpers we could get from the police force.
(Inaudible) ... those incidents, is that right? --- Can you repeat your question please?
Sorry, you ... (inaudible - tape faulty) ... these bodies that you found. --- Yes, that's true.
This may not be easy for you, but just so that people get a sense of what happened to the people whose bodies you found, in your statement you've told us the sorts of wounds that they had. Please just tell us for
the record, so we get a sense of how people were killed. --- The first body I came across was Moses Zuma's. This Moses Zuma, according to my inspection then he had different wounds that were approximately 31. The next one - and I also discovered that he is the father of Moses Zuma, by the name of Israel Zuma - also he had 30 wounds (Inaudible - end of Side A, Tape 4) ... who was an elderly lady, one wound. And Mvusane Ngubane, who had 16 wounds.
The people you found, you've told us about some -obviously elderly men, elderly ladies, and then young people. Were there children amongst these people? --- There were no children amongst these, but I do have an idea that - and knowledge that there was one female, one woman, from Ngubane family. She had just delivered a baby, but among these there were no children at all.
In total you found 10 bodies at that particular scene, and then later you found another five. --- These five, I was not the one who discovered these five bodies, but it's part of what I investigated. What led to these five is the bodies that we used to discover lying around as well in KwaMnyandu, but I did not see them when I discovered the previous 10. There was enough evidence that they were also murdered at the same time when the 10 got murdered. That is exactly what led me to combine the two and treat them as one case.
(Inaudible) ... a case involving 15 deceased people. --- That is correct.
And you, as a very junior officer, were expected to investigate that matter. --- Yes, I was put in that position.
/What sort
What sort of success did you have with your investigations? --- This was not a usual case, or rather an easy one. People here were harassed and tortured as well, so that this made me not feel so comfortable.
What did you ... (inaudible) ... how would you - looking back now - and let me just for the record say that after some years you went to the Goldstone Commission, is that correct, and then you thereafter moved to the ITU, so you now have a much greater experience of investigation techniques and other ways of doing things? --- That is correct.
In the light of that experience how would you have tackled the matter, knowing what you know now? --- It is clear that this was a serious matter. It would require that I have a senior person, a superior person, an experienced one - experienced investigation officers who were so much versed with knowledge and experience, put together with an intention of investigate further and deeper in as far as this matter is concerned.
Now, all these incidents were investigated as a single incidence, is that correct? --- That's true.
There was no attempt made to look at the picture holistically. --- That's true.
And if one looks at the various inquests that were held there was no effort to take all the killings on one day, in one area, and hold one inquest for them. --- That is correct.
They were just treated as separate murders, as if they were totally unrelated. --- It is a procedure of the court of law. It was procedural at the time that when /in an
in an incident, for instance, more than one person was killed, when the documents were brought to the prosecutor
to make a decision, with an intention of conducting the inquest, the prosecutors would request us to separate those cases so that each and every corpse would have the documents that relate direct to him and with him.
So even with the best intention in the world it was - you can't hear me? --- I can hear now.
Okay. I am saying, even with the best intention in the world - and we are not blaming you personally, but it shouldn't surprise anyone that if that's the kind of investigation that happened, and if that's the way in which, say, the Justice Department treated the matter, it shouldn't surprise us that the real picture didn't come out at that time. --- Yes, I do agree with you.
Thank you, Chairperson.
Just one or two questions. I discover that at the time when you were assigned this duty, this position to be an investigating officer, you were still very young. --- That is correct.
Why do you think you were assigned and appointed to this position, only you, especially being a senior position like this, and you being so much of a junior to be appointed to this position. What did you have in mind? Did you have mixed feelings, or what? --- Maybe what I should emphasise here is that the unit in which I was assigned and appointed to, even though I was young at the time, but I already was a trained investigating officer, being already transferred from Murder and Robbery, when I compared myself to my colleagues at that time, because they were only coming from uniform branch. I am talking about my colleagues now. They had no vast experience in
as far as investigating is concerned. This gives a picture and a position that I had one eye amongst the blind. At least I had one eye, the rest were the blind men.
Are you done? --- Yes, I am done.
Let me ask one more question. I will take you back a little bit. We've seen here people with many wounds here. Now, as an officer upon inspecting those bodies what did you think about those wounds? You see, probably they were stabbed with assegais, or with bush knives, or were they shot? Tell us about the nature of these wounds. --- Almost each and every weapon that we have that exists, from the gun upward. You have the assegais, bush knife, and anything you can think of was used, because even the wounds were not equal in size. Some were bigger than others, and there were lacerations, and one you could tell that these were chopped.
When you were investigating, busy doing that, did you discover probably something which led to an idea as to who killed those people as an investigating officer? The very perpetrators, did you have any kind of idea who could those be? --- With help that I was rendered, and especially from the refugee camps, those who witnessed, it ultimately was clear that some people were disclosing that they were being attacked by Inkatha, and the leaders of Inkatha, some of them, the names were implicated.
Was it only Inkatha? On your investigation did you only find out Inkatha being implicated in this matter? --- Yes, that's true, that's correct.
Bongani, I have about two questions. I would like for you to explain concisely, is it a usual procedure that upon investigating some issues you will be assigned to do so much more, being the only person? --- It is difficult for me really to answer this question satisfactorily, because it depends upon the unit, and as to how many cases should be investigated. When there are more cases the officer in charge then is in for it and it's a challenge.
Over how long a period did you investigate these cases? --- I have given you 80 as a figure of the cases. You will find out that today I receive five cases in addition to what I already have. You find out the following day I get 10, or probably six that have to be closed. That put me in such a position and a situation that figures were - did vary to a great extent the whole time I have served that Riot Unit.
How long is the time you are talking about? --- I remember I joined December 1987. I will not quite remember, though I think it was late 90s when I was transferred. Or let me say 1991 when I was transferred to Bulwer to work on the cases there.
Did you find this acceptable to you that you were so much busy investigating these various cases which were so intense? Was there a reason? Did you see any reason why - as for why at that time should you be transferred to Bulwer? Do you think that was acceptable and was fair, or did you suspect some other things why this was done? --- At that time nothing really came into my mind except I just said to myself, "It's fine, let me go and work." One other thing when it comes to you, like in my case, in Bulwer I was going to be placed in a position of being in charge of the cases that were related to the violence.
There is a situation at times like those that do prevail, and you see it clear that you are being transferred because you are seen as an expert in what you are doing.
Bongani, according to my opinion I think if you were so much of an expert I think you were supposed to be kept in this area and finish up the work that you already started, instead of being transferred. --- I will not repudiate that, but I am just telling you things that happened there, and getting instructions from the commanders telling me I should do this and that. I did not see myself in a state or probably wanting to say something to them.
Did you not feel bad, or get to a point where you felt bad, and also thinking that you were being disturbed from your work? --- Yes, of course I did feel bad, because already the relationship I had already developed with the victims of the Seven Day War, that was not easy. I knew that one day they also wish and hope that they will succeed in their cases, and also that it was my wish. But I had no two ways about it. When they told me I have to be transferred I had to comply and adhere to the arrangements.
Bongani, one question. I was touched here by your opinion that the incident of the Seven Day War was a massacre. That's how you've put it. And also according to you and your opinion you felt there should have been a special task team placed there to investigate the damage and the violence in the area. Why - what was the reason that they did not think of doing that? I mean we're talking about your superiors. --- As I have explained
before I don't think I will give you a satisfactory answer here, because I only discover such things now, especially with the experience that I have now, but at that time I was just being instructed to do this and that and the other, and I will simply do that.
This opinion that you have here is of fundamental importance to us, and it seems to me this should have been undertaken then, making us believe some of the things that have been mentioned before us, that in the police force, especially the superior officers they had some kind of strategy that they were using to destroy and confuse the black nations using IFP. Thank you.
Just one last question, Mr Nxumalo. One of the purposes of our work in this Commission is to try and see what lessons we can learn for the future so that we can make recommendations. As a very much more experienced investigator what should we recommend, say, for example, about the carrying of the number of dockets that a detective should reasonably carry? --- It's very easy to answer that one, because even if there - there are many things that are being implicated here. I have this belief that at least an investigating officer can conduct his work successfully if he is put in a position of handling at least not more than 20 cases, because you find out that one officer has more than 80 cases, and even if he is told to go and work he will go with three other colleagues to work with, and these other three other colleagues have their own cases, 80 respectively. When you look into this /you find
you find out that the officers definitely won't satisfy the community because we will have to try that if, for
instance, I am driving, everyone in the car should be satisfied that at least let's take one cases each, or two cases each per day. That puts us in such a state that you get people attending more than 200 to 300 documents in one car, and you find out the officer are in one car and they cannot perform effectively.
Just one last question. Was there any difference between the number of cases black members would carry as opposed to white members? --- That I may not say explicitly clear. It's difficult for me to answer the question, but at the time I did not see anything that will make me say this was the difference in the Riot Investigation at that time. And also it's inevitable of me to say it does happen that you realise that amongst the black members there's more work allocated to them. And on the other side, the white side, you find there's less work allocated to them. And the answer you get related to that, you find they tell you that many cases - most cases are black cases.
Mr Nxumalo, thank you very much for your evidence. It seems to us from what you have said that to deal with these incidents, these deaths which arose from the Seven Day War, there should have been a large task team of senior, experienced detectives, who should have been appointed to investigate these incidents. It should have been a co-ordinated investigation, with co-operation and participation from senior policemen at every level, and it should never have been left to constables like yourself, who were carrying a case load of eight dockets. You nevertheless attempted to investigate these cases to the best of your ability, and in retrospect it seems a great
pity that there were not more policemen of your integrity and ability around at the time. So again we thank you for coming and telling us that story.
/HANNAH MONICA WITTENBERG
HANNAH MONICA WITTENBERG (Sworn, States)
Monica, I greet you. I think what we are going to need from you is just a narrative of your experiences during the time of the Seven Day War. We know that you are one of the people with a certain group who were very much involved, especially at Imbali. And there was a time when you were shot there at Imbali, which was very unusual for the white people to be at Imbali during that time. Can you give us your whole experience, your whole narrative about what you know about what was happening during the Seven Day War, especially with reference to Imbali. --- Thank you. I could give much more. I was asked to relay just one incident of the 29th, and I'll be very brief on that.
Yes. --- But I want to record that I was there from the beginning, or nearly from the beginning. I was a bit late due to compiling that box, first aid box in which the famous tweezers were missing. It was not an act of sabotage, it was an oversight.
Thank you very much, Sister Monica. I just want ask you just a few questions. You've said that here you were asked to monitor the situation. Who asked you? --- The family of Mr Sipho Gabela, who was my foster son for many, many months, had suffered very much at the hands of police. He has given evidence previously before this Commission.
So when you went to Mlotshwa's house you were already involved in the Imbali situation? --- Yes. We started after the last very severe attack on Mr Sipho Gabela. By the way, Mama Monica, how many were there in the
group? --- In the beginning we were 42. 42 in the beginning.
All white? --- All white. It was because of the white policemen, not because of Inkatha.
In the group it was a mixture of women and men? --- There were lecturers, there were African Enterprise members - ja, we were a very mixed group. Mostly middle-aged, not young adventurers.
What reaction did you get from your community, because this thing was so popularised, you know? --- Ja.
Because people could not believe that whites could be there at Imbali during that time? --- I think they didn't want to know. Not - I mean I come from the German-speaking Lutheran community. Nobody asked me any questions. They didn't want to know.
They didn't want to know. --- And they didn't especially want to know what I saw there.
Who was Mlotshwa? --- We had a group in Imbali with whom we liaised. We had to have the people with telephones. The Mlotshwa's was one of the houses with telephones, and that's why that evening we went to the Mlotshwa's house to have a telephone at hand. They are both working in Fort Napier Hospital. Mrs Mlotshwa is one of the matrons there.
To which group or party was Councillor Awetha? --- He is a known Inkatha councillor of Imbali.
Was it common for him to invade the houses of the UDF people? --- I guess that there are many cases. I wouldn't like - I must give evidence that I know about, and this case I must say I heard about it.
In your statement you say that when there were shots you grabbed your camera and a flash went off. Did you manage to take the ... (intervention) --- I would have been killed. I didn't. I didn't photograph them.
And you were so terrified too. --- Yes.
This newspaper which was invited, what newspaper was that? --- That was the Natal Witness.
The Natal Witness. --- We found them quite supportive.
Quite supportive. --- Ja, I must say.
Did you get any support from other papers? --- I can't remember. We didn't do the trouble to phone them.
You didn't trouble to phone them. Who was leading the police force which arrived first? --- We had our course about being good witnesses after that. At that time I didn't do the trouble to take car numbers and names yet. Afterwards I knew better.
Monica, I must say that during this time I lived at Imbali, and I think your group saved many lives. --- I hope so.
We must emphasise that. Many people would have been killed at Imbali if your group did not deter them. --- I hope so.
And it showed how powerful people can be if the whites and blacks work together. It became proved very well at Imbali, and I must really thank you for that. This is why I said yesterday if the history of this area is written, and your name is not there with your group, then the history of South Africa will not be enough, and I want to thank you very much. And it was during the time when you had problems too in your family. You son too, Martin Wittenberg, was being arrested, detained, but that did not deter you as the mother in following your mission, and we want to thank you very much, Mother. --- Thank you.
I have one question and one comment. The first question, did the fact that you were white in a black township give you some advantage in not being intimidated by the police? --- We were - they tried to severely intimidate us, but there is a way you can refuse to be intimidated by police. I personally was - they tried to severely intimidate me, but somehow I refused to be intimidated by them.
Okay. The second one is a comment. I would like to make these comments. It might be an unfair comment directed to you, but to me it's important. That we as the Truth Commission nationally we are worried that we are not moving along in the same direction with most of the whites. We still feel there are very few people like you. --- I'm afraid so.
We - yes we are supposed to reconcile. We are polarised even at a time of pain. You just have to look at this hall and see who is here. It's hurting us blacks very badly. Probably the process for you is not finished. You can help us in the process of reconciliation, I think, by trying to bring in as many whites as possible. We want to reconcile. We can't reconcile without them. That's a challenged to you and people like you. Thank you very much. --- They don't want to hear, that is the problem.
Just one question, Monica. You have already said that you were intimidated, and you have already say that your group was a group comprising of whites only. Now, I would like to know whether perhaps at any stage did you feel that you were threatened in the suburbs or the areas in which you lived because of your involvement? --- Oh yes. We had tyres slashed in front of our house. We did have our share of - I had a death threat, and I had my strong suspicion who did it. I had a death threat and subsequently was nearly killed in an accident, which was a peculiar accident, in Imbali. But of course that was the police who phoned me. That was police who phoned me to give me the death threat. Otherwise from my own community it was just a sort of a turning your back and not listening. But we had tyres slashed in front of the house.
Thank you very much, Mrs Wittenberg. Just before you go, are you aware that the constable who gave evidence here yesterday, Constable Harrington, has admitted to us that he shot the vehicle on the night in question? You're aware of that? --- Yes. I did tell him that I am sure Graham Swan has forgiven him. Knowing Graham Swan I know he has forgiven him.
I don't think I've got anything further to add to what Dr Magwaza and Dr Mgojo have said, other than to commend you for your bravery in those times, and to ask you to continue to be an example to other white people in your community. Thank you very much indeed. --- Thank you.
/MR LYSTER
MR LYSTER
That was the final witness for today, and in fact for this entire hearing, and I am going to briefly summarise the evidence.
We have heard a great deal of evidence this week ... (incomplete)
COMMISSIONER
We are not done yet. Please let's respect ourselves. Richard Lyster is yet to summarise everything that happened and took place here. Let's give him and afford him an opportunity to do that. Please respect and be respectful.
MR LYSTER
We, as a Commission, have not had time to analyse the evidence and to draw conclusions or to make findings, and all I will do here is to briefly summarise the evidence and to look at some of the trends and the patterns that the evidence points to.
We've been looking at the week from 26th March to 4th April 1990, and I think that it can safely be said that this week was not a good week for the people of the Edendale valley. We have heard evidence in vivid detail from both victims and perpetrators that the people of this valley were subjected to an armed invasion by thousands of heavily armed men, resulting in 200 residents of that valley being murdered, hundreds of houses being looted and destroyed, stock driven off, and 30 000 refugees being created, many of whom are still homeless today.
For the people of places like Ashdown, Xaluza, Mpumuza, Gezabuso, KwaShange, KwaMnyandu, it was undoubtedly the most terrifying experience that they had ever and will ever undergo. Several witnesses said that this was not a war, because a war implies a battle of equals. One witness said it was a political cleansing, while another said it was an armed invasion.
Just as that week was a bad week for the people of the Edendale valley, so also was this week a bad week for three organisations, the Defence Force, the SAP, South African Police, and the Inkatha Freedom Party. Many witnesses who have testified over the past four days, people who were both victims and perpetrators, pointed fingers at these three organisations, and I will look briefly at each one of them.
With regard to the Defence Force, Brigadier Swanepoel said that the role that he was given by the police to play in the Seven Day War was to ensure that the Edendale Road was kept open, so that Edendale or Vulindlela residents could get to work without being stoned. He confirmed that at no stage were his troops deployed in the upper valley, where the destruction was taking place. He confirmed that if his troops had been stationed there they could have prevented loss of life and destruction of property. Residents of these areas, journalists and violence monitors pleaded with the Defence Force to deploy what forces they had in the areas where the attacks were taking place, but the SADF did not respond. The reason that Brigadier Swanepoel gave was that the plan that had been worked out by the Joint Management Centre did not provide for the deployment of troops in the unrest area. This may appear to many of us to be unbelievable, but I believe that that is what in fact happened. The Joint Operations Centre decided that the army should only be deployed to keep open the Edendale road. There is no doubt that vehicles were being stoned on that road before the Seven Day War, but there has been no evidence that any political party was responsible for the stoning, and it seems that it was probably young people who had been driven away from their homes at Elandskop and Vulindlela.
Brigadier Swanepoel and Director Meyer of the police contradicted themselves as to whether the Defence Force was sufficiently resourced to enable it to enter the upper reaches of the valley where the real trouble was taking place. Brigadier Swanepoel said that the Defence Force was hopelessly understaffed, whereas Director Meyer said the SADF resources were quite adequate. One thing is certain, is that if the six armoured vehicles and the 100 soldiers which the army did have had been deployed in the valley there seems to be no doubt that a substantial proportion of the death and destruction could have been averted, and Brigadier Swanepoel agreed to this. Another thing is certain, if army reinforcements had been called in immediately the Seven Day War could have been averted altogether.
This brings us to the role of the police. Director Meyer presented the official version of the South African Police, and he portrayed the police as being completely impartial and unbiased, and as having done everything possible to prevent loss of life and damage to property. On the other hand the version from Special Constables Shabangu and Madlala, and a Riot Unit Constable Harrington, was one of open complicity on the part of the police with the IFP forces.
Shabangu said that he drove a Riot Unit vehicle to pick up special constables; that he met up with a large Inkatha crowd, including Mr David Ntombela; that he went with this group to the outskirts of KwaShange, and there he watched with other members of his Riot Unit as the special constables attacked, burned and looted houses at KwaShange, and returned with stolen property, which they loaded onto a police vehicle, which was then driven to Mr Ntombela's home, along with cattle which had been stolen from the residents of KwaShange.
During the course of his evidence Director Meyer did make some significant concessions. He said that it was probable that some special constables had participated in the violence, but that if they did so it was contrary to the instructions of senior officers. He said that it was possible that arms and ammunition had been given by the police to IFP combatants, but that if they did so it was contrary to the instructions of senior officers. He said that he could not account for the participation of the KwaZulu Police in the Seven Day War on the side of the IFP, and said that the KwaZulu Police were part of a different command structure.
With regard to the role of the special constables generally, I do not believe that Director Meyer was frank with the Commission. Evidence has been given before this Commission by several other people, not only witnesses at this hearing, but other witnesses, that the special constables were specifically recruited, trained and deployed to act against the UDF/ANC and to support Inkatha. I have no reason to disbelieve Constable Madlala, Shabangu and Harrington when they say this, and I also have no reason to disbelieve ex-police Captain Brian Mitchell, who has given evidence under oath to this Commission, when he says that special constables were in fact the so-called third force during that time in the entire Midlands area, and that the sole purpose of the special constables was for them to be deployed offensively against members of the UDF, and to support and assist the IFP.
Constable Harrington told the Commission that while he and some special constables were braai-ing meat and drinking beer in the Table Mountain area with an IFP group another IFP group launched an attack on a nearby ANC settlement. Instead of intervening and stopping the attack, or investigating the attack, or even observing the attack, Harrington and the Riot Unit and the special constables continued to eat and drink, after having been assured by their IFP hosts that it was merely an attack by IFP on UDF people. He said that that attitude and that behaviour was typical of the work of the Riot Unit and the special constables during that time. He said that he routinely assaulted and tortured people, threw people from the back of police vehicles, used his police vehicle to transport IFP people to UDF areas to carry out attacks, confiscated weapons from UDF areas, and gave them or sold them to IFP members. He said that this was commonplace behaviour in the Riot Unit, and that it was done by many of the Riot Unit members.
I accept that after the death of Major Terblanche the official attitude towards the ... (inaudible - end of Side A, Tape 5) ... Erasmus and Madlala to have taken place. However, I cannot believe that the police hierarchy in the Midlands did not have a full appreciation of what the special constables actually were, and what they were to be used for.
With regard to the investigations into the deaths caused by the Seven Day War, we have heard the evidence of Inspector Bongani Nxumalo this afternoon, and it is clear that those investigations were completely inadequate.
Finally we look at the role of the IFP. Almost
Mr Ntombela was invited to give evidence before this Commission. The Commission had originally agreed to subpoena Mr Ntombela to come to this Commission in the same way that it subpoenaed many other witnesses, but we decided that we should rather first invite Mr Ntombela out of respect for his public office. He initially accepted the invitation, but on the day that he was due to appear he refused to give evidence, and instead he called for the dismissal of the entire panel as it was constituted for this hearing.
I should also place on record that a couple of weeks before the hearing a senior IFP member went onto the Zulu language radio and said that if Mr Ntombela was subpoenaed
And this is what should have happened in the
Edendale valley. This is what the residents of the Edendale valley were entitled to expect from the police, but because they were poor, and because they were black, and because they represented what Director Meyer called the UDF/COSATU alliance, they did not get that help. And we hope that those days have passed.
Finally I just want to thank all the various people who have worked hard during this past week to make this hearing proceed as it did. I want to thank the witnesses, because without them we would not have had a hearing. We want to thank them for their courage and bravery in coming forward. We want to thank the special Truth Commission task team which worked so hard to pull all these witnesses together, and the other TRC staff members who also worked very hard. We want to thank the police for protecting this building, the interpreters who interpreted for us, the press, and the many other voluntary people who worked so hard to make this hearing a success. Also thanks to the media in general for their coverage and their hard work.
Please, as you leave the hall please do so with respect and dignity that this occasion demands. We thank you very much for your attendance.
Before we part please let's not forget that each time we gather we don't part before singing a cultural song or traditional song. We came together in this fashion, talking about those who've left us, who died, and simply depart easily like that. Let's stand up so we can sing a traditional song or some kind of a song.
/TRANSCRIBER'S