CHAIRPERSON: Good morning everybody. Today is the 29th of August 2000, a Tuesday. When we adjourned yesterday afternoon, Mr McIntyre had finished his evidence-in-chief.

ROBERT PETER McINTYRE: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Joubert, before I ask the other legal representatives to commence with their cross-examination, is there anything else which you want to cover at this moment?

MR JOUBERT: No, there's nothing further, Mr Chair. Thank you very much.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Hattingh?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Mr McIntyre, may I just refer you to paragraph 8.2 of your statement, Exhibit A.

MR McINTYRE: I have the paragraph.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. Therein you motivate the decision that you took for the building to be damaged, is that so? And then on page 11, paragraph 8.5, you state that you cannot recall specifically at which stage you gave the order, but that you would recall that it was approximately one to two weeks before the incident. Now this isn't about the precise date for me, all I want to know is whether you explained your motivation for the order to the person to whom you issued the order, did you tell the person why you were of the opinion that it was necessary for the building to be damaged?

MR McINTYRE: Chairperson, I believe that I did.

MR HATTINGH: Yes. And then one could also accept that he in his turn similarly explained and informed the persons that he approached to assist him with the operation?

MR McINTYRE: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Chairperson, I have nothing further.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Hattingh. Mr van der Merwe.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VAN DER MERWE: Thank you, Mr Chair.

Mr McIntyre, as you have become aware from the statement made by Mr Hattingh, it is his evidence that he states that you gave him an order to continue with this operation, and you have confirmed this, you stated that you were not completely certain but that you would accept it as such.

MR McINTYRE: Yes, that is correct.

MR VAN DER MERWE: Now although you indicate in your evidence that you are not completely certain of the wording of the order, I would like to know whether there was any mention of a fire in your order, or did you simply mention the damaging of this building?

MR McINTYRE: Chairperson, I really cannot recall what the precise wording of my order was.

MR VAN DER MERWE: This information to which Mr Hattingh referred you on page 9, paragraph 8.2, is this information that you received from your Intelligence sources? Can you recall from whence you obtained the information?

MR McINTYRE: Chairperson, this is information that came, not only from Intelligence sources, but the Stratcom component also responded to information which came via the Security Head Office's desk. So it was information that came from various Security Branches, it wasn't restricted to Intelligence sources as such.

MR VAN DER MERWE: At the time of your decision for an action to be launched against Khanya House, were you aware, or did you have any information which indicated that there were persons residing in this building?

MR McINTYRE: No, Chairperson, I did not possess such information.

MR VAN DER MERWE: My instructions from Mr Hattingh are indeed that upon the conveyance of this order, you indicated that specific attention should be paid at not involving innocent persons and not damaging closely situated property.

MR McINTYRE: Yes, that is correct.

MR VAN DER MERWE: And then in the final instance, Mr Hattingh states that he is not certain, he confirms the feedback in his statement, the last paragraph of his statement, he's not certain to whom he reported back, but he's prepared to accept that it might not necessarily have been you.

MR McINTYRE: Yes, that is correct.

MR VAN DER MERWE: Just one moment, Mr Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Certainly.

ADV SANDI: Sorry, if I can just ask a question whilst you're getting ready, Mr van der Merwe.

But did you personally get any report after this operation was carried out?

MR McINTYRE: No, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: When you read about this in The Citizen, did you speak to any of the people you were working with?

MR McINTYRE: Chairperson, not that I can recall, I cannot recall that I discussed it with anybody.

ADV BOSMAN: Mr McIntyre, I find it strange that you issued the order, yet there was no report-back and no further discussion.

MR McINTYRE: Chairperson, I could answer as follows, this was an illegal covert operation, I would really not have discussed it with everybody and I would not have expected anybody to return with a report-back, explaining exactly how everything happened. I indicated in my statement that after the incident, towards the end of October 1988, I received a call indicating that I had been transferred, I then took leave. In other words, what I wanted to say was that I probably didn't have the occasion upon which to have a discussion about the incident, but I wouldn't have done it, because in the security community everybody worked on a need-to-know basis.

ADV BOSMAN: I'm not suggesting that you would have discussed it with all and sundry, but there were so many persons involved and I find it peculiar that you would not have followed it up within that group. That is the point that I'm trying to make.

MR McINTYRE: Chairperson, I was not aware until I read the applications, of precisely who had participated in the operation. My order to Mr Hattingh was the first and the last word that I uttered regarding the incident, so I wasn't aware of who participated, so that I could go and discuss it with them after the incident occurred.

ADV BOSMAN: Thank you, Mr van der Merwe, you may proceed.

MR VAN DER MERWE: I have no further questions, thank you Mr Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: But again, even though it's a covert operation and Khanya House posed a threat in the sense that they printed material, harboured insurgents, nothing else is discussed about the success of this covert operation, how would it, because if it was not successful, Khanya House would proceed with whatever they were doing?

MR McINTYRE: Chairperson, I would just like to remark with regard to the word "insurgents". In my statement I refer to activists. Secondly, Honourable Chairperson, the purpose with the operation was to damage the building so that they could be put out of action temporarily or in the long term. I don't believe that it was at all necessary to have a subsequent meeting to discuss the successes and/or failures of the operation. When I read on the front page of The Citizen, that the building had been seriously damaged, it was accepted that the operation had been successful.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Nel?

MR NEL: Thank you, Mr Chairman. I've got no questions for Mr McIntyre.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Wagener?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR WAGENER: Mr McIntyre, I'm appearing in this matter for an ordinary footsoldier, Mr du Plessis, who simply carried out orders, however, you heard yesterday afternoon that Ms Cambanis indicated that her clients would be opposing the application and she basically explained the framework of that opposition, did you hear that?

MR McINTYRE: Yes.

MR WAGENER: You also heard that her clients are of the opinion that your application is insufficient, among others, in the regard that there is not sufficient political motivation which relates to the deed itself. You heard that?

MR McINTYRE: Yes, I did.

MR WAGENER: Now in terms of this, I scratched around in my old documents yesterday evening and there are one or two statements that I would like to put to you and I would like to hear your commentary on these statements. I am referring to paragraph 8.2 of your statement where you state that in terms of your position, you obtained certain information which indicated that Khanya House was promoting the objectives of the liberation movements, do you see that?

MR McINTYRE: Yes, I do.

MR WAGENER: Do you concur that the overall purpose of the liberation movements was to take over the former government of the country by any means conceivable, including violence?

MR McINTYRE: Yes, that is correct, I agree.

MR WAGENER: And that we always heard that they were trying to render the country ungovernable.

MR McINTYRE: That is correct.

MR WAGENER: By means of various forms of mass action, if I were to use that term.

MR McINTYRE: Yes.

MR WAGENER: Protest actions and so forth.

MR McINTYRE: Yes, that is correct.

MR WAGENER: Are you aware that in terms of this action, we in our country, from 1986 onwards, experienced a general State of Emergency?

MR McINTYRE: Yes, I am aware.

MR WAGENER: And that the basis of the announcement of a general State of Emergency was that the regular laws of the country could no longer maintain the situation.

MR McINTYRE: That is correct.

MR WAGENER: And are you aware of the fact that in terms of the general State of Emergency, emergency regulations were announced?

MR McINTYRE: Yes, I'm aware of this.

MR WAGENER: In terms of which large numbers of persons were arrested and put in detention.

MR McINTYRE: That is correct.

MR WAGENER: And that the general basis for this detention was that the activities of the detainees entailed a threat to the internal security of our country.

MR McINTYRE: That is correct.

MR WAGENER: Now I would like to show a document to you which was published in The Weekly Mail of the 13th of March 1987, indeed more than a year before this incident took place. However, it is a document which was published by the Southern African Catholic Bishops Conference, an open letter to all detainees. I would just like to show it to you and then I will request your commentary on the document.

Mr Chairman, I have copies, I will see that everyone has his own copy also.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Wagener. Can we mark it at this stage, Mr Wagener? I think our next would be C.

MR WAGENER: Maybe I should I should wait a moment, Mr Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Ja, let most of the people get what you would be talking about. Thank you. You may proceed now, Mr Wagener.

MR WAGENER: Perhaps, Mr McIntyre, I should simply ask you without leading you, for your commentary on this.

MR McINTYRE: Chairperson, it is the first time that I view this report, the content thereof is obvious in indicating that the Catholic Church in general opposed the apartheid government in all its forms. This is proof, an example of the attitude that they adopted to all the actions of the former dispensation.

MR WAGENER: In order to cut it short then, is this the sort of information that you refer to when you state in paragraph 8.2, that you obtained certain information?

MR McINTYRE: Chairperson, this is part of the type of information that we were obtaining.

MR WAGENER: Did you have knowledge at that stage of a publication by the name of The New Nation?

MR McINTYRE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: It was a weekly which was published by the Bishops Conference, do you recall this?

MR McINTYRE: Yes, I can recall something like that.

MR WAGENER: Are you aware of the fact that this publication, The New Nation, was banned at a stage towards the end of 1987, it was a forbidden document?

MR McINTYRE: I cannot recall that.

MR WAGENER: Because I will put it to you that it was indeed the situation. In terms of the former media emergency regulations, this publication was banned for period of three months, towards the end of 1987.

MR McINTYRE: I am not aware of it.

MR WAGENER: And that the basis for this ban was generally - Mr Chairman, and I will give you a full reference to this, it was generally that the publication, in terms of the emergency regulations, and I will read the relevant section to you, it is 7A(1):

This constituted the basis for the ban of the New Nation. I accept that you do not have this knowledge, but I'm just informing you that there was such a case.

MR McINTYRE: I was not aware of it.

MR WAGENER: And that this case preceded to the highest level of our court system, the Appeals Division, after they had not had any success in the lower sections of our judicial system. Their appeal was not successful, but this is what the ban of the newspaper boiled down to.

Mr Chairman, this is a matter, it's been reported in the Law Reports, The Catholic Bishops Publishing Company vs The State President and Another. It is reported in the South African Law Reports, 1990 NO 1st Edition. On page 849 and further you will find this.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR WAGENER: The only reason why I have put these questions to you is because I want to know whether or not this was the sort of information that came to your attention when you state what you stated in paragraph 8.2.

MR McINTYRE: That is correct.

MR WAGENER: Nothing further, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Wagener.

Now these - or let me start by saying, Ms Cambanis I recall you saying that amongst the people you are representing, I see in this there would be Bishop Umkhumishe(?) and those I can remember, Bridget Flannagan, and I see there are signatories to this document, at least. I'm just recalling the people you said you represented.

MS CAMBANIS: Yes, that's correct, I represent Sister Bridget Flannagan, yes. I'm just checking the names, Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: The second column you'll see Bishop Umkhumishe.

MS CAMBANIS: Yes, you are correct. And also in the second column, Bishop D Verstrate. I can't pronounce it, I apologise to my clients.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MS CAMBANIS: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: These activists which they were harbouring, were they illegal in the country or were they just people who were in the country but opposing the regime of the day?

MR McINTYRE: Chairperson, to the best of my knowledge, the activists were not illegal or illegally in the country, they were local, they were RSA citizens. Chairperson, I also do not want to say that the activists were accommodated there, but they had access to the Catholic Bishops offices.

CHAIRPERSON: Because on page 9, paragraph 8.2, that would be the second-last sentence, you say - or the third:

My question is based on that.

MR McINTYRE: Chairperson, I mentioned yesterday that upon an occasion we, the Security Branch, had to arrest an activist on behalf of the Eastern Transvaal Security Branch. The information indicated that she was in Khanya House, and it was confirmed that she was in Khanya House and she was arrested outside Khanya House. The point that i want to make is that there were meetings held in Khanya House under the umbrella of the liberation movements and activists had free access to Khanya House. Once again I would like to emphasise that they did not necessarily reside there permanently.

CHAIRPERSON: In this Exhibit C, that the Southern African Catholic Bishops Conference expressed their distaste about the repression and called for solidarity with those detained, how was it unpalatable to the government that people of the cloth would express such solidarity?

MR McINTYRE: Chairperson, could you please repeat.

CHAIRPERSON: I say the - I want to use the same words, but I trust my utmost that my reading, quick reading of Exhibit C, which is before you, the conference, the Bishops Conference expressed their distaste about the further repression in the country and show solidarity with those detained for fighting this repression, and I say if people of the cloth showed this solidarity with those detained, what do you find unpalatable towards the government of the day?

MR McINTYRE: Chairperson, I think that the actions of the Catholic Church go further than mere opposition to the detention of certain activists or troublemakers. I do not expect that the Catholic Church or the Bishops Council would associate themselves with the action of the former government. However, one of the tasks of the Security Branch was to collect information regarding all organisations and activists who opposed the government of the day or the objectives of the government of the day in maintaining stability in the country, or at least attempting to maintain stability in the country.

CHAIRPERSON: When they say in the second paragraph, the second sentence:

Would you say, if they say these are the injustices meted out, that that is opposition to the government?

MR McINTYRE: If we have to examine violence and injustice, the Catholic Church had their own view on violence and injustice and the Security Branch, and I'm speaking for myself, had its own perspective on violence and injustice.

CHAIRPERSON: I am conscious that we are speaking of the intensification of opposition which started in 1976, and if we particularly look at the years 1985/'86/'87, there was violence on both sides, and would you say when there was no differentiation between the youth and the adults, that the police who were particularly targeting the youth, that was not viewed as violence from the State by Intelligence, or only what the youth was doing against the State, was it then viewed as violence?

MR McINTYRE: Chairperson, I reckon that if the youth had revolted against the government and if they were incited into revolt against the government or governmental institutions such as schools, then yes, I would have regarded this as going over into violence, and I suppose it was also a form of injustice from their side as well.

I beg your pardon, Chairperson, if I mix my English and my Afrikaans.

CHAIRPERSON: No, no, that's in order, you can use any language interchangeably at any given stage, Mr McIntyre.

MR McINTYRE: Thank you, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Because it goes further and says:

That's the violence I was asking about.

MR McINTYRE: Chairperson, in my opinion this is a general statement, there were allegations of assaults which I personally did not know of or investigate, and to "suffer solitary confinement, a very important contribution" from the perspective of the Catholic Church, Chairperson, if I was a member of the church, I would also have adopted that viewpoint, or this perspective.

CHAIRPERSON: If we think back and think of the existence of Vlakplaas and how they treated those which the State perceived as their opposition, wouldn't you say violence was perpetrated at an alarming scale in that instance?

MR McINTYRE: By whom Chairperson?

CHAIRPERSON: I say if we look at Vlakplaas, which was the operational wing, basically, of Intelligence, and the people who they came across as opponents of the State, the violence meted out, wouldn't you say it was alarming? And are you suggesting that people had to keep quiet even in the fact of that?

MR McINTYRE: No, not at all, Chairperson. If there was evidence of violence by the police, whether in detention or not, then it had to be exposed. I did not condone it for one moment and I do not condone it.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr McIntyre. I was informed that Mr du Plessis will run late and somebody will stand in for him.

MS PATEL: It's Mr Jansen, Honourable Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Jansen. Oh, Mr du Plessis, I apologise.

MR BUNN: Thank you, Mr Chairman, Steven Bunn on behalf of applicant Ras, we have no questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Lamey?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: Thank you, Chairperson.

Mr McIntyre, I see that one of the signatories to this document was Archbishop Dennis Hurley, did you know anything about him at that stage?

MR McINTYRE: Chairperson, nothing in particular.

MR LAMEY: Then I won't take it any further. This incident took place not very long after the Khotso House incident, is that correct?

MR McINTYRE: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: Were you aware of the fact that there was information regarding the utilisation of Khanya House for the liberation movements, and were you aware that the Khotso House incident had taken place already?

MR McINTYRE: Yes, I was aware of it.

MR LAMEY: Were you aware that the Khotso House operation was approved from the upper levels and that Khotso House was also a structure which was used in promotion of the liberation movements, more specifically the South African Council of Churches, in promotion of the objectives of the liberation movements such as the ANC? And I'm saying this in a nutshell, I do not want to go into the entire Khotso House incident, it is history and the facts have already been put before the Committee. I just want to summarise these facts. Were you aware of it?

MR McINTYRE: I was aware of the incident of the explosion at Khotso House, but I was not informed, I didn't have concrete knowledge that it had indeed been a Security Branch operation, I drew my own inferences from the relevant information.

MR LAMEY: Very well. When you refer in paragraph 8.2, to liberation movements, do you refer specifically to the ANC, or other liberation movements as well?

MR McINTYRE: Chairperson, specifically the ANC. Perhaps I should have mentioned the umbrella organisations or the front organisations of the ANC.

MR LAMEY: I beg your pardon, I interrupted you, would you continue.

MR McINTYRE: I would also like to state in a nutshell that during the '80s there were many organisations on practically every level of society, which were opposing the government, from schools and universities through labour and the service industry, and I regarded this as their promotion of the objectives of the ANC.

MR LAMEY: Is it correct that at that stage there was a perception of the political scene in South Africa, which was viewed as a situation of total onslaught and total danger and that this view was fostered among the members of the security community? And what I mean by this is that the opposition to and the struggle against the government which came in essence from the ranks of the ANC at that stage, was managed on a sympathetic level by various front organisations?

MR McINTYRE: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: And there was also information that the Khanya House facility was used, and more specifically a printing press in Khanya House was used in order to print and distribute material which was in promotion of the ANC's objectives.

MR McINTYRE: With regard to the printing press, the information which was available indicated that the printing press was being used by the front organisations as such. I do not wish to link it directly to the ANC itself. Pamphlets were printed, there was a printing press to which activists had access in order to print materials that they needed.

MR LAMEY: But this was the view on the side of the Security Branch and you specifically, who issued the order, and this was viewed as something which promoted the conflict which was committed against the government.

MR McINTYRE: Yes.

MR LAMEY: There may have been a moral justification, there may have been another perspective regarding the justifiability of the situation, but the fact remains that this was the perspective of the government and the Security Branch at that stage.

MR McINTYRE: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: Thank you, Chairperson, nothing further.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Lamey. Mr du Plessis?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr McIntyre, I would just like to put a few statements to you and I would like you to say if you agree with me or not. The Catholic Church specifically, but also some of the other churches supported the liberation movements in their struggle against apartheid in this time when Khanya House was burnt down, is that correct?

MR McINTYRE: Yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: And that was the information that you had.

MR McINTYRE: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And then they also did not do it silently, but they also did it publicly by criticising apartheid, by taking part in protest marches and publicly announcing that they do support the liberation movements, is that correct?

MR McINTYRE: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR DU PLESSIS: And if I'm talking about the liberation movements, I'm talking about the ANC, the SACP alliance, is that correct?

MR McINTYRE: Yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: And the Catholic Church and the other churches who supported the liberation movements also on behalf of these liberation movements, did certain tasks, for example in assisting them in some way or another and that assistance will then be for people who also wanted to leave the country.

MR McINTYRE: It is possible, Mr Chairperson, I cannot recall that I had such concrete cases, or I cannot specifically recall something like that, but it is possible, yes.

MS CAMBANIS: Sorry, Chairperson, this evidence being led by legal representative is most sweet, but when we are referred to the Catholic Church and other churches, is it the intention of my learned friend to put evidence before this Commission that the Catholic Church was actively assisting in getting people out the country? The propositions he's putting, is that the evidence that he has against the Catholic Church, that he will be placing that information and evidence before this Commission?

MR DU PLESSIS: May I answer that in the following way, Mr Chairman, firstly, I'm busy with cross-examination, I'm not leading evidence, which means that I may ask with ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: No, no, she says are you later going to proffer evidence.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: That's how I understood her.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, I'm coming to that, Mr Chairman, if you'll just give me a moment with your permission and if you will allow me. And I want to make the point that I'm entitled to ask leading questions in respect of this witness. But firstly, and - but secondly, my questions relate to a specific document which we have been given, called, The Catholic Church Submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, dated August 15, 1997, and each and every statement I make, I derived from this document. The question that I've asked now of Mr McIntyre, was a question based on this document, which was formulated in the following way.

CHAIRPERSON: I would allow that question.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: That line of cross-examination.

MR DU PLESSIS: May I then base the question on this document?

CHAIRPERSON: Certainly.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr McIntyre, on page 6 - and if my learned friend wishes to lead evidence in this matter to contradict the Catholic Church's own statement to the Truth Commission, Mr Chairman, she would be most welcome, with respect.

Mr McIntyre, I'm going to read for you from the Catholic Church's presentation document to the TRC. On page 6, the last paragraph reads as follows:

You've already confirmed that that was your information as well.

MR McINTYRE: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS:

Was that your information?

MR McINTYRE: Yes, Mr Chairperson.

MR DU PLESSIS:

That is what I asked of you just now and which you confirmed was your information as well. ...(transcriber's interpretation)

MR McINTYRE: Yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: While we're busy with this document let us page to page 4 of this document, I beg your pardon, page 2, let us start there. The bottom paragraph. I just want to know if you agree with the allegations that are made in this document and that this correlates with the information that you had at that stage.

MR McINTYRE: I understand, yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: It is said in the last paragraph on page 2, the third sentence, third line:

Would you say this is correct according to the information that you obtained?

MR McINTYRE: Yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: So would you agree that some people who were members of the Catholic Church, placed themselves in an active role, or made themselves actively involved in supporting the liberation movements?

MR McINTYRE: That is correct, yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: Then if we page to page 4, the third paragraph, it is said, the second sentence:

Do you see that?

MR McINTYRE: Yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: Was that your information and perception, that the Catholic Church was opposed to the political system of the apartheid years?

MR McINTYRE: That is correct, yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: And therefore, your perception was that the Catholic Church was part of the struggle against the political system of apartheid?

MR McINTYRE: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And if you page to page 5, at the top of the page, there in the second-last sentence it says, the sentence starting with "While understanding":

Can you recall if your information was that the Catholic Church sanctioned, even if it was with reservation, supported the sanctions against South Africa and the government?

MR McINTYRE: I can recall that some of the front organisations who had access to the Bishops Council, did ask for sanctions. I cannot recall if I ever saw a document issued by the Catholic Church asking for sanctions.

MR DU PLESSIS: Very well. But you had no reason to deny what was said to the TRC?

MR McINTYRE: If the church say this, yes, I do believe it.

MR DU PLESSIS: Page 6, the second paragraph:

...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Ja, I was going to ask you whether you are talking about one, two or three.

MR DU PLESSIS:

Can you recall these facts? Can you confirm it as correct, the fact that Father Makatchwa was in jail, that he was interrogated and tortured, that he and Archbishop Hurley had to appear in court?

MR McINTYRE: Mr Chairperson, I am aware that Makatchwa was detained under house arrest, but I do not have any knowledge of the assault on him.

MR DU PLESSIS: Very well. In this regard, can I just state to you concerning Father Makatchwa, that two previous clients that I represented in the amnesty process, Hechter and Paul van Vuuren, applied for amnesty for attempted murder on Father Makatchwa, they attempted to, if I may use the English word, assassinate him by means of a specific rifle that they built and that they attempted to use at the Durban international airport when Father Makatchwa disembarked from the plane. And as God maybe ordained it, there was a woman in front of Father Makatchwa when they wanted to shoot him and they then couldn't shoot. They then drove behind him, he was quite a distance in front of them and where the road split to Pietermaritzburg and the North Coast, they had to choose which one he took and then they took the wrong turn and they never found him.

But to make a long story short, they testified that they applied for amnesty and they did receive amnesty for it, and in that amnesty hearing there was also evidence led in detail concerning Father Makatchwa's involvement in the struggle. You do not have any knowledge of that, I will ask that ...(end of side A of tape) ... in the struggle.

MR McINTYRE: Mr Chairperson, no, what you said there, I knew that he was involved in the Bishops Council, he was an activist. I cannot think of any other specific evidence that I can add to that.

MR DU PLESSIS: I'd like to put to you for the purposes of argument at the end of this hearing, I would just like to put to you that Father Makatchwa during that amnesty hearing, did not oppose the application of my clients and when he testified he made it very clear that from his, the viewpoint of his church involvement, he does forgive my clients and there was a very long discussion between him and my clients about this matter and there was some reconciliation and forgiveness in that hearing. We do not know how this hearing will end up, but I would like to put to you that his action was a very good example of reconciliation and it is different from the actions of the church today, in their opposition to this application. You do not have any knowledge of that?

MR McINTYRE: No.

MR DU PLESSIS: I will then attempt to place this record in front of this Committee and then argue on this later.

If you can look on page 6 - I beg your pardon, we've already referred to that. These are the aspects that I would like to mention to you. This instruction that you gave, did you expect that the people who you gave this instruction to, will follow it?

MR McINTYRE: Yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: And you therefore accept that those who acted under those instructions, acted on the instructions that you gave?

MR McINTYRE: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And do you also agree that the subordinates who acted in this operation, amongst others, my clients, Mr Hammond and Kotze, did not have the same information from an Intelligence perspective concerning the church's involvement in the struggle and the use of Khanya House, in the way in which you had?

MR McINTYRE: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And do you also agree that they would have followed this instruction because they would have accepted that if this instruction came from you, it was an instruction that had a purpose and it was justified in the circumstances?

MR McINTYRE: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And did you ever have direct contact, just concerning this event, the Khanya House incident, with my clients, Hammond and Kotze?

MR McINTYRE: No, Mr Chairperson.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr du Plessis. Mr Cornelius?

MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chair, I have no questions for this witness.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS CAMBANIS: Thank you, Chairperson.

Mr McIntyre, you speak about front organisations extensively, just let us clear, are you suggesting that the Catholic Church was a front organisation for the liberation struggle?

MR McINTYRE: Mr Chairperson, no.

MS CAMBANIS: Which front organisations do you refer to?

MR McINTYRE: Mr Chairperson, the information was that the students, trade union members, activists in the unions and those activists in the tertiary institutions, civics, etcetera, that they had access to the Catholic Bishops Conference and that these activists with their organisations were seen as front organisations for the ANC.

CHAIRPERSON: Could you give us some names?

MR McINTYRE: I beg your pardon?

CHAIRPERSON: You've mentioned students, unions, etcetera, did they have any names?

MR McINTYRE: Mr Chairperson, I'm now trying to put by back in the position of about 12 or so years ago, I cannot give you specifics, or there were various organisations who were active in the struggle against apartheid. Mr Chairperson, I'll have to go and look for documents if I have to give them all names.

CHAIRPERSON: You may proceed, Ms Cambanis.

MS CAMBANIS: Thank you.

Mr McIntyre, do you accept that there is a distinction between a violent and non-violent opposition to apartheid?

MR McINTYRE: Yes.

MS CAMBANIS: And are your views different relating to the different parties? Those who condemned apartheid, or fought against apartheid in a non-violent way, in your mind, is that the same as the soldiers of Umkhonto weSizwe?

MR McINTYRE: Mr Chairperson, no, there is a difference.

MS CAMBANIS: Yes, what is the difference?

MR McINTYRE: Mr Chairperson, the way in which you put it, the Umkhonto weSizwe soldiers were actively involved in the violent struggle and the non-violent struggle was in opposition, mass action, the intimidation of people, the asking for sanctions, etcetera.

MS CAMBANIS: But Sir, being against apartheid, in your mind, would that threaten the State? Simply being against apartheid.

MR McINTYRE: Mr Chairperson, I do not believe that it was a question of just being against apartheid, in my opinion the previous government of the day attempted to govern the country and the opposition against this plan to govern the country and also then to stabilise the situation and the actions that were targeted against that, and although the problem was the apartheid policy, we in the Police and especially in the Security Police, had to not only protect the government but also stabilise the situation. So I do not want to say that because myself - or we acted against people who were opposed to apartheid.

MS CAMBANIS: Yes. Isn't it what you had to stabilise was the violence being experienced in the country, isn't that correct?

MR McINTYRE: That is correct, yes.

MS CAMBANIS: And people who were of the same mind, that violence was not acceptable, would be on the same side as you so to speak, not the enemy.

MR McINTYRE: Mr Chairperson, I cannot quite hear, if I can just get the device ready.

CHAIRPERSON: Could the Logistics engineers assist Mr McIntyre with the device?

MR McINTYRE: Thank you, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: You may proceed, Ms Cambanis. Could you repeat your question to Mr McIntyre.

MS CAMBANIS: Thank you, Chair.

Mr McIntyre, isn't it correct that what you considered a threat was the violent opposition to apartheid?

MR McINTYRE: Mr Chairperson, maybe in the '80s, yes, but since my connection with the Security Police in the '60s, all information that the government of the day, that was threatening to the government of the day or harmed the government of the day 'or the policies of the government since 1966, I was intent on collection information so that in the '80s, yes, the opposition was to stabilise the violence.

MS CAMBANIS: Yes. Now unfortunately I don't have copies, Chair, I will make this available from the South African Catholic Bishops Conference, a statement as church leaders made prior to the bombing - I beg your pardon, the burning of Khanya House:

What is your comment on a statement like that, issued by the Catholic Church?

MR McINTYRE: The church's opinion, I've got no problem with that statement.

ADV SANDI: Sorry, Ms Cambanis.

At the time in question, were you aware of this statement?

MR McINTYRE: Mr Chairperson, no, I cannot recall that I ever heard this statement or have seen it or had insight into it.

ADV SANDI: Yes, but were you aware of the fact that the SACBC would issue statements like this condemning the killing of innocent people in the streets with bombs?

MR McINTYRE: Mr Chairperson, yes, they would have made such statements, but I am not aware of that statement. I could have read it maybe, I could have seen it, but I cannot immediately say yes, it sounds familiar.

ADV SANDI: Is it the position here that such a statement would never have made any difference to you?

MR McINTYRE: A difference in what sense?

ADV SANDI: In terms of whatever action you deem appropriate to be taken against the SACBC.

MR McINTYRE: Mr Chairperson, the action against the SACBC was based on information - as I said, with my arrival in 1971 at the Security Branch in Pretoria, information was collected with regards to the SACBC, concerning, or up and to the incident in 1988. In other words, it was a process that come over a very long period of time. So I do not believe that would have had such a big influence on the incident itself.

ADV SANDI: Thank you.

MS CAMBANIS: Yes, but at the time that you took your decision you were aware of the fact that the Catholic Church had throughout the years condemned violence as a means of change and had condemned bombings and killing of innocent people.

MR McINTYRE: Mr Chairperson, the Catholic Church opposed apartheid and the Security Police's actions opposed all of these elements, they criticised them publicly, so I cannot say that I was aware of the fact that the Catholic Church was against violence, but I do accept that they were against government violence or State violence.

MS CAMBANIS: Now Mr McIntyre, you've just told, in answer to the Chair, they refer here to a recent spate of bombings in shopping areas and public places, who do you think they're referring to in this statement?

Do you think they refer to State violence?

MR McINTYRE: Mr Chairperson, no, I do not know, I do not know what they're referring to.

MS CAMBANIS: Mr McIntyre, please try. Are you suggesting tot his Committee that when they condemn in the strongest possible terms, the recent spate of bombings in shopping areas and public areas, they're referring to State sponsored violence?

MR McINTYRE: Mr Chairperson, there were various bomb explosions in shopping centres etcetera, the Catholic Church could have, or I believed that they opposed all types of violence. If they are there referring to State violence or the violence of the liberation movements, I'm not quite sure.

MS CAMBANIS: Mr McIntyre, is it correct, yesterday you said this is the only application, the only event for which you seek amnesty?

MR McINTYRE: That is correct, yes.

MS CAMBANIS: And during cross-examination today you've given the evidence that at the time of making this decision you were not aware of who was involved in the Khotso House bomb attack.

MR McINTYRE: Mr Chairperson, once again I would like to repeat that in an intelligence community we did not go and tell each other what was done or who did it, my inference was that I suspected that it was some of my colleagues, but nobody came specifically to me and told me who was responsible and I never asked questions.

MS CAMBANIS: Who did you think was responsible of your colleagues, which division?

MR McINTYRE: Mr Chairperson, no, I do not know, I've got no idea. My instruction concerning Khanya House was for Mr Hattingh, but I do not know who was involved in the Khotso House incident and I did not know afterwards either.

MS CAMBANIS: And at that time that you made your decision in relation to Khanya House, did you have knowledge of where orders had come from in relation to Khotso House?

MR McINTYRE: No, Mr Chairperson.

MS CAMBANIS: You were not aware of ministerial involvement, Commissioners of Police involvement?

MR McINTYRE: No, Mr Chairperson, I heard that at a later stage or I read about it in the newspaper, concerning the involvement of the higher officials.

MS CAMBANIS: At the time that you made the decision relating to Khanya House, you based your authority on the letter you referred to yesterday.

MR McINTYRE: Mr Chairperson, yes, in broader terms the letter to which I referred to that came from the State Security Council, but also as in my position as a unit Commander of the Stratcom unit, and with the information that I had and seen in the struggle, I took that decision or I made that decision.

MS CAMBANIS: I don't understand, are you saying even without the letter you would have had the authority to make that decision? Is that what you mean to say?

MR McINTYRE: Mr Chairperson, I believe that without the letter I could have made that decision.

MS CAMBANIS: Based on what, Mr McIntyre?

MR McINTYRE: Based on information gathered and in an attempt to remove a serious thorn in the side of the government and to stabilise the internal circumstances, if I thought it was necessary to attack Khanya House in the broader spectrum or framework of the situation at that stage.

ADV BOSMAN: Ms Cambanis, may I just interrupt you for one moment.

Mr McIntyre, it isn't quite clear to me, did you see it as illegal or legal when you gave this instruction?

MR McINTYRE: It was definitely illegal.

ADV BOSMAN: And you yourself say that even without the letter you would have again issued such an illegal instruction.

MR McINTYRE: Can I just mention that the unit of which I was the Commander, was responsible strategic communication for covert operations, covert operations consist of, I would say approximately a hundred percent illegal activities or operations.

ADV BOSMAN: Thank you. Please continue, Ms Cambanis.

MS CAMBANIS: It wasn't necessary for you to get authority from someone above you, your superior?

CHAIRPERSON: He's the Head of Stratcom.

MR McINTYRE: Chairperson, no ...(intervention)

MS CAMBANIS: Is he?

CHAIRPERSON: Ja, he's Head of Stratcom.

MS CAMBANIS: Thank you, Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Or he was. I'm sorry.

MR McINTYRE: I was.

MS CAMBANIS: Did you discuss this decision with anyone other than Mr Hattingh?

MR McINTYRE: No, Mr Chairperson.

MS CAMBANIS: And Mr Hattingh, is it correct he was at that time the Head of Explosives in the Bomb Squad?

MR McINTYRE: That is correct, yes.

MS CAMBANIS: Why did you go to Mr Hattingh?

MR McINTYRE: Mr Chairperson, I know Mr Hattingh since 1962, we were stationed at Durban at the uniform branch. He was Umbilo, I was at ...(indistinct). I know him for many years and because I knew him very well, I still trust him to this day and I knew that I could approach him with this.

MS CAMBANIS: And you say you don't remember what the order was?

MR McINTYRE: Mr Chairperson, I cannot recall the specific wording of it, but I believe that I had to, or should have said, "Damage the building", but I cannot really tell you what my specific words were.

MS CAMBANIS: But if you go to the explosives and bomb people, can we, is it reasonable to think that you would have wanted something a little bit more than arson?

MR McINTYRE: Mr Chairperson, I gave Mr Hattingh the instruction, I believed that I did discuss it with him and I left it in his hands. It was the first time that I issued such an instruction and also the last time that I issued such an instruction. I did not tell him exactly what he must do, who must do it and how he must do it. I cannot really think what I expected or what I said, it's impossible.

MS CAMBANIS: If he had have bombed the building, would that have fallen within your instruction then?

MR McINTYRE: Yes, Mr Chairperson.

MS CAMBANIS: Would you have expected a unit like Vlakplaas to have been involved in the destruction of a building?

MR McINTYRE: Mr Chairperson, at that stage when I gave this instruction I did not expect anybody, or I did not know who was going to be involved, so I cannot speculate and say that I expected Vlakplaas to be involved or not.

MS CAMBANIS: What did you know, what was Vlakplaas' instructions, what was their task at the time of this incident? What was their job?

MR McINTYRE: Mr Chairperson, when this incident occurred, and maybe I should, maybe I'm going to repeat about what the instructions were, but I did know that they did covert work.

MS CAMBANIS: Yes. Did you know that it was in relation to members of Umkhonto weSizwe or other liberation armies?

MR McINTYRE: Could you just repeat please.

MS CAMBANIS: That they were tasked mainly in relation to the liberation armies.

MR McINTYRE: Mr Chairperson, yes, I knew this.

MS CAMBANIS: Do you agree that it wasn't really their job to get involved with non-governmental organisations or civil society?

MR McINTYRE: Mr Chairperson, no, I cannot agree with that. At this late stage I do not want to say what they could have been involved in.

MS CAMBANIS: Sir, earlier you said that you would have given instructions that people should not be injured or killed. You think that's what you would have said.

MR JOUBERT: Sorry Mr Chair, if I may come in here. I don't think that was the evidence as such, the evidence was that no innocent people must be injured in this. Not specifically any people at all, no innocent people and no property adjacent to the building to be damaged.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, that's correct.

MS CAMBANIS: I beg your pardon. Sorry, Mr McIntyre.

MR McINTYRE: Mr Chairperson, I believe I would have used such words, yes. I do repeat I cannot recall what my specific words were when I gave this instruction.

MS CAMBANIS: Yes, no I understand, but it would have been that injury or death of civilians should be avoided, would you have said something like that?

MR McINTYRE: I believe so and I hope I did.

MS CAMBANIS: Sir, if the applicants before this Committee would give evidence that they were instructed to shoot anyone they encountered on the premises, clearly that doesn't fall within the order that you gave.

MR McINTYRE: Mr Chairperson, no.

MS CAMBANIS: Mr McIntyre, you collected all this information, are you aware of the raid at Khanya House by Security Police on the 1st of September, five weeks before this incident? At noon, to be exact.

MR McINTYRE: Mr Chairperson, if you say a raid, can you just explain what happened there, because I also went to go and arrest an activist there, I'm not quite sure if you're referring to that.

MS CAMBANIS: Yes, you're quite right, Mr McIntyre, I refer to car loads of policemen arriving at Khanya House, entering the premises and systematically searching office to office.

MR McINTYRE: Mr Chairperson, no, the incident in which I was involved, we didn't enter the building, so I do not have any knowledge of this incident to which you are referring now.

MS CAMBANIS: My instructions are that such a raid, as previously described, took place on the 1st of September, and that not one piece of so-called subversive literature, pamphlet, banner or anything else was retrieved by Security Police during that raid a mere five weeks before this attack.

MR McINTYRE: Mr Chairperson, I do not know anything about that raid.

MS CAMBANIS: Sir, inter alia you were collecting information regarding the Catholic Church and specifically the South African Bishops Conference and specifically Khanya House, were you not?

MR McINTYRE: Mr Chairperson, yes, to an extent it is correct, it was not just myself who gathered this information, some of the field workers gathered information concerning the SACBC and this was channelised to the headquarters or head office and this done nationally. So it wasn't just myself as an individual or my unit who focused on the Khanya House or the Catholic Church as such.

MS CAMBANIS: Mr McIntyre, an attack on Khanya House in whatever form, one could have expected that it would have national and international repercussions, an attack on the Catholic Church building, do you agree?

MR McINTYRE: Mr Chairperson, yes, the results would have been, or I saw the SACBC as an administrative headquarters of the church in Pretoria and the larger Pretoria area, so I do agree that it would have had national and international results or media coverage.

MS CAMBANIS: And so you would have been careful and considered before making a decision to give an order like that, would you not?

MR McINTYRE: I believe so, yes.

MS CAMBANIS: And yet you're unaware that five weeks before this attack, the Security Police had raided and not found one single piece of evidence of a subversive nature.

MR McINTYRE: Mr Chairperson, I repeat, I'm surprised, this is the first time that I've heard about this raid.

MS CAMBANIS: Had you known about it on the 1st of September, before the attack, would you still have made that order?

MR McINTYRE: Mr Chairperson, it's difficult to say, I had to consider then all options and the fact that nothing was found in the house on the 1st of September, I do not know if I would have then accepted that nothing happened there after all the indications that we had. So it's very difficult to say, I would have to consider the whole situation again.

MS CAMBANIS: But Mr McIntyre, there were repeated raids of the nature I've described previously on Khanya House, this was not the first time, it was just the most recent one before the incident.

MR McINTYRE: Well Mr Chairperson, I've never been involved in a raid at Khanya House, I was at the Security Branch in Pretoria since 1971 and I was at the Security Branch on and off up until '82, and I never took part in a raid at Khanya House.

MS CAMBANIS: Mr McIntyre, it's my instructions that the Security Police were frequent visitors to Khanya House over the years, and that on not one such occasion did they find any illegal literature or any illegal substance or material, did you not know this?

MR McINTYRE: Mr Chairperson, I am surprised to hear that the Security Branch were regular visitors to Khanya House and never found any pamphlets or whatever, I do not have any knowledge of that. The only visit, the only time I went to Khanya House was on the Saturday afternoon when I went to go and arrest an activist.

MS CAMBANIS: My colleague is sabotaging me, Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Please, Mr Cornelius, don't derail her thought of cross-examination.

MS CAMBANIS: ...(indistinct - no microphone)

CHAIRPERSON: Is it a convenient time to break for tea? We will adjourn for tea, we'll take fifteen minutes.

ROBERT PETER McINTYRE: (s.u.o)

CHAIRPERSON: ... proceed with your cross-examination, I just want to ask Ms Patel something. We were waiting for a document that had to be faxed from Cape Town. I forgot to ask this morning, what is the position about that document?

MS PATEL: Unfortunately they faxed the wrong document through to me now, Honourable Chairperson, and it's just come in, so during the tea break I'll call the office again ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: No, we've had the tea break.

MS PATEL: I mean during the lunch break I'll call the office back and make sure that they send the right one. I've informed my learned colleague, Ms Cambanis about it.

CHAIRPERSON: Please bear with us, Cape Town is not near. You may proceed, Ms Cambanis.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS CAMBANIS: (Cont)

Thank you, Chair.

Mr McIntyre, in an operation such as this, would you have made the effort to acquaint yourself with the place Khanya House, the building Khanya House? Would you have had that information?

MR McINTYRE: Chairperson, I don't follow the question, could you repeat it please.

MS CAMBANIS: Mr McIntyre, ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: He has been to Khanya House, when he says he had gone to arrest somebody.

MS CAMBANIS: Yes. As a matter of interest, Mr McIntyre, when was that?

MR McINTYRE: Chairperson, I think it was during the late '70s, I'm not certain of the precise month or day. I was familiar with the building, I knew where it was situated. I had not entered the building, but I had an idea of how it looked.

MS CAMBANIS: Sorry, the only experience of activists being ... was in the '70s, at least eight/nine years before this plan? That is your experience of Khanya House?

MR McINTYRE: No, Chairperson, what I meant was that it was the only occasion upon which I visited the premises to arrest an activist. The indication was activism and the opposition, the political set-up surrounding Khanya House and the government, I'd been aware of this since my attachment to the Security Branch in Pretoria, but I only visited the premises once and that was to execute an arrest.

MS CAMBANIS: And that was in the '70s?

MR McINTYRE: Chairperson, as far as I can recall it was during the late '70s.

MS CAMBANIS: And do you know of any other arrests that were carried out at Khanya House?

MR McINTYRE: No, Chairperson.

MS CAMBANIS: Where were you at Khanya House? You say you didn't enter the premises, where was the arrest carried out?

MR McINTYRE: Chairperson, the arrest was executed at the entrance to Khanya House, on the premises at the entrance. If I recall the old Khanya house correctly, the entrance wasn't very far from the pavement.

MS CAMBANIS: Yes. What happened to this person that was arrested, were they charged?

MR McINTYRE: Chairperson, this person was handed over to the Security Branch, I think it was Springs or Benoni, I'm not entirely certain. They came to fetch the person that very same afternoon. On the contrary, they were present at the time of the arrest.

MS CAMBANIS: Yes, Mr McIntyre, what happened to them, were they charged? It was a woman wasn't it?

MR McINTYRE: I don't know, I cannot recall.

MS CAMBANIS: You do not know if they were charged, she was charged?

MR McINTYRE: No, Chairperson.

MS CAMBANIS: But this you give as an example of the activities at Khanya House, a so-called activist.

MR McINTYRE: Chairperson, I merely mentioned it as one example. I refer in my statement to the information, the informer reports which dealt with the informers that reported that activists had access to Khanya House, that they have free movement inside the house. This was simply one example that I was aware of that I was involved with, I'm not saying that that was the only time when an activist was in Khanya House or on the premises.

MS CAMBANIS: Mr McIntyre, did you request any information about the layout or structure of Khanya House?

MR McINTYRE: Do you mean before the incident?

MS CAMBANIS: Yes, before you took the decision.

MR McINTYRE: No, Chairperson.

MS CAMBANIS: You said in paragraph 8.2 of your statement, on page 9, that you were concerned about the printer, printing, "drukkery op hierdie perseel".

MR McINTYRE: Chairperson, I will read it to you:

Yes, that is correct, there was such information available.

MS CAMBANIS: And what was the information, what equipment was there?

MR McINTYRE: A printing press. I cannot recall in detail, but the information indicated that there was a printing press.

MS CAMBANIS: And if it was only a photocopy machine, would that surprise you?

MR McINTYRE: Chairperson, I must state that a photocopying machine or a photostat machine would have been part of a printing set-up.

MS CAMBANIS: And if you knew that that was housed in the building adjacent to Khanya House, would that surprise you?

MR McINTYRE: Well Chairperson, if I had known it I don't know if I would have been surprised, but my information indicated that it was inside Khanya House.

MS CAMBANIS: Excuse me, that was your information?

MR McINTYRE: That was the information on the table.

MS CAMBANIS: And as a result of that information, Khanya House was burnt, or on your orders, to be damaged. I beg your pardon, Mr McIntyre.

MR McINTYRE: Chairperson, my decision or order or whatever you would like to call it, was not based entirely on the printing press or the printing set-up, it was about the assortment of "undermining activities" which emanated from Khanya House. My plan or my order was not only based upon the knowledge of the printing press.

MS CAMBANIS: Yes, but Mr McIntyre, you refer to it and it is certainly a major component that went towards your decision to give this order, the printing of material.

MR McINTYRE: Yes, it was part of my conviction or my consideration in issuing the order.

MS CAMBANIS: You have read the bundle and the other applicants' applications, you gave that evidence yesterday, you have read the bundle.

MR McINTYRE: Yes, I read it.

MS CAMBANIS: And many of them give the reason that they were told of why they carried this out was because of the printing of subversive material. Did you read that?

MR McINTYRE: Yes, Chairperson, that is also correct, it was part of the consideration.

MS CAMBANIS: And you wouldn't be able to explain how only that part of the instruction was given to them, obviously? That it had to do with the printing, you can't explain that.

MR McINTYRE: No, Chairperson, I cannot say how thorough the operatives were informed. Personally, as I've already testified, I did not brief them.

MS CAMBANIS: Mr McIntyre, if an applicant was under the impression that the object of this exercise was to destroy the printing facility, then in that regard I want to just show you a photograph relating to Khanya House, showing that the printing was kept housed in a separate building away from Khanya House. Chair, again I don't have copies, I'll ...

CHAIRPERSON: Hold it for a while in your hand because I want to ask you something. What is written on the cover of that magazine we have?

MR McINTYRE:

CHAIRPERSON: Oh, thank you. Hold it, apparently Ms Cambanis wants to ask you questions whilst it's still in your hands, I don't know.

MS CAMBANIS: Chairperson, if everyone can please put off their cellphones in my vicinity, please Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Oh, he's sabotaging you again.

MS CAMBANIS: Yes.

Mr McIntyre, you agree that that's a separate building?

MR McINTYRE: Chairperson, according to the photograph, yes, it would appear that there is a main building and then a separate seemingly temporary building adjacent to it. However, Chairperson, if I may ask, it would appear to be on the same premises.

MS CAMBANIS: That is correct, it is. Now Mr McIntyre, also in that publication is a photograph of Khanya House at the time, if you page through it you'll see that it's a four storey building.

MR McINTYRE: Yes.

MS CAMBANIS: Ground and three storeys.

MR McINTYRE: On the front page it would appear to me that there is a photograph indicating this.

ADV BOSMAN: Is there a date on the publication? Could we just have that please.

MS CAMBANIS: Chair, there's an extra copy by client, if I can hand that up to the Committee.

CHAIRPERSON: We would be most grateful, Ms Cambanis.

MR McINTYRE: Chairperson, I don't see a date anywhere.

ADV BOSMAN: You may leave it at that, we can discuss it later.

MS CAMBANIS: Mr McIntyre, only the ground floor was used for offices, those are my instructions. There were sleeping quarters on the first, second and third.

MR McINTYRE: Chairperson, I would not dispute that.

MS CAMBANIS: I've just been indicated that it's actually the second and third floors were sleeping quarters. Did you not know that?

MR McINTYRE: Chairperson, may I just state that I am aware that during the '70s, Rev Makatchwa resided in Khanya House. I don't know whether it was permanent. But in answer to your question, no I'm not aware of the fact that the second and the third floors were utilised as residential spaces or permanent dwellings, I was not aware of that.

MS CAMBANIS: And also, Mr McIntyre, I am instructed that they were clearly bedrooms, anyone who had gone into them would see that they were bedrooms and not offices.

...(end of side B of tape) In the bundle there's reference by certain of the applicants who refer to Khanya House as a residential building. Do you recall seeing that in the bundle? I'm sorry, I can't find the reference now.

MR McINTYRE: No, Chairperson, I do not recall having read something like that.

MS CAMBANIS: Alright, I will find my reference. At page 331 of the bundle, sorry, 313 under paragraph (b), Khanya House, the third line:

MR McINTYRE: What page is that, Chairperson?

MS CAMBANIS: 313, under paragraph (b), the third line, reading:

MR McINTYRE: Chairperson, I cannot explain the presence of the word "residential quarters", I cannot comment on that.

MS CAMBANIS: Well then comment on page - turn to page 316, again under paragraph (b), the second paragraph. What does this mean in the third line:

MR McINTYRE: Provision of accommodation to exiles. Chairperson, once again the presence of the word "residential quarters" indicates that the applicant knew more than I did, because I was not aware of the fact that they were storeys which were used as permanent residential quarters or living quarters.

CHAIRPERSON: For the record, that is du Toit's application.

MS CAMBANIS: Thank you, Chair.

Well Mr McIntyre, I don't think so, because originally your evidence was that Khanya House was used to harbour, in the sense of give accommodation, do you recall?

MR McINTYRE: Activists.

MS CAMBANIS: Yes.

MR McINTYRE: Chairperson, I stated that activists had free access and the information indicated that they also stayed overnight upon occasion, but I was not aware that there were persons who were residing permanently on the premises.

MS CAMBANIS: That is alright, Mr McIntyre, but you did know that people stayed there on occasion.

MR McINTYRE: Yes, that is correct.

MS CAMBANIS: And knowing that, what would your instructions have been regarding loss of life?

MR McINTYRE: Chairperson, as testified previously, I believe that I would have said, "be careful and reconnoitre the place thoroughly, determine whether or not there are people living there, so that we do not injure innocent people." I believe that I would have said that, or at least something to that effect.

MS CAMBANIS: Precisely, because you knew that there was a possibility, you knew that there was a possibility that people may be in the building at the time of the incident.

MR McINTYRE: Chairperson, yes, I was aware of the possibility that people may be in the building.

MS CAMBANIS: Thank you. Mr McIntyre, you'll recall after the incident the press reports, you've referred to The Citizen, you will recall the headlines that came out relating to arms caches found at Khanya House. Do you recall that?

MR McINTYRE: Yes, Chairperson.

MS CAMBANIS: And do you recall that there was concern about two limpet mines that had been found in a cupboard on the premises?

MR McINTYRE: Chairperson, I read about the limpet mines, yes, but I don't know about the concern surrounding it. I know that there was mention in the report of the limpet mines.

MS CAMBANIS: And do you remember that there was allegedly also found handgrenades and AK47 magazines at Khanya House?

MR McINTYRE: Chairperson, yes, that was all part of the report.

MS CAMBANIS: Chairperson, can I just have one minute, I have to find a reference please?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, certainly.

ADV SANDI: Can I just ask a question in the meantime? Mr McIntyre, I understood you to say Stratcom operations were covert operations, please correct me if I misunderstood you.

MR McINTYRE: Chairperson, the Stratcom operations in which I was involved were cover by nature.

ADV SANDI: I further understood you to say that cover operations are essentially illegal operations, is that correct?

MR McINTYRE: Those that I were involved with, yes, Chairperson.

ADV SANDI: And you also said such operations were hundred percent illegal, did I misunderstand you?

MR McINTYRE: Chairperson, no, you are correct, the Stratcom covert operations in which I was involved were practically all of them unlawful, in my opinion.

ADV SANDI: Now as I understand the position before the Committee, you have only applied for amnesty in respect of this particular incident only.

MR McINTYRE: That is correct, Chairperson.

ADV SANDI: Now can I ask you to explain that in the light of the questions I've just asked you concerning the covert operations of Stratcom?

MR McINTYRE: Chairperson, the covert operations in which I was involved, in light of the letter that I mentioned yesterday, the Security Police was tasked with the labour sector and the tertiary sector. In the two years that I spent with Stratcom, my unit and I specialised in projects which were aimed against Cosatu.

In other words, Chairperson, we support UWUSA for example. We supported the National Students forum, which was a student organisation which was established on various campuses. In the two years that I spent with Stratcom, we were completely involved with labour projects and with projects which were aimed against left-wing radical student elements on certain campuses. That is why I have not applied for amnesty for any other covert action, because the projects which were launched, were launched by front organisations.

ADV SANDI: Is it then the position here that this is the only illegal action in which you were involved during the time you were in the Stratcom operation?

MR McINTYRE: Chairperson, if one operated covert operations as one did in my case, there was a very fine line of division between illegal and legal. I wrote letters to the press under a false name and address for example, so that opponents of the government could be criticised. Whether that is illegal or not, I cannot say. It is very difficult to define. If I request funds from the Secret Fund to have T-shirts printed for UWUSA or to arrange a meeting on behalf of UWUSA, would that be illegal? What I'm trying to say is that it is very difficult to draw the line between what was legal and what was illegal, but this incident at Khanya House was the only incident for which I gave an order where damage was brought, or was to be brought to a building. The other actions involved paperwork so to speak.

ADV SANDI: Thank you. Yes, I'm aware that there's a very thin line sometimes between what is legal and what is illegal, please don't understand me to be inviting you to implicate yourself. Thank you.

MR McINTYRE: I understand, Chairperson.

MS CAMBANIS: Mr McIntyre, you'll see at page 20 of the bundle, paragraph 3, you said:

Incidentally, this morning did you change that to say that it was a success? Is it not, Mr McIntyre?

MR McINTYRE: Mr Chairperson, on page 20 I personally - it made me uncomfortable because AK47 magazines were found. The success in the operation was in the fact that the infrastructure of the building was destroyed and that was the main purpose of the operation. But the limpet mines and the AKs did make me a bit uncomfortable at that stage. So maybe I put it a bit strongly if I say I did not regard the attack as successful.

MS CAMBANIS: I understand that today you're explaining that it was successful because the building was damaged, but what does this mean:

MR McINTYRE: Mr Chairperson, I made this statement in 1998 and with hindsight, 10 years after the incident, it was very clear when I made this statement that the inference that I could draw was that these AKs or limpet mines were planted there and I made that inference in 1998.

MS CAMBANIS: Mr McIntyre, at the time of the incident, did you believe that the AKs and the limpet mines were the property of someone residing at Khanya House, is that your evidence?

MR McINTYRE: Mr Chairperson, no, I cannot say that I believed it, but it was a possibility because in my opinion it was a possibility, but in 1998 after all the Commissions and the evidence that was led, I came to the conclusion that I believed that it was planted there, but the morning after the incident I couldn't say if it was planted or not, if it was possible or not.

MS CAMBANIS: No, Mr McIntyre, I put it to you that you knew that in October 1988.

MR McINTYRE: No, I would like to say to you, no, I did not in October 1988 know for a fact that that what was found on that terrain or scene, the weapons and limpet mines, were planted or not. Nobody came to me to tell me about it, I had no information, no knowledge that it was left there or planted, definitely not.

MS CAMBANIS: Today do you accept that it was planted there?

MR McINTYRE: In 1998, I accepted that it was planted there, yes.

MS CAMBANIS: And you've been through the bundle ...(intervention)

MR McINTYRE: Mr Chairperson, I read through it and I cannot recall everything that it is contained in it, but I do have the bundle in front of me.

MS CAMBANIS: You understand that that arms and ammunition was planted, Mr McIntyre?

MR McINTYRE: Yes, I do understand it. Many years after the incident I do understand it and I can see it here.

MS CAMBANIS: And we know from the bundle that no-one's applied for that part of the operation.

MR McINTYRE: I am not aware of it.

MS CAMBANIS: Mr McIntyre, why you knew this in 1988 is because this incident enjoyed a lot of news coverage, it was clear that the two limpet mines had been found after Brother Jude had called the police in to examine a package. Do you recall that?

MR McINTYRE: Mr Chairperson, no, I cannot recall.

MS CAMBANIS: I will just then put it to you, Mr McIntyre, two limpet mines were found at the request of Brother Jude, after investigation by the police. No mention was made of any other weapons and it's only in a subsequent statement that the police revealed that they'd allegedly found grenades and AK47s. And that was in the newspaper, each and every newspaper every day for days and days after that. You don't recall that?

MR McINTYRE: Mr Chairperson, no, I read the article in The Citizen after the incident, I cannot say that I looked at all the newspapers to gather all the information.

MS CAMBANIS: Mr McIntyre, this was your operation, this was your order.

MR McINTYRE: That is correct, yes.

MS CAMBANIS: And you did not follow even the news reports subsequent to the attack.

MR McINTYRE: I testified here that the building was damaged intensively and I left it there. The instruction was, "damage the building".

MS CAMBANIS: Mr McIntyre, is it your evidence that you did not follow any of the press after that incident and you are not aware of these allegations and the contradictions thereafter?

MR McINTYRE: Mr Chairperson, I could have read the articles, but I cannot specifically recall those incidents.

MS CAMBANIS: Mr McIntyre, do you remember what was the attitude of the then Minister of Law and Order, following this attack, publicly?

MR McINTYRE: Mr Chairperson, I can't recollect that he had a specific attitude, no Chairperson.

MS CAMBANIS: That's officially. Unofficially, do you know?

MR McINTYRE: No, Mr Chairperson.

MS CAMBANIS: The Minister of Law and Order at the time was Mr Adrian Vlok, was it not?

MR McINTYRE: Yes, as far as I know.

MS CAMBANIS: To the best of your knowledge did he know who was responsible for this attack?

MR McINTYRE: Mr Chairperson, no, I reported to no-one and definitely not to the Minister.

MS CAMBANIS: Mr McIntyre, if you can explain to us what was touched on by the Committee earlier. You give an order, serious damage is done, national and international repercussions, and you don't follow up.

MR McINTYRE: Mr Chairperson, as I also said, I doubt if there was an information system who would execute covert operations and then report to people what was done. It didn't work like that.

MS CAMBANIS: I know, Sir, but when you gave the instruction you gave it to Mr Hattingh.

MR McINTYRE: Yes.

MS CAMBANIS: And at no time did you feel it necessary to ever discuss the matter at least with Mr Hattingh, who you trusted you said?

MR McINTYRE: Mr Chairperson, I must mention that a day or two after the incident I was transferred to another unit at Headquarters, I then went on leave, and I think I also testified that there was really no opportunity to talk to Mr Hattingh, and I doubt if I would have. I read in the newspaper that the building was damaged, I do not think I would have gone to Mr Hattingh to find out more, I would have been made to have done it.

MS CAMBANIS: Mr McIntyre, you're changing a little bit, you said earlier that it was a few weeks later that you were ... but even if it was one day, is this not a significant event to you?

MR McINTYRE: Can I just come back, I cannot really follow the weeks or the days that you now mentioned.

MS CAMBANIS: I think that you said in your application that you held that position until the 1st of November. This incident happened on the 12th of October, that's a two-week period.

MR McINTYRE: Mr Chairperson, what I can recall, and if my statement is different in this regard, I - well a few days after the incident I was transferred to another unit and I took leave up until January or December of 1989, I then went on a senior training course. So when I went on leave, I think at the end of October, beginning of November, I had nothing more to do with Stratcom.

MS CAMBANIS: Yes. Mr McIntyre, it's actually at page 11, 8.6, where you say that:

MR McINTYRE: That is correct, yes.

MS CAMBANIS: That is why I say you still held that position for at least two weeks before you left with "verlof".

MR McINTYRE: Mr Chairperson, it is possible, I cannot specifically recall when I got the instruction to report to another unit, but I am not going to deny or argue that it was two weeks.

MS CAMBANIS: Okay, Mr McIntyre, let's say it was one day or two days, what would you - let's just even say that your statement is wrong and now you're changing paragraph 8.6, say it was one day, an incident of this magnitude, how is it possible that you did not speak with Mr Hattingh after the event?

MR McINTYRE: Mr Chairperson, I can just repeat what I said, a need-to-know basis. The building was damaged, I read it in the main article of The Citizen the next day, what must I go and ask Mr Hattingh, I do not care who did it or how it was done. There was no purpose to go and do follow-up work, I saw in the media that it was extensively damaged.

MS CAMBANIS: Mr McIntyre, when you refer to the pamphlets and the printing, can you please just tell the Committee to what you are referring. You spoke about banners, what banners were these that were so objectionable?

MR McINTYRE: Mr Chairperson, there were reports, information from sources, not my sources or my unit's sources, that there were various anti-government, or pamphlets were printed to incite the masses, there were anti-governmental propaganda, etcetera. That is what I'm referring to you.

MS CAMBANIS: Yes, that's - but what, just give us one example from Khanya House, one example. What banner, what pamphlet or what other written matter that was so objectionable to make you decide to attack Khanya House, just give us one example.

MR McINTYRE: Mr Chairperson, it was not an attack just because of this press and the printing of banners and pamphlets, Khanya House was attacked as I said earlier on, seen against the broader background of the Catholic Church, seen in that they harboured activists, that activists came and went and the press was one of the reasons, and if I had to in some way get hold of these pamphlets or printed media. I cannot recall what specific organisations or whatever.

MS CAMBANIS: I understand what you say, Mr McIntyre, but not even one example can you give the Committee.

MR McINTYRE: Mr Chairperson, I do not have an example, but the information reports, the documentation concerning the literature, there was a lot of it at the Head Office of Security.

MS CAMBANIS: That came from Khanya House?

MR McINTYRE: That was submitted by informers together with source reports concerning activities in Khanya House. I'm not saying that the officials of Khanya House printed it, but activists who had access to Khanya House printed it there or copied it there.

MS CAMBANIS: And yet it was never found during the visits by the Security Police.

MR McINTYRE: Mr Chairperson, I mentioned earlier on that the Security Police visited so often, or went to Khanya House so often, if there were banners and pamphlets, with all respect towards the officials of the church, I do not think if they would have shown it to the Security Police. The Catholic Church said that they were against the actions of the State and the Security Police, why would they display these pamphlets and banners?

MR McINTYRE: Mr McIntyre, can we agree that prior to you making a decision, you had no information that arms and ammunitions were being kept at Khanya House?

MR McINTYRE: That is correct, yes.

MS CAMBANIS: Can we agree that you had no information that members of Umkhonto weSizwe or what you referred to yesterday as terrorists, were staying there?

MR McINTYRE: That is correct. I would just like to say that yesterday I mentioned, I talked about activists and terrorists and there's a big difference, I did not have concrete information that yes, there were members of Umkhonto weSizwe at the house.

MS CAMBANIS: And then finally, Mr McIntyre, I just really want to understand in your original application, page 13 9A(4). I know that you have given this evidence, but can you explain to the Committee how it is possible to go from suggested, discussed, hinted, to your evidence yesterday to this Committee that it now becomes an authorised order?

MR McINTYRE: Mr Chairperson, during a visit of the Investigative team of the TRC, they visited me, I think I assisted them in certain matters and I received this form from a member of the Investigative team and I filled in this form in Umtata, as best I could, and when I decided to contact a lawyer concerning this application, I took the telephone directory of the Eastern Cape and I found I C Clark Attorneys, I then went to go and discuss this application with this attorney and also my later application.

And I want to say that where I said yesterday that my legal representative, I was very naive when I completed this, it is not correct, the suggested, discussed, hinted, proposed. At that stage - until I read this bundle, I was not sure who I gave the instruction to and who I discussed it with and after I read the documents at the end of the year, it was very clear that I spoke to Mr Hattingh. This application was, as far as I can say, was done by myself alone in Umtata, it was not an attempt to cover anything up or to hide anything.

MS CAMBANIS: Mr McIntyre, you had been a police at the time of filling this out, for how many years, 30 years?

MR McINTYRE: 30 years.

MS CAMBANIS: And you know that the Police Force functions via orders and lines of command.

MR McINTYRE: Yes.

MS CAMBANIS: You were the Head of Stratcom.

MR McINTYRE: That is correct.

MS CAMBANIS: Now you say you gave an order, but when you filled this form out you couldn't formulate, "I gave the order but I do not remember to whom". That you couldn't do. Is that correct, Mr McIntyre?

MR McINTYRE: Mr Chairperson, no, with all respect, I do not believe that you or the Honourable Committee must read into this paragraph that I don't want to specify that I gave an instruction, this incident happened 12 years ago and truly I completed this form the best I could and there's no reason why I now suddenly would say I gave an instruction.

MS CAMBANIS: Mr McIntyre, I put to you that if you had have given the order, you would have said so in paragraph 4, you would not have to use words like "hinted".

MR McINTYRE: Mr Chairperson, I did give the instruction and I apologise for the faulty wording in paragraph 4, page 13, I apologise for the faulty wording, I did give the instructions.

MS CAMBANIS: Chairperson, I have no further questions, but while the other questions are being taken, may I be excused just to confer with my clients in case there's anything further?

CHAIRPERSON: Whilst Ms Patel is asking questions?

MS CAMBANIS: If it's not too rude, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: No, no, it wouldn't.

MS CAMBANIS: Thank you. Sorry, Chair, with the understanding that if there's something further they wish me to put, I will be allowed to do so.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, certainly.

MS CAMBANIS: Yes, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Patel?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS PATEL: Thank you, Honourable Chairperson.

Mr McIntyre - sorry, Mr McIntyre are you ready to proceed?

MR McINTYRE: Certainly.

MS PATEL: There's just one thing that I want to understand that I'm not really clear on. You say that your instructions to Mr Hattingh was that everything possible should be done in order to ensure that innocent persons are not injured or killed, did I understand that correctly?

MR McINTYRE: Chairperson, I cannot recall the precise wording of the instruction that I issued, but I believe that I would have said it, yes.

MS PATEL: But that would have been the gist of what you would have said.

MR McINTYRE: The gist, yes.

MS PATEL: Alright. You've applied for attempted murder as well, would you have at that stage, considered the victims who are present here today, to be legitimate targets, in terms of your order at the time?

MR McINTYRE: No, definitely not.

MS PATEL: Thank you, Honourable Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Advocate Bosman?

ADV BOSMAN: This is not really a question, I just want to put it on the record that the date of the publication to which you referred, was January 1989, so it was virtually almost immediately after the incident took place that this publication was issued, and would you accept it as such?

MR McINTYRE: Yes.

ADV BOSMAN: Thank you, Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Advocate Bosman. Advocate Sandi?

ADV SANDI: Just one question.

Mr McIntyre, I understood you to say that this was the first and the last order you had given for an operation of a similar nature, did I misunderstand you on that?

MR McINTYRE: Yes, that is correct.

ADV SANDI: Now the problem I have is, how does it happen then that there are so many issues and details which you cannot remember, pertaining to this incident? You could not even remember, for example, who you had given the order to. On would understand it if someone was involved in a number of similar operations, you know to make an example here of Mr de Kock, who's been involved in quite a number of operations which in many cases are very similar. One can understand it when such a person cannot remember the details pertaining to each and every particular incident, but I think I would have a difficulty where you're dealing with a person who was only involved in one incident, the first and the last of its kind. I don't know what you want to say on that.

MR McINTYRE: Chairperson, that it was the first and the last order of this nature that I issued is definitely so. I agree with you when I completed my amnesty application it also bothered me, the fact that I could not recall specifically to whom I issued the order. Consequently I made enquiries with Maj Kendal, Capt Boily, Inspector Savage Reid, former colleagues of mine at the unit and I said to them, "Please can you recall to whom I gave the order or with whom I discussed the Khanya House incident?" With the exception of these three former colleagues, I also contacted other colleagues in an attempt to determine precisely to whom I issued the order. I agree with you, it might sound strange, but I tell you that it is the truth, there is no reason why I should try to obfuscate the truth or try to misrepresent the truth.

CHAIRPERSON: How would they have known to who you gave the order, because you had no interest in even finding out whether it was a success or not?

MR McINTYRE: Yes, that is correct, but we were a handful who served on this Stratcom unit and in an attempt to determine to whom I'd actually issued the order, I consulted them, I made telephonic enquiries in order to determine whether or not I may have mentioned something to them, because I saw that there was a vagueness here because I could not recall to whom I had issued the order and that created a space, an open space in my application.

CHAIRPERSON: I'm sorry, Advocate Sandi, to just interrupt.

ADV SANDI: That was all, Mr Chairman, I had to ask. "Ndiyabulela Mnumzana uMcIntyre".

MR McINTYRE: Thank you, Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: It would appear both of you come from the Eastern Cape.

MR McINTYRE: "Qola ke Mhlekazi".

MS CAMBANIS: Chairperson, I'm sorry to say there is one question that I would like to ask, one last question.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, please go ahead.

FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS CAMBANIS: Mr McIntyre, I've been instructed to ask you, you said that you were monitoring the labour movement at the time, would you have knowledge of the Catholic Church's Labour Committee, did you know about it?

MR McINTYRE: Chairperson, my unit and I didn't really monitor the labour market, but we instituted counter-actions. One of the covert operations was, for example, to establish other labour organisations as counter-organisations to COSATU and NACTO. So I cannot really say that I was aware of the Labour Committee of the Catholic Church as such.

MS CAMBANIS: Were you aware that such committees would have had conferences at Khanya House?

MR McINTYRE: Chairperson, there were many conferences in Khanya House, I cannot say that I was specifically aware of those conferences.

MS CAMBANIS: Yes, there were many conferences, they were generally two or three-day conferences, is that correct?

MR McINTYRE: Chairperson, there were many conferences according to informer reports, but I cannot say specifically what the duration of these conferences would have been, I really cannot recall that.

MS CAMBANIS: I put to you that they were on occasion, two days, and that the people attending the conferences from all over the country, would have slept at Khanya House, because that's what it was, a conference centre as well. Is that what your informers told you?

MR McINTYRE: I cannot recall whether informers told me this specifically, but I will accept that there were lengthy conferences on the premises and that persons slept on the premises. I do not have a problem with that statement.

MS CAMBANIS: Thank you very much, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Ms Cambanis. Mr Joubert, any re-examination?

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR JOUBERT: Thank you, Honourable Chair, just one or two singular aspects.

Mr McIntyre, you were referred to this letter by my learned colleague, Mr Wagener, it is a letter from the Bishops Council, which is Exhibit C as it has been marked in these proceedings, if I may just refer you to that and if you can have a look at paragraph 2, approximately in the middle of that paragraph you were cross-examined regarding certain aspects, but in the middle of the paragraph there is a sentence beginning with "we":

That section, how do you interpret that?

MR McINTYRE: If the Catholic Church referred to continuing the work that they had been doing, it would mean that in other words, the detainees opposition, whether it was verbal or covert by nature, would continue, the opposition politics would continue. In broad terms that is my interpretation of it.

MR JOUBERT: And then you were further cross-examined regarding the distinction between violent and non-violent action against the government of the day.

MR McINTYRE: That is correct.

MR JOUBERT: And the point was made that the Catholic Church or the Bishops Conference then, were supporters or could be regarded as supporters who did not act violently, they acted non-violently.

MR McINTYRE: That is correct.

MR JOUBERT: How did you experience this Khanya House, even though you conceded that they did not participate in violent actions, how did you experience them, were they opposed to violent actions or did they support persons who were actually guilty of violent actions?

MR McINTYRE: The informer reports indicated that the Catholic Bishops Council, their support, whether it was by means of front organisations or not, their support was for the benefit of the ANC and the ANC was waging an armed struggle. I don't believe that I need to elaborate regarding that. So the support which was given to the front organisation or the umbrella organisation was given in order to promote the objectives of the ANC.

MR JOUBERT: Furthermore, you were cross-examined regarding the applicants who had referred to the necessity to shoot certain people if the situation justified it, you were not involved in any such orders, is that correct?

MR McINTYRE: That is correct.

MR JOUBERT: And am I correct in saying that the execution of the initial order was left to the operative on ground level, to his discretion, in executing the order, is that correct?

MR McINTYRE: That is correct.

MR JOUBERT: I have no further questions, thank you, Honourable Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Joubert. Thank you, Mr McIntyre, you are excused.

MR McINTYRE: Thank you, Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Joubert, are you leading any further evidence in respect of Mr McIntyre?

MR JOUBERT: Mr Chair, at this stage no, we are still attempting to get the documentation from the Deputy Commissioner, that we have referred to in our application. We contacted him once again. I would like to attempt to get that documentation still, we are still endeavouring to do that. If that comes to hand I will obviously then provide that to the Committee, but at this stage I have no further evidence to present.

CHAIRPERSON: If it comes to hand, would Mr McIntyre be available, because questions might be asked around that document?

MR JOUBERT: Yes, Mr Chair, Mr McIntyre will be available for the rest of this hearing, he will stay available.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR VAN DER MERWE: Thank you, Mr Chair, I think the next witness will then be Mr Hattingh.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR VAN DER MERWE: He will give his evidence in Afrikaans.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------ADV BOSMAN: Mr Hattingh, your full names for the record please.

MR P J HATTINGH: Paul Jacobus Hattingh.

ADV BOSMAN: Do you prefer to the oath or do you prefer to take the affirmation?

PAUL JACOBUS HATTINGH: (sworn states)

ADV BOSMAN: The applicant is duly sworn, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Advocate Bosman. Mr van der Merwe?

EXAMINATION BY MR VAN DER MERWE: Thank you.

Mr Hattingh, your application in this bundle is indicated as appearing from page 400 to 402, which embodies your initial application.

MR P J HATTINGH: That is correct.

MR VAN DER MERWE: In that application you did not provide ...(end of side A of tape) ... already applied for the other three incidents and this is the final incident for which you have applied for amnesty, is that correct?

MR P J HATTINGH: Yes, that is correct.

MR VAN DER MERWE: We have submitted to this Committee, Exhibit B, a complete application from you for your involvement in this incident.

MR P J HATTINGH: That is correct.

MR VAN DER MERWE: You have it before you and it goes from page 1 to page 7, is that correct?

MR P J HATTINGH: Yes, that is correct.

MR VAN DER MERWE: You confirm the correctness and the truth of the content thereof?

MR P J HATTINGH: That is correct.

MR VAN DER MERWE: With the exception of the errors pertaining to the date on page 5, which in all cases would be 1988 and not 1998.

MR P J HATTINGH: That is correct.

MR VAN DER MERWE: Mr Hattingh, you compiled this application without having the opportunity to consult with colleagues or other involved parties in this amnesty application, you did not have the opportunity to confer with any of them.

MR P J HATTINGH: That is correct.

MR VAN DER MERWE: And you will have to rely on your recollection in as far as your evidence and application are concerned.

MR P J HATTINGH: That is correct.

MR VAN DER MERWE: During this incident you were the Commander of the Demolitions and Bomb Disposal Unit in Pretoria.

MR P J HATTINGH: That is correct.

MR VAN DER MERWE: Will you then proceed and very briefly read paragraph 3 on page 5, into the record.

MR P J HATTINGH:

I could just mention that this meeting at Head Office took place at Head Office, practically every morning, where I would have to report regarding the activities of my unit. The persons attending the meetings would differ from day to day, to I cannot recall precisely who was present during this meeting, there were too many of them over the years.

MR VAN DER MERWE: You then also confirm the fact that you received an order in this matter from Brig McIntyre, who was your unit Commander at that stage.

MR P J HATTINGH: That is correct.

MR VAN DER MERWE: You also confirm that at the time of this order from Brig McIntyre, you were already involved in the Cosatu and Khotso House incidents, is that correct?

MR P J HATTINGH: Yes, that is correct.

MR VAN DER MERWE: The information which was conveyed to you by Brig McIntyre, would you also have conveyed it as such to the two members under your command, namely Kotze and Hammond, when you issued the order to them?

MR P J HATTINGH: That is correct, Chairperson. In fact, I must mention that we were a specialised unit, the Demolitions and Bomb Disposal Unit, we didn't participate in the collection of information or the predetermination of targets, this was conducted by other units at Head Office, we dealt exclusively with ground level activities. So we simply executed orders.

MR VAN DER MERWE: Would I then be correct in saying that what was significant to you regarding an order of this nature, was simply that it was an authorised operation from a senior member of the Security Branch or Head Office?

MR P J HATTINGH: That is correct. We never questioned orders which were issued from this level, because it was part of our duty to perform covert operations.

MR VAN DER MERWE: Therefore you would not be in a position to verify information or to question information with regard to the decision to damage Khanya House.

MR P J HATTINGH: No, Chairperson, as I have already stated, we never questioned orders of this nature because we believed it was for the sake of national interest, in that it was already cleared and that we simply had to execute the order.

MR VAN DER MERWE: If we could just pause there for a moment. You heard that my learned colleague who appears for the victims, made mention of the nature of the Catholic Church's involvement, which was passive, from your perspective of the past and the struggle which reigned at that point, there were two sides, those who were for apartheid and those who were against it, is that correct?

MR P J HATTINGH: That is correct.

MR VAN DER MERWE: And someone who did not support apartheid would then be viewed as an opponent to apartheid.

MR P J HATTINGH: That is correct.

MR VAN DER MERWE: And such persons, whether they be passive or active, were still regarded as persons who were involved in bringing about the fall of the State.

MR P J HATTINGH: That is correct.

MR VAN DER MERWE: During this period, or let me say, after you gave the order to Kotze and Hammond, were you at any stage involved in any discussion with members from the Mechanical Unit, which fell under the command of WAL du Toit?

MR P J HATTINGH: Chairperson, we had an internal liaison system which functioned on a need-to-know principal and if Technical members would be involved in any way, I would communicate this via their Commander, who was at that stage WAL du Toit, and this would also have been communicated by Eugene de Kock's Commander, because they didn't fall directly under my command, although all of us were part of the same picture, so to speak.

MR VAN DER MERWE: You are not necessarily one hundred percent aware of the reason why Brig McIntyre gave you the order.

MR P J HATTINGH: I think, Chairperson, that Brig McIntyre knows me well, he knew what I was doing and in which unit I was involved and by nature of his work at Stratcom, he was aware of the set-up. Perhaps he doesn't remember all that well anymore, but I'm sure it would refresh his memory if I were to say that I'm sure he could recall that we were involved in other matters as well and that would have been the channel that he would have had to follow in order to consult this unit due the nature of our activities.

MR VAN DER MERWE: And then by nature of the situation, when it was about damaging a building, it was necessary to employ persons who were knowledgeable on that level and to use them in such an operation.

MR P J HATTINGH: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VAN DER MERWE: And this regard, you would confirm that members of your unit who were members of the Demolitions and Bomb Disposal Unit, as well as those members of the Mechanical Unit, had knowledge on this level and were then suitable persons or candidates for this sort of operation.

MR P J HATTINGH: That is correct, Chairperson. We worked quite closely with the members of these units.

MR VAN DER MERWE: And the fact that Col de Kock was then also involved, did you have any idea why he also would be involved and what his specific role would be, what was expected of him?

MR P J HATTINGH: Chairperson, we used him and his staff with Khotso House and other incidents which preceded this particular incident. We had employed them with great success, if I might put it that way. He and his staff possessed extraordinary capacities and such an operation could not be executed by two members of my unit only, it wasn't possible.

MR VAN DER MERWE: The instructions that you then conveyed to the rest of the staff below you, would this also have included, that they had to operate the operation from that point onwards, that they had to manage and plan it and bring it to execution?

MR P J HATTINGH: That is correct. The staff that served below me, all of us had the same level of expertise, whether I went or whether they went was immaterial, we all followed the same working method and I had complete confidence in their ability to execute and plan the operation along with Mr de Kock and the other staff members of the other units.

MR VAN DER MERWE: Subsequent to the incident, this is perhaps something which some people still don't understand at this point, could you just explain to the Committee what one's reaction would be subsequent to such an operation, would one attempt to make contact with those who were involved in the operation, would one avoid them, what would one do?

MR P J HATTINGH: No, Chairperson, particularly in a place like Pretoria, where there were many units of many policemen, where everybody knew one another, something like this was strictly need-to-know and even one's own staff would not all be informed regarding what was going to happen or what had happened, who would be involved or who had been involved.

MR VAN DER MERWE: Such an operation was by nature illegal and if it were to be exposed, you would be open to prosecution.

MR P J HATTINGH: That is correct.

MR VAN DER MERWE: As far as you are concerned, do you have any knowledge that the information which was conveyed to you indicated that there were people living in the building, or who were staying over in the building?

MR P J HATTINGH: No, we worked only with the information that was conveyed to us by those who knew more about the set-up than we did, those who had more security information about the premises. We had to depend on what they told us and we had work from the basis that there would not be any unnecessary endangerment of innocent life or damage to unrelated property, and people would have to inform themselves by means of observation or reconnaissance, that the activities would be restricted to the particulars of the order itself.

MR VAN DER MERWE: When you make use of certain language in your statement, in the third paragraph you say that there was literature which was being published in promotion of the revolutionary struggle, is this information which was conveyed to you secondhand or third-hand?

MR P J HATTINGH: Yes, we didn't work with this sort of information ourselves.

MR VAN DER MERWE: So you didn't know what precisely the documentation would entail or what the nature of such documentation would be?

MR P J HATTINGH: No, Chairperson.

MR VAN DER MERWE: And the same would apply for the fact that there were facilities in the building which were made available to accommodate members of the revolutionary struggle, you didn't know whether these persons were members of MK, whether they were mere activists or what particularly their roles were?

MR P J HATTINGH: No, we didn't have any further particulars, with the exception of what I have stated.

MR VAN DER MERWE: Thank you, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr van der Merwe. Mr Hattingh, any questions?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ADV HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr Hattingh, concerning Vlakplaas' role, Mr de Kock and his men, is it so that in an operation of this nature it would necessarily mean that there would be some security for the people who would penetrate the building?

MR P J HATTINGH: That is correct, yes.

ADV HATTINGH: And do you know if this was one of the functions that Mr de Kock and his men fulfilled?

MR P J HATTINGH: That is correct.

ADV HATTINGH: You also said that if your involvement was disclosed concerning the operation, it would have led to certain charges against you and also a lot of embarrassment for the Police and the Security Police.

MR P J HATTINGH: That is correct.

ADV HATTINGH: And through that then also for the government of the day.

MR P J HATTINGH: That's correct.

ADV HATTINGH: It would have led to a very huge political embarrassment.

MR P J HATTINGH: That's correct, Chairperson.

ADV HATTINGH: It could have led to the fall of the government then.

MR P J HATTINGH: That is correct.

ADV HATTINGH: Are you aware of the nature of the police investigation that followed on this incident?

MR P J HATTINGH: No, Mr Chairperson, we did not have anything to do with that.

ADV HATTINGH: But did anybody from your unit, or one of your members, were they approached to maybe find out if they had any information about this incident?

MR P J HATTINGH: You know I think Lieut Hammond and Col de Kock were at the scene the next morning after the incident.

ADV HATTINGH: But you yourself were not there?

MR P J HATTINGH: No. I'm sorry, it wasn't de Kock, it was Kotze.

ADV HATTINGH: You were not approached by an investigative officer who had to deal with the investigation with the idea of getting information from you?

MR P J HATTINGH: No, Mr Chairperson.

ADV HATTINGH: Do you know who was appointed as the investigative officer for this incident?

MR P J HATTINGH: No, I cannot recall it, I do not know, I wasn't part of it.

ADV HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairperson, I've got no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Hattingh.

MR NEL: I've got no questions, Mr Chairperson, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Wagener.

MR WAGENER: Chairman, I've got no questions, thank you.

MR JANSEN: Thank you, Chair. Jansen on record, no questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR JOUBERT: Mr Hattingh, in your statement you mention on page 5, paragraph 2, to a meeting that you attended with Brig McIntyre, was this a formal meeting or more just an opportunity where you could meet with people or with him and other people? Was it a formal meeting where minutes of the meeting were taken?

MR P J HATTINGH: It was an informal meeting as far as I can recall.

MR JOUBERT: And you cannot recall if there was anybody else present and who they were?

MR P J HATTINGH: No.

MR JOUBERT: Then in the next paragraph of the same document, where you refer to, it's the last sentence of that paragraph, the instructions of Brig McIntyre, you then mention that he's the Coordinator of Stratcom. If he says that's he's actually the unit Commander of Stratcom, will you then agree with that?

MR P J HATTINGH: Yes, I will, it was a mistake on my side.

MR JOUBERT: Then just the last paragraph where you refer to the report or the report-back that you did, Mr McIntyre will say that nobody ever reported back to him, can you deny that?

MR P J HATTINGH: No, I cannot. I cannot recall who was present at that meeting, as I said it's a very regular thing to discuss certain things with Head Office on a daily basis and I cannot recall what happened 12 years ago at that meeting, it's impossible.

MR JOUBERT: Thank you, Chairperson, no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Joubert. Mr Lamey?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: Mr Hattingh, you yourself were involved in the Khotso House incident a few months before this incident and you will know it was sanctioned on the highest level. You probably accepted that when the instruction was given concerning Khanya House and a building which in the case of the Khotso House, belonged to a church institution and who also supported the liberation movement, more specifically the ANC, that the action against this building, for example the printing press, had to be sanctioned from the highest level.

MR P J HATTINGH: That is correct, yes.

MR LAMEY: Thank you, I've got no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Lamey. Mr du Plessis?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr Hattingh, can you just explain to the Committee, this unit to which you belonged, this was the Bomb Disposal Unit at Security Head Office in Pretoria, where were the offices of this unit?

MR P J HATTINGH: Mr Chairperson, can I just say suddenly I can't remember the name of the building, but Security Head Office was decentralised. As it happened with many departments in Pretoria, we couldn't all fit into one building so there were various other units in different buildings and I cannot recall what the building's name was.

MR DU PLESSIS: It's not really important that you do identify the building, but can I just ask the following question, there was also a bomb disposal unit that was part of the Security Branch in Northern Transvaal, is that correct?

MR P J HATTINGH: That is correct, Mr Chairperson, we were the Head Office component, a part of our work was training and to fight the onslaught on a national level we had to train the people who were placed all over the country, so we had to - so all the smaller centres and the bigger centres also had their bomb disposal units.

MR DU PLESSIS: And your unit and that unit from the Norther Transvaal were two different units, is that correct?

MR P J HATTINGH: Yes, the one was part of the Pretoria Bomb Disposal Unit and we were with Headquarters, Pretoria.

MR DU PLESSIS: And if there was an action launched on, let's say for example, in Pretoria, who would have gone out to do the investigation or the work concerning this specific bomb in the Pretoria area? Would it have been the branch or you?

MR P J HATTINGH: It would have been the branch and sometimes we were requested to assist them at scenes where it was a bit difficult or where they needed assistance, but in this case I believe that because it was in Pretoria and because it was very close to where we were, we went to go and look as well, but it was actually the Security Branch Pretoria who had to do the investigation.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Hattingh, you gave a direct order to Hammond and Kotze to act in this matter.

MR P J HATTINGH: Yes, that is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And they had to follow your instructions.

MR P J HATTINGH: Yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: And you accepted that the instruction that you received from Brig McIntyre was justified under the circumstances and it was not your place to ask questions about the justification of it.

MR P J HATTINGH: Yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: And similarly for Kotze and Hammond who were also not in a position to really question this instruction.

MR P J HATTINGH: No, they wouldn't have.

MR DU PLESSIS: The purpose of your unit for example, had nothing to do with the collection of information concerning the activities of activists, so one could actually just say that you were more-or-less a technical department dealing only with bomb disposal, etcetera?

MR P J HATTINGH: That is correct, yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: Can you please look at the document that I'm going to show to you now. Mr Chairman, I beg leave to hand this document in as the next exhibit, I think that would be Exhibit D.

CHAIRPERSON: That's correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: May I beg leave to hand the document to you.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, certainly.

MR DU PLESSIS: Would you look at that document, it is a crypto report, it's got a stamp on from the 3rd of October 1988, can you see that?

MR P J HATTINGH: Yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: And can you look at the first page on the right-hand side your name appears, "P J Hattingh", is that your signature?

MR P J HATTINGH: Yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: You will see the dates at point 2 and 4 is the 12th of October 1988, that is the date of the fire at Khanya House, and then point 10 there is "weapons found at Khanya House", can you see that?

MR P J HATTINGH: Yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: And then if you look at A1, it says that:

Before we continue with the contents of this document, can we accept that at that stage when you were the Commander, that you saw this document?

MR P J HATTINGH: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS:

Can you see that?

MR P J HATTINGH: I see it.

MR DU PLESSIS: Do you have any reason to deny the correctness of that?

MR P J HATTINGH: No.

MR DU PLESSIS:

and then they refer to a dossier that was opened, and this is signed by Col M D Ras, this is the Colonel or the then Colonel who then later became a General, Martiens Ras, the father of Martiens Ras who also applied for amnesty in this case, is that correct?

MR P J HATTINGH: Yes, I do know them both.

MR DU PLESSIS: And he was involved in the Security Branch Northern Transvaal?

MR P J HATTINGH: Yes, he was in command there.

MR DU PLESSIS: So would it be correct that this report came from the Security Branch Northern Transvaal?

MR P J HATTINGH: Yes. The sender is Detective Strydom. I also know him, he was attached to the Security Branch in Pretoria.

MR DU PLESSIS: Security Branch Northern Transvaal?

MR P J HATTINGH: Yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: Can we then accept that this report was sent from their office to your office?

MR P J HATTINGH: Yes, that is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr du Plessis.

MR CORNELIUS: Cornelius for the record, I've go no questions for Mr Hattingh. Thank you, Mr Chairman.

MS CAMBANIS: Please Chair, can we have lunch now?

CHAIRPERSON: We will adjourn for lunch, we'll come back after 45 minutes.

PAUL JACOBUS HATTINGH: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: Good afternoon. May we begin with the afternoon session of this hearing. Ms Cambanis, I hope you have regained your strength.

MS CAMBANIS: I have, thank you, Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, you may proceed.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS CAMBANIS: Thank you.

Mr Hattingh, Mr McIntyre's evidence was to the effect that it was clear to him that the limpet mines and arms had been planted, do you agree with that?

MR J P HATTINGH: Yes, Mr Chairman.

MS CAMBANIS: Do you know who planted the limpet mines?

MR J P HATTINGH: No, no, I don't Mr Chairman.

MS CAMBANIS: Do you know where they would have come from, to be planted?

MR J P HATTINGH: Not from my section, but I don't know from whom.

MS CAMBANIS: From where else could they possibly have been obtained? Could it be any of the Security units attached to the Security Police?

MR J P HATTINGH: No, no, Mr Chairman, Vlakplaas, - the only people that are allowed to handle explosives are the people that are trained in explosives. So in the case of Vlakplaas, the people, not all of them but many of them are trained or had been trained in explosives at that time. So it could be from there as well.

MS CAMBANIS: Yes, thanks Mr Hattingh, but from the sections that were involved in this operation, amongst them, if it wasn't from your division, then could it only have been from Vlakplaas?

MR J P HATTINGH: Most likely, Mr Chairman. I don't know, but I think so.

MS CAMBANIS: Thank you, Chair, I have nothing further.

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Patel?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS PATEL: Thank you, Honourable Chairperson. Perhaps just one aspect.

When you gave the instructions or conferred with, is it Mr Kotze and Mr Hammond, to proceed with the operation, did you give instructions for a proper reconnoitring operation to be undertaken prior to the undertaking of the operation itself? Or would you have left that over to their discretion? Was there a discussion about the reconnoitring that had to be done?

MR J P HATTINGH: Well Mr Chairman, they did the planning in conjunction with Mr de Kock and the Technical Division and of course they gave me feedback as things went along, but the planning and whatever they did before the time and the actual deed, we had communication but that was up to them to do the whole planning.

MS PATEL: Alright. From the feedback that you would have got up until the point of the operation actually being carried out, can you give us an indication of what kind of feedback you got.

MR J P HATTINGH: The only thing I can recall is that they said that they needed to sort of make sure what was happening in the place, by means of sort of a recce as we call it, which they did to make sure that, as I said earlier in evidence, that there were no people involved unnecessarily and to establish what the outlay of the building was.

MS PATEL: Okay. And can you recall for what period the place was recce'd as you've stated?

MR J P HATTINGH: No, that I can't recall Mr Chairman, I don't know how long they took for that side of it.

MS PATEL: Alright. Thank you, Honourable Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Ms Patel. Advocate Bosman?

ADV BOSMAN: Thank you, Chairperson.

Just two questions, Mr Hattingh. I do not know if you've already answered this question, please correct me if you have, but can you recall how Mr McIntyre formulated the instructions when he gave it to you?

MR J P HATTINGH: Mr Chairperson, as far as I can recall he just gave me a short background of the specific target, if I can call it such, and that the building had to be damaged in order for it to be put out of action. He also talked about, as far as I can recall, that it had to be damaged by means of a fire.

ADV BOSMAN: And then at that stage when you received the instructions there were already incidents round Khotso House, Cosatu House, is that correct?

MR J P HATTINGH: Yes, that had already happened at that stage.

ADV BOSMAN: Was it your impression that Mr McIntyre was aware of this?

MR J P HATTINGH: No, we never spoke about Khotso House or the others.

ADV BOSMAN: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Advocate Bosman. Advocate Sandi?

ADV SANDI: I don't have a question, thank you Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Hattingh, in the reports you received about the planning stage, were you advised whether the building was occupied or not?

MR J P HATTINGH: Mr Chairman, I can't remember all the exact details, the only thing I can remember is that they tried to ascertain by means of their recces that they did, to establish whether the building was in fact empty. That's all I can remember, I can't remember anything further than that.

CHAIRPERSON: Did they report that it was indeed empty?

MR J P HATTINGH: Repeat please, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Did they report that the building was in fact empty, not occupied by people in the evening, that is people who would be put up overnight?

MR J P HATTINGH: I can only conclude from what they did that they decided on that particular day that as far as they were concerned, there were no people in the building. They never told me that, I can only conclude from what they did.

CHAIRPERSON: If I understood Ms Cambanis well whist asking Mr McIntyre questions, she said the people who were rescued by the fire people, had come to attend a conference, you recall that kind of evidence? Or the questioning along those lines?

MR J P HATTINGH: I can remember that, but I didn't know about this conference, Sir, no Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: I'll tell you why I'm asking this is because if there were printing done in the printing house which according to the document we saw, was adjacent or next to the main building, then wouldn't you say the intelligence, Security Intelligence should have been aware of a meeting or conference that had to take place?

MR J P HATTINGH: Mr Chairman, I can't comment on that, I don't know because of the fact that I didn't take part in the actual planning itself.

CHAIRPERSON: Nor was this mentioned to you during the report-backs of the planning stage?

MR J P HATTINGH: I only heard this the next day, Sir, that apparently there were people in the building that they didn't know about. So I didn't know beforehand, no.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Hattingh. Any re-examination, Mr van der Merwe?

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR VAN DER MERWE: Just one aspect, with your permission, Mr Chair. I'm reading from this After the Fire Attack on Khanya House, page 5 of this little book. There's a quote there, it starts on the bottom of page 4, which says: - and I just want to put it through the witness to you:

And then the important part:

So I'd just like to focus the Committee's attention on that, it seems therefore that the impression of the arsonists were that there ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Pass it through Mr Hattingh, because he would be testifying.

MR VAN DER MERWE: I will leave it at that. Thank you, Mr Chair, no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MS PATEL: Mr Chairman, if I may just for proper housekeeping, several parties have been referring to that booklet, but it hasn't been given an exhibit number.

CHAIRPERSON: Could we say it's E.

MS PATEL: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: And would you today probably try to have copied it because my Committee Members don't have it.

MS PATEL: I will certainly, thank you Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And I'm guarding mine jealously.

MS PATEL: Your attitude is noted, Honourable Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: We shall mark it E. Thank you, Mr Hattingh, you are excused.

CHAIRPERSON: Anything further, Mr van der Merwe?

MR VAN DER MERWE: No further evidence on behalf of this applicant, thank you Mr Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr du Plessis, it would appear to me that it would only be logical if we hear either Messrs Kotze or Hammond, because that's the line of command.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes. Mr Chairman, we have had a discussion before the commencement of these proceedings and the general consensus amongst us, unless you give other directions, obviously, ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I don't want to disturb the applecart.

MR DU PLESSIS: Ja. The general consensus was that we would hear the evidence of Col de Kock, as he was in a command function of the Vlakplaas contingent and that we would carry on from that point of view. And for that reason, Mr Kotze who is the first witness I would have wanted to lead, requested me if he, because of work circumstances, could not be here today and I said to him well, I don't think we're going to reach his evidence today, so he's unfortunately not here. If you would, unless obviously ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: No, no, I wouldn't insist, I wouldn't disturb the arrangements.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes. That was the agreement amongst everybody, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Hattingh, counsel? I just want our records to be clear.

MR HATTINGH: It is correct that we have amongst ourselves, subject to your approval, agreed that Mr de Kock will be the next applicant to testify, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: That is in order with me.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: (sworn states)

ADV BOSMAN: The applicant is properly sworn, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much. You may be seated, Mr de Kock. Mr Hattingh?

EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr de Kock, you are also an applicant in this matter and your application appears from page 1 of the bundle, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: Just before I lead you concerning this incident itself, can you just look at this application and when you deal with the incident itself you deal with it on page 7. You deal with this whole incident on one page, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: Am I also correct that it was a very cryptical and short version of what your involvement was in this matter?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, yes.

MR HATTINGH: At other matters you've testified about this, that you have a very large application for amnesty where you deal with literally hundreds of incidents, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And when you submitted your application you were in prison.

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And was Mr Hugo there as your legal representative? Did he have free access to you at all hours of the day?

MR DE KOCK: No, Mr Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And in that time while you were busy submitting your, or compiling your application, were you involved in other investigations?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: What other parties did you assist?

MR DE KOCK: It was the Attorney-General, it was also a section of National Intelligence Service.

MR HATTINGH: Did these people also make use of your time?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, a lot.

MR HATTINGH: The time that Mr Hugo wanted to spend with you for the purposes of your application?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And are you aware that in February last year there was a meeting between legal representatives of applicants and representatives of victims families, under the Chairmanship of Judge Wilson? Were you informed about this meeting?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And during that meeting your legal representatives were told that because of the time restraints that came from government level, these proceedings were supposed to have finished by August last year.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, yes.

MR HATTINGH: And because of that reason the parties were informed that they will not be allowed to give very long evidence and if they wanted to speak ...(end of side B of tape)

... and were there once again problems with access to you concerning supplements that you wanted to make?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, there were various.

MR HATTINGH: And at long last the Committee decided not to continue with that decision and they then allowed applicants to supplement their written applications orally.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: When you compiled your application, did you have insight to documents that could assist you in helping you with your memory?

MR DE KOCK: No.

MR HATTINGH: Were you given the opportunity to consult with other members in order to assist you in your recollections?

MR DE KOCK: No.

MR HATTINGH: After you read the other applicants' applications and documents, was your memory then refreshed because of information contained therein? ...(transcriber's interpretation)

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: Were you approached to assist with an attack on Khanya House, in order to damage it?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: Can you recall who approached you?

MR DE KOCK: It was Capt Kotze, and the facility had to be destroyed, either by explosives or fire.

MR HATTINGH: And who would have been involved in this?

MR DE KOCK: The Explosives Unit and members of Vlakplaas.

MR HATTINGH: And what about Mr WAL du Toit's unit or section?

MR DE KOCK: Well we co-opted them in terms of opening the locks.

MR HATTINGH: To get access to the building?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, and afterwards to also lock the doors behind us so that it does not seem as if somebody broke in.

MR HATTINGH: Was a reason given why it was decided to damage this building?

MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairperson, yes, this building was used as a workplace, it was also used for actions against the then government.

MR HATTINGH: As a workplace by whom?

MR DE KOCK: By the Catholic Church.

MR HATTINGH: And according to the information that you received, who was working there then, who were these members?

MR DE KOCK: It is very difficult to say, I did not know who was there, but members of the Catholic Church, people attached to them or who worked for them and who also launched actions against the State.

MR HATTINGH: Did you receive any information concerning possible presence of activists?

MR DE KOCK: No, Vlakplaas' task was the destruction of this facility, it was more the operational side of it.

MR HATTINGH: Were you informed about who took this decision?

MR DE KOCK: I was informed that it was a Brig McIntyre, who was Head of Stratcom and I then contacted Brig Schoon and confirmed it with him. He told me yes, it is true, we must assist him.

MR HATTINGH: And did you then start planning the attack on the building?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, with Capt Kotze, amongst others, the fires question was, "what is the method that we are going to use?" We then decided on the fire or arson, because in the light of our previous actions at Khotso and Cosatu House one also saw what the destruction or the damage was, the debris and the spreading of it.

After the house was shown to me there was a hotel on the west side, or rather the east side or it, on the corner, lower down there was the old Continental Hotel that was used by the police. There were approximately between four and five hundred police members who resided there. We then decided not to use explosives because of the detonation a lot of debris could result in secondary injuries or deaths.

MR HATTINGH: Were you worried about the fact that there could be people who would be injured or killed in it?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, the same as with Cosatu and Khotso House, we attempted to prevent all injuries, apart from the problems around such a task especially in an urban area.

MR HATTINGH: What steps did you take to prevent people from being injured?

MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairperson, I did not know that there was such a place like Khanya House before it was identified to me, we did not work on Churches, but then we observed the house twice or three times afterwards. I could have used some of my members, I do not recall, but at one opportunity myself and one of the Kok brothers entered the terrain of Khanya House on the side of the church. You go through the church and a fence or wall and you get to the back door of Khanya House, and they were then able because of their technical abilities, to open all the locks. We ensured that there were no guards or dogs.

MR HATTINGH: This access, this time when you got access to the building, was it during the day or the evening?

MR DE KOCK: It was late that evening and we tried to arrange it in the time in which we would then act, so we could get the feeling of the flow of traffic and the movement of people that time of the night and what would accompany it then.

MR HATTINGH: At this opportunity did you then actually enter the house, when you did this reconnaissance?

MR DE KOCK: As far as I can recall we went into the terrain but I cannot recall that we went into the building. I stood guard at the gate, they went in. Our main problem was guards or if possible, dogs.

MR HATTINGH: Did you see any signs that this building was used, or that people lived in this building?

MR DE KOCK: No, not at all.

MR HATTINGH: And this reconnaissance that you did through observation, what time of the day did this occur?

MR DE KOCK: It was also in the evenings. I think it was twice before that we also observed the house. We attempted to move in once again to get the feeling of it and the nature of the flow of traffic and the movement of people and the direction of movement of people.

MR HATTINGH: You say that this happened more-or-less during the time when you launched this operation, can you give us an estimate of about what time it was in the evening?

MR DE KOCK: I think it was just after twelve, I think it was early morning.

MR HATTINGH: And during this observation with regard to the building, could you then see, were there any signs that people lived there, either temporary or permanently?

MR DE KOCK: No, Mr Chairperson. The knowledge that I had about this building was that it was a workplace and not a residence.

MR HATTINGH: Were you under that impression when you launched the attack?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: Did you accept that this operation was necessary after the instruction that was given by Brig McIntyre and the information that he conveyed to you?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Mr Chairperson, I did not doubt it and it was also furthermore confirmed by Brig Schoon, who told me to go ahead. In other words, I had no doubt that he knew about it, and we will then later hear in evidence why I say so.

MR HATTINGH: In other words, you had the authorisation of your Commander to go ahead with this operation?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Very well, Mr de Kock. Where did the final planning take place?

MR DE KOCK: It was at Vlakplaas.

MR HATTINGH: Can you tell the Committee, apart from the applicants whose names appear in the documents, were there any other members of police units who were involved in this incident?

MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairperson, I looked at the names, I do not want to implicate anybody but I think there are maybe three or four people who did not apply for amnesty. It could be even more.

MR HATTINGH: Are these people from other units or are they from Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: No, they're from Vlakplaas but I do not want to just name names.

MR HATTINGH: You've mentioned a few names to me of people who you think were also involved in it, please name them although you're not even sure about it.

MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairperson, I'm quite sure that Capt Snyders was involved, Lieut van Dyk, he could have been a Captain, I've also got a suspicion that there was a person with the surname of Morkel. That is my recollection concerning them. I do not want unnecessarily implicate people.

MR HATTINGH: But apart from Vlakplaas members, do you know if there were members from other police units who were involved in this operation, who did not apply for amnesty?

MR DE KOCK: No, not what I can recall now, no.

MR HATTINGH: Can you recall the amount of people who actually took part in this?

MR DE KOCK: For such an operation we needed a lot of people, but what we tried to do was to build in some kind of defence system or mechanism, so if there were problems and we encountered problems at the scene, there would some type of backup.

MR HATTINGH: So you did the planning at Vlakplaas, so everybody who was involved was at Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And from there you went to Khanya House to execute this operation.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, yes.

MR HATTINGH: At Vlakplaas, during the planning, were there any possibilities mentioned that you would plant weapons in the building?

MR DE KOCK: Because it was a Stratcom operation, because we are going to act against this group who acted against the State, I on my own initiative decided to leave a few devices at the scene, of a Russian make.

MR HATTINGH: If you talk about devices, what kind of devices?

MR DE KOCK: Explosive devices.

MR HATTINGH: Such as, Mr de Kock?

MR HATTINGH: Like limpets. I hear they talked about handgrenades, I cannot recall it, but if they say so, it was so.

MR HATTINGH: And what about magazines for AK47s?

MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairperson, yes, I also gave the instructions or permission that they had to add a few AK47 magazines and that this must be left at the scene.

MR HATTINGH: To create what impression?

MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairperson, it heightens the value of the Stratcom operation and it creates further embarrassment for this group of people who then creates embarrassment for the State.

MR HATTINGH: While you then decided not to make use of explosives to destroy the building, why did you decide to then place limpet mines there?

MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairperson, it would have created the impression that people were assisted from that house, assisted people from the ANC or assisted people who acted against the government in a violent way. So that just heightened the whole sense or the issue.

MR HATTINGH: So this building will then be burnt down?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, but the devices were not prepared with detonators, in other words they were burnt out. In previous experiences and also in north of Ovamboland, I also worked with landmines that did not have detonators in, so they do burn out with only the container left.

MR HATTINGH: And we can see in Exhibit D, page 2, paragraph 3 you say emphatically that the landmines and handgrenades were placed there without detonators. Did you give instructions that they must ensure that whatever is placed there must be without detonators?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: That is to prevent them from going off?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: You say that you have personal knowledge of landmines that if they were exposed to heat and if they did not have detonators they will not explode but they will only burn out.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct. I'd like to just explain. If you've got a detonator in your hand, it can also become so hot that it will detonate, that's also one thing that you teach people who work in mines, that even the heat of your hand can detonate the detonators.

MR HATTINGH: And if they did have detonators in and were exposed to that heat, they would have detonated and you wanted to prevent that?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Can you recall who took the landmines and whatever was placed there?

MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairperson, I would have given instructions to my people, I do not know who I gave the instructions to. I had the keys for the storerooms, so I would have given the person the keys as well. I can accept that we wouldn't have walked in there with it in our bare hands, we would have placed it in some container.

MR HATTINGH: You do not know who took it and who placed it there?

MR DE KOCK: No.

MR HATTINGH: And did you accept that your instructions would be followed?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, definitely.

MR HATTINGH: And it also then seemed that such items were found at the scene.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct.

MR HATTINGH: Very well, Mr de Kock. It was now discussed at Vlakplaas, you now depart to go to Khanya House to execute this operation.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Would you have according to the planning, entered the building yourself?

MR DE KOCK: No, Mr Chairperson, I would have remained outside, moved around there, not on the terrain itself, but on the side of the road. I had to observe the guard unit's building.

MR HATTINGH: Can I just make sure, the guard unit is the unit of the - the unit who stayed at this hotel that was used as police quarters?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, people who also then guarded some of the Ministers or the President.

MR HATTINGH: You then observed them.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, and we had to be very careful that nobody contacted radio control that there's a group of, or a suspicious group. Because of the time of the evening and the nature in which we had to execute it, it could have drawn attention and in the end it did. In the way in which I moved, I moved in a vehicle with two or three other members and I moved around as a member of the Diamond Branch. I had a blue light in the vehicle and my identification.

I would have been the first line of defence if the police were to arrive at the scene or any other group, to then prevent them to get to my people who were busy dousing the house.

MR HATTINGH: In other words, you and two members were moving around, were there other people who were to remain outside of the building?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I had a second vehicle which transported members. I think it was under the command of Mr Bellingan and he then had to look out for the firearm and the provincial library. He had to remain in that area and if I warned him or needed him, he would have been able to come to assist. We were in radio contact.

Then I cannot recall if it was two or three, I pointed them to remain at the access gate, or let us say at the back door of Khanya House, I placed them there, who would then protect the backs of the operators in the house. I'm sure I armed them. If somebody passed them they would have had to deal with the next group.

MR HATTINGH: Let us just stop there. At Khotso House, did you receive any instructions concerning what you should do in case you are surprised by outsiders while you were busy with the operation? ...(transcriber's interpretation)

MR DE KOCK: Yes, we were told to use violence or use the weapons.

MR HATTINGH: If you talk about violence, what are you talking about?

MR DE KOCK: Well we had Uzzis with silencers and in the case of Khotso House we also took a 40mm grenade launcher with us, which I think was handled by Mr Hanton. ...(transcriber's interpretation)

MR HATTINGH: Who gave you this instruction to use violence if somebody would surprise you?

MR DE KOCK: At Khotso House it was Gen Gerrit Erasmus. MR HATTINGH: He was also an applicant in that matter?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: Why was it necessary to act against people who surprised you and then using weapons?

MR DE KOCK: Well first of all, we are an operational unit so everything that we do in that sense, or approached, would have been operational in nature. We do not know what can happen, we do not know what would happen if they pass me first of all, who they were, what the nature of it was and if they killed any of my members. And right through the world with Special Forces, the operators do, their lives come first and whoever attacks them comes second.

MR HATTINGH: What about the secrecy concerning your participation in operations like these, would that have played a role?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, secrecy was paramount, we compromise concerning this.

ADV BOSMAN: Mr Hattingh, can I just interrupt you, I think I've lost Mr de Kock and I'd just like to fill in the gap.

Mr de Kock, your Advocate asked you who told you to use weapons in case you were interrupted and you said in Khotso House it was Gerrit Erasmus, but what about in this specific incident?

MR DE KOCK: I gave the instructions because I was appointed to take this operation further as the operational Commander, so I took all the responsibility.

ADV BOSMAN: Thank you, you've clarified it, I was just not certain. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr Hattingh.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Chairperson.

And for those two reasons you gave an order that if necessary weapons be used?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And you said that you reckon that the two or three persons that you placed at the back entrance should be armed and you gave them the order for this.

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: The other members, were they armed? That would be those who were supposed to enter the building.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, they had a cosh, which was some from of a leather baton which one could purchase in stores. They were armed with that and as far as I know we also had shock devices which were hand held and can also be purchased in public. We had a number of those devices among the group.

MR HATTINGH: Can you recall how many of the members who were involved in the operation would indeed penetrate the building?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I would say that it would have been approximately eight to nine members, because I think that we had ten cans of petrol, 20 litres worth of petrol which we took in with us. I vaguely recall that we may have mixed the petrol with pieces of rubber or soap powder and I'm not certain if we also used steel wool to add to this. It was like metal, but it glowed and it would increase the temperature.

MR HATTINGH: And these persons who were supposed to penetrate the building had to douse the building with the fuel and set it alight?

MR DE KOCK: Yes. Furthermore I must state, I don't know if I'm going too fast, but after the completion of this operation and my report of it to Mr Schoon the following morning or upon the first available occasion thereafter, Brig Schoon attack me quite furiously regarding the fact that explosive devices were left in the building. All that I can infer from that is that it wasn't part of the Stratcom plan. In other words, what I did, did not fit in to whatever Stratcom's plan was. He didn't have a problem with the arson, the break-in and the unlawful entry, but he was concerned about the devices which were not part of Stratcom's plan.

MR HATTINGH: Did he reprimand you quite severely regarding this?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, he wasn't the sort of man to use cuss words, but that morning he certainly did.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. You heard the section from Exhibit E which my learned friend, Mr van der Merwe read out, the section which appears on page 5 where Brother Jude states:

He said that during a press conference shortly after the attack. How does that rhyme with the impression that you had?

MR DE KOCK: It was my belief that there would not be people in the building.

MR HATTINGH: Did you give any order to your members to work gently, so that they would not disturb anybody in the building?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, they went in and they themselves went in with the belief that there was no-one in the building.

MR HATTINGH: Did you inform them as such?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And Mr de Kock, let me ask you this first, if one examines the amount of fuel that you used, it would appear that you wanted to determine and ensure that the building would burn.

MR DE KOCK: Well that was our task.

MR HATTINGH: And was it the idea to burn the building down?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: If you had known that there were elderly persons higher up in the building, would you have continued with the attack?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: You state in your application that you were severely shocked when you noted that there were indeed persons in the building shortly after it started burning. It's at the bottom of page 7 where you state that.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. I state that because the golden rule that I always observed and always held to and which was broken for the first time with this, was that one would never return to a place where one had just executed an operation, one wouldn't even return a day later or a week later, one would never return.

And as we all know, C1 would visit a place once and once only, because afterwards there would be nothing to go back to. But in this case I did drive back and that is why I say I think that Lieut van Dyk was with me as the driver, and the fire brigade was already at the scene and I saw that an elderly woman, who was one of the nuns, was being brought down one of the ladders and to me it was a reasonable shock because my unit was aimed against armed persons or terrorists, with the exception of all the other tasks, and this was not our line. It wasn't part of our task description. It wasn't part of our task to attack nuns.

MR HATTINGH: How do you feel today about the fact that you set a building alight and that you undoubtedly created much fear and anxiety for those who were occupying the building?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I would like to say to those ladies who were climbing down the ladders, that I'm tremendously sorry because it wasn't part of the plan. Our task description was to burn the building down, it was not to kill anybody. And particularly with regard to the fear and the humiliation that they suffered, I'm particularly sorry.

MR HATTINGH: Let us return. The people penetrated the building, you were securing the building from all sides and then you noted eventually that the building was indeed burning.

MR DE KOCK: I didn't notice it immediately, as the people started withdrawing and reporting back to me that everybody was back in their vehicles, because one would have to make sure that no-one was kept behind or trapped, as the vehicles reported that everybody was accounted for, they drove away and I departed last of all. We turned back, returned to the building and saw that it was burning, but by that stage the fire brigade was already there. Apparently the fire brigade station was situated approximately 80 metres away from the building.

MR HATTINGH: It has been put by previous witnesses that the section of the building where the printing press was housed, was actually a small building as it is indicated in a photograph on page 7, were you aware of that?

MR DE KOCK: No, because I didn't move around on the premises itself and I didn't enter the premises.

MR HATTINGH: On the photo of the building there is a caption which states: "The Remains of Khanya House Print Unit", do you know what the nature of the print unit was, to which is referred here?

MR DE KOCK: I didn't see it myself, but I heard that there was indeed a printing facility there. What the nature and size of it was is unknown to me.

MR HATTINGH: Was that part of the target?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. I must state, as a result of the Cosatu House incident, with that incident one of the Scandinavian countries had established a printing unit there and that was part of the target when Cosatu House was targeted.

MR HATTINGH: Why was that so?

MR DE KOCK: Because it was used to publish literary documents which were aimed against the State policy, or which criticised State policy.

MR HATTINGH: And was this also the information that you received with regard to this printing unit which existed in Khanya House?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that was part of the information.

MR HATTINGH: Very well, Mr de Kock. After everybody withdrew, you also withdrew and where did you go then?

MR DE KOCK: We went straight to Vlakplaas and from that point onwards we ensured that none of us had left any of our equipment behind. We gave a brief session of feedback. Among others, Mr Bellingan reported to me that he had experienced problems with the police. While we were still at the scene he heard on the radio that things appeared suspicious.

I myself had also been encountered by members of the uniform branch and I told them that we were busy with a trap and that they had to depart, which they did.

MR HATTINGH: I think it may be in Mr Ras's application where mention is made of the fact that Brits allegedly stole a television.

MR DE KOCK: No, there wasn't any time for that. What Mr Brits did tell me at Vlakplaas and what he brought to me was a portable computer or sorts. He made this decision on the ground level, to take the computer because it might contain information, which is why he withdrew it from the scene.

I took it from him and we gave it to Radio and Technical, to a Captain there, so that they could then draw whatever information they could from it. I didn't hear if there was any information on it and I never saw the computer again.

MR HATTINGH: Do you know who was appointed to investigate the incident on behalf of the police?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I only know that approximately three or four weeks later, he was then a Colonel, I think, or he had just become a Brigadier, it was Engelbrecht who arrived at Vlakplaas.

MR HATTINGH: Would that be Gen Krappies Engelbrecht who testified here yesterday?

MR DE KOCK: Yes. And he had two identikit photos with him, two photos of two people and he asked whether or not we recognised these persons. He said the one looked like Bellingan. I looked at the identikit photos myself. I knew that we would not be able to recognise Bellingan from there. Both of these photos were placed on the braai grill for us to view. Why he came directly to Vlakplaas is something that only he will know, none of us knew. By nature of the situation we all denied it.

MR HATTINGH: Someone in the documents stated or put it to Mr Engelbrecht that one of the identikits resembled you.

MR DE KOCK: There was no identikit which showed a person wearing glasses. Neither of these identikits had a face which wore spectacles, in fact the one face has freckles and none of the members had freckles.

MR HATTINGH: Did he ask if any of your members were involved?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, he did and we said that we didn't know anything.

MR HATTINGH: And do you know if there was any later information which indicated the chances of an arrest?

MR DE KOCK: No, not with regard to the Khanya House incident.

MR HATTINGH: Do you know whether anybody was prosecuted regarding the incident?

MR DE KOCK: No.

MR HATTINGH: You request amnesty - just a moment's indulgence, Chairperson, conspiracy, damage to property, accessory to those crimes and transgressions regarding the Arms and Ammunitions Act, as well as the Explosives Act, arson.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And then any lesser offences which may emanate from the facts pertaining to this incident.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And then you also request for any civil liability which may emanate from the incident.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And then also attempted murder, although at that stage you did not know that they were in the building, but you later were informed of the presence of persons in the building.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Chairperson, nothing further.

CHAIRPERSON: Not even dolus eventualis would ... (indistinct) in such a situation, would it?

MR HATTINGH: I think not, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Okay, thank you. Pardon?

MS CAMBANIS: No, Chair, I'll leave it for argument.

CHAIRPERSON: Oh, thank you. I don't know what it is, I'd rather listen to it in argument.

MS CAMBANIS: What it is, Chairperson, is that this is the first time that Mr de Kock has now added attempted murder on to what he asks for. It doesn't appear prior to this. Thank you, Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

Mr de Kock, have you read the other applications of your co-applicants in this incident?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, all I read was the summary in the front. There is a summary in the front and that is all that I read.

CHAIRPERSON: And that is not precise if you have read this, the summary is not precise. Have you noted that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, with the sentence that I have, they might as well just add it on if it's so important.

CHAIRPERSON: No, but what I heard you there to say Mr Brits came with a computer there when you were at Vlakplaas, when you withdrew to Vlakplaas.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I think that I have stated here for lesser offences as well, what the nature of that may be. It was the offences which were committed in the course of action where people used their initiative in the operational context. I do take responsibility for that automatically, and of course I also approved it and we did take the computer further to see whether or not there was any information to be gleaned from it. So as far as I'm concerned, it is all part of the operation.

I could give you an example, we could attack a house in Swaziland where we were informed there would be six terrorists, but then there are nine, there would be decision that would have to be taken in the heat of the moment as circumstances dictated it.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr van der Merwe?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VAN DER MERWE: Thank you, Mr Chair.

Just one question, Mr de Kock. You were not certain of one of the Kok brothers, it is my instruction that it was Japie Kok who was with you.

MR DE KOCK: I will accept it as that.

MR VAN DER MERWE: No further questions, thank you Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Nel?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR NEL: Thank you, Mr Chairperson.

Mr de Kock, just one aspect. My client, Mr Larry Hanton, recalls in his application which is on page 153 of the bundle, that you were one of the person who entered and from your evidence it would appear to be clear that he is mistaken.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I was definitely on the outside. In fact, I went so far with the planning which affected my role on the outside. I contacted Radio Control in Pretoria that night and asked for the rank of the Service Officer, so that I would not be apprehended at the scene by the officer on duty in Pretoria that night and that his rank would be higher than mine.

In this case I had to be certain that my rank would be higher and that I could give orders and tell to leave my people alone. We didn't want to have any fight ensuing because of the ranking system while we were busy with an operation.

MR NEL: Thank you, Chairperson, nothing further.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Nel. Mr Wagener?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, on behalf of Brig Schoon, he states that at the time of this incident he was on leave.

MR DE KOCK: I don't know, Chairperson, because I know that he was furious regarding the fact that I had taken a decision to leave explosive devices at the scene.

MR WAGENER: Yes, I will come to the subsequent discussion that you have mentioned today for the first time. But he states that at the time of the incident he was on leave and that he was not previously notified of the process, that he did not know about the operation.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I would not have been able to take the order from Mr Kotze, I did not speak to Mr Hattingh and I didn't liaise with Brig McIntyre. I cleared it with him, he told me to go ahead.

MR WAGENER: Brig Schoon maintains that he himself has submitted a comprehensive amnesty application for very serious cases, even more serious than this case, if he was involved in it, he would have requested amnesty for it, that is why he did not ask amnesty for it.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, the denials of the hierarchy are legendary by this stage. I will not comment any further on that.

MR WAGENER: Just so, Mr de Kock, upon that statement of yours, your false evidence is just as legendary by this stage.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, when it comes to falseness, then I think that with regard to Gen Engelbrecht, with the Khotso House situation, he also came to Vlakplaas as a full Colonel of the Detective Branch, along with Mostert from Johannesburg. He visited Vlakplaas and he wanted the names of the members who were involved with Khotso House. I only gave my name and I did not give the names of the other members. So when it comes to liars in this case, Mr Engelbrecht would be first in line.

MR WAGENER: I am still busy with Brig Schoon, we will deal with Mr Engelbrecht later. Brig Schoon maintains that your memory has failed you in this respect and as I have listened to your evidence today, you have conceded to many aspects as to not having a recollection of it, as to not being certain of it, as to having limited memory and Brig Schoon says that your memory has failed you with regard to his involvement in this operation.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, the scale of my application is of such a nature that for the sake of completion I could not, at that stage, have given specific attention to every minor aspect. All I wanted to ensure was not to involve people unnecessarily and in so doing destroy people lives and the lives of their families. I did not want to create any injustice.

MR WAGENER: Lastly, with regard to Brig Schoon, the evidence today regarding his reaction upon the feedback situation is new evidence, I do not have instructions regarding this, I cannot take it any further. His instructions were that he was not at his office at the time of the authorisation for this operation.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I recall the incident very well.

MR WAGENER: With regard to Mr Engelbrecht, his instructions are that immediately after the incident there were already the initial accusations in the media and in the public that the police may have been involved in this incident. Do you remember this?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no, I cannot recall what the media had to say.

MR WAGENER: And that the matter enjoyed a high level of prominence from the very beginning, particularly with the Department of Police. Perhaps I could just complete the statement, it led to the fact that a senior officer, Jaap Joubert was appointed to be the overall Commander or person in charge of the investigation.

MR DE KOCK: Well I cannot recall Jaap Joubert, he never came to Vlakplaas, Col Engelbrecht did, but it would probably have been for the purposes of a cover-up.

MR WAGENER: Gen Engelbrecht's instructions are that he was requested to assist with a team of investigators in this particular investigation, under the overall command of Gen Joubert.

MR DE KOCK: Well I simply know that he arrived at Vlakplaas, that's all. ...(end of side A of tape)

MR WAGENER: ... collected during the investigation that persons in the vicinity of Khanya House were seen that night and that they pretended to be police officers. It appears to be in line with your evidence and the evidence of Mr Bellingan, which we are still to hear.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, there was such an incident, it was foreseen and it was for this purpose that we made those preparations.

MR WAGENER: And based upon this, the investigating team received certain identikits. You have also referred to the identikits. That is correct.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I believe they did because they arrived there at Vlakplaas with two of these identikits.

MR WAGENER: Furthermore, Mr Engelbrecht tells me that he didn't go directly to Vlakplaas as you said that he did, you weren't that high on his priority list as you claim to have been, they went to many places with these identikits, based upon the evidence that there were persons who appeared to be policemen, but that they did arrive at Vlakplaas in the process of their investigation with these identikits.

MR DE KOCK: I said it was approximately three to four weeks later, so quite apparently we were not that high on the list of priorities.

MR WAGENER: In conclusion he states that he showed the identikit to persons there but he cannot recall who these persons were and that it was said to him that the persons who were depicted in the identikits were unknown.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, he convened everybody who was there. We were under the "lapa" where the functions were usually held and everybody looked at the identikits.

MR WAGENER: And then in conclusion, for the sake of interest, it might not be directly relevant, he says that at a later stage he received a statement which basically led to a confession by Mr Barend Strydom, the notorius "Wit Wolf" who was in detention at that stage and that he confessed towards Mr Engelbrecht that it had been he and his unit, or the Wit Wolwe then, who were responsible for burning down Khanya House.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that wasn't the only one, Gen Engelbrecht boasted about it because this Strydom also accepted responsibility for the explosion of Khotso House and Mr Engelbrecht took that statement with great speed, because it would keep the police clean. I know about it because he told me about it, and it was with much amusement.

MR WAGENER: I've got no further questions, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Wagener. Mr Joubert - oh, Mr Jansen first.

MR JANSEN: Thank you, Chair. Jansen on record, no questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Joubert?

MR JOUBERT: Thank you, Chair, I have no questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Lamey?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: Thank you, Chairperson.

Mr de Kock, the submission of Vlakplaas is already on record, I'd just like to as they say in English "recap" on a few aspects that comes out of the submission and also out of the submission of Gen van der Merwe. ...(transcriber's interpretation)

In the functioning of Vlakplaas, it was an operation unit of which you were the Commander and you had the operators under you. Sometimes you got requests from Head Office or branches, other branches.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And as Gen van der Merwe also said in his submission, it happened very often that it is not possible for the operative on grassroots level to really find out what is the political motive behind a certain action.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Mr Chairperson, they were always informed about what we are going to do and where we're going to do it so that they can have a choice to withdraw or not, because you do not want to take somebody with you if he doesn't feel physically or otherwise ready for it, but they knew what they were doing all the time.

MR LAMEY: Let's talk about this incident, you get an instruction or a request, you did some groundwork that led to the decision to go ahead with this operation, if there was a really urgent reason not to go ahead because of certain information, and then question this information this information that came from Head Office and then maybe in the lower ranks you would, if you know that you received the information or the instruction, that you will assess the situation and then trust you in terms what you knew.

MR DE KOCK: No, they wouldn't have questioned it, and I also take responsibility for my members and all the other members who were there that evening and who were under my command.

MR LAMEY: I do not know if you are an applicant in that matter, and I also do not know if you have knowledge of it, the so-called Vryburg incident, where a press or something similar was destroyed in a fire.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it was the National Union of Mine Workers incident, and I also applied for amnesty for that matter.

MR LAMEY: I represent an applicant who is under the impression that it was also a church building, but I will leave it there.

Was it your impression then, right or wrong, that this Catholic Church was part of the South African Council of Churches?

MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairperson, I focused only on terrorism, either the prevention of the executing of it. I never worked on trade unions or churches, these were two fields that I never touched and I was led by the needs, the operational needs of other sections.

MR LAMEY: Very well. Were you and your members aware of the South African Council of Churches, in the sense of their solidarity with other liberation organisations?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, maybe it's not that important, but in my time of service in the former Rhodesia, we were informed about what the role was of churches and missions. For example, in Ovamboland at a certain stage, myself and my unit members killed members of SWAPO in an attack and we got information that pointed to the Finnish Mission and we also found chevron tracks that came from the same batch. We did not take any action against them. But you cannot really blame them because somebody that arrives there with the gun is at that stage the boss. But at the same time people from those church groups did not report it back to the police, which was approximately three kilometres from that area. So there was some kind of solidarity with the liberation movements. I cannot take it any further because I did not study it.

MR LAMEY: But what was important in this case, apart from the organisation who owned this building, we are from a South African context where - and the point is that this facility or this building was used to promote the liberation movement.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, well that was the information that we received, and I did not doubt it all.

MR LAMEY: And that is what you dealt with most of the time, and that is the fighting of the liberation movements.

MR DE KOCK: If this was part of it, Mr Chairperson, then I will agree with it, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: No, but here these people were inside the country, they were merely being vociferous and that wouldn't have fallen within your ambit, because you were just concerned with those people you named terrorists.

MR DE KOCK: Yes Mr Chairperson, as I said, this was about the destruction of the facility and not a specific member of the Catholic community. If the facility was used for activists or by activists, it would have fallen in an operational category, although Vlakplaas dealt more with active combat situations.

MR LAMEY: This is not the typical case in which Vlakplaas would operate in, but it is one of the cases like Cosatu and Khotso House, where you were called in and requested to provide cover and support, which is not quite part of your main function but was a request from other institutions or sections.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, yes.

MR LAMEY: Then I'd like to ask you, some of the applicants whom I represent, do you know if they had a desk concerning churches?

MR DE KOCK: Well at Head Office they had the central desk, but some of the sections and some of the branches, or every Security Branch also had a church section or desk and a trade union section, etcetera. Even on the grassroots level in the branches itself there would a desk for trade unions and churches and from there it went to the section, Head Office and then from there to headquarters.

MR LAMEY: Thank you, Mr Chairperson, I've got no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Lamey. Mr du Plessis?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Mr Chairman, just one or two questions.

Mr de Kock, will you agree with me if I put it to you that Capt Kotze and Lieut Hammond did not have weapons with them in the execution of this operation?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I will accept it.

MR DU PLESSIS: And can you recall - or you say that you went out two or three times to go and observe Khanya House, to do reconnaissance, can you recall, and I specifically refer to the time when you actually entered the terrain, if Capt Kotze accompanied you?

MR DE KOCK: I cannot. I know one of the Kok brothers accompanied me and I still think that we were three or four.

MR DU PLESSIS: If he is going to testify that he did accompany you, you will not deny it?

MR DE KOCK: No, I will not.

MR DU PLESSIS: And this vehicle that you used when you saw the female climb out of the building and who was assisted by the fire brigade, ...

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Mr Chairperson, because you ensure first of all that all your men have left the scene, that they are not being followed and in other words, that they are freely on their way and that all the members are present.

MR DU PLESSIS: Can you recall if Capt Kotze was in that vehicle?

MR DE KOCK: No, I cannot.

MR DU PLESSIS: If he is going to testify that he was, will you deny it?

MR DE KOCK: No.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Mr Chairperson, no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr du Plessis. Mr Cornelius?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chair.

Just there short questions. You worked on a need-to-know basis, that's the footsoldiers.

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR CORNELIUS: And there was no doubt on the side of the footsoldiers that this operation was authorised through Head Office.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, yes, they wouldn't have doubted it at all.

MR CORNELIUS: Especially with all the other policemen who worked together?

MR DE KOCK: And also in the light of Khotso and Cosatu House.

MR CORNELIUS: This was not a frolic of Vlakplaas.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: And then in conclusion, I also represent Blackie Swart, I realise that you did not mention him in the list of people who did not apply, but it is my instructions from him that he was not involved in it.

MR DE KOCK: No, Mr Chairperson, he wasn't.

MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Cornelius. Ms Cambanis?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS CAMBANIS: Thank you, Chair.

Mr de Kock, was anyone wearing disguises or balaclavas during the course of that operation?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, there may have been persons wearing balaclavas, I know that I didn't wear one.

MS CAMBANIS: Would you have expected some of them would have done that? Would it have been part of your orders?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, because it would break the facial line and that could also then create confusion with possible identification.

MS CAMBANIS: Mr de Kock, I can't find it in the bundle, but there's reference in the bundle to a kombi, a motor vehicle, they give the licence number place, I don't really expect you to remember, DNW 8452, someone will find it, which turned out later to be a false number plate. There was a kombi used that night with false number plates, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. What sometimes occurred was that we had prepared a whole series of number plates, not only for this particular operation but for many other operations. I'm just explaining that to you for the sake of clarity. We would go and view vehicles which were of the same make, model and year and colour and then we would take that vehicle's number and then we would go the official printers of the police which issued annual third party discs, we would have these printed and keep everything together. So yes, it would have been false numbers, it wouldn't have been able to be traced back to the us.

MS CAMBANIS: Thank you. The person who refers to this kombi says that there were persons sighted inside, which included black people.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, we did not take any black members with on this operation.

MS CAMBANIS: Mr de Kock at page 119 of the bundle, Jacobus Kok will give evidence, or he has said that it was his instruction to open all the doors on the first floor so that the Vlakplaas operators could search the place. It's at 2.4.4.

CHAIRPERSON: What's the page, Ms Cambanis?

MS CAMBANIS: Chair, it is 119, paragraph 2.4.4 at the bottom of that page.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, by nature of this task and the circumstances pertaining to the high density of force members so close to us, the building wasn't even 50 metres away from the unit and it was a question of entering and exiting as swiftly as possible. For example, the petrol cans were made out of plastic so that we didn't have to take it out again, we could just leave at the scene where it would burn. The plastic cans would burn in the fire.

We tried to deal with the operation as quickly as possible, so that we could go in and get out as quickly as possible.

MS CAMBANIS: And across the page at 120, paragraph 3.3, he says that he carried out the instruction and he in fact did open all the doors on the first floor.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, they had to open the locks.

MS CAMBANIS: And all you are saying is that it was not for the purpose of search?

MR DE KOCK: There wasn't time for a search.

MS CAMBANIS: What would be the point of opening the locks to all the doors?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I know that upon their exit they would have to lock the doors again, so that it wouldn't look as if entry had been gained. It was just a question of sowing more confusion.

MS CAMBANIS: Sorry, Mr de Kock, I'm misunderstanding. He refers to unlocking doors on the first floor, he's not referring to gaining entry into the building. I understand what you're saying, but what Mr Kok is saying, he's referring to doors inside the building. That's how I read it.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it would be a question of going in as silently and as quickly as possible. Mr Kok and the others were highly capable to the extent that it would take you longer to chop a door open with an axe than what it would take them to go in.

MS CAMBANIS: Sorry, Mr de Kock, if you can just read the whole, his evidence at 3.3:

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it could be that they also doused that area with petrol. I wasn't in the building, so I cannot give evidence about that, I don't know.

MS CAMBANIS: Well Mr de Kock, actually the doused the building, the second and third, all the floors were doused with petrol, not just the first floor.

MR DE KOCK: Well then that must be why they opened the doors.

MS CAMBANIS: And you dispute that it was to check - it's not to check what was happening in the rooms? To check, for example, if people were there?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, because there was no reason for us to believe that there was anyone there. All we had to do was douse the building with petrol, set it alight and get out. We had no doubt in our minds that the building was indeed empty.

MS CAMBANIS: Mr de Kock, I think you've given this evidence, I didn't hear. Jakob, the other brother Kok, at 135 his evidence is that you entered with him previously into the building. I think you've said that that's, you dispute that.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I know that he was present when the outside door was opened and they entered, but I waited there so that we would not be surprised from the back. I have never been inside Khanya House itself, I would not even be able to give you a description today, because if I had been there I would have described it to you, I would have told you if we turned left or right, along which passages we walked and so forth.

MS CAMBANIS: Yes Mr de Kock, I think he's not talking about - you're talking about a previous recce, is that right? Are we on the same wavelength?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I wasn't inside.

MS CAMBANIS: You dispute that evidence that he will give?

MR DE KOCK: He might be mistaken.

MS CAMBANIS: Mr de Kock, and then it will be the evidence of Mr du Plessis, I understand, at page 208, that he says:

And that is what you're referring to, to the two or three times previously during the night when surveillance was carried out?

MR DE KOCK: For the period that we did it, it was thorough.

MS CAMBANIS: And it is your evidence that on none of those occasions was there any indication that people were in the building, that is was used as a residence, if I can put it that way.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MS CAMBANIS: Now Mr de Kock we've heard your evidence regarding the use of force, can I just ask you, do you refer then to the use of force if you were attacked? Not you, or you or your operatives were attacked?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MS CAMBANIS: You refer to a self-defence situation.

MR DE KOCK: I beg your pardon?

MS CAMBANIS: You're referring to a self-defence situation.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, not only self-defence, but also a situation of defence, because the operatives were inside the building, so if there was an attack from outside there would have to be sufficient persons to be able to defend or protect themselves.

MS CAMBANIS: Yes, Mr de Kock, I'm being obtuse, the point is that there wouldn't be unnecessary killing of civilians, that's all I'm trying to say.

MR DE KOCK: No, definitely not.

MS CAMBANIS: Yes. If you look at page 265 of the bundle, Mr Leon Flores, in his application he says in the second paragraph:

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, definitely not. Then he might have been at Kagiso House, then it wasn't I who was there.

MS CAMBANIS: Yes. I think he carries on to say:

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it is my belief to this very day that when we entered that building there were no people inside.

MS CAMBANIS: Yes. Could you just explain, what would be the rank or position of Mr Flores?

MR DE KOCK: He was Sergeant at that stage.

MS CAMBANIS: Did he fall under your command?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MS CAMBANIS: Would he be able to take a decision like this without your authorisation?

MR DE KOCK: Could you repeat please.

MS CAMBANIS: Would he be able to make a decision like this:

MR DE KOCK: Well Chairperson, I cannot say that he would have done this or that, but I believe that he would have withdrawn if there were people and so too my other members, and then we would not have executed the operation.

MS CAMBANIS: Mr de Kock, let me just understand, what you are saying is that as you understood from the people under your command, they wouldn't have carried through with this operation had they known?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson, and I also wouldn't have gone and burnt people to death.

MS CAMBANIS: Chairperson, I have nothing further, but I would like to please consult with the persons that I represent just before I keep quiet.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I would allow Ms Patel to continue with her cross-examination and you'll give us an indication if you've got further questions to ask after the consultation.

MS CAMBANIS: So I should be excused?

CHAIRPERSON: I'm excusing you.

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Patel?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS PATEL: Thank you, Honourable Chairperson.

Mr de Kock, was there a report-back made to you immediately after the operation had taken place?

MR DE KOCK: Is that at Vlakplaas?

MS PATEL: Yes.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, all of us came together and then every person would simply state - it was a long time ago, but basically every person would state that he was not identified or that he was not injured or that he hadn't lost any of the equipment and so forth.

MS PATEL: Can you recall if Mr Flores had mentioned at any stage during that report-back or sometime thereafter, that there were in fact nuns in the building at the time it was set alight?

MR DE KOCK: He didn't report anything to me, Chairperson. I drove back - when my people were free and away, I was the one who turned around and went back, upon which I saw a woman climbing down the ladder.

MS PATEL: You've stated that generally with Vlakplaas operations that you never returned back to the scene.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MS PATEL: Why did you choose to do so in this case?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I don't know, I'm not one to entertain mysticism, but I must have seen it somehow. I don't want to take it any further than that.

MS PATEL: Thank you, Honourable Chairperson, one can certainly not take that any further.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Ms Patel. Advocate Bosman?

ADV BOSMAN: I have no questions, thank you Chairperson.

ADV SANDI: I've got no questions, thank you Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: I'm loathe to excuse you until we hear from Ms Cambanis.

MR VAN DER MERWE: Excuse Mr Chair, maybe I can help, I've just got two aspects which I want to clear up with Mr de Kock.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you helping her out?

MR VAN DER MERWE: I'm helping you out with the time that no-one was here.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR VAN DER MERWE: There are just two aspects I want to take up with Mr de Kock, with your permission.

CHAIRPERSON: Okay, you may proceed, Mr van der Merwe.

FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VAN DER MERWE: Thank you, Mr Chair.

Mr de Kock, on page 119, paragraph 2.4.4, my learned colleague asked whether or not it wasn't possible for you to find these persons in the building, but the word "offices" were used, so it was clear that sleeping quarters was not something that was allowed for.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR VAN DER MERWE: And then on page 135 of the record, Mr Japie Kok's statement, if one were to read his paragraph one would see:

but no further reference is made to you, which is not necessarily an indication that you were inside the building.

MR DE KOCK: I agree with that, I was not inside the building.

MR VAN DER MERWE: Thank you, Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Yes Ms Patel, you want to say something?

MS PATEL: Seeing that we have a few moments at hand, Honourable Chairperson, may I take the opportunity to place on record that the report in respect of the missing docket has in fact come through. I have given Ms Cambanis a copy of it and she is satisfied with the report, Honourable Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: She's not here to confirm.

MS PATEL: Oh yes, alright.

CHAIRPERSON: We can stretch our legs for a few minutes, we definitely need that.

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: (s.u.o.)

FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS CAMBANIS: Thank you, Chair.

Mr de Kock, on the ground floor was a documentation centre and it's my instructions that that documentation centre was not as damaged as the rest of the first floor, it appears as though petrol wasn't put into that part of the building. It's also my instructions that on the top floor, that floor was not as soaked as the other floors. Did you get any information that people had to withdraw before they had finished the task? A report I mean, sorry.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no, not that I can recall. I could only ascribe it to haste, possible condensation because petrol is that kind of substance, but I did not receive any kind of report that they had to run.

MS CAMBANIS: Because one of the people who were present, Bishop Verstrate, he on awakening, found that his door had been opened although he had gone to sleep with it locked.

MR DE KOCK: I don't know about that, this is the first time that I've come to hear of it.

MS CAMBANIS: And if that is so, then it would have been one of your operatives that in fact unlocked the door and saw the Bishop sleeping. It must be.

MR DE KOCK: I don't know, Chairperson, because they did not report to me that they found or saw somebody there. The observation that I conducted and the first time that it came to my knowledge that some of the staff members were there or that there were people sleeping there, was when I returned and saw the lady coming out on the ladder. That was the first time that I became aware that there were persons in that building.

MS CAMBANIS: Who were the people that distributed the petrol mixture throughout the building?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, we will have to ask them, I cannot recall how I divided them into groups. There would have been reasons why certain people went in and others waited outside. We will have to ask them.

MS CAMBANIS: Yes. How many groups, do you remember how many groups would have been tasked with that?

MR DE KOCK: I had Bellingan on the outside and another two or three persons. He also transported the greatest number of persons with petrol. And then I had two or three persons at the most exterior door or the back door of Khanya House, so to speak, it would be an access door to the premise, and then there was me.

MS CAMBANIS: Mr de Kock, what I was referring to is the people that were tasked with pouring the petrol inside the building, was that one group of more?

MR DE KOCK: It was only one group and I think that it comprised eight to nine members in total.

MS CAMBANIS: And what did they report to you afterwards? Did they have any incidents?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, they did not report anything regarding incidents, so they didn't experience any resistance there or experience something which bothered them or which was disturbing.

MS CAMBANIS: Mr de Kock, I don't know if this is your field, but if there were wire taps or monitoring, electronic monitoring going on at Khanya House, who would be responsible for doing that?

MR DE KOCK: It would have fallen under the Security Branch of Pretoria, but I don't want you to exclude the possibility that National Intelligence Services and Military Intelligence Services could also not have had any kind of tapping device there.

MS CAMBANIS: And at this hearing, who would know about that? In this application.

MR DE KOCK: There is no-one from the Security Branch here. Demolitions wouldn't have worked with it, neither would we have, it would have had to be somebody specific from the branch, from their division.

MS CAMBANIS: Thank you, Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Ms Cambanis. Mr Hattingh, any re-exam?

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Just one question, Mr Chairman.

Mr de Kock, my learned friend, Ms Cambanis, has examined you regarding Flores's allegation that they determined that there were people there and that they decided regardless to continue with the operation. You've already stated in your evidence-in-chief that you informed your members that there was no-one in the building.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Did you also tell them that you had made certain that there were not any people inside the building because you didn't want any injuries?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: You've already stated that he was a Sergeant, if he had determined in some or other way that there were occupants in the building, would he have possessed the capacity to decide upon his own initiative to continue with the operation or not?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: So if any of the members who entered the building to cause the arson, would they have had any capacity to make such decisions?

MR DE KOCK: No. Let me just qualify. Perhaps Mr Flores, due to the fact that he worked under my command, had been involved in quite a number of operations, it is possible that he may have mistaken himself or that he may have deviated from the regular course of action.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Chairperson, nothing further.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Hattingh. Thank you very much, Mr de Kock, you are excused.

MR DE KOCK: Thank you, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Anything further, Mr Hattingh?

MR HATTINGH: Not as presently advised, thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chair. There's a possibility that I might proceed with Mr Brits and I think that we can use this time fruitfully.

CHAIRPERSON: I was thinking about that, to use the term fruitfully.

MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chair. There's a document placed before you which I drew, it's the application of Brits. You would note that the application which is bound into the bundle of folio 46, is a very, very ...(indistinct) version and this will represent his testimony. I beg leave to call him.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------DAWID JAKOBUS BRITS: (sworn states)

ADV BOSMAN: The applicant is duly sworn, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. You may be seated, Mr Brits. Mr Cornelius?

EXAMINATION BY MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chair.

Mr Brits, you are an applicant in this matter and your initial application you prepared yourself without legal assistance.

MR BRITS: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: And you put it very short or you gave a brief version in your application and it was also signed under oath by you.

MR BRITS: That is correct, yes.

MR CORNELIUS: In the amendment on page, paragraph 7(a) and (b) in the initial application should read that you were a supporter of the National Party and that the word "none" must be removed or deleted.

MR BRITS: That's correct, yes.

MR CORNELIUS: You do confirm your career in the South African Police as it appears in page 1 of the document, is that correct?

MR BRITS: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: You also confirm the personal circumstances as you set it out on page 2 of the document.

MR BRITS: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: And then thirdly, do you also confirm your political motivations as a policeman, as it appears on page 3?

MR BRITS: That is correct, yes.

MR CORNELIUS: You were attached to Vlakplaas, the so-called C-Section of Eugene de Kock, is that correct?

MR BRITS: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: During the Khanya House incident what was your rank?

MR BRITS: I was a Warrant Officer.

MR CORNELIUS: It is common cause out of the evidence that you got an instruction to assist in the arson or the setting alight of Khanya House.

MR BRITS: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: Can you just in short tell us what you did.

MR BRITS: I was part of the group who took the petrol to the house. I was part of the group who doused the house.

MR CORNELIUS: You then also entered the house?

MR BRITS: Yes, I did.

MR CORNELIUS: What did you do with the petrol?

MR BRITS: I doused it, or I poured it out over the floor. Some of the people were busy unlocking doors.

MR CORNELIUS: They unlocked the doors and moved in and you poured out the petrol?

MR BRITS: That is correct, yes.

MR CORNELIUS: On the merit part of your application you said when you left the area you took it with you, you took something with you, what did you take?

MR BRITS: It was part of a computer.

MR CORNELIUS: Why did you do it?

MR BRITS: It was a very short or quick decision, I thought it may contain some information that could provide us with more information concerning the house or what it was used for.

MR CORNELIUS: It is common cause that sometimes documents or computers were removed from scenes that were searched, is that correct?

MR BRITS: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: What did you do with it?

MR BRITS: When we arrived at Vlakplaas I handed over the computer to Col de Kock.

MR CORNELIUS: Did you accept that this operation was approved by Head Office?

MR BRITS: Yes.

MR CORNELIUS: Various other sections of the Police were also involved in this.

MR BRITS: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: Did you think that there were people in this building?

MR BRITS: No, Mr Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: Very well. No disciplinary actions were taken against you and you followed the instructions as it was given to you.

MR BRITS: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: Col de Kock also testified that everybody worked on a need-to-know basis.

MR BRITS: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: So you did not ask any questions?

MR BRITS: No, Mr Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: Did you have any personal feelings of malice or revenge towards the owners of this house?

MR BRITS: No, Mr Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: Did you receive any remuneration for this?

MR BRITS: No.

MR CORNELIUS: Except for the salary.

MR BRITS: Yes, I only received my salary.

MR CORNELIUS: You apply for amnesty for arson, damaging of property, conspiracy, the use of explosives, defeating the ends of justice and any possible delicts that may arise from this.

MR BRITS: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: And you will agree with me that the computer was stolen by you and I assume that you also then apply for amnesty for the theft of the computer.

MR BRITS: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Cornelius. Mr Hattingh?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr Brits, I do not know if you were there when we read from the book, I think it was Exhibit E, the version of one of the people who were in the building that states that ...(intervention)

MS CAMBANIS: Sorry ...(inaudible)

MR HATTINGH: Oh I'm sorry. May I have a little booklet and then rather quote from it, Mr Chairman, lest I might mislead the applicant.

CHAIRPERSON: Before you proceed with your question. Mr Cornelius, we'll mark the affidavit or the "aanvullende", Exhibit F.

MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. You may proceed, Mr Hattingh.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

I made the inference that the person was in the building, but I was informed that I was wrong. A section in this version of this person to which is referred to as Brother Jude, he says:

Two questions arising from this and I'd like to put to you, where you under the impression that there were no people in the building?

MR BRITS: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Did you move freely in the building without trying to - without making any noise, because you thought there was nobody in the building?

MR BRITS: That is correct, yes.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairperson, no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Hattingh. Mr van der Merwe?

MR VAN DER MERWE: No questions, thank you Mr Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Nel?

MR NEL: No questions, thank you Mr Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Wagener?

MR WAGENER: I have no questions, thank you Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Jansen?

MR JANSEN: For the record, Jansen. Chair, no questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Joubert?

MR JOUBERT: I have no questions, thank you Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Lamey, for a moment I lost you.

MR LAMEY: Thank you, I see it's me, I lost myself Chairperson. I've got no questions, thank you Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr du Plessis?

MR DU PLESSIS: I've got no questions, thank you Mr Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Ms Cambanis?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS CAMBANIS: Thank you, Chairperson.

Mr Brits, were you with Mr Flores that evening?

MR BRITS: That is correct, yes, he was part of the team.

MS CAMBANIS: And when you entered the building you were one of the people that threw petrol, where did you go?

MR BRITS: Inside the house.

MS CAMBANIS: You will recall that has a ground floor and three storeys, do you recall that?

MR BRITS: Yes, I can recall that.

MS CAMBANIS: Yes, and so then were you on the ground floor, the top floor, all the floors?

MR BRITS: As far as I can recall ...(end of side B of tape)

MS CAMBANIS: ... was he?

MR BRITS: I do not know, Mr Chairperson, it was very early in the morning, it was still dark.

MS CAMBANIS: Who was with you on the ground floor and the first floor?

MR BRITS: I cannot recall, there were various people, approximately eight or nine.

MS CAMBANIS: You never went up to the first floor, is that correct?

MR BRITS: I was on the ground floor and as far as I can recall I was on the first floor.

CHAIRPERSON: He was on the first.

MS CAMBANIS: Sorry, I beg your - I'm sorry, Chairperson. From the time that you entered the building till when you left, how long would you estimate that was?

MR BRITS: From when we arrived at the scene until we completed it, I would say approximately 10 minutes maximum.

MS CAMBANIS: Inside the building distributing petrol, that's approximately 10 minutes?

MR BRITS: That is correct, yes.

MS CAMBANIS: And the laying of the cordite, is that included in that time?

MR BRITS: Can you just repeat that please.

MS CAMBANIS: "Die brand tou".

MR BRITS: I do not know anything about that, Mr Chairperson.

MS CAMBANIS: Mr Brits, do you know anything about the theft of a TV?

MR BRITS: No, Mr Chairperson, I did not steal a TV, I took part of a computer.

MS CAMBANIS: From where?

MR BRITS: Out of one of the offices that was unlocked.

MS CAMBANIS: By whom was it unlocked?

MR BRITS: I do not know.

MS CAMBANIS: Was the computer taken from the ground floor?

MR BRITS: As far as I can recall, yes.

MS CAMBANIS: You've heard the comments about your colleague, that it came to his attention that there were nuns on the top floor at the house.

MR BRITS: We heard about it afterwards, yes.

MS CAMBANIS: Did you not get that information while you were inside?

MR BRITS: No, Mr Chairperson.

MS CAMBANIS: And the evening of the operation, was that the first time that you had personally been to Khanya House?

MR BRITS: That is correct, yes.

MS CAMBANIS: Thank you, Chair, nothing further.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Ms Cambanis. Ms Patel?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS PATEL: Thank you, Honourable Chairperson.

Just one question, Mr Brits. In your application to us you've stated that amongst the members who were present during the operation, or who were present, you've mentioned Capt Snyders, who is not an applicant here today. Can you recall what his involvement was?

MR BRITS: I can recall that he was part of the planning, Mr Chairperson, I cannot say with great certainty that he was there. As I said, it was in the evening, it was dark, but it's possible that he could have been there.

CHAIRPERSON: When you left Vlakplaas, was it dark as well there, or where you assembled?

MR BRITS: That is correct, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: So where you assembled you couldn't see each other?

MR BRITS: No, we could see each other, but it was a long time ago, I cannot exactly recall who was in which vehicle.

CHAIRPERSON: You may proceed, Ms Patel.

MS PATEL: Are you certain that Mr Snyders was the planning meeting at Vlakplaas?

MR BRITS: As far as I can recall, yes.

MS PATEL: But you can't say what his involvement was subsequent to the operation?

MR BRITS: No, Mr Chairperson.

MS PATEL: Do you know whether he was present at the report-back meeting at Vlakplaas?

MR BRITS: I cannot recall.

MS PATEL: Thank you, Honourable Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Ms Patel. Advocate Bosman?

ADV BOSMAN: I have no questions, thank you Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Advocate Sandi

ADV SANDI: No questions, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Brits. Mr Cornelius, any re-exam?

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR CORNELIUS: Only one questions, Mr Chair, thank you.

You did not steal the television set?

MR BRITS: That's correct.

MR CORNELIUS: And it seems as if there's a confusion between the television and the computer.

MR BRITS: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: It wouldn't have made sense to in the middle of the night steal a television set and then walk down the street with this television set on your back or on your shoulders.

MR BRITS: No, Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chair.

MS CAMBANIS: Sorry Chairperson, I've received an indication from my clients to consult, can I just please be excused just to take instructions regarding this matter?

CHAIRPERSON: With Mr Brits?

MS CAMBANIS: Yes, with Mr Brits.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MS CAMBANIS: Thank you. Thank you, Chairperson, may I put a question to Mr Brits?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, certainly.

FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS CAMBANIS: Mr Brits, I'm instructed that the only place that you could have taken the computer from was from the documentation centre on the ground floor. Do you agree?

MR BRITS: That is so, yes, I will agree with that.

MS CAMBANIS: And is that also the area where you doused the area with petrol?

MR BRITS: Yes, that is correct.

MS CAMBANIS: Because Mr Brits, that is the area that in fact didn't burn extensively.

MR BRITS: It is possibly so, I wasn't there afterwards.

MS CAMBANIS: But it's your evidence that you did douse it as thoroughly as you did the rest of the building?

MR BRITS: That is correct, yes.

MS CAMBANIS: And the documentation centre, do you know who else entered into that area?

MR BRITS: I cannot recall, no.

MS CAMBANIS: Because that is also the place where the limpet mines were found in a cupboard.

MR BRITS: I cannot testify about that, I do not know anything about the limpet mines.

MS CAMBANIS: You don't know who brought the limpet mines to Khanya House?

MR BRITS: No, Mr Chairperson.

MS CAMBANIS: So at the time you didn't know and to this day you don't know?

MR BRITS: That is correct, yes.

MS CAMBANIS: Did you know at the time that limpet mines would be placed?

MR BRITS: No, Mr Chairperson.

MS CAMBANIS: And while you were in the documentation centre, you never saw who placed anything other than petrol?

MR BRITS: No, Mr Chairperson.

MS CAMBANIS: Was there anyone else in the documentation centre?

MR BRITS: As I said, we were eight to nine people who were in the building at that stage, it was dark, I do not know who was there with me.

MS CAMBANIS: Sir, this is where the computer was taken from, it's an area you would remember.

MR BRITS: That is correct.

MS CAMBANIS: I'm asking about that area where you took the computer, did anyone else enter into that area with you?

MR BRITS: I took the computer when we were busy leaving the building.

MS CAMBANIS: Mr Brits, in the area from which you took the computer, was anyone else in that area with you?

MR BRITS: We were eight to nine people in that area, Mr Chairperson, I cannot say who was with me at that stage in the office.

MS CAMBANIS: Then say that, Mr Brits. Were you the only person in that area, or don't you know?

MR BRITS: We were eight or nine people in that area. I cannot recall who was with me at that stage, maybe I was alone.

MS CAMBANIS: It's possible that you were the only person that went into that area.

MR BRITS: No, Mr Chairperson, because I did not open the doors.

MS CAMBANIS: Thank you, Chair.

ADV SANDI: Sorry, can I just ask a question here just to get clarity.

When you say "that area", which part of the building are you referring to? Are you referring to the ground or the documentation centre?

MR BRITS: I'm talking about the ground floor.

ADV SANDI: Were the only person who entered the documentation centre?

MR BRITS: No, Mr Chairperson.

ADV SANDI: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you have anything to clear, Mr Cornelius?

MR CORNELIUS: No, I don't have anything, thank you Mr Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much, Mr Brits, you are excused.

MR BRITS: Thank you, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you leading any other evidence in respect of Mr Brits, Mr Cornelius?

MR CORNELIUS: No Mr Chair, thank you, that concludes his application.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. I see we have hit four and from the gathering of documentation people are suggesting that we end the day just here. We shall adjourn until tomorrow morning at nine thirty.