CHAIRPERSON: Ms Lockhat, have you been able to establish the whereabouts of the victims, relatives?

MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, we've been very fortunate that we have located the relatives of the deceased which was Carl Marx and Kruschev. Their names were Schoeman Ramokgopa. He was Carl Marx. And Solomon Mlonsi, who is Kruschev.

We have here Norman Ramokgopa, the brother of Carl Marx and Daphne Makubela, the sister of Carl Marx. We have the mother, Phuleng Joyce Swartbooi, the mother of Kruschev.

CHAIRPERSON: Phuleng who, Swartbooi?

MS LOCKHAT: Joyce Swartbooi. Chairperson, this morning I have spoken to the relevant victims. I've explained the incident to them and I've explained who the applicants are. I've explained to them that there's one more applicant in this matter.

CHAIRPERSON: Two.

MS LOCKHAT: Two, that is correct. Thank you, Chairperson. And I've explained their rights to them, and Chairperson, they've given me instructions to represent them.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MS LOCKHAT: The issues on which we'll basically represent them is the issue of full disclosure, in a sense. So that's basically it, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. What I'm going to say will be addressed to Norman Ramokgopa, Daphne Makubela, Phuleng Swartbooi.

On behalf of the Amnesty Committee, we wish to welcome you to these proceedings and tender our humble apologies for not having facilitated your attendance to these hearings much earlier. Eight policemen have come forward to accept responsibility for the killing of your loved ones. I have already been advised by our Evidence Leader, Ms Lockhat, that the basis on which these applications have been made have been explained to you.

This Committee is charged with a duty of hearing evidence from persons who confess to having committed offences such as these policemen have done. In terms of our Act, you as the relatives of the deceased must be informed of the date, the place and the fact of the hearing. In your case unfortunately, we did not do so because our Investigative Unit did not or could not trace your whereabouts timeously.

This Committee was told that your whereabouts are unknown, so we proceeded to hear these applications on the basis of that information. We were only given this information through the assistance of Mr Visser, who is representing the eight policemen. That is how we came to know of where you are staying. And upon finding our about your whereabouts we made all attempts to facilitate your attendance here.

You will now be given an opportunity to be part of these proceedings, even though we have now come to a tail end. You will nevertheless be in a position to hear the evidence of the two remaining applicants, who also are confessing to the killing of your loved ones. This we hope will go a long way, not so much in assuaging your pain of having lost your loved ones, but in better equipping you to deal with your pain, with a view to taking those difficult but necessary steps towards healing, strengthened by the fact that you at last know what you have always known but could not prove, about who killed your loved ones, why and how they were killed.

You at least have now today seen with your very own eyes those who are confessing to having committed this gruesome act. You at last can be in a position to go to the exact spot. They've been kind enough to give us details of this nature, of where your sons' souls were unfortunately taken and at last you can through your traditional rituals, bring their souls back to your homes and at last you may now be comforted that their souls by this act, will rest in peace.

The process we are dealing with is about uncovering the truth about our painful past and it is hoped in so doing we can add more pillar to the bridge that has already been built to bring our previously divided society together, so that we as South Africans can at last be reconciled with one another.

We will now proceed to hear the application of Mr van Zyl I presume, Mr Visser? And we hope that through the evidence that we'll hear from Mr van Zyl, even though you were not here previously, you will be put in a better picture than you've been before about this incident involving your loved ones. I thank you.

Mr Visser?

MR VISSER: May it please you, Madam Chairperson. Perhaps three aspects in regard to what you have said, and particularly from the point of view of the victims. Perhaps they might be informed of the fact that the inquest was held in Thabazimbi, and we've got the inquest case numbers 1, 2 and 3 of 1983. They might be able to trace, if they don't know already, and I don't know what the facts are, but if they don't know where the bodies of the two victims are, where they were buried, you have heard that normally in such cases, those people were buried in paupers' graves. We know that as part of the history of this country. But they could possibly trace it through the Investigative Unit, through Thabazimbi Magistrate's Court, on those serial numbers and they might be able to establish where their loved ones were buried, if they don't know so yet. Because we don't know whether they may have received them, although it's doubtful. That's the one point.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I'm advised that our Investigative Unit, at least insofar as that is concerned, they have attended to it and the exhumations will be carried out in due course.

MR VISSER: They've actually found the graves?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VISSER: Oh well that's wonderful.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, the other thing is, as far as the victims' families are concerned, Ms Lockhat informed me that they are not opposing the application, they are basically leaving it in the discretion of the Committee. Perhaps Ms Lockhat can just confirm that.

MS LOCKHAT: That is indeed correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And lastly, Chairperson, and I mention this because I will follow your lead in this regard, the two witnesses who are now going to testify really had nothing to do with the whole thing except that they were present and participated. It might be appropriate for me, when I address you in argument, just to give a brief summary of the facts in general so that the relations can hear what the evidence has been before you.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, you may do so at an appropriate stage.

MR VISSER: Thank you.

ADV DE JAGER: I believe Ms Lockhat has also already explained to them to a large extent.

MR VISSER: Perhaps I should put it this say, that I offer my assistance in case it's needed in that regard.

CHAIRPERSON: We appreciate that, Mr Visser.

MR VISSER: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: But Ms Lockhat will be in a position to give us a better indication. We will allow Mr van Zyl to give evidence to the extent that his participation is material and at least the victims will hear, even if he had a minimal role to play, at least they are part of the proceedings.

MR VISSER: Yes. With your leave we then call Superintendent van Zyl.

ADV DE JAGER: Your full names please.

GIDEON JACOBUS VAN ZYL: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct)

MR VISSER: Exhibit K.

CHAIRPERSON: I'm trying to find my van Zyl affidavit.

MR VISSER: Yes, it's Exhibit K. In bundle 11, it's page 7 to 14. The actual incident is dealt with at page 8, very briefly. Mr van Zyl basically referred to du Preez Smit, whom you're already heard.

Mr van Zyl, ...(intervention)

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: If I then may proceed, Chairperson.

Mr van Zyl, you are an applicant in this matter which involves the Silent Valley incident, wherein three persons were killed, is that correct?

MR VAN ZYL: Yes, that's correct.

MR VISSER: You have compiled an affidavit which you request to be incorporated with your evidence, that is Exhibit K which has been served before the Committee, and from page 1 until 21 of Exhibit K, you have not only provided your personal circumstances and police career details, but as well as details of your personal background, the struggle of the past, your political motivations and so forth, as well as on page 26 to 28, do you confirm this insofar as your knowledge goes, that this is true and correct with regard to the content of those pages and paragraphs?

MR VAN ZYL: Yes, that's correct.

MR VISSER: Mr van Zyl, if we could just get to page 22, there you deal with the Silent Valley incident. Just before we proceed with the facts of the matter,

you informed me that at a stage you left the police and later rejoined, how long before this incident did you rejoin the police?

MR VAN ZYL: Two days.

MR VISSER: So you had been back with the police for two days when this incident occurred, and what was your rank?

MR VAN ZYL: I was a Sergeant.

MR VISSER: What were you doing, according to your recollection, on the 4th of May 1983?

MR VAN ZYL: As far as I can recall, Chairperson, Nieuwenhuis and Marais and I at that stage were together I think. We were in the process of investigating an infiltration of another group and we were in the vicinity to monitor that.

MR VISSER: To monitor that?

MR VAN ZYL: Yes, that's correct.

MR VISSER: Was this the PAC group which has been mentioned earlier?

MR VAN ZYL: Yes.

MR VISSER: And what happened while you were busy with your monitoring?

MR VAN ZYL: We received an order that we were to go to this point where the incident took place at Silent Valley. We were to move in the direction of Silent Valley where we would meet the rest of the people.

MR VISSER: Yes, and in paragraph 69 on page 23, you say that you went with numerous members of the Security Branch. We will not discuss the scene once again, but you state there that there was a steel gate which closed part of the road and that you closed off the rest of the road with branches and stones and that was done in order to apprehend the vehicle.

MR VAN ZYL: Yes, that's correct.

MR VISSER: What was your order at that stage?

MR VAN ZYL: At that stage, General Steyn was still on the scene and his order was that we were to attempt to arrest three ANC infiltrators.

MR VISSER: Is that all which was said to you with regard to the three persons who were coming in?

MR VAN ZYL: That is the only knowledge which I had.

MR VISSER: In your affidavit, in paragraph 72, according to your recollection you have mentioned the names of certain people that you can recall being there. You know that there were numerous other members and we know who they were, so we don't have to pause there.

MR VAN ZYL: I agree with you.

MR VISSER: Did Colonel Steyn, or presently General Steyn remain at the scene all the time?

MR VAN ZYL: As far as my recollection goes after the decision was taken that we were to attempt to arrest the insurgents, he left the scene.

MR VISSER: So he left the scene. And you knew, as you say in paragraph 73, that these would be armed MK members?

MR VAN ZYL: That is what was conveyed to us.

MR VISSER: And in 74 you state that your information was that they would jump over the fence. That is an expression which was used to indicate that they would cross the border illegally at another place than the border post.

MR VAN ZYL: Yes, that's correct.

MR VISSER: And that they would then be transported in a red Toyota bakkie.

MR VAN ZYL: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Very well. If we can go to page 24. In 76 you explain the order and that you would be in two groups on both sides of the road or the gate, that would be west and east according Steyn's instructions? - paragraph 76.

MR VAN ZYL: That's correct.

MR VISSER: And that he then departed as you've already stated. Who was the person who then assumed command on the grounds of seniority at the scene after Steyn had left?

MR VAN ZYL: Brigadier Loots, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: What did you do then, can you just tell us in your own words?

MR VAN ZYL: We attempted to simulate the arrest by creating a simulation of how we would attempt to arrest these persons. As far as I know, Sakkie Marais, who was the furthest away from me on the driver's side of the vehicle was to confront the persons at the door. Danie Nieuwenhuis would be on the opposite side of him on the other side, on the passenger's side. Sakkie Marais I think would have been on the passenger's side and Danie Nieuwenhuis on the driver's side. My instruction was to jump on the back of the bakkie when it came to a pause and the passengers of these vehicles were to be arrested.

MR VISSER: And then you practised it, you jumped on the back of the bakkie?

MR VAN ZYL: That's correct.

MR VISSER: And what did you realise?

MR VAN ZYL: I had an essential problem with my own position as well as Marais' position. Should the passengers have opened fire or used a hand-grenade during the incident, Marais and I would have been in the direct line of fire from where the rest of the group were.

MR VISSER: And with the two groups on either side of the road, if they had opened fire, what would have happened then?

MR VAN ZYL: We would have shot at each other.

MR VISSER: Did you voice your protest?

MR VAN ZYL: Yes, I did, I objected.

MR VISSER: To whom did you object?

MR VAN ZYL: To Brigadier Loots.

MR VISSER: We know that discussions were then held between Brigadier Loots and Colonel Crause and Colonel Venter and Mr du Preez Smit as a result of this practise run and it was decided that this plan wouldn't work because it was too dangerous and that Brigadier Loots then gave the order that the passengers were to be killed as soon as they stopped at the roadblock and that they were no longer to be arrested.

MR VAN ZYL: That's correct.

MR VISSER: What was your personal sentiment about this change or order?

MR VAN ZYL: In my heart I was grateful because I knew immediately that this would give me the opportunity to spare my life.

MR VISSER: Yes. And at the scene, in paragraph 81, you say that there was a generator and there were people who were manning the generator and the idea was that as soon as the bakkie would arrive there, because it would be dark by then, not so?

MR VAN ZYL: That's correct.

MR VISSER: The generator would be switched on and that the lights would light up the whole area.

MR VAN ZYL: That's correct.

MR VISSER: And did it happen like that?

MR VAN ZYL: Yes, it did.

MR VISSER: And when the bakkie stopped, what happened?

MR VAN ZYL: We fired at them.

MR VISSER: I've omitted to ask you that when it was decided that the arrest would not take place the one group was moved over to the other side of the road?

MR VAN ZYL: That is correct, all of us were positioned on my right side of the road.

MR VISSER: That would be on the driver's side of the road, on the western side?

MR VAN ZYL: Yes, that's correct.

MR VISSER: Fire was opened on the bakkie, did you yourself fire any shots?

MR VAN ZYL: Yes, I did.

MR VISSER: Can you say how many shots you fired?

MR VAN ZYL: I'm not 100% certain.

MR VISSER: Yes. And you may have hit some of the passengers?

MR VAN ZYL: Yes.

MR VISSER: Just to explain, all of you were on the driver's side of the bakkie as it stopped?

MR VAN ZYL: That's correct.

MR VISSER: So in other words you would have to shoot past the driver in order to hit the passengers?

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Visser, wasn't there also evidence that people stood in front of the bakkie in the road?

MR VISSER: I'm speaking of this witness. I beg your pardon.

Perhaps you can recall, who was on the right-hand side of the bakkie with you? If you cannot recall just say so.

MR VAN ZYL: I think the persons whose names I've mentioned in my affidavit are the people that I recall prominently.

MR VISSER: That would be Nieuwenhuis and Marais?

MR VAN ZYL: That's correct.

MR VISSER: And when you were firing and attempting to hit the passengers, could you do this without hitting the driver?

MR VAN ZYL: That would have been very difficult.

MR VISSER: Why didn't you take up position on the other side of the bend? Why did you assume your actual position?

MR VAN ZYL: If my memory does not fail me, I think that was the part where the gate was. They had to stop at the gate and that was the closest that we could get to them.

MR VISSER: And that was on the inside of the bend?

MR VAN ZYL: Yes, that's correct.

MR VISSER: After the scene what did you do directly after the shooting stopped?

MR VAN ZYL: I received an order, I can't remember precisely from whom, but the order was to withdraw. I walked in the direction of the generator where we were to wait until the explosives or demolitions experts declared the scene safe and had cleared the scene.

MR VISSER: Before you moved away from the scene, did you look into the bakkie to see whether or not it was safe or whether the passengers had been killed?

MR VAN ZYL: I cannot recall that. I saw that there were many holes in the vehicle and that is all that I saw.

MR VISSER: As you've said in paragraph 84, that you did not investigate the presence of weapons or explosives in the bakkie.

MR VAN ZYL: That's correct.

MR VISSER: Do you know of any instructions to you or anybody else to take Russian weapons to the scene to plant on these people?

MR VAN ZYL: No, I have no knowledge of such an instruction.

MR VISSER: Did you yourself with your own eyes see any AK47s at the scene?

MR VAN ZYL: No, I didn't.

MR VISSER: We know that the bodies were later identified and we have been fortunate enough to have the next-of-kin of the MK members here today and we know that you later heard that there was a Botswana citizen whose name was Andries Moatshe.

MR VAN ZYL: That's correct.

MR VISSER: Were you aware of the fact, or were you aware of Andries Moatshe, of who he was, whether he was an informer for the Security Branch of the Western Transvaal?

MR VAN ZYL: Negative.

MR VISSER: What was your knowledge which you later gained regarding this Moatshe person?

MR VAN ZYL: I understood that he was a double-agent.

MR VISSER: You say that he was a collaborator and conspirator?

MR VAN ZYL: That's correct.

MR VISSER: That is the evidence-in-chief, thank you, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Visser. Mr du Plessis, do you have any questions to put to this witness?

MR DU PLESSIS: I have no questions, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Ms Lockhat?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS LOCKHAT: I just have one question.

Mr van Zyl, you said you received an order to go to the incident, who gave you these orders?

MR VAN ZYL: Chairperson, if I recall correctly I think I received the message from Colonel Crause.

MS LOCKHAT: Can you just explain to us what he said to you?

MR VAN ZYL: As far as I know at that stage, as I've mentioned at the beginning of my evidence, I was with Nieuwenhuis and Marais and he simply informed us that we were to go in the direction of Silent Valley and that they would meet us there.

MS LOCKHAT: So you were basically informed of your participation at the incident, at that place?

MR VAN ZYL: That is entirely correct.

MS LOCKHAT: Thank you, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. You are excused, Mr van Zyl.

MR VAN ZYL: Thank you, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: The next and last witness in this incident is Superintendent Isak Johannes Marais, who is present with his own tie today. That would be Exhibit L. They have apparently been circulated by my attorney.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

MR VISSER: Yes, they would not be marked at this stage. They follow K, so it would be L.

ADV DE JAGER: Your full names please.

ISAK JOHANNES MARAIS: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Chairperson, the application of this applicant you will find in bundle 11 at page 32 to 37. The actual incident is dealt with from page 33 onwards. It again is very brief and also refers to the application of Du Preez Smit.

Mr Marais, you have compiled an affidavit and signed the affidavit, is that correct?

MR MARAIS: That's correct.

MR VISSER: And in that affidavit you discuss your personal circumstances, your police career and so forth as well as the struggle of the past and the political considerations, from page 1 up to and including page 9, is that correct?

MR MARAIS: Yes, that's correct.

MR VISSER: And do you confirm the truth and correctness thereof, of that Exhibit L, as far as your knowledge goes?

MR MARAIS: Yes, that's correct.

MR VISSER: At the time of the incident on the 4th of May, what was your rank?

MR MARAIS: I was a Sergeant.

MR VISSER: You and van Zyl were apparently Sergeants. I think that was on the lower level of the rank order.

MR MARAIS: That's correct.

MR VISSER: If we could just page to page 19. You have heard what van Zyl testified according to that which you were busy with when you received the radio message, do you recall this, do you agree with this?

MR MARAIS: Yes, I agree with that.

MR VISSER: And that which was said to you at the scene about the persons who were coming in, as his evidence went?

MR MARAIS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Regarding Andries Moatshe you were later informed about his status, what was it?

INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone is not on.

MR MARAIS: Only at a later stage.

MR VISSER: And what did you hear?

MR MARAIS: I heard that he was an ANC collaborator.

MR VISSER: Now on that evening there were a number of members at the place to which you were called.

MR MARAIS: That's correct.

MR VISSER: And according to your recollection you have given the names of those persons that you recall.

MR MARAIS: That's correct.

MR VISSER: You say in 71 what you were told, that there would be armed MK members and in paragraph 73 you explain what happened when you arrived at the scene and the order which you received when you arrived there.

MR MARAIS: That's correct.

MR VISSER: Who was in command when you arrived at the scene?

MR MARAIS: At that stage it was General Steyn, who was the most senior member at the scene.

MR VISSER: Yes, and what was your order?

MR MARAIS: Our order was that as soon as the persons arrived there in their vehicle we were to arrest them.

MR VISSER: And branches and stands and a gate were placed across the road in order to apprehend the vehicle.

MR MARAIS: That's correct.

MR VISSER: What did Steyn do then?

MR MARAIS: Colonel Steyn and the Branch Commander left he area at that stage.

MR VISSER: Who was the commander?

MR MARAIS: Jan Truter. They went to undertake observations, to monitor the movement of the vehicle to be able to determine when it would arrive at the place where we had set up the roadblock.

MR VISSER: And what did you do?

MR MARAIS: In the meantime we practised the exercise of arresting the persons when the vehicle was to have stopped there and how to arrest these person.

MR VISSER: Yes. And at that stage you would have been divided into two groups on either side of the road, west and east?

MR MARAIS: Yes, that's correct.

MR VISSER: And what did you then realise when you began to practise the exercise?

MR MARAIS: Sergeant Nieuwenhuis and van Zyl objected and said that this was a very dangerous operation because should a shooting incident take place we could be casualties of this shooting incident.

MR VISSER: And over and above this you were also on both sides of the road, what would happen once you started firing at the vehicle?

MR MARAIS: We would have fired at each other and we may have killed each other during the process.

MR VISSER: We know that there was a discussion and that a change of order took place, Brigadier Loots said that everybody was to move over to the one side of the road and leave the arrest and simply open fire as soon as the vehicle stopped.

MR MARAIS: That's correct.

MR VISSER: And what did you feel about that order?

MR MARAIS: I was grateful because I felt that my own life was more important and it was not placed in as much jeopardy.

MR VISSER: To which side of the road did you move?

MR MARAIS: Initially I would have participated in the arrest on the passenger's side, but we all moved over to the western side so that all of us would be on the driver's side of the vehicle.

MR VISSER: Was there any reason that you recall, for the fact that you were not positioned on the other side of the road, in other words on the eastern side of the road?

MR MARAIS: Not specifically, but if remember correctly regarding the environment there was too little shelter on the opposite side of the road and if we had become involved in that shooting incident we all would have been injured.

MR VISSER: The vehicle arrived, it stopped and you opened fire?

MR MARAIS: That's correct.

MR VISSER: Did you yourself fire any shots?

MR MARAIS: Yes.

MR VISSER: Do you know how many shots you fired?

MR MARAIS: No, not exactly, but quite a few shots.

MR VISSER: There were three persons in the bakkie, according to paragraph 80.

MR MARAIS: Yes, that's correct.

MR VISSER: And they were killed there?

MR MARAIS: That's correct.

MR VISSER: Did you investigate the presence of any weapons in the bakkie?

MR MARAIS: No, we had to withdraw first and after the demolitions experts had cleared the area we were allowed to return to the scene.

MR VISSER: And what did you see?

MR MARAIS: I saw a bag with hand-grenades and a firearm.

MR VISSER: Why type of firearm?

MR MARAIS: I'm not certain what sort of weapon it was, but it was a hand weapon.

MR VISSER: Did you receive any order to take any Russian weapons to the scene to plant on the deceased?

MR MARAIS: Negative, at no stage.

MR VISSER: Did you see any other Russian weapons in the vicinity?

MR MARAIS: No.

MR VISSER: Apart from those which you saw in the bakkie.

MR MARAIS: That's correct.

MR VISSER: With regard to the deceased, with which vehicle did you travel there?

MR MARAIS: I had a Toyota 4X4 bakkie, which was my official state vehicle which I used to undertake my investigations with.

MR VISSER: Can you say how the bodies of the deceased were removed from the scene?

MR MARAIS: After the bodies had been removed from the red Toyota bakkie they were loaded onto the back of my bakkie. I can't recall exactly who loaded the bodies onto the bakkie, but they left in my bakkie.

MR VISSER: You didn't drive the bakkie?

MR MARAIS: No.

MR VISSER: And you can't recall who was the person who drove your bakkie away from the scene?

MR MARAIS: No.

MR VISSER: What did you hear later with regard to the further transport of the bodies?

MR MARAIS: I recall that they struggled to get the state mortuary vehicle and they would have met each other halfway and carried over the bodies.

MR VISSER: You can remember that, that the hearse, the state hearse would have met the bakkie halfway and at that point they would have loaded the bodies over into the state hearse?

MR MARAIS: That's correct.

MR VISSER: You heard that there was a post-mortem inquest, but you know nothing further about it?

MR MARAIS: That's correct.

MR VISSER: Was it Rustenburg or Thabazimbi?

MR MARAIS: Rustenburg.

MR VISSER: And we know now who the persons were, we know what the identification of all the persons is and you are applying for amnesty for your share in these events?

MR MARAIS: That's correct.

MR VISSER: That concludes the evidence-in-chief, thank you, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Visser. Mr du Plessis, do you have any questions to put?

MR DU PLESSIS: I have no questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Ms Lockhat?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS LOCKHAT: I just have one question, Chairperson.

Did you see the hand-grenades in the bag? Was that after the demolitions experts were there?

MR MARAIS: Yes, after they had cleared the area and removed the bodies or after we had been removed from the scene I moved closer and saw the bag of hand-grenades with the passenger on the extreme left of the vehicle.

MS LOCKHAT: So after the incident you didn't look at the bakkie, it was just the bag of weapons that you saw after the incident, is that correct?

MR MARAIS: I myself was not permitted to work with the vehicle because I was not suitably trained to undertake this work.

MS LOCKHAT: Thank you, Chairperson, no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Ms Lockhat. Mr Visser, that should conclude your applications.

MR VISSER: Indeed it does, thank you, Chairperson. May this witness be excused?

CHAIRPERSON: He may be excused. Mr Marais, you are excused.

MR MARAIS: Thank you, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: As far as the continuation is concerned, would you like me to argue straight away?

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Lockhat, you have earlier on advised the Committee that there was no indication from the victims of wanting to address us, is that so?

MS LOCKHAT: That is correct, Chairperson, but I think I should just check again with them after they've heard all the evidence. I just feel a bit ...

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, you may do so. We'll give you a second to do so. We will not adjourn.

MS LOCKHAT: Thank you, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: May I be excused for a moment while she does that?

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Lockhat?

MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, Ms Swartbooi, the mother of Kruschev would just like to address the Commission, just to say a few words as to what she feels.

CHAIRPERSON: The mother of Solomon Mlonsi?

MS LOCKHAT: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Who is referred to in our documents as Kruschev?

MS LOCKHAT: That is correct, Chairperson.

Ms Swartbooi, can you just tell the Commission what you want to tell us today?

MS SWARTBOOI: I want to ask these people who were testifying here today as to whether for them to be able to identify Moatshe. How were they able to get in contact with Moatshe? I want to know again as to whether the place where these children were killed, where were they taken to, which place because I need the remains of my child. I want the remains to be exhumed so that we will be able to give them a decent funeral.

Secondly, when the police are on duty why was it possible that they should kill these people, because they were supposed to arrest them not kill them. Do they know that they killed my child, the only child whom God blessed me with.

CHAIRPERSON: We will take a short adjournment for 10 minutes.

CHAIRPERSON: I've already in my opening remarks before opening these hearings to proceed today, already alluded to the fact that as soon as we became aware that you could be traced we made a ruling in the interest of reconciliation because we are also required by our Act to be compassionate, particularly to the victims, to ensure that your attendance is secured before these proceedings in respect of these of these applications could be concluded.

It is most unfortunate that you were not here from the beginning because maybe you may have been in a better picture to know exactly what happened to your loved ones.

We nevertheless hope that even though you are coming now, the fact that you are able to see the people who are accepting responsibility for the killing of your child, will help you in assuaging your pain that you have been suffering for all these many years. The fact that you will now know where his soul was taken and you will be in a position to go and conduct what I know to be a very important requirement, the traditional ritual to go and reclaim his soul, so that you can bring it back to your home, you will be able to also rest in peace.

We cannot do much about your pain, but we hope that this truth that has now been uncovered, that we have established will enable you to take the most difficult step in dealing with your pain. You have our empathy. We will now give an opportunity to Ms Makubela to also say something to the Committee.

MS MAKUBELA:  What I wanted to ask is that as Steyn has taken them to where they were supposed to be killed, I learnt that Marais said that it was a dangerous operation. I don't know how to ask them as to why that even to these children it was dangerous to them. They don't know as to whether they were going to their homes or not. For them to use guns, why was it for them to kill ...(end of side A of tape)

... I'm directing my question to Mr Marais that he shot many times, though he doesn't know how many times he shot. And again he was afraid to come closer to these children because he said they were dangerous. Were these children not in danger at the time? And then again the car which they were in was used again to transport the corpses. Why does he say he doesn't know where these corpses were taken to?

And then, how did they contact the mortuary? They knew that when they were going to kill them which mortuary they were going to be taken to. They knew everything about this plan. How are we able to forgive them if they don't show us where they killed then and again where they were buried, so that we will be able to do our ritual so that we'll be able to collect their spirits and bring them home. How would we know where they are? We want them to explain to us because nobody, all of them don't know how many times they shot, but they know that they shot.

These people were three and they were eight. Why they did not try to arrest these people I want to know, why should they kill? They received information how many people were coming, why was it possible for them to kill, because the Lord doesn't allow you to kill.

I don't believe that among them, meaning the police, one of them was injured or killed and we don't know where our sons are.

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Makubela, you have expressed a need to know about the remains of your child, the remains of your brother. This Committee had laboured under the impression that Ms Lockhat had already advised you that the Investigative Unit of the Commission has already established where these remains are and we had actually laboured under the impression that you had already been contacted to be informed that the process of exhuming the remains of your loved ones were about to take place. The person who is sitting next to you is our Investigator, who is charged exclusively with a duty of establishing the remains of people such as your loved ones and after having established that information, to inform you of his findings and make arrangements with you with a view to enable you to go and take the remains of your loved ones.

I know that in our custom - and I say this as an African, until a ritual of having to reclaim the soul of your loved ones has been performed, you as relatives can never find peace. And I had hoped that at least with regard to this issue that you have been contacted. If you have been so contacted, may it be my duty to tell you that in due course the Investigator will be coming to you and arrangements will be made that you accompany them to exhume the bones of your loved ones and conduct the necessary ritual.

The remarks I've expressed before after Ms Swartbooi addressed this Committee, I would like them to apply to you. We hope that somehow through God's strength you will be able to assuage your pain. It is a difficult process. We cannot by coming here expect you to be reconciled to all these difficult problems.

Unfortunately we cannot answer the questions that you have posed, those questions have already been answered when the other applicants who really had a major role in the decision to kill your sons and the method of operation that would be used to so kill them. When they gave evidence they advanced reasons why they had to decide to do so.

A record will be made available to you so that you yourselves can look at the record and satisfy yourself as to the reasons already advanced. We also hope that Ms Lockhat will again take her time to go through that record with a view to answering the questions that you have pertinently posed relating to the killing of your sons.

You are going to be here until this matter finally gets concluded. It will be so concluded once we hear argument from the legal representatives of the applicants. Without suggesting what they should be saying, I think it's common cause that as they argue the law they will touch upon some of the issues that you have raised in their arguments.

We trust that somehow that will also enable you to be in a better position than you are now. Thank you very much for your presence, we appreciate it very much. We will take a tea adjournment and we'll come back at twenty five to twelve. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, are you going to start first?

MR VISSER ADDRESSES COMMITTEE: I will commence, Chairperson. Chairperson, this is an application in regard to the Silent Valley incident. We are not in the fortunate position to know exactly what the identity of the victims, all three of them, were and we know that Carl Marx was a person by the name of Schoeman Skhwiri: S-K-H-W-I-R-I Ramokgopa:

R-A-M-O-K-G-O-P-A and that Kruschev was a person by the name of Kelvin Khakasa - have I got this right? -

K-H-A-K-A-S-A.

MR LAX: Mr Visser, in fact his name was Solomon Mlonsi.

MR VISSER: Sorry, I thought I was wrong. It's Solomon Mlonsi. And that is in accordance with what was published in Dawn, which was attached to Exhibit C, the affidavit of Brigadier Loots.

There are eight applicants. We appear for seven, but you could probably conveniently group all eight together, their versions are virtually identical.

For the sake of the families, family relations of the deceased, and I'm not talking about Mr Moatshe now, about the others, we will very briefly repeat some of the evidence, but if I may - perhaps I should just do that first.

Very briefly, what happened was on the 4th of May, Mr Crause was contacted by an official at the Derdepoort border post and he was told that there was a person who wished to speak to him.

He went to the Derdepoort border post together with du Preez Smit and he there met Mr Venter, who already obtained amnesty in this matter, a client of my learned friend, Mr du Plessis, as well as the person, Andries Moatshe. He explained that Moatshe was not a previous informer of the Security Police, but that Crause himself had previously warned Moatshe that he was aware from what he had been told by other informers, that Moatshe was supportive of cadres and thereby also of the ANC/SACP alliance.

On that day, Moatshe told Crause that he was asked by members of the ANC to assist in the infiltration of two armed MK cadres who were going to infiltrate on that particular evening. I see that one of the family relations has a problem with ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I'm aware of that, I thought my secretary had attended to that. You may proceed, Mr Visser, we've been assured that there is no problem.

MR VISSER: ... that two MK cadres were going to infiltrate and that he was asked to assist them in the RSA to transport them to a certain destination.

Leaving aside side issues, what happened then was Crause contacted the Divisional Commander of the Western Transvaal, Mr Steyn, Steyn and Loots then went to the Derdepoort border post where they spoke to Crause and where they were informed. It was then decided by Steyn that a roadblock had to be set up at a convenient spot and that the Security Police had to arrest all three the people who came in into the RSA.

Du Preez Smit was then asked on a radio to choose a spot which would be convenient to erect a roadblock. He chose a spot. This spot is on the road from Derdepoort border post in the direction of Mariko, where that road joins with the Dwaalboom Road. There appears to be a bend in the road and just after the bend in the road there was a gate, an old gate, which they used to erect a barricade.

We were told by one of the witnesses who had been to the scene later after the event, that the road there has been altered, so that we don't know at this stage whether that gate might still be there as a point of reference for anyone who wants to go there now, but it should be fairly easy to find the exact spot.

On the scene - various other members, comprising of inter alia the other applicants before you, Madam Chairperson, who were then summoned to go to this particular point where General Steyn ordered that those present had to be divided into two groups, one on each side of the road, so that when the vehicle came to a stop as it had to do in front of the gate, an arrest could be effected.

He then left together with Jan Truter in order to go closer to the border to monitor the movement of the vehicle which they knew would be a red Toyota LDV.

After Steyn had left, the person left behind at the scene practised in order to ascertain whether there are any problems with the plan to arrest the infiltrators and in the process of the exercises they realised that for various reasons the plan to arrest could not be practically executed because of the danger, which was inherent in the plan, to the members of the Security Force, of the Security Police.

There were complaints by some of the subordinates and four people, Loots, Venter, Crause and du Preez Smit, who were the most senior officers on the scene discussed the matter and they together decided that to arrest was not a proposition and it was too dangerous and therefore Loots as the senior officer on the scene gave the instruction that once the vehicle transporting the two MK cadres stopped at the gate they had to open fire and shoot to kill.

The group on the eastern side was moved over to the western side, that would be on the side where the driver of the vehicle would have been, as we now know was Mr Moatshe, and that was done in order to avoid that when they started firing that policemen would not fire at each other and get caught in the crossfire.

The reason why it was dangerous was that at that particular spot there was insufficient cover for them to hide in order to attempt an arrest while hiding behind, for example trees or whatever. And you've heard, Chairperson and Members of the Committee, from one of the witnesses to say that all that there was a little furrow on the inside of the road, that will be on the western side, which was created by the graders when they graded the dirt road.

The other problem was that the only hiding place being on the side of the road, brought them very close to the vehicle itself after it had stopped and it was foreseen that if a hand-grenade was thrown out of the vehicle one or more of the Security Police would either be injured and probably killed.

Broadly speaking, those are the reasons why it was then decided to eliminate them. They were also aware of the fact that the two people who came in were going to be armed. As it turned out, the LDV arrived, the occupants were shot and killed and after the incident there was evidence that inside the bakkie, on the laps of the two MK cadres, there were three hand-grenades each, two defensive and one offensive hand-grenade and that some of the hand-grenades or all of them, we're not sure, were already primed for use.

CHAIRPERSON: Does it really matter what was discovered? The basis of the decision was on the information from the informant.

MR VISSER: That is correct, but ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: That he was bringing in armed insurgents.

MR VISSER: Yes, but you will recall that Ms Makubela asked the specific question: why if there eight policemen did they kill the three people in the motorcar? And Ms Swartbooi specifically asked why had these insurgents to be killed an not arrested, what possible danger could they have been? And it's from that point of view that I just mentioned that.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but Captain Loots had been informed, or Mr Crause had already been informed.

MR VISSER: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: ... that Mr Moatshe was bringing in armed insurgents. So when the decision was taken it was taken on the basis of that information, it didn't really matter what was later discovered in the car.

MR VISSER: Quite correct, yes. Quite correct, Chairperson, I'm just busy with, for the benefit of the family relations, just to mention these facts and then I'll go on to address you.

They were then killed and they were transported to Rustenburg and there was a legal inquest held in Thabazimbi. And that would conclude the facts broadly speaking.

MR VISSER IN ARGUMENT: If I may then address myself to the Committee. Chairperson, we submit that the best argument which we could put forward to you lies in the strength of the evidence which you've heard. We submit that you heard witnesses who went out of their way to try to recall and to try to assist in all possible ways, with a view of making a full and frank disclosure. There can be no doubt that all the witnesses that you heard, including Mr Smith, made a full disclosure to you.

There are two issues really in the matter and we will submit in a moment that they take the matter no further, one or the other way. And that concerns first of all the question of whether Moatshe was an informer or not and secondly, the issue of the possibility that there may have been Russian-made firearms to be planted on the insurgents.

As far as the first is concerned Chairperson, it really isn't an issue. The only person who was under that impression was Mr Venter. And really, in the light of Crause's evidence we submit with respect, that that evidence of Crause ought to be accepted, that he wasn't an informer, that this was the first occasion upon which Moatshe ever gave them information.

Crause, on the question by yourself, Chairperson, on why he would have done that, Crause related that back to the fact that he spoke to him and warned him before and he speculated as to why he might have done that. The fact of the matter is that the information of Moatshe was correct as it turned out, with hindsight.

The other aspect ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, if he wasn't an informer and had been warned before about his activities, why would the Security Police make elaborate plans and act on the information of somebody who they had no reason to believe?

MR VISSER: Well common sense would dictate the obvious answer, they could never take a chance of ignoring it. Security Policemen will tell you that they had been sent on wild goose chases more often than in terms of accurate information, for various reasons, but they could never dare ignore it.

CHAIRPERSON: But now here is a person who doesn't know Crause, as an informant asks for Mr Crause particularly, discloses an information that would be disclosed by an informer, not an ordinary Botswana citizen, but an informer.

MR VISSER: Madam Chair, how do we know what motivated him? The fact is he knew Crause, he knew Crause, Crause spoke to him before, he warned him. And Crause suggested to you that there was a possibility that he might have done so in order to protect himself against arrest once next he comes into the Republic of South Africa. That's a feasible explanation.

CHAIRPERSON: That's right, his explanation was that he probably was going to ask a favour of some kind. He was expecting some kind of a benefit.

MR VISSER: Precisely, it could also be, one doesn't know. He may have decided to turn his back on the ANC and become an informer and this might have happened later, how will we know?

CHAIRPERSON: But in such circumstances isn't it probably therefore for Mr Venter to believe that a person who comes with this kind of an information must be an informer.

MR VISSER: Yes, but we don't argue about that, in fact our witnesses have all conceded that he may have thought so and that's why I say that really isn't an issue, it's not an issue which should concern you.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

MR VISSER: Yes. The last submission on the evidence really relates to yet another aspect which Mr Venter mentioned, and his words were that they were given weapons to plant on the insurgents if necessary. He didn't tell you in his evidence at the time - I believe it was 1996 or 1997, who might have given them the firearms.

We submit with respect, that none of the witnesses who gave evidence before you knew of such an order although in honesty, Brigadier Loots told you that he did in fact see one. So you must assume that there was an AK47. And again, if that is so we are not able to say that Venter was entirely wrong in perhaps making an assumption that there was an order, because he probably also saw the AK47. And Loots wouldn't tell you that he saw an AK47 if there wasn't one, he actually explained to you where it was.

So apart from that, Chairperson, we would respectfully submit that there is no discrepancy in the evidence, none whatsoever. All that we have to show really is that there wasn't any material discrepancy, but we want to say that there wasn't any discrepancies in the evidence and that you will be safe to assume that what you heard here during these hearings was the full truth and nothing but the truth for so far as they could remember the issues.

Chairperson, I refer you to the written argument which I have already placed before you, from page 14 onwards we deal with general submissions ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

MR VISSER: Pardon?

CHAIRPERSON: Let's try and locate our documents, Mr Visser.

MR VISSER: I'm not going to go through it.

CHAIRPERSON: Oh.

MR VISSER: I'm not going to go through it at all. I've done so before and ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: We would prefer you to just make a reference, give us a page reference.

MR VISSER: Yes, from page 14 onwards. And Commissioner Lax has given the assurance through you that he will come up to speed, we assume that he has.

CHAIRPERSON: He definitely has. You don't know Mr Lax, it takes him a second ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: Yes, yes, we know Mr Lax and he didn't disappoint us in that regard.

Chairperson, so we submit that what we have submitted in the written argument as far as general submissions has been submitted over and over again and although no decision has been handed down by the Amnesty Committee either confirming or rejecting any of the submissions which we made, particularly in regard to the conflict of the past and the legal requirements, the Amnesty Committee has in effect and in practice acted in accordance with those submissions and really there's no point in us repeating them yet again before you, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: We heard you just two days ago, Mr Visser.

MR VISSER: Correct, except that Mr Lax didn't, but as you said he's up to speed.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, other than that you have already in bundle 1, the Amnesty Committee has given Mr Venter his amnesty. It was on the basis of the evidence stated in the paragraph at page 52. We submit that apart from the two aspects which we have raised and which we believe can easily be discounted, it is identical and with submission we say to you that if you had given Venter amnesty, then there is no reason why the present applicants, all eight of them, should not be granted amnesty. And we would ask you to grant such amnesty.

The form of the amnesty which we ask is for any act, omission or offence which could constitute a crime in regard to this incident, it would include murder or any other competent verdict and any other commission, or omission or offence committed after, either prior, during or after the incident. We don't believe that it is correct to try and set up a list as long as you grant amnesty in regard to that incident, which is properly identified as an incident on the 4th of May at a particular spot and we know who the victims were, there should be no problem at all if you gave amnesty in that form. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: So the only offence which has seemed to be clearly explained by your evidence is murder?

MR VISSER: Murder, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: In respect of all the applicants?

MR VISSER: Yes, or any competent ...

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VISSER: Yes. Thank you Chairperson, that concludes my argument. If there is anything you wish to hear me on specifically I'll gladly address you, but with respect, this is not an involved application in any sense and we would ask you to grant amnesty.

CHAIRPERSON: Would you just address us with regard to the order that was given by Captain Loots, in view of the fact that there had been an earlier order by General Steyn only to arrest.

MR VISSER: Yes, certainly.

CHAIRPERSON: I'm interested only in respect of that argument.

MR VISSER: Yes, certainly. I believe perhaps what you might be referring to are the requirements set out in Section 20(2)(b) read with Section 20(2)(f).

CHAIRPERSON: Precisely, (b) and (f).

MR VISSER: Yes. The situation here is that Steyn gave an order, as we know Loots changed that order. The immediate result or consequence of that would be no more than a departmental inquiry. If one however says no, but it goes further than that, it entails where previously people would have been arrested, them now being killed and one wishes to extract from that some sinister motive.

Our submissions are that no such sinister motive appears in the light his explanation to you about the danger to his men. Once you believe him, and there's no reason not to believe him as he was corroborated by even his junior officer, in particular van Zyl and Marais and Nieuwenhuis, that he acted reasonably, well then all ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: I don't think we're thinking it's sinister or whatever, it's only contrary to an express order of his senior, without consulting his senior he is changing the order. So that I think is the - did he have any authority to do so?

CHAIRPERSON: Before you proceed, let's go even further and put our problems pointedly. Did he have any authority to change a specific order to the order that he later took or issued?

MR VISSER: Well the answer to that would be twofold. The first argument would be that if a commanding officer in the field realises that an order which he has to carry out will in all probability lead to the death or injury of his men, with great respect we submit that it would be expected from him to do the right thing. We say that Loots did the right thing. But in the alternative if you say or if you think that he did not do the right thing for the reasons advanced by him, then the question that Commissioner de Jager has put to me becomes relevant because now the question is, what authority did you act under? The answer to that, Chairperson, is that in the whole of the amnesty process, as far as members of the Security Forces are concerned, you deal solely with situations where they acted outside authority, nobody had authority, as has been pointed out on many occasions. No member of the Security Force ever had authority to kill anyone, he acted outside the authority, but he believed reasonably that that was the way he had to act. And the principle applies equally as far as they apply to all amnesty applications, also to this incident.

CHAIRPERSON: That's not entirely true. With regard to the Cronje matters people were acting in terms of a general order given allegedly by people like Brigadier Viktor and Brigadier Schoon. That's the evidence that we have heard.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, I don't want to get into Jack Cronje and his applicants, but if you accept if that is true, what possible authority could Viktor or Schoon have to give such an order? ...(indistinct) they can't have that authority.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Visser, if I as a General put X in command of a certain situation, I'm instructing him to do this but to handle this situation, wouldn't it be implied that he would have the authority to change the procedures or, the only question would be whether it would also be implied that he could sort of take it quite a different line than that which he was expected to do?

MR VISSER: Yes, that ...(intervention)

MR LAX: Sorry, Mr Visser, if I could just come in for one sec before you answer. My difficulty hedges around what Mr de Jager has alluded to and that is there is a fundamental difference between everything connected with an arrest, which is a perfectly lawful normal operation in the normal course of any kind of implied or other explicit authority. Now that was the specific instruction, not eliminate, arrest, which has a whole range of implications that would follow that and which, in terms of the rational for it would be perfectly justifiable etc.

MR VISSER: ...(inaudible)

MR LAX: Absolutely. Now that authority was the authority that was given to Colonel Loots, as he then was at the time, to be in command of, that authority then shifted to an elimination and the issue is then, and I think this is where it's being raised, on what basis do we find the authority for the elimination from the original order to take charge of an arrest?

MR VISSER: The answer is on the basis of what Commissioner de Jager has just put to me. May I give you an example? The General in the field sends his second-in-command to go and torch a town, suspecting that in that in that town there are members of the enemy, of enemy personnel hiding in the houses. The subordinate goes, now being in command of this operation, and he enters the town, takes the town and now he's got to execute his order to burn the town, but before he starts torching the town he finds out that there are woman and children hiding in the houses, being kept for example as hostages by the enemy, and he decides I'm not going to burn the town, wouldn't that be as Commissioner de Jager - this is the mirror side of our situation, but the principle must be the same, isn't that in reality the truth of the situation as put by Commissioner de Jager?

When you have authority to deal with a situation on the ground, it can't be narrowly interpreted when things start happening. For example, Loots was ordered to arrest, let's assume for a moment the occupants of the car started firing, what then, wouldn't Loots then have the authority to say fire, shoot, shoot to kill? - obviously he would. So really, the differentiation between deciding beforehand we're not going to even try, and waiting, as was suggesting to some of the witnesses, to see whether they fire first, with the accompanying danger to the men. We submit with great respect that what Loots did was the correct thing and that he was acting within the bounds of his authority. But that's in terms of Section 22(b).

ADV DE JAGER: But isn't the facts of the case that whatever he did was condoned by the very General who gave him the order?

MR VISSER: That's the fourth point.

ADV DE JAGER: ...(indistinct) full knowledge ...(indistinct).

MR VISSER: That's the fourth argument.

CHAIRPERSON: Isn't that the crux, shouldn't that be the crux of your argument?

MR VISSER: Well there are four arguments, Chairperson. I was dealing with 22(b) and I was trying to explain to you that the reality on the ground gave them the authority, which is sufficient for 22(b). If you're not satisfied with that, then with great respect, he told you that he genuinely believed that he had that authority because of those facts on the ground. That's the second argument.

The third argument I've now forgotten. But certainly, at the end of the day back comes Steyn, he's confronted what has happened, but he immediately talks to Loots and Loots tells him what has happened and he says; you know if I let my mind go, if I had more time I would probably have come to the same conclusion, and I fully agree with what Loots did. Which brings us back to the question, isn't what Loots did at best to disobey an order which would have an internal consequence and not the consequence of an offence in public law?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Indeed from the evidence we heard coming from General Steyn, he approved.

MR VISSER: Yes, yes.

MR VISSER: And all his men said thank goodness. Certainly it's very difficult for us to site in the calmness of a room years later, 14 years later or whatever, and try to assimilate the situation which was there on the ground. But one must know that with hindsight, people in the bakkie had primed hand-grenades. So with hindsight, he made the correct decision, that much is clear.

CHAIRPERSON: But that's not important.

MR VISSER: But it's not important as you say.

CHAIRPERSON: And I keep on reminding you of that, that that aspect of evidence is not important for purposes of deciding whether he reasonably believed that he had authority, implied authority at least, to change the order. And your submission is that he reasonably believed that he such implied authority, for the reasons that you have already submitted.

MR VISSER: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: And further that in any event the whole operation was approved, his decision was approved by General Steyn and that's his evidence.

MR VISSER: And just to conclude that portion of the argument, Chairperson, the fact of authority to give an order, can either be given before or after by way of approval. So clearly you're correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, in terms of Section 23(e), that certainly, there is no suggestion that an approval has to be before or after, an approval is an approval.

MR VISSER: Sure, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: In this case it happened ex post facto.

MR VISSER: Yes.

MR LAX: Just one other aspect which occurs to me and which would in a sense strengthen your argument, and that was the issue of alternatives. They didn't see any other alternatives. In fact the evidence was quite clear that the alternative of, for example, postponing the operation just didn't occur to anybody. So their only alternative that they saw was the elimination alternative.

MR VISSER: I'm indebted to Commissioner Lax because actually I was going to mention that and I forgot, because the fact is that is was suggested by a Member of the Panel to one of the witnesses:

Well of course there was just never such a possibility because if you left those people, we know from what we know of the conflict of the past, what would have happened, people would have been killed in this country or maimed, damage to property. As MK commanders, we know that they were actually sent into the country to train others internally and there was no, it just wasn't an option just to let it go. As Commissioner Lax points out, there was also no way of postponing it because if they had to postpone it, if one had to speculate, assuming they took the gate away and they waited until this car passed, what would they then have done, they would have had to follow them and try to stop them with sirens etc. What happens then in that situation where people are ready with firearms and hand-grenades is there would have been a shoot-out, without a shadow of a doubt. So correct, it is our submission and a submission strongly made that there wasn't any other option, with respect.

CHAIRPERSON: And then what Commissioner Lax is suggesting is that there was no alternative to abandon the whole operation altogether.

MR VISSER: Well he's suggesting something different, he's suggesting that perhaps it should have been, could have been postponed or moved to another location, but we know that that wasn't on. But I'm taking it a bit further, I'm saying that you couldn't just let go and let these people move in and hope that you might arrest them later.

CHAIRPERSON: But the evidence before us is that they had no option, they did not want to exercise any option at all.

MR VISSER: That's right.

CHAIRPERSON: So that was hardly an issue. That is the evidence before us.

MR VISSER: That's right, yes.

MR LAX: Just to emphasise, I am saying that on the evidence before us, it never even occurred to any one of the applicants that there may be an alternative, there just was no alternative in their minds. So I'm not saying they should have thought of one, I'm ...(inaudible). On the evidence before us it's incontestable that there was any other alternative.

MR VISSER: No, no I did understand you correctly, Commissioner Lax and I'm trying to agree and I don't seem to be so correctly, but it wouldn't have occurred to them because there wasn't an option. You put it quite correctly, yes. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Lockhat do you wish to make - oh, Mr du Plessis, do you wish to make any submissions?

MR DU PLESSIS IN ARGUMENT: Yes please, Chairperson, on a few issues. May I perhaps just hand up to you copies of the, it's part of the Heads of Argument which I handed to the Committee which heard the amnesty application of Colonel Venter. Now I've made copies of those Heads of Argument and it's the extract of those Heads of Argument in relation to Colonel Venter's application, which I'm handing to you and I have drawn a line through those parts which are not relevant for purposes of Mr Smith's application at this hearing.

...(end of side B of tape)

... Heads of Argument, they make the points clearly and they deal mostly with the political motive. You will see that on the first page, it's paragraph 254, you will see the acts for which amnesty is sought and then on the next page, page 400, paragraph 254.2.1 - I just want to give you the page references to Mr Smith's application, if you could just include there, it's page 38 to 62 of the bundle which we are dealing with.

MR LAX: It's bundle 11.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Mr Lax. Bundle 11 and page 68 to 71. Now as I said I'm not going to deal with each and every requirement of the Act, I just want to deal with some of the issues which have been raised by my learned friend, Mr Visser in respect of this matter.

My client, Mr Smith, testified that he did not have any knowledge of the question of Moatshe having been an informer or not and I submit that he was of such a low rank that that would not have been something that he would have known of.

And then in respect of the planting of weapons he also made common cause with Mr Visser's applicants in that regard, he testified that he didn't know anything about it. And I submit that he was of such a rank that he would not have in any event known about it.

In respect of the last mentioned issue, the question of weapons having been planted, Colonel Venter testified in his application only once to that as far as I can determine, and he said:

Now one ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Smith doesn't anything about it.

MR DU PLESSIS: No, Smith doesn't know anything about it, Mr Chairman. I just want to make one submission pertaining to Colonel Venter's evidence in that regard as against Mr Visser's applicants, if I may.

One must remember that when Colonel Venter testified, and I know he received amnesty, I just want to make this one point, when he testified he testified in respect of this application alone. He did not, as far as I am aware, and I was involved when the preparation was done, have contact with the other applicants which you've heard and he did not have the benefit of his memory being ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: Isn't that a sort of dangerous argument now? We could then say that they've all sat together and worked out a story?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, Mr Chairman, the only point that I'm making is that one must bear in mind that Colonel Venter did not have the benefit of reading anybody else's application or anybody else's version before he testified, neither did he have the benefit of listening to other versions.

CHAIRPERSON: But he testified to facts which were within his personal knowledge.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: What more do you need other than that? You don't need to consult somebody to refresh your memory about something that resides within you, do you?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I'm not advancing the argument that Colonel Venter's testimony was wrong, I'm not advancing that argument.

CHAIRPERSON: We don't like the line of argument that you are taking now, it's taking us nowhere.

MR DU PLESSIS: Then I will leave it, Chairperson.

The last point that I wanted to raise - I wanted to come to the submission I wanted to make, but I'm going to leave it, Chairperson, I'm going to leave it there. The last point that I wanted to raise relates to the question of the order and there was reference by Mr Visser to the situation pertaining to the order.

Now I just want to make this submission and because it will arise in future again, I want to deal with it now.

CHAIRPERSON: Will it arise in future with regard to Mr Smith, Mr du Plessis? Because we'd like you to confine yourself to the evidence that's before us with regard to this incident, insofar as your client is concerned.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright. So you give me an indication, Chairperson, that in respect of Brigadier Viktor's order and everything flowing from that, that I mustn't address you on that.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, he didn't act on anything that had to do with Brigadier Viktor or anyone.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright.

CHAIRPERSON: The evidence before us is that he acted on the order of Captain Loots.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes. I however, Chairperson, was of the view that it may be something that I have to address at this hearing and maybe one will have to address it at a future stage, but I will leave it at that if you give me the indication that I shouldn't deal with that.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, you shouldn't deal with it unless you think it's of particular relevance and you are able to give us an indication of that relevance.

MR DU PLESSIS: The only possible relevance that it may have, and perhaps I can have an indication if I then should elaborate on that, is in respect of Mr Smith's participation in this operation. Mr Smith obviously accepted the orders that he received and in any event accepted that the actions, or that such orders would have been authorised from above, it wasn't in the mouth, and he testified to that, that he accepted the orders, was that any objection couldn't have been taken by him in that regard.

The only point that I want to make in respect of that, and perhaps that relates to the question of him having been reasonable under the circumstances, that there was an authority and with reference to Section 20(2)(f) ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Would that apply to a person of the rank of Mr Smith? Certainly that would apply to Captain Loots, in having to give an order.

MR DU PLESSIS: Well Chairperson, if you have regard to the Act, if you regard to the Act and you have regard to Section 20(2)(b) ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Only? I thought you ...(intervention)

MR DU PLESSIS: 20(2)(b).

CHAIRPERSON: 20(2)(b), yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: (b). It refers to a person who acted in the course and scope of his or her duties, specifically. Now the question arises, did the shooting of these terrorists under these circumstances, did that fall within the scope of Mr Smith's express or implied authority?

Now it is so that he received an order and that he had to execute the order, but if you come for instance to a finding that the order was tainted, if I can put it like that, in the sense that it wasn't an order that fell within the scope, ag it wasn't an action that fell within the scope of Colonel Loots' express or implied authority, the only questions that remains, would that have an influence on Mr Smith's situation?

Now one can argue on the one had that it will not, because it could still have fallen under his express or implied authority, but on the other hand one could then say that well, if the order is tainted right at the top, it stays tainted right down to the bottom and then Mr Smith has to rely on Section 20(2)(f). The question then becomes, did he have reasonable grounds to believe that he was acting in the course and scope of his duties.

And then if one arrives at that point it becomes important to ask the question, was the fact that he believed that the order was authorised and that he was acting within the course and scope of his duties, was that reasonable under the circumstances? And then the whole situation arises what was the position the Security Police found themselves in? Did they find themselves in a situation where there was strict lines of orders, strict ways of orders coming down from the top to the bottom, or was there this atmosphere created within the Security Police that under certain circumstances fighting the liberation movements, elimination was regarded as necessary and within if not express implied authority.

And in that regard - and that is where I come to the point of Brigadier Viktor's order. Brigadier Viktor's order, and Mr Smith wasn't involved in that section, so Brigadier Viktor's order doesn't relate there, but it relates to the submission I want to make now.

Brigadier Viktor's order was given at a specific stage, for certain people to act in a certain way. And my submission is that ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: There's no evidence that he was even aware of Viktor's order.

MR DU PLESSIS: Smith?

ADV DE JAGER: Ja.

MR DU PLESSIS: No, no, no, I'm trying to get to the final submission I want to make. The final submission I want to make is that although you do not have evidence of similar orders like Brigadier Viktor's orders, for some reason or another, which we can debate, the submission I'm trying to make is that in all probability there were various different, similar kinds or orders in the Security Police Force, existing in the Security Police, alternative lines of authority, alternatives lines or orders which created in the minds of the people on the ground a view that this kind of action is authorised, maybe not in every instance specifically, but in any event implied, by way of things that happened, orders that were given and alternative lines of authority that existed. And that is the only point I'm trying to make, and I make that point that the probabilities are overwhelming that that was the case, and therefore Mr Smith would have acted reasonably to believe that he had authority.

CHAIRPERSON: In terms of Section 20(2)(f)?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes. Thank you, Chairperson, I have no further submissions.

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Lockhat?

MS LOCKHAT IN ARGUMENT: Chairperson, there's basically three issues relating to this matter. The first one was whether Moatshe was an informant, the second one is whether - an informant of Crause that is. The second one is whether Loots had the capacity and the authority to authorise the elimination of the youths and the third one relates to the weapons that were brought into the application by Venter, which relates to an issue of full disclosure.

Firstly, Chairperson, the fact that Moatshe came to the border post requesting to see Crause, you can get an assumption from that that he knew Crause, that he could have been an informer, but then we also have evidence from Crause stating that he was not an informer, that he had met him on a previous occasion, where he was actually infiltrating MKs and he warned him, but he was definitely not his informer.

Then on the other hand you have Venter's evidence, which unfortunately is not here, we can't gather exactly where he found, got to the knowledge that Moatshe was actually according to him, an informer of Crause. So we'll - well that's just as it is. And then all the other applicants never believed that Moatshe was actually an informer of Crause, so the evidence of Crause would then stand in that respect, Chairperson.

The second issue relates to the authority of Loots instructing the other applicants to pursue and eliminate the targets. Firstly, there was General Steyn that authorised just a simple arrest, the situation changed in that the place where this incident was to occur was not suitable and Loots felt that the officers would put themselves in danger. He, on the other hand, had radio contact with General Steyn, he never contacted him to inform him of the change of plan. So in that respect he acted on his own accord and he went against the instructions of General Steyn. The other evidence relating ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: What about the fact that when General Steyn was brought up to speed with what had happened, nothing came out of what Captain Loots had done. Doesn't that amount o an approval?

MS LOCKHAT: No, definitely Chairperson, I was coming to that.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MS LOCKHAT: The fact that after the incident when Steyn got there, Loots informed him that this would actually endanger his men and General Steyn actually said well he would have done the same in the circumstances and that he did the right thing. That is the evidence before us, Chairperson.

The issues is relating to just the radio contact between General Loots and Steyn. He just felt - he never contacted them. The reasons also provided was that he was far away, they didn't know exactly where they were and that they also could have been in close distance behind the MK soldiers and that it was possible that they could have heard them relating that there was a change in plan and that they were actually going to eliminate them.

CHAIRPERSON: But wasn't the evidence pointedly on this issue that there was an inherent risk in having to convey an information of this nature to General Steyn?

MS LOCKHAT: That was delivered by Crause, that everybody was in radio contact and that people would then come to know about it and then the operation would have just failed. Yes, Chairperson, that is before the Committee as well.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you find that to be a plausible reason, what's your submission?

MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, the only problem about that is, from the first instance all of this was actually done by radio contact and in essence informing Steyn about it, Crause and all the rest they made radio contact and it worked perfectly fine, but on the other had as well they could have also used code - I mean surely they have codes you know, instead of change of plan, they could have thought of another way, that if there was a change of plan they could have worked out a code strategy. I mean that they're always busy working out strategies, so this is one where they could have planned for that as well, for those circumstances because operations do fail, operations do go wrong. So reasonably, they could have also worked out that kind of a strategy, where maybe, and in that way General Steyn would then have been aware of all of this.

CHAIRPERSON: Unfortunately we don't have evidence in that regard.

MS LOCKHAT: That is correct, Chairperson. The issue relating to the weapons, well the evidence before us is Venter's evidence, saying that they had to have weapons in order to plant this onto the operatives. There is no evidence before the Commission by the applicants, that they indeed took weapons with them to plant these weapons. The only evidence that we have is Loots' evidence that there was an AK47 found there.

We also know that there were lots of other people involved in this incident, which people can't remember, so it is possible that these other persons had, because it was supposed to be a normal arrest, that they actually brought these weapons with them because it was standard procedure to plant weapons on people, especially in arrests situations. So it was possible that other persons also involved in this operation could have planted that AK47 there. And the applicants in their evidence said that they didn't plan any weapons and they didn't take any weapons with them. So that is the evidence before the ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: And the junior applicants, as I could call them, they were called straight away while they were on an inspection or a investigation, straight away from there, so they wouldn't have gone back to the station in order to get weapons. So it seems as if they ...(indistinct)

MS LOCKHAT: That is indeed correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: With regard to this issue, should we be exploring it any further than it has been, because really, having to rely heavily on the evidence already tendered by Mr Venter doesn't take us anywhere. His evidence is not pointed, he doesn't say so and so told me to plant weapons. So we are left in the dark, even with the evidence of Mr Venter. So to have reliance on that aspect of his evidence doesn't help this Committee.

MS LOCKHAT: That is indeed so, Chairperson. And then just the next issue relating to proportionality, whether it was fair in actually killing the youths. That is also another issue we have to consider and look at. The fact that the intention was to actually arrest these people, circumstances changed.

Then you have the other issue that, yes, these MKs came to the border post, stopped at the roadblock, they didn't fire, they didn't fire any shots, was there a duty on the police then to attempt to arrest them without ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Why should there be a duty on the policemen to do anything other than to execute an order given by a senior policeman? They were there to eliminate, an order had already been taken, that's why they were at Silent Valley, to execute an order. Why should they actually disobey an order from Captain Loots and attempt to effect an arrest?

MS LOCKHAT: That is indeed correct, Chairperson, but we also must take into consideration that these were also policemen and ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, who were acting under orders.

MS LOCKHAT: That is so, Chairperson, but the issue is just whether it was proportional to eliminate them in the circumstances.

ADV DE JAGER: And every policeman was a legitimate target to the MK.

MS LOCKHAT: That is correct. I can take it no further, Chairperson. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Visser, do you have any reply?

MR VISSER: Chairperson, I wasn't going to reply, but I do want to remind you of the Breslow(?) case, which you were part of in Pietersburg, Commissioner Lax wasn't there, but what happened there was an elaborate plan was set up to arrest six people who came in and in fact the road was blocked by a Buffalo vehicle and an officer of the army got up and said: "You are surrounded, you are under arrest", and he was shot, shot right there. On the point that my learned friend is making, we submit that once it was decided, as you've just put to her, we say quite correctly, to eliminate, that was it. We know and we may perhaps at this stage frown on how many bullets were fired yes, but you also remember that evidence that once there's a fight you keep on firing until there's no further reaction.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VISSER: So it takes the matter no further, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: You may not address us further on that.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr du Plessis, do you have any reply?

MR DU PLESSIS: I have nothing to say, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. We wish to express our gratitude to the legal representatives involved in this incident, for the assistance rendered to this Committee. I think we will be able to make our decision in respect of this particular incident in due course. We are however aware that we still have a host of other incidents to deal with, so we might as well not make our decision known at this stage, until we've concluded all the incidents which are set down for this week.

MS LOCKHAT: That is correct, Chairperson, the Thibedi matter and the McKenzie car bomb incident.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Is it an appropriate time to take a lunch adjournment so that we can commence at half past one with the Thibedi matter.?

MS LOCKHAT: In order, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MS LOCKHAT: Please stand.

MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, the next matter on the roll is the attempted murder of Jerry Thibedi. The amnesty applicant is Mr PJC Loots.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Loots, your full names?

PHILLIPUS JOHANNES CORNELIUS LOOTS: (sworn states)

MR DU PLESSIS: May it please you, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct)

MR DU PLESSIS: It is bundle 12.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr du Plessis.

ADV DE JAGER: Other references, other bundles that you'll use?

MR DU PLESSIS: Chairperson, bundle 2(b). You will find the evidence of Mr Thibedi in bundle 2(b), from page 303 to page 323. I'm not going to refer to it, I'm just referring you to the correct pages.

ADV DE JAGER: ...(indistinct) refer us to the relevant documents, so that we can try and get ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Isn't that bundle 2(a), Mr du Plessis?

MR DU PLESSIS: Chairperson, it appears in two bundles, the first is 2(a), that is from page 255 to the end and then also in bundle 2(b), from page 301 to page 323. That is the evidence of Mr Thibedi.

CHAIRPERSON: Just give us a moment to locate our bundle. Proceed, Mr du Plessis, we don't seem to be capable of locating all our bundles.

EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Chairperson. I'm not going to refer to the previous evidence at the previous hearing, except for one question I will ask Colonel Loots. So maybe it won't even be relevant.

Mr Loots, do you confirm the content of your amnesty application, from page 1 to page 47?

COL LOOTS: Yes, I confirm that.

MR DU PLESSIS: That is the evidence with regard to the general background, which also creates a basis for your political motivations.

COL LOOTS: Indeed.

MR DU PLESSIS: Very well. Then you also confirm the correctness of pages 57 up to and including 75. That is also the outline of your political motive.

COL LOOTS: I confirm that.

MR DU PLESSIS: Now Colonel Loots, you were also present during all the hearings of Brigadier Jack Cronje, Captain Jacques Hechter, Paul van Vuuren, Colonel Venter and Captain Wouter Mentz, is that correct?

COL LOOTS: Insofar as it regards the immediate environment, that's correct. I know that there were times that they drove down to Cape Town and I did not attend those hearings. However that was on a minimal basis, but the rest with regard to this Johannesburg/Pretoria environment I confirm.

MR DU PLESSIS: And you heard the evidence of Generals van der Merwe and Brigadier Cronje with regard to the general background of the struggle and the political situation which reigned in the mid-1980's in this country?

COL LOOTS: Yes, that's correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And do you confirm that this is correct?

COL LOOTS: I confirm it as correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Can I then take you to page 48 of bundle 12. Do you have it?

COL LOOTS: Yes, I do.

MR DU PLESSIS: And the matter that we are discussing here is the Thibedi matter, which begins on page 48, do you see that?

COL LOOTS: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Before you begin, may I ask you the following. During this incident and other incidents, for which you have applied for amnesty as well, were you aware of the command which was given by Brigadier Viktor to Captain Hechter as well as Brigadier Cronje?

COL LOOTS: Chairperson, yes, although I was not in personal contact with Brigadier Viktor, however by means of Brigadier Cronje on the one hand and Lieutenant, at that point on the other hand.

MR DU PLESSIS: And did you regard your actions as residing below that command?

COL LOOTS: Certainly.

MR DU PLESSIS: Can you read the Committee your application? I will pause you at certain points to discuss certain aspects. Please begin on page 47. I beg your pardon, I have not fixed the date, what was the date of this event approximately?

COL LOOTS: If I recall correctly, it occurred at the end of 1987, but if I do make a mistake with the dates, I beg your pardon, it was quite a few years ago.

MR DU PLESSIS: Can you please proceed on page 48?

COL LOOTS: I continue:

Am I going too fast, Chairperson?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, you may actually try and lower the pace at which you are giving your evidence, to enable the translators to be able to translate in the many languages they are using to do so, without gasping for air.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr du Plessis, with regard to the date, I think we can accept that it was the 22nd of October 1987.

MR DU PLESSIS: I'm indebted to you.

COL LOOTS: Chairperson, I take notice of your request and I will move a little bit slower, without beginning afresh.

MR DU PLESSIS: Would you pause for a moment there. This evidence has been put to the Committee previously and I do not wish to repeat it too much, but could you please explain how the informer system worked, did the informers know about one another, how did the reports reach you and how did you process this information?

ADV DE JAGER: Mr du Plessis, I don't think that it's in dispute that Mr Thibedi played a significant role in the freedom struggle. I don't think it is recognised that he participated in the killing of people, but as I understand the evidence, he was a role-player within the freedom struggle on behalf of COSATU. If you have further details then provide them. I don't know if this can be confirmed.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Mr de Jager. Madam Chair, I may perhaps make a suggestion. I know we have all read the application and I don't know if you want Mr Loots to go through the extent of the whole application, otherwise I can just ask him to confirm it.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, no, you may go through your application, but we would prefer, was merely making a suggestion that you don't go into the whole aspect of how information was gathered by informers and how verification was conducted of information gathered from the various informants.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright.

CHAIRPERSON: Otherwise you can proceed with your application.

MR DU PLESSIS: Alright, thank you, Madam Chair.

Very well, Colonel Loots, would you proceed with the second paragraph on page 50.

INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone is not on.

COL LOOTS: As it pleases the Chairperson and the Committee.

MR DU PLESSIS: You say there's something missing here, could you please elaborate?

COL LOOTS: Chairperson, if you would just page to page 54, typed 68, paginated 54. It begins with:

What should be added there before that extract:

Is that sufficient?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, that's sufficient.

COL LOOTS: I continue, page 54:

I continue.

MR DU PLESSIS: Can I just stop you there once again. Is that the information which you received, from who?

COL LOOTS: From Captain Hechter.

MR DU PLESSIS: And where did he get this information, do you know?

COL LOOTS: From Warrant Officer Joe Mamasela.

MR DU PLESSIS: The informer reports about Mr Thibedi which reached you, can you recall whether this made any reference to his place of resident and his wife and kids? If you can't remember this, would those facts have appeared in such a report?

COL LOOTS: No, not usually. We were interested in his activities, his decisions, his planning and his movements, not where he lived or whether he had a wife and children.

INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone is not on.

ADV DE JAGER: But if at that stage you had already decided to eliminate him and you sent Mamasela with the purpose of determining where he lived, would it not have been of interest where his wife and children lived.

COL LOOTS: Chairperson, the high-profile activists at that time usually moved around quite a lot, they knew that we were hunting them and we couldn't say with all certainty where exactly they would find themselves.

MR DU PLESSIS: Very well, continue.

CHAIRPERSON: Before we proceed, Mr du Plessis, I just made a note on a question of clarity. The evidence given by Mr van Vuuren was to the effect that the information about the house of Mr Thibedi was supplied, not by Mamasela but by Mr Loots, can you just clear that up? That appears on page 256 of bundle 2(b) - 2(a).

COL LOOTS: That is entirely correct, I read that extract and took notice thereof, but it couldn't have come from me because I didn't have the address.

CHAIRPERSON: So was Mr van Vuuren mistaken then when he said it was you who provided them with the address and other related information with regard to Mr Thibedi?

COL LOOTS: I merely think that he drew an inference, I don't think that he was really certain. I didn't give it to him.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, you may proceed.

COL LOOTS: I thank you, Chairperson. We continue:

Chairperson, I would just like to add here that if I recall correctly, van Vuuren also said in his affidavit that I drove the minibus and that is not correct, I did not drive the minibus, I sat on the left-hand side in front and Slang was the man who drove the minibus. Thank you, Chairperson.

...(end of side A of tape 2)

MR DU PLESSIS: Very well, Colonel, may I ask you something with regard to your evidence, or the evidence of Mr van Vuuren. Mr van Vuuren testified that in the informer reports it appeared that Thibedi's house was a safe-house. May I repeat? Mr van Vuuren has given evidence that from the informer reports it appears that Thibedi's house was a safe-house.

COL LOOTS: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Very well. And you have read the evidence of Captain van Vuuren and Hechter?

COL LOOTS: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And you agree with it?

COL LOOTS: Yes, I do.

MR DU PLESSIS: Except insofar as you have wished to fix the Committee's attention on the aspects which were important to you?

COL LOOTS: Yes, and where they state in the report that they had a five second delay mechanism on the bomb and that they were already 50 to 100 metres away from the house. I don't believe that a man dressed in jeans and takkies, carrying an AK47 could run 50 to 100 metres within five or ten seconds.

MR DU PLESSIS: Chairperson, this is a bit on a lighter note. You will see on page 258, Hechter and I think van Vuuren testified the following, he said:

That means they each did the 100 metres, with an AK47, in jeans and takkies, in about 10 seconds, which cannot be and that is why Colonel Loots, he showed me this this morning and I said to him on a lighter note we can point that out to you, not that it makes any difference.

Very well, Colonel Loots, your commanding officer with regard to this incident, was Brigadier Jack Cronje, although he was not involved in the execution of the action?

COL LOOTS: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Will you please come again, I was distracted by something, what was your question, Mr du Plessis?

MR DU PLESSIS: Your commanding officer with regard to this incident, although he was not involved in the execution of this operation, was Brigadier Jack Cronje, is that correct?

COL LOOTS: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Chairperson, I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR DU PLESSIS

CHAIRPERSON: Who specifically took the decision to bomb Mr Thibedi's house?

COL LOOTS: Chairperson, I can explain that, because after I had discussed the matter with Brigadier Cronje we decided that Thibedi had to learn a lesson and that he had to be eliminated and then I went back to Hechter and van Vuuren, and I can't recall whether this took place in my office or theirs, but the three of us, me, Hechter and van Vuuren and possibly Mamasela, were also present in the office, but the three of us, actually the three of us decided there and then what would be used and we also decided upon an explosive device.

ADV DE JAGER: You decided to kill him, you and Jack Cronje decided to kill him?

COL LOOTS: That's correct, me and Jack Cronje, Brigadier Jack Cronje.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, because the other people you mentioned participated in the planning of the modus operandi that would be employed in executing the decision that had already been taken by you and Hechter and Cronje.

COL LOOTS: And Cronje.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, yes.

COL LOOTS: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR LAX: How could you teach him a lesson by killing him?

COL LOOTS: Chairperson, there were many expressions, such as "taking a man out" and that wouldn't be taking him out to dinner, that would mean to kill him, to teach him a lesson in the same relation would be an expression that would denote elimination of a man. Are you satisfied?

MR LAX: Yes, no, no, I'm familiar with all these terms, I've heard them over and over again in all sorts of other contexts, teaching a lesson doesn't usually mean to kill somebody, it usually means to teach him a lesson, to give a fright or to show him the error of his ways. There's a subtle difference between teaching someone a lesson and eliminating him, you'll concede that? Usually if you want to teach someone a lesson you would assault the person or detain him or something, so that the experience would be instructive and act as a deterrent to further conduct on that person's behalf. That's the only confusion I have.

COL LOOTS: Yes, I concede that, under normal circumstances of course you are 1000% correct.

CHAIRPERSON: I have only one concern. When reading your application and listening to your viva voce evidence, against obviously the evidence given by Mr van Vuuren, if one reads the third paragraph on page 68, that suggests that at the time when the bomb was made, a decision and a decision taken to bomb Mr Thibedi's house, the information with regard to the safe-house had not yet been established. Am I reading that correctly?

MR DU PLESSIS: Chairperson, exactly what is the reference, if I may ask? I'm sorry.

CHAIRPERSON: It's his application, it's on page 54, paragraph 68, the third paragraph.

MR DU PLESSIS: Oh, I'm sorry. Yes, thank you, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON:  Did you understand me, Mr Loots?

COL LOOTS: I understand you completely, you said that the bomb was manufactured before we determined the address.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

COL LOOTS: Yes, that is correct, the explosive device had already been manufactured before we determined the address.

CHAIRPERSON: And that does not accord with the evidence already given by Mr van Vuuren.

MR DU PLESSIS: Chairperson, do you perhaps have any reference to it?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, 269. So you had this information about Mr Thibedi's house even before you started devising the bomb?

COL LOOTS: No, Chairperson, I went to Hechter and van Vuuren's office where we decided upon the manner in which Thibedi would be eliminated. That is where we decided about the explosive device and that Mamasela would determine that address as well as his movements.

CHAIRPERSON: So the manner of execution was decided before you could establish the address of Mr Thibedi?

COL LOOTS: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: You obviously have already cleared that Mr van Vuuren was mistaken when he said that the information about Mr Thibedi's address was furnished by you and not by Mr Mamasela.

COL LOOTS: That is correct, otherwise I would never have asked Hechter to instruct Mamasela to monitor the man's movements, because then I would have had the address already. I didn't have the address.

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Lockhat, do you have any questions to put to Mr Loots?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, my instructions are just to take Mr Loots just back relating to certain issues regarding Mr Thibedi, Mr Thibedi personally.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MS LOCKHAT: In your evidence as well as page 49 of the bundle you say that he was a high-profile member of COSATU, and you also informed us in your evidence that he instructed stay-away's, he authorised and instructed stay-away's, is that correct?

COL LOOTS: I didn't say that, I said that I'd read this in the reports from informers, the reports stated that.

MS LOCKHAT: Fine. I just want to place on record, Mr Thibedi says that yes, he was the Chairperson of the Northern Transvaal region for COSATU, he says that these stay-away's were not taken by himself, that it was an organisation that took the decision to actually conduct the stay-aways. I just want to place that on record, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, we'll take that into account, Ms Lockhat.

MS LOCKHAT: And he also says the issues regarding consumer boycotts, he says that this was a community based organisation which actually called for consumer boycotts and that it was not taken by him personally, that is was a community based decision and he just formed part of that. Do you want to comment on that?

COL LOOTS: Chairperson, I don't wish to lodge a personal attack on Mr Thibedi, but he is a politician and as far as I am concerned, the politicians of the past and of the present, when it comes to practical politics it would appear to me that it is connected to the denial of truth and fact.

MS LOCKHAT: Mr Thibedi also states that regarding school boycotts, these decisions were taken by COSAS and he was no part of that decision regarding school boycotts. I just want to place that on record as well.

CHAIRPERSON: Don't you at least want him to comment, afford him an opportunity to comment?

MS LOCKHAT: What is your response to that?

COL LOOTS: Chairperson, once again, with regard to my decision and the evidence which has been submitted to the Committee, what I have given you was made available to me in written reports and from these reports I have based my facts which I have submitted to the Committee, so I cannot really comment any further on what you have said.

MS LOCKHAT: So you had absolute faith in these reports?

COL LOOTS: Yes, Chairperson, the informers did not know one another whatsoever, the one would not be able to identify the other and the reports ran parallel to one another. If I might just pause here for a moment. Chairperson, you must also remember that when we speak of informers we are also speaking of two other things, one being post interception and the other was telephone monitoring. When we speak of postal interception we're speaking of WH10. And with telephonic monitoring we're speaking of WH11. When a report was written the informers number had to be filled in and if it wasn't the informer's number it would be either WH10 or WH11 and these reports were also made available to me - when we are speaking of informers, and that is what I based my facts on.

MS LOCKHAT: How many informers were placed onto Mr Thibedi to inform you relating to his whereabouts and his activities?

COL LOOTS: Chairperson, it is extremely difficult to tell you. In my affidavit I have stated that the ANC/SACP and COSATU alliance intertwined their actions. I was simply the Head of the black forces desk and there was also a trade union desk that was separate to mine and all these desks had informers.

With regard to informers, we had approximately 270 informers. Not all of them were full informers, there were two statuses. Your full informer would have NT status and an occasional informer would have an NT(G) status. So it is very difficult to indicate precisely how many informers, specifically with regard to the desks, were monitoring Mr Thibedi's activities.

MS LOCKHAT: You also said ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: But as far - may I interpose, Ms Lockhat?

MS LOCKHAT: That's in order, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: But as far as you were concerned, you had a plethora of informers from whom you were able to get information about the activities of Mr Thibedi, you were able to verify the various information from different informers and from your sources, that is the informants, you were convinced in your mind that Mr Thibedi was a high-profile activist.

COL LOOTS: Chairperson, you are absolutely correct.

MS LOCKHAT: You also said in your evidence that Mr Thibedi was responsible for instructing youths to burn out taxis and so forth. Mr Thibedi's comment is that he never instructed members or youths to do that. Can you give me comment on that please?

COL LOOTS: Once again I will have to appeal to the content of the reports which were made available to me.

MS LOCKHAT: So these facts were basically in the reports, you did not witness Mr Thibedi issuing these instructions or even attempting to burn out taxis himself?

CHAIRPERSON: That's his evidence, Ms Lockhat. His evidence is based on the information that was obtained from the many informers that were at their disposal as the Security Branch.

MS LOCKHAT: Thank you, Chairperson. Just to take you back to the incident again, did Jack Cronje authorise this?

COL LOOTS: That is correct, he authorised it.

CHAIRPERSON: Did he authorise or did he instruct?

COL LOOTS: He gave instruction to continue. I beg your pardon if I wasn't clear.

MS LOCKHAT: Mr Thibedi also says that his house was never used as a safe-house, that was actually his residence and that that information was incorrect that was delivered to you, can you comment on that?

COL LOOTS: Chairperson, as indicated in my affidavit, I relied quite heavily on the people in my command such as Hechter and van Vuuren and Mamasela. I indicated in my affidavit that when the information was conveyed to me I didn't continue to establish whether or not these were the facts, I simply accepted it, I accepted that it was a safe-house.

CHAIRPERSON: May I interpose? But from the information that was obtained from Mr Mamasela about the fact that Mr Thibedi was in a safe-house, you acted on that on the basis of that information.

COL LOOTS: That's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: At least with regard to the fact that it's a safe-house.

COL LOOTS: That is correct, that is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Were you able to canvass facts about this safe-house, whether there were other activists in the safe-house or whether other people other than those related to the ANC were present in that safe-house?

COL LOOTS: I went to no trouble whatsoever, I was satisfied with the information which was conveyed to me and I acted according to that information.

CHAIRPERSON: But did you explore whether there were any other persons other than Mr Thibedi or ANC activists, who were present at any time in that safe-house?

CHAIRPERSON: No, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Proceed, Ms Lockhat.

ADV DE JAGER: I beg your pardon, who would you have expected to find in a safe-house?

COL LOOTS: One of two things would have happened, either the safe-house was used by people who were fleeing away from us, who didn't want us to arrest them. They would go there in order to lay low, as we expressed it, or it could have been a place where activists met one another, one of the two.

MR LAX: If I could just interpose for a moment, Chair, sorry.

Would it have made any difference to you if this was actually just his home and it wasn't a safe-house?

COL LOOTS: I do think so. If I were certain that that was his house I would have made provision for the fact that there may have been woman and children in that house. For me it wasn't about hitting or eliminating anybody other than the target.

CHAIRPERSON: But emanating from the statement just made by my colleague, Advocate de Jager, to which you've agreed, it would have made a difference because a safe-house is usually used by people who are there for purposes of safety, to run away from the police. So in the normal run of events it would not only be the identified target which would have been Mr Thibedi in this instance, it would have also included other people who were using the house as a safe-house. So it wouldn't have been only the target who would have been caught in the crossfire.

COL LOOTS: I understand you completely, Chairperson, perhaps I was being somewhat vague. When I speak of a target I speak specifically of Mr Thibedi, in the light of himself and activists who may have been there.

MR LAX: So repeat my question, because you know, so in a sense you're differentiating now between his family on the one hand and other activists who might have been there, and that wouldn't have made as much difference to you as his family might have made a difference?

COL LOOTS: That's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Is it a possibility that you foresaw at any stage that when you went in to blow this house there might be people other than Mr Thibedi?

COL LOOTS: I don't know if I ever thought that far, I really don't know. I can't remember thinking about that.

CHAIRPERSON: And according to the information received from Mr Mamasela, the impression that was created to you was that it was Mr Thibedi who was in that house and that you had no information that any other person, be it an activist of the ANC or his family, were also in that house?

COL LOOTS: You are completely correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Proceed, Ms Lockhat.

MS LOCKHAT: Can you tell us, that when you bombed the house, what was your role?

COL LOOTS: Chairperson, I was the unit head of both Hechter and van Vuuren and then naturally also of Joe Mamasela and ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but what did you do in relation to the operation, what role did you have, what was your participation?

COL LOOTS: I remained behind in the minibus along with Slang or Danny Sleshlage. The reason for this being that should the operation go wrong or should a situation develop that we had not budgeted for, we would be able to handle that situation, because as the evidence which has been given before has indicated, we operated with AK47 automatic machine guns.

MS LOCKHAT: Tell me, did you wear masks and so forth?

COL LOOTS: Chairperson, I may have worn a balaclava on my head, but I don't recall pulling it over my face, and the same with Danny Sleshlage because we were in a dark minibus, but Mamasela, Hechter and van Vuuren didn't only wear masks they also wore gloves. I've said masks, sorry, they weren't really masks but they were balaclavas.

MS LOCKHAT: Did you have any firearms with you?

COL LOOTS: Yes, we were always armed with AK47s, always.

MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, I just want to check with Mr Thibedi if there are any other questions he wants me to ask.

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Lockhat, I suppose we virtually read the evidence previously given to the original Committee about this incident, which relates amongst others to the fact that prior to this incident taking place, somebody had reconnoitred the place. If I recall it was Mr Mamasela. Mr du Plessis might be able to assist me.

MR DU PLESSIS: Chairperson, there was evidence that Mr Mamasela was sent out before to obtain information and that he came back and that he said that it was a safe-house.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: And then Mr Thibedi's evidence was that there was somebody at the house, I think approximately a week before in a kombi, I think, who came and knocked on the door. I don't think the link was ever drawn to Mr Mamasela, although the probabilities are overwhelming that it was the same person, but that link was never drawn.

CHAIRPERSON: But wasn't there evidence that Mr Mamasela reconnoitred the place before the operation was executed?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, that's what I referred to now.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, and obviously Mr Thibedi's evidence was that he was advised by his wife that a week prior to the occurrence of this incident some people came in to make enquiries about his whereabouts.

MR DU PLESSIS: One person.

CHAIRPERSON: One person?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes. That's why I said the probabilities - there was never the link made that that was Mr Mamasela, but the probabilities are ...

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Nor do I seek to make the link.

MR DU PLESSIS: Sorry?

CHAIRPERSON: I do not want to make a link between that aspect to what happened thereafter, what I wanted to draw Ms Lockhat to is whether he doesn't want to put questions in relation to that piece of evidence to Mr Loots.

MS LOCKHAT: I'll just check with him again, Chairperson. Chairperson?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Ms Lockhat.

MS LOCKHAT: Just one question relating to that. Mr Thibedi wants to know what the purpose was for them coming to his house prior, the week prior to the ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: May I request you to rephrase your question, we do not have evidence from Mr Loots that he sent anyone to Mr Thibedi's house. So maybe you can put to him what Mr Thibedi has already said in relation to that and request him to respond, because he hasn't said that.

MS LOCKHAT: Mr Thibedi in his evidence in the previous hearing, said that people came, a person came to his house and his wife had spoken to the person and they wanted to know certain details. What was the purpose of that visit, was it an attempt, was it a prior attempt or just explain that.

CHAIRPERSON: May I again, Ms Lockhat, request you do invite him to comment whether he is aware of having sent anyone to Mr Thibedi's house, as alleged by Mr Thibedi when he gave evidence before the original Committee.

MS LOCKHAT: Thank you, Chairperson, I'm indebted to you.

CHAIRPERSON: You may proceed to respond to the question as I have put it.

COL LOOTS: Chairperson, as you have explained the question, I understand it completely. It is so, I did tell Hechter to tell Mamasela to verify an address, but whether they ever used a kombi and whether it was the person who was at Mr Thibedi's house at that stage, is completely unknown to me.

CHAIRPERSON: Proceed, Ms Lockhat.

MS LOCKHAT: Thank you, Chairperson, I have no further questions.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Loots, it is correct that the house was entirely destroyed?

COL LOOTS: That is the feedback which I received, that absolutely nothing remained of the house and that the vehicle of Mr Thibedi had been seriously damaged during the explosion.

INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone.

ADV DE JAGER: You've read his evidence about the stove and all the furniture which was destroyed, did you go and investigate the scene yourself?

COL LOOTS: No, I never returned to the scene, that was the information which I received.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Loots, you will remember that when Mr Thibedi - no, when either Mr Hechter or Mr van Vuuren gave evidence they stated that when they arrived at the scene they noticed that Mr Thibedi was parked outside the house that was used as a safe-house, do you recall that?

COL LOOTS: That is correct, they gave evidence that the vehicle was indicated to them by Mamasela as being Mr Thibedi's vehicle.

CHAIRPERSON: Were you there when Mr Mamasela informed them that the car that was in the premises that needed to be bombed, belonged to Mr Thibedi?

COL LOOTS: No, Chairperson, I remained in the kombi with Slang.

CHAIRPERSON: So you did not form part of the conversation that took place with regard to the identity of the car?

COL LOOTS: No, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr du Plessis, as Judge Mall would have put it, are you bold enough to re-examine?

MR DU PLESSIS: Not at all, Chairperson, not at all, I've got nothing to say, for once. For once I've got nothing to say.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Loots, you are excused.

COL LOOTS: I thank you, Chairperson.

WITNESS EXCUSED

CHAIRPERSON: Mr du Plessis, I take it that you are in a position to make your submission at this stage?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: And we'll give you the floor to proceed to do so.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Chairperson.

Chairperson, I have similarly in this matter, made copies of the Heads of Argument which I addressed to the previous Committee in respect of the Thibedi matter, with reference to Warrant Officer van Vuuren and Captain Hechter's application in respect of this matter.

CHAIRPERSON: Can I interpose, Mr du Plessis? A Member of my Committee has drawn my attention that maybe Mr Loots might wish to say something - oh, Mr Thibedi might wish to say something to the Committee.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, may I just say that that is something that I forgot to ask Mr Loots when he testified, so perhaps we should give Mr Loots an opportunity to say something to Mr Thibedi ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: As well?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, please.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Ms Lockhat?

MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, we discussed this prior, Mr Thibedi and I, and he said he wasn't going to speak, but he's changed his mind now, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. I recall you saying that to me in chambers, that Mr Thibedi was not prepared to say anything to the Committee. I simply presumed, but I think it's better always to explore some of these things because it is the right of any person to change his mind.

MS LOCKHAT: Definitely Chairperson, I agree with that.

CHAIRPERSON: We will give him the right to exercise. And before you do that, Mr Thibedi, we'll also afford Mr Loots an opportunity to say something before we come to you.

Mr Loots, you may proceed. I am advised that you wish to say something to Mr Thibedi.

COL LOOTS ADDRESSES MR THIBEDI: I thank you, Chairperson.

Mr Thibedi, I wish to close the period between 1983 and 1987, as a chapter in my life which I never again wish to experience or repeat. What I have learnt is the hard and naked truth, the brutal truth, that in war or situations of conflict which existed, which still exist and which are yet to come, it is so that the innocent people are always the ones who suffer the most. And in this case specifically, where I was the unit commander who planned your elimination, I would like to say to you that I am extremely glad and sincerely grateful that your wife and your children were not injured during the onslaught.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Loots.

Mr Thibedi, we will now afford you an opportunity to address the Committee. I take it that you don't want to give evidence under oath, but you merely want to make certain remarks to the Committee, is that correct?

MR THIBEDI: That's correct, Madam Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR THIBEDI ADDRESSES COMMITTEE: Madam Chair, thanks for giving me this opportunity. What I want to say to the Committee is that I have listened to what Mr Loots said, and I want to say, much as it is not my intention of course to oppose the application, I just want to say that, and I want to convey the message from my family that what happened happened during the period where there was serious fighting in the country, but what my family is unable to understand, and is very difficult to come to grips with is the fact that Mr Loots and his unit knew very well that they have identified me as a target, but for them to go to the extent of throwing what they did throw in the house, irrespective of who was in the house, it's something that I will take a long time to forget. But nevertheless, as he is putting it he is very happy that my family, that's my wife, my kids and my sister were not hurt.

I'm also grateful that all what happened, all the damage that was caused was only caused to material things and all of us who were in the house are still alive today. And I really want to say that I hope what has happened to my family and myself and to all other people in the country who were fighting for this liberation, should never ever occur again. And I really wish this Committee good luck in their endeavour to try and find a solution or an amicable solution to this problem and I hope that in indeed it is a closed chapter and I hope that I will never ever again appear in a situation like this, because it took me many years actually to know who did what happened, but at least for now I want to thank the TRC and I want to thank all of you, Madam Chair, who participate in this particular exercise to make sure that at the end of the day my community knows what actually happened because it was said to my community at the time that I kept all these explosives in my house and I was going to use them somewhere and they exploded prematurely. But at least I am happy because Mr Loots said with his own mouth that he planned this thing and he takes full responsibility of this activity. So that is all what I wanted to say, that I wish you good luck in your endeavours to try and resolve this particular crisis. As for my part and my family, in my view this chapter is closed.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Thibedi, we thank you as a Committee for your kind words, particularly those of encouragement. It is not every day that we get such encouraging words about the painful function that we are performing as a Committee. I may on behalf of my Committee also express our sincere sympathies for the loss of your daughter. We know that as you are sitting there you are going through an even much more severe pain and are still grieving and have to yet bury your daughter who has passed away, yet you have been able to attend these hearings and thus enabling and facilitating this Committee to be able to achieve its primary objective of uncovering and establishing the truth, with the hope that that exercise will reconcile our deeply previously divided society. We thank you for your attendance. Thank you.

Mr du Plessis?

MR DU PLESSIS ADDRESSES: Thank you, Chairperson. Chairperson, may I open my argument, which will be very short, by making the following submission, and that is that I have been involved in quite a lot of amnesty applications and I must say that this application today of Mr Thibedi is one of those applications where the end result is the kind of reconciliation that I think we need in this country and that I think should take place. On the one hand we've had Colonel Loots, who was a frank and open witness, who testified openly, he gave all the facts that he knew of and he presented Mr Thibedi with a full account of what happened. On the other side, Mr Thibedi did not express any

hatred or ill will or ill feeling towards Colonel Loots, and for that I want to thank him and I think on behalf of Colonel Loots too. It is something that in my submission, or it's something that has made a great impression on me and something that I think should happen more in this country.

Chairperson, to come back to the Heads of Argument that I've handed to you, the argument is set out in detail there upon which Captain Hechter and Warrant Officer van Vuuren obtained amnesty. Exactly the same facts pertain to this application, there is really no difference between the evidence of Colonel Loots and the evidence of Hechter and van Vuuren. Colonel Loots was frank in his evidence about the decision that was taken, he did it under orders of Brigadier Jack Cronje and he was also frank in testifying that his subjective belief, when he executed this operation and this action, was that he was acting against Mr Thibedi, who he believed was involved in all the acts he referred to in his evidence and that he believed that their house was a safe-house.

I do not think it is necessary for me, Chairperson, to elaborate in detail on the contents of the Heads of Argument, the arguments are exactly the same pertaining to Colonel Loots. I just want to make one further submission in that regard, and that is that the Committee can take into account the fact that Hechter and van Vuuren have already obtained amnesty pertaining to the same application and the same facts and the same incident. And on that basis I would request you to grant Colonel Loots amnesty, as set out in paragraph 241, the first page over to the second page of the Heads of Argument that I handed to you. You will see it refers to paragraph 241.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Thank you, Mr du Plessis.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Lockhat, do you have anything to say in view of the fact that Mr Thibedi is not opposing this application?

MS LOCKHAT: No, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: I think this brings us to the close of Mr Thibedi's application. We've already expressed our gratitude made by Mr Thibedi to make himself available for purposes of participating in these proceedings even thought he's got very pressing and painful duties to attend to with his family. We will excuse you, Mr Thibedi and as I have already stated before, you have our condolences. We hope that you will grow in strength through God's blessings as you go through this difficult period of your life and your family.

The decision in respect of this application will be made by this Committee in due course.

Are we in a position to proceed now? This is in relation to an amnesty application by the following applicants: Mr Goosen, Mr Momberg who are being represented by Advocate Alberts, Mr van der Merwe, Crause, Loots and KC McKenzie, represented by Mr Visser and Mr du Plessis and Mr Alberts. Mr du Plessis is representing the interest of Brigadier Cronje, Ms Lockhat appears on behalf of the Amnesty Committee as the Evidence Leader.

This matter was scheduled to be heard this week and it will now be adjourned by agreement between the parties, to next Wednesday, the date being the 21st of April 1999, at 10 o'clock. Thank you.

MS LOCKHAT: Thank you, Chairperson. Please stand.