CHAIRPERSON: Mr Steenkamp, which one are we starting with today?

ADV STEENKAMP: Mr Chairman, as agreed yesterday it will be the Mnisi matter. The applicants are Mr Steyn, Crause, du Preez Smit and Crause again. Thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, do you appear for all the applicants?

MR VISSER: I do indeed, Chairperson.

ADV STEENKAMP: Mr Chairman, I was initially informed, well I'm still informed that Mr Brian Koopedi was appointed as the legal representative for Mr Mnisi. I spoke to Mr Koopedi yesterday and informed him that the matter will start this morning at nine and he informed me that he will be ready by this morning at nine. I phoned him at five to nine and he informed me that he's not going to appear here on instructions of Mr Mnisi. He has already consulted with Mr Mnisi and the instructions are that Mr Mnisi is not going to attend the hearing, he doesn't wish so. He's not opposing the application and for that reason he's not appearing himself at all. I've indicated to Mr Koopedi that it will be necessary to submit a letter in this regard to you. As soon as that letter is finished, Mr Chairman, I will submit it to you.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Mr Visser.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I call the first witness, Mr Crause. There are two brothers and this one is P R Crause, whose application you'll find at page 13 to 20, and we will specifically refer to where he deals with the incident, at page 15 of the bundle. He is available, is ready to take the oath and he wishes to address you in Afrikaans.

P R CRAUSE: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Please be seated.

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Crause, do you confirm Exhibits A and B and do you request that they be incorporated with your evidence, and do you also confirm the content of your amnesty application as it appears before the Amnesty Committee, subject to the evidence that you will deliver today?

MR P R CRAUSE: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, may I refer you to Exhibit B, and I will refer to the - well it doesn't matter to which one of the page numberings I will refer you to, if it's more convenient I should perhaps refer you to the typed pages because the other page numbers are the Naledi bundle page numbers, but it doesn't matter, whichever is convenient to you.

CHAIRPERSON: Just tell me what you're talking about.

MR VISSER: At page 3 there's a reference to Sello Mnisi ...

CHAIRPERSON: A reference to?

MR VISSER: Sello, S-e-l-l-o Mnisi. We wish to make it clear, Chairperson, that that is not the victim in this particular case, that is a cousin - or it's not a brother, but it's a family relation of Mr Mnisi. At page 5 of Exhibit B you'll find a reference to Mr Johannes Mnisi, from which it will appear that his MK name was Victor. That's in paragraph 5, page 5.

CHAIRPERSON: Before you carry on, Mr Visser, there seems to be a bit of confusion as to the spelling of the name of the deceased, are you able to give us the proper spelling?

MR VISSER: Yes. First of all Chairperson, he's not deceased, he's very much alive, but it's - yes, the victim, but it's M-n-i-s-i. To be distinguished from Mr Msibi, who is an entirely different person, M-s-i-b-i. He was a person who was an operative in Swaziland and not in Botswana. He's not the victim. But there has been a lot of confusion between the two.

Chairperson, I just want to point out the page numbers for your own reference in Exhibit B, where he is mentioned. 5, as I stated and then page 6 of Exhibit B and then the last reference is page 9 - I'm sorry, again there's a confusion here because the one at page 9 is not the victim, it is Sello. I just wanted to make that clear, so that you don't become confused.

Mr Crause, could we firstly discuss the date of these events, because in your application you stated that the date was unknown to you. Were you capable of determining a date for when this incident occurred?

INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone is not on.

MR P R CRAUSE: ...(no audible reply)

MR VISSER: And how did you ...(intervention)

INTERPRETER: I could not hear the speaker properly, his voice was very feint.

MR VISSER: Could you repeat what you said, so that it can come through.

MR P R CRAUSE: It had to have been July/August ...(intervention)

INTERPRETER: The speaker's voice is still very feint, the Interpreter is afraid that she might not be able to hear him properly.

MR VISSER: If we may then proceed, Chairperson. Perhaps you should just repeat for the record. Were you capable of determining the date for when these incidents took place?

MR P R CRAUSE: Yes, Chairperson, it had to have been approximately July or August 1986 when I was approached. I determined this by means of information which I obtained from Brig Loots yesterday, indicating that the explosion had taken place in the eleventh month of 1986 and this incident where I was approached took place approximately three months before the explosion. ...(transcriber's interpretation)

MR VISSER: Before you get to this could you tell us, before July 1986, were you familiar with the person, Mr Johannes Mnisi?

MR P R CRAUSE: Yes, he was known to me as a Commander of Special Operations of MK.

MR VISSER: And where did he operate?

MR P R CRAUSE: He operated from Lusaka, but from time to time he also operated from within Botswana.

MR VISSER: Was he an important figure in the struggle of the past?

MR P R CRAUSE: Yes, very important.

MR VISSER: And did you collect information regarding him, or did you attempt to gather information regarding his activities in Botswana?

MR P R CRAUSE: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And over a period of time you provided that information to other members of the security community.

MR P R CRAUSE: Yes, it was reported as such to them, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And indeed then also to Special Forces?

MR P R CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Let me ask you this, this information that you collected and distributed, particularly to Special Forces, for what purpose was this done?

MR P R CRAUSE: It was with the objective of being able to determine his whereabouts and consequently being able to eliminate him.

MR VISSER: To eliminate him. Very well. You say that you were approached, can you elaborate on this please?

MR P R CRAUSE: It was approximately July or August 1986, when I received a visit from Capt Frans Harmse. Capt Harmse at that stage was attached to the Security Branch, Pretoria.

MR VISSER: Which area?

MR P R CRAUSE: It was for the Pretoria/Northern Transvaal area.

MR VISSER: And your position at that stage, what was it?

MR P R CRAUSE: I was the Branch Commander of the Security Branch in Zeerust.

MR VISSER: And he paid you a visit, what then?

MR P R CRAUSE: He then informed me that Johannes Mnisi had requested a certain source of theirs to obtain a vehicle for him, Mnisi, for his use in Botswana and that this vehicle was then equipped by himself or members of his security structure, with explosives ...

CHAIRPERSON: Who is this?

MR P R CRAUSE: This is Capt Harmse who informed me.

CHAIRPERSON: What did he and his colleagues doe?

MR P R CRAUSE: It was with the cooperation of the SADF that an explosive device was placed in this particular vehicle which would have been sent to Mr Mnisi, which would have been able to be detonated by means of remote control, and the vehicle was also equipped with a tapping device. In other words a transmitter, so that one could monitor conversations in the vehicle.

MR VISSER: And what did Harmse want to know from you, or what did he want from you?

MR P R CRAUSE: Harmse's request to us was that we would have to provide them with a facility near the Botswana border, from which point they would be able to erect radio equipment and monitor any discussions.

Perhaps I could also mention that the planning, as he put it to me, Chairperson, was firstly to monitor discussions in the vehicle and if it could be determined that Mnisi was indeed in the vehicle, the device would be detonated.

MR VISSER: Did you also foresee within this scheme that other persons could also be present in the vehicle along with Mr Mnisi, who would also be killed?

MR P R CRAUSE: It could not have been different.

MR VISSER: Did you associate yourself and did you agree with the action?

MR P R CRAUSE: Yes, completely.

MR VISSER: And in terms of this request from Harmse, what did you do?

MR P R CRAUSE: Firstly, I notified my Commander in Potchefstoom, I informed him of the request that I had received from Capt Harmse and he informed me that I should continue and that I should have staff available, along with a premises from which the vehicle could be monitored.

MR VISSER: What would members of your branch have done in participation in this operation?

MR P R CRAUSE: They would have assisted with the monitoring of discussions in the vehicle.

MR VISSER: With what purposes would this have occurred?

MR P R CRAUSE: It was in order to collect information. And perhaps I could also mention at this stage that the person whom I deployed or assigned were Capt du Preez Smit and Frik Crause.

MR VISSER: Is Frik Crause related to you?

MR P R CRAUSE: Yes he is my brother, he was a staff member with me.

MR VISSER: And where was he in the rank structure?

MR P R CRAUSE: I'm speaking under correction but I do believe that he was a Warrant Officer.

MR VISSER: But he was fairly lower down in the structure.

MR P R CRAUSE: Yes, he was.

MR VISSER: And du Preez Smit was also below you?

MR P R CRAUSE: Yes, that is correct, at that stage he was a Lieutenant.

CHAIRPERSON: Who was the second person, Frik Crause and who else?

MR P R CRAUSE: Frik Crause and du Preez Smit.

MR VISSER: Both of them are fellow applicants of yours in this matter.

MR P R CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Very well. You state that that you made a premises available, where and what was it?

MR P R CRAUSE: It was a safehouse which we possessed near the Koffiefontein border post.

MR VISSER: And was any radio transmission or reception equipment erected there?

MR P R CRAUSE: Yes.

MR VISSER: By whom?

MR P R CRAUSE: By Special Forces, their experts conducted this.

MR VISSER: And who manned the radio there?

MR P R CRAUSE: I must just mention that I visited the place periodically, I wasn't there permanently, but the person whom I met there was a person who was known to me as Pierre.

MR VISSER: You cannot recall his surname?

MR P R CRAUSE: No.

MR VISSER: Very well. And the two men from your branch or your division that you deployed, Smit and your brother Crause, they were alternately in order to monitor the situation to see whether or not information could be collected from discussions taking place in the motor vehicle.

MR P R CRAUSE: Let me just explain it as such, for two or three days after the monitoring of the discussions commenced, I received feedback from them indicating that discussions had indeed taken place. After that the discussions ceased and there were no further discussions for the following three months and in that period they periodically visited the place.

MR VISSER: When the discussions ceased, what was the idea then, what happened?

MR P R CRAUSE: We suspected that the vehicle had either travelled beyond the reception area or had travelled north to Zambia, outside of Botswana.

MR VISSER: And during these three months, do you know ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Or perhaps the device was discovered?

MR P R CRAUSE: Yes we were not entirely aware of what had happened to the motor vehicle.

MR VISSER: Or perhaps it had exploded?

MR P R CRAUSE: That was also a possibility, but I have an idea that if it had exploded in Botswana we would have known about it.

MR VISSER: During this three month period do you know whether or not Special Forces searched for the vehicle in Botswana?

MR P R CRAUSE: As I understood they did conduct a search.

MR VISSER: Yes, we will hear later from Mr Smit that they conducted and aerial search as well.

MR P R CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And what was the following thing that you heard?

MR P R CRAUSE: This would be approximately in the eleventh month. One Sunday morning I received a telephonic message from Gen Steyn, in which he informed me that he had heard over the news that a certain vehicle had exploded at a hospital at Mochudi, Botswana, he wanted me to establish exactly what had taken place there, what had been there and who had been involved.

MR VISSER: Who was that?

MR P R CRAUSE: Gen Steyn. On a Sunday morning he contacted me and informed me ...

MR VISSER: Just proceed.

MR P R CRAUSE: ... and informed me that he had heard over the news that an explosion of a vehicle had taken place near a hospital in Mochudi.

MR VISSER: Just spell that please.

MR P R CRAUSE: It was at Mochudi, M-o-c-h-u-d-i.

MR VISSER: In your application on page 16 you state that the names of the victims are unknown to you and so forth and that everything else is unknown to you and under (b) you also state that it is unknown to you whether any person was injured or killed or whether any damage was brought to property.

MR P R CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Is that your knowledge still today?

MR P R CRAUSE: Later I heard that persons had indeed been killed and injured.

MR VISSER: Can you say how many persons were killed and how many were injured?

MR P R CRAUSE: Unfortunately not. I heard that one was killed, but I cannot say with certainty.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, we have attempted to obtain information in this regard and we were unsuccessful, but the recollection is that one or two persons, perhaps even three were killed and if my recollection ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: What's he making application for?

MR VISSER: Well Chairperson, on the evidence he made himself guilty of conspiracy and being an accessory before the fact to murder and it is clear, it follows that ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Then it doesn't seem to matter whether there was a fatality or not thereafter?

MR VISSER: That would be my submission. And of course with the car that they were going to explode, also malicious damage to property, the problem there ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct - no microphone)

MR VISSER: Well, the problem there is it was the motorcar belonging either to Special Forces or to the Police. So it's a moot point whether - but we believe Chairperson, that chances were ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I'm not going to get into it but if you're on the track to say they couldn't have committed the crime in respect of their own property, it is fatally wrong because actually it's not their property, it's public property. But we'll leave it at that, I appreciate what you're saying.

MR VISSER: No I was just going to submit as a submission, that it wouldn't have been the Police's, it's would have been the State's property, so it would still be a crime to commit. So in both those instances, Chairperson. And then again, the issue of defeating the ends of justice, which we've dealt with before and any other offence or delict.

CHAIRPERSON: This applicant was not in possession of any explosives? That was a fait accompli when he was told about ...(indistinct)

MR VISSER: Yes, in fact the vehicle as I - when you were approached by Harms - I just want to ask him that to make sure. When you were approached by Harmse, do you know whether or not the vehicle was still in the Republic or was it in Botswana?

MR P R CRAUSE: As far as he told me the source had already departed on his way to Botswana with the vehicle.

MR VISSER: You had nothing further to do with it?

MR P R CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: ...(inaudible)

ADV STEENKAMP: No questions, thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: ... Mnisi, you say you had information concerning his - or collected information concerning his activities.

MR P R CRAUSE: That is correct, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: According to your evidence the decision to kill him had already been made when you were informed that that was the plan.

MR P R CRAUSE: Yes, it was the planning, it was decided before that he will be a target. Let me put it this way.

CHAIRPERSON: Were you part of that decision?

MR P R CRAUSE: Yes, I was part of the decision, I would have supported it. I was part of the decision.

CHAIRPERSON: When was this?

MR P R CRAUSE: It was a meeting, probably just after the Church Street bomb in 1983, where we received information.

CHAIRPERSON: So when Harmse got to you he knew that you had knowledge of the reasons to kill Mnisi? ...(transcriber's interpretation)

MR P R CRAUSE: Correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And you knew that he knew? It was not strange that he came to you?

MR P R CRAUSE: No, it wasn't strange at all.

CHAIRPERSON: It was just the manner in which he would be killed that they decided. ...(transcriber's interpretation)

MR P R CRAUSE: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: You agreed with that?

MR P R CRAUSE: Yes, I agreed with that.

CHAIRPERSON: Why was he targeted and killed?

MR P R CRAUSE: Can you just repeat your question please.

CHAIRPERSON: Why was he seen as a target?

MR P R CRAUSE: He was involved in various acts of sabotage, he was a Commander of Special Operations of the ANC and they were involved in acts of larger sabotage actions.

CHAIRPERSON: And you knew about this?

MR P R CRAUSE: Yes, we knew about this. I think every member of the Security Branch was aware of this.

CHAIRPERSON: Over what period did you collect this information?

MR P R CRAUSE: I was at Zeerust from 1971 and I think came under our attention from 1979 onwards. The problem was that he only periodically came down from Botswana and he moved around in a covert way. He initiated operations, completed operations and we had problems, or we found it difficult to find out where he was.

CHAIRPERSON: Why did it take so long to execute such a plan?

MR P R CRAUSE: This was a perfect time to do it, he requested a vehicle ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Are you saying that you didn't have the opportunity to do it before?

MR P R CRAUSE: No, we did not have the opportunity.

CHAIRPERSON: You didn't then consider to send in the Special Forces of the Defence Force to deal with this?

MR P R CRAUSE: That was our problem, Mr Chairperson. As I said, he only came down periodically.

CHAIRPERSON: I'm talking about in Botswana.

MR P R CRAUSE: Yes, I'm talking about Botswana. We did not know, we did not have vehicle particulars, we did not have detail of where he lived, where he was at that stage.

CHAIRPERSON: Over this period of six years you never knew?

MR P R CRAUSE: No.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR P R CRAUSE: Thank you.

MR VISSER: I call Mr Smit, Chairperson. His application you will find at page 21 to 31 of the bundle.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------CHAIRPERSON: What's his name, de Smit or Smit?

MR VISSER: C Du Preez Smit. He's got a double-barrelled name, Chairperson. Well du Preez is his christian name, but it's surname christian name, but his surname is Smit. And his application in regard to this incident is at page 25.

C J DU PREEZ SMIT: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Smit, you also incorporate Exhibit A and B in your application and do you confirm the content of this written application?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That's correct, yes.

MR VISSER: Concerning the incident of Mr Mnisi, can you say at what date this occurred? On page 24 you mentioned a period from 1982 to '89 where there were various operations in which you took part, can you maybe just tell us with more accuracy when you think this incident took place? ...(transcriber's interpretation)

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: I think it was in '80 or '86.

MR VISSER: What was your knowledge of Mr Johannes Mnisi before this incident?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That he was a prominent MK member who was actively involved in the bringing in of transportation and planning of sabotage in South Africa.

MR VISSER: You said you were field worker, did you as a field worker also attempt to gather information concerning Mr Johannes Mnisi?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: Yes.

MR VISSER: And if you received information, was this then conveyed to, amongst others, the Special Forces?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That is correct.

MR VISSER: What was the purpose of this?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: That was to eliminate Mnisi.

MR VISSER: Mr Crause said that Mr Mnisi was a target since 1979, did you know about this?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: Yes.

MR VISSER: What was your knowledge concerning this specific incident?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: I received instructions to assist members of Special Forces who were under the command of Mr Naude, with the monitoring of a vehicle which was in Botswana. It came to my knowledge that the vehicle was sent in to eliminate Mnisi, that explosives were in the vehicle which could be activated by means of remote control and that there was also a radio transmitter in the vehicle ... (transcriber's interpretation)

MR VISSER: Did you then take part in this monitoring action?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: Yes, initially when it started we were there regularly and we also received signals from this vehicle.

MR VISSER: Was there anybody else with you there?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: It was Frik Crause, my co-applicant.

MR VISSER: Were you there together or did you work alternatively?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: Yes, we worked alternatively.

MR VISSER: What happened with this monitoring? Did it continue?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: Yes, it did.

MR VISSER: For how long?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: For approximately three months.

MR VISSER: Did you receive signals from the vehicle?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: Initially like I said, we did but afterwards it stopped. At some stage I was with Special Forces in a plane and we moved across the border to Botswana at a certain height to see if we could find a signal but we couldn't find any signal.

MR VISSER: What else do you know about this incident?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: After we couldn't pick up any more signals we visited this house less often and I think it was on a Sunday morning when Gen Steyn contacted me and informed me that there was an explosion that took place at the Mochudi hospital and also requested us that we have to find out what happened there.

MR VISSER: And did you then try to find out?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: Well we did find out that there was a vehicle that exploded there, that people were killed. I do not know how many and I do not know how many were injured, and that the hospital itself was damaged by this explosion.

CHAIRPERSON: How long were you at that monitoring house?

MR DU PREEZ SMIT: I was there periodically. Initially I was there very regularly. It was over a period of three months, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: That's the evidence from this witness, Chairperson.

ADV STEENKAMP: No questions, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Mr Frik Crause, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: His application is at page 32 to 39. He deals with this matter at page 34.

FRIK CRAUSE: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Please be seated.

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Crause, you also ask that Exhibit A and B must be incorporated in your evidence and do you also confirm the written application?

MR F CRAUSE: Yes.

MR VISSER: You've heard the evidence of your then Commander, Mr Crause and Mr Smit?

MR F CRAUSE: That is correct, yes.

MR VISSER: Is there anything that you would like to add to their testimony?

MR F CRAUSE: Yes, there is something I'd like to add. I agree with everything that they've said.

MR VISSER: And do you also then ask for amnesty for the same thing that they are asking?

MR F CRAUSE: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you say that you wanted to add something?

MR VISSER: He's says he's got nothing to add, Chairperson. Unless you want him to repeat it, or there's no point in it.

CHAIRPERSON: I heard the Interpreter said:

MR VISSER: Oh, I wasn't listening to the Interpreter.

CHAIRPERSON: Well that's the point, I misunderstood him.

MR VISSER: Oh, so it's a misunderstanding all round. Chairperson no, he says he's got nothing to add. That is all from him.

MR VISSER: And the last witness is Gen Steyn, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: According to Mr Crause, the first witness, Gen Steyn phoned him and asked him to investigate what the explosion at this hospital was all about, am I correct?

MR VISSER: ...(inaudible)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Steyn, in terms of the evidence thusfar, unless he's going to come and tell us differently, would not have known about that plan.

MR VISSER: No, he knew about it, he was informed. But you'll hear from him, Chairperson, that he's very vague on who informed him, but he was informed.

J A STEYN: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Steyn, you've already incorporated Exhibit A and B in your application and you confirm the contents of your application.

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: In this case Mr Steyn, can you recall it well?

MR STEYN: With the drawing up of my amnesty application I couldn't recall everything, but I do know now what happened.

MR VISSER: Can you tell us what do you think, on what date did this incident take place? ...(transcriber's interpretation)

MR STEYN: I think it was in '85, in the eleventh month.

MR VISSER: Not in '86?

MR STEYN: No.

MR VISSER: Why do you say this?

MR STEYN: Mr Chairperson, I was already then transferred to Durban and this incident happened when I was still here.

MR VISSER: When were you transferred to Durban?

MR STEYN: I was transferred to Durban in May 1986.

MR VISSER: What do you know about this incident?

MR STEYN: Mr Chairperson, I was approached by Col Crause who informed me that he received a request to assist the Special Forces of the Defence Force in the monitoring of a vehicle that would be sent or was already in Botswana.

MR VISSER: You then gave instructions that the monitoring had to continue.

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: You heard his evidence today that the Security Branch of Northern Transvaal also asked for a house from which they could do this monitoring.

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And you also approved this?

MR STEYN: Yes.

MR VISSER: Were you, or did you know of the activities of Johannes Mnisi?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Did you consider him as a target of the Security Forces?

MR STEYN: That is correct, he was a member of the Special Forces of the ANC.

MR VISSER: Do you know anything about any activities in which he was involved?

MR STEYN: He was, amongst others, involved in the Church Street bombing in Pretoria.

MR VISSER: And he also applied for amnesty for that incident, amongst others.

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: At a later stage did you hear anything concerning this monitoring and what was going on?

MR STEYN: Periodically I was informed that the contact of the members that did the monitoring, Smit and Crause, that they stopped this monitoring but continued on a periodic basis, but it did seem that they lost contact with this vehicle.

MR VISSER: You know that the action was aimed at killing Mr Mnisi and/or other people in that vehicle? ...(transcriber's interpretation)

MR STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You associated yourself with this?

MR STEYN: Yes.

MR VISSER: For the reasons that you just mentioned?

MR STEYN: Yes.

MR VISSER: Do you know what the end of this, or the result of this incident was?

MR STEYN: On the news, Chairperson, I heard that there was a vehicle in Mochudi that exploded close to a hospital or at the hospital and we had to report back in terms of our responsibility to Head Office, that's why I wanted to find out from Crause and Smit what was the circumstances surrounding this explosion.

MR VISSER: And as they testified you then contacted them and gave them the information and the instruction.

MR STEYN: Yes.

MR VISSER: You say in your application that if people were injured or killed, that they were unknown, what is your opinion today?

MR STEYN: Yes, I am of the opinion that people were killed and injured in that explosion. I saw a newspaper from Botswana in which they also referred to damage to the hospital building itself.

MR VISSER: Was reference made to people?

MR STEYN: Yes, they referred to people who were killed and injured.

MR VISSER: Is there anything else that you can recall and that you can add to clarify this incident?

MR STEYN: No, Mr Chairperson, I think that is all.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman, that's the evidence from Mr Steyn.

MR VISSER: We have no further witness, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: The application is in respect of conspiracy to murder and damage to property?

MR VISSER: Yes, damage to property, it's both the motorcar as well as, on this evidence there may have been damage to property in Botswana as well. If it's the same bomb, but it appears ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I don't think we can go that far because there must be some link between the bomb that caused the damage to the hospital and the bomb planted. We're not really sure. It is possible, I'm not saying no.

MR VISSER: Yes, that is why I thought it was important to try and establish a date, Chairperson, and we've not been able to be successful because ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: That was my next question. I have to consider this with my Panel and if we're restricting to a conspiracy, then there's no problem about the date, but if you are going to insist on a particular finding as to murder, the date would have been important and - I think we're more confused. The vehicle belonged to the State?

MR VISSER: Yes.

MR MALAN: It may be a vehicle that they have stolen from some private individual.

MR VISSER: My attorney asks me to offer to you if you were interested in some reading matter and you don't have enough to read at this stage, he can present you with Mr Mnisi's amnesty applications as well, Chairperson. For what it's worth.

CHAIRPERSON: That is an early morning joke.

Yes we'll reserve the decision in this.

CHAIRPERSON: The next one seems to be the last one on the roll. It is the last one on the roll, it is the applications of Coetzee, Heystek and Pretorius.

MR VISSER: Well it's the last one in which we're involved, Chairperson. And this one - while we're waiting, this one concerns abduction, unlawful detention and assault as well as contravention of border control regulations regarding entry and exit of people as well as firearms, Chairperson.

The first witness I will call will be Mr Coetzee.

CHAIRPERSON: I assume the victims present are involved in this matter.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: That's correct, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Just announce yourself on the microphone for the purposes of the record.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: Mr Chairperson, I'm Advocate Chris van der Heyde, from Standard Bank Chambers here in Pretoria and I represent the victim, the wife, Mrs Lengene, in this matter.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, who do you call first?

MR VISSER: The first witness is the first application in the bundle, Mr W H Coetzee. His application is to be found at page 1 through to 17, and he deals with the application from page 4 onwards, Chairperson. He is ready to take the oath and he wishes to address you in Afrikaans.

W H COETZEE: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Please be seated.

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Coetzee, you are an applicant in this matter and you apply for amnesty for your role in the abduction, assault or illegal detention or Mr Peter Lengene, as well as the contravention of the stipulated border control regulations which concerns the entry and exit of yourself to Botswana and back, as well as the illegal importation of weapons into Botswana, as well as defeating the ends of justice, is that correct?

MR COETZEE: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: You have studied Exhibits A and B, do you wish to incorporate the contents thereof with your amnesty application?

MR COETZEE: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Do you also confirm the correctness subject to the evidence that you will give today, of your amnesty application which was submitted in December 1996?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Could you tell the Committee about the background, firstly, and then your share in this incident.

CHAIRPERSON: Before we continue Mr Visser, are there any other applicants?

MR VISSER: Yes, there are two further applicants. The other one is Mr Heystek and there is Mr Anton Pretorius, as indicated by the index page of the bundle.

CHAIRPERSON: Don't you think it would be advisable for them to hear this evidence?

MR VISSER: Throughout the entire process thusfar applicants have listened to the evidence, but if you feel that it would be better for them to wait outside, then ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: No, I want to know whether it wouldn't be advisable for them to listen to the evidence.

MR VISSER: Oh, but they are seated here.

MR MALAN: But they weren't here at the beginning.

CHAIRPERSON: Oh I beg your pardon, I couldn't see them.

MR VISSER: Yes, they are indeed present.

Can you please provide us with the background pertaining to Mr Peter Lengene.

MR COETZEE:

MR VISSER: What does SAYRCO, S-A-Y-R-C-O stand for?

MR COETZEE: South African Youth Revolution Council.

MR VISSER: Please explain very briefly once again, what is the difference between an RS agent and an informer?

MR COETZEE: An RS agent is a member of the Force, while an informer would depend upon the occasion.

MR VISSER: Very well, proceed.

MR COETZEE:

MR VISSER: What was the military wing of SAYRCO? How was it known, what was its name?

MR COETZEE: It was know as TSU.

MR VISSER: What did that stand for?

MR COETZEE: Tactics and Strategy.

MR VISSER: And the abbreviation is T-S-U?

MR COETZEE: Tactics and Strategy Unit.

MR VISSER: Tactics and Strategy Unit, TSU?

MR COETZEE: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You referred to the contact which SAYRCO had with other States or countries, what was the purpose, among others, with that contact?

MR COETZEE: In order to obtain military training for their members and to obtain weaponry, so that they could also fund their struggle against the RSA.

MR VISSER: Very well, continue. Was there any information regarding what they aimed to do in the RSA?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

INTERPRETER: Could the speaker please slow down. Could the speaker please slow down, the Interpreter finds it difficult to follow the speaker as he's reading a document which speeds up his speech.

ADV SIGODI: The Interpreter is asking the speaker to slow down because she cannot keep up.

MR VISSER: I'm sorry, I should have thought of that.

Will you please proceed somewhat slower and just repeat. You say that confirmed information indicated that SAYRCO deemed it necessary to organise a singularly controversial military action in the RSA, and you have just stated that it became known later that this action which was proposed was the attack the Protea Police complex in Soweto, is that correct.

MR COETZEE: Yes.

MR VISSER: Will you then just proceed somewhat slower please.

MR COETZEE:

MR VISSER: Very well, if we can come to Mr Lengene himself. Can you tell us what you knew of his activities?

MR COETZEE: His participation in these activities.

...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: What do you mean?

MR COETZEE: Could you repeat the question?

CHAIRPERSON: I want you to explain - just keep your finger on the mike please. What do you mean when you refer to proposed activities?

MR COETZEE: Chairperson, as a member of their military wing, he coordinated all their activities and he was directly in command of their military activities and everything that was committed by the military units was known by him and coordinated by him and sanctioned by him.

CHAIRPERSON: So his activities were not proposed as such, they were actual activities?

MR COETZEE: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: That is why I asked what you meant by your reference to proposed activities.

MR COETZEE:

MR MALAN: What do you mean when you refer to his status and the 1976 unrests?

MR COETZEE: Chairperson, his involvement in the violence and his organisation of the youth.

MR MALAN: During 1976? His involvement in the 1976 unrests, is that what you mean?

MR COETZEE: Yes.

MR MALAN: In other words he feared that the police would descend upon him?

MR COETZEE: Yes, that is correct.

MR MALAN: Continue.

MR COETZEE:

...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Is it correct that he did become some form of an informer then?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: For you?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Please continue.

MR COETZEE:

CHAIRPERSON: Who were they?

MR COETZEE:

MR VISSER: Just a moment. In your application on page 6, you have stated the name Khotso Seaflolo, but it has been misspelt. At the bottom of page 6 you refer to a person called Khotso Seahalelo, but you say the correct spelling is, S-e-a-h-l-o-l-o?

MR COETZEE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: As well as the other person who is Isak Masemola, M-a-s-e-m-o-l-a?

MR COETZEE: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Continue.

MR COETZEE:

MR VISSER: May I just interpose. In 1982, who was the Commander of the Intelligence Unit?

MR COETZEE: Col Heystek, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Very well, continue.

MR COETZEE:

CHAIRPERSON: Didn't you ask Lengene to become an informer?

MR COETZEE: Could you repeat the question please.

CHAIRPERSON: Before you asked Heystek whether or not you could abduct the man you must have decided that he would be a good source for the Police, didn't you then discuss the matter with Lengene himself?

MR COETZEE: No, Chairperson, there were always the intermediaries to whom I referred, they consulted with him and discussed the matter with him.

CHAIRPERSON: What I want to establish is why did you decide that he should be abducted if the possibility existed that he might be willing to become an informer?

MR COETZEE: Chairperson, it was important to bring him back with us to the RSA in order to finalise the recruitment process and to apply him for these purposes in South Africa. Previously on a continuous basis there had been liaison with him, as I have indicated in my application.

CHAIRPERSON: It's a simple question, was he ever asked to become a full informer?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson, but there was no substantiation regarding his credibility to work with us or to cooperate with us. Information pertaining to his involvement in military activities had not yet been validated, that is why the recruitment progressed as it is set out within my amnesty application.

MR MALAN: May I just ask you, was he aware of the fact that he would be abducted?

MR COETZEE: No, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: I just want to establish, and this is not something that concerns your application, it's just a simple question. If he had already been some form of informer, having already provided information to you, he would then be your informer, as I understand your evidence. How then did it come to be that you decided to abduct him? Why didn't you make more of an attempt and say "Lengene I think that you should become a full informer, what do you say about that?"

MR COETZEE: Chairperson, due to the psychosis of fear within him and secondly, in order to finalise the recruitment process.

CHAIRPERSON: But you could have finalised that process regardless of whether or not he accompanied you.

MR COETZEE: The process spanned a number of days, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Continue.

MR COETZEE:

I am just proceeding to the next paragraph.

MR VISSER: You are proceeding way too fast.

MR COETZEE: I will repeat once again, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: May I just interrupt you. Mr Lengene refers to the date thereof as the 6th of February 1982. Lengene made a sworn statement, Chairperson, and he says in that sworn statement - I'm just looking for the exact page number, he says at page 53 in paragraph 18, he says in the middle of that page where he starts describing where he went with the informant, he says:

and we have no reason to question that date.

Very well, please proceed.

MR COETZEE:

CHAIRPERSON: The recruitment, was that a regular method of making the proposed informer an informer?

MR COETZEE: The modus operandi of people differed, but that was my modus operandi. This was a military person ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I want to know if you did the same to all your informers?

MR COETZEE: No.

CHAIRPERSON: Is this the first time you slapped a proposed informer?

MR COETZEE: No, there were others.

MR VISSER: May I just take you back to this before we forget about it, when you entered to Botswana, just clarify this for us, did you enter legally via the border post or did you enter illegally over the border?

MR COETZEE: Illegally, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And did you take any weapons with you or not?

MR COETZEE: Yes.

MR VISSER: And those weapons were obviously not declared at any legal border post?

MR COETZEE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Very well, proceed.

MR COETZEE: Paragraph 32:

MR VISSER: Where is this Tony Lengene currently?

MR COETZEE: Currently he is a serving member. I don't know where he is stationed.

MR VISSER: Is he still in the South African Police Services?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: I beg your pardon, Chairperson, it is my information that Mr Lengene is deceased. I beg your pardon, I was actually busy with something else.

MR VISSER: The victim is deceased but the brother is still alive and he is still in the Police Services.

Very well, continue.

MR COETZEE:

MR VISSER: This information that you are now explaining, where did you get this information from?

MR COETZEE: Mr Chairperson, it was information that came up from interrogation of Lengene and other informants that provided us with this information.

MR VISSER: And were you then informed that these were the aspects that were conveyed to Mr Hershveld from the Botswana Security Branch?

MR COETZEE: Yes, I was not present.

MR VISSER: Mr Peter Lengene, the person that you abducted, is he alive today?

MR COETZEE: No, Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: What happened to him?

MR COETZEE: I heard, Mr Chairperson, that there was an incident in which he was involved that was partly his fault,

MR VISSER: It had nothing to do with any politics?

MR COETZEE: No, Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Now Mr Lengene made a statement from page 48 and in this statement he described how he was abducted, did you study that statement?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Everything that appears in that statement, is it correct?

MR COETZEE: No, Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Can you just in short deal with the aspects that you do not agree with.

MR COETZEE: I can say that the fact that he allegedly was injected and the fact that he was assaulted by people in Rustenburg, that is not part of my knowledge that something like that could have happened.

MR VISSER: Can we just go through it point by point. On page 53, paragraph 19 alleges that when he arrived at the house that evening, a Saturday evening in Botswana, he was suspicious and he tried to get away. That was now while you were hiding in the house.

MR COETZEE: I do not carry any knowledge of this.

MR VISSER: And he also says that the lights in the house were switched off and that the informant tried to light a candle. What is your evidence concerning this?

MR COETZEE: According to my knowledge the lights were on and we did not make use of candles.

MR VISSER: In paragraph 21 on page 54, that someone threatened him with a hunting knife. According to your knowledge did this happen?

MR COETZEE: I cannot remember such an incident at all. CHAIRPERSON: I beg your pardon?

MR COETZEE: I cannot remember such an incident at all.

MR VISSER: And then on page 54, paragraph 22, that he was injected.

MR COETZEE: I deny that completely.

MR VISSER: Was it true that you gave him alcohol to appease him? Did you give him alcohol?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: For what reason?

MR COETZEE: To get him under control?

CHAIRPERSON: Was it necessary?

MR COETZEE: I believe that it was necessary.

CHAIRPERSON: What made you think that?

MR COETZEE: Because I knew Mr Chairperson, that we were on our way back to the Republic and there was that psychosis of fear within this man and to bring him back, it was our first meeting with him, knowing that he is now in the final process of recruitment.

MR VISSER: What was his action when you seized him that night in the house?

MR COETZEE: He did not have room to move, we immediately took control of him in order to finalise this recruitment successfully in the Republic.

MR VISSER: Did he fight back or did he resist?

MR COETZEE: It could be possible - yes, there was some resistance, Chairperson, which I would ascribe to fright, the reaction to a lot of people suddenly on you, unknown people. ...(transcriber's interpretation)

MR VISSER: Mr Lengene says on page 54, paragraph 23, that he had to sleep on a cement floor.

MR COETZEE: I do deny that.

MR VISSER: He also ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: The Security Police do have that such a habit, that after they interrogated a person they would do this.

MR COETZEE: Mr Chairperson, we were busy with a very sensitive recruitment and that is why it was very important to me that we had to look after this person.

CHAIRPERSON: He was assaulted or hit, this recruit or informant, to show to him that you were serious, is that correct?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And that occurred over a period of a week until you were satisfied that he is trustworthy and that he's been recruited, correct?

MR COETZEE: That is true.

CHAIRPERSON: And he was treated badly in that week, he was hit. There were no apparent reasons for that, is that not so? ....(transcriber's interpretation)

MR COETZEE: Yes, I did slap him or assault him at a certain stage.

CHAIRPERSON: Right through the week you slapped him until you were satisfied that he was - I cannot think of the right words to describe it, but he was now satisfied that he was trustworthy.

MR COETZEE: I will put it this way, Mr Chairperson, that after the conflict points were clarified, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: And he was dealt with on such a level that he had to know that you were serious and that you were in control?

MR COETZEE: Yes, that's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Now if he was treated in such a bad way, why would this allegation that he was naked be so unusual? ...(transcriber's interpretation)

MR COETZEE: At no stage in Rustenburg he was naked. We were in a garage as I said in my application.

CHAIRPERSON: Was he in a garage?

MR COETZEE: Yes, and we were there with him all the time.

CHAIRPERSON: In the garage?

MR COETZEE: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Was he handcuffed?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Mr Chairperson, from time to time, especially in the evenings.

CHAIRPERSON: His hands and is feet?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Was it cold?

MR COETZEE: February month in Rustenburg is very hot, it was summer.

CHAIRPERSON: Was the cement on the floor very cold? Was it cold in the evenings?

MR COETZEE: Yes, that is possible, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Were there times that he was not aware of what was going on around him?

MR COETZEE: No, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you speak to him in Afrikaans?

MR COETZEE: Mostly in English and in his own language, with the use of Sgt Mothiba.

CHAIRPERSON: Was he placed in the boot of the car?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: It was a Ford Cortina XR6?

MR COETZEE: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: The old one?

MR COETZEE: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: The alcohol, whether it was brandy or whisky, how big was the bottle?

MR COETZEE: It was a quart, I think they call it a quart - a dumpie, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: What type of alcohol?

MR COETZEE: I myself do not drink. It was a white alcohol.

CHAIRPERSON: Is it true that the bottle was emptied when he was forced to drink it?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Mr Chairperson, he had to finish it.

CHAIRPERSON: How was he cuffed, his hands and his feet? With cuffs or ropes?

MR COETZEE: I think we used cuffs.

CHAIRPERSON: And in Botswana, was it cuffs or ropes?

MR COETZEE: If I can recall correctly, Mr Chairperson, his feet were tied with rope.

CHAIRPERSON: Continue, please.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, just one correction if I may, I believe that you referred the witness to page 58, paragraph 33, as to where in the blue Ford XR6 he was transported, Lengene says he was made to lie on the back seat, not in the boot.

CHAIRPERSON: Ja, 54.

MR MALAN: The reference is to paragraph 23, Mr Visser.

CHAIRPERSON: Let's put it this way, Mr Visser, this is one of the trips, I'm not too if they talk about one same trip.

MR VISSER: Oh yes, that may be. Thank you.

Now in paragraph 28, page 56, Mr Lengene describes an incident where your father-in-law was involved and that he took a pliers and assaulted him on his private parts.

MR COETZEE: I do not carry knowledge of such an incident, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Was Mr Lengene kept in the garage of your father-in-law in Rustenburg?

MR COETZEE: Yes, but he was in our company.

MR VISSER: Was your father-in-law involved in the interrogation or the recruitment process?

MR COETZEE: No, not at all.

MR VISSER: Did he from time come in or was present while you interrogated him?

MR COETZEE: No.

MR VISSER: Mr Lengene then says on page ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Did your father-in-law know what was going on in his house?

MR COETZEE: No, Mr Chairperson. He knew that we were busy with a recruitment.

CHAIRPERSON: Was he aware of the fact that you assaulted this person?

MR COETZEE: No, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: When you assaulted him, did he not shout?

MR COETZEE: No, Mr Chairperson, he was not assaulted by me in such a way. Not according to me, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And when you left?

MR COETZEE: I was there on a full-time basis.

CHAIRPERSON: The whole week?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And your father-in-law never entered the garage?

MR COETZEE: No, Mr Chairperson, because we requested him and we told him that we were busy with work.

CHAIRPERSON: Was there anyone by the name of Willem?

MR COETZEE: Yes, my name is Willem.

CHAIRPERSON: Did Lengene know that your name was Willem?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you tell him?

MR COETZEE: It was well known what my name was, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: On the 6th day of your work there, is it correct that you decided to stop slapping him or assaulting him?

MR COETZEE: It was a few days before that.

CHAIRPERSON: But did you get a call?

MR COETZEE: I received various calls.

CHAIRPERSON: Was that on the sixth day?

MR COETZEE: I cannot remember that, but I made various calls and I received various calls there.

CHAIRPERSON: At a certain stage - and I'm asking you, did you receive a call from Johannesburg and you took the call, you came back to the garage and you tell you colleagues "Stop now, we are going to leave, there are problems in Johannesburg"? Did this happen?

MR COETZEE: It is possible, but I cannot remember the incident.

CHAIRPERSON: Then he was left behind, still cuffed while you left him behind in the garage.

MR COETZEE: As I said before, Mr Chairperson, I was present the whole time, from when we arrived until we left.

CHAIRPERSON: And this was the time when he then realised that you changed his attitude towards him.

MR COETZEE: Our attitude was very positive towards him, although I said ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: No, but Mr Coetzee, you couldn't have slapped him or assaulted him and still be positive.

MR COETZEE: I'm talking about conflict areas or points.

CHAIRPERSON: The fact that he was assaulted is conflict in itself. The point is that on the sixth day he declared that you received a call, you spoke to your colleagues and everybody left the garage. He was still cuffed. You went to the main house, when you returned your attitude was different, it had changed and according to him you smiled at him, then the cuffs were taken off. This is what he says in his statement. I'm asking if this is how it happened.

MR COETZEE: No, Mr Chairperson, because he wrote every day, how can he write with cuffs on?

CHAIRPERSON: Maybe you do not understand me correctly. I'm talking about the sixth day. On the sixth day he said concerning his detention, the day on which he was slapped or assaulted, at a certain time in that day you received a call and you dealt with it, you came back, you then went to the main house, when you returned your whole attitude was different towards him, you smiled at him and he was uncuffed. Do you say that this is how it happened, or that it didn't happen this way?

MR COETZEE: Mr Chairperson, he was first uncuffed when I returned to Johannesburg, when we left Rustenburg. That is what I can remember.

CHAIRPERSON: Well it fits in with the statement, but is it true that on the sixth day, it seems to me that because of the call that you received, that your whole attitude towards him changed and that he was not assaulted anymore or not cuffed anymore? Is that how it happened or not?

MR COETZEE: It can be so, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Mr Visser.

MR VISSER: As it pleases you.

There is also a suggestion that was made by Mr Lengene that this call had to do with a report that was on the radio concerning his abduction out of Botswana and that that was the reason why you then changed your attitude towards him. That was on the sixth day. What do you say about that?

MR COETZEE: Mr Chairperson, I cannot remember it, but I know that before the so-called sixth day there were various reports in the media concerning his alleged abduction.

MR VISSER: Mr Pretorius can tell us more about this, but according to your recollection, from when was it known that he disappeared from Botswana?

MR COETZEE: If I'm correct, it was that Monday.

MR VISSER: After the Saturday?

MR COETZEE: Yes.

MR VISSER: Mr Lengene also said with reference to the visit to Pretoria, where he spoke to Mr Hershveld, he indicated that at that stage his comrades in Botswana were fond guilty in Botswana and were sentenced to 11 years concerning the activities around vehicle theft, what do you say to that?

MR COETZEE: Mr Chairperson, I was not present in Pretoria.

MR VISSER: ... aware of that Mr Coetzee. He says that during his visit to Pretoria, his comrades had already been sentenced in Botswana, do you know anything of that?

MR COETZEE: According to my knowledge, I cannot remember this aspect or comment on it.

MR VISSER: Mr Lengene also says that he suffered a lot in the Republic of South Africa, do you agree with this?

MR COETZEE: No, Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Did you provide him with a house and transport and his needs in general?

MR COETZEE: Yes, his career testifies to it.

MR VISSER: He then lastly talks about an incident, on paragraph 42, page 62, where his vehicle broke down and that he was without a vehicle for three months because you did not want to help him with the vehicle. What do you say about that?

MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson, if I can recall correctly, shortly after his arrival and after he started working in Soweto, he was involved in two accidents with two new State vehicles and that he was under the influence of alcohol and that was why I did not want to provide him with another vehicle for that specific period of time.

MR VISSER: How long was Mr Lengene a policeman until he died?

MR COETZEE: Up until - approximately 16 years, Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And did he take part in actions of the Security Branch?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Mr Chairperson, Col Pretorius will be able to testify about it because he was his primary handler at a later stage.

MR VISSER: And was he a valued member by you?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman, I have not further questions to this - oh, I see that it's five past eleven, Mr Chairman, perhaps if you wish to take the adjournment now.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you finished?

MR VISSER: I'm finished with this witness.

CHAIRPERSON: We'll take a short tea adjournment.

W H COETZEE: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: ...(no recording) with the facts that you withheld the abduction.

MR COETZEE: For everything, Chairperson, within the context of this incident.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VAN DER HEYDE: Very well. Once again I want to take you very briefly to the abduction. You stated that there was a possibility and you were aware that Mr Lengene wanted to cooperate with you to a certain extent and that during his stay in Botswana, he had already disclosed certain information to you via an informer and that this led to the arrest of a person, Messrs Seahlolo and a Mr Masemola. Wasn't he valuable to you in Botswana, why did you want to abduct him from there?

MR COETZEE: There were various objectives which we sought to achieve with his abduction and one of them was that as a Commander of a military unit, we wanted to destroy the military unit and also combat the violent onslaught from the organisation. That was the primary objective with his recruitment.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: In other words, were you of the opinion that he would be more valuable to you in South Africa than in Botswana?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson, that is correct.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: Could you tell us who the informer was, the intermediary between you ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: How is that relevant to any interest that the victims might have, Chairperson, with great respect? We've gone through these arguments so many times ...

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, let the witness say if he doesn't want to, and say why he doesn't want to give the name. There may be a reason why Mr van der Heyde finds it relevant. I don't want to interfere with his questioning unnecessarily. He's a qualified Advocate and he would know whether it's relevant or not.

MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson, it may cause certain discomfort for the person and/or his family members.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

MR COETZEE: No, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Is there any specific reason why you need to know the name?

MR VAN DER HEYDE: It is my instruction from my clients that they would like to know the name of the intermediary.

CHAIRPERSON: Will it be put to the witness at the end of the day that Mr Lengene was not an informer or did not have such activities?

MR VAN DER HEYDE: That is the understanding that I have with my clients, yes Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Would it then be correct that you want to determine whether or not the existence of this informer is true? Because if it will be put to him that Mr Lengene was not an informer or did not interfere with such activities, then the fact that the witness states that there was an informer who contended that, is something that you would like to contest.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: Chairperson, my clients is of the opinion is of the opinion that the whole reason why the applicant has spoken of the reason why they wanted to abduct him for his cooperation, was in fact not the actual reason and that according to them the informer never provided information via Mr Lengene and that if we could establish the name of this person, it would be important to see whether or not we could call him as a witness, so that he can come and tell us exactly what happened. If such a person would be available, then we would apply for the subpoena of such a person to the TRC.

CHAIRPERSON: What do you have to say about this, Mr Visser?

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, the original Amnesty Committee already in 1997, make a ruling that informants, the identity of informants should not ordinarily be disclosed. That's the first thing. The second - yes, that was a ruling of Chairman, Justice Mall, at the time and that ruling ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I'm aware of it, but what do you say in view of the extraordinary, the possible extraordinary circumstances, where they say "Look, the allegation that Mr Lengene involved himself in activities akin to informants, is being questioned" and they are contemplating, the families, of calling this informant, alleged informant, to come and say exactly what happened. That amounts to extraordinary circumstances, that possibility. What ...

MR VISSER: Mr Chairperson, my reply to you is the following. In a matter in which Mr Malan was a member of the Panel that was heard in Natal, under the Chairmanship of Justice Wilson, a so-called extraordinary circumstance also appeared on the facts and the facts there were that the two informants that went into Swaziland ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: Mr Visser, there's no decision out on that, so I don't think it will take us any further.

MR VISSER: I know that, I know that, Chairperson. The two informers there were co-perpetrators and in that matter - and if you wish me to do so, I'll do so again here, I collected authorities, both ancient and modern to show one thing, and that is that there is a rule that the identity of an informer will be protected unless it is against contra bonos mores not to do so. And Chairperson, throughout, and I've got the authorities and comes argument stage we can argue that, it is quite clear that both in statutory law, in the Criminal Procedure Act the provision is made, as well as in our positive law, that under no circumstances will the identity of an informer be disclosed.

CHAIRPERSON: You are incorrect, it doesn't state "under no circumstances".

MR VISSER: I'm busy saying, Chairperson, barring some notable exceptions. The one is where the identity of an informer can lead to proving the innocent of an accused, where the identity of an informer can be instrumental in proving the innocence of an accused. That's an exception. It all comes down to what public policy is. The issue is public policy. Public policy plays no role here. My learned friend seems to ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Why not?

MR VISSER: Well he seems to suggest that Coetzee's evidence that Lengene started cooperating is untrue, he therefore wants to know who the informer is, what has public policy got to do with this? There's no public, no principle of public policy is involved, it's an issue of credibility, at most.

CHAIRPERSON: I'm just trying to mull this thing over in my mind. Here is an offence for which amnesty is being applied for, notably one of them is kidnapping, it makes it worse that it was kidnapping from a foreign country. To me, on the face of it, straight, involved public policy. But let's not hone in on that. The nature of this type of investigation and this inquiry, it's the job of the Commission is to as far as possible, see to it that the truth of the matter be disclosed publicly. If the facts which we are trying to establish here involves other than what the applicant has now told us and there's reason to believe that there may be a possibility of another type of version coming out and this version can only come before this Panel through a particular person who is privy to this knowledge, certainly that person should be - or it should be considered to call that witness.

Your argument on that score I imagine would be that no, while that my be correct, here we have this person in a special situation and position, that he happened to be an informant and informants have a special place in the justice system where they are mostly protected from identity for reasons or public policy. I agree with that. But we've got to weigh that public interest against the obvious public interest in this Commission, and isn't that the issue that we must grapple with?

MR VISSER: Part of the public policy that you must consider, Chairperson, and what has been considered in all the other authorities that I referred to, is the safety and wellbeing of the informer. And it has been shown through history, through that what happens to informers during wars and after that, is that they are affected adversely if their identities are know, them as well as their families.

Now the balancing act which one has to do, is to ask yourself what is the interest of the victims here to know the identity? They say they might want to call him as a witness, who says that he is ever going to be prepared to appear as a witness? But leave that aside, Chairperson, we've already had the situation of two informers in Durban, that's why I referred to it, who refused point blank to participate in any of the proceedings.

CHAIRPERSON: I'll tell you something, if I have reason that an informant can throw light onto the truth of an application, I will subpoena him.

MR VISSER: That's not the test, Chairperson, what happens then. But the point is ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

MR VISSER: But even at the risk of the life of an informer, Chairperson. That is where public policy comes into the matter. But Chairperson, it seems that we're going to have to argue this matter in full. If you'll allow me ten minutes, I will set myself up and we can argue ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: ... continue with the cross-examination. Let me think about that issue as well.

MR VISSER: Mr Malan might or might not have the written argument which ...

MR MALAN: Mr van der Heyde, before you continue, I don't know whether you will come to this because you are requesting the name of the identity, I want to ask Mr Coetzee whether the name George Khoza rings a bell.

Do you know such a person?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Did you read the affidavit of Mr Lengene?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: His reference to George Khoza, does that make any sense to you?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Did Lengene have contact with George Khoza after he was recruited?

MR COETZEE: One of the persons, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: After he was recruited?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Because he states in his affidavit that he determined that Khoza was actually a South African citizen.

MR COETZEE: Yes, it is possible, Chair. Yes, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Was he the intermediary?

MR COETZEE: He was one of them.

MR MALAN: Mr Coetzee, your evidence was that the recruitment discussions was conducted via an intermediary, not various intermediaries.

MR COETZEE: What I meant in that context is that various persons were directly and indirectly involved in the monitoring action.

MR MALAN: The weapons which Mr Khoza gave to Mr Lengene, according to Lengene's affidavit, does this balance with your information?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Are those the weapons that you made available to him?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Then the question arises once again, Mr Coetzee, the person whose identity we are discussing, isn't it commonly known that it was George Khoza?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Thank you, Mr van der Heyde, then we have clarified that.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: Thank you, Chairperson.

Mr Coetzee, when you went to arrest Mr Lengene in Botswana, the evidence is that you bound his hands and legs when you seized him there. You stated that there was a measure of resistance from him at that stage.

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: I have counted swiftly, you were at least seven persons who seized him there, was it really necessary to bind his hands and feet and to force alcohol down his throat? Was it necessary to do all these things?

MR VISSER: There is no evidence from this witness, Mr Chairman, that liquor was poured down his throat.

CHAIRPERSON: How did you manage to get him to consume the liquor?

MR COETZEE: We forced him to drink it with his hands.

CHAIRPERSON: Were they bound?

MR COETZEE: Not yet at that stage, Chairperson. After all these years I cannot recall exactly when he was bound and when he drank the liquor. I know that I made him drink there in the house after we took over and it was part of the phase during which I had to assume control of the situation and bring him back.

CHAIRPERSON: Let us take it step for step. He was lured out at that house and when the lights went on, he was seized by your men, is that correct?

MR COETZEE: Yes Chairperson, upon approach, if I recall correctly. It is very difficult.

CHAIRPERSON: As I understood your evidence, was it necessary for you upon first meeting the man, to immediately get him under control, to cuff his hands and to bind his legs?

MR COETZEE: Yes, that is correct. Yes, Chairperson.

INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone.

CHAIRPERSON: And once you had managed to gain control over him to such an extent, for some other reason that you found feasible, he had to be fed liquor, is that correct?

MR COETZEE: Yes, that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: As I understand your evidence, the liquor was in his body after he was bound.

MR COETZEE: It is possible, Chairperson, however today I cannot recall when the liquor was administered, but that he consumed the liquor is true.

CHAIRPERSON: Then it was asked of you why it was necessary to force him to drink the liquor and an objection was raised. Then I asked how this took place and you said that you administered this liquor to him, but he had to drink it with his hands, and this is what I don't understand, his hands were cuffed.

MR COETZEE: Chairperson, it is still possible if one's hands are cuffed, to hold something and to drink something.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you saying therefore that his hands were cuffed on the front of his body?

MR COETZEE: Please repeat the question.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you saying that his hands were bound at the front of his body?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson, I cannot recall precisely how we cuffed him at that stage, but I believe and a I assume that his hands were bound in the front of his body.

CHAIRPERSON: In light of the fact that your recollection is not clear, isn't it possible that the liquor was forced down his throat?

MR COETZEE: That possibility exists, Chairperson.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: Mr Coetzee, did Mr Lengene loose consciousness at a certain stage due to the forced consumption of this liquor?

MR COETZEE: I cannot recall that, I cannot recall that he lost consciousness at any point. I would have noticed this immediately, Chairperson.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: In light of your poor recollection, isn't it possible?

MR COETZEE: No, Chairperson.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: Did you then leave him, or load him into the vehicle in order to bring him over the border to South Africa?

MR COETZEE: Yes, we departed shortly thereafter.

R VAN DER HEYDE: Where in the vehicle was he?

MR COETZEE: I cannot recall at that stage, I think that he was with us in the vehicle. I recall that we made use of a Ford Station Wagon, a Ford Cortina Station Wagon. I'm not completely certain of the facts.

CHAIRPERSON: You agreed that he was in the boot. It was in his affidavit, it was an XR6, a blue vehicle and he was in the boot and you agreed with this evidence.

MR COETZEE: That XR6 was not in Botswana, Chairperson, the blue XR6 was in the RSA, or at least on the RSA side of the border. We crossed the border fence by foot.

CHAIRPERSON: He said that when he became conscious ... Continue please.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: Did I understand you correctly when you said that while you were on your way on the South African border's side, on the way to Rustenburg he tried to escape?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Mr Chairperson. Yes, Mr Chairperson, with our arrival in Swartruggens, Mr Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Mr van der Heyde, I think in the statement of Mr Lengene, he does refer to it himself.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: Was it the same day when you were in Swartruggens that you arrived in Rustenburg, or was it the next day?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Mr Chairperson.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: When he tried to escape you said that you ran, you tackled him and you fell on the tar road.

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: Were you the only person who tackled him?

MR COETZEE: No, Mr Chairperson.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: Did you just tackle him or did you also assault him in any other way to get him under control?

MR COETZEE: Yes, it is possible that I would have assaulted him there or slapped him a few times.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: How could he have

CHAIRPERSON: How could he have run if he was tied?

MR COETZEE: His feet, if I can remember correctly, were in leg cuffs and there's a chain between the two legs and you can move, because he got out very quickly out of the vehicle. He was a few feet from the vehicle itself.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: How long after this incident took place did you take him to the doctor to receive treatment for his injuries after you'd tackled him?

MR COETZEE: I cannot remember, Mr Chairperson. What I can confirm is that with our return to Johannesburg.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: In other words it was after the few days that you had him in the garage that you took him to the doctor?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Mr Chairperson.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: Why do you then think it important to take him to the doctor, because it's been a few days since he's been tackled and he had these injuries? Why would it then be necessary now to take him to the doctor? I assume that his injuries were of such a nature that you had to take him to a doctor, you would have done it earlier on.

MR COETZEE: Mr Chairperson, from my point of view he was taken to the doctor at that stage for a full medical checkup. Our agents from abroad were taken to doctors for medical checkups in order to final out what the health of that person was and after the recruitment stage to take this informant to the doctor is a proof that we were on our way to work together, on the road of cooperation. We had to clarify his medical situation first.

CHAIRPERSON: To take him to the doctor was not for the doctor to look at his injuries, but it was more a general visit, Chairperson.

MR COETZEE: Yes, it was more a general visit to the doctor.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: Mr Lengene in his statement said that when he was in the garage of your father-in-law, he was assaulted, he was electrocuted, he was hit with a hosepipe and at one stage a pliers was used to injure his private parts in order to force him to make information known to you. Do I understand you correctly to say that you deny all of it?

MR COETZEE: I deny that at any stage, that I'm aware of, and I was there whole time and I was the person who assaulted or slapped him the most, that we used electrical appliances to electrocute him, a hosepipe or the pliers.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: The pliers on his private parts?

MR COETZEE: I've already mentioned, Mr Chairperson, that I don't carry any knowledge of such an incident that took place there.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: Chairperson, we will call Mr Lengene's wife as a witness and she will testify about parts of his body that were so deformed that he was not able to have children after that. If you can just give me a moment.

Mr Coetzee, can you tell me, was Mr lengene fearful from when he was abducted in Botswana and while you interrogated him here in South Africa, and also afterwards? Was there a sword above his head that if he did not cooperate, it will be to his detriment and that his family will suffer because of this? Am I correct in this?

MR COETZEE: No negative, then he wouldn't have, at a later stage, requested that we must also appoint his brother.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: Are you aware of the fact that Mr Lengene in his community was seen as a traitor after he was with you?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Mr Chairperson.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: You see it's my instructions from my client that the whole reason why she is here is not because she's got any problems with the fact that you had political motives, but the fact that she wants to clear his name in the community. She says that the whole community call them traitors, they were not welcome in the community anymore and up till today she cannot lift up her head in this community because Mr Lengene was abducted and then was incorporated into the South African Police. She would like to clear his name. She is also further of the opinion that he decided to join you out of fear for his family and for himself and that he joined the police for that reason.

MR COETZEE: I do not agree with that because he had a career, a future, he had the freedom of movement and I think in the beginning it was difficult for him, I think Col Heystek can testify about this, because we managed it and we dealt with it and we also mentioned it in our application that we accommodated him in a different place and that he was a very important topic at that stage. But the case, Peter Lengene, was forgotten and in my opinion he had a normal life and he could move around in the community.

MR MALAN: I beg your pardon, Mr van der Heyde.

Mr Coetzee, the father of Lengene who was the Mayor in Soweto, is that same man?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Did you know him?

MR COETZEE: No, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: But he was Mayor under the old order.

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: But it was said, or the questions put to you is that he had to stay on at the police because he feared for the safety for his family. Do you know if his father or mother were under any pressure from the police?

MR COETZEE: Under no pressure from the police, Mr Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Some of his other family members?

MR COETZEE: No, Mr Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Did you know his wife?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Mr Chairperson, I think at a later stage, I do not know if it was a year or two after he joined, she joined him. And can I just come back to the previous question. After 1982 and 1989 I met his brother for the first time, only then at that late stage, and it shows that I did not know the people, but like Col Heystek will testify, it was his mother and sister.

MR MALAN: We will then hear what the nature was of the pressure that was placed upon the family. Thank you.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: Mr Coetzee, you said that Mr Lengene was an informant also in Botswana and that he provided you with information that led to the arrest of certain people in South Africa. Was he paid for this? Or are you aware of something like this?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, he was paid?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Mr Chairperson.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: How did you pay him?

MR COETZEE: I cannot remember, Mr Chairperson, there was a phase where he worked as a normal informant and then he became a full member of the Force and I cannot remember if it was in cash or a treasure order, but I believe that there were cash amounts paid out to him.

MR MALAN: I do not know if I understand you correctly, your answer means that he was paid first of all as an informant and then later as a member of the Force? I understood the question as before the abduction. Before the abduction, when you received information through the go-between, was he paid at all then? Is that what you meant?

MR VAN DER HEYDE: Yes.

MR COETZEE: I beg your pardon, he was never paid beforehand.

MR MALAN: Thank you.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: Mr Chairperson, I have no further questions at this stage.

MR VISSER: I have no re-examination.

MR MALAN: I have a few questions and this one is, why would you abduct the person if you could get the information while he was in the structures on the other side? If you can maybe just answer that question, maybe you can try and answer it again.

MR COETZEE: Yes, Mr Chairperson. If you look at the history of SAYRCO at that stage and if you look at the amount of members who were trained at that stage and if you look at who trained them and if you look at the problems that they had to get funding and if you look at the aspect that they were planning to infiltrate the ANC and to tap their DLBs, they had to have a trustworthiness in order to target or - Soweto was the target of it, and I think they had certain problems according to my opinion, and that contributed to the fact that at that stage we had to bring him back in such way to South Africa. To remove him from TSU was my personal priority, knowing that he was the man with the power, he was controlling the military leg of it and to bring him back with the following arrest and the actions of the Botswana Police, with those that were left, we succeeded in our goal. And I think in the next year or two we withdrew all our agents.

MR MALAN: Well if your information was that he was willing to become an informant and to cooperate with you - and I think your evidence said that you went over once or twice but you could not organise or arrange for a meeting and you feared that he would be - the fact that they may get to know that you were corresponding with him, did you just go over and try to see him?

MR COETZEE: Let me put it this way, there were various other agents, we regularly dealt with cross-border actions and it was dealt within those actions when this aspect became part of it.

MR MALAN: So while you were there you just tried to make contact with him?

MR COETZEE: Yes, we did make contact with specific persons, but specific appointments were also made but they were not realised, and that was with the go-between and the informant.

MR MALAN: Was this done through Khoza?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Mr Chairperson.

MR MALAN: When these appointments did not realise and your information was that Lengene wants to become an agent, because this is how I understood you.

MR COETZEE: Yes, Mr Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Why didn't you ask that they must just cross the border and come and see you on this side, so that you can finalise this thing?

MR COETZEE: Mr Chairperson, I would like to refer to one aspect. These people from the various organisations were monitored on a regular basis by their members, and if I can put it this way, they are very careful with their contact with maybe the wrong person, that can maybe be to their detriment at the end of the day. There was a suggestion and it was well known, that the South African security community had various informants there and it created that psychosis of fear. This is how I see it, Mr Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Was the obvious option then not to make an appointment through Khoza, that you will stage an abduction?

MR COETZEE: That could have worked, Mr Chairperson.

MR MALAN: But I want to know. If you want him to cooperate, why do you abduct him if you know that he wants to cooperate, why don't you just arrange that he'll come over and just stage the abduction? The question is, if you know that he wants to cooperate, why do you do it in such a clandestine way, why do you abduct him, why don't you look for a way to bring him out of his situation?

MR COETZEE: Mr Chairperson, as I said, I approached this recruitment in such a way that I can have immediate control and if there's damage done to this person, to rectify it immediately, and that's what I did in the following few years and that is how I approached my operation at that stage. I thought, get control, bring him back and we will build on that and that was my goal. He did not know what my goal was at that stage, in terms of the recruitment.

MR MALAN: The third question - it doesn't sound like the third question, but it's the third aspect. If you abducted him and you've got him in Rustenburg and he refused to cooperate, what would have happened? Did you ever consider this?

MR COETZEE: Mr Chairperson, I was never in discussion with what the alternative would have been, I had to manage the problem and solve it.

CHAIRPERSON: What would you have done?

MR COETZEE: Mr Chairperson, there were two ways to deal with it, give him back to Botswana, or I would have killed the person.

CHAIRPERSON: Why would you have killed him?

MR COETZEE: The lives that he would have put in danger because of the range of agents that we had.

CHAIRPERSON: That is the point that Mr Malan tried to find out from you. If you had asked him to become an informant and he then said no, what would you have said?

MR COETZEE: Can you just repeat the question.

CHAIRPERSON: If he was approached in Botswana to become a full informer in South Africa and at that stage he refused to do it, what would you have done?

MR COETZEE: Then I would have withdrawn.

CHAIRPERSON: And not taken it further?

MR COETZEE: No, not at all, but I would have taken it further with agents by monitoring their actions.

MR MALAN: Thank you.

ADV SIGODI: After you had abducted him and brought him back into the country, of what use was he to you, given his circumstances?

MR COETZEE: Chairperson, may I just have the opportunity. I am ready, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Of what value was he to you after he was brought back to South Africa and he was cooperating?

MR COETZEE: Chairperson, he was of immeasurable value, he became part of the Police Intelligence Units. He was involved with the training and handling of various agents. He was also involved in the later in-place recruitment under similar circumstances of people such as him. He was part of the management of the Soweto Intelligence Units operational programme.

CHAIRPERSON: I would have asked you this previously, but just to follow up, wouldn't he have been more valuable as an agent if you sent him back to Botswana and placed him in the same place, so that he could extract this information from the heart of the military wing and disclose it to you?

MR COETZEE: Chairperson, as I have just referred to it, at that stage the organisation was in its infant stages and they were only just beginning to establish their military wing and they had quite a number of problems in doing so. We had already arrested two of the prominent figures in the structure in the RSA. If you recruited a person like that, he would be more valuable in South Africa than abroad, because SAYRCO died a very quiet death shortly thereafter.

CHAIRPERSON: At that stage he was the head of their military wing, as I have understood your evidence.

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Then who better to provide information for you? That was not the objective when he was abducted, the objective was not to keep him here, he had to become a full informer with you in terms of the situation in Botswana. That is how I have understood your evidence.

MR COETZEE: Our objective was to paralyse the entire military wing. After Lengene there were numerous other arrests, among others, within a week and a half, the Political Commissar. We succeeded in paralysing the entire military wing and then afterwards we also withdrew our military agents and tasked them in terms of the relevant military structures.

ADV SIGODI: Do you have any idea how many people were involved in SAYRCO?

MR COETZEE: Today I cannot recall the numbers. There was a reasonable number, but there were also many who defected and adversely affected the organisation.

ADV SIGODI: Who was the leader of this organisation?

MR COETZEE: Cheche Mashinini. However, I cannot recall all the managerial members.

ADV SIGODI: And is there any information besides the assistance which he gave when he was inside, but was he able to give you information on what was happening outside in Botswana?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson, Col Heystek will give evidence shortly regarding where they were present, pertaining to a visit from the Botswana Commission of Police, where information was exchanged.

CHAIRPERSON: If you had asked him properly to become an informer and if he had agreed, were there any methods at your disposal by means of which you could test him, without having to assault him?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yet regardless, you decided to abduct and assault him for a week until you decided that you were satisfied that he could be a reliable agent, is that correct?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Now during the week when he was assaulted, was he interrogated or was he merely assaulted?

MR COETZEE: Chairperson, he placed his entire input since his days in Soweto in 1976, on document for us. He was a learned man, he was very good at English and he himself could process his input with interrogation from time to time regarding the various inputs given by him.

CHAIRPERSON: What was the purpose with this?

MR COETZEE: The purpose was to process and use all this information eventually, that was the reason why we brought him back to the RSA.

CHAIRPERSON: How was he persuaded to become an informer, because for me at this stage, it sounds as if it was merely interrogation. He does not make any mention of the fact that he was asked to become an informer, he says that he was interrogated.

MR COETZEE: I cannot comment on that, Chairperson, but that's my version.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I understand that. You have testified that he was interrogated regarding his history from 1976 onwards and that this was documented and that you assisted him with certain questions. Now at which stage and in which manner was he persuaded to become an informer?

MR COETZEE: It was a continuous process from the time in Rustenburg. Recruitment is not a one day process.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I understand that.

MR COETZEE: It has to take place over a period of time, during which persons find one another and establish a relationship of trust with one another.

CHAIRPERSON: Well I must say that I am stupefied to discover that assault could lead to reliability or confidence between people. I don't know, I've heard of many divorces which produced the opposite affect, but in either event, that is your evidence.

MR MALAN: I don't know whether or not we have become confused as a result of semantics, you wanted him to be an informer via the intermediary initially, and in fact he did act as an informer of sorts, via the intermediary.

MR COETZEE: Yes.

MR MALAN: And after you abducted him with the purpose of having him in South Africa and not replacing him in Botswana, by nature of the situation he would not have been an informer, he would have been an agent, why do you keep on referring to an informer? Because after that you appointed him as a policeman.

MR COETZEE: That is correct.

MR MALAN: So after the abduction there was no way in which he could have been an agent, unless you had placed him in Botswana again.

MR COETZEE: Yes, one could put it that way.

MR MALAN: That he could be an informer, unless you had placed him once again in Botswana, he may have been a local informer, but then he would have had to get other work.

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Well then I don't know whether it is this that confuses me. If I've understood you correctly, your evidence is that you removed from Botswana in the first place, in order to accomplish the collapse of TSU, because he was the pivotal figure in TSU according to you and according to his affidavit he was the Secretary. Secondly, when you removed him it was less important how you would use him than how you would use his information and that is why you made all the statements. After that you told him that you wanted him to become an agent or an informer of yours, that you wanted to appoint him in service.

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson, that was the route that we presented for him with us.

MR MALAN: You see because in paragraph 35 he refers, this is page 59 of the documents, he refers to the fact that you spoke to him, that Matheus and Pretorius also spoke to him and that Heystek also told him that the Botswana Government wanted him, that his cohorts had already been arrested and sentenced and you presented to him the opportunity to be free in South Africa and to work for you. So his perception was that he had been abducted and that a job was being offered to him, he would be removed from the structure and have the opportunity to rehabilitate. So in the experience of the Amnesty Committee it would appear as if his perception was closer to the perception of an askari or a policeman, but definitely not that of an informer in the traditional sense of the word.

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson. If I may bring it all together, I could say that we created a future for him in the Force.

MR MALAN: Yes, but you ruined another future for him, and we won't discuss that now. I beg your pardon, Chairperson, for my choice of words. But the point is simply that we have discussed the fact that you wanted to use him as an informer and ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: That's the truth ...(indistinct - no microphone)

MR COETZEE: I agree with what the Chairperson has said.

MR MALAN: But I want to know why you keep on referring to him as an informer, because he could not have been an informer in the sense that he would continue to provide the information that he formally provided because he would no longer be in Botswana. He couldn't really be an informer here because he wasn't locally familiar with what was going on. At the very best he could become an agent or an askari or a policeman, which he indeed became.

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: But wasn't it your intention to make him a policeman? Is that correct?

MR COETZEE: All such cases in which I was involved ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Was that your objective?

MR COETZEE: Among others, yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Then why didn't you say so?

MR COETZEE: Because, Chairperson, I deal with that phase from 1982 onwards, that's why I refer to him from time to time as an informer. I suppose that later I should have begun to refer to him as a member of the Force with a relevant rank.

MR MALAN: Very well, Mr Coetzee. I must just tell you that it was extremely difficult for me to listen to this after having read a lengthy affidavit and one cannot really interrupt you because then you lose the thread of everything and you cannot hear what our questions are. So it has definitely complicated the process, but it would appear to me now as if - and I have gathered this from the examination during which I feel that you testified freely, from this we understand that George Khoza was the informer through which Lengene conveyed information to you. Let me just summarise.

He felt that he wanted to return to South Africa to cooperate and to bring an end to his own exile and that on the basis thereof, you abducted him with the intention of turning him formally, as it was referred to in the Security Division, but actually you wanted to recruit him as some or other form of a conspirator in the Security Force, an askari or a policeman or something like that, because hew as very valuable to you. And based upon a question put by the Chairperson, you say that you would have killed him if you could not have replaced him in Botswana. Why then did you always refer to him as someone that you wanted to determine as suitable for being an informer? That's my last question.

MR COETZEE: I must have made an error in that regard, because I referred to an informer, but one always had to process and analyse the information given by an informer. With regard to the recruitment of an informer there would be a phase where one deals with information and gives the candidate certain tasks and without his knowledge there would be others who would also be tasked with the same aspects, so that you could measure up the credibility of the candidate. I agree with what you have said.

MR MALAN: Thank you, Chair.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, the next witness is Mr Anton Pretorius. His application is to be found at page 25 to 47 and he deals with this incident at page 34 of the bundle.

ANTON PRETORIUS: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, you may be seated.

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Pretorius, you also incorporate Exhibits A and B in your evidence.

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, that is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And then subject to the evidence given by today, you confirm the contents in your amnesty application which has been submitted to the Committee.

MR PRETORIUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: You have heard the evidence of Mr Coetzee, who has just testified before you.

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Do you concur with the background that he has sketched regarding Lengene and his activities during 1976 and his later involvement with SAYRCO?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, that is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Now you state on page 34, Mr Pretorius, that you are aware of the fact that two persons were arrested and in the second-last paragraph you refer to Khotso Seahlolo and then in the final sentence you refer to the fact that somebody had succeeded to escape during an investigation. It was either Seahlolo or Masemola.

MR PRETORIUS: It was Masemola, as far as I can recall.

MR VISSER: Is it he that escaped?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Because your application would create the impression that it was Seahlolo.

MR PRETORIUS: No, that is incorrect.

MR VISSER: Furthermore, you state that SAYRCO, during the beginning of 1982, began preparing for a full-scale offensive to commit acts of terrorism in South Africa.

MR PRETORIUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Do you agree with the evidence given by Mr Coetzee regarding the attempt to impress other States or countries in order to obtain assistance from them and so doing achieve a large-scale action by SAYRCO?

MR PRETORIUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Very well. Is it also correct that SAYRCO's management was actually in Botswana due to the fact that they were not safe here in this country as a result of police actions against them?

MR PRETORIUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Were you one of the persons who knew of Mr - did you have knowledge of information and reports which were received from Botswana?

MR PRETORIUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Did you yourself have any agents or informers that you were handling in Botswana?

MR PRETORIUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Then on page 35 of your application you refer to a report given by an informer. Could you tell us what that involved?

MR PRETORIUS: Do you want me to read the paragraph?

MR VISSER: Was there information that a full-scale attack was on the verge of happening against a target in the RSA?

MR PRETORIUS: After the arrests of Seahlolo and Masemola, we also received information through various informers that SAYRCO terrorists were planning on launching a full-scale offensive, specifically on Soweto from Botswana and that it would lead to a mortar attack on the Protea Police Station in Soweto. Cheche Mashinini was a founding member of SAYRCO, but at that stage Khotso Seahlolo was already the President of SAYRCO, and you could imagine for yourself how important this offensive towards South Africa was for SAYRCO, to such an extent that they sent their President to South Africa on a clandestine operation and then he was captured as a result.

CHAIRPERSON: You have listened to Mr Coetzee and he stated that he took the decision to abduct Lengene and to bring him to South Africa and to turn him, or whatever, was it only he who took that decision, according to you?

MR PRETORIUS: May I sketch my perspective of my recollection of the events which gave rise ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Didn't he himself take that decision?

MR PRETORIUS: He was the Commander of the unit.

CHAIRPERSON: And he took the decision.

MR PRETORIUS: That the person had to be brought back to South Africa.

CHAIRPERSON: That he had to be abducted.

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: He was your senior.

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, he was the Section Commander.

CHAIRPERSON: Were you involved in the abduction?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, I was involved.

CHAIRPERSON: Tell us how this happened.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, with great respect, would you allow me to lead the evidence in that regard, because you're jumping some matters which I need bring to your attention, with respect.

CHAIRPERSON: You can do so, Mr Visser, but I thought you asked him to confirm what Coetzee had said, and he did so.

MR VISSER: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

MR VISSER: On page 36, Mr Pretorius, you referred to what happened before the abduction of Mr Lengene.

MR PRETORIUS: That is correct, yes.

MR VISSER: Can you just inform the Committee about this.

MR PRETORIUS: Page 35, Lieut-Col Coetzee says ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: I'm sorry to interrupt you. Mr Visser, we have read this and he did confirm it, is it necessary that he must read it again?

MR VISSER: Mr Chairperson, the witness understand me, I did not ask him, I'm referring him to page 36.

CHAIRPERSON: You wanted to lead them, then deal with him.

MR VISSER: Will you please inform the Committee what you are referring to on page 36, what happened before the abduction of Mr Lengene.

MR PRETORIUS: Mr Chairperson, it is correct what Mr Coetzee said ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: Mr Pretorius, was there a meeting?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes.

MR VISSER: Who was at this meeting?

MR PRETORIUS: Col Heystek, myself and Mr Coetzee was also present.

MR VISSER: Was it here where Mr Coetzee made the suggestion to Col Heystek?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, that's where he informed Col Heystek.

MR VISSER: Were you later informed that you were going with to Botswana to help with the abduction?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes.

MR VISSER: What was you role in this?

MR PRETORIUS: I had to go and assist with the bringing back of Lengene to South Africa.

MR VISSER: Did you do anything?

MR PRETORIUS: Physically I went with the team, I made the preparation as to how we will enter Botswana, where we will wait for Mr Lengene and how we will bring him back to the Republic. So I was part of the planning and of the seizing of Mr Lengene.

MR VISSER: That evening when you waited in the house, were the lights on or off?

MR PRETORIUS: Mr Chairperson, as far as I can remember all the lights were off except for the lounge, because we wanted to see when Mr Lengene and Khoza entered the lounge.

MR VISSER: How did you observe this? I'm now talking about yourself.

MR PRETORIUS: I was with Mr Coetzee, we stood at the door of a bedroom that led into the lounge, Mr Coetzee peeped through the keyhole and the door was slightly ajar and I could see the lounge.

MR VISSER: When Mr Lengene and Khoza entered the lounge, what happened then?

MR PRETORIUS: They entered, they were talking and we could hear them opening the door. And Mr Lengene, I think there was a bookcase in the lounge ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: I'm sorry, Mr Pretorius, did you storm out of the rooms?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, they were in the room for a few seconds and then we stormed out.

MR VISSER: Did Mr Lengene resist?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, he was very surprised, he was not aware that we were there.

MR VISSER: What did he do?

MR PRETORIUS: Khoza who was with him, turned and grabbed him and Mr Lengene bit a piece of meat out of his chest.

MR VISSER: Did you then tie him up?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes.

MR VISSER: Did you give him alcohol?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes.

MR VISSER: Was it forced down his throat?

MR PRETORIUS: No, Mr Chairperson, he drank it himself.

MR VISSER: How did he do it if he was cuffed?

MR PRETORIUS: As far as I can remember his hands were cuffed in front of him. We gave him the alcohol and said that he must drink it. The reason was that he had a drinking problem and he would have drank it.

MR VISSER: Did you then bring him back to South Africa?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct - no microphone)

MR PRETORIUS: I am not somebody who knows about spirits, it was a clear spirit but we mixed it with cough medicine or chest medicine.

CHAIRPERSON: Who did this, who made up this mixture?

MR PRETORIUS: I think myself and Mr Coetzee made up this mixture.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

MR PRETORIUS: I did not hear your question, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone is not on.

CHAIRPERSON: How did you know that you were supposed to make that mixture and what was going to happen?

MR PRETORIUS: I will answer you, but can I just explain to you what our idea was.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Coetzee said that you wanted to make him drunk, so that he will not resist on the way back to South Africa.

MR PRETORIUS: The idea was just to load him in the vehicle and to drive with him and if we hit a Botswana roadblock and they ask us "Where are you going?", we will say we were on our way to wherever. And the idea was if they saw Lengene and saw that he was drunk and sleepy - nobody told us about the process, but Mr Coetzee and myself were aware of the fact that if you use Cepacol with alcohol it makes you sleepy. We had a brainwave ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Maybe you should use a different word.

MR PRETORIUS: ... because we thought there wasn't another alternative, we thought that if we could put the Cepacol in the bottle of spirits, I think it was Cane, if we mixed it and again he drank this, it would have made him sleepy and it would have easy - we would have been able to handle him better.

CHAIRPERSON: We do know about the chemistry of this drink, but wasn't there anyone that said that this will be the affect and how much of what you must put in the bottle?

MR PRETORIUS: No, we just read the paper that was within the box of the bottle.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, and you just gave it to him to drink?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes.

MR VISSER: You said it was Cane, how big was the bottle?

MR PRETORIUS: It was a half-jack, it was a small flat bottle.

MR VISSER: What was your knowledge concerning Mr Lengene's drinking problem?

MR PRETORIUS: The information that we had, and I can now mention it, it was from Khoza and right from the beginning we knew that he was a serious drinker and he wasn't shy to use strong alcohol.

MR VISSER: Did Mr Lengene have a vehicle that he used in Botswana?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And after you abducted him from Botswana, did this vehicle play a role in later incidents? Can you just tell us about that.

MR PRETORIUS: Yes Mr Chairperson. If I recall correctly, it was a Peugeot. Mr Coetzee's instruction was to the agent. After we left the house, Mr Coetzee asked the agent "Keep the vehicle at the house, hide it, do not drive around in it, do not use it at all", because I think myself and Mr Coetzee knew what the result of this would be and it then also happened. Can I just say this, that our initial purpose of the operation was that because of this vehicle, the whole goal went awry because with the arrest of - and I think that it's important the Committee know, the informant then, the day after we left he drove around in Gaborone in this vehicle and the SAYRCO members that were left over saw that there's a vehicle of their Commander and that somebody else was behind the steering wheel and then they came to the house where he lived, they cornered him and they left him to die. They withdrew and left and they realised that he exposed the whole operation. The afternoon when his wife came home, she just saw her husband lying in a pool of blood and ... he thought it was his attackers who did it to him and the whole story of the abduction he told that to the Botswana Police and that's how the Botswana Police got to know about it and where the whole secret operation was exposed. I do not know if I've answered your question.

MR VISSER: Very well. On the way to Rustenburg from the border there was an incident.

MR PRETORIUS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Can you just quickly tell us what happened.

MR PRETORIUS: Mr Chairperson, I was not in the same vehicle in which Mr Lengene was transported, I was in another vehicle driving behind them. From Koffiefontein border post to Swartruggens is approximately an hour's drive, it had to be very early int he morning, it was still dark, I was very tired because we didn't sleep and in Swartruggens there's one street and while the front vehicle in which Mr Coetzee and Lengene were approached the stop street, Mr Coetzee braked and as the red lights went on I saw the one door open and a person jumped out in the main street in Swartruggens. I jumped out and at that stage I saw it was Mr Lengene who attempted to flee.

MR VISSER: You then got back into the car and you went to Rustenburg. Did you take part in the recruitment? Did you assault him there?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, I did slap him a few times.

MR VISSER: Did you assault him in any other way?

MR PRETORIUS: No.

CHAIRPERSON: Over the period of five or six days, did you assault him every day?

MR PRETORIUS: No. Can I just tell you that after the incident in Swartruggens, we realised that Mr Lengene was not with us all the way and we had to be very careful about what he said and did, and I think from there the assaults took place.

MR MALAN: I do not want to duplicate it unnecessarily, but you've read the statement of Mr Lengene and the allegations that were made about the pliers etcetera.

MR PRETORIUS: Let me put it this way. Mr Coetzee requested me to go back to Soweto to get provisions and finances, so I was not there over the whole period of six days, but in that time while I was there he was never electrocuted. I doubted that Mr Coetzee's father-in-law was there and did this. I did not see it and I really doubt it. I cannot believe that Mr Coetzee's father-in-law would do it.

MR MALAN: Is he a member of the Force?

MR PRETORIUS: No.

MR MALAN: What does he do?

MR PRETORIUS: He worked at the mines and he had emphysema.

MR MALAN: Mr Visser, I didn't want to take over your examination, but I do not want you to unnecessarily lead evidence which we don't expect anymore. I want to go back to the meeting about which you testified, on page 35 of the bundle.

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, Sir.

MR MALAN: In the briefing coordinating meeting you mention that Coetzee and yourself suggested that you must go and recruit Lengene in Botswana.

MR PRETORIUS: I will accept it ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: My question is, this is what you say. What did you understand if you had to go and recruit him, what were you supposed to do?

MR PRETORIUS: I know it sounds difficult to understand today, but I would like to clarify it. Coetzee was busy with a process that was over a long period of time, but the things that resulted in the change of Coetzee's recruitment strategy was the attack on Protea Police Station with mortars, and we made the suggestion, myself and Coetzee, or I supported Coetzee in this, that is actually what I mean by it, because there is this attack manifesting in Botswana, we do not have time to go through this long process and then maybe speak to Lengene in Botswana, but that we have to go and get him there. He is the Head of the Military Force ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: I'm sorry to interrupt you, I'm not interested in it because I do accept it, it is a given and you've already confirmed it. But you said that you had to go and recruit him, you had to recruit him as what? As an informer in Botswana, to remain there and work from there, was that the decision?

MR PRETORIUS: No, as I said, we were already busy with a recruitment strategy or process where Lengene notified Khoza and Mothiba that he is recruitable. In our terminology we did talent spying around this person ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: Look at that paragraph if you need time to read through it, but let me just read what you say here:

Why did you have to recruit him then, what was the other alternative? He is recruited for what? Or what? What do you mean with that paragraph?

MR PRETORIUS: The other alternative was bringing him back to South Africa, then he didn't have a choice but to work with us. But what would have happened ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: What was the alternative of which you speak? ...(transcriber's interpretation)

MR PRETORIUS: The alternative is - we did not provide him with an alternative, we went to Botswana or when we entered Botswana on that specific day, we did not leave an alternative open for Lengene, but we were quite sure that we will be able to complete the recruitment action.

MR MALAN: Mr Pretorius, did you read this statement before you came to testify?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, Sir.

MR MALAN: Well let me tell you what you are saying in this paragraph. You say here that at this meeting, because of the information that you obtained, suggested to go and recruit Lengene. This recruitment would have happened in Botswana, it's not an abduction, it is the whole plan to recruit him, but we do not know "recruit as what", but you say an informer. You then continue in this paragraph and you say that the information that you received from Mothiba indicated that Lengene will easily concede to be recruited as an informant if he realises that there is no other venue to follow. Mothiba who already contacted Lengene, would then have make the suggestion of recruitment to him.

MR PRETORIUS: That's correct.

MR MALAN: And Lengene was willing but he did not know how to break away, because he feared for his own life and the lives of his family in South Africa.

MR PRETORIUS: That is correct.

MR MALAN: Well to break away cannot indicate an informer because to break away is a very public or open action. So in this paragraph, and this is your version ...(intervention)

MR PRETORIUS: Then I apologise if I brought you under the wrong impression.

MR MALAN: You see the problem is, it seems to be the most logical conclusion, Lengene wanted to come back to South Africa, but he's scared about what his colleagues are going to do to him and his family in South Africa.

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, that is correct.

MR MALAN: In other words, Lengene wanted to come to South Africa.

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, that is correct.

MR MALAN: But you did not want him to come to South Africa.

MR PRETORIUS: No, we also wanted to bring him back to South Africa.

MR MALAN: But then you didn't want to recruit him as an informant.

MR PRETORIUS: But why not? We recruited hundreds of informers like that. I can name various names of informers, but in my whole career recruited 30 to 40 people like this. I brought them back to South Africa. It is as easy as that. As I told you, Mr Chairperson, that was the plan, to bring him back.

CHAIRPERSON: And to do what?

MR PRETORIUS: Then with the information that he would have given us, the operational circumstances, we would have looked at what will happen to him. One of the possibilities was that he had to go back to Botswana, but as I already mentioned to you, things went wrong.

MR MALAN: But you see, that's the whole point. You would have brought him back here first of all, then you would have got his cooperation, he's now on your side, and then you would have seen how to apply him. So he could have, if possible, be placed in an informant's position.

MR PRETORIUS: Not possibly, definitely.

CHAIRPERSON: In Botswana?

MR PRETORIUS: In Botswana, we could ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: I am not asking if you could, please listen to me. Obviously you could have done it.

MR PRETORIUS: We would have been able to do it.

MR MALAN: Yes, you may have succeeded, but in your evidence now when you talked freely, it's that you wanted to get him here, get all the information from him and see how to apply him. And that's what you just said to us.

MR PRETORIUS: Where we are going to deploy him and in which way we are going to deploy him.

MR MALAN: And afterwards you decided to appoint him in the Force.

MR PRETORIUS: But then the situation changed drastically.

MR MALAN: I don't have further questions, we are struggling to get clarity on this. We are really struggling to get clarity on this issue.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Chairperson. I would just like to see if there is anything I have to add.

In any event, according to you he was recruited as an informant after he came back to South Africa.

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, for the first period time he was an informer and then later he became a policeman that same year.

MR VISSER: And did he work closely with you?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes.

MR VISSER: Who attested him?

MR PRETORIUS: It was Mr Heystek.

MR VISSER: For how long was he a policeman?

MR PRETORIUS: I think it was 17 or 18 years of service, loyal service.

MR VISSER: Do you also agree on his brother and the discussion with his mother?

MR PRETORIUS: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And concerning the Police' interest in their family, that Mr Coetzee testified about?

MR PRETORIUS: I'd just like to tell the Committee that it is blatant lies from the family's side, that person had the best treatment under my command. I went out of my way, as well as the South African Police. He always got the best vehicles, he had a very good salary, we looked after his family. We had to keep him out of jail because of acts that he committed, he was not disciplined. Under different circumstances we would have kicked him out of the Force, but we always stood up for him, we stood behind him and he got only the best. He was a trustworthy or loyal person and over this long period he worked under my command and like I said, we only wanted the best for him.

MR VISSER: He also served the Police very well, he served you very well.

MR PRETORIUS: That is correct, he also received a medal for loyal service.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I notice it's 1 o'clock.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

MR VISSER: I would just like to check, but I believe I am.

MR MALAN: While Mr Visser is looking at his documents, in examination by Mr Visser, you also said that he worked as an informant for the first period of time, what did he inform on?

MR PRETORIUS: On SAYRCO activities in the Transvaal area. He assisted us to get the safehouses in Soweto. He assisted with arrests. He's a person that we sent in. If I can give an example, a specific house in Soweto we did not want to act on that or launch an attack on it if we were not sure if that person was there or not, then we sent Lengene there.

CHAIRPERSON: He's now a member of SAYRCO that was abducted, everybody knows it.

MR PRETORIUS: No, not everybody knew. Let me put it this way, it was in the media but nobody was sure ...

CHAIRPERSON: Please listen to my question. Various people knew about it, his own people in Botswana knew about it, now how do you manage to recruit him and place him in position where he can still give that information of Soweto?

MR PRETORIUS: Let me give you the answer. Commissioner Hershveld from Botswana was here, if Lengene wanted to go back he had the opportunity that a few of them had, who were in the hands of the Security Branch. He could have gone back. Botswana with their propaganda said he was abducted from our side. The propaganda was that he was not abducted. In other words, there was a 50/50 situation of confusion and we knew that in that first phase we could still use that confusing situation and get Lengene to contact people who are still in South Africa. We're talking about an era where there were no cellular phones and no real communication lines, so we used this to get to these people with the assistance of Lengene.

CHAIRPERSON: I'm going to ask you another question and I do not want to hear a long story. What would he have told his own people when he gathered this information there in Soweto? Wouldn't they have said, but isn't he working for the Police now?

MR PRETORIUS: I think he would have denied it and he would then say "But here I am, I'm a free man, I'm not abducted."

CHAIRPERSON: But you know and everybody knows that the people who walked around in the streets in the townships, who generally speaking supported the ANC, knew that some of your men walked around there, you know it, everybody knew it, how do you think then - what I want to know is, he's fresh out of your hands, there's a story that he was abducted from Botswana, he's the Head of their military wing, he is free, he walks around in Soweto, how would he have explained this to the people?

MR PRETORIUS: Mr Chairperson, if I can just answer the question there. Up until late in the '90s I used Lengene in such clandestine operations. He had information on MK - I do not know if I said it myself or if it was Mr Coetzee said it, he assisted us in MK information, PAC information and everybody knew that Lengene was caught ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: Mr Pretorius, please. A person can receive that information as an investigating officer, you can gather this information in different capacity. The question is, how did Lengene act? He couldn't have been an informant who worked within an organisation.

MR PRETORIUS: ...(indistinct)

MR MALAN: Do not interrupt me. I'm telling you the way in which I understand is that after he was abducted, after Khoza followed and was assaulted after the propaganda from Botswana, if there were SAYRCO members in Soweto there would have been no way in which he could have just walked in there and said "I infiltrated, here I am." How is he going to explain why he is there? But there are various ways in which he can gather this information. You see this is the question. If you tell us that he's an informer within the structures, then it doesn't gel.

MR PRETORIUS: No, I never said within the structures. He's an informer and that's a fact, but he was an informer that did various things. Maybe you misunderstood me.

MR MALAN: In other words, he provided you with information that he gathered. He went out and gathered information, he did not feed you information and still pretend that he's a member of SAYRCO.

MR PRETORIUS: No, not the whole time.

MR MALAN: Now you are saying it cannot be like this, but then you say it is.

MR PRETORIUS: Maybe I do not understand you very well. The bottom line is that he was an informer for a period of time after he came back. He received an informer's salary and we applied him like we applied other informers, but he was not part of the formal structure of SAYRCO anymore.

MR MALAN: And he was an informer that was handled by you or managed by you, not one that by coincidence gave you information?

MR PRETORIUS: No, not at all.

MR MALAN: Maybe we understand the concept better.

MR PRETORIUS: I'm sorry if I confused you.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, do you have any questions?

MR VISSER: Did you listen when I took Mr Coetzee through Lengene's statement?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, Sir.

MR VISSER: Do you agree with the objections that he made concerning the correctness of certain sections in his statement?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: I do not want to go through the whole thing. You do agree with the answers that Mr Coetzee gave?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER

CHAIRPERSON: We'll adjourn till quarter to two.

ANTON PRETORIUS: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr van der Heyde.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VAN DER HEYDE: Mr Pretorius, I just want to take you to the incident which took place after Mr Lengene was abducted, when he wanted to escape at a certain stage.

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: You have said the following a while ago, this is after he jumped out of the vehicle and tried to escape:

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, that is what I said.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: You realised ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Before you continue.

Before that incident did you think that he was with you?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, Chairperson, I think that is in my original application ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Forget about your application. You knew that he was with you?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, that is correct, Chairperson.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: However, at that point you realised that he wasn't entirely on your side, that's correct, isn't it?

MR PRETORIUS: I can say that it is my personal opinion which I summarised from the situation because of his attempt to escape.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: Isn't it true that if he wanted to escape, it was true that he didn't want to cooperate with you, he wanted to escape and he didn't want to cooperate with you?

MR PRETORIUS: No, Chairperson, that is not entirely correct.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: What did you think was the reason why he wanted to escape?

MR PRETORIUS: Unfortunately I cannot tell you what his reasons were why he wanted to escape, but I realised at that point, as I have already told you Honourable Chairperson, that it was clear that we had not yet managed to gain complete control over Mr Lengene.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: You then stated that from that point onwards, the assault ensued. Now when he was in the garage, did you participate in giving him a few slaps, as you put it?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: Was that to persuade him to cooperate with you?

MR PRETORIUS: Among others, it was one of the reasons.

CHAIRPERSON: What were the other reasons?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, you must remember that we had already gained information. If we asked Lengene a question and if he had responded too slowly or in our opinion, incorrectly, then we would have slapped him over the head or on the ear, to describe it as such, and in that case he would then also have changed his story and said "No, but this is how it happened."

MR VAN DER HEYDE: Did you at any stage pull a bag over his head?

MR PRETORIUS: No, Chairperson.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: Did anybody else pull a bag over his head at any point?

MR PRETORIUS: Not that I observed.

CHAIRPERSON: But among the Security Police ranks it was a custom.

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, it was a custom of many persons to bag people, so to speak.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: According to your knowledge was it also a custom to use pliers with which to pinch the private parts of individuals?

MR PRETORIUS: No, Chairperson, I read about that for the first time in Mr Lengene's report, it definitely wasn't a custom.

CHAIRPERSON: I have done many of these cases in the Eastern Cape and I must say that this is the first time that I have come to hear of pliers. Previously I heard of drawers.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: This incident took place in a garage. What was in the garage? Is it possible that perhaps a pair of pliers may have been in the garage?

MR PRETORIUS: I don't want to speculate but it is a garage, so it is highly probable that there may have been pliers in the garage. I would concede to that.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: At which stage did you decide that you would stop slapping him, as you put it?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, today I really cannot tell you on which day it was precisely, but it must be kept in mind that we were busy with a recruitment action, so it was unnecessary for us to keep on assaulting the person because that wasn't our objective, our objective was to recruit the person. And I know that there was a period of six days, but I cannot tell you that it was on the fifth day and then Mr Coetzee or somebody else says that it was on the sixth day that he was also slapped, but I know for a fact that there was a period during which we stopped and it was while we were at the house, but I really cannot tell you upon which day precisely that took place.

CHAIRPERSON: According to the affidavit, it stopped on the sixth day.

MR PRETORIUS: If Lengene were to say that I would concede to it. I would then have to accept that that may have been the last day.

CHAIRPERSON: And on the seventh day there was rest.

MR PRETORIUS: Yes.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: Was it therefore your opinion - and I just want to examine you about this, is it your opinion that you stopped slapping him when you realised that you had achieved his full cooperation?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, from that day onwards, or the sixth day, so to speak, to his death 18 years later, I do not know of any assault on Mr Lengene which was conducted in my presence.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: When Mr Lengene was there in the garage, is it correct that you realised that there were basically two options for him? The people in Botswana were already looking for him and he couldn't return to Botswana, you were aware that he knew who the agents were, that he had quite a lot of knowledge which he could disclose if he didn't cooperate with you, is it correct to say that there were basically only two choices for him, either he would have to cooperate with you or you would have to make a plan with him? For example, have him killed.

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, I know what Mr Coetzee testified, I'm speaking on my behalf. There was no such idea. I think what is important is that on the sixth day, if we could stay at the sixth day, we became aware that things had gone awry in Botswana and up to that sixth day, everything went well with regard to the recruitment, according to us.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: What was your idea, what would you have to do if he didn't want to cooperate?

MR PRETORIUS: I cannot refer to something that I may have thought of 18 years ago. I was convinced that the recruitment had been successful, that everything was going according to plan and that there were no problems.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: You were in contact with the so-called intermediary, who appears to have been Mr Khoza, you never had any direct contact with Mr Lengene while he was in Botswana, before you abducted him?

MR PRETORIUS: That is correct.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: How did you know that information which came via Mr Khoza from Mr Lengene, was indeed reliable?

MR PRETORIUS: Because Mr Khoza had worked for quite some time for Mr Coetzee, he hadn't spent that long working for me. I had been at Soweto for less than six months at that point, but Mr Coetzee knew Mr Khoza for considerably longer than I did.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: Would you say that Mr Lengene, after he became part of the Police Force, had some form of fear to break away from you?

MR PRETORIUS: What sort of fear? He was free, if he wanted to run away he could run away within the first month, if he wanted to run away. Within the first month.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: Wasn't there a Mr Olifant who still monitored him for quite some time and in the evenings cuffed him before he went to sleep?

MR PRETORIUS: I do not wish to refer to any cuffing, but it is possible, there was a custom with any new informer that one recruited, which would be to place other persons or agents with a task to watch the man in case he ran away, because there was always that possibility. Unfortunately for Mr Lengene, he never exercised his options.

MR MALAN: I beg your pardon, what do you mean that "unfortunately for Lengene he never exercised his options?" What do you mean by that?

MR PRETORIUS: To attempt to escape or run away. He had all the time in the world. He had all the opportunities in the world, he could even have run away with a State vehicle.

MR MALAN: Why do you say "unfortunately"?

MR PRETORIUS: Because as I have heard from the legal representative over there, it sounds to me as if according to his information, this was what Mr Lengene wanted to do but he never did it.

MR MALAN: Just answer the question, Mr Pretorius, do not try to amuse us, just answer the question directly according to the facts.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: Is it correct that even after he was "discharge" from the garage, that you still didn't trust him completely?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes Chairperson, as I told you - I have already answered this basically, with any informer who has been recruited there would be a period of a week or a month or a year during which one would always try to observe, because there was always the possibility of the person turning back or becoming a double agent. It is so.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: What would you have done in such a case, if for example he had turned back?

MR PRETORIUS: We would then have managed the circumstances, I don't know how we would have done so, but we would have addressed the problem as it originated. But I cannot tell you the manner in which we would have addressed it. Unfortunately I have never had experience of such a case where a person has returned to the other side.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: Isn't it true that he knew that there were people who were monitoring him, that he couldn't run away? Wouldn't it then be natural for him to be fearful?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, perhaps initially he had that fear, I would concede to that, it is possible. I don't know what was going through his mind, but as we have heard Mr Coetzee's evidence and mine, he spent 18 years with us and I'm certain that during those 18 years at some point he wasn't watched all the time during those 18 years. That is certain.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: I have nothing further, thank you.

ADV STEENKAMP: No questions, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: You testified that when the incident on the way to Rustenburg took place, you realised that possibly he wasn't on your side and that was the first time that you had such an impression.

MR PRETORIUS: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Why was he abducted?

MR PRETORIUS: As I have already told you, or attempted to tell you, we didn't want to take any chances in Botswana, we didn't want to try a recruitment action in Botswana. We decided that regardless of what happened, the man had already disclosed his willingness to cooperate with the Security Police and we decided between me and Coetzee, that we would bring the man back to the RSA where under more favourable circumstances, we could speak to him and work with him and persuade him even further to give his full cooperation to us.

CHAIRPERSON: Well either a person is persuaded to cooperate or not, there are no degrees.

MR PRETORIUS: As I've already told you, Honourable Chairperson, we had not personally spoken to Lengene yet and we needed to create the opportunity where we personally could speak to him and the route that we followed was to bring Lengene to South Africa by means of abduction.

CHAIRPERSON: Why wasn't he just asked to come over?

MR PRETORIUS: He wouldn't have done so, I'm convinced of that.

CHAIRPERSON: How do you know?

MR PRETORIUS: I was the primary Commander of the operation, but I don't know whether at that stage such a suggestion had been put to Lengene by means of the intermediary, so I don't know about that. But as Mr Coetzee correctly testified, there was a problem that if the person had to come through on his own, how would he have done so? He would have had to do so via the regular border control channels and this would have created additional problems. That is all that I can think of at this stage. However, I cannot elaborate on this, I cannot say whether any suggestion as such was ever put to him.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that your response to my question?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: I will repeat my question.

MR PRETORIUS: Very well.

CHAIRPERSON: How do you know, or how did you know at that stage that if he was asked, he would not come over by himself?

MR PRETORIUS: As I've said, I cannot comment on that, perhaps ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: You have testified that he would not have come over.

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, that is what logic told me, Chairperson, that he would not have come over.

CHAIRPERSON: What logic?

MR PRETORIUS: As I've already told you, because the initial idea with the recruitment is not to expose a person, we were not planning to expose him. With any recruitment one would never expose the person, that was not the objective, and if he had travelled through the regular channels back to South Africa, the chances were very good that he would be exposed and we didn't want that to happen.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, do you have any further questions?

MR VISSER: No re-examination, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, you are excused.

MR PRETORIUS: Thank you.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, the last witness is Mr Heystek. He will also address you in Afrikaans and he has no objection - although I didn't ask him, perhaps you should ask him whether he has an objection to taking the oath.

His application is at page 18 to 24 and he deals with this incident at page 20, I believe, Mr Chairman.

A M HEYSTEK: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Heystek, do you also request that Exhibits A and B be incorporated with your evidence?

MR HEYSTEK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And do you also confirm the contents of your amnesty application which has been served before the Committee, as being true and correct according to your best knowledge?

MR HEYSTEK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: In 1982, where were you? Where were you stationed?

MR HEYSTEK: I was second in command of the Security Branch in Soweto.

MR VISSER: Who was in command of the Security Branch?

MR HEYSTEK: At that point it was Col Erasmus. He has retired as a Lieutenant-General.

MR VISSER: Is that Gerrit Erasmus?

MR HEYSTEK: No, Louw Erasmus.

MR VISSER: Louw, yes.

MR HEYSTEK: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And who was the Head of the Intelligence Unit?

MR HEYSTEK: I myself dealt primarily with it, but it was Willem Coetzee's portfolio.

MR VISSER: But if he had gone to a higher officer, would he have come to you or to someone else?

MR HEYSTEK: He would have come to me.

MR VISSER: In 1982, did you come to hear of a plan with regard to the victim in this matter, Mr Lengene?

MR HEYSTEK: Yes, that is correct. And at that stage I was the Acting Commander, because Erasmus was on holiday.

MR VISSER: What was your knowledge regarding this incident?

MR HEYSTEK: Mr Coetzee and Mr Pretorius came to see me due to certain information that we possessed indicating that SAYRCO specifically wanted to destroy Protea in order to create controversial news and so-doing gain assistance from abroad. Coetzee acted as the speaker during that visit and told me that there was a recruitment action in place and that they were busy with the recruitment of Lengene and that information that he had already disclosed by that point, had led to the arrest of certain persons. I then gave them the order to continue with the project.

MR VISSER: Just to pull this through, were you later once again approached by Mr Coetzee, to ask you or to tell you that contact had been established and that a visit would be undertaken to Botswana by him, so that he could continue the project?

MR HEYSTEK: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Was the question of Mr Lengene's abduction mentioned to you specifically at that point?

MR HEYSTEK: Chairperson, as far as I can recall it was not specifically mentioned to me, but I accepted that if any problems would occur over there, it would be done and it enjoyed my approval.

MR VISSER: Were you familiar with the background of SAYRCO, as it has been sketched by Mr Coetzee here?

MR HEYSTEK: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And do you agree with the fact that the members of SAYRCO were indeed a threat to the Republic during that period in time?

MR HEYSTEK: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Did you also share the information regarding Mr Lengene's position in SAYRCO?

MR HEYSTEK: That is correct.

MR VISSER: That among others, he was the Head of the military wing, TSU?

MR HEYSTEK: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Was it reported to you after the abduction, how things had progressed regarding Lengene?

MR HEYSTEK: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And did it also enjoy your approval?

MR HEYSTEK: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Did you study Mr Lengene's affidavit, have you read it?

MR HEYSTEK: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: In his affidavit, Mr Lengene refers to the fact that he went with you to Pretoria, although he states that he went with other persons.

MR HEYSTEK: Yes, that is correct, he refers to it.

MR VISSER: Can you tell us what you know of that?

MR HEYSTEK: The visit to Pretoria was due to a visit which was paid by Commissaris Hershveld, who was from the Botswana Police at that stage, as well as the Head of their Security Branch, the Head of their Criminal Investigation Division, which was arranged by the Department of Foreign Affairs under the order of Gen Johan Coetzee. I gave Coetzee the order to bring Lengene to my office on that particular morning, I think it was a Tuesday morning, and Sgt Mothiba and I went to Pretoria with him for this interview.

MR VISSER: On page 59, paragraph 35, if Mr Lengene with his reference to Protea, means to indicate Pretoria, then the question arises whether or not Willem Coetzee, Pretorius and Matheus would have accompanied him. Now I assume that the Matheus would refer to your name, wouldn't it?

MR HEYSTEK: Yes, it is possible.

MR VISSER: What is your name?

MR HEYSTEK: My name is Marius. That is what people call me.

MR VISSER: But on the day when you went to Pretoria, you say that Mothiba ...(intervention)

MR HEYSTEK: Yes, Mothiba accompanied me. There were only three of us in the vehicle.

MR VISSER: And can you tell us what took place in Pretoria, according to your recollection?

MR HEYSTEK: On our arrival in Pretoria we were taken up to the floor where Gen McDonald was seated. We were informed that Commissaris Hershveld, along with his two assistants, were with Gen McDonald in the office. At that point he had the rank of Brigadier.

MR VISSER: What did Hershveld want to know?

MR HEYSTEK: The purpose of the visit as I understood it, was to determine whether or not Mr Lengene voluntarily came to the RSA and if whether he was prepared to return to Botswana.

MR VISSER: What was Mr Lengene's viewpoint on this, did he tell them that he had been abducted or what?

MR HEYSTEK: In the first place, Mr Lengene had a long discussion of Head of Security and the Head of the Criminal Division, after which Commissaris Hershveld came in, when they were finished. General or Brig McDonald at that stage, told the Commissaris that we could leave the office and that he wanted to speak to Mr Lengene alone. In fact he insisted later that we remain in the office where the discussion took place.

MR VISSER: Who insisted on this?

MR HEYSTEK: Commissaris Hershveld. The discussion that ensued was exclusively between Commissaris Hershveld and Mr Peter Lengene, and it took place in English.

MR VISSER: Did Lengene tell him that he had been abducted and that he wanted to return?

MR HEYSTEK: Mr Lengene told him that he was in the RSA and that he was very happy and that he did not want to return to Botswana. If I am correct, Commissaris Hershveld upon three or four occasions, put three or four different requests to him, among others one which I recall specifically and it was that he said that he would only take him alone in an aeroplane to Botswana where he would have to sign a document indicating that he wanted to return to South Africa voluntarily, but Mr Lengene still refused to go back with him to Botswana.

MR VISSER: In his statement, in paragraph 35 and onwards, Mr Lengene states that some of his comrades in Botswana at that stage, had already been captured and prosecuted with regard to acts that they had committed there and he was afraid that he would also be put in jail by the Botswana authorities. What do you say about that?

MR HEYSTEK: Chairperson, the information which led to the arrest and conviction and sentencing of the persons to whom he referred, was given that morning by him to the Head of the Detective Branch and the Head of Security. At that stage those persons were still unknown to the Detective Branch, they didn't know who was responsible for those deeds.

MR VISSER: And then you say - is it your evidence that because of the information that Mr Lengene provided you with, that these people, the previous comrades of Mr Lengene were arrested in Botswana and later convicted?

MR HEYSTEK: That is correct, Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Mr Lengene was later attested as a member of the Police Force.

MR HEYSTEK: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And concerning yourself, were you aware of any unhappiness?

MR HEYSTEK: No, I attested him myself as a member of the Force.

MR VISSER: Were you also involved in interrogations or discussions with his mother and his safety?

MR HEYSTEK: After it appeared in the newspapers that Mr Lengene had been abducted I got instructions from Head Office to arrange that he meet his mother and appease her, in the sense that he is safe and not as it had been alleged that he was assaulted and injured. We then did that. If my recollection is correct, such meetings occurred there times within my presence, it was not in an office, it was in a vehicle that was used for this purpose.

MR VISSER: And do you carry any knowledge of any medals that Mr Lengene received?

MR HEYSTEK: It was after my time in the Force.

MR VISSER: Very well. Thank you, Mr Chairman, I believe that's the ...

Oh yes, there's one aspect that I want to deal with. There was a person in Botswana that was arrested, a certain Tijiana, I think a persons spell it, T-i-j-i-a-n-a.

MR HEYSTEK: That's correct, yes.

MR VISSER: And was a legal representative appointed to represent him?

MR HEYSTEK: Yes.

MR VISSER: Where was this legal representative, in Botswana or here?

MR HEYSTEK: No, somebody was appointed in Botswana, but there was an Advocate, I'm not quite sure what his surname was, I was given the instructions once again to go and consult with the Advocate. I think it was an Adv Cohen, I'm not quite sure who he was, I cannot remember.

MR VISSER: Was this in Johannesburg?

MR HEYSTEK: Yes. After which on his request, I arranged that Mr Lengene, and I think it was Sgt Mothiba who went with us, who accompanied him and as far as I know Mr Lengene consulted with this Advocate alone. That was the requirements.

MR VISSER: You were not present?

MR HEYSTEK: No.

MR VISSER: Or any other member of the Police Force?

MR HEYSTEK: No, not at all.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: I have no questions, Mr Chairperson.

NO QUESTIONS BY MR VAN DER HEYDE

ADV STEENKAMP: No questions, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Heystek, do I understand you correctly, that the way of recruiting someone, you did not know anything about this?

MR HEYSTEK: The information that I had, that I received from Mr Coetzee was that Mr Peter Lengene was willing to work with us, but that we did not have any guarantees at that stage that this is the case. I told Mr Coetzee to go and try and recruit this person but also to use their own initiative, because to recruit somebody in a foreign country, a country where you are not welcome, is always a very dangerous and surely an illegal act. But that was the situation.

CHAIRPERSON: When you gave the approval to go and recruit him, did you foresee any irregularities in what may happen to him? I can understand that you understood that they will cross the border illegally and that they may break other laws in the process, but did you foresee that they will act in an unlawful manner towards him?

MR HEYSTEK: Mr Chairperson, if I may put it this way, although I did not tell them this directly, I would have been very unhappy if they found themselves in a situation where they were arrested by the Botswana Police, because you must know that I did not have approval from anyone to execute this operation.

CHAIRPERSON: Your knowledge at that stage was that he was willing to work with you and then you gave your approval.

MR HEYSTEK: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And then you gave your approval.

MR HEYSTEK: Correct.

CHAIRPERSON: When you received approval, did you foresee or plan that they will act unlawfully towards Peter Lengene? In other words, to assault him, to hit him.

MR HEYSTEK: No, I did not expect it.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you foresee that when you gave your approval he be abducted?

MR HEYSTEK: Yes, I accepted that if something went wrong they would abduct him and bring him back to South Africa, and I think I had a good reason to think this.

CHAIRPERSON: What was that?

MR HEYSTEK: We were in a war situation and I want to call it a situation of war, with the then government and the current government and the current government and if SAYRCO succeeded in levelling Protea with the ground, as they planned to do, and that's the information we had, they would have received a lot of attention, especially from abroad but also in South Africa amongst the black communities or those who did not have the right to vote, if I can put it this way, and that I wanted to prevent at all costs.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you ask them to come over?

MR HEYSTEK: When did I ask them, Mr Chairperson?

CHAIRPERSON: Before you gave them approval.

MR HEYSTEK: Honourable Chairperson, Mr Coetzee told me that this man is recruitable ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: No, my question is, did you ask Coetzee if they asked this person to come across?

MR HEYSTEK: No, they hadn't had contact with him, so how can they ask him?

CHAIRPERSON: How did they find out about this?

MR HEYSTEK: Through their informers, Mr Chairperson. My answer to you is that they did not speak to him personally, but there was information on the table that indicated that this person is willing to come across.

CHAIRPERSON: Why didn't ask Coetzee then to ask the person through your informer?

MR HEYSTEK: Time played a factor. Time was a factor to prevent chaos in Protea and Soweto and in the whole Republic of South Africa.

CHAIRPERSON: And you believed that SAYRCO will do this to South Africa?

MR HEYSTEK: Honourable Chairperson, if SAYRCO succeeded in blowing up the whole Head Office of the Soweto South African Police, the Unrest Unit, the Detective Head, the Uniform Head, the Department Commissioner, the Head of the Security Branch, that whole complex, if they attacked that complex and succeeded in it, then you can understand what reaction it would have in the rest of South Africa and in the rest of the world.

CHAIRPERSON: You see I cannot understand your answer, the person could have been asked in the same period of time that it took to abduct him. That's all.

MR HEYSTEK: Honourable Chairperson, who do you ask to go and ask him?

MR MALAN: The same person who told you that he's willing to come across.

MR HEYSTEK: But then we sit with the same situation that if he turns around and says "No, I am not very honest", because at that stage he already had knowledge of two of our men who worked across the border, then their lives would have been in danger.

MR MALAN: Please explain it to me.

MR HEYSTEK: Mr Chairperson, Mr Lengene, if I understood it correctly and if my recollection is correct, he already had contact with - or maybe he wasn't aware of it or completely aware of it, I do not really know what the circumstances were, but that that stage he already had contact with two of our cross-border operators, or whatever you want to call them, who were both members of the Force. If he had been approached by one of them and they say "Well come across to our side" and he had said "No, I will not, why do you ask me", then it would have led to a chain reaction and it would have put the safety of our own people in danger and I was not willing to place somebody under my command in such a situation. That is why Mr Coetzee suggested that they go across the border with a few men, sum up the situation and then take their own initiative, and I agreed with that.

CHAIRPERSON: I think it was Mr Coetzee that said that if you followed the route of the informers and to convince him to come over without abducting him and he refused, then he would have left it that. I think it was Coetzee who said that. Now what do you say about this?

MR HEYSTEK: I do not quite understand the question, can you just repeat it.

CHAIRPERSON: I asked him what would happen if you had chosen the route of inviting to walk across the border and come here and he sent a message "I refuse to do it", he's not interested, then Coetzee said that he would have left it there and wouldn't have done anything else.

MR HEYSTEK: Mr Chairperson, it's very easy to speculate at this stage, but I accept that if somebody on the other side said "I'm not interested", I will not have any interest in him either. That is logical.

CHAIRPERSON: The impression that you create in your testimony is that you didn't have this option, you had to abduct him because if you provided him with the option to come across, you would have placed your members or the agent's lives in danger and that is why you couldn't do it. I am now referring to asking him personally to walk across.

MR HEYSTEK: What was discussed that morning in my office is what Mr Coetzee suggested, we did not have the situation in terms of what could happen. Mr Coetzee reported to me that this person was recruitable. I mentioned that time was a factor and we wanted this person on our side.

CHAIRPERSON: Your evidence does not correlate with that of Coetzee's on this point and I will tell you why. You are telling us now that according to the information that you had that morning in that meeting, you knew that they had to do everything except abduction, or including abduction, to get this person to cross and to ask him to walk across was not an option for you because if he was asked and he refused, then you place the agents at risk. Now Coetzee says well if we had that option that we did not use, but if we did use it, to ask him to walk across and if he then refused, we wouldn't have done anything else to him. That is what he said. Do you understand that your testimony or evidence is different?

MR HEYSTEK: Mr Chairperson, I do not really understand where we're going. In my knowledge our evidence is exactly the same, we may not use the same words, or I may not use the same words as he did, but I did not think about the idea if this man will possibly be recruited or how it will happen or what happened there, it was Coetzee's duty and his work to accomplish that task. Coetzee came to me and told me that this person is recruitable. I told you in my evidence-in-chief that after they left there with this that they abducted Lengene, although I did not give him permission and although we did not discuss it, I did not have any objections.

CHAIRPERSON: Let us go back to that meeting. I am going to repeat my question on this point, please listen carefully. When you gave the approval to go and recruit Lengene, for whatever reason, we are not going to discuss that now, you planned that any illegal or unlawful acts may be executed towards Lengene.

MR HEYSTEK: The possibility was always there.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you know that there's this possibility that he could be abducted?

MR HEYSTEK: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: And later on in your evidence you testified that it was not an option to ask him to walk across himself. Can you remember that you said that?

MR HEYSTEK: Yes, I did say it.

CHAIRPERSON: Then to Lengene if he had walked over, there wouldn't have been any unlawful acts towards him.

MR HEYSTEK: I understand what you're saying.

CHAIRPERSON: If that option was not an option to you, what else except illegal actions against him could have been taken?

MR HEYSTEK: I didn't even think of the option of asking ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: No, I know that, but what other ...

MR HEYSTEK: But it wasn't my work, it had nothing to do with me. Coetzee and them came to me and said "This is a project that we want to do", and he had to execute it.

CHAIRPERSON: But you knew that it could be possible that they would have abducted him.

MR HEYSTEK: Yes, in the back of my head I thought of it.

MR MALAN: I wish we could start with the first witness, because the evidence that was read out confused me. If I think back now, because we constantly cover the same point now, but this is my same question. If Lengene was willing to come through, why didn't we ask him to walk through? I cannot remember, we'll have to look at the evidence and I'm not quite sure and I do not know if I'll find it in my notes. If the witness said or the informer said, Khoza's information to you was that Lengene is willing to walk across to the Police or that Lengene - and this appears in the application, or was it just Khoza's idea that Lengene would have liked to have done that and it was Khoza's impression that he was recruitable? I do not know what the facts are anymore, I would like to look at the transcript. Can you comment on this? Can you tell me how you understood it?

MR HEYSTEK: Mr Chairperson, Mr Coetzee came to me and Anton Pretorius and we discussed shortly about what possibilities there were. In other words, Peter Lengene is on the other side - I cannot remember the exact words, but the fact of the matter is that he was willing to become an informer for us and already at that stage he did provide us with some information. This is according to Mr Coetzee. I cannot confirm that the information did come from him but I have no reason to say that it did not come from him.

MR MALAN: Very well. Then I want to take you back to the statement of Mr Lengene, that I assume you also read. If you then look basically from page 51 of the bundle, paragraph 11 right through, his statement is that he worked with George Khoza and in his whole statement he said that he was quite surprised to see that Khoza blocked his escape and according to Lengene's statement at the stage when he was abducted, that Khoza was not an agent. And the question is, is that not also a possibility or explanation that Khoza would have let you know that "Lengene is recruitable, according to what he had said to me." It's a different story in that Khoza would have told Coetzee or Pretrious that Lengene wanted to join them. It's two different stories.

MR HEYSTEK: Mr Chairperson, I cannot deny this statement of Lengene, but where my name has been mentioned is lies. If that is a lie, then I must make the conclusion that some of the other facts are also lies. That is point number one. Point number two is that I do not think that one of us testified that we spoke to Lengene himself, the information that we received was that Lengene's motive or willingness to work with us came from informers, the informer amongst others, Mr Khoza. What Khoza told Mr Coetzee - and unfortunately he is not with us anymore either, but what Khoza told Coetzee, I cannot say, I was never present.

MR MALAN: Yes, but what can stand out in your mind is the two possibilities. Either Coetzee came to you and said "We has Khoza that tells us that he, Khoza, thinks that Lengene is recruitable because he's saying all kinds of things", or Khoza comes to Coetzee and says "Look, Lengene told us that we have to give a message. He knows I am an agent and he would like to come back and come and work." In other words, Khoza is the messenger of Lengene, or the message comes from Khoza and not from Lengene at all. Do you have any feeling about this and about how you understood it at that stage?

MR HEYSTEK: What I understood at that stage was what I heard from Mr Coetzee.

MR MALAN: And the question is, what? What did you understand?

MR HEYSTEK: What I understood from Mr Coetzee is the fact that people were arrested because of information that Mr Lengene would have then sent in some way or another to Mr Coetzee. That is a fact. The second thing is that Mr Coetzee came to me and told me that this person is now willing to work with us and they want to cross to the other side. Where the information came from, how we received it, or in which way we received it, I cannot assist you in that.

MR MALAN: I will then summarise that version. Lengene is the messenger and he's the one who conveyed the information that Khoza is only the medium.

MR HEYSTEK: That is correct, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I just need to clarify one aspect which I failed to do so. It's just one question.

FURTHER EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Did you also notify Head Office concerning the recruitment of Mr Lengene?

MR HEYSTEK: Mr Chairperson, I did not.

MR VISSER: What I actually want to know is, did you tell Head Office that he was abducted?

MR HEYSTEK: After it became known in newspaper, yes I did.

MR VISSER: Did you report to somebody that Mr Lengene had been abducted?

MR HEYSTEK: I told Johan Coetzee who was then the Head of the Security Branch. He contacted me the Friday evening, a few days after the abduction of Mr Lengene, that Mr Twet Masire, the then President of Botswana was at Pik Botha and the allegation was that we had abducted Mr Lengene. I then told him that we do have him with us, but that it was a recruitment action.

MR VISSER: Thank you, that is what I wanted to know. No further questions, Mr Chairperson. No further witnesses either, thank you Mr Chairman.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: Mr Chairperson, I wish to call Mrs Cynthia Lengene as a witness.

CHAIRPERSON: Mrs Lengene, which language would you prefer to use?

MS LENGENE: I'll make use of Sesotho, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Have you any objection to taking the oath?

CYNTHIA LENGENE: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Please be seated.

EXAMINATION BY MR VAN DER HEYDE: Mrs Lengene, you were married to Mr Lengene, the victim in this case, is that so?

MS LENGENE: That is correct.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: When did you meet him? The year.

MS LENGENE: We met in 1982, in August.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: And were you married until the time of his death last year?

MS LENGENE: That is correct.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: Can you tell us about the scars on his body, did he show it to you, you saw it and where was it and how did it look?

CHAIRPERSON: Look here, Ms Lengene, I assume before he was kidnapped you were able to say whether he had any scars on his body and wherever they were?

MS LENGENE: He had no scars before he was abducted.

CHAIRPERSON: How long after he was abducted did you see him again?

MS LENGENE: When I first met him the scars were still fresh.

CHAIRPERSON: How long after he was abducted did you first see him?

MS LENGENE: He arrived in February and I saw him on the seventh month, that is July.

CHAIRPERSON: 19?

MS LENGENE: 1982.

CHAIRPERSON: You told us that you first met him in August 1982.

MS LENGENE: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Now you say you first met him after the kidnapping, in July 1982?

MS LENGENE: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Something is wrong then, you could not first have met him in your life in August 1982 and then met him for the first time again after ...(intervention)

MS LENGENE: That is correct, Chairperson, I first met him in 1982, in August.

CHAIRPERSON: And when did you - then he was abducted, correct?

MS LENGENE: He informed me that he was abducted.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you know him before he was abducted?

MS LENGENE: The person who knew him was my brother.

CHAIRPERSON: I'm asking about you.

MS LENGENE: No, Chairperson, I did not know him.

CHAIRPERSON: So you met him first in 1982, in August?

MS LENGENE: Correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: He had already been abducted by then.

MS LENGENE: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: I assume you met him in South Africa then?

MS LENGENE: Correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And you say - did I hear you correctly, that when you met him his scars were fresh?

MS LENGENE: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Did they still have scars on when you met him?

MS LENGENE: He died with those scars, Chairperson, and they were ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: No, I'm talking about - let me put it this way, did those wounds have crusts on them when you met him, because you say they were fresh? Or why do you say they were fresh?

MS LENGENE: Yes, Chairperson, they were fresh scars, they were still fresh wounds.

CHAIRPERSON: And how did they look for you to say they were fresh?

MS LENGENE: If a person has a stitches on a particular place in the body, you'd see that the flesh is not correctly connect as it were, or the skin is a little bit cut.

CHAIRPERSON: So he still had stitched in his body?

MS LENGENE: The stitches were removed, but you could see the stitch scars.

CHAIRPERSON: Alright, now I understand. Please carry on.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: Tell me, where on his body did he have these scars?

MS LENGENE: One was under the penis and the other scar was on the hand and the other one on the face. Other scars were on the two legs and the other one was at the back, because the one at the back had a bit of a hole.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: Was one of his testis removed?

MS LENGENE: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: Did he tell you what happened that one of his testis was removed?

MS LENGENE: I was surprised because we stayed for too long without having children, without conception.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, I just think let's allow it, I'll know what to do with it.

MR VISSER: I'm not objecting, Chairperson, I think it's important, as you say, for her to say what she has to say.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: Mr Chairperson, I realise that some of these questions I ask may be hearsay evidence, but it's ...

CHAIRPERSON: Maybe she needs to say it.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: How did the community react to the fact that they knew that your husband was now working for the Police? The community that you lived in.

MS LENGENE: He did not stay at a black area, he went to stay with the Coloured community, because many Coloured people did not know him, so he went to stay there.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: Why did he go to stay there?

MS LENGENE: Because he was afraid to come into contact with black people because they would call him an informer.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: Can you tell me, according to you, did he have a drinking problem?

MS LENGENE: No Chairperson, he did not. He was a casual drinker. For example, during weekends.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: Did he ever tell you that he was afraid of the people that he worked for?

MS LENGENE: Yes, we were taken to a particular farm after we had been removed from the community township. That is where I experienced that he was afraid of his employers, because they would come even during the night when he was asleep, to send him a particular errand.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: Tell me, did he change his surname?

MS LENGENE: That is correct, Chairperson, I have two IDs. I have Lengene ID and then I have Abrahams ID.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: Why did he change his surname?

MS LENGENE: Because he did not want to buy a house with Lengene's surname because those people who were with him in exile would burn his house.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: I have no further questions, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, have you got any questions?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Allow me one question, Chairperson.

Was he seen by a doctor as far as you know, for any of his wounds, and if so, who was that doctor?

MS LENGENE: The doctor I know is the only doctor who is the only gynaecologist we went to when we were going to get help for conception.

MR VISSER: Thank you, no further questions Mr Chairman.

ADV SIGODI: Do you know if your husband has got any children besides from the marriage?

MS LENGENE: That is correct, Chairperson, he had one child. That is correct, Chairperson, it's a daughter.

ADV SIGODI: And how old is the child now?

MS LENGENE: She was born in 1986.

ADV SIGODI: '86 or '76?

MS LENGENE: She was born in 1976.

ADV SIGODI: And what is her name and surname? Do you have her details, her name and surname and address?

MS LENGENE: I have the address, it's at home, but I know her name and her surname.

ADV SIGODI: ...(inaudible)

MS LENGENE: Her name is Mpo.

ADV SIGODI: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Steenkamp, will you be able to give us that?

ADV STEENKAMP: Mr Chairman, I don't have those details with me but I'm sure we will get it. Thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes thank you, you're excused.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr van der Heyde is that all?

MR VAN DER HEYDE: That's all, Mr Chairperson.

ADV STEENKAMP: No further evidence or witnesses, Mr Chairman, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Would anybody like to make any submissions?

MR VISSER IN ARGUMENT: Chairperson, yes there is perhaps one thing I should refer to. I don't want to repeat the evidence etcetera. I would submit to you that on the evidence there is - there ought to be no problem, in the sense that there was a decision that the man was going to be abducted and authority was sought from Mr Heystek, who knew of that possibility and in fact, Mr Lengene was abducted.

The question of course is the obvious question that arises and that is, if the man suggested that he wanted to cooperate, why then abduct him? And I discussed this with the applicants, Coetzee and Pretorius in consultation, and the answer they gave me is the answer they gave you. The point is that Coetzee felt that it was important for him being in a strange country, that he had to take control, take Lengene to a safe place where he could make certain that he could work with him undisturbed in order to secure his cooperation.

CHAIRPERSON: I accept that argument in a sense I can understand, I don't mean ...(indistinct) understand it. The problem with that argument is that there were previous attempts to meet him there and for other reasons beyond Coetzee's control, it couldn't happen. So they did attempt to do that and now you argue that they had to take him away safely to deal with him. I' not too sure if that is conflicting or not.

MR VISSER: I would suggest to you that it is not in conflict, there were attempts and they came to nothing. And on this occasion what Coetzee decided the way to go, would be to abduct him, Chairperson and that is why they're here before you as applicants.

CHAIRPERSON: What you are saying then, whether it was the right thing to do or the wrong thing to do, it was a judgmental matter and that's the decision he made?

MR VISSER: We know it was wrong, we know it was wrong, that's why he's here.

Chairperson, the only other matter that really has to be addressed is the statement of Mr Lengene, from where it appears that various allegations of assault ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Let me put it to you this way, I don't think we can put much value on it where there's a dispute. On the common cause issues, maybe we can rely on it.

MR VISSER: I just wanted to make the one submission, Chairperson, as to what the evidential value is, and I would submit to you with respect, that at most it calls for an answer which is not inherently improbable or impossible or clearly not believable. And I submit that we've dealt with that through the evidence of Coetzee and certainly his answers are not so improbable that you can reject them, and therefore Chairperson, we would ask you to accept the evidence of the applicants.

In those circumstances, Chairperson we would ask you to allow the amnesty as we've asked for. In the case of Heystek of course, there is not a question of assault, he never knew of it.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

MR VISSER: Yes. Chairperson, it would entail abduction, unlawful detention, assault and then there would be contravention of border control regulations as far as entry and exit of persons and firearms are concerned. There is not a question of possession of illegal firearms in this case, because they took their own service pistols along. And then any other offence or delict, Chairperson. And then clearly, on the evidence of all the witnesses, Head Office was informed but they were not informed that the man was abducted, so there's clearly a defeating of the ends of justice as well. Thank you, Mr Chairman.

MR VAN DER HEYDE: I have no submissions, Mr Chairperson.

ADV STEENKAMP: No submissions, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: We'll reserve the decision in this matter and we'll issue a decision in due course.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, before you rise, would you give me an opportunity just to address you on another issue please.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

MR VISSER: I didn't want to interrupt you.

Chairperson, my attorney received a telephone call from a Mr Julian Rademeyer who is, apart from obviously being a concerned citizen, is a reporter of the Pretoria News and this gentleman was kind enough after he had heard of our dilemma of not being able to obtain extraneous evidence as to dates etcetera, has gone to the trouble of going to the archives of the Pretoria News and finding news clippings in regard to Mr Naledi's death, for which we've thanked him already. Chairperson, I haven't had an opportunity of studying it, but we would like to hand this to you.

CHAIRPERSON: For what it's worth?

MR VISSER: Yes. There are some things that are of interest to you, Chairperson. For example, the names of the deceased are mentioned on the first one. And the second one, Chairperson, the second aspect here is, it would appear that the raid, the SAW raid into Botswana was in fact this raid, the raid on the house of Naledi. We had such suspicions, but we didn't have the evidence.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you talking about the matter that we're still going to hear?

MR MALAN: The arms cache.

CHAIRPERSON: The arms cache?

MR VISSER: Yes. So it had to do with the operation against Naledi, not against the other U-shaped building where no people were killed. And as far as we suggested to you that that might be the position, we were obviously wrong, but we'll leave this with you. It makes no difference to the applications one way or the other, it just gives more information.

CHAIRPERSON: ... say that the issue of newspaper cuttings fall in the same category as we agreed on with ...(inaudible) But that's why I say we accept it for what it's worth. Thank you.

We'll adjourn till the 24th of July, 10 o'clock.