______________________________________________________CHAIRPERSON: This morning we will complete the hearing of the Dion Cele application because one of the applicants, unfortunately, was not available when all the evidence was led on behalf of the other applicants. Mr Labuschagne, is he here to give evidence?

MR DU PLESSIS ADDRESSES: Thank you Chairperson, may I just place myself on record? It's Roelof du Plessis of the Pretoria Bar on instructions of Strydom Britz Attorneys, I act on behalf of Mr Labuschagne. Before I call Mr Labuschagne, I just want to place a few facts on record, for purposes of the record and just to make things clear. Our client, Mr Labuschagne, in his negotiations with the South African Police Services and the State Attorney, he requested the services of an attorney and counsel to represent him at this hearing. That request was turned down notwithstanding the fact that there is an existing agreement with the State Attorney and the South African Police Service in that regard. It seems to us and I'm making this statement on behalf of Mr Labuschagne, that there is currently a discriminatory practice

in respect of the provision of legal services to certain applicants. Some applicants are provided with the services of an attorney and an advocate and some are not in the same hearings. We believe that that is discriminatory and we believe that that is also unconstitutional and I want to place that on record.

The position was that Mr Labuschagne indicated that he will not accept the situation as such and that he will then hold his amnesty application over until such time as he has been afforded the right to be represented by an attorney and counsel. May I say that the practice in South Africa, as you well know, has been that counsel usually appears only with the assistance of an attorney and this matter and the magnitude of these kind of matters is such that I do not believe that it can be dealt with in any other way. Mr Labuschagne was thereupon was not represented by either Mr Britz or myself last week during the hearing but we have decided in the spirit of this whole process that Mr Britz and I will, to assist the Committee and to safeguard against a possible later hearing of Mr Labuschagne's application, that we will assist the Committee without the situation in respect of representation of Mr Labuschagne having been sorted out and that is why we are here and I place that on record, Chairperson, we are here to assist you and to assist the process and we do not want to make the process more difficult. It just seems to us that the attitude of the Police Service and the State Attorney in this instance has really

prolonged this matter and has caused further time delays instead of streamlining the process. We do not believe that it is to the advantage of justice and to the process that it should be dealt with this way and lastly I want to say that Mr Labuschagne obviously reserves all his rights pertaining to this application, pertaining to the process and pertaining to the fact that he was not represented last week in the way that he should have been represented and that the fact that we are here is no waiver of his rights or any concession in any regard in respect of that.

May I call Mr Labuschagne?

CHAIRPERSON: Please do.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you Chairperson.

F LABUSCHAGNE: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, please proceed?

EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you Chairperson, I'll lead the evidence in Afrikaans.

Mr Labuschagne, you are currently in the Police Service, is that correct?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And you were in the police service since when?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: Since 1976.

MR DU PLESSIS: You have your amnesty application before you?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And your amnesty application commences in the bundle before you, this is the bundle with regard to the application of Dion Cele and it commences on page 116?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And you set out your background, your career, your political background and your political motivation from page 116 up to page 152, is that correct?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Do you confirm the correctness thereof?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: I do.

MR DU PLESSIS: And Mr Labuschagne, last week you attended these proceedings when you had heard the evidence of all your fellow applicants?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And you have heard the evidence of all your fellow applicants?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And you heard evidence insofar as evidence was offered with regard to the general background of the struggle and the political motivation with which the security branch acted during those years, is that correct?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: There are just a few aspects which I would like to put questions to you about. Do you confirm these pages as correct?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And the evidence that you had heard last week, do you confirm it as correct?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes I do.

MR DU PLESSIS: And therefore it is correct to say that the Eastern Transvaal Security Branch closely worked with the Natal Security Branch?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: That is so.

MR DU PLESSIS: And it was not strange for you to receive instructions from the people from the Natal Security Branch?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: No it was not.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Labuschagne, the acts for which you apply for amnesty appears on page 152, do you confirm that?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: Yes I do.

MR DU PLESSIS: And on page 153 you go to the nature and particulars of the incident, is that correct?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Very well, I shall not ask you to verbally place the evidence before the Committee because it appears in your application. There are certain aspects which I want to put to you. Page 153, do you contents of that page?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: Yes I do.

MR DU PLESSIS: And do you especially confirm Mr Cele's relationship with the Natal machinery?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: Yes I do.

MR DU PLESSIS: And was he an important person in that machinery?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: Yes he was.

MR DU PLESSIS: And was it your view that the planned action against him insofar as you know the action would have results?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: Yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: Who approached you to become involved with the operation?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: It was Col Taylor from Durban from the security branch.

MR DU PLESSIS: And then on page 154 of the bundle you give a list of the names of people who were involved there. Is there anything that you would like to rectify there with regard to the involvement of Sam du Preez that he had been implicated in this matter and before we continue to the further particulars of the incident, you have heard the evidence of the other applicants with regard to the incident itself and the factual version thereof, do you confirm that you agree with the evidence there?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And specifically with the evidence of Mr Verwey?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And on page 154 do you confirm the correctness of the last two paragraphs on that page?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: May we just pause there for a moment? Was there any reconnaissance done before you became involved in the operation?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And who was involved with the reconnaissance?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: As far as I know at that stage it was Capt Botha and Capt Vorster.

MR DU PLESSIS: And it was reconnaissance trip in Swaziland?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: What was the purpose thereof?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: The purpose was to, amongst others, to become familiar with the environment and vicinity where Dion Cele would be met.

MR DU PLESSIS: And when you executed the operation how many vehicles were used?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: Three vehicles were involved.

MR DU PLESSIS: And were was all - you don't have to explain to us who was in each vehicle, it has already been put before the Committee, who was all with the operation?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: It was for the purposes of inside Swaziland, it was Col Botha, Col Vorster, W/O Wasserman, W/O Verwey, myself and an informer.

MR DU PLESSIS: And were they all in Swaziland?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: That is correct yes, although the informer was met in Swaziland.

MR DU PLESSIS: He was already in Swaziland?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And the informer caused Cele to be called to the kombi?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And he climbed inside?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And you say you went to a before agreed point, is this on a remote road?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: It's not the normal highway which you crossed the border back to the R.S.A.?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: No.

MR DU PLESSIS: And one of the primary reasons why Mr Verwey and you went along was because you knew the area there?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: That is correct, it was part of the area which we worked in.

MR DU PLESSIS: Very well and what was the impression that you had, what was the purpose of the operation, why did Mr Cele have to be abducted?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: I was told or the impression that I had that it would be a recruitment action.

MR DU PLESSIS: Was there information that it would be possible to recruit Mr Cele?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: Yes there was information to that effect.

MR DU PLESSIS: So would refer to the recruitment as an informer?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Did you have any idea or any indication during the whole operation when it took place that Mr Cele was to be eliminated?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: No, I did not.

MR DU PLESSIS: And did the idea come about with you?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: No.

MR DU PLESSIS: And you don't know what happened afterwards?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: No.

MR DU PLESSIS: Do you confirm page 156 and further the political motive with which you acted up to page 165?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And another further question which I want to put to you, when did you hear that Mr Cele was eliminated?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: It was much later, I cannot recall a specific date.

MR DU PLESSIS: And were you surprised?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: That is correct, yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: And page 166, there is a piece which you embodied in your application with regard to reconciliation. You do not have to read it, do you confirm it as correct?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: Yes I do.

MR DU PLESSIS: And just convey your current opinion and feeling in which you find yourself in currently and your view of the new South Africa and of the Truth and Reconciliation procedure?

ADV BOSMAN: Mr du Plessis, if I may interpose for one moment? Do you not think it is important that your client's current opinion be put to the persons here?

MR DU PLESSIS: I should have perhaps done that.

Mr Labuschagne, would you please read what you say there on page 166?

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you Chairperson, I have no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

What is your present status in the South African Police Force?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: I am a superintendent in the South African Police attached to Crime Intelligence Service.

CHAIRPERSON: Had you heard of or had you met Dion Cele before this incident when you were asked by Taylor to assist?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: No but I knew of him but I never met him personally.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you know the informer?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: No I didn't know him personally.

CHAIRPERSON: So what was the real reason why you should have been asked by Taylor to assist in this matter, is it just because you came from the Eastern Transvaal and you knew the area well or were there other reasons?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: I think insofar as it is applicable to this incident, it is because of the fact that this was our area which we worked and we knew the area well.

CHAIRPERSON: What precisely did you do apart from merely accompanying them on that occasion, what did you do?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: Apart from us accompanying them we showed them the roads or the small paths which we crossed the border illegally with later.

CHAIRPERSON: On the first occasion when this reconnaissance was done you were with them?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: No, I was not present. I heard the following day that they had already had been in Swaziland to do some reconnaissance.

CHAIRPERSON: Now on the day of the occurrence when you were with them did you actually go into Swaziland yourself?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: That is correct, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: And did you go via one of these secret ...(intervention)

MR LABUSCHAGNE: No, we crossed the border legally, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: How did you exit from Swaziland?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: It was across the border fence in other words we returned illegally across the border fence.

CHAIRPERSON: On the return journey on that day did you have any dealings with Dion Cele?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: No Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Any dealings with the informer?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: No.

CHAIRPERSON: Were you present at all when there was any discussion of your colleagues with the informer before this incident about Dion Cele?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: No, I was not present Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Precisely what are you applying for amnesty for?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: The fact that Dion Cele had been abducted.

CHAIRPERSON: Was he abducted and brought in the vehicle which you were in?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: No, he was never in the vehicle.

CHAIRPERSON: So how were you involved in the actual abduction?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: The fact that we accompanied the people and we showed them how to cross the border illegally, I feel I was part of the abduction and it was also not normal.

ADV BOSMAN: Perhaps if I may just take up from where you left off?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

ADV BOSMAN: With the abduction itself were you told that you would possibly play an active role, were you ready to step into or similar?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: No, we were just there if I could say for a type of backup and because we knew how things worked in Swaziland and how to get back to the border.

ADV BOSMAN: What was your rank at that time?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: I was a sergeant.

ADV BOSMAN: Thank you Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Any cross-examination?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS THABETHE: Just on question on one aspect Mr Chair?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MS THABETHE: Mr Labuschagne, I just want to clarify something, you might have covered it in your evidence but I might not have gotten a clear picture. You say when you were approached by Mr Taylor to assist in them abducting Mr Dion Cele, is that correct?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: That is correct yes.

MS THABETHE: Did he give you any details of why the abduction had to take place and who was going to be abducted?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: Yes he said it would be Dion Cele and he also said but I do not want to say according to research but according to their opinion he was to be recruited as an informer.

MS THABETHE: And you were willing to associate yourself with that abduction, is that correct?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: That is correct.

MS THABETHE: Thank you Mr Chair, I have no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, I trust you have no questions to put to this witness?

MR VISSER: I do have one however Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: I'm surprised to hear that.

MR VISSER: Well you'll see very briefly what the matter is.

CHAIRPERSON: Do proceed Mr Visser.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Page 154 you confirmed, Mr Labuschagne, except that you had rectified that Mr Sam du Preez was not there and you were mistaken there but according to the evidence of Wasserman, Du Preez and Vorster, Sergeant Brooks was also there from Pietermaritzburg who accompanied you?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: Yes that is so, I just omitted to say that.

MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson.

MS THABETHE: Mr Chair, may I please be allowed to ask one more question I did not ask?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes please do.

MS THABETHE: Thank you.

Mr Labuschagne, when did the abduction of Dion Cele occur?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: It was in 1988 round about July.

MS THABETHE: Thank you Mr Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chair, may I perhaps in re-examination be - thank you Chairperson.

Mr Labuschagne, just one or two questions flowing from the questions. You did not have any objection against the abduction, you associated with it and you agreed with it and you had the intention to participate therein?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And your intention there was the same as the other persons who were involved with you in this operation?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And you were also involved with the planning of the operation insofar as regard to Swaziland?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And you were asked for what you applied for amnesty, you applied for conspiracy as well?

MR LABUSCHAGNE: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you Chairperson, no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much, you are excused from further attendance. Counsel and attorney who have taken the trouble of coming down despite the difficulties that were in their way, I must say that your presence here, your assistance and co-operation is appreciated by this Committee. Thank you.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you Chairperson, may we be excused?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MS THABETHE: Chairperson sorry, before you excuse them?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MS THABETHE: I had indicated to you earlier on that I've got a statement from Mrs Celeste Morrison. I have not had an opportunity to speak to her and there are a few points that are contrary to the evidence that was led in this incident.

CHAIRPERSON: By this witness?

MS THABETHE: No, not necessarily with this witness.

CHAIRPERSON: Oh.

MS THABETHE: Yes, so I just want to put it on record that we might have to call her. I've made my own opinion that it's not relevant but I would like to speak to her nevertheless.

CHAIRPERSON: You haven't spoken yet to her?

MS THABETHE: No, I haven't.

CHAIRPERSON: When is that going to happen?

MS THABETHE: Our investigator has gone to fetch her, she'll be here any time. If I can be given maybe an opportunity to phone the investigator and find out exactly where they are, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, may I be allowed to enter this discussion with your leave? Chairperson, we were given a statement, a written statement of this lady.

CHAIRPERSON: Don't place it on record, don't place any comments on record.

MR VISSER: Oh I see, well I was going to submit to you Chairperson, that there's no point in waiting for this lady to come and give evidence because of what the statement says because it takes the matter no further at all and you can conclude this incident in our respectful submission in spite of the statement.

CHAIRPERSON: We haven't studied the statement.

MR VISSER: Well may I suggest that my learned friend gives you the statement so that you can look at it?

CHAIRPERSON: We have been given the statement as we walked in this morning. We haven't had the chance to evaluate it's contents.

MR VISSER: It's not the typewritten one, it's the one in manuscript, Chairperson, it's just one page.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VISSER: And really, to ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: You're expressing an opinion that it has no impact on the application?

MR VISSER: Absolutely not, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: In other words, whether she gives evidence or not?

MR VISSER: It's going to make no difference to whether you are going to consider either refusing or granting amnesty Chairperson, really I believe that it's going to be a waste of time if the matter has to stand down to wait for her.

CHAIRPERSON: I gave an undertaking to Mr Britz that as soon as his client's evidence was heard he would be excused and considering that they've come down at their own expense and their time is valuable to them, Mr Britz you and your counsel and your client if the client wishes to leave, you are excused from further attendance.

MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson, we appreciate it.

CHAIRPERSON: We will take a decision on this aspect of whether this lady should be called to give evidence or not when the time comes. In the meanwhile we will proceed with the other matters in which we were engaged.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, I must just make my position clear, the only reason why I mentioned it now was because I thought that my learned friend Mr Du Plessis and Mr Britz would be detained to wait for the lady to come and that was the only reason why I mentioned it. But once they've now been excused of course we don't mind waiting.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you very much. Somebody has taken the trouble of alerting the TRC, calling the TRC and has taken the trouble of making a statement. We haven't had a chance to consider this statement. The leader of evidence does not know the person, she's only going to have a chance of seeing this person and then evaluate whether there's any point in calling her or not but until then this matter will remain and we will come to it if necessary when it's convenient to do so.

MR VISSER: There's absolutely no problem with that from our point of view Chairperson, as I said before it was just that I thought that Britz and Du Plessis might have to be detained for this and that's why I mentioned it, for no other reason at all.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Now what is your further interest in this matter?

LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE: Chairperson, I was going to ask if I may be excused. I thought you were going to adjourn before the Quarry Road Incident proceeds but I have no interest in the Quarry Road and if I may also be excused, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes you are.

LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Now may we proceed with the Quarry Road incident, is Mr Webster here?

MS THABETHE: He is not here, Chairperson. We will need to telephone him because he is right in Smith Street, so can I ask for a ten minute adjournment?

CHAIRPERSON: Well, ten minutes to phone him. Will it take ten minutes to be here?

MS THABETHE: Well I'll find out as soon as I've spoken to him. Shamanaz is going to call him right now.

CHAIRPERSON: It seems that this is one of these other unavoidable hiccups. We are going to adjourn until as soon as you are ready to call us.

CHAIRPERSON: It's never possible to do things the way one would like them to do with all these difficulties that conspire against you. However, Mr Webster is here and may we proceed with the matter in which Mr Webster is involved, as counsel.

You were being questioned at the end of yesterday by Mr Webster, you're reminded that you're still under oath, do you understand?

MATTHYS CORNELIUS BOTHA: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR WEBSTER: Thank you, Chairperson.

We broke off yesterday when I had asked you about the radios and being in radio communication, do you recall?

MR BOTHA: That is correct, Chairperson

MR WEBSTER: Were you in fact in radio communication?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR WEBSTER: With all the participating people?

MR BOTHA: I'm not sure whether we had radio contact with all the vehicles but we were in contact with some people.

MR WEBSTER: One would have expected every vehicle to have had a radio, do you agree with me?

MR BOTHA: That is possible.

MR WEBSTER: I just want us to back up a bit and get back to the police station at kwaMashu. Obviously somebody was in charge of the operation, do you remember saying that is so?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR WEBSTER: And was that Breytenbach?

MR BOTHA: Lt Breytenbach was in charge of the reaction unit.

MR WEBSTER: I'll go back, Mr Botha. Somebody was in charge of the entire operation, is that not so?

MR BOTHA: The senior man in the entire operation was General Steyn.

MR WEBSTER: Was he in charge of the entire operation?

MR BOTHA: Globally yes.

MR WEBSTER: I'm not talking of seniority, I want the person who was the man who was in charge to whom communications had to be made who was going to give orders and all that. Was that the general?

MR BOTHA: As the senior man at the police station yes, that's correct.

MR WEBSTER: Please Mr Botha, I'm having difficulty.

CHAIRPERSON: Put it to him if you think it was somebody else.

MR WEBSTER: Was it not Breytenbach who was in charge of the entire operation?

MR BOTHA: Lt Breytenbach was in charge of the reaction unit.

MR WEBSTER: And you said he was the person because of the training, of the specialist training, who were going to take charge about stopping the vehicle?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR WEBSTER: So insofar as stopping and arresting those people who was concerned, that was a responsibility and it fell under direct command of Breytenbach?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR WEBSTER: So he was in charge?

MR WEBSTER: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: No, I thought you said who was in charge at the kwaMashu Police Station?

MR WEBSTER: Sorry, that is where it was determined that this is a person who is in charge before they go out, in other words from the moment that you then left the police station it was known that the officer in charge was Breytenbach?

MR BOTHA: Chairperson, let me put it this way, a person in charge as far as the arrest and the entire operation, that was Lt Breytenbach of the reaction unit.

CHAIRPERSON: Let's progress.

MR WEBSTER: Thank you Chairperson.

In other words from the moment that you saw the vehicle you were supposed to report to Breytenbach?

MR BOTHA: Yes, I think that was the case.

MR WEBSTER: And then Breytenbach was the person who would give instructions as what was to be done?

MR BOTHA: In respect of his people in the reaction unit, yes.

MR WEBSTER: Not the entire operation, about the apprehension of those people?

MR BOTHA: Perhaps I should just explain that Lt Breytenbach was the person in charge of the reaction unit but as regards what happened at kwaMashu Police Station there were more senior people than Breytenbach, but to answer your question as regards the action regarding the arrest of the people, that was the responsibility and task of Lt Breytenbach.

MR WEBSTER: So despite the fact that you were aware that the stopping of that vehicle, the arrest of those people was the responsibility of the specialised unit, you decided to usurp their authority and proceed to try and stop the vehicle untrained and inadequately trained as you were?

MR BOTHA: The other members who were present were there in support of the reaction unit.

MR WEBSTER: Yes but you didn't have that experience don't you agree?

CHAIRPERSON: They worked as a team.

MR WEBSTER: I understand Chairperson, what I'm saying is ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Does it matter very much?

MR WEBSTER: Chairperson, insofar as the full disclosure, this is our point.

CHAIRPERSON: No you see full disclosure must be on something really substantial. You know, there might be minor differences of who did what and who did when.

MR WEBSTER: That is quite so, Chairperson, I agree completely with you.

CHAIRPERSON: But I think if it was something substantial then you must make that point.

MR WEBSTER: The point that I wish to make here Chairperson is and probably with a little digging we might have gotten a little further but the point that I want to make to Mr Botha is this:

That it had never been your intention to apprehend those people, that in fact it had been decided that those people would be just butchered and killed and that is why, knowing that Breytenbach was the person responsible for the operation, that is namely the arrest of those people, you went above orders contrary to the arrangements and decided to shoot at the occupants of that vehicle?

MR BOTHA: Chairperson, the purpose was not or there was no prior decision taken beforehand that the people had to be killed.

MR WEBSTER: I want to take to the scene now of the shooting as you were then travelling on the road. You told us that you were in the left lane, the vehicle was in the centre lane, remember?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR WEBSTER: And before it stopped you slackened a bit so it was slightly ahead of you?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

MR WEBSTER: You then say that the kombi overtook the vehicle, drove in front of the vehicle, stopped so that the vehicle collided into the rear of the kombi, remember?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WEBSTER: Is that when the firing then started?

MR BOTHA: The shooting had already started before that, before the vehicle collided for the second time the shooting had already taken place.

MR WEBSTER: You didn't know where it came from?

MR BOTHA: I shot, I fired shots.

MR WEBSTER: We've heard that you shot at the wheels?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WEBSTER: Now you don't know where that shooting came from?

MR BOTHA: As far as the other shots are concerned, it came from the right hand side of that vehicle, that's where it originated from.

MR WEBSTER: Now it could not then have come from the kombi because the kombi was already ahead of that vehicle?

MR BOTHA: No but the kombi was in front of the vehicle after the shooting had already taken place. The shooting took place whilst the kombi was on the right hand side of this suspect vehicle.

MR WEBSTER: Now we have an application from Wasserman and from that application it appears that the shots which he fired or that could have been fired into the vehicle could not have been a fuselage or a number of shots but a couple of shots?

MR VISSER: Chairperson, I would like to hear from my learned friend where he finds that in Wasserman's affidavit?

MR WEBSTER: Sorry, we'll get the evidence from the applicant himself when he testifies.

But are you saying that there was heavy firing from the kombi before the kombi drove ahead of this vehicle and stopped?

MR BOTHA: Shots were fired from the direction of the kombi.

MR WEBSTER: Now this is what I want to establish from you, was it just a couple of shots or was it heavy firing?

MR BOTHA: There was fairly heavy shooting. From the moment I started shooting there was a massive attack of shots being fired from various directions.

MR WEBSTER: We know that you were firing?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WEBSTER: We know the kombi was firing. Where else was the shooting coming from?

MR BOTHA: From the right hand rear side of my vehicle.

MR WEBSTER: The vehicles then all came to a stop at some stage or another?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WEBSTER: Can you then tell us which vehicles were at which position after they came to a stop?

MR BOTHA: My vehicle, the one that I drove, was on the left hand side at the rear, in relation to the suspect vehicle the kombi was in front of the vehicle and then there were other vehicles behind us, I can't remember the exact positions and who drove them etcetera.

MR WEBSTER: Because it was at three main carriageway, would you say that those vehicles that were behind were in the lane in which the vehicle was?

MR BOTHA: I can't recall but there were vehicles behind my vehicle, possibly spread over the three lanes or two lanes, but there were vehicles, I can't remember exactly where each of them was.

MR WEBSTER: Okay, the fast lane, was that open to traffic when your vehicles all came to a stop?

MR BOTHA: I'm not sure, it might have been the case, I can't recall.

MR WEBSTER: As best as you can recall Mr Botha, was there a vehicle on the fast lane, a vehicle from the reaction unit, whatever with any of the police officers?

MR BOTHA: There were vehicles behind my vehicle so the possibility existed there could have been such a vehicle.

MR WEBSTER: No, I understand, you've already told me about the vehicles behind yours, I'm talking about vehicles on the fast lane. Were there such vehicles?

MR BOTHA: What I can recall is as I've described that my vehicle was on the left hand side of the suspect vehicle, the vehicle itself and then to the right in front of the suspect vehicle or kombi.

MR WEBSTER: You cannot then recall any other vehicles on this - whether behind you or behind the suspect vehicle or in the fast lane?

MR BOTHA: There were vehicles behind mine that I can recall but I can't recall exactly. Well, it was a long time ago, I can't remember exactly where they were but there were vehicles behind mine.

MR WEBSTER: Was at any stage that any other vehicle could have shot from the left of the vehicle in which the four occupants were besides your vehicle?

MR BOTHA: I suppose it's possible because when the shooting starting there was heavy shooting so it's possible.

MR WEBSTER: What is possible?

MR BOTHA: Chair, let me explain that during this shooting it wasn't only police vehicles that were present, there were also vehicles belonging to members of the public. We tried to put these vehicles between ourselves and the suspect vehicle so there weren't only police vehicles on the road but also many other vehicles driven by members of the public.

MR WEBSTER: Don't be evasive Mr Botha, my question to you is very simple insofar as shots being fired from the left side of that vehicle, was there any other vehicle from which shots could have come besides your vehicle?

MR BOTHA: It's possible.

MR WEBSTER: Which vehicle would that have been?

MR BOTHA: I can't remember but it's possible.

MR WEBSTER: This is strange, Mr Botha, you're in radio communication, from what you have told us, your vehicle was the only vehicle as far as I can understand that was to the left of the vehicle in which the occupants were and there's possibility there was another vehicle on the left hand side that you cannot even remember or can tell us about? Is that the position?

MR BOTHA: Chairperson, as I've already testified there were several vehicles, not only police vehicles but vehicles belonging to members of the public, the road was very busy when it took place.

MR WEBSTER: I'm not talking of ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: No, Mr Chairperson ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I think if that you would be doing yourself a favour, the questions are really being directed at the police vehicles. Admittedly there were other vehicles that were using the road and so on but I think that we are concentrating on the police vehicles, the vehicles of the reaction unit and so on, that's what he is talking about. That's what you're interested in?

MR WEBSTER: Chairperson, thank you for that.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VISSER: But Chairperson, this witness has said time and again "I didn't look back, I don't know where those vehicles were". He keeps on saying that and it's the only answer he gives.

CHAIRPERSON: No, we're asking him about whether there was firing from those vehicles.

MR VISSER: Yes well he says he doesn't know where the vehicles were.

CHAIRPERSON: That there was heavy firing the question seems to be - you see the way, the picture we've got is here is a suspect vehicle, this vehicle is behind that, the kombi was alongside and at some stage got in front. He talks about heavy firing and I don't have a picture in my mind as to where that heavy firing came from apart from his attempt at shooting behind and the kombi. Now, were there other vehicles that were firing?

MR VISSER: Yes he gave that answer, he said from behind him and to his right there was also firing but he didn't observe the motor vehicles, Chairperson.

MR WEBSTER: Yes, so there was firing from other police vehicles, plain and simple isn't it?

MR BOTHA: That is correct Chairperson.

MR WEBSTER: Chairperson, my interest at the moment is vehicles to the left of the vehicle of that Cressida. Not interested in all the other, behind the vehicle, to the right of the vehicle, we're talking about the left of that vehicle.

MR BOTHA: It is possible but if I may just explain, in a situation like this where shots are fired so quickly, your attention is focused on the vehicle in front of you and the danger and the problem, I was nearly knocked off the road twice, so there's not a lot of time to then make observations around me. Your focus is on the present situation.

MR WEBSTER: Surely you would have known or been aware of the presence of another vehicle in front of you, police vehicle in front of you which could have fired at that Cressida because I take it that that vehicle, once the Cressida had come to a stop would have also stopped there, not just driven away that you could never have seen it, do you agree with me?

MR BOTHA: Sorry, could you just repeat the question?

CHAIRPERSON: Is it possible that apart from the kombi where you say at one stage was on the right hand side of the suspect vehicle and then came in front of the suspect vehicle, there was a collision between the suspect vehicle and the rear of the kombi, was there a possibility that there was another police vehicle?

MR WEBSTER: On the left hand side of the Cressida.

CHAIRPERSON: On the left hand side in front of the Cressida.

MR WEBSTER: In front of Mr Botha's vehicle.

CHAIRPERSON: In front of your vehicle on the left hand side. Could there have been a vehicle on the left hand side of the suspect vehicle?

MR BOTHA: As I said, it's possible but I can't remember it.

CHAIRPERSON: You can't remember.

MR WEBSTER: All things consider, Mr Botha, that vehicle would not have driven away after the Cressida was stopped, do you agree?

MR BOTHA: Which vehicle?

MR WEBSTER: If the vehicle, another vehicle had been present in front of your vehicle?

CHAIRPERSON: Police vehicle?

MR WEBSTER: Police vehicle from which shots could have been fired?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, did any of the police vehicles drive away immediately after the suspect vehicle had come to a stop?

MR BOTHA: It's very possible, it's possible but I can't remember.

MR WEBSTER: Mr Botha, very possible is so wide that as a former senior officer I would have thought that you talk about probabilities. I want to put it to you that it's inherently improbable that such a vehicle would have existed that it would have driven away and that you would just be saying it's possible. There was no such a vehicle, do you agree?

MR BOTHA: I said that I can't remember, I conceded that the possibility existed but I can't remember.

MR WEBSTER: I want to suggest some reason for this amnesia in this regard Mr Botha.

MR VISSER: But just before my learned friend - Chairperson, may I come in here?

CHAIRPERSON: You'll re-examine, you'll re-examine.

MR VISSER: But Chairperson, with respect, if my learned friend is going to cross-examine a witness, at least he should put to him is it his case that there was in fact a police vehicle before this witness? It's quite simple to put that to the witness and we'll all know what this is about. We are now on a speculation and we're going on to a second speculation upon a first speculation that there might have been a vehicle. We still don't know. This witness says he was behind that car, he didn't see another police vehicle, now couldn't my learned friend just tell all of us whether he is putting to the witness that there was such a vehicle then we can speculate from a fact, Chairperson, at least.

CHAIRPERSON: Alright, I think I would myself require that to be clarified. It's your contention that to the left of the suspect vehicle and in front of his vehicle there was another vehicle, another police vehicle?

MR WEBSTER: Chairperson, unfortunately when you're dealing with cases of this nature where the families do not have access, we don't even have dockets of mysteriously ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Well there are no eyewitnesses accounted for.

MR WEBSTER: I have Chairperson, the only thing as my weapon at the moment are post-mortems and I will deal with why I make or question the witness ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Well now you see that is what is important you see, to ask questions for the sake of asking questions gets us nowhere, I also don't want to - I also would like to know the direction in which we are moving when you ask these questions.

MR WEBSTER: Chairperson, the direction is towards the end these post-mortems.

CHAIRPERSON: Well get to them.

MR WEBSTER: Chairperson, I don't know whether jumping into the post-mortems is really going to get us, without laying the basis ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: No, I'm not saying you must jump into the post-mortems. You know, I don't have a clear picture, I got the impression you were going to put to this witness that there was in fact another vehicle to the left of the suspect vehicle, that's the point of your questioning?

MR WEBSTER: Chairperson, what I'm going to say to him is that some of the occupants had injuries on their bodies which were on the left sides of the bodies.

CHAIRPERSON: Put that to him.

MR WEBSTER: Chairperson, with all of the respect may I be allowed to lay the basis for getting to that?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR WEBSTER: Because otherwise I know the answer is going to be "it's possible" or "it's not possible" and we are not getting to probabilities and I think you are interested in probabilities Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes we are, we're interested in arriving at as much of the truth as possible.

MR WEBSTER: Thank you Chairperson.

Before we get to the post-mortems, we're getting closer to the post-mortems, Mr Botha. Can you tell us about the positions of the occupants?

CHAIRPERSON: You mean how many sat in the front, how many at the back or who sat where, is that it?

MR WEBSTER: Chairperson could we just ...(intervention)

(Disturbance from members of the public)

CHAIRPERSON: I will ask you to leave this hall if you interrupt these proceedings. You will have a chance to talk. Please don't interrupt these proceedings. Yes do carry on.

MR WEBSTER: The various, there were four people in that vehicle and I would just like to have some idea about who was sitting where?

MR BOTHA: Chairperson, there were four people in the vehicle, I can't - but I didn't know the people, so I can't tell you which person, which individual sat where, but there were four people in the vehicle.

MR WEBSTER: Who is Capt or who was Capt L Botha?

MR BOTHA: Capt L Botha was a colleague of mine who was later transferred to I think it was Port Elizabeth or East London.

MR WEBSTER: He was in the special branch?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WEBSTER: Was he present on that day?

MR BOTHA: I'm not sure.

MR WEBSTER: You see, one of the strange things is that Capt Botha was able to state on affidavit where each of the persons were seated, do you find that strange?

MR BOTHA: I suppose it's possible.

MR WEBSTER: Possible? Probability?

MR BOTHA: As I said it's a possibility.

CHAIRPERSON: He doesn't even remember whether he was there?

MR BOTHA: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR WEBSTER: Were the occupants, that is now after they had been shot at, were they in seated positions?

MR BOTHA: They were still in the particular vehicle in a semi-seated position, some of them.

MR WEBSTER: Let's talk about the left front passenger, what position was he in?

MR BOTHA: Chairperson, it is not easy for me to describe thirteen years afterwards as to what the attitude and the position and lying and the seating of each individual in that vehicle.

MR WEBSTER: At best could you recall whether he was in a seated position?

MR BOTHA: It is possible.

MR WEBSTER: And the one who was in the left back, left rear passenger, was he also in a seated position?

MR BOTHA: Chairperson, the persons who were killed, so if we speak of a seating position then we do not speak of a upright seating position but we would say a seating/lying position if I recall correctly.

MR WEBSTER: You see because according to my instructions after rigor mortis the people were still in seated positions, that's according to the families. You wouldn't dispute that?

MR BOTHA: Chairperson, it is not logical that a person who had already been killed would remain in a seated position, in an upright seated position.

MR WEBSTER: But in a seated position.

CHAIRPERSON: They may have been reclining but still seated.

MR WEBSTER: That is the point I'm making, not necessarily straight up but generally in a seated position, that's all I want to know.

CHAIRPERSON: Quite right, in other words they were not standing and they were not sleeping, they were not lying down.

MR BOTHA: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR WEBSTER: Okay let's take the first one and that would be the person who was seated in the left front. According to the post-mortem and according to the affidavit of Capt L Botha, that person was Mbongeni Henry Zondi. You ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: Chairperson, can we now hand them in as exhibits so that we know where we are, Chairperson?

MR WEBSTER: That would be post-mortem number 2021/86, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Hold it. 2021?

MR WEBSTER: 2021.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes?

MR WEBSTER: According to Capt L Botha he was seated on the left front passenger side or seat of the vehicle. You would not dispute that?

MR BOTHA: One moment please, Chairperson?

MR LAX: It's on the third page of that set of documents.

Sorry Mr Webster, is this going to be the first one you're going to refer to?

MR WEBSTER: This is the first one I'm referring to.

CHAIRPERSON: Alright, do carry on.

MR LAX: That will be Chair, Exhibit E.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well.

MR WEBSTER: Could we then take - we should have actually started with 2019 but we'll make 2019 Exhibit F, that relates to Mabaso.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes?

MR WEBSTER: 2020

MR LAX: That's Brian Thabani Mamela?

CHAIRPERSON: Exhibit G

CHAIRPERSON: What is the number.

MR WEBSTER: Sorry, 2022 Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR WEBSTER: If we've also numbered them unfortunately it's not going to be very scientific.

CHAIRPERSON: But we'll do the best we can.

MR WEBSTER: We'll do the best we can. There is an annexure to paragraph 4 which is labelled DR31/86, it's a typed list of various injuries that were found on the body of the deceased.

CHAIRPERSON: Is it an annexure to paragraph 4 of what document?

MR WEBSTER: Of Exhibit E.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Yes, do you want to give us a number as well?

MR WEBSTER: May we say it's E13. We have not numbered the ...(intervention)

MR LAX: Sorry Chair, should we not just paginate this bundle E and then we'll get the page reference E - whatever it is?

MR WEBSTER: It will then be page 14, A 14, the first one being the cover.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR WEBSTER: Mr Botha, we see according to E14 that the deceased had at least ten injuries, do you agree with me?

MR BOTHA: Chairperson, may I just have regard to the document?

MR VISSER: It's actually page 15.

MR WEBSTER: It would be 15? I'm sorry, I'm indebted to my learned friend.

CHAIRPERSON: Alright.

MR WEBSTER: E15 and E16 is the list of the injuries that were found on the deceased's body, do you agree? I want us to go to E17. I take it that injuries marked 1, 2 and 3 on the figure on the top left corner of E17, the arrows depicting a downward direction would seem to indicate that the shots or the injuries must have been caused by bullets coming from above and from the right side of the body of the deceased in that case, do you agree?

MR BOTHA: It's possible, Chairperson.

MR WEBSTER: That there can be no other explanation?

Do you agree?

CHAIRPERSON: He said it is possible.

MR WEBSTER: Bearing in mind that those - sorry, I'll rephrase the question Chairperson. Those injuries could not have been caused by shooting from you, do you agree with me?

MR BOTHA: That is correct, Chairperson, I don't believe that it was my shots that I had fired.

MR WEBSTER: And similarly with injuries depicted as 8 and 5, on that figure on E15?

MR BOTHA: 8 and 5?

MR WEBSTER: 8 is on the right hand thumb of the figure and 5 is from the right knee of that figure.

MR BOTHA: Chairperson, may I just ask, this person where was he seated?

MR WEBSTER: E3, that is left front.

MR BOTHA: Left front? It is difficult to distinguish, Chairperson, if we look at 8, point 8 on page 17, then one could assume or I suppose that this person's hand was low or it could have been high. It's difficult to say whether these were my shots because I crouched low in the vehicle but it is impossible for me to say whether it was my shots or not.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, let's proceed.

MR WEBSTER: But from what you've told us, you didn't - you couldn't have held your firearm at such a height that would have hit a hand when you were aiming at the wheel. It reversed to that ground yesterday?

MR BOTHA: What I had said was that I shot at the left rear wheel of the vehicle but it may be possible that some of my rounds may have been fired off higher than just the wheel.

ADV BOSMAN: Mr Botha, may I just have clarity? I'm sorry to interrupt, Mr Webster.

What type of firearm did you have?

MR BOTHA: It was a 9 mm pistol.

ADV BOSMAN: So it was not an automatic firearm?

MR BOTHA: No.

ADV BOSMAN: Thank you. You may proceed, Mr Webster.

MR WEBSTER: Thank you.

You see, I'm suggesting to you, Mr Botha, that none of these could have been caused by you, do you agree?

MR BOTHA: I don't know, Chairperson.

MR WEBSTER: And if one then bears in mind what the doctor has said regarding the cause of death, namely as being injuries 1, 2 and 3, then you could not have been responsible for the death of that person, do you agree?

MR BOTHA: As I have said, Chairperson, I don't know.

MR WEBSTER: Come on, Mr Botha, what can you speculate? That your bullets could have come from the right hand side bullets causing injuries 1, 2 and 3?

MR BOTHA: No, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, my learned friend is being unfair to the witness. Does he have evidence in what direction this deceased was looking at the time he was shot? He might have been looking backwards for all we know. We're on such highly speculative ground, Chairperson. If my learned friend wants a concession from us, that the probabilities are that these bullet wounds were no caused by this witness, I will gladly concede it and we can get on with the matter. But surely, Chairperson, speculating with the witness, none of the two of them being an expert, none of the two of them having been on the scene to say what really happened. It takes us nowhere, with respect, Chairperson.

MR WEBSTER: With respect, no, not the two of us were not on the scene, Mr Botha was on the scene.

CHAIRPERSON: We are dealing with a fast moving incident where there is firing from all sides.

MR WEBSTER: That is quite so, I understand Chairperson, but ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: You haven't got a situation that is frozen and you are now examining it. This is an event that is developing fast and shooting. The injuries to the right hand side of the body, the head and so on, on your version it would be improbable for those injuries to have been caused by this man if he says he aimed at lower left rear of the car.

MR WEBSTER: Yes, that's all I wanted from the witness.

CHAIRPERSON: All he says, he aimed at the left rear of the car, some of his shots may not have gone to the level of the wheel, they may have gone higher up, that's as far as he goes.

MR WEBSTER: But insofar as the injuries and looking at them, Chairperson, with the greatest of respect, I do not think that sitting here as you are sitting, Chairperson, that one could even - if I were to argue that those were caused by the shots fired by this witness, aiming at the wheel even though they may have gone a little higher, that injuries 1, 2 and 3 could conceivably have been caused by him.

CHAIRPERSON: Unless the man was crouching at the time.

MR WEBSTER: Unless he was crouching with his head in such a direction in which case, bearing in mind that the left front seat and not even the back, the probability recedes even further.

CHAIRPERSON: Just let's talk about the probabilities, but you can't pin things down and come to definite final conclusions beyond a man saying "I fired at this vehicle, I don't think that I shot anybody, I don't think I shot anybody" and that's as far as he goes?

MR WEBSTER: Mr Botha, is it your evidence as the Chairperson has summarised it that insofar as you believed you did not shoot anybody?

MR BOTHA: Chairperson, I have a possibility that some of my shots may have hit the people, I fired at the left rear of the vehicle but it is possible that some of them - I do not know but it may be.

MR WEBSTER: Chairperson, I have to put the next question ...(intervention).

CHAIRPERSON: You see there are people in the back seat, there are four passengers, some in the back, two in the front. We're dealing with the injury to the man in the front and these are all probabilities. You are firing from behind and it is being put that the injury to the chap on the front left hand side could not have been caused by you?

MR BOTHA: It's possible Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that as far as we can go?

MR WEBSTER: Chairperson, I am grateful.

And again the next question that I put is also merely on probability and subject to confirmation of instructions that as I indicated yesterday and even when it suggests further that injuries 1, 2 and 3 - Chairperson, this is speculative, it's the best I can do with the information available to me, please pardon me?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes do carry on.

MR WEBSTER: That injuries 1, 2 and 3 again on probability would be very consistent with firing from above the vehicle and hence the direction of the injuries of the bullets through the deceased's head.

CHAIRPERSON: Well now that doesn't convey a clear picture to me when you say from above the vehicle and then through the roof of the car?

MR WEBSTER: Through the roof of the car.

CHAIRPERSON: That's what you say could have happened?

MR WEBSTER: That could have happened, as I say unfortunately because of the inability to secure the necessary evidence may I ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Well there was no ballistic evidence at all, was there?

MR WEBSTER: At the moment nothing is available, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, right.

MR WEBSTER: So as I say I'll ask for your indulgence in putting that question.

CHAIRPERSON: It's being suggested that the injuries to the top of the head might have been caused from shots fired from above the car. Have you any comment to make?

MR BOTHA: Chairperson, I think it is highly improbable.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, let's move on, it's improbable as far as he is concerned.

MR WEBSTER: We go on to Exhibit F, dealing with Blessing Mabaso. According to Capt Botha he was the driver of the vehicle and whilst we just look at the first page of Exhibit F you will notice there that there's a note: "The deceased was the driver of a vehicle which was conveying suspected terrorists and was killed in the shoot-out with the police, do you see that?

MR BOTHA: I see that Chairperson.

MR WEBSTER: That note must have been disinformation given to Capt Botha about the shoot-out, you admit that I'm sure?

MR BOTHA: Chairperson, I cannot comment to that.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. You don't know what was said to Lt Botha?

MR BOTHA: I don't know.

MR WEBSTER: But it would have been consistent with your actions afterwards in planting guns?

CHAIRPERSON: They could have easily denied that they planted the guns, they could have said that the guns were in the car.

MR WEBSTER: Pardon Sir?

CHAIRPERSON: They could have easily said that the guns were in the car.

MR WEBSTER: I agree Sir, but what I'm saying is what the witness has now admitted that this would be consistent with the planting of the guns in other words the shoot-out.

CHAIRPERSON: That's a matter for argument and a guess.

MR WEBSTER: We'll leave it at that, thank you Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Yes.

MR WEBSTER: Let's go again to the ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Mabaso.

MR WEBSTER: We are dealing with Mabaso, the annexure again, of F, I think it's page 11 and probably whilst we are still here, it's quite in order, according to this exhibit the deceased had minimum of 11 injuries on his body, do you agree?

MR BOTHA: I see that it is so, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And if we look at 11 and 12, if we look at F13 and look on the figure on the right, unfortunately Chairperson my numbers are not very legible but when you look at the figurine on the right, top right corner, you see a great number of injuries?

MR BOTHA: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Again, if you look at the injury on the left, the top left, on the right shoulder and then look at the figurine bottom left on the neck, it would appear that and considering what appears on descriptions on page 11 and 12, that none of those injuries could have come from the left or been fired from the left.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, with great respect, I hate to interrupt. My learned friend is putting points to the witness and he is misleading the Committee. I'm not saying he is doing so on purpose. Will you look at page 12 injury number 6 as an example. What does the doctor say about this, he says:

Clearly on the left and that Chairperson, according to his finding is a fatal shot. Then Chairperson, he says at the bottom of that page the last sentence:

My learned friend is not putting accurately to the witness what the report appears to state, we having heard the doctor, we haven't heard any evidence but on the face value, Chairperson, there are four wounds that clearly according to the doctors and we will draw your attention to it later. According to the medical legal report, it clearly penetrated at least on the left side of the body if not from the left side of the body.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR WEBSTER: Chairperson, we'll deal with that counsel was getting ...(indistinct) we'll deal with the wounds. Let's deal with wound number 6. Look at the right, page 14, right bottom figure, look at the direction of the arrow, Mr Botha. Project your mind at seated passenger and the possibility of you on the left rear firing and hitting the person at the spot where it is indicated on the body, the exit wound being on the left side of the neck and tell me that that wound could have in any way have been caused by your firing from the left side of that vehicle bearing in mind that this person was the driver. Is there any probability that that could be so?

MR BOTHA: Chairperson, it is difficult for me to speculate here, a person or I cannot say in which position every individual body was during the shooting incident. According to my judgement they would have looked around to the left or to the right and that would certainly have influenced the exit and entry wounds so it is difficult to comment.

MR WEBSTER: You see unfortunately we just talk on probabilities since we don't have evidence, Mr Botha, I understand that.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but I think that you can't pin things down with any level of certainty.

MR WEBSTER: That is agreed, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And I'm afraid that is what you are trying to do.

MR WEBSTER: No, no, all I'm saying is on looking at this, looking at this injury, the probabilities.

CHAIRPERSON: That is the level that you can put it.

MR WEBSTER: That is the level at which I'm putting it, Chairperson and not as a fact, I couldn't ever do that but on the level of probability, wound number 6 could never have been caused from you firing from the left hand side.

MR BOTHA: Chairperson, it is difficult to speculate. If we look at this page 13 to which you refer, and that was the driver, it is difficult to speculate but I don't know.

MR WEBSTER: We'll leave it at that, we'll get the doctor to tell us. Let's do Exhibit H quickly, sorry G, I'm sorry it is Exhibit G. It is Mamela, G17, 18, 19 and 20. Would you agree with me that according to the doctor the injuries indicates that caused the death were 2, 4 and 7? 2, 4 and 7, it's at the bottom, it appears on bottom of page 17, last sentence. Chairperson, I wonder if you would have the original with you, at least the original photocopy because the others are copies from copies.

MR LAX: Sorry, the summary appears on page 18 not 17, you said 17.

MR WEBSTER: My apologies, I noticed that pages are missing from some of the exhibits and I'm talking of the page with the four figures of the body, the figurines here, that's the page at which I'm at and which the numbers of the wounds are set out. Unfortunately I've got a very poor copy but we then will revert to the description. Wound number two reads:

MR LAX: Mr Webster, that wound is - if you look on page 19, it's the lower right hand figure, the injury to the neck there is visible only as a 2, although it's a bit light you can see it quite clearly.

MR WEBSTER: I was going to so speculate, thank you Sir, but that is the wound on Mr Mamela, wound number two and we know from page G3 that Mr Mamela was the right rear passenger.

You could not have caused that wound?

MR BOTHA: I don't believe that I could have caused it Chairperson because this person, according to the document was seated on the right hand side in the back seat so this was in line with the shots which I fired which were aimed at the left rear tyre.

MR WEBSTER: I need some assistance in this regard Chairperson, wound number 4, it appears to be looking at the top left figure, to be on the left front side of the chest/

MR LAX: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR WEBSTER: You see that on the figure?

MR WEBSTER: Yes page 9, Chairperson. That is correct.

MR LAX: Just below the sternum. Round about the side of the sternum.

MR WEBSTER: The top section of the sternum, yes, or probably just above, I think whilst looking at it but looking at that you couldn't have caused that wound either?

MR BOTHA: Yes, I doubt it.

CHAIRPERSON: You see Chairperson, that's the danger of this cross-examination.

CHAIRPERSON: Just let him get done please, Mr Visser, so he can get done and you can make all the points that you wish about how valuable this is or not otherwise we are going to carry on. Please get done.

MR WEBSTER: And the same with wound number seven, do you agree?

MR BOTHA: Chairperson, my documents are very illegible.

CHAIRPERSON: Just help him point out wound seven precisely so that he can follow it on his diagram?

MR WEBSTER: In the description it says:

MR BOTHA: Which page Chairperson?

MR WEBSTER: 17, the second page of the list of the injuries, the very top one.

MR LAX: Just for the record that's page 18, you're obviously missing a page.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, what is the description.

CHAIRPERSON: Now you will tell me what that means?

MR WEBSTER: I seem to understand it to be on the right shoulder, where the shoulder, the bottom shoulder - was it on the front side? I'm not really sure here, Chairperson, but as best I can, but towards on the right side of the body.

MR LAX: Mr Webster, if you look on page 20 which is the second page of diagrams, 7 is marked there with a line coming down.

MR WEBSTER: Would that be on the right side?

MR LAX: The figure on ...(intervention)

MR WEBSTER: Top left?

MR LAX: Correct.

MR WEBSTER: Again we agree that not likely?

MR BOTHA: That is correct, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Not impossible, but not likely?

MR WEBSTER: Thank you Sir.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR WEBSTER: That's the highest that one can pitch it.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR WEBSTER: Mr Botha and again, Chairperson, I will ask you to bear with me, there are some newspaper cuttings which we've managed to circulate. I don't know if you've had a chance to just look at them, Mr Botha?

MR BOTHA: I haven't seen it, Chairperson.

MR WEBSTER: I'm not going to suggest that those are the facts that what's there is true and correct, they are after all newspaper reports but they do seem to suggest that the police had great difficulty in issuing statements regarding this incidents, do you agree with me? And when I say statements ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: You are asking him whether he agrees that that is what he has reported?

MR WEBSTER: That they had difficulties in the police issuing statements with the facts relating to the death of the four people.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you know anything at all about that?

MR BOTHA: No, Chairperson, I did not come to hear of that.

MR WEBSTER: And it appears when one looks at this and again, Chairperson, with your indulgence, looking at the third page of these cuttings, the head note reads:

And the bottom right:

CHAIRPERSON: What is your question?

MR WEBSTER: I'm just going to suggest that indeed there was difficulty in the police issuing statements to explain this killing. Chairperson, I'm not putting it as a fact, I'm putting it as I indicated to you, as suggestion.

CHAIRPERSON: Well what question do you want to put to this witness?

MR WEBSTER: Would he agree with that suggestion?

MR BOTHA: Chairperson, I was not responsible, there was a officer appointed who would handle press releases at that stage so I would not know.

MR WEBSTER: This penultimate point that I wish to take, Mr Botha, after the killings from what I understand your evidence, it was either you or the general who came up with the suggestion of getting arms and planting them on the deceased?

MR BOTHA: Chairperson, Gen Steyn and I collectively decided at the scene that the weapons were to be fetched and I planted the arms in the vehicle.

MR WEBSTER: What I want to know, Mr Botha, and this is the question I'm going to ask you, the thought could not have emanated from the two of you simultaneously, not the agreement, the thought, whose idea was it?

MR BOTHA: Chairperson, it's difficult to say now, it could have been either mine or either General Steyn's but it was definitely one of the two of us who decided or came forward with the idea.

MR WEBSTER: Mr Botha, if you look to your right you will see members of the families of those four young people that you murdered. I take it that you are aware that their presence here is because they want to know who killed their children? Is that not so?

MR BOTHA: It's probably so, Chairperson.

MR WEBSTER: And from your evidence they can never ever know who killed their children, is that not so?

MR BOTHA: Chairperson, I have sketched it to the Committee that I fired shots and other members of the South African Police fired shots and what else can I say?

MR WEBSTER: Do you agree with me, Chairperson, that in their minds they will be justified in going away with that uncertainty and lack of knowledge about the identities of the killers, they will not even know who to forgive and who to pardon and who to reconcile with regarding the death of their children because we only have possibilities, we don't even know who killed their children?

MR BOTHA: Chairperson, I cannot state here what their thoughts are at the moment, the family members who are here, I don't know what they are thinking.

CHAIRPERSON: You can never know what ...(intervention)

Sorry, Mr Botha, please finish?

MR BOTHA: It's difficult to comment as to how the families feel.

MR WEBSTER: You cannot dispute that that is how they feel, the way I've described for you is the way that they feel, you cannot dispute that?

MR BOTHA: You represent them so I would assume that it is so.

MR WEBSTER: Mr Botha, I didn't hear you at any stage, I know it's not one of the requirements for amnesty, I didn't hear any indication of any remorse from your side, am I correct?

MR BOTHA: Up to this stage not yet Chairperson.

MR WEBSTER: Chairperson, may I stop there and ask your indulgence that some concrete evidence come up and only on those aspects, namely that is the helicopter and the shots being fired from above the vehicle and in no other respect, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes I understand except that you would have realised that this Amnesty Committee doesn't have an indefinite lifespan?

MR WEBSTER: That is quite so, Chairperson, I am asking that indulgence with that pertinently in mind, thank you Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Right you are, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Have you any questions to put to this witness, Ms Thabethe?

MS THABETHE: No questions, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, re-examination?

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson.

Mr Botha, I will not enter into argument with you but let us just set the record straight? I would request you to once again page to Exhibit G, this incident deals with a person who sat on the back seat on the right hand side. You have conceded according to the questions which my learned friend put to you that wound number 4 could not have been caused by you, do you recall that?

MR BOTHA: Exhibit G?

MR VISSER: Exhibit G page 17 deals with the person who was on the back seat on the right hand side. You have conceded in cross-examination of Mr Webster that if you fired shots at the vehicle that those shots could have caused wound number 4?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Well let us have a look at page 19? Before we arrive at the description, I will read the description and it would seem that on the right hand side figure on page 19 the topmost wound, although we cannot read it clearly, would be the entrance wound of wound number 4?

MR BOTHA: It would seem so.

MR VISSER: And on the left figure at the number 4 is the exit wound?

MR BOTHA: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Well let us see what the doctor has to say about that. On page 17, Chairperson and that was the fatal shot, Chairperson, one of the shots which could have caused the death. The fourth wound is a wound anterior to the chest, that's in front and exists of a round wound, this enters the chest cavity and goes through the anterior edge of the left lung and whatever else that means. The rest I can't quite understand, Chairperson. "Enters the heart sac and so forth and so forth."

From this cryptic description of this wound which speaks of whatever the round hit would be directly behind which you see on the left hand figure and if the suspicion is correct that it entered from behind and exited in front, do you still say that you could not have possibly caused that wound?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VISSER: So you say so? Very well.

Commissioner Bosman asked you with which weapon you fired and you said with a pistol?

MR BOTHA: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And then she asked you if it was an automatic weapon and you said no.

MR BOTHA: It was a 9 mm parabellum firearm Chairperson.

MR VISSER: The question is was it an automatic weapon?

MR BOTHA: It was not a machine gun as such.

MR VISSER: But that's not what I'm asking you, is it not an automatic weapon?

MR BOTHA: It can fire more than one shot.

MR WEBSTER: I'm sorry Chairperson, I don't know whether that is re-examination, it seems to be bordering on cross-examination?

CHAIRPERSON: I think that this is not a trial, this is a Committee of Enquiry, it will help us.

MR WEBSTER: Thank you Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: If that question was not asked we might have asked some of it ourselves. I want to know how many rounds that 9 mm pistol would carry?

MR VISSER: To satisfy Commissioner Bosman's question, this pistol has a magazine, is that correct?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Which holds a certain amount of rounds. With which weapon did you fire?

MR BOTHA: A 9mm parabellum.

MR VISSER: CZ75? What type of weapon.

MR BOTHA: A 9mm parabellum.

MR VISSER: And how many rounds did the magazine hold?

MR BOTHA: I'm not certain but I think nine.

MR VISSER: And to answer the question further, the moment when you fired a shot by pulling the trigger of the firearm, what do you have to do to fire the next shot?

MR BOTHA: You once again pull the trigger.

MR VISSER: So all you do is you pull the trigger, is that what you did?

MR BOTHA: Yes Chairperson.

MR VISSER: So it is not a machine gun where you just once pull the trigger, the difference is it's an automatic weapon but you have to pull the trigger all the time but it loads itself?

MR BOTHA: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: In other words each time you pull the trigger it only fires one bullet?

MR BOTHA: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And you've told us it carries, the magazine carries 9 bullets?

MR BOTHA: I think so, I might be wrong but I think it's 9 Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Alright. Have you any recollection as to whether you used more than one magazine that day?

MR BOTHA: No definitely not, not more than one magazine, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And the magazine which you used was it full before you started firing? Would you have ascertained that your magazine is full?

MR BOTHA: I am not certain whether it was full but I would believe that there were enough rounds in the vehicle.

MR VISSER: And did you empty the magazine or what is the position?

MR BOTHA: I am not certain but I believe that some of the rounds remained in the magazine.

MR VISSER: After or when the shooting commenced did you then foresee the danger that persons could be killed?

MR BOTHA: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And you say you heard many shots?

MR BOTHA: Reasonably many.

MR VISSER: And by your action you associated yourself with the order?

MR BOTHA: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: When afterwards you investigated and you saw that four persons were killed in the vehicle, did you then associate yourself with this action?

MR BOTHA: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And you have testified that you went further, you tried to better the police's side by testifying falsely?

MR BOTHA: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And while we are at that point, Mr Webster asked you are you a person who had lied much in the past and had compromised your position as a senior officer, can you recall that?

MR BOTHA: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And you gave two answers, the one was you said yes and afterwards you said when this matter was taken further that in this matter you had lied. What did you mean when you said yes to the first question that you had often told lies?

MR BOTHA: Chairperson, I was honest in the sense that during my work in the recent years it happened that one handled informers who when questions were put to them you could not give them honest answers and you would tell them lies with good intentions and it was also about the hiring of safe houses where you would not convey honesty to persons hiring the house out, because of circumstances one could not do so and the truth was contorted a little bit to protect informers.

MR VISSER: Was it also the fact that police stories concocted legends and cover stories?

MR BOTHA: You speak of cover stories?

MR VISSER: If you want to call it a cover story?

MR BOTHA: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: This cover story, what was it all about?

MR BOTHA: The cover story would be if one approached someone with a false name or false request in order to obtain information from people, it was part of my work.

MR VISSER: And also if one wanted to discredit somebody by distributing false information about the person?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VISSER: In other words you now are referring to so called lies which you have told or your dishonesties outside the courts?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR VISSER: But now in the legal system, in court, did you often tell lies there during evidence?

MR BOTHA: No Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Can you tell the Committee how many times you've done so?

MR BOTHA: Chairperson, with the post-mortem of Brian Mamela I did indeed do so.

MR VISSER: And in this matter?

MR BOTHA: This is this matter.

MR VISSER: Oh, Mamela, I thought he said Mamela, I'm sorry I misunderstood him.

MR VISSER: You were also questioned about the fact that you knew that this action was illegal, that is so, is it not so?

MR BOTHA: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And that is why you request amnesty?

MR BOTHA: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And it should it be that you have acted under a direct order which was illegal would you in the spirit of those circumstances had not obeyed such an instruction?

MR BOTHA: No Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Nothing further thank you Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

Mr Botha, how many people were in your car at the time when you were chasing this car?

MR BOTHA: It was only myself and Gen Steyn, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Did he sit alongside you in the front side?

MR BOTHA: That is correct, he was passenger on the left hand side of my vehicle.

CHAIRPERSON: Did he have a gun?

MR BOTHA: I don't think he had a weapon.

CHAIRPERSON: And you don't know whether he fired at this car as well?

MR BOTHA: No, he definitely didn't fire.

CHAIRPERSON: Have you any questions to put to this witness?

MS THABETHE: No Chairperson.

MR LAX: Thank you Chairperson.

Mr Botha, you spoke - let me just get this right, you were the first person to start shooting in this incident?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR LAX: You didn't hear any shots before you started firing at the back left tyre?

MR BOTHA: When I started shooting there had already been a shooting, a fraction of a second.

MR LAX: Sorry, say that again please?

MR BOTHA: From the moment that I started shooting there was just a very, very short moment afterwards when I heard the next shots being fired.

MR LAX: The way I heard it translated was as if you shot immediately after, a fraction after, but in fact it was the other way around?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR LAX: And you distinctly, the impression I gain from your evidence was that you distinctly saw the flashes of firearms on the right hand side?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR LAX: And that's how you thought you were being fired at?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR LAX: Now did you see any flashes on your left hand side?

MR BOTHA: No.

CHAIRPERSON: They may have been there but you paid no attention?

MR BOTHA: That is correct, my attention was focused on the vehicle.

MR LAX: The thrust of my question is this, is that if there had been shots on your left hand side, you were behind the vehicle at this stage, the kombi and the suspect vehicle were ahead of you?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

MR LAX: If there had been any shots from your left hand side ahead of you, you would have seen those flashes, you would have noticed them, it was dark after all?

MR BOTHA: Yes it was dark and as I said there were also members of the public amongst us so it was a very difficult situation and after the first shots were fired you were then quite tense and things happened very quickly.

MR LAX: Yes, I'm talking about the likelihood of you seeing shots ahead of you on the left hand side?

ADV BOSMAN: I can't recall that I saw flashes.

MR LAX: You certainly didn't hear shots coming from that direction?

MR BOTHA: There were many shots being fired and it's not possible, not easy to determine whether a shot which was quite close to you comes from a particular direction.

MR LAX: Okay. Now just one other small aspect that Mr Visser dealt with in re-examination, he said to you that you associated yourself with the order. What order was that?

MR VISSER: Chairperson, if I may, please forgive me but I said even if there was an order which we don't say because there wasn't an order in fact given to shoot but it was suggested, Chairperson, that there was an illegal order given and I put it to him on the basis that even if there was such an order would you disobeyed such an illegal order, that's what I intended to state.

MR LAX: I was just puzzled because his direct evidence was that there was no decision taken at any stage that he was aware of to kill these people?

MR VISSER: That's precisely correct, that's our evidence but that is what was put by my learned friend to the witness.

MR LAX: Until the point that the vehicle came to a stop, you had no idea that anybody had died yet?

MR BOTHA: Due to the number of shots that I heard I thought that somebody might be seriously injured or killed.

MR LAX: If we just add up the number of shots found on the bodies and that obviously doesn't include shots that missed those bodies and the shots that missed the vehicle altogether, we're talking about - if you'll just bear with me a moment, I didn't do it earlier, 19, 29, 40 ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: My attorney added it, Chairperson, it's 10, 11 and 19 which add up to 50. 40?

CHAIRPERSON: 31 and 19 is 50.

MR VISSER: 50. Except that it's not clear whether all of them are actually bullet wounds, there may be other wounds that one can distinguish as ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Entry wounds and exit wounds.

MR VISSER: Well also there was bumping of the cars, Chairperson, there may have been injuries, we don't really know because we haven't heard the doctor but it apparently seems as if there might have been 15 bullet wounds.

MR LAX: Just from my reading of those post-mortems and again obviously subject to that, the doctor does distinguish between lacerations and gunshot wounds in that and shrapnel wounds and so on so let's at least we can say with a degree of certainty that at least 15 odd shots were fired?

CHAIRPERSON: What is the question?

MR BOTHA: It's possible.

MR LAX: And you say you heard - you're not sure how many shots you heard. Would that accord with what you heard, with your recollection of what you heard?

MR BOTHA: Yes there was quite an intense gun battle going on so I'm going along with that number of shots, yes it was an intense exchange of fire.

MR LAX: Thank you Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Just help me, one tries to get as clear a picture as one can. You talked about intense shooting and I can't in my mind yet form a picture as to where the shooting came from apart from your car and the kombi. Now there were other police vehicles, they were behind you, they shot at this car from behind your car?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And they never came alongside your car, those other police vehicles, while they were shooting at this car in front? Is that the picture or is it not a clear picture?

MR BOTHA: Chairperson, as I testified I shot from the left rear of the vehicle of the kombi, who moved past us on the right and there were shots fired and then there were also shots from the rear of our vehicle to the right hand side, shots came from that direction as well, that's what I can recall.

CHAIRPERSON: How many people were in that kombi, do you know?

MR BOTHA: It was three people.

CHAIRPERSON: How many of them were armed, do you know?

MR BOTHA: I'm assuming that they were all armed.

CHAIRPERSON: And I take it you don't know who was in the vehicle immediately behind your vehicle?

MR BOTHA: If I was to speculate I think it would have been the reaction unit's vehicle who were shooting from behind.

CHAIRPERSON: And they were all armed?

MR BOTHA: Yes that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: One final question just to clear my mind, are you certain that there was never a decision that these people should be shot and killed beforehand?

MR BOTHA: Most definitely, there was no such a decision taken beforehand.

ADV BOSMAN: Mr Botha, when you were at kwaMashu Police Station, I seem to recall that you said that the purpose was that you planned preventative action?

MR BOTHA: Yes that is correct.

ADV BOSMAN: But what would the content of these plans be? What did the preventative action include?

MR BOTHA: It included to in respect of people whom we thought were on their way to attack certain targets, to arrest these people, to try and thereby prevent serious damage to property or loss of life.

ADV BOSMAN: Did you not discuss ways and means as to how you would prevent this and how you would stop these people. Surely you would have expected these people to be in possession of arms? Did you discuss the extent of the operation and how far you would have to go?

MR BOTHA: It's a very difficult situation, the problem was that if we could get the opportunity to arrest the people properly, but the problem was we didn't actually know which targets they had targeted so we didn't know where to arrest the people and we always had the fear that we would reveal the identity of our informers so what we did was to try and intercept people on the road when they left their homes.

ADV BOSMAN: Or is this said or implicitly or expressly that when this happened that shots had to be fired?

MR BOTHA: Yes, I mentioned in my statement, if I can perhaps just find the place, we discussed this amongst ourselves that if shots were fired at us we would have no choice but to fire back, we didn't realise that these were dangerous people and that we would have to deal with the situation as we found it.

ADV BOSMAN: On the evidence here it would seem to me as if it was an exercise "horribly gone wrong" that's the impression that I'm getting, am I right or wrong?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

ADV BOSMAN: Now if one looks at it ex post facto, what would do you think what went wrong, what caused this operation to go so awry because now we know that the people were not in possession of weapons?

MR BOTHA: After I tried to stop the vehicle by shouting, "police, police" people tried to force me off the road twice and then there was a collision with the front kombi in an attempt to flee and thereafter I decided to halt the vehicle by shooting at the tyres and thereafter the spontaneous exchange of fire took place.

ADV BOSMAN: Perhaps it's not a fair question but what triggered the shooting in your opinion? You were there.

MR BOTHA: It was try and bring the vehicle to a halt so that we could arrest the people.

ADV BOSMAN: I'm assuming that a docket was opened in respect of this case?

MR BOTHA: There was an inquest docket, yes.

ADV BOSMAN: Do you know what happened to the vehicle in which these people were passengers?

MR BOTHA: I'm assuming that the vehicle was seized and what happened afterwards I'm not sure.

ADV BOSMAN: Did you ever read the docket, the inquest docket, do you have any knowledge of those proceedings?

MR BOTHA: Yes, I testified in the inquest.

ADV BOSMAN: Can you recall whether the vehicle had been inspected in respect of the number of gunshot wounds, had that been noted anywhere?

MR BOTHA: I can't recall.

ADV BOSMAN: I'm not a police officer but as a former State Prosecutor, public prosecutor, I would expect that there would have to be a definite record as to how the vehicle looked after the incident where all the bullet holes were on the sides or wherever.

MR BOTHA: Yes, I'm sure that or I believe that that would have been in the inquest docket.

ADV BOSMAN: You can't recall however that that was ever an issue?

MR BOTHA: In what respect?

ADV BOSMAN: The question as to whether the bullet holes or the bullets had entered from the top, the roof or from the sides or from the windows or wherever?

MR BOTHA: Yes, unfortunately I didn't have a look at this docket, I'm not familiar with it.

ADV BOSMAN: So you can't help us to determine from which directions these shots could have been fired. Then a last aspect, last question Mr Botha, Mr Webster put it to you and we all know that a feeling of remorse or regret whatever is not essential in an amnesty application. However, I do feel that you can appreciate the emotional quality of the amnesty application?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

ADV BOSMAN: And I'm asking you is there nothing which you would like to say outside of the strict legal confines of the case? I see that you're looking at your legal representative, Mr Botha, it's not my intention to corner you, to make life difficult for you, I'm simply asking you whether there isn't perhaps a need on your part to say something to the family?

MR BOTHA: No Chairperson.

ADV BOSMAN: Thank you Mr Botha.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you ever find out who the occupants were, whether they were in fact members of the ANC or any organisation of that kind? Did you have any information at all about these people?

MR BOTHA: Chairperson yes, one person Brian Mamela according to Col Andy Taylor, he'd been a trained terrorist, MK terrorist.

CHAIRPERSON: That's all?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Nothing about the others?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes thank you.

MR BOTHA: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser?

MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson, if we might kick off with Gen Steyn? I see it's quarter to but if we can go as far as we can?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, please.

MR VISSER: He is ready to give evidence, he does not have an objection to taking the oath, Chairperson, and he prefers to give his evidence in Afrikaans. His statement has been handed to you before as Exhibit C, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, we have that thank you.

J A STEYN: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: General Steyn, you previously testified in the Ndwandwe case?

GEN STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And I see in your statement you also testified in the kwaMashu 3 case? No, I don't think you testified there, I think that's my mistake, but you also testified in the Cry Freedom Amnesty Application?

GEN STEYN: Yes.

MR VISSER: You have Exhibit A in front of you, have you read it?

GEN STEYN: Yes.

MR VISSER: Is there anything in Exhibit A which you don't agree with?

GEN STEYN: No.

MR VISSER: Do you confirm the correctness of Exhibit A and you ask that it be incorporated into your amnesty application as well as also the evidence and documentation to which Exhibit A refers?

GEN STEYN: Yes.

MR VISSER: Your amnesty application is in the Quarry Road bundle, page 1 to page 15, is that correct? Do you also confirm the correctness of the contents of that?

GEN STEYN: Yes.

MR VISSER: As far as the Quarry Road incident is concerned, at the time of the drafting of your amnesty application you said that you could not recall at that stage what all the facts were and that you were intending to give the facts later?

GEN STEYN: Yes.

MR VISSER: Can you explain to the Committee what the circumstances were which gave rise to that in the first place to the fact that you decided to apply for amnesty and what the circumstances were when you applied and went to the attorney? Just generally? This was in 1996?

GEN STEYN: Chairperson, we didn't have all the facts in respect of all our applications so we had to make some enquiries about various aspects of our applications.

MR WEBSTER: Sorry Chairperson if he could just raise his voice a bit please?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes?

GEN STEYN: Chairperson, we had to make certain enquiries about our applications and in the process we consulted with each other and our legal representatives.

MR VISSER: Were many people involved?

GEN STEYN: In the various applications, some applications more than others.

MR VISSER: And how long before the cut off date of December was that?

GEN STEYN: We had to work under tremendous pressure, very shortly before the final date for the cut off date for the applications, it was in the last days and weeks before the expiry of the cut off date and we put in a lot of work and then we handed it in.

MR VISSER: You're applying for amnesty for multiple activities?

GEN STEYN: Yes.

MR VISSER: And was it possible for you to make all the necessary enquiries before the cut off date?

GEN STEYN: No it wasn't possible, I couldn't do it all and not in respect of the applications.

MR VISSER: Now Mr Steyn, you're requesting amnesty for this application as a result of your complicity in this. Could you please tell us from page 2, paragraph 1, perhaps we've dealt with 1, perhaps you can start with paragraph 2 and just explain to the Committee during 1986 ...(intervention)

MR LAX: Sorry Mr Visser, this is of Exhibit C now?

MR VISSER: This is Exhibit C Chairperson, thank you.

In 1986 you arrived in Durban?

GEN STEYN: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: And during this incident you were second in charge of the division, is this Port Natal?

GEN STEYN: The security branch of Port Natal.

MR VISSER: Please continue with paragraph 3?

GEN STEYN: Chairperson, during August of 1986 an incident took place in which the wife of an IFP councillor was killed and three of the children were injured in the same incident. An AK-47 rifle and hand grenade had been used.

MR VISSER: Yes, we've already referred to the ANC submissions, continue?

GEN STEYN: Sometime afterwards the previous witness, Botha, told me that one of his informers had reported to him that a certain Brian Mamela and his group had been responsible for this attack.

MR VISSER: Yes?

GEN STEYN: Mamela, according to the information at that stage, was a trained MK member and leader of a group. I also knew that Director Botha had given this information to the Terrorist Unit of Col Taylor for further investigation and work and that would have included follow up action by informers with a view to tracing these people.

During September in 1986 I was told by Brig Botha, Director Botha, to come to kwaMashu in respect of certain information regarding the presence of armed ANC members in kwaMashu. I went there and met Botha and Capt van Sittert there and I was told by these officers that Mamela and his group, according to their information, were somewhere in kwaMashu and that they were armed.

MR VISSER: Now in those years there was general reference to people who had committed acts of terror, they were called terrorists?

GEN STEYN: Yes.

MR VISSER: And in your view was it only Brian Mamela who was a terrorist or what was the position regarding his group?

GEN STEYN: No, when we referred to Brian Mamela and his group who had committed certain acts according to our information we were referring to people who operated along with him and who had probably also had been trained as he had been.

MR VISSER: So in your view these were terrorists?

GEN STEYN: Yes. I was informed that the information was they were planning to launch another attack that very same night on a councillor's home.

MR VISSER: A Black councillor?

GEN STEYN: Yes. Van Sittert further told me that apart from this, this group of Mamela's had also been responsible for an act of terror just a couple of days previously. I can't remember the exact circumstances of this act of terror. I was also told by Van Sittert that the house where this group were at that stage had been kept under observation and that the people doing this observation had been in radio contact with Van Sittert and the idea was that the people doing the observation should make radio contact as soon as those people in the Mamela group left their shelter and move away.

The plan was also not to act against them at that very moment because it might compromise an informer.

CHAIRPERSON: What does that mean?

GEN STEYN: That meant that if we swooped on that group in that area the inference could be drawn that somebody in that area or very close had furnished this information about the presence of these people.

CHAIRPERSON: That's a strange statement, kwaMashu's such a large place with thousands of people, how can you believe that you'd be compromising an informer?

MR VISSER: I think you can reveal that information to the Committee as to where the informer was.

GEN STEYN: Chairperson, the informers were in that area very close to that home.

CHAIRPERSON: The reaction unit was also present when I arrived at the scene at kwaMashu Police Station and if I remember correctly, I also summoned Col Taylor later and I think it would have been him who told Mr Wasserman to go to kwaMashu Police Station.

MR VISSER: Now General, just to avoid any confusion, at that stage what was your rank?

GEN STEYN: I was a Colonel.

MR VISSER: Second in charge of the Port Natal division?

GEN STEYN: Yes.

MR VISSER: At the scene at kwaMashu you were the senior officer?

GEN STEYN: Yes.

MR VISSER: Now there were two units, what would you call the sections of the police, the one would be the security branch and the other one the task force?

GEN STEYN: Yes.

MR VISSER: Now would it be correct to say that you were in charge in an overarching way?

GEN STEYN: Yes.

MR VISSER: Who was in charge of the action on the ground?

Was that you?

GEN STEYN: No, the way it worked was like this. During Van Sittert's information to me as regards the presence of the armed terrorists, it was discussed with the reaction unit and the person in charge there was Lt Breytenbach that should any action arise out of this incident, the intercepting or arrest of the people whatever, that it would be Lt Breytenbach who would be in charge as far as that part of the operation was concerned.

MR VISSER: Alright, so that necessarily meant that the people from the security branch would then have to report to him or would they still be under your command, your command as overall commander?

GEN STEYN: They would still be under my command.

MR VISSER: But they would carry out Breytenbach's orders?

GEN STEYN: Yes, if circumstances demanded it.

MR VISSER: And what was the plan? What was the idea to have security branch members there? What were they supposed to do?

GEN STEYN: The security branch had to give back up and give us the necessary information so that should it become necessary at a later stage that the task force would be able to act.

MR VISSER: And by support that would mean that they would also have to help you to do that?

GEN STEYN: Correct.

MR VISSER: Please continue with paragraph 16?

GEN STEYN: The planning was to the effect that we would wait for the suspects to leave, their vehicle had already been described to us and the reaction unit would then try to intercept these people after having left the house. The purpose was to arrest them but we were not to endanger our lives.

MR VISSER: Now the question was put during cross-examination whether - it was put to Botha, whether you hadn't discussed beforehand and decided that come what may we are going to kill these people?

GEN STEYN: No, there was no such decision.

MR VISSER: But should you have taken such a decision, would that have been the way in which you would have gone about it?

GEN STEYN: No. Then we could have done it in a different way and more conveniently so we wouldn't have wanted to go about it in this way on the N2 freeway.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, I notice it's 1 o'clock, I won't get through, perhaps it would be convenient to take the break now?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, we will take the adjournment now, Mr Visser.

MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: May we resume at quarter to 2? Mr Webster?

MR WEBSTER: I'm comfortable with that arrangement, thank you Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: We'll adjourn and resume at quarter to 2.

J A STEYN: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, please proceed?

MR VISSER: Chairperson, before I do so, may I ask an indulgence that we might discard such articles of clothing as is not compatible with the temperature in the hall, Chairperson?

CHAIRPERSON: You may do so, Mr Visser.

MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson.

MR WEBSTER: Could I apply that direction too, Chairperson?

CHAIRPERSON: Certainly.

MR WEBSTER: Thank you.

MR VISSER: (continues)

General Steyn, we had proceeded up to page 4, I beg your pardon to page 3. 15 and 16 and 17, Chairperson, we're now on to 18 I believe?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VISSER: May you continue with paragraph 18?

GEN STEYN: Chairperson, by dusk that evening a radio message came from W/O Shabalala that the suspects had left the house and had departed with that vehicle. We immediately departed with various vehicles in different directions in order to cover all escape routes. I drove with Maj Botha, or Director Botha in his vehicle. Mr Wasserman drove in a mini-bus with two other members. Taylor drove with his vehicle and the reaction unit with their vehicles.

The suspects, Chairperson, drove on the N2 from North to South. There was much traffic and it was difficult to catch up to the vehicle. In our attempt to catch up with the vehicle, Maj Botha and I observed the vehicle at some stage. We moved in to the left side of the vehicle and Mr Botha continually shouted "Police, stop". The vehicle would not stop and attempted to push our vehicle off the road by swerving in our direction. There was however no contact with our vehicle. This took place twice.

Mr Wasserman was behind us in a kombi with two Black members, Lembede and Mduli. I observed at some stage that they moved in on the right hand side of the vehicle. The suspects vehicle collided with the kombi at some stage if I recall correctly. Shots were fired.

MR VISSER: Can you just say according to your recollection who first fired shots?

GEN STEYN: My recollection, Chairperson, is that Director Botha shot first.

MR VISSER: And what happened afterwards?

GEN STEYN: Directly thereafter several shots were fired.

MR VISSER: From which direction or are you not able to say?

GEN STEYN: Chairperson, if I recall correctly, shots were fired from the kombi which was driven by Mr Wasserman and I don't know how many shots Director Botha fired but he definitely fired a few shots.

MR VISSER: Continue?

GEN STEYN: At the same time from diagonally behind us shots were also fired and shooting ensued from all directions.

MR VISSER: Diagonally behind you? Was this on the right or on the left?

GEN STEYN: On the right hand side.

MR VISSER: Did you look about to see exactly where the vehicles were, in which the police were, at that stage?

GEN STEYN: No Chairperson, it was all chaos and it was not easy to say that this vehicle was there and the other vehicle was there except for the fact that I knew we were.

MR VISSER: When you observed the vehicle, General Steyn, did you in some or other manner try to inform the other people that you had observed the vehicle on the N2?

GEN STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson. I did not follow radio procedures as one would do on the normal circumstances but I just shouted that the vehicle had been observed and it moved in this direction.

MR VISSER: And you pursued them?

GEN STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: You say shots were fired from the kombi and from the right hand side behind you and Botha fired shots?

GEN STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: When this shooting took place what did you think would be the consequence of the shooting that you had heard there with regards to the occupants of the vehicle?

GEN STEYN: Chairperson, I accepted that the people in that vehicle would either be injured or killed.

MR VISSER: Very well, did you associate yourself therewith and did you then try to stop people?

GEN STEYN: No I did not try to stop anyone and I associated myself therewith.

MR VISSER: Please continue with paragraph 23?

GEN STEYN: Because of this shooting and the fact that at this stage this suspects vehicle had been hit several times, this vehicle collided into the back of the kombi which was driven by Wasserman and it stopped.

MR VISSER: You say driven by Wasserman, is that what you recall?

GEN STEYN: That's a mistake, the kombi in which Wasserman was an occupant.

MR VISSER: And the vehicle collided with it from behind and they came to a stop?

GEN STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And was there any further shooting?

GEN STEYN: I think shots were still fired for a few seconds after which it ceased. Director Botha Parked our vehicle to the left behind their vehicle and in that process while the shooting was still underway it came to an end.

MR VISSER: What is the inference that you draw, who shot from behind, to the right, behind of the vehicle, who was that?

GEN STEYN: That was the task force.

MR VISSER: And does this concur with your observations after the action had ceased?

GEN STEYN: Yes that is correct, I surmised that the reaction unit members did fire shots.

CHAIRPERSON: What was your question?

MR VISSER: The question was, Chairperson, whether his thought that it was the reaction unit that had shot from the right hand side from behind their vehicle was confirmed by what he observed after the incident was over and he said it did.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Yes, do carry on?

MR VISSER: Please continue?

GEN STEYN: After these vehicles had all come to a stop, Director Botha jumped out and he investigated the vehicle in which the suspects were. He returned to me and told me that the occupants of the vehicle were dead and that they did not have any weapons with them.

MR VISSER: Did this surprise you?

GEN STEYN: Initially in the sense that our information was that they were armed earlier that evening when they were observed, yes I was. After he informed me that there were no arms in the vehicle I decided that the arms according to our information which was still at the house where they had hidden earlier that we had to fetch these arms and plant it on these persons.

MR VISSER: So you drew the inference chiefly from the information which you received from Sittert that if the arms were not in the vehicle then it has to be at the house from which they departed?

GEN STEYN: Chairperson, earlier that evening we were told that they were at that house and they were armed and on that basis the fact that they were not in possession of arms and they departed from that house, I believed that the arms would still be at that house.

MR VISSER: Whose idea was it that the weapons had to be fetched and planted?

GEN STEYN: It was my idea.

MR VISSER: And did you discuss it with Botha?

GEN STEYN: Yes I discussed it with Botha.

MR VISSER: And did he concur?

GEN STEYN: Yes he did but it was my idea.

MR VISSER: What did you and Botha do then?

GEN STEYN: I then in the meanwhile I asked the reaction unit members and the police members to move away from the scene where they had all gathered.

MR VISSER: Why did you do that?

GEN STEYN: My idea was that if we received the weapons or had fetched the weapons with the purpose of planting them that as few as possible people be at the scene and as far as possible from the scene so that they would not observe that we were planting arms on these people.

MR VISSER: Did you tell Wasserman to fetch the arms?

GEN STEYN: Yes I did Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And did a Black member accompany him who knew where the house was?

GEN STEYN: Yes if I recall correctly or I can recall that definitely there was a Black member who was with him and Wasserman then returned.

MR VISSER: Please tell us what happened next?

GEN STEYN: Wasserman returned, I was the closest to the scene, I was not at the scene, I was closest to the scene, I was in a position to see him handing the weapons over to Director Botha and I accepted that those were the arms and Botha placed these arms in the vehicle of the deceased. I was under the impression, Chairperson, that it was done in such a manner that other persons standing around would not observe it and it was also my objective.

MR VISSER: And in your research what did you attempt to do?

GEN STEYN: Chairperson, as to obtaining more information about this incident I attempted to obtain the post-mortem inquest in order to jog our memories as to whom made statements and who said what. I was not successful in this endeavour. On the 29th July 1987 Gail Wannenburg of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission said that the Commission had pulled the file from the Magistrate's Court and at a later stage Wannenburg said that the document had been handed over to the Attorney-General and with further enquiries nobody could assist us in tracking down this post-mortem document.

MR VISSER: Did you also ask your attorney, Mr Wagenaar, to attempt to track this document?

GEN STEYN: Yes I insisted upon it on many occasions and at one instance I was present when it was done but without success.

MR VISSER: Please continue with paragraph 28?

GEN STEYN: Chairperson, Director Botha falsely testified in the post-mortem inquest, he also gave false evidence with regard to the presence of arms in the vehicle and that shots were fired at us from that vehicle. This was done with my knowledge and my approval.

MR VISSER: Why did you act in the manner that you did that evening?

GEN STEYN: Chairperson, I acted in the execution of my services and duties in the South African Police and I believed that such action was expected of me and this fell within the ambit of my expressed or implied authorisation. I believed in the light of the pressure which was placed upon us in the security branch by the political leaders of the time and continually it was said to us that terrorists had to be wiped out in order to combat the revolution. Chairperson, my action was aimed at protecting the State and the National Party and maintaining them. In this whole process, Chairperson, I never received any reward and did not draw any personal advantage from this.

MR VISSER: Mr Steyn, suggestions have been made that a helicopter had apparently taken part in this pursuit that evening. Firstly, do you recall that you had seen a helicopter at the scene during or directly after the pursuit?

GEN STEYN: No Chairperson.

MR VISSER: After these suggestions were made did you direct enquiries whether a helicopter could have been possible?

GEN STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Who made these enquiries?

GEN STEYN: I enquired from a member of the then reaction unit who still remains in Durban.

MR VISSER: And were you informed that the reaction unit did have a helicopter to their availability at some stage?

GEN STEYN: No Chairperson, I was informed to the contrary.

MR VISSER: What were you informed?

GEN STEYN: Chairperson, I was informed that there was no helicopter with the police in Durban at that stage.

MR VISSER: Mr Steyn you have told me that you have something on your mind to say about the struggle of the past and your position and the position of the men under you. Would you like to use this opportunity to do so?

GEN STEYN: Yes Chairperson. Chairperson, the South African Police and specifically the Security Branch was under immense pressure because as it was commonly known because of the undeclared war which reigned at that time, bombs went off, bridges were blown up, railway lines were blown up, limpet mines exploded in shopping centres. I was at the scene of a bomb where people had been blown apart, three or four killed and 96 injured, I was at several scenes where police officers had been murdered in this process of terror and this necessitated us to more and more think that there was one way in fighting this war with all our means and it was also voiced by the politicians from their platforms. We would chase or hunt terrorists right throughout Africa and we would not allow the ANC to win this war, we were conditioned and we believed that we had to do everything in our power to prevent that what the politicians had advocated that that become true.

MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Cross-examination?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR WEBSTER: Are you now Mr Steyn?

GEN STEYN: I'm General Steyn.

MR WEBSTER: Still General Steyn?

GEN STEYN: That's right.

MR WEBSTER: Are you still in the force?

GEN STEYN: No but I remain with the title of General.

MR WEBSTER: You don't mind that I call you Mr Steyn or would you prefer that I call you General Steyn.

CHAIRPERSON: Just call him General and get done with it.

MR WEBSTER: I'll call him General.

CHAIRPERSON: If you mind I'll call you General as well.

MR WEBSTER: I don't mind.

MR WEBSTER: General, I've listened to the last part of your evidence. Is it correct if I say that the interpretation is that all these sentiments that you have expressed are sentiments which you think were believed by the Special Branch?

GEN STEYN: That is right, Chairperson.

MR WEBSTER: And not necessarily the department of the Police as a whole?

GEN STEYN: I would say specifically the security branch who were tasked with acts of terror.

MR WEBSTER: It would not necessarily have been the sentiments of members of the National Defence Force?

GEN STEYN: I wouldn't be able speak for the National Defence Force but that would necessarily be the feeling of the normal uniformed members.

MR WEBSTER: Correct me if I'm wrong, General, I do not believe that was the time specially in '86 when the entire police force was under this pressure that you talk about, is that not correct?

GEN STEYN: Probably not the whole force.

MR WEBSTER: And correct me again, as far as I believe and recall there was never a stage when the entire defence force was committed to this total onslaught by the communists in the sense that within the boundaries of the country they then had to fight this onslaught?

GEN STEYN: Chairperson, the South African Police was responsible for the maintenance of law and order within the country.

MR WEBSTER: To see, to my mind, if at all what you are telling us ever did take place it was to a very select few and that it was those few who would have been members of the Special Branch, is that correct?

GEN STEYN: Could you repeat the question please?

MR WEBSTER: If those perceptions did exist then they probably existed in the minds of a few members of the Special Branch, is that not so?

GEN STEYN: Probably in most of the Security Branch members but also other members like the task force members who had to deal with these operations who had to act on scenes where there were terrorists, that was indeed the case>

MR WEBSTER: General, you know the least - I shouldn't say you know it, but you have an idea about the - is it the Geneva Convection, about prisoners of war?

GEN STEYN: Yes I know thereof.

MR WEBSTER: And you are aware General, I'm sure, that the people who are in a war, people who are in a war are expected to respect that convention?

GEN STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR WEBSTER: In other words where real bombs are raining around them, all sorts of devastation is taking place around them, when a soldier lifts his hands up he is expected to be taken as a prisoner of war.

GEN STEYN: I am not up to date of the finer details of that convention but it sounds correct to me.

MR WEBSTER: In fact no soldier, no matter under what circumstances may shoot at defenceless children or defenceless civilians?

GEN STEYN: Under normal circumstances that's correct, Chairperson.

MR WEBSTER: You know what is going on in the Balkans at the moment, Sarajevo and Yugoslavia and all these areas, you know what is going on there?

GEN STEYN: I read about it in the newspaper.

MR WEBSTER: And you know that humanity, society does not accept that conduct?

GEN STEYN: That is correct.

MR WEBSTER: And at no stage has society ever indicated that it would condone such conduct, not so?

GEN STEYN: Yes.

MR WEBSTER: That in fact in 1986 we were part of a world which was sophisticated sufficiently to abhor conduct that you say was conduct which became acceptable to the members of the Special Branch?

GEN STEYN: That is correct.

MR WEBSTER: General, what was your rank in '86?

GEN STEYN: Col.

MR WEBSTER: And to get to General, how many ranks must you go through?

GEN STEYN: Another one.

MR WEBSTER: When did you get the rank of General?

GEN STEYN: I think '92.

MR WEBSTER: You got it in '92.

GEN STEYN: I think so if I remember well.

MR WEBSTER: Right and I take it that the Minister of Police must have known about your conduct at that stage?

GEN STEYN: Of what conduct are you referring to?

MR WEBSTER: This conduct here of a total onslaught and your having to kill and behave as you did in order to prevent these communists from taking over and this ANC from taking over this country to ensure that the National Party remained in control? He must have known about that?

GEN STEYN: No, I never discussed it with the Minister, I never told the Minister.

MR WEBSTER: But you are aware that the Minister from time to time did praise members of the Special Branch for some of these disgusting and most horrific conduct?

GEN STEYN: Yes there were several instances where the politicians voiced their opinions about this.

MR WEBSTER: You had - you have, even at this very moment an onerous duty to be an example to each and every officer that served under you or that might hear of you in the future, is that not so?

GEN STEYN: That is correct.

MR WEBSTER: You knew that what you were doing was wrong?

GEN STEYN: That is correct.

MR WEBSTER: When did you decide that now we are going to leave - or before I get to that, I withdraw that. And I take it that you're a Christian?

GEN STEYN: That is correct, yes.

MR WEBSTER: I take it that you have taken the oath because you want to tell the truth?

GEN STEYN: That is correct.

MR WEBSTER: And I take it that you have taken the oath previously and lied?

GEN STEYN: That is correct.

MR WEBSTER: How old are you?

GEN STEYN: 59.

MR WEBSTER: You still go to church, do you?

GEN STEYN: Regularly.

MR WEBSTER: And in 1986 you still went regularly to church, did you?

GEN STEYN: That is correct.

MR WEBSTER: You never had a twinge of conscience about what you were doing?

GEN STEYN: Yes I did.

MR WEBSTER: But despite that you never ever got to a stage where as a Christian, as a conscience, you felt that you had to admit your sins for your transgression for the evil that you had done in 1986, it was only when the amnesty process came into existence and at the very last minute that you decided to make an application for amnesty, is that not so?

GEN STEYN: No, that is not so. After these acts, after several acts - you asked me if I was a Christian and I say that I cleared it out with the Lord. We were in a state of war as we saw it and I settled the matter with the Lord and I tell you that a Christian is not infallible, a Christian does make mistakes and if you read the Bible you will hear and see the Bible says we are there to err but we may turn to the Lord and He would grant us forgiveness. Yes I have cleared this matter with the Lord in totality, not only this one, all the others for which I have applied for.

MR WEBSTER: General, that is your secret between you and your God and may you have peace some day.

GEN STEYN: I have definitely.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Webster, can we really get down to the substance of this application instead of the character of the individual and his religious beliefs?

MR WEBSTER: General, you say you associate yourself with annexure A, is that not so?

GEN STEYN: That is correct.

MR WEBSTER: You were present here yesterday when we dealt with it when I was cross-examining Mr Botha, do you remember?

GEN STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR WEBSTER: You virtually know the type of questions that I'm going to ask you regarding annexure A?

GEN STEYN: I'm not certain what you will ask.

MR WEBSTER: That annexure A was not composed by you, is that correct?

GEN STEYN: No, but I have knowledge of which is entailed in there.

MR WEBSTER: And in fact it was composed by your legal representatives and at some stage updated, was that not so?

GEN STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR WEBSTER: Because they felt that it had to incorporate other aspects, is that not so?

GEN STEYN: Yes, the aspects which is in regard to our case.

MR WEBSTER: As the applications for amnesty proceeded, is that correct?

GEN STEYN: That is correct.

MR WEBSTER: I just want to get to your application, General.

During the lunch break I took Mr Botha's application which would be annexure B and I put it next to yours which is annexure C and on the left side of your application I wrote the corresponding affidavits which appear from annexure B or Exhibit B. Do you understand what I'm saying? I looked at paragraph 1 of yours, identical to paragraph 1 of Mr Botha.

CHAIRPERSON: Carry on.

MR WEBSTER: I looked at paragraph 3 of yours, it was identical to paragraph 2 of Botha. I looked at paragraph 4 of yours, it was identical to paragraph 3 of Botha and so on and so on, I'm not going to belabour the point but what I can say without fear of being perceived to be misleading this hearing is that your applications are substantially the same to a point where they are identical word for word, do you agree?

GEN STEYN: Chairperson, that is correct, there are certain aspects which are similar.

MR WEBSTER: General, you must have testified in trials over decades?

GEN STEYN: Yes, in many cases.

MR WEBSTER: And you know that it's important in a trial that you should stick to your statement, is that not so?

GEN STEYN: Yes.

MR WEBSTER: Because if you make a statement you're going to stick to the statement, is that not so?

GEN STEYN: Yes.

MR WEBSTER: You depart from the statement you destroy your credibility, don't you?

GEN STEYN: Yes.

MR WEBSTER: Likewise you also know that it is improper for a police officer to sit and discuss evidence with a colleague and thereafter draw up a statement, you know that is improper?

GEN STEYN: Chairperson no, in this instance with the drafting of this document for this application we refreshed our memory and we spoke to each other to see if we can arrive at the correct facts because as I've explained previously we could not obtain any documentation.

MR WEBSTER: But my question still General is, that you are aware that it is improper for police officers to sit together and decide what the facts are and then make statements in accordance to their discussions, you know that that is improper?

GEN STEYN: I don't know in this case that is applicable, Chairperson, because we did not have all the facts to our availability and it was years ago. We wanted to place an amnesty application before the Amnesty Committee to the best of our abilities and in this process we negotiated with each other and discussed the matter to see if we could arrive at the facts.

MR WEBSTER: Then you've all pooled this together, you then write it as I say, statements which are substantially identical, is that not so?

GEN STEYN: In certain instances, yes.

MR WEBSTER: I can just point out to paragraph 26 of your application and say that it is only there where I found some difference because you spoke of four AKs and you didn't mention hand grenades. Except those two points over the limited period I had over the lunch break, I find no substantial difference whatsoever in your application. Does that surprise you?

GEN STEYN: No, I've already explained why I had done so.

MR WEBSTER: In other words these applications are a combined application where all three of you have contributed and not necessarily remembered the facts as they really were?

GEN STEYN: No, during our negotiations and if one discusses a case it is true that certain aspects would arrive and somebody would remind you of something that one has forgotten and in this process one is reminded of the aspects.

MR WEBSTER: I take it General that you'd be reluctant today as you always were in the past to disclose the names of these informers, is that correct?

GEN STEYN: I don't know who these particular informers were.

MR WEBSTER: I'm saying you'd still be reluctant to disclose their identity today?

GEN STEYN: I said I don't know who the informer in this case was.

MR WEBSTER: You did not know any of the people that you ultimately found in the car, is that correct?

GEN STEYN: I've never known them before but I knew of them.

MR WEBSTER: You did not know whether any of them were terrorists or not?

GEN STEYN: I knew that Mamela was a trained terrorist and at the best, according to the information which I had received, had operated with him and was trained locally.

MR WEBSTER: In fact you just were told by Sittert or Taylor of these facts, is that not so?

GEN STEYN: I was informed so by several persons.

MR WEBSTER: And not that you had any other personal knowledge there about that?

GEN STEYN: No.

MR WEBSTER: And you'd agree with me that doesn't mean that because a person has been trained and is as what you'd like to call him a terrorist, that the others are also terrorists or according to you that naturally follows?

GEN STEYN: Would you please repeat?

MR WEBSTER: Would it naturally follow that because a person is a terrorist as you call him that any other person who'd be in his company would also be a terrorist?

GEN STEYN: But that was the information that Brian Mamela was a trained person and the group who was with him were locally trained, in other words they were terrorists, that was our viewpoint at that stage.

MR WEBSTER: I'm asking you whether a person who is in the company of a terrorist as you call him is also a terrorist, Sir?

GEN STEYN: No, it would depend on the circumstances but here the evidence was available that these persons were trained so I regarded them as terrorists.

MR WEBSTER: But it was not evidence, General?

GEN STEYN: It was information ...(intervention)

MR WEBSTER: It was information and there is world of difference between reports ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Just give him a chance, the difficulty is that I don't get enough time to put this down.

MR WEBSTER: Sorry.

CHAIRPERSON: Now he's relying on the fact that the information was that these people were trained terrorists. Your question is the fact that one man is a terrorist does that mean that everybody who accompanies him is a terrorist, is that the gist of that question?

MR WEBSTER: That was the basic gist of the question.

CHAIRPERSON: In this particular case?

MR WEBSTER: In the particular case, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Sorry I disturbed you but I wanted to take it down but if you want to elaborate on those questions please do so.

MR WEBSTER: Thank you, Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: It's just that I'd like to have a little time to write it out.

MR WEBSTER: I will remember to look in your direction, thank you Mr Chairperson, my apologies for forgetting.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, do carry on.

MR WEBSTER: General, you were given information and that ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: From Van Sittert that Mamela was a trained terrorist?

GEN STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: You went on to say that your information was that his companions, those who were with him were also trained terrorists?

GEN STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: I see.

MR WEBSTER: And that information came from an informer?

GEN STEYN: It came from Col Taylor and from Van Sittert and their members who worked with them.

MR WEBSTER: That information came from an informer, had it not, did you know?

GEN STEYN: That may be so, yes.

MR WEBSTER: If you would bear with me please, Chairperson?

CHAIRPERSON: Certainly.

MR WEBSTER: Very well, General and you say, if I understand you, that a meeting of some sorts took place at the kwaMashu Police Station?

GEN STEYN: Yes.

MR WEBSTER: At which the entire operation was discussed?

GEN STEYN: Correct.

MR WEBSTER: And according to your application it was the reaction unit which was going to attempt to intercept those people after they had left the house. They would arrest them but you would not expose your lives to danger?

GEN STEYN: That's right.

MR WEBSTER: And according to you it was Breytenbach who was in charge of that operation?

GEN STEYN: Correct.

MR WEBSTER: At no stage did Breytenbach give any order to either you or to the occupants of the kombi insofar as you are aware?

GEN STEYN: I don't follow the question?

MR WEBSTER: You are aware and as far as you know, Breytenbach did not issue any order either to you or to Mr Botha or to the kombi in which Wassenaar was?

CHAIRPERSON: What kind of order?

MR WEBSTER: Any type of order regarding the arrest or apprehension or anything about the vehicle that you were pursuing?

GEN STEYN: Chairperson no, Breytenbach would have given the order to his people as to how they should conduct themselves, he wouldn't have given me an order.

MR WEBSTER: He did not give any order to you?

GEN STEYN: No, not to me.

MR WEBSTER: And if I understand you correctly after you had identified or at least spotted the vehicle, it was then expected that Breytenbach and his team would then take over and do the necessary?

GEN STEYN: That is correct.

MR WEBSTER: Because they were trained to do so?

GEN STEYN: That is correct.

MR WEBSTER: But you never allowed Breytenbach to exercise that right?

GEN STEYN: No, I didn't prevent him from doing that.

MR WEBSTER: What I'm saying is you never afforded him the opportunity to do that.

GEN STEYN: The circumstances did not allow him the opportunity, the circumstances which I mentioned in my evidence in chief.

MR WEBSTER: No circumstances, General, up until the stage that the firing commenced which could have prevented you or any of the Special Branch people from notifying Breytenbach and leaving it to Breytenbach to put into operation whatever plan that he had in mind with his people, is that not so?

GEN STEYN: No. I think I should explain the situation. After we received the message we all left in quite a hurry in an attempt to catch up to the vehicle ...(intervention)

MR WEBSTER: Yes but it would be ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: May the witness be allowed to answer?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes please.

MR WEBSTER: I was allowing him Chairperson, it's not a problem.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, do carry on.

GEN STEYN: I'll start again. After we'd left we each one of us left in our own vehicles in an attempt to try and catch up to this fleeing vehicle. I've explained to the Chairperson and the Committee that things happened very quickly, there were a lot of vehicles on the road and each one tried, Breytenbach tried, I'm sure Wasserman tried, I'm sure all of them, all of the people involved tried to catch sight of the vehicle. The ideal would have been that Breytenbach should intercept or catch up to this vehicle ahead of us but due to the traffic and the circumstances it so happened that the vehicle in which I was caught up to this vehicle first so I did not prevent Breytenbach purposefully from doing his work.

MR WEBSTER: General, I'm trying to picture this episode and something in your explanation doesn't make sense to me, please help me?

GEN STEYN: I'm listening.

MR WEBSTER: You were in danger, you did not want to expose your lives to danger, hence the reason that Breytenbach take charge of the operation, is that not so?

GEN STEYN: Yes.

MR WEBSTER: Having seen the vehicle, two of your vehicles on either side of it, you were in radio communication, you could have asked him and you would have known where he was, you could have waited until he was right behind you, you could have waited till you knew exactly where he and his team were before anything was done because this vehicle was in the centre lane, it was boxed in by two of your vehicles, is it not so?

GEN STEYN: No, I think I should explain that this incident did not take place in a lounge where one person walks in the other person walks out, this was a high speed chase in which we tried to catch up to the vehicle and one moment you're approaching them and the next moment another vehicle butted in front of you, the next moment you had to swerve to your left or to your right and those circumstances applied to all of us, it wasn't a matter of leisurely driving and then eventually we would catch up to it and stop the vehicle and then proceed with the procedure, that's not how it happened, it wasn't as easy as that.

MR WEBSTER: General, I would have expected, I would have expected what you have just said to be incorporated in your application. Can you show me where that appears in your application?

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Webster, you're a sufficiently experienced man as a lawyer, these statements are not made ipsissima verba in the words of the man, these are in the words of their legal representatives, isn't it?

MR WEBSTER: I appreciate that Sir, but at the same time ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: There is a similarity in language phraseology in all these statements and quite clearly it seems so obvious that they were done in the language of the legal people?

MR WEBSTER: Sir, the "jagtog", the chase, whether it's in English or Afrikaans "hy bly 'n jagtog", it remains a chase.

CHAIRPERSON: I agree with that.

MR WEBSTER: And it is an element because it has certain consequences. As the General has now described, with respect Sir, what he has then described now is something which is completely at variance with what appears here and I dare say that those representing him having been told by the General of the "jagtog" would not have relegated it to non-existence in the entire application, it would have been there.

MR VISSER: Well Chairperson, now I'm obliged to reply to that, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: No, I'm not going to prevent that, I think that point is not really relevant for present purposes, really.

MR VISSER: Thank you.

MR WEBSTER: Thank you Sir. Now ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: There are differences but in essence the handwriting of the author is in all these documents is the same hand. You know, there is a co-ordination between these people who all got together, this wasn't the case where each individual separately worked and made his statement. I'll imagine there was joint consultation and in the presence of each other, notes are then taken and then statements are drawn.

MR WEBSTER: Sir, I'm loathe to engage in a debate with you, Chairperson, I'm most loathe to do that but may it be recorded, Chairperson, that my view is that what the General now says is so materially different from what appears from his application, that had that in fact been the position it would have been incorporated, that's a point that I just wish to make.

CHAIRPERSON: I understand, in other words why doesn't he say ...(intervention)

MR WEBSTER: There was a chase?

CHAIRPERSON: There was a chase?

MR WEBSTER: Because if there was a chase, Chairperson, then some of the conduct which he now talks about would have been justified but that chase is nowhere visible despite the fact that three of them over a period of time went through this and even when his evidence was led he didn't speak of a "jagtog".

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR WEBSTER: Thank you Sir, that's the point that I ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I've cleared it up, I think that you are entitled to that question to put once again, to put to him.

MR WEBSTER: I'm indebted to you Chairperson.

You've heard, General, what my problem is?

GEN STEYN: Can you repeat please?

MR WEBSTER: I'll do it for the fourth time for you. Why is it so patently lacking and why is it that you make no reference whatsoever to such very important aspect of what took place that day, namely the chase. Why is it that any reference is missing altogether?

MR VISSER: Chairperson, I'm going to object to the question, it's an unfair question.

CHAIRPERSON: Let him answer the question.

MR VISSER: Yes but I just want to refer you to paragraphs 21 and 22 Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: You can re-examine him on that.

GEN STEYN: Chairperson, during the drafting of our documentation, I've already explained that we had to act with great haste and if I had to describe word for word what happened in each part of my amnesty applications it would have run to pages and pages in length. It is normal that you simply lift out the essential points as you remember those and then that by means of the evidence which you give before the Commission you would then elaborate on those essential factors.

MR WEBSTER: Are you finished, General? I want to get to paragraph 21.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes?

MR WEBSTER: Is there any suggestion that until Mr Botha had shouted "Police, stop" continuously that the driver of this vehicle had done anything whatsoever - in paragraph 21 - to indicate flight, to indicate any attempt to ram you, is there?

GEN STEYN: Yes.

MR WEBSTER: There is?

GEN STEYN: Yes. The vehicle tried to push us off the road on more than one occasion.

MR WEBSTER: General, I will repeat the question and if it's necessary that it be interpreted to you let it be interpreted to you. Paragraph 21 - until Botha shouted "Police, stop" continuously, is it correct that there is nothing in paragraph 21 to suggest that that vehicle was in flight or that that vehicle was trying to ram you?

GEN STEYN: This vehicle was busy driving along and we had to catch up to it and we had to try and stop that car so that we could gain some time so that the reaction unit could also catch up to us to then support us in whatever steps we thought necessary and the indications are there in that paragraph that this vehicle wanted to push us off the road.

MR WEBSTER: General, were you armed?

GEN STEYN: No.

MR WEBSTER: What arms did you believe these murderers, terrorists, to be carrying?

GEN STEYN: At that stage we suspected that it would have been AK-47s.

MR WEBSTER: And you want this Commission to believe that somebody, members of your force, whether Botha, Wassenaar, Nduli or whoever, would have let rip with service pistols when a trained terrorist was carrying an AK-47 which he could put on automatic? Is that what you want us to believe?

GEN STEYN: I had attended various scenes and was involved in various operations where I never carried a firearm because I had people with me who were armed and who can then perform that task.

MR WEBSTER: Is that the answer to my question?

GEN STEYN: Yes.

MR WEBSTER: I want to suggest to you that none of you would have ever done that and in fact what you would have done and logically what you would have done was you would have radioed Breytenbach to tell him of your position, where you were, to confirm the direction in which you were because according to Botha you were in contact with him although communication would break down from time to time but you would have waited until he arrived there on the scene, is that not so?

GEN STEYN: No, I couldn't wait because as I've explained we were not just driving leisurely in a normal way, there was a possibility that this vehicle could evade us and get away from us existed and anything was possible, anything could have happened before help arrived. So no, I can't agree with that.

MR WEBSTER: General and I want to put it again to you that there's nothing in your application to suggest that the occupants even were aware that they were being pursued and you're on their left hand side of the kombi and the right hand side, bearing in mind, Sir, that you've said that the traffic was very, very heavy, that they would have then suspected that here are the police after us. There's nothing to suggest that in your application, do you agree?

GEN STEYN: Yes, it would appear to be so but I didn't know who was where at that stage so we had to make the best of that situation at that moment

MR WEBSTER: Are you finished?

GEN STEYN: To stop that vehicle.

MR WEBSTER: Are you finished?

GEN STEYN: Yes.

MR WEBSTER: What was that radio there for?

GEN STEYN: On occasion I said on the radio without using radio terms I simply said we are driving in this direction and we notice a vehicle.

MR WEBSTER: Why didn't you get confirmation of the whereabouts of the people who were supposed to execute the dangerous duty?

GEN STEYN: I can't remember whether they were communicating with me, that I told them where we were. Things happened very carefully at that stage, everybody is talking on the radio at that stage and we were dealing with an operation where we wanted to arrest suspect terrorists and we wanted to get hold of them some or other way.

MR WEBSTER: I see.

CHAIRPERSON: Well now he may have ought to have done it, he may have ought to have contacted Breytenbach, but they didn't do it. My question is what is the conclusion you are seeking to draw from his failure to contact Breytenbach and allow Breytenbach to take control of the chase. Are you suggesting something else?

MR WEBSTER: Chairperson ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Are you merely saying that his conduct was not reasonable in these circumstances, is that what you are saying?

MR WEBSTER: In the end we are going to be arguing that there is no full disclosure, we are going to be arguing that the version is so inherently improbable that it could not be the truth.

CHAIRPERSON: Generally speaking yes, but on this question about him not having radioed to Breytenbach, you know, are you suggesting this why did he do it? He had a possibility of doing it, why did he step aside and allow Breytenbach to do it? Now he didn't do it now how does that effect?

MR WEBSTER: Chairperson, it goes to the entire credibility whether in fact ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: But if it is true, assuming it is true that he didn't phone Breytenbach his credibility is not effected there, he is telling the truth on that point, isn't it?

MR WEBSTER: That's the big question whether it is or not Chairperson, unfortunately from his concessions I'm dealing with a man will serve of the truth when it suits him.

CHAIRPERSON: Well now we won't know ...(intervention)

MR WEBSTER: Whether it was ever the truth or not.

CHAIRPERSON: We will know a lot but on this particular point he didn't contact Breyenbach. Now my question to you is are you leading up to a point?

MR WEBSTER: The point that I'm leading to is that his conduct was so inherently improbable that he is not telling us the truth of what actually took place?

CHAIRPERSON: So what are you saying, are you saying that he did in fact contact Breytenbach?

MR WEBSTER: That in fact that this supposed plan of Breytenbach taking charge etcetera could not have been what was expected because had that been the plan and we're dealing here, Sir, with an operation which is not an operation in a lounge or in a sitting room as the General says, this is more of a military operation or a police operation.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR WEBSTER: With precision, with plans and is not going to be jettisoned because somebody just decides at some stage to say "Stop, police, stop police", that we are not therefore being told the truth and that there is therefore not full disclosure.

CHAIRPERSON: Now what is the untruth as far as he is concerned on this aspect of the matter? Do you think he is not telling the truth when he says he did not contact Breytenbach?

MR WEBSTER: Well we've just heard a version that everybody was talking simultaneously over the radio just now, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes but now where does this lead to, this particular aspect now? You see you are not going to suggest Breytenbach in fact was there ahead of him, Breytenbach's car was ahead of his car, you're not suggesting anything like that?

MR WEBSTER: In fact nobody would know where Breytenbach was.

CHAIRPERSON: We won't know?

MR WEBSTER: Ja, but they are the people who were there and they are the people who ought to enlighten us in such a fashion that at least we have a clear picture.

CHAIRPERSON: Well now carry on.

MR WEBSTER: Thank you Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: So now the clear picture you've got ...(intervention)

MR WEBSTER: Is rather jumbled.

CHAIRPERSON: Is a picture with which you disagree?

MR WEBSTER: It's rather jumbled.

CHAIRPERSON: The picture he gives you, you disagree with it and you're putting it to him that it makes no sense because it was contrary to the plans?

MR WEBSTER: Absolutely and that if in fact that is what had happened then something must be explained.

Can we take it any further than that, General?

GEN STEYN: I'll answer any further question.

MR WEBSTER: Now General, who insofar as the death of these people are concerned, who acted unlawfully according to your knowledge?

GEN STEYN: I personally acted unlawfully and my colleagues who are applying for amnesty also acted wrongly.

MR WEBSTER: I'm dealing, I'm excluding the planting of firearms, General, I'm talking about the shooting. Who acted unlawfully?

GEN STEYN: All those who fired shots.

MR WEBSTER: Why?

GEN STEYN: Chairperson, upon reconsideration at the scene and during that incident I associated myself with the shooting incident. This was a very intense shooting incident.

CHAIRPERSON: It was a one sided, it was a "skietery" only in the sense it was a one sided affair, it wasn't a conflict between two sides?

GEN STEYN: That is correct and in my view as I experienced it at the scene I could almost use the word excessive shooting took place and that you have to see in context of the minimum violence which normally be used and I believed that we who fired shots and later then also covered our tracks, everything that went with it, that we had exceeded our limits and our boundaries and I discussed the circumstances of this shooting incident with my legal representative, the shooting and everything that went with it and I was advised that the circumstances could be such that that which we had done could mean that we are guilty of an offence, murder, culpable homicide and I was advised to also apply for that, apply for amnesty.

MR WEBSTER: Yes, before you were so legally advised by trained lawyers I take it that you must have believed that your actions were justified in law, is that not so?

GEN STEYN: No, I can't say that I agree with that. I restate that I feel that in the circumstances which reigned at the time our actions, our conduct was excessive. That's my view, that was my view at that time. I'm just looking for the right word. We probably used more violence than necessary and that could give rise to a charge of murder or another serious offence so I felt that we had perhaps overstepped the mark.

MR WEBSTER: You might have exceeded the bounds, is that what you are saying?

GEN STEYN: Yes.

MR WEBSTER: Not that you believe you exceeded the bounds?

GEN STEYN: That's what I believed that there was such a possibility.

MR WEBSTER: General, did you at any stage during as the Chairperson has said, this one sided heavy firing shout "stop firing"?

GEN STEYN: I never gave such an order.

MR WEBSTER: You could see that there was no firing coming from the vehicle into which the firing was taking place, is that correct?

GEN STEYN: No, I can't say whether at that moment I knew whether or not shots were being fired from that vehicle, there were a lot of shots being fired, that's the point and I can't say at that precise moment that I knew whether or not shots were being fired from that car.

MR WEBSTER: But there was nothing whatsoever?

GEN STEYN: Yes.

MR WEBSTER: There was nothing whatsoever which could have made you believe that there was any firing coming from that vehicle is that not so?

GEN STEYN: No, maybe I should put it like this, after the first shot had been fired by Botha, several more shots were fired and then a lot of shooting took place and I can't say what I thought at that moment or I thought we were being shot at from that vehicle, perhaps I could have said so later but not at that precise moment.

MR WEBSTER: There was no broken window in any vehicle on the left hand side, your vehicle or any of the vehicles in front of you, is that correct as far you know?

GEN STEYN: No, no there weren't.

MR WEBSTER: You did not see any flashes in that vehicle?

GEN STEYN: No, not that I can recall.

ADV BOSMAN: Mr Webster, isn't this perhaps something that you should argue? I mean we have all this evidence before us so I don't want to curtail you, it's for the Chairperson to do it but it just occurs to me that maybe you can deal with all this in argument?

MR WEBSTER: Sometimes we get carried away when we're doing the questioning and a person looking in has a more balanced view but if that is a feeling of ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Apology accepted, Mr Webster.

MR WEBSTER: Thank you.

General, you must be aware of other amnesty hearings where evidence was led that the Special Branch at some stage came to the decision where they did not bother about apprehending suspects but wiped them out. You must have heard of such instances had you not?

GEN STEYN: Yes I think there have been trials or hearings but I don't know the facts.

MR WEBSTER: Neither can I but I think we're both aware of a stage and the conduct of the Special Branch where they acted above and beyond the confines of law, is that correct?

GEN STEYN: Yes.

MR WEBSTER: And the reason for so acting was basically because they had to find a system of covering their tracks to a point that they knew or thought they knew that their evil will never ever be discovered because after all they were the ultimate seat of power, is that not so?

GEN STEYN: Yes we did a lot of things which we afterwards then covered up so that the truth should not emerge.

MR WEBSTER: And we cannot say that rational human beings, God fearing human beings would get to a stage in their lives where the protection of a political party would justify conduct such as this? Do you agree?

GEN STEYN: No.

MR WEBSTER: And it is on that basis that I put the question to Mr Botha and I repeat it to you, that you're not telling us the truth about any intention of ever wanting to apprehend these people and that this murderous attack without any retaliation from the occupants of the car is indicative of the absence of any intention at any stage whatsoever on your part, that you ever wanted to apprehend those occupants?

GEN STEYN: No, that's not true.

MR WEBSTER: General, I want to put it to you that it was known in the highest echelons of the National Government that you were engaged on this conduct which was a crime against society and it was approved even at the highest echelons, do you agree?

CHAIRPERSON: What do you want him to agree?

GEN STEYN: No.

MR WEBSTER: That the violent manner and the unlawful legal conduct in which they engaged in, Chairperson, was known and accepted at the highest echelons of government and I'm going to suggest that because of that and condonation by those in authority and the fact that people like you who butchered these terrorists were in fact rewarded and that there was a reward and that promotion was that award.

CHAIRPERSON: I want to stop you, you know. You're calling these people terrorists, are you conceding that they were all terrorists?

MR WEBSTER: The terrorists were the Special Branch, with respect Mr Chairman, also.

CHAIRPERSON: No, no, I thought you are questioning, you are putting it to him about killing terrorists?

MR WEBSTER: Well, in the context of in inverted commas because in their minds if you - well let me not, I was never in their minds, but that their whole approach was you kill quote, unquote, "terrorists", your conduct or good work will be recognised ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: And rewarded?

MR WEBSTER: You will be rewarded when you get a promotion.

CHAIRPERSON: I don't think there's any quarrel with that.

MR WEBSTER: Is that not so?

GEN STEYN: I received no reward for the acts which I committed and I never spoke to anybody in a higher position than myself and said "look I've done this, that and the other", that only came to light when the amnesty procedure commenced.

MR WEBSTER: You must have been that Rip van Winkle, General, you must have been sleeping when Vlok was congratulating people who had butchered so-called terrorists?

GEN STEYN: No, I'm aware of that, but I'm talking about myself, in my case not, I'm talking about my case. I know, I've heard reports and evidence that certain people were congratulated and received medals, whatever the case may be but that does not apply to me.

MR WEBSTER: Those medals and that recognition was for conduct identical to this, is that correct?

GEN STEYN: In certain cases yes, if I remember correctly but it doesn't apply to me.

MR WEBSTER: You naturally wouldn't that, General, would you?

GEN STEYN: What do you want me to admit?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, let's proceed?

MR WEBSTER: General, in how many applications are you involved?

GEN STEYN: I think about ten or twelve.

MR WEBSTER: Are you not involved in various applications by Du Preez, Wasserman, others?

GEN STEYN: Yes I was involved with them in certain cases and in other cases I was involved with other members.

MR WEBSTER: At all times you were second in command when these atrocities were being committed, General?

GEN STEYN: No.

MR WEBSTER: You were not the second in command?

GEN STEYN: Not at all times.

MR WEBSTER: I put the same question to Mr Botha, I direct it to you again. Those poor widows whose orphans do not even get a State grant, they're here to know who killed their husbands and their fathers, can you help them?

GEN STEYN: Yes.

MR WEBSTER: Who killed them?

GEN STEYN: The policemen who were at that scene.

MR WEBSTER: And those - and you did not pull the trigger, is that correct?

GEN STEYN: No, I did not fire a shot but I associated myself with that conduct, in other words I carried the same blame.

MR WEBSTER: I understand General, I understand the law, those women there are not interested in the law, they want to see the faces.

CHAIRPERSON: Now sometimes these things are not possible, you know.

MR WEBSTER: I say in so far as here.

CHAIRPERSON: I think we must just get along, we're not pandered into a gallery, you are talking to a Committee here, you know, and I think the question must be directed at trying to persuade us that he is not entitled to amnesty, that should be the purpose of your questioning.

MR WEBSTER: It indeed is with the greatest of respect Chairperson and if I err I also err on the side of wanting to express the deep hurt and the deep feelings of those people least that it be said that at some stage that their feelings were not given heed to and the applicants afforded the opportunity of identifying so that they probably know who the murderers are.

CHAIRPERSON: They will be allowed, they will be at liberty, they'd be allowed to come and talk and give evidence.

MR WEBSTER: Yes, no I understand Chairperson, but what I'm saying is so that the General who was there who could know where the firing came from could be more explicit and not as vague as to simply tell us that about 50 shots were fired at and killed the occupants of those of that vehicle without a face being attached to any of those shots that were fired.

GEN STEYN: Chairperson, there's already been evidence here that Director Botha shot, he is not certain whether he actually hit people.

MR WEBSTER: From his evidence it is not reasonably possibly true or not reasonably possible that he could have injured any person?

GEN STEYN: Yes.

MR WEBSTER: That will be an argument none the less. General, thank you very much.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you have any questions to put to this witness?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS THABETHE: Yes Chairperson, I do.

The picture of - of course I stand to be corrected by you, the picture that you've given today is that you were called to the kwaMashu Police Station and there were people who were observing the house where Mamela and others were at that time, is that correct so far?

GEN STEYN: Yes.

MS THABETHE: And then immediately you were told that these people are leaving the house, that's when you got into your car and you gave chase to them, is that correct?

GEN STEYN: No, let me just correct here?

MS THABETHE: Okay.

GEN STEYN: It didn't happen immediately after I arrived there, it was only at about dusk.

MS THABETHE: At about dusk?

GEN STEYN: Yes.

MS THABETHE: Now my question is why didn't you conduct the arrest at the time when these people were still in the house?

GEN STEYN: I've already answered the question, we didn't want to carry out an operation in that area in order to protect our informer, we didn't want to reveal his identify.

MS THABETHE: No, why I'm asking you this question is that in the evidence it's become clear that there were weapons in the house so without necessarily blowing up the cover of your informer, you could have gotten into the house, found those weapons and you would have had evidence to charge them on, that's the basis of my question. I understand that you had to protect the informer but there was an alternative?

GEN STEYN: My answer remains the same in these circumstances, we need to protect the informer.

MS THABETHE: You did not see it necessary that you could arrest on the evidence or get the firearms that were in the house, you did not look into that option?

GEN STEYN: It was as a result of the fact that the informer's cover should not be revealed.

MS THABETHE: I'll continue, I won't belabour on that point very much.

MR LAX: Sorry, before you do and while we are on this issue, if I might interpose Chair? I'm a bit puzzled by this myself and I've heard all the answers that have been given so far to this issue and the only basis I would understand that you might expose the informer is if the informer was one of those people in the house who would be arrested with you. Any other basis that would exclude that, how would you possibly expose such an informer?

GEN STEYN: It could amount to that yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Twenty policemen raid a house in the evening. How is anybody going to know who the informer was, how would these inmates know who was the one who informed you? So this question about protecting the informer, there's something which one has some difficulty in accepting.

GEN STEYN: Chairperson, the way I thought at that stage was that it would be good to stay as far away from that house as possible, it would be safer the further away we got.

MS THABETHE: Now coming to the chase that eventually took place, what I want to know is that when you followed Mamela and others, what was your intention at that stage?

GEN STEYN: As I've already said, to arrest these people.

MS THABETHE: But that didn't subsequently happen of course as the evidence?

GEN STEYN: Yes, I testified to that effect.

MS THABETHE: Now my last question to you is, if your intention was not to kill or to murder Mamela and others, how then would you justify the granting of amnesty on a killing if your intention was not to kill?

MR VISSER: Chairperson, that surely is a legal argument, it's not for this witness to reply to?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes the fact of the matter is that they engaged in conduct which resulted in the death, the conduct itself.

MS THABETHE: So intention is not important, Chairperson?

CHAIRPERSON: Murder, the intention is important as an element in the crime of murder, yes. Here this constructive intention, when you open fire at people, you're not saying I'm going to kill you but you open fire, reckless of whether the consequences of whether he will die or not.

MS THABETHE: Okay Chairperson, on those bases I don't have any further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Right you are. Any re-examination?

MR VISSER: None thank you Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thanks very much. Now sorry about this, Mr Webster you must just bear with me. We have a witness who was supposed to give evidence in another matter.

MS THABETHE: Yes Chairperson, she's been waiting since 11 o'clock.

CHAIRPERSON: Is she available to give evidence?

MS THABETHE: She is Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Just hold it.

ADV BOSMAN: General, according to my notes you said that Mamela was according to your information was at that stage an informed man and leader of a terrorist group. You used the words "at that stage", did you then receive more or different information at a later stage?

GEN STEYN: No, no we didn't receive any other information at any other stage.

ADV BOSMAN: So those words are not that important. Alright and then I just want to find out from you Breytenbach's name was specifically mentioned by you and the previous witness and he was actually implicated in this attack. Did Lt Breytenbach have anything to do with the inquest into this matter or did he never figure again?

GEN STEYN: Chairperson, I'm not sure whether he made a statement as far as the inquest was concerned but as far as my knowledge goes I think that some of the members made statements and I think he made a statement but I'm not entirely sure whether he made a statement personally.

ADV BOSMAN: Is he still in the police?

GEN STEYN: Yes in Durban.

ADV BOSMAN: And you don't know whether he applied for amnesty for this?

GEN STEYN: He definitely did not apply for amnesty.

ADV BOSMAN: Thank you.

MR LAX: Thank you Chairperson. One arising and one other small issue that I'd just like to canvass, General? You mentioned that the other three people who were with Mamela were internally trained people you said. Did I hear that correctly?

GEN STEYN: That is correct.

MR LAX: And how did you verify that information?

GEN STEYN: It was information that I received from Taylor and from Van Sittert and it may have been from some other people, it could have been on file as well.

MR LAX: Did you ex post facto check any of this information yourself or follow it up in any way?

GEN STEYN: No, I did not do so.

MR LAX: And then just the other issue that I just wanted to clarify and it arose it out of, I overhead you saying something while there was an interaction between the Chair and Mr Webster, it was to do with whether you had spoken to Breytenbach over the radio or not and I heard you say something to the effect "Yes I did actually contact him" and I just want to be clear about that?

GEN STEYN: Chairperson, if I can recall correctly what I had said, in that there is there at some instance I said but without using any radio terms, I spoke quickly to say that we are going in this direction and we observed the vehicle, not necessarily Breytenbach but any other persons who could hear.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you. You are excused from further attendance.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, there may be one question that I might want - but may I confer with the witness before I do so?

CHAIRPERSON: Do that Mr Visser.

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman.

Yes Chairperson, not to keep you in the dark, it was a question of whether the General felt that I could make available to the Committee in privacy more information about the informer but he feels that he does not want to take that risk, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: We will not be able to finish this matter now. The next applicant will take some time, a witness in a part heard matter has become available and we would like to dispose of that witness because we are told that witness won't take too much time but in the time that is available between now and this afternoon we would like to dispose of this so that we can commence with your matter tomorrow morning. Pardon, what is it?

MS THABETHE: I want to suggest, Chairperson, I mean it won't take long, the witness.

CHAIRPERSON: Well Mr Webster, then I can't excuse you, please hang on for a while?

MS THABETHE: Yes, so that when we finish we proceed.

CHAIRPERSON: I'm sorry about that, I thought I might excuse you.

MR WEBSTER: Notwithstanding Chairperson, I know who my ...(inaudible).

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, this concerns the part heard matter some of which we heard this morning and apparently a statement has been handed to you this morning and that woman is - the lady herself is available to give evidence and the leader of evidence proposes to call her to give evidence so may we now switch over from the present matter to go back to that Cele application?

MR VISSER: Certainly Chairperson, it will not inconvenience us in the least.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, how very, very kind of you, Sir.

MR LAX: Chair, I see Mr Wills is here. He indicated he wanted to say something.

CELESTE MORRISON: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: I am sorry that ...(inaudible) such a long time but it is beyond our control and this is the best we can do now, so will you please proceed?

EXAMINATION BY MS THABETHE: Thank you Mr Chair.

Mrs Morrison, can you tell us how you are related to Mr Goodwill Sikhakane?

MS MORRISON: I was his common law wife.

MS THABETHE: Where were you staying in 1988?

MS MORRISON: I was in Mozambique. No sorry, I was in South Africa in 1988.

MS THABETHE: In 1988?

MS MORRISON: Yes.

MS THABETHE: And can you tell us what was your relationship to Dion Cele?

MS MORRISON: Well Dion Cele was my husband's friend.

MS THABETHE: And can you tell the Committee - maybe before I do that Mr Chair can I be allowed to hand in the statements of Mrs Morrison? It's two statements, the one page statement?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MS THABETHE: I'm not sure how far we were with our exhibits, if my learned colleague can assist me in that Dion Cele?

MR VISSER: We've reached H Chairperson, so we either go to I or J.

CHAIRPERSON: Alright, the hand-written document will be Exhibit J and the typed document will be Exhibit K.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, please proceed?

MS THABETHE: I beg to hand them in, Chairperson, the said exhibits.

CHAIRPERSON: Right you are.

MS THABETHE: Can you tell the Committee what led to Dion Cele being abducted as far as you know?

MS MORRISON: Well he was abducted because Goodwill Sikhakane had to prove himself to the Special Branch that he was ready to work for them.

MS THABETHE: When did Goodwill Sikhakane start to work for the Security Branch? When did he begin to work for them?

MS MORRISON: In 1988.

CHAIRPERSON: You know that question, the answer is a bit confusing to me, Goodwill Sikhakane had to prove to the Security Branch that he was ready to work for them, who? Cele or Goodwill himself?

MS MORRISON: Goodwill himself.

CHAIRPERSON: He was at that stage, he wasn't an informer?

MS MORRISON: He was, he was just starting to.

CHAIRPERSON: I see, so it was in order to prove his bona fides, he suggested that we might be able to recruit Dion Cele, is that what you're saying?

MS MORRISON: I beg your pardon, Sir?

CHAIRPERSON: Are you saying that in order to prove his own commitment to the police in the Security Branch he suggested that he might persuade Dion Cele to be an informer?

MS MORRISON: No.

CHAIRPERSON: Well tell us what you mean?

MS MORRISON: Well he was told by the Special Branch that he should actually abduct Dion Cele.

MS THABETHE: The applicants have given evidence before the Committee that it's Goodwill Sikhakane that came to them and informed them that Dion Cele was willing to be recruited or rather let me put it, to work with the Security Branch. What is your response to that evidence?

MS MORRISON: No that's not true.

MS THABETHE: Why do you say so?

MS MORRISON: Because there was no such thing. If he was willing to work for Special Branch why did he have to be abducted?

MS THABETHE: You've also indicated that the abduction of Dion Cele occurred in July 1988 and not - sorry, not in July 1988 but in April 1988, is that correct?

MS MORRISON: Yes.

MS THABETHE: You have also indicated in your statement, Exhibit J, the hand-written statement, that Mr Goodwill Sikhakane did not drive the car, the driver was a white person. Do you remember saying that in your statement?

MS MORRISON: Yes I do.

CHAIRPERSON: Drive which car when?

MS THABETHE: Okay, when Dion Cele was abducted there was evidence that there was a kombi driven by Mr Sikhakane when he was abducted. Now you have given something to the contrary that Mr Sikhakane did not drive the car. I'm saying why do you say that?

MS MORRISON: Well he told me that it was a White man driving the kombi.

MS THABETHE: So would I be correct if I say that with all the evidence that you've given, Mr Goodwill Sikhakane told that himself?

MS MORRISON: Yes.

MS THABETHE: No further questions, Mr Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson.

Just to take it one step further, apart from the date which you gave as April 1988, you have no personal knowledge of any of the matters which you testified about?

MS MORRISON: No.

MR VISSER: How do you remember so clearly that the date was the 27th April 1988 when Cele was abducted?

MS MORRISON: Because we left Swaziland on the 29th April and that was my father's birthday, I wouldn't forget it.

MR VISSER: That was the day after?

MS MORRISON: Yes.

MR VISSER: Well thank you very much for giving us that date because we didn't have the date and we're quite happy to accept your date. Thank you Ms Morrison.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that all?

What do you do Ms Morrison?

MS MORRISON: I beg your pardon?

CHAIRPERSON: What do you do?

MS MORRISON: I'm a security officer.

CHAIRPERSON: Where?

MS MORRISON: At Checkers, Scottsville and I work for Asset Security.

CHAIRPERSON: And although there might not be direct evidence about this but somewhere along the line the information has come to us that Goodwill Sikhakane has passed away?

MS MORRISON: Yes Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: When was that?

MS MORRISON: In 1991.

CHAIRPERSON: Where?

MS MORRISON: He was killed in Greytown.

CHAIRPERSON: Did his death result in some criminal prosecution or a trial of anybody?

MS MORRISON: No, not that I know about.

CHAIRPERSON: Were you present at the time when he was killed?

MS MORRISON: No.

CHAIRPERSON: Any questions to ask?

MS THABETHE: Sorry Mr Chair? She's just indicated to me that she made a mistake, there was a criminal proceeding following the death.

CHAIRPERSON: The death?

MS THABETHE: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Oh I see.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, if you would allow me two bits of information?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes?

MR VISSER: One is Eugene De Kock is a person who was found guilty in this trial, I'm not sure what he was found guilty of but he was charged and found guilty in regard to the murder of Mr Sikhakane.

CHAIRPERSON: I see.

MR VISSER: And the other bit of information is that there is of course an amnesty application in regard to Mr Sikhakane, not before you at present but some time in future it will come up.

CHAIRPERSON: I trust it won't come before me?

MR VISSER: You mean you hope it won't come before you.

CHAIRPERSON: Alright, thank you very much.

MS THABETHE: Thank you Mr Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much, you are excused.

MS MORRISON: Thank you.

MR VISSER: The next witness I wish to call is Mr Lawrence Gerald Wasserman. His statement is Exhibit D before you. He will give his evidence in English and he is prepared to take the oath, Chairperson.

LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson.

Mr Wasserman, you gave evidence previously last week before this Committee?

MR WASSERMAN: Correct, Chairman.

MR VISSER: Do you confirm your evidence and the confirmation of the documents and other evidence which you made last week again today?

MR WASSERMAN: I do, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Were you involved in the incident which took place which is known as the Quarry Road incident?

MR WASSERMAN: Correct, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Can you address the Committee and tell the Committee what you remember of this incident from page 2 onwards?

MR WASSERMAN: Okay Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: I'm sorry Chairperson, I neglected to say that the amnesty application is from page 40 to 54 in the bundle, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR VISSER: Yes please continue?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, on a Sunday of what I'm reminded was the 7th September 1986, I was summoned by Col Taylor to go to the kwaMashu Police Station. Upon my arrival there and later during the day a large number of the police congregated there. I was informed that a gang of MK terrorists which had operated in the Durban area was observed entering a certain house where according to information available they had previously left weapons and ammunition after an attack on the wife and children of an IFP member.

MR VISSER: Now I must ask you this question now because we'll later come back to that, did you personally know where this particular house was situated?

MR WASSERMAN: I did not, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Alright, well continue then?

MR WASSERMAN: I was told that the house was being kept under observation by certain members of the Security Branch who were in radio contact with the police station and a description of the terrorist car was also given. I was informed that no attempt was to be made to arrest the four terrorists at the house as that would compromise an informer and the plan was to allow them to drive away from the house whereafter the reaction unit would intercept the vehicle and execute arrests.

As Maj General Steyn was present, I fell directly under his command.

MR VISSER: But who directed the operation on the ground?

MR WASSERMAN: It was General Steyn, he was my commander on the ground, Sir.

MR VISSER: Your commander?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes.

MR VISSER: And who would arrest the - or perhaps we'll come to it. You can just go on?

MR WASSERMAN: At a certain point a message was received over the radio that the suspects had left the house and had driven off. A frantic scurry took place with everybody jumping into vehicles and setting off with a view of intercepting the terrorists.

I landed up in a kombi mini-bus with two Black members, Lembede and Nduli.

MR VISSER: Lembede is spelt L-E-M-B-E-D-E and Nduli is spelt N-D-U-L-I?

MR WASSERMAN: Correct, Mr Chairman. The latter drove the kombi. I was seated on the seat behind the front seat and the three of us were armed with service pistols only. We stayed as close as possible to the car in which General Steyn and Mr Botha were travelling. At some stage we noticed the vehicle of the suspects travelling North to South along the N2, this is a three lane freeway. It was a wild chase which went on for about 5 to 6 kilometres.

Mr Botha's car was to the left and slightly behind the suspects car and we were to the right. At one point I say Botha's car draw up alongside the suspects' car and I saw Botha waving out the window to indicate them to stop. The suspects' car then executed two or three sharp swerves to the left in an obvious effort to ram Botha and Steyn off the road. Nduli accelerated and drew alongside the fugitive's car. It immediately swerved sharply to it's right and collided with the kombi and at this point Lembede opened fire at the suspects. I heard other shots being fired as well.

I then opened the sliding door of the kombi. I was tossed around inside of the vehicle as a result of the hectic way in which Nduli had to drive and it was a life threatening situation which was ameliorated only by good, excellent driving skills of Nduli. I was unable to get a steady aim but I fired in the direction of the vehicle and might have hit one or more of the occupants.

MR VISSER: Can you tell us how many rounds you fired?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, I fired a magazine, 15 rounds.

MR VISSER: Fifteen rounds?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes.

MR VISSER: And all of this, can you give us the angle at which you fired at that vehicle? Were all the shots fired while the two vehicles were travelling in exactly the same position in relationship to each other or what was the position?

MR WASSERMAN: No, Mr Chairman, it was from side being parallel with and then the vehicle behind us as well but all from the right hand side.

MR VISSER: All from that vehicle's right hand side?

MR WASSERMAN: The driver's side of the vehicle.

MR VISSER: Out of the left hand side of the kombi?

MR WASSERMAN: Left hand side of the kombi, yes.

MR VISSER: Did Mr Nduli fire any shots?

MR WASSERMAN: No, he was the driver but Mr Lembede fired.

MR VISSER: Can you please continue?

MR WASSERMAN: Apart from our firing I heard other shots, one or two being fired. I could not tell whether the shots came from the mini-bus or from elsewhere.

MR VISSER: When you refer to the mini-bus, you're referring to Mr Lembede firing from in front of you, you couldn't tell whether it was his shots or came from elsewhere, is that what you're saying?

MR WASSERMAN: Well actually here, Mr Chairman, some of these shots must have been Mr Lembede but his hands were outside the vehicle so it would have been his and other shots coming from the other side.

MR VISSER: Alright.

MR WASSERMAN: Nduli drove past this car and braked in front of it and the car collided violently with us from behind, both vehicles moved forward. At this spot we were still on the freeway and approaching traffic lights. The car then stopped and Lembede and I jumped out and approached the suspects' vehicle. Suddenly there was a large number of shots fired at the suspects' car, as it appeared later, the reaction unit. Lembede and I found ourselves caught in the crossfire with bullets whistling around our ears. We ran away up the embankment between the off-ramp and the N2 freeway and came down after the shooting had ceased and when we deemed it safe to return.

When I got back to the scene I was ordered by General Steyn to go to the house where the suspects were thought to have left their weapons and go and fetch it. I believe I was accompanied by a Black member who knew where the house was situated but I cannot remember who this was. We drove quickly back to the house. The Black member went into the house and returned with a sports bag and we then returned to the scene of the shooting as quickly as possible. At the scene of the shooting I handed the bag to Director Botha in such a way as it was not to be seen by others at the scene. I noticed when the bag was opened there were AK-47s in the bag. Botha then planted these weapons on the occupants of the car.

In doing what I did I executed my duties as a policeman on the orders of a senior commander. The way I saw it as my obligation during a time of conflict and political violence. I did not hesitate to participate in the planting of the firearms on the suspects and to commit the defence of defeating the ends of justice in the belief that I was thereby assisting in avoiding embarrassment for the SAP and the Government.

MR VISSER: Yes not despite the fact that you also took part in the shooting and therefore you're also applying for amnesty for murder obviously?

MR WASSERMAN: Correct, Mr Chair.

MR VISSER: Please continue?

MR WASSERMAN: We were conditioned by speeches of politicians and directions by senior officers to do everything in our power to confront the revolutionary onslaught at all costs. The victims in the present case were all members of MK I was told and who had previously committed political acts of terror. In view of the above I was of the bona fide belief that what I did in the present instance in order to combat or derail the revolutionary onslaught and to protect the Government and National Party from political embarrassment fell within my express or implied authority. I did not participate in this event for any personal gain or driven by personal malice, by personal spite or malice and I received no reward.

MR VISSER: Mr Wasserman, your application before this Committee would then be for your participation in the killing of Mr Blessing Mabaso, Thabani Mamela, Percival Mgobozi and Mbongeni Zondi. You in fact were in possession of the AK-47s which you yourself said you saw in the bag. Did you also see any other arms in that bag?

MR WASSERMAN: There were hand grenades, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Hand grenades, so you would ask for amnesty for the unlawful possession of unlicensed firearms and ammunition as well as hand grenades for the time in which you had custody of that bag, not so?

MR WASSERMAN: Correct, Mr Chair.

MR VISSER: And any lesser offence including defeating the ends of justice, is that not correct?

MR WASSERMAN: Correct, Sir.

MR VISSER: And that is by not having reported what had actually happened to the authorities?

MR WASSERMAN: Correct, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: And you were aware of course that the weapons were planted as you've already stated and you were aware that that was unlawful as well?

MR WASSERMAN: That is so, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Mr Wasserman, suggestions have been made that there might have been a helicopter present on the scene during the chase on that occasion. Can you shed any light on that as far as you can recall?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, there was no helicopter whatsoever on this occasion.

MR VISSER: Do you believe that you would have remembered it if there was?

MR WASSERMAN: I would have remembered it, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Chairperson?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes?

MR VISSER: Allow me to say that we have had a long day, it's now 6 minutes to 4. I wondering whether we could take the adjournment for the afternoon now. I'm probably finished with this witness and he can then perhaps be cross-examined tomorrow morning if it suits you Mr Chairman?

CHAIRPERSON: Well you tell me that you're probably finished with him or have you finished?

MR VISSER: I probably have Mr Chairman, there may be one or two issues.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

MR VISSER: Pardon Chairperson?

CHAIRPERSON: Can't you finish your evidence in chief?

MR VISSER: Yes but I would like to take an adjournment now Chairperson, if I may bung five minutes off you?

CHAIRPERSON: We'll adjourn at this stage so that cross-examination would obviously - we can't dispose of this witnesses evidence this afternoon in cross-examination and it's suggested that we resume cross-examination early tomorrow morning. Mr Webster?

MR WEBSTER: Mr Chairman, I don't have a particular objection to a postponement but I would have preferred that the witness conclude his application or his evidence before the Committee and I'd be probably, through you, permitted to ask just one question and that would be where do I find Breytenbach because I believe he is in the police force. The witness may be able to help me and I would look forward to the postponement so that I could speak to Breytenbach.

CHAIRPERSON: Think very hard, are there are there any other questions you might want to put, Mr Visser?

MR VISSER: No Chairperson, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MS THABETHE: Mr Chair, I was going to suggest that we continue with the witness and if possible do the cross-examination because as it is we are running way behind schedule.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Webster, if we do not finish your part of the cross-examination you are available tomorrow morning?

MR WEBSTER: I will be. I will be and as I indicate Chairperson, it would suit me to have an early adjournment so that I can as I indicated I unfortunately have without even an assistant or an investigator in the case here today.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR WEBSTER: So if I just through you just ask Mr Wasserman?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, please put your question?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR WEBSTER: Mr Wasserman, where do I get Mr Breytenbach, can you help me?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, he is still in the force and I think he is at headquarters, he is still involved with public order policing somewhere.

MR WEBSTER: Is that in Pretoria?

MR WASSERMAN: No, here in Durban.

MR WEBSTER: At C R Swart or where is that?

MR WASSERMAN: The headquarters at Point.

MR WEBSTER: At Point?

MR WASSERMAN: At Point.

MR WEBSTER: At Point Police Station?

MR WASSERMAN: No, at the reaction unit the old Point Prison.

MR WEBSTER: Oh I see, I see thanks.

MR WASSERMAN: The number 9 barracks.

MR WEBSTER: Thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Some of the cross-examination directed at the first two applicants in this matter covered ground, I trust that you it will not be necessary to cover all that ground in the cross-examination of this witness?

MR WEBSTER: That is generally the idea Mr Chairman unless there's something very untoward.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes but you'll think that your consultation with Breytenbach will assist you in formulating questions or avoiding any questions?

MR WEBSTER: That is quite so, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Well I regret that I can't comply with your request here, it seems as if we'll make up time in some other way. Mr Visser your suggestion is granted. We will now adjourn and resume at 9.30 tomorrow morning.

MR VISSER: As it pleases the Committee.

MS THABETHE: As it pleases the Committee.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes Mr Webster, we'll be here at 9.30 tomorrow morning and there are people who are coming specifically for the matter that is set down tomorrow. Mr Pravine Gordon and Mr Lala?

MS THABETHE: Mr Chair, I had indicated to Mr Gordon's secretary that anything might happen this week, we might hear his matter, we might not hear his matter, it will depend on how fast we're moving. I spoke to Mr Gordon this afternoon and I indicated to him that we had set down the Ndaba and Shabalala matter for today which hasn't kick-started as yet so I was under the impression that as soon as we finished this one we're going to do the Ndaba and Shabalala matter more especially because the applicants had indicated to me that it would be better to do the Ndaba and Shabalala first for the background than do the Lala and Gordon matter later on so I wasn't aware that we were going to do the Lala and Gordon matter before we had disposed of the Ndaba and Shabalala incident.

CHAIRPERSON: Well no, I thought because of the brevity of the matter, looking at the papers, we thought that because it is a short matter maybe we could dispose of that but we are in your hands and you must do the best you can.

MS THABETHE: Yes Mr Chair.

MR VISSER: Yes Chairperson, if I may be allowed to say so, you will recall right at the outset as Ms Thabethe has just told you, we indicated to you that the logical sequence would be to do Ndaba and Shabalala before Gordon and Lala for the reasons which we advanced to you. The problem which we're now going to have if we want to interpose the Gordon and Lala matter earlier is that there are some witnesses, some applicants from Pretoria who are now waiting for the Ndaba and Shabalala matter to be concluded before they are going to be here, they certainly aren't here now Mr Chairman and I believe it's Mr Britz who appears for them, I'm sorry, Mr Nel who appears for them and he indicated that it would suit his clients certainly also if Gordon and Lala matter be heard after Ndaba and Shabalala so there will be a practical problem if we want to juggle them around at this stage, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Well I think that you will have to do the best you can, what you think is the most convenient which will cause the least convenience to everybody concerned. That will be guided by you.

MS THABETHE: Thank you Mr Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: We will adjourn until 9.30 tomorrow morning.