JOHN LOUIS McPHERSON: (sworn states)
EXAMINATION BY MR CORNELIUS: Thank you.
Mr McPherson, you have ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Cornelius, you can skip all the introduction, it's contained in his statement, you can get onto the facts of the matter.
MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chairman.
These documents before the Committee are before you, is that correct?
MR McPHERSON: That is correct.
MR CORNELIUS: You confirm the political motivation and you confirm your political career as stated in the document, is that correct?
MR McPHERSON: That's correct, Chairperson.
MR CORNELIUS: You were also tasked, as the evidence has been led here, to collect information and to obtain information from sources, is that correct?
MR McPHERSON: That is correct.
MR CORNELIUS: You were Chief of the Africa Desk, is that correct?
MR McPHERSON: That's correct.
MR CORNELIUS: Briefly, what were your duties?
MR McPHERSON: My task was to monitor all ANC/SACP and PAC activities in Africa, and I particularly worked and concentrated on the ANC's activities.
CHAIRPERSON: This was over a course of time?
MR McPHERSON: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: Were you involved in any way in the preparation for this attack?
MR McPHERSON: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: How so?
MR CORNELIUS: Your direct Commander was Maj Craig Williamson, as it appears from your statement, is that correct?
MR McPHERSON: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR CORNELIUS: You received an instruction from him, what was the nature of the instruction?
MR McPHERSON: Maj Craig Williamson called me in one morning and told me that he received instruction from Brig Stadler that I and my unit at the Africa Desk, should take all information that came to our availability and promote this through to Western Transvaal Division, as well as Special Forces, as well as DCC, Directorate of Covert Collections.
MR CORNELIUS: That was all information with regard to intelligence in Botswana?
MR McPHERSON: That's correct.
MR CORNELIUS: Do you know why this was asked?
MR McPHERSON: Yes Chairperson, he told me that a raid was planned in Gaberone, Botswana, and that I should specifically concentrate on that.
MR CORNELIUS: Very well. You have heard the evidence of Mr Anton Pretorius, were you also at the Special Forces meeting?
MR McPHERSON: I attended several Special Forces meetings.
MR CORNELIUS: And you conveyed all the information, did you identify targets?
MR McPHERSON: Chairperson, I only submitted two, the one was the front that the ANC ran under the name Solidarity News Service, and the other one was Barry Gilder, he was involved in the intelligence collection for the ANC, and performed a certain task there in Gaberone.
MR CORNELIUS: Were those the only targets that you identified?
MR McPHERSON: Yes, those were the only two I gave.
MR CORNELIUS: At a stage, I see according to your evidence you went to Cape Town, under whose instruction was that?
MR McPHERSON: What happened Chairperson, was that Craig Williams contacted me and told me that he or Brig Stadler were not available for a meeting in Cape Town, at Min Gen Magnus Malan, and the late Min Louis le Grange and that I along with Special Forces and DCC, should fly to Cape Town, and the DCC person will make a submission ...(intervention)
MR CORNELIUS: Very well, we shall get to that. You then flew to Cape Town. I see in your statement you say that you flew along with Capt Kallie Steyn, are you sure about that?
MR McPHERSON: Chairperson, now that I think back ...
MR CORNELIUS: Yes?
CHAIRPERSON: Was Mr Magnus Malan notified?
ADV STEENKAMP: Yes, Mr Chairman, indeed he was given notice.
MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Chair. You are not certain about Kallie Steyn?
MR McPHERSON: That is correct.
MR CORNELIUS: You then arrived in Cape Town, did you then attend a meeting?
MR McPHERSON: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR CORNELIUS: Who was present at that meeting?
MR McPHERSON: It was in the Hendrik Verwoerd building, because during that time the parliament was in sitting in the Cape, and present was Gen Malan and then the late Louis le Grange and Gen Kat Liebenberg, that I can recall now, and there were, I cannot recall exactly who was the Colonel from DCC who did the submission.
MR CORNELIUS: Submissions were done then, were targets identified?
MR McPHERSON: At that stage there were 18 targets identified. The briefing was done by means of transparents and an overhead projector, which were shown to the Ministers and then ...(break in tape) who lived there and which vehicles, for example, were used.
MR CORNELIUS: Were the targets accepted?
MR McPHERSON: The Minister asked many questions with regard to the targets, specifically whether Botswana persons or other citizens from other countries lived in these houses, and systematically they started whittling away some of these targets and they also specifically asked whether there were targets with children, and I then gave some input with regard to my target, Barry Gilder and his wife. At that stage they had two very young children, I think it was a daughter and a son with red curly hair, and they were immediately removed from the list.
MR CORNELIUS: And then the target was removed?
MR McPHERSON: Yes.
MR CORNELIUS: And the Solidarity News Service, did that remain as a target?
MR McPHERSON: Yes, it remained as a target.
MR CORNELIUS: And in hindsight, it was attacked?
MR McPHERSON: Yes, it was attacked.
CHAIRPERSON: Was there anyone on the list of deceased that appeared on the list that you had before the Minister, that was attacked?
MR McPHERSON: Chairperson, do you know, this was so far back and I have studied that list and personally I cannot recall any of those names.
CHAIRPERSON: You did see it?
MR McPHERSON: I have seen it, yes.
MR CORNELIUS: You say you cannot identify the names on there?
MR McPHERSON: Not at all.
MR CORNELIUS: And after the meeting you went back to Pretoria.
MR McPHERSON: That's correct.
MR CORNELIUS: Did you monitor the attack?
MR McPHERSON: Yes, that is correct Chairperson.
MR CORNELIUS: There was evidence already that everyone listened to Special Forces on radios.
MR McPHERSON: Yes, what happened was that we who were involved, went to Speskop, there was a large operational tent, approximately as large as half of this church hall and there were speakers, loudspeakers, and when they went in after one, we heard that feedback was given. But as somebody else has testified here, it was code language and so forth, we only knew when it started and it lasted approximately 20 minutes and then it was over.
MR CORNELIUS: And the following day everything appeared in the newspapers?
MR McPHERSON: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR CORNELIUS: Did you see some of the documentation that they confiscated?
MR McPHERSON: That's correct.
MR CORNELIUS: And did you study it?
MR McPHERSON: Yes, I went through it, that which was relevant to Solidarity News Service.
MR CORNELIUS: Your target?
MR McPHERSON: Yes.
MR CORNELIUS: Did you participate in the operation and did you reconcile yourself with the operation?
MR McPHERSON: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR CORNELIUS: You knew that persons could be killed and possibly innocent persons would be killed.
MR McPHERSON: Yes, that's correct Chairperson.
MR CORNELIUS: And you request amnesty as in the concluding paragraph in your amnesty application and the whole raid in Botswana, and all delicts which might flow from it.
MR McPHERSON: Yes, that's correct.
MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Chairperson.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR CORNELIUS
MR COETSER: I have no questions.
NO QUESTIONS BY MR COETSER
MR VISSER: Chairperson, Visser on record, I have no questions thank you.
NO QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BERGER: Thank you, Chairperson.
Mr McPherson, I have a recollection that you were involved in Stratcom, is that right?
MR McPHERSON: Yes, that is absolutely correct. I think you questioned me at the last Commission hearings.
MR BERGER: Yes, I thought that you gave evidence about that. Very briefly put, that was a mechanism devised by the former regime for putting out false information into the media for public consumption.
MR McPHERSON: That was one of their objectives, yes.
MR BERGER: And you say that you direct head was Craig Williamson?
MR McPHERSON: Correct, Chairperson.
MR BERGER: And he was also known to put false information into the media for public consumption, is that correct?
MR McPHERSON: Yes, I think the last time when you questioned him, that report with regard to Ruth First's death ...
MR BERGER: That was one such example?
MR McPHERSON: Yes, that was an example where it was admitted that the information was false.
MR BERGER: At the press conference after this raid, the Botswana raid, that press conference was addressed by Stadler and Williamson?
MR McPHERSON: That's correct.
MR BERGER: And a whole lot of information was released for the public media.
MR McPHERSON: Definitely.
MR BERGER: And how much of that information was false?
MR McPHERSON: The only place where I was involved, I and my Africa staff, we did the preparation of the targets, these were placards which we made, addresses, the description of the facility, photos of the individuals ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Mr McPherson, the question is, how many of those statements ...
MR McPHERSON: I'm just doing this by way of an introduction. We identified targets briefly and then I did read those reports, and the whole preparation of Brig Stadler's report was aimed to give a factual version. So just looking at it, I cannot say whether this is a propaganda report. And as I have said, with regard to Craig and the Brigadier's media statements, I did not play a role there, they prepared those themselves, and I think on the Sunday evening they were on the 8 o'clock news, the TV news.
MR BERGER: Well then I take it you wouldn't be in a position to say how much false information was contained in their press release?
MR McPHERSON: No.
MR BERGER: Do you have a copy of their press release? Not the newspaper report, their press release.
MR McPHERSON: No, I do not have it with me. I never kept it, I have just read the newspaper reports.
MR BERGER: You were also involved in intelligence gathering at Headquarters level of the Security Branch, is that right?
MR McPHERSON: Yes, that is so.
MR BERGER: So you would have known, I take it, that the ANC was planning to hold a National Consultative Conference somewhere in Africa, starting on the 16th or thereabouts, the 16th of June 1985?
MR McPHERSON: Yes, that was, I think it was in June in Kabwe. Kabwe's is close to Lusaka in Zambia, I had an informer there, who lived there.
MR BERGER: You had an informer at the conference?
MR McPHERSON: Yes.
MR BERGER: I suppose I'm not allowed to ask you who that informer was.
MR McPHERSON: I think he's deceased.
MR BERGER: So you knew shortly before the 16th that there was going to be this National Consultative Conference, where it was going to be and that it was going to be attended by all the bigwigs in MK and the ANC?
MR McPHERSON: That is correct, yes. I think Oliver Tambo was also there.
CHAIRPERSON: And that the strategy of MK was going to be revisited and discussed there. Did you know that?
MR McPHERSON: That MK was?
CHAIRPERSON: That the strategy of MK was going to be revisited on that day.
MR McPHERSON: Yes, that's right, because what they do, every fourth year they had such a meeting and then they do the MK restructuring and they do the political and the foreign policies and the internal policies. That's done through different committees there.
MR BERGER: Well besides the fact of a four-yearly review, this was the first National Consultative Conference of the ANC since the 1969 conference in Morogoro, did you know that?
MR McPHERSON: Yes.
MR BERGER: You knew that at the time?
MR McPHERSON: Yes, yes, because I had to prepare for the meeting, okay.
MR BERGER: You had to prepare for a meeting?
MR McPHERSON: I had to prepare my source that attended, for the meeting.
MR BERGER: So you had to tell your ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Not only ANC members prepared for the meeting.
MR BERGER: So if it was known to you, then I take it that this information was known to the Security Branch Headquarters and everyone in a leadership position?
MR McPHERSON: It was known to the whole intelligence community. So it's National Intelligence, Military Intelligence and the Security Branch of the Police.
MR BERGER: Did it occur to you that at the time of the raid, most of the people who were being targeted by the attack, or in the attack, were likely to be at the conference in Kabwe?
MR McPHERSON: Yes now that I think about it. At that specific day and time I did not think about it, I saw the two incidents as separate, one was preparation for the attack and the other one was preparation for the attendance of the meeting. I saw it as separate, but look, it did have a disruptive action, that meeting.
MR BERGER: It did have such an effect?
MR McPHERSON: Yes, because now I have heard this afternoon that the congress persons were shocked to hear that some of their cadres had been shot dead by the Army.
MR BERGER: Not only shocked, but angered and that influence the tenor of the debate at that conference. You must have known that at the time as well, from your delegate?
MR McPHERSON: Yes, I think the feedback indeed indicated that.
CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)
MR BERGER: Just shows how democratic the ANC was then as well.
Mr McPherson, you say that you conducted reconnaissance of different safehouses, this is at page 268 of volume 1, you personally - because I know that you have given evidence before about you personally going up to Botswana.
MR McPHERSON: Yes, I've been in Botswana, I can't tell you how many times, because I had a policeman fully based in Gaberone amongst the ANC, and I had another source also permanently based in Gaberone. So I had to visit them at least once a month to give them instructions and to debrief them.
MR BERGER: Alright. And which houses did you do reconnaissance on?
MR McPHERSON: Well if you ask which houses, in Tlokweng, some of the cadres stayed there ...(intervention)
MR BERGER: Can you link them to people?
MR McPHERSON: You know it's so long ago that if I have to link it, it was the different divisions which say: "Listen, we've got a suspect and he stays at that and that address", then I'll go out and I'll photograph the address and send the photographs to them.
MR BERGER: Let me ask you this, can you recall the names of any people who were on the list of targets? Now I know targets were identified by buildings, but attached to them were names, can you remember the names of any people who were on the list?
MR McPHERSON: Not at the moment, except my own that I had put on, Barry Gilder and his wife.
MR BERGER: And the SNS offices?
MR McPHERSON: And the SNS, that's correct. I photographed the SNS offices. I think two weeks before the raid I went to the actual offices and made sure exactly where it is situated, which office it is and so forth and so forth.
MR BERGER: Okay. But besides Barry Gilder, no other people you can recall?
MR McPHERSON: No. I probably photographed the ANC Head Office and I had other places in Broadhurst, but if you ask me now exactly who, I won't be able to tell you.
MR BERGER: Alright. Now your meeting with Magnus Malan in Cape Town, and Louis le Grange, was that meeting before or after the Speskop meeting?
MR McPHERSON: I think the meeting with Speskop was - yes, I think in May and the meeting of - I've looked at my diary and it looks like the Cape Town meeting with the Minister was on the 4th of June. So that's ten days before the attack.
MR BERGER: So the Speskop meeting is the one that all the previous witnesses have been testifying to, the one that was two to two and a half weeks before the attack?
MR McPHERSON: Yes, yes.
MR BERGER: Subsequent to that you then went down to Cape Town and met with the two Ministers?
MR McPHERSON: Yes.
MR BERGER: And you say that at that stage, in Cape Town on the 4th of June 1985, there were 18 targets that were being discussed?
MR McPHERSON: Ja, it was also a surprise to me, but in-between there the Directorate Covert Collections, must have had another discussion amongst themselves with Speskop, with the Special Forces, to determine which places would be easily hit and which would be difficult to hit, because they would have had to concentrate in a certain area, and then they decided to take some of the targets away.
MR BERGER: No you see, because the evidence we've heard thusfar is that by Speskop, by the time of the Speskop meeting, or immediately after the Speskop, the targets had been reduced to twelve.
MR McPHERSON: Yes, it was brought down to - it was more than 10, it was approximately 10 to 12.
MR BERGER: But then subsequent to that you went to Cape Town and all of a sudden there are 18 targets, do you see my problem?
MR McPHERSON: I think perhaps ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Don't guess, can you explain?
MR McPHERSON: Very well, can I say what I think, following from what I've heard here?
CHAIRPERSON: Very well, yes.
MR McPHERSON: I think the target is 10, because 10 were hit, it remains in people's heads and that is why they refer to the Speskop meeting that came down to 10, but there it was finalised with the Minister there to 10, 10 or 12.
MR BERGER: Well if you have a look at page 268 - I'm sorry, my copy has been cut on the left-hand side. It says
"At the Minister's (I think residence or place, I just see a ce) I had to give a detailed target analyses. The Minister of Police was also present. 18 targets were discussed, but Mr Malan narrowed it down to ..."
MR McPHERSON: To 12.
MR BERGER: 12.
"... and scrapped those where Batswana (sic) or children were staying in the houses."
So it was Magnus Malan, you say, who cut the list down to 12?
MR McPHERSON: Yes, well Gen Kat Liebenberg, you know, they had a discussion there and between the Army personnel and Minister Magnus, they brought it down to 10.
MR BERGER: 10 or 12?
MR McPHERSON: To 12, ja to 12. Sorry, to 12.
MR BERGER: And those 12 were the 12 targets that were attacked?
MR McPHERSON: Because Special Forces were ...(intervention)
MR BERGER: That were to be attacked. We know that one wasn't.
MR McPHERSON: Yes, because the Head of Special Forces was there, so he now would know what to instruct his men when they had to go in.
MR BERGER: And who is that person?
MR McPHERSON: Gen Kat Liebenberg. He's late now.
MR BERGER: I still don't understand, but perhaps you don't have information to assist. I don't understand how the list could have been decreased from 29 to 12 at Speskop and then popped up to 18 and down again to 12 in Cape Town. But you don't have any specific information?
MR McPHERSON: I don't have - I'm not very sure about what exactly happened at Speskop.
MR BERGER: Even though you were there?
MR McPHERSON: I was.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr McPherson, are you able to tell us why the list was increased? No?
MR McPHERSON: I have no idea.
MR BERGER: And you say that the final decision to exclude 6 targets, to go from 18 to 12, was because amongst those targets there were people who ...(intervention)
MR McPHERSON: There were still Botswana people ...
MR BERGER: Hang on. ... there were people who were not considered legitimate targets for attack.
MR McPHERSON: Yes.
MR BERGER: There were people who were not involved in MK activities.
MR McPHERSON: Exactly.
MR MALAN: I think he did say specifically Botswana or permanent children.
MR BERGER: That's what he says and I'm asking him whether that was the reason that they were excluded.
MR MALAN: I'm just not sure whether you're broadening the category in the way you've framed your question, people who were not legitimate targets. I think we're on the same page.
MR BERGER: When you say you followed the progress of the attack, that was also from Nietverdiendt?
MR McPHERSON: No, no, the messages from Nietverdiendt was relayed straight to Speskop in Pretoria, the Special Forces operational room.
MR BERGER: And who was there monitoring the progress of the attack?
MR McPHERSON: I think Gen Kat Liebenberg was there and Alfie Saag, yes.
MR BERGER: Why were you there?
MR McPHERSON: I was part of the operation.
MR BERGER: Was Craig Williamson also there?
MR McPHERSON: I think he came later that evening, yes. I think he came around. I and some of my staff of the Africa Desk were there.
MR BERGER: And Johan Coetzee, was he also there?
MR McPHERSON: No.
MR BERGER: Johan van der Merwe?
MR McPHERSON: No.
MR BERGER: Barry Gilder you say was a target initially, because of his MK activities?
MR McPHERSON: Yes, he was involved with the SNS, the Solidarity News Service they used for propaganda purposes. They presented a bulletin, I think on a monthly basis, and other leaflets and propaganda material. And then Barry Gilder at his home he a computer, sources of the ANC that had to bring in information came to his home or met secretly and the information he obtained he put on floppy disk and coded it and then this was taken by courier to the Lusaka Head Office, where it was decoded. So that was an intelligence, part of the ANC Intelligence structure from Botswana.
MR BERGER: No. I've drawn a clear distinction in my questions throughout between political activities of the ANC and military activities of the ANC, and until now the answers have been consistent, that political activities were not targeted in this attack, it was only military activities that were being targeted in this attack. Do you confirm that?
MR McPHERSON: Yes.
MR BERGER: So then why was Barry Gilder considered a target?
MR McPHERSON: I think he was also a member of the Special Operations section ...(intervention)
MR BERGER: Of MK?
MR McPHERSON: Of MK, yes.
MR BERGER: Okay. But despite that, he was excluded because of the presence of his wife and children?
MR McPHERSON: Actually the two children.
MR BERGER: Thank you, I have no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR BERGER
ADV STEENKAMP: No questions, thank you Mr Chair.
NO QUESTIONS BY ADV STEENKAMP
MR CORNELIUS: No re-examination, thanks.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr McPherson, you're excused.
MR McPHERSON: Thank you very much.
WITNESS EXCUSED
CHAIRPERSON: We now come to the stage where we have one more applicant left, but we can't proceed with him. Mr Visser, have you to any other witnesses to call?
MR VISSER: No Chairperson, we don't intend leading any further witnesses.
MR CORNELIUS: I don't have, thank you Chair.
CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)
MR BERGER: I have many witnesses that I intend calling.
CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)
MR BERGER: I estimate that my witnesses are going to take about three days.
CHAIRPERSON: Three days?
MR BERGER: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: How many have you got?
MR BERGER: Chairperson, I can't give you a specific number, but I'm looking between five and ten.
CHAIRPERSON: Okay. I just want to point out to you, or remind you about the Act says. If they're going to testify on the merits, you can call as many as you think you need to, but if they're going to be called as victims just to come and say certain things then maybe you've got to get representative witnesses, instead of calling everybody.
MR BERGER: No Chairperson, I'm not intending to lead witnesses like the witnesses were lead in the Maseru raid, I intend leading on the merits. It may only be around five.
CHAIRPERSON: I'm told that with the pressures on the TRC to finish their work, we're going to have to get a date that suits most. We all are just going to have to fall in with that, and I'm asking all the representatives, is it acceptable that we liaise with representatives' offices to determine that date and not having to re-serve notices and all that? Are we all happy about that? Well in due course then the office will contact the various offices.
MR VISSER: Chairperson, just before you rise, may I just draw attention to a decision that was taken on the 6th of February of last year, during the meeting which was held - I can't remember whether my learned friend was there, but where Justice Wilson presided and Mr Malan was present and one of the important decisions that were taken there was in regard to victims who wished to oppose and who wished to present evidence, as well as all other persons, statements in writing have to be prepared and given to the other side well in advance, so as in order not to surprise those people, so as to cut down on possible postponements. And in this case it seem imminent that that must happen, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Have you got any objections to that, Mr Berger?
MR BERGER: I have no objections, subject to the proviso that my learned friend will know that a lot of the evidence that he led during this week was not contained in the amnesty applications and he expanded a lot, subject to the rider that we can expand, the essential points of the evidence will be contained in the statements.
CHAIRPERSON: Well I think that's the understanding, it has to be.
MR BERGER: I have no objection.
CHAIRPERSON: Will you people just meet and if you can, work out time limits and whatever.
MR BERGER: Yes, we'll do that.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, this matter is adjourned till some future date.
HEARING ADJOURNS TO A DATE TO BE ARRANGED
