MR VISSER: The next witness Mr Chairman, is Brig Oosthuizen who I wish to call. We have a statement for him as well, which we hand in as Exhibit C with your leave Mr Chairman, it has been signed by the applicant. Brig Oosthuizen is available to take the oath Chairperson, he has no objection to take the oath, he wishes to give his evidence in Afrikaans.
MR SIBANYONI: Will you rise please. Your full names?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: Alfred Oosthuizen.
ALFRED OOSTHUIZEN: (sworn states)
MR SIBANYONI: Thank you, please be seated. Sworn in Chairperson.
EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Oosthuizen you are an applicant in this amnesty application for any illegal or unlawful act or omission which was committed during, before or after an incident which took place in Mbabane in Swaziland during February 1989, during which the victims were killed?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct.
MR VISSER: Your application appears in the Bundle on page 239 and specifically you deal with this incident from page 232 to 235?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct.
MR VISSER: Do you confirm the correctness of the content of your formal amnesty application?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct.
MR VISSER: In your application with paragraphs 7(a) and (b) you stated not applicable and the Chairperson has heard on various occasions what the explanation for this would be. What would be the correct answers with regard to paragraph 7(a) with regard to you support of any political party?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: It is correct that I was a supporter of the National Party.
MR VISSER: Very well, and you then request that your application form be amended as such?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct.
MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, it is the same reason as has been advanced before, Mr Chairman, with respect. Furthermore you have also studied the documents which has been marked as Exhibit A, is that correct?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct.
MR VISSER: Do you concur from within your own knowledge with the information contained therein, as true and correct?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: Yes.
MR VISSER: And do you request that that evidence as well as the evidence to which is referred to in Exhibit A, be incorporated in your application?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct.
MR VISSER: This is the first occasion upon which you will be giving evidence before the Amnesty Committee during an amnesty hearing?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct.
MR VISSER: Will you then proceed from page 2 and address us on what your particular share in this matter was. Perhaps we could curtail it with the permission of the Chairperson, during 1988, in January to July 1989, you were connected to the Intelligence Unit of the Security Branch, Head Office in Pretoria which was known as Group D for Delta, is that correct?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: Yes.
MR VISSER: And that during that period of time, you resided under the command of Maj-Gen Erasmus?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: Yes.
MR VISSER: He is also an amnesty applicant, and he will give evidence after you, and you state that as a member of the aforementioned division or group and by nature of your duties, you participated in among others, information management and co-ordination and the management and handling of information which was of security interest as well as the monitoring of political organisations and groups, who were dangerous to the State within the RSA and abroad. Could you state which groups are of relevance for the current application?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: Sansco.
MR VISSER: That would be the South African National Students' Congress?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct.
MR VISSER: Please proceed.
MR OOSTHUIZEN: Shall I read from paragraph 3 onwards?
MR VISSER: No, 3. The others would be Sayco?
CHAIRPERSON: Does he need to read it all Mr Visser, can't he merely confirm it?
MR VISSER: Chairperson, with your leave ...
CHAIRPERSON: You can ask him to amplify any paragraphs that you wish.
MR VISSER: Yes, with your leave I would like to do that to save time, until we come to paragraph 7 Chairperson with respect. It was the student organisations of Sayco, Sansco and Cosas in which primarily although not exclusively, there were students who underwent tertiary studies, they were members of these organisations?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct.
MR VISSER: And these groups or these organisations were infiltrated as Col Coetzee has submitted to the honourable Committee, you had information and knowledge about it, is that correct?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: And as he has given evidence, at a stage reliable information came to light which indicated that some of these underground structures had multiplied within the aforementioned organisations and wanted to establish contact with groups abroad in order to become part of the existing MK underground cell structures within the organisations, and that they wished to establish MK underground cell structures within the RSA and they wanted to send or channel members of such underground structures abroad for the purposes of training as well as for the purposes of bringing arms in from abroad?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct.
MR VISSER: You have also heard the evidence of Mr Coetzee indicating that great emphasis was placed by the ANC/SACP alliance on the recruitment of students in order to fortify the revolutionary onslaught in South African?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct.
MR VISSER: And then you confirm the evidence of Mr Coetzee regarding the national workshop as well as the information which he made available to you regarding Mohale?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct.
MR VISSER: And then with the permission of the Chairperson, I would just like to reiterate that the existing information indicated that Mohale was a member of a core group in Sansco which wanted to enter the arms struggle within the RSA and that he or his core group wished to establish contact with structures beyond the borders of the country, particularly in MK and then for the purposes that you have already summarised with regard to underground structures, they wanted to establish stockpiles and they wanted to obtain training?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct.
MR VISSER: Is it true that all this information was thoroughly checked and monitored on a consistent basis with Security Head Office?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct.
MR VISSER: Then could you begin with paragraph 10 on page 4 and explain to us how you entered the picture?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: Paragraph 10 - during approximately the first week in February 1989, Lt-Col Willem Coetzee made a submission to me with regard to the political activities of political activists connected to the South African National Students' Congress, Sansco. At that stage, he was the Group Head of an Intelligence gathering Unit which was under my direct command.
MR VISSER: Here you refer to Col Coetzee?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct. Col Coetzee informed me that an informer, one Phineas Moshualiba ...
MR VISSER: Please repeat.
MR OOSTHUIZEN: Col Coetzee informed me that an informer, one Phineas Moshualiba, also an applicant in the current application for amnesty, who had previously penetrated Mohale's group in Sansco and had consistently provided information regarding the activities of the group, had reported to Col Coetzee that a change had come. According to Moshualiba Mohale had decided that he and members of his group would travel to Swaziland during the weekend of 11 - 13 February 1989 in order to establish liaison with MK structures, to receive military training and to smuggle weapons to the RSA in order to establish an underground cell and to enter the armed struggle. (1) To hold discussions with members of the African National Congress, the ANC, to co-ordinate student activities on a national level in order to promote the creation and extension of the people's war strategy. These discussions would also among others focus on a planned national protest actions, boycotts, and so forth.
MR VISSER: Yes, and then it is merely a repetition of what you have already stated, to undergo quick training and handling of weapons. Please continue, page 5.
MR OOSTHUIZEN: Paragraph 12, because the tertiary educational terrain had already been destabilised and unrest and violence existed on a broad basis already, the visit to Swaziland in terms of all available confirmed information ... (tape ends) ... on campuses within the RSA, drastically, consequently this information was of the utmost importance, seeing as the proposed visit to Swaziland would open up a whole new dimension in the struggle, which had to be prevented at all costs. I had no reason to question Lt-Col Coetzee's motive, information or credibility because he was an experienced Intelligence operator and possessed credibility with regard to the correctness of information. Col Coetzee suggested to me that a controlled covert offensive operation be launched with regard to the political activists who were going to Swaziland. He motivated this by raising the following points - normal legal actions or options with regard to arrest and court oriented action against student leaders, were basically out of the question as a result of intimidation of witnesses and fears which were created by informers and police officers. Furthermore any action against these leaders would create a focus point of new activities such as protest actions and boycotts, which in either event, would increase the intensity of unrest and violence even further. Furthermore it was the experience that detention of activists, gave them a very high stature and prominence. Liaison with the ANC in Swaziland had to be discouraged, because instant training in weapons could lead to large scale violence in the RSA. The smuggling of weapons to the RSA by means of these student leaders, had to be avoided at all costs for obvious reasons. Given the intensity of the political instability with the accompanying unrest and violence which at that stage still reigned in the RSA, I realised thoroughly that a direct liaison through the student political activists with the ANC in Swaziland, could have extensive consequences for the security situation in the RSA.
MR VISSER: Mr Oosthuizen, if I could just take you back to paragraph 15. Mr Coetzee was examined by Commissioner Sandi regarding why you simply did not arrest Mohale and or members of his group and then the following question would have been why didn't you arrest and detain them? How would you have reacted to such a suggestion?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: There were two reasons, Chairperson. The first as already stated in paragraph 15(1) and then the other very important reason was in order to protect the Intelligence network and not expose the informers.
MR VISSER: Are you saying that in order for you to charge them, you would have required a witness and the only witness who would have known about their activities or their offences, would have been the informer?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct.
MR VISSER: Very well.
MR OOSTHUIZEN: I continue with paragraph 17.
MR VISSER: Yes, you agreed with Col Coetzee and everything possible had to be done in order to prevent this Swaziland liaison, is that correct?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: Yes.
MR VISSER: And did you also agree that a controlled operation had to be planned and it was controlled in the sense that they should not be allowed to arrive in Swaziland by their own means but that you should make a vehicle available to them and attempt to maintain contact with them as they went to Swaziland?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct.
MR VISSER: And did you then undertake towards Coetzee that you would consult Head Office regarding the authorisation for the operation?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct.
MR VISSER: In paragraph 18 you state that at that stage you foresaw that if a minibus were made available to them, a larger group of people may have gone, which would not necessarily have formed part of the core group of activists and that the possibility existed that innocent persons could in such a case, be struck?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct.
MR VISSER: And then at some stage the suggestion was made that a smaller vehicle be made available to Mohale and his core group by means of Moshualiba, is that correct?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct.
CHAIRPERSON: Was that suggestion made by you?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: Yes, that is correct Chairperson.
MR VISSER: During discussions with Coetzee?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct.
MR VISSER: Very well, please continue, page 6, paragraph 20.
MR OOSTHUIZEN: Furthermore I advised Lt-Col Coetzee to prepare a proper coverage legend so that if the operation was successfully completed, the informers would still be capable of maintaining their penetrated positions within the political structures. The latter mentioned was of vital importance seeing as information was of cardinal importance. Furthermore, any exposure of informers would necessarily lead to their death.
MR VISSER: Was this your experience during that period of our country's history?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct.
MR VISSER: Very well, please proceed, paragraph 21.
MR OOSTHUIZEN: During the afternoon, in the absence of Lt-Col Coetzee, I submitted the entire operation to Maj-Gen Erasmus, my immediate superior as well as the Group Head of Group D for approval.
MR VISSER: You are referring to the same person in his various capacities?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct. I also submitted all documentary support and Intelligence reports with regard to student unrest and violence, the profiles of suspects, ANC objectives as well as established liaison between members of the ANC and student leaders. After consideration of all the relevant information, he informed me that in principle, he held no objection towards the operation, but that he would have to clear it with Head Office first, however he informed me that we could continue with the planning of the operation. Lt-Col Coetzee and I went to Vlakplaas the following morning where we discussed the content of the proposed operation with Col de Kock. We discussed the political motivation for the operation and after that, the proposed execution. Lt-Col Coetzee and I agreed that the groundlevel arrangements would be given to Col de Kock.
MR VISSER: That should actually read left over?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is right, it should be left over to Col de Kock. We agreed that Lt-Col Coetzee would liaise further with Col de Kock regarding the arrangements, vehicles, time, coverage legends and so forth. Maj-Gen Erasmus called me to his office that afternoon and informed me that the operation had been authorised. I informed Lt-Col Coetzee that the operation was authorised and that he could continue with the planning and liaison with Col de Kock. I did not form any further part of the planning. I am not aware whether it was Lt-Col Coetzee or Col de Kock's staff who participated in the operation. During the weekend I received feedback that the operation had been successfully completed and that three or four persons had been killed.
MR VISSER: Can you recall precisely what the feedback was that you received, whether it was three or four or can you not recall?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: Chairperson, I cannot recall.
MR VISSER: Very well, please proceed.
MR OOSTHUIZEN: On the day of the action, 98-02-12, I accompanied Col W. Coetzee, Col D. Els and Col Snyman to Vlakplaas, during which the latest information which was available, was conveyed to Col de Kock and they were wished luck.
MR VISSER: Was this before their departure?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: Yes, it was the morning just before their departure.
MR VISSER: Do you recall the content of the information which was conveyed that morning, today?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: No, I cannot recall it.
MR VISSER: Very well, proceed.
MR OOSTHUIZEN: The manner of action in Swaziland, was not discussed during this meeting by Col de Kock with us, that would be me, Col Coetzee, Col Els and Col Snyman.
MR VISSER: Yes, and later you were informed what the result of the action had been?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: What do you say in paragraph 30?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: With regard to Col de Kock's amnesty application, I wish to confirm that I, Brig Schoon, Gen Erasmus, Col Coetzee had indeed held discussions with him at Vlakplaas because the Opel Kadett had been traced back to the SAP and the decision was taken to duplicate the vehicle.
MR VISSER: Therefore your evidence would be the same as that of Col de Kock and Mr Coetzee in this regard?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct.
MR VISSER: Please proceed with paragraph 31.
MR OOSTHUIZEN: At all times, I associated myself with the action and I participated in the conspiracy to murder them, therefore I am probably guilty of murder of whoever died during this operation and I am also guilty of defeating the ends of justice because I did not report the matter.
MR VISSER: And how do you motivate your action in terms of the stipulations of the Act?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: This action took place in a situation of warfare where the rules of normal warfare were not of application. My action was aimed against supporters of a liberation movement who were the enemy of the government and who were waging a revolutionary onslaught against the State dispensation, during which among others innocent civilians were killed or injured and much damage was brought to property. The struggle that we combated, was a political struggle and everything that I did, was done in the execution of my duties as a policeman in protection of human life and property and in maintenance of the State dispensation of that time and in support of the National Party and to prevent that the country fall into chaos and anarchy. In the light of the pressure which was exerted upon us within the Security Branch, by the political leadership of that time and the many statements and speeches during which reference was made to the obliteration of terrorists, I truly believed that such actions were expected of me. In motivation of my participation in the action, I state that at all times I acted in the execution of my duties as a policeman in service to the SAP and in the execution of orders which I received from senior officers. I believed that what I did, was expected of me as a police officer, that I acted within the execution of my duties as a police officer and that my actions fell within my express or implied authorisation. In no way did I benefit or was I rewarded for the action and I drew no personal advantage there from.
MR VISSER: Thus you request that the Amnesty Committee will consider your amnesty application favourably with regard to any crime or delict which was committed by you before, during or after the relevant incident with regard to the incident which took place near or in Mbabane in Swaziland during which the mentioned persons in paragraph 38 of your Exhibit C were killed, is that correct?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Hattingh on record, Mr Chairperson. Mr Oosthuizen, with regard to paragraph 23 of your statement, on page 6, when you and Mr Coetzee went to visit Vlakplaas the following day, did you inform Mr de Kock of the fact that you had discussed the matter on the level of Gen Erasmus?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: I did inform him Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: And that you had his approval with regard to the planning of the operation?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: And that he, Col Erasmus, undertook to clear the operation at Head Office?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: Do you know whether he meant that he would clear it with Brig Schoon?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: Your recollection of this visit to Vlakplaas, Mr Oosthuizen, is that it was only yourself and Mr Coetzee who went there, is it possible that Gen Erasmus had accompanied you?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: Chairperson, I cannot recall exactly. The meeting to which I refer to, I did all the talking, it may be that other meetings were held that I cannot recall.
MR HATTINGH: Mr de Kock was informed of the fact that this was an operation which was authorised from Head Office?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: And that he received instruction to execute the operation?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: And if Gen Erasmus was not present during this discussion which you referred to in paragraph 23, he would have deduced the fact that it had the approval of Head Office, could he have drawn the inference from the visit to Vlakplaas by Brig Erasmus and Brig Schoon when it was established when the vehicle was traced back to the police?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: And the final aspect Mr Oosthuizen, Mr de Kock will testify that he was entirely certain that only three persons were in the vehicle and all three of them had been killed, and that was the feedback that he gave back to you, is it possible?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: I accept his word because he was on the scene.
MR HATTINGH: He is certain about it, because at the scene, he went to each of the deceased, and because they did not want to use any torches and betray their presence in the vicinity, he touched the eyes of all the deceased, to see if there was any reaction from their eyelids in order to surmise whether these persons were still alive or not, and that is why he was certain that there were only three?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: I do not question that at all Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: Thank you Mr Chairman, we have no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HATTINGH
MR BOOYENS: Booyens, Mr Chairman, I have no questions, thank you.
NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS
MR CORNELIUS: Cornelius, for the record, Mr Chairman, I have no questions.
NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR CORNELIUS
MR NEL: Thank you Mr Chairman, Nel, I have no questions.
NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR NEL
MR ROSSOUW: Thank you Mr Chairman, Rossouw, I have no questions.
NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR ROSSOUW
MR BOTHA: Botha, I've got no questions.
NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BOTHA
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VAN HEERDEN: Van Heerden, Mr Chairperson, I've got a few questions. Mr Oosthuizen, did you know Tabo Mohale or did you know of him?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: I did not know him Chairperson, I only knew of him by means of information which from time to time, became available to us.
MR VAN HEERDEN: What did you know of him?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: Chairperson, at this stage I cannot recall in detail, although I can recall with the submission and before the submission, information was available to us that he was a political student activist.
MR VAN HEERDEN: What do you know of Portia Shabangu?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: I cannot recall any information at this stage with regard to that person, Chairperson.
MR VAN HEERDEN: Derek Mashobane?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: Similarly no information, but I would accept that they were part of the core group of Mohale. At this stage, I cannot recall exactly what the information was.
MR VAN HEERDEN: The submission that Mr Coetzee made to you, what nature did this take on?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: It was an oral submission Chairperson, supported by reports. At our office we had access to all types of information in the Security Branch and in his submission, his submission consisted of oral submission as well as, direct oral reports as well as written reports.
MR VAN HEERDEN: Can you recall with whom these reports dealt with?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: Chairperson, at this stage I cannot recall the exact content of the reports, but I recall that it was about this incident and it was in regard to Mohale and his grouping.
MR VAN HEERDEN: So in effect at this stage, you don't know anything of the other two persons involved?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: At this stage, I cannot tell you in detail what the content was, but at that stage, the information was submitted with regard to Mohale and his group who was to go to Swaziland. If you at this stage ask me what the exact information was, then I cannot recall.
MR VAN HEERDEN: Do I understand you correctly that this submission was in general about this grouping?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: The submission at that stage was in regard to the Mohale group and it was not the first submission, we on a weekly basis, information was analysed, not only at tertiary level but also at other levels and the threat was analysed. It was not the first time that Mohale's name came about and that specific submission was in regard to Mohale and his grouping who had a specific objective and wanted to go to Swaziland. That is what the submission was all about.
MR VAN HEERDEN: In paragraph 11 you mention that the grouping, that Mohale and his members would travel to Swaziland in order to establish liaison with the ANC to assist them in the smuggling of arms. Why was it such a problem that the MK structures in Swaziland, I assume that there were MK structures in the Republic as well?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: Yes, there were MK structures in the Republic on a covert basis, it was part of the Security Branch's task to try and lift out these structures on a continual basis and at that stage, with regard to the student structures, they were absolutely isolated and it was a matter of urgency for us to allow ANC activities on campuses or have them form part of the total underground structures.
MR VAN HEERDEN: So it was impossible for these persons to form part of MK structures within the Republic?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: Yes, it was impossible for them to part of structures in the Republic.
MR VAN HEERDEN: And the matter of the arms?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: I think the word impossible is a bit too strong, I would rather use the word improbable, because MK structures were on self-forming and the one cell with regard to the other cell, worked on a need to know basis, whereas the cell structures outside the RSA, were very easily reachable for persons within the RSA, who wanted to undergo training and who wanted to obtain weapons.
MR VAN HEERDEN: In paragraph 13 you mention that the visit to Swaziland would open up a whole new dimension in the struggle, how would a visit by only three persons open up a whole new dimension?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: Chairperson, at that stage, Sansco itself were busy with student activities, political activities and if we allow MK structures on campuses and allowed them to undergo training, it would fortify the political activities in universities.
MR VAN HEERDEN: Were there structures outside Swaziland?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: Please repeat that?
MR VAN HEERDEN: Were there structures outside Swaziland where such training could be undertaken in the neighbouring States?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: That is correct Chairperson, all the machineries, the ANC machineries were managed from neighbouring States and there were structures in those countries.
MR VAN HEERDEN: How many persons at Head Office would have to give authorisation for an operation of this nature?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: Chairperson, one cannot say how many persons, it depends how many Units participate. In this regard two Units, the Intelligence Unit and the Operational arm, it would be the Heads of those two Units who would have co-ordinated and have given their approval and authorisation.
MR VAN HEERDEN: In paragraph 18 you refer to the use of a minibus by these political activists, where would this bus have come from, do you have any information with regard to that?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: The minibus would possibly have been made available by us, there was no certainty at that stage as to where the minibus would come from, and the whole idea was a controlled operation and by controlling it we mean that we would most probably make the minibus available.
MR VAN HEERDEN: Paragraph 20, you refer to a covering legend which would be prepared by Mr Coetzee, can you please elaborate on that?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: The purpose of the cover legend would have been firstly to negate the tracing back to the Security Forces and secondly to give the Swaziland police an indication that these people were of the ANC and thirdly to create the impression that the ANC had themselves eliminated these persons.
MR VAN HEERDEN: The planning of the operation as it is mentioned in paragraph 22, what was your part therein?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: Firstly my role was that I authorised Col Coetzee to continue with the operation while waiting for authorisation from Head Office, secondly I accompanied Col Coetzee to Col de Kock, held discussions and also told Col de Kock that I associated myself with it and they could continue with the planning while we await authorisation from Head Office and thirdly the morning before the operation, before the departure of all the Vlakplaas members, I visited Vlakplaas and gave them my full support and received feedback after the operation had been executed. After the operation had been executed and the problem emanated with the particular vehicle, and not directly but indirectly assisted in the duplication of the vehicle and as a whole, I fully associated myself with the operation and I formed part of the decision that was taken.
MR VAN HEERDEN: Was it necessary for you to personally go to Vlakplaas?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: Chairperson, I would say so, yes, I was in a position of command, and Col de Kock was also in a position of command and it is practice that Commanders speak to each other.
MR VAN HEERDEN: The morning before the departure of Col de Kock, did you ask any questions there with regard to the exact manner in which the operation would be executed?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: No Chairperson.
MR VAN HEERDEN: May I ask you why not?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: The operation had already been fully planned by then, and at that stage, no arrangements were made, it was a matter of we convened and they would depart from there, the operation was not discussed during that meeting.
MR VAN HEERDEN: You, as a senior official, were you not interested in the manner in which the operation would take place?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: Chairperson, it is not a matter that I was not interested or I did not want to know, Col Willem Coetzee resorted under my command and his was in liaison with Col de Kock and there was also a fulfilment of the role with regard to what Col de Kock's part would be and our part. Our part was the Intelligence part and Col de Kock's would be the execution. With regard to the Intelligence, I was aware, but with regard to the execution, the operational, with regard to the operational planning, I was not aware. I saw some of the members the morning before they departed, but I was not aware of the exact detail of the operation.
MR VAN HEERDEN: If we look at one of the points and that is the smuggling of weapons from Swaziland to South Africa, would it not be possible to set up a routine roadblock, to search the vehicle when they returned?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: Chairperson, it is possible to set up a roadblock or whatever, but the manner in which these things were done at that stage, and the false bottoms and hiding places, would make it difficult, because that is how arms got into the country. It was not just a matter of setting up a roadblock. Secondly with regard to when that motor vehicle went through to Swaziland, we lost control of the vehicle.
MR VAN HEERDEN: Why are you saying that control was lost of the vehicle?
MR OOSTHUIZEN: I refer to the Intelligence angle, we did not have any more control over the vehicle. Another aspect which has to be considered is if they returned with the vehicle and we found the arms as I have said in evidence-in-chief, we ran the risk that tracing could be established and as such, the informer or informers could be exposed, so the purpose was not to establish roadblocks and find weapons, our objective at that time was to eliminate these people.
MR VAN HEERDEN: Thank you, no further questions Mr Chairperson.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VAN HEERDEN
ADV STEENKAMP: No questions, thank you Mr Chairman.
NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ADV STEENKAMP
CHAIRPERSON: Re-examination?
MR VISSER: No re-examination, thank you Mr Chairman.
NO RE-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER
CHAIRPERSON: Do you wish this witness to be excused as well?
MR VISSER: Under the same conditions, yes, thank you Mr Chairman.
WITNESS EXCUSED
