MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, I think my witnesses are next, my applicants, I beg your pardon, if I can just request a microphone over here please.
ADV DE JAGER: Would you kindly switch seats Mr du Plessis?
MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman we'll use Mr Cornelius's place. I beg leave to call Hennie Kotze. Mr Chairman, I beg leave to call Hennie also known by certain Russian people as Ginger Kotze, Mr Chairman.
HENNIE KOTZE: (sworn states)
EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman you'll find his application on page 97 of Volume 2.
Mr Kotze you have given your background and your training from page 98 up to and including page 116, do you confirm this?
MR KOTZE: Yes I do.
ADV GCABASHE: But you do want to make a correction on page 98 don't you? Paragraph one, two, three, four
"On the 1st December 1995 I joined the Police at Benoni"
You want to change that? Page 98?
MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, Mr Chairman, that is correct, that just skipped my attention but that should be 1st December 1975. I am indebted to you, I didn't pick that up.
Mr Kotze during the time that you were involved with the Security Branch with regard to this specific operation did you act for and behalf of the National Party and did you believe in their ideology?
MR KOTZE: That is correct.
MR DU PLESSIS: And were you a supporter of the National Party?
MR KOTZE: Yes I was a supporter.
MR DU PLESSIS: And did you believe that you were fighting against the liberation movements and communism.
MR KOTZE: Absolutely, Chairperson.
MR DU PLESSIS: And you have heard the evidence of Minister Vlok and General van der Merwe and the other witnesses with regard to the political reasons and motivation for their action in this operation. Do you confirm that evidence?
MR KOTZE: Yes, I confirm that.
MR DU PLESSIS: Will you please turn ...[inaudible]. Under whose command did you act?
MR KOTZE: At the time of the incident I was under the command or the direct command of Colonel Hattingh.
MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Kotze, you've given the details of this deed from page 117 and that is with regard to Khotso House, that's page 117 to page 119.
MR KOTZE: That is correct, I confirm that.
MR DU PLESSIS: Could you please explain to the Committee the order which you received with regard to this action, was this issued by your commander, Mr Hattingh?
MR KOTZE: That is correct. Colonel Hattingh gave the order to me and my colleague Mr George Hammond to execute this operation.
MR DU PLESSIS: And was this order given before the first operation took place?
MR KOTZE: Yes that is correct.
INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone is not on.
MR DU PLESSIS: That he also told you that the Municipal Elections were to be disrupted?
MR KOTZE: That's correct.
INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone.
MR DU PLESSIS: And during the abortive attempt it was stopped because a more senior officer was not there, what was the reason for that?
MR KOTZE: The prominent reasons were of a dual nature. Firstly because in the street where the target building and that is Khotso House was situated, there were too many people, even in the early morning hours there were too many people and I was afraid that people would be injured and it would also be easier for us to be noticed and that would of course place the entire operation at risk. I decided that we should withdraw and try again at a later occasion instead of picking up too many problems.
MR DU PLESSIS: Lets return to the order given by Colonel Hattingh. When you received the order did you believe that it was a lawful order?
MR KOTZE: Yes. Colonel Hattingh's managerial style was that we as a unit would not execute anything unless a lawful or legal order had been issued from above and then the order would also flow to us by means of the commander of our unit who at that stage was Colonel Hattingh. Therefore when the order was conveyed to me I had no doubt that in terms of the structure of the Police and it was a legal and legitimate order and he also said that the order came from much higher above. According to my recollection he made such a remark that it was an order which came from a very high level.
MR DU PLESSIS: But he didn't tell me from who the order came?
MR KOTZE: No, he didn't say.
MR DU PLESSIS: And then with the second operation that was approximately a week before the first abortive attempt?
MR KOTZE: Yes, it could be a week or it could be a few days less or more but it was approximately a time period such as that which followed according to my recollection.
MR DU PLESSIS: Could you explain the preparation which you undertook? The charges which were used, the switches and such?
INTERPRETER: The speakers microphone is not on.
MR KOTZE: After we received the order we had the meeting and discussed how we would compile the charge, what type of switch we would use and in order to explain the characteristics of this operation we decided to use Eastern Bloc weaponry so that if pieces of debris were left or if a partial detonation were to take place and leave pieces of debris it could not be traced to South African origin and that the finger could not be pointed at us. We decided to use mechanic switches, if I remember correctly, they were of Russian origin, mechanical time switches and along with that an MD5M switch of Russian origin.
With our first attempt we used landmines mostly, if I remember correctly they were Russian landmines and a number of sticks of TNT. There was also a block of plastic explosives which was also of Eastern Bloc origin. That is more or less what we used during the first attempt.
MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you Mr Kotze, we neglected to discuss the end of the first aborted attempt. When you came back from that attempt you went to talk to your Commander Colonel Hattingh?
MR KOTZE: That's correct. That evening we decided between myself and Mr Hammond we discussed it, we told each other that it may be possible to involve Colonel de Kock and his staff because he was a very well experienced an capable operative and we'll be able to enjoy the protection of his staff when we acted and the following day we discussed this with Colonel Hattingh and he agreed that this was a good idea and according to my best recollection, Mr Hammond and I drove out to Vlakplaas where we presented our problem to Mr de Kock. His immediate reaction was that he didn't have a problem with assisting us but that he didn't want to do something like that out of his own and that he requested that his commander at that state, Brigadier Schoon, also be involved in the matter and that he needed the green light from that side.
Then from Vlakplaas I phoned Colonel Hattingh and by means of a cryptical discussion I conveyed the facts to him and if I remember correctly, Colonel Hattingh then phoned Brigadier Schoon and discussed the matter with him and approximately ten to fifteen minutes later a telephone call came from head office, from Brigadier Schoon to Colonel de Kock to inform him that there would be no problems in his assisting us and then we began to plan the operation with him.
MR DU PLESSIS: Regarding the operation, entering the building, who was involved in entering the building.
MR KOTZE: I can remember that it was Colonel de Kock, myself, Mr Hammond, Mr Kok was also with us, Charles Zeelie was present, I remember Willemse, Nonnie Beyers of course who walked ahead to point out the route and I think Mr Snor Vermeulen as well. That would be the group that moved in to the back part of Khotso House.
MR DU PLESSIS: You've heard the evidence that people were spotted from inside who could look through into the parking area and it was decided not to plant the explosives in a car, do you agree?
MR KOTZE: Yes I do.
MR DU PLESSIS: And then it was decided to plant the explosives near the lift shaft?
MR KOTZE: Yes, we then decided to plant the charge against the lift shaft.
MR DU PLESSIS: And you followed the same route out of the building?
MR KOTZE: Yes, after the charges had been placed Colonel de Kock gave the order that all who were not directly involved should withdraw and if I remember correctly, myself and Mr Hammond and Mr de Kock remained with the charges.
MR DU PLESSIS: And after it had been activated you left the building by the same route?
MR KOTZE: Yes, climbed back into the vehicle that was driven by Mr Snyders and then we left.
MR DU PLESSIS: Where did you go then?
MR KOTZE: A distance away we stopped and I heard from the versions of the other applicants that it was near the Braamfontein Hotel. We waited until we heard the explosion taking place. When this happened and was confirmed by radio from other vehicles among others Colonel de Kock was in a different vehicle and we received confirmation that the charge had indeed gone off and that the explosion had taken place. We went back to the safe house in Honeydew.
MR DU PLESSIS: And did you receive any financial gain from this operation?
MR KOTZE: None whatsoever.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR DU PLESSIS
ADV GCABASHE: Just one question. Page 117, bottom paragraph line 2, 10 to 14 days before the operation you received this order from your superior. Was this the first or the second, the first order you're talking about before the aborted attempt?
MR KOTZE: Yes the section of my application on page 117 was written in very short detail but the initial order from Colonel Hattingh definitely came before the first attempt. It could have been more or less days but a number of days lapsed before Mr Zeelie phoned regarding the planning of the operation.
ADV GCABASHE: If we assume that you got this order 14 days before your attempt, that would have meant in relation to the 31st August? Sometime in the first or second week of August, would I be right? I'm just trying to put this together.
MR KOTZE: Yes, Mr Chairman, that could be very well well be the fact. Sometime earlier in August, yes, for the first attempt.
ADV GCABASHE: Thank you.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR ROSSOUW: Sorry, Mr Chairman. Sorry Mr Chairman, I was skipped, I didn't have time to pose my question. Can I just ask a couple of questions to the applicant?
Mr Kotze, can you recall that Mr Willemse went along with you into the building?
MR KOTZE: I can remember that very clearly Chairperson.
MR ROSSOUW: Can you remember that he also carried a bag in which there were explosives?
MR KOTZE: I can't remember specifically who the persons were carrying that, I think Mr Hammond and I as well as other members of staff. I could have been so but I remember that his specific task was, moved through an adjacent apartment building which would give us access to the back part of Khotso house and we then had to climb over a wall and above or on top of this wall. There was wire fencing and that was the access or that was what presented access to Khotso House from this back part in the parking area and Mr Willemse had a side cutter and one of his tasks was to cut a hole in the fence for us so that we could climb through. I remember specifically because at that stage every time he cut a piece of wire it sounded like a cannon shot.
I can't remember that he went along with us into the building, he remained there in order to prevent that we be trapped by people from behind, people that we didn't expect.
MR ROSSOUW: Were you also involved in the Cosatu House incident?
MR KOTZE: No, not at all.
MR ROSSOUW: No further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR ROSSOUW
WITNESS EXCUSED
