CHAIRPERSON: Morning everybody. We'll continue with the CCB hearing. Has it been decided who the next applicant's going to be Mr du Plessis.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, Mr Chairman, he's ready to give evidence.

LEON A MAREE: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Thank you Mr Chairman.

EXAMINATION BY MR P DU PLESSIS: Mr Maree you are an applicant in this matter for amnesty in terms of the National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 95 in regard to an incident regarding Gavin Evans, is that correct?

MR MAREE: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And your application was filed on the 2nd of December 1996. It's dated the 2nd of November 96, is that correct?

MR MAREE: That is so.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Now also as far as you're concerned, you initially applied in terms of the first Act, number 35 of 1990, the "Wet of Vrywaring", is that correct?

MR MAREE: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Sorry, yes while we're busy, do you prefer speaking English or Afrikaans?

MR MAREE: No, it's irrelevant.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, can I just sort this out with the applicant.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Maree, it's your choice, whatever language you want to speak, please feel free to do so.

MR MAREE: Very well, I will give evidence in Afrikaans and English with cross-examination.

CHAIRPERSON: Speak to Mr du Plessis, maybe he has ...

MR P DU PLESSIS: Thank you Mr Chairman, it's sorted out, he will give his evidence-in-chief in Afrikaans and he will answer the cross-examination in English, where applicable, from Mr Kahanovitz.

CHAIRPERSON: We won't hold you to that Mr Maree. If you want to at any stage speak Afrikaans or English, that's up to you.

MR MAREE: Thank you Mr Chairman.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Very well Mr Maree let us then speak Afrikaans at this stage. So you made that initial application in terms of the Act that is dated the 28th March?

MR MAREE: That is correct, yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Concerning that application, there was no formal reply to it.

MR MAREE: No, none at all.

MR P DU PLESSIS: But later you did receive notice that in terms of the Act, in terms of further indemnity, that this first application of yours was referred to the hearing of two Judges in Bloemfontein and indeed it was done on the 9th of December 1993, where you were then represented by Attorney Havenga and Juri Wessels and they argued on behalf of you. Were you present there?

MR MAREE: No, I wasn't.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Well, also concerning this, there was no feedback in terms of the publication of the indemnity in the Government Gazette and then the next step was that in terms of the Act of 34/95, you apply for amnesty?

MR MAREE: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And this is now in terms of the incident around Gavin Evans?

MR MAREE: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Now this application of yours, it's now this application that is serving in front of the Commission at this stage?

MR MAREE: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And you were then assisted by Adv Swiegelaar and you application is in the form of, or with your annexures dated 28th of March 1991, is that correct?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: We will come back to this at a later stage. Very well, before we then deal with the matter as such, I think it is necessary for us to allow you to continue and explain to us in your own words, what the background was. The first issue that I'd like to deal with is your own personal background. I assume you are a South African citizen and that you grew up in Natal?

CHAIRPERSON: Mr du Plessis, you heard that?

MR MAREE: I seem to be the culprit.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: You grew up in Natal?

MR MAREE: That is correct. I grew up and schooled in Port Shepstone. I then joined the police in 1971 and I finished school in 1970.

MR P DU PLESSIS: If you could just slow down for the interpreter.

MR MAREE: I apologise. Directly after school I joined the Police Force and I went to the Police College in Pretoria.

MR P DU PLESSIS: We are now talking about 1970, is that correct?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Continue.

MR MAREE: From there, after the Police College, I went to Pietermaritzburg, from there to Empangeni and from Empangeni Detective Branch to the Brixton Murder and Robbery Unit.

MR P DU PLESSIS: What year would this be where you joined the Brixton Murder and Robbery Unit?

MR MAREE: It was in 1978 or 79.

MR P DU PLESSIS: You were then attached to the Brixton Murder and Robbery Unit up until 1988, is that correct?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: What was your rank when you started your service?

MR MAREE: I was a Warrant Officer.

MR P DU PLESSIS: I would just like to deal with the circumstances around the fact that you then left the Police Service. Can you just in short explain this to us?

MR MAREE: I investigated a murder case or a few murders where the suspects that I identified were Mr le Grange, a former Captain of Murder and Robbery and Robert van der Merwe who was also at the Brixton Murder and Robbery Unit.

MR P DU PLESSIS: It was the murder of drug smugglers.

MR MAREE: Yes. I made my presentation to the Commander.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Who was the Commander?

MR MAREE: It was Col Burger.

MR P DU PLESSIS: This is now Staal Burger who is also an applicant in this matter?

MR MAREE: Yes. Because Capt le Grange was an officer, the dossier was taken from me and then handed over to Pretoria for further investigations.

MR P DU PLESSIS: This Capt le Grange as you've already mentioned, was then an officer at the Brixton Murder and Robbery.

MR MAREE: He was a former Captain at Brixton, but he was then part of the East Rand at that stage.

MR P DU PLESSIS: But if you say Brixton Murder and Robbery, you say that you knew him?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And that is the reason why the file was taken from you?

MR MAREE: Well, I assume so, yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: What - this whole matter round le Grange, what led to it?

MR MAREE: Well, there was certain communication between the Attorney-General's office and certain members at Brixton and also at Head Office, they were asked to transfer certain people and I was amongst them.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Where were you transferred to?

MR MAREE: I was transferred to the Durban Murder and Robbery Unit.

MR P DU PLESSIS: So once again, it was a Murder and Robbery branch. Was this seen as a reflection on your capacity and your impartiality?

MR MAREE: Yes. I believed it was not because I did anything wrong in the investigation.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Did you then indeed accept that transfer to Durban?

MR MAREE: Yes, initially I did when I was called to Pretoria, but in the interim stage I was then approached by Col Burger.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Well, this now includes the recruitment for the CCB. If you can just continue and tell us what happened then.

MR MAREE: Col Burger then approached me and asked me if I was interested in joining the Special Forces, Special Forces asked him to do certain recruitments.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Special Forces of whom?

MR MAREE: The South African Defence Force.

MR P DU PLESSIS: It was then known as the "recce"?

MR MAREE: That is correct. At that stage I was interested in looking at, or to accept the recruitment, I then attended a meeting where Sterk addressed us.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Were there other members who were then later recruited? Who were they?

MR MAREE: Mr Joe Verster addressed us.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Was this meeting at a military compound?

MR MAREE: No, it was on the Ponti Building in Hillbrow.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Did you say who was present as well?

MR MAREE: It was Calla Botha, Staal Burger and Mr van Zyl.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Did you then accept the appointment?

MR MAREE: Yes, after I spoke to Mr Verster and he explained to me what this entailed, I considered it and I think two days later I came back to Mr Burger and told him that I accepted.

MR P DU PLESSIS: You then resigned from the South African Police Service?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Just in short, the initial description of the unit, the Special Forces Unit of the Defence Force, what did this entail?

MR MAREE: What they told me was that it was a covert arm of Special Forces and at that stage I did not have a lot of knowledge concerning Special Forces, so I accepted, as they explained it, covert in the line of the Security Branch of the Police.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, there seems to be a problem with Mr Kahanovitz, I don't know whether it's about...

MR KAHANOVITZ: It's just to do with the quality of the sound in Afrikaans and it seems to have to do with the position of the microphones and also the speed at which they're speaking.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Thank you Mr Chairman. Very well, you are now talking about the covert operations. So you were under the impression, or you were brought under the impression from the start, that you will not run around in Angola in uniform. What was your impression then? Where will you be stationed and what would the circumstances be under which you would work?

MR MAREE: Initially they told us, because there was a contract or an agreement between the South African Police and the South African Defence Force, there will be a cooling off period of 6 months, thereafter we will get an office in Johannesburg and that did occur.

MR P DU PLESSIS: In other words you'll be stationed in Johannesburg?

MR MAREE: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And on that basis you then accepted it?

MR MAREE: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: At that stage of your recruitment, was there any discussion or talk that you would have to act in any illegal way and that would fall in the parameters of your services as the Special Forces of the Defence Force?

MR MAREE: No.

MR P DU PLESSIS: You then mentioned that they told you that there would be a cooling off period of six months. But just before we get to that, did you receive an official service contract?

MR MAREE: Yes, I signed it and handed it over to Mr Verster.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Now what was your impression? For what institute or organisation were you working for?

MR MAREE: For the Defence Force.

MR P DU PLESSIS: The name CCB, was that known to you, that it would be a branch of the Defence Force?

MR MAREE: No, not with the first meeting.

MR P DU PLESSIS: But when you joined?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: So when you signed the contract, the name was then made known to you?

MR MAREE: This contract I think was, if I can recall correctly, with the organisation and it said CCB, but the word used was organisations.

MR P DU PLESSIS: It has been put to you before that the CCB stood separate from the Defence Force in the sense that the activities of the CCB could not lead back to the Defence Force, do you understand what I mean?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: This is also how you were informed?

MR MAREE: Yes, that's how I understood it.

MR P DU PLESSIS: But did you understand that you will not be in the service of the Defence Force then?

MR MAREE: No, that it would be a covert organisation.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And your Commander of this specific unit?

MR MAREE: Gen Joubert.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Gen Joubert, did you meet him?

MR MAREE: Yes, I did meet him.

MR P DU PLESSIS: So in other words, it was a General that was in full-time employment of the Defence Force?

MR MAREE: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: So you had no doubt that you were working for a State Organisation and for the Security Forces at that stage?

MR MAREE: No, I had no illusion that I worked for the Defence Force, that is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And that's also where you money came from, the salaries and the funding for certain projects?

MR MAREE: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: During this cooling-off period, we've also heard other evidence and I do not think it is disputed that there was no activation and you did not really serve in the traditional sense of the word, during that period of 6 months, up until December 1988?

MR MAREE: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: But you did have contact with the organisation, is that correct?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: By means of whom?

MR MAREE: It was Wouter Basson.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Who was know to you as Christo Brits. Was he ...?

MR MAREE: He was the co-ordinator of Region 6.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And this contact during that 6 month period, where did this happen, or how did it happen?

MR MAREE: It was mostly meetings at different hotels in hotel rooms.

MR P DU PLESSIS: What was discussed?

MR MAREE: In short, it was at the start of it, we tried to sort out the documentation. We had no documentation so we tried to find all of that out.

MR P DU PLESSIS: What your service would entail?

MR MAREE: Yes, that is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Then it's also common cause that you were later activated in January 1989.

MR MAREE: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And that indeed the course was presented and that you went through this course and amongst others, Joe Verster, Wouter Basson and others addressed you?

MR MAREE: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Am I also correct that it was also the Commanding General, who was Joubert at that stage?

MR MAREE: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Now without dealing with this extensively, what did this course entail?

MR MAREE: There were different phases. Once again the military style of administration. Because we were Special Forces we did things differently. We did the writing of documents, the purpose of the organisation was explained to us.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Being?

MR MAREE: Being the disruption of the enemy of the country.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Was the enemy explained to you or spelled out?

MR MAREE: Yes, at that stage, I think it was common knowledge that it was the ANC, the PAC or the so-called freedom fighters, which we called the terrorists and today are called the freedom fighters.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Well, what was put to you in broad terms concerning your functions?

MR MAREE: What was put to us, in broader terms was that the day of conventional warfare in South Africa is over, the enemy is now in the country and that we are a similar organisation and we will fight fire with fire and we will adapt our methods to theirs.

MR P DU PLESSIS: What did this entail?

MR MAREE: It was the elimination of people, the burning of houses or any disruption to ...

MR P DU PLESSIS: Disruption actions?

MR MAREE: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Would this include fund organisations of the ANC, to act against the ANC?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: At that stage you just left the South African Police, what was your perception concerning those circumstances in the country?

MR MAREE: Well from the police's side I was aware of it. I was aware that there were bombs in the country, that bombs were planted against the State, friends of mine, policemen who were blown up, cars that were blown up, so I was aware that the war was in the country, I was aware of this.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And did you sympathise with the tasks of the South African Defence Force?

MR MAREE: Yes, I did, I was part of them.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Very well, we will at a later stage deal with that area, but was it explained to you how these covert operations would work?

MR MAREE: Yes, in broader terms they explained to us that the blue plan and a red plan ...

MR P DU PLESSIS: That would be then the cover, to give you access?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And also to give you a legitimate base to work from, from there you would then execute your operations?

MR MAREE: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And the red plan would then be the activation in terms of the operations against the enemy?

MR MAREE: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And with that you confirm what has already been said in terms of the recruitment of unconscious agents?

MR MAREE: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: I'm not going to cover all of that again, but you then indeed after you completed that course, took certain steps to establish a cover for yourself?

MR MAREE: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: What did you then do in terms of the establishment of a blue plan cover?

MR MAREE: Well, I established a front company for the export from South Africa to other African countries, electronic appliances, computers, pocket calculators, watches, etc.

MR P DU PLESSIS: You now said that you established a company, was this a formal company?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: What was the name?

MR MAREE: It was Lema, L-E-M-A, was the name of the company.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Did it stand for something?

MR MAREE: Well, it is the first two letters of my name and then my surname. The company I established in Johannesburg, funding was approved for the establishment of this company by the Defence Force.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Was this then an official request for funds that you had to do through documentation?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Can you recall what type of funds were made available to you?

MR MAREE: At a certain stage, R40 000 was made available for the company.

MR P DU PLESSIS: What would you use it for?

MR MAREE: Well it would be the buying of furniture to furnish the offices.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And to get personnel?

MR MAREE: That is correct yes, for the first month or two.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And did you then use those funds?

MR MAREE: Yes, I did, some of it, but my plans changed, I did not buy furniture but I started renting furnished offices.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Was this now in a centre where there were offices and also furniture and also personnel?

MR MAREE: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Where were the offices?

MR MAREE: They were in Park Town in Johannesburg and I then gave back the rest of the money until I needed it at a later stage.

MR MAREE: So if I understand you correctly, you made a monthly withdrawal and rather than using the whole lump sum at the same time.

MR MAREE: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: When you activated this company, was it a business?

MR MAREE: Yes, it was a business. I did business and I also embarked on a - because it was a new area, I'm a policeman, I do not know anything about business and I thought if I had people around me who knew about it, I could learn from them, that's why I started with a very small company. I then did that and after a few months I started with these things that I exported. I started making money and then I got a partner to assist me in it.

MR P DU PLESSIS: So you then indeed, to put it this way, you had a bona fide business?

MR MAREE: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Was the idea of this whole system that you would have a believable cover or was it only a door where there's nothing going on behind it?

MR MAREE: I understood and later I went into it a bit further, that it was very important to have a good foundation, a very good blue plan. To get access you need, if somebody asks you, you must seem legitimate. If somebody comes to your office, it must seem as if there's things going on and I tried to do this to the best of my abilities.

MR P DU PLESSIS: So it is a question where in the community you want to establish yourself as a businessman, it's not just a front door, you must indeed run a business and people must trust you doing it and you then did it?

MR MAREE: Yes, that is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: At the, or during this initial term from January to March, we also heard evidence that there were basically provinces given to the different members of Region 6 on the ground floor level, that was yourself and Mr Botha and you had to concentrate on these areas?

MR MAREE: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: But you were not always applied in these areas?

MR MAREE: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And that KwaZulu Natal was given to you so that you could also establish yourself there and that would be the province on which you would focus?

MR MAREE: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Why was this done? Is there any specific reason for this?

MR MAREE: Well, because I went to school there and I grew up there and I knew Natal and I assume that was the reason.

MR P DU PLESSIS: But out of your evidence before, it seemed that if you were to ...(indistinct) as a detective or policeman and you did not work in Natal.

MR MAREE: It's true, I knew the area but I've lost contact with a lot of the people there, but I went back to look up old friends and to make contact with them again.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Very well. Did you also extend your business activities?

MR MAREE: Yes, I also established a company in Durban that provided goods to ships coming in and once again I got a partner to run the business to give me the freedom to move around.

MR P DU PLESSIS: He did not know what was going on?

MR MAREE: He was completely unconscious, he did not know what was going on.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And was this once again a normal branch or office?

MR MAREE: It was not the same type of work as the first company. I provided goods to ships that came into the harbour.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Can you still recall the name of the company?

MR MAREE: Capall, C-A-P-A-L-L.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Was it once again a formal company?

MR MAREE: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: You say that this company did indeed run the business and did do business. Did you make use of the funds?

MR MAREE: No, the Lema office in Johannesburg, I just took one or two months of their profit to make use, to buy furniture.

MR P DU PLESSIS: So you were running the Lema business at a profit?

MR MAREE: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And you used that money to create the company in Natal. If I understand you correctly, it was not against the rules of the CCB, it was indeed the policy of the CCB that you will have a legitimate business, you will establish this business from which you can then draw a salary or that you can make a living with it and you were supported in this, that you were going to make a profit in it and make use of it?

MR MAREE: That is correct. I did run it in terms of the profit, but it was not the purpose to get a salary from it, but I got a salary from the Defence Force.

MR P DU PLESSIS: It wasn't a factor however, this is now from the profits of the company?

MR MAREE: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: But you had to make a profit otherwise the company would not exist.

MR MAREE: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Just to come back to what you have already said to us. You spoke to us about CAPALL, the other company that did business, to come back to Lema, this company you say did exports to what country?

MR MAREE: Well, it was Zambia, Swaziland, Botswana, African countries around us.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Did this include Namibia?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Botswana?

MR MAREE: Namibia, Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Zimbabwe?

MR MAREE: Zambia, not Zimbabwe.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Very well. Did you personally, in order to further your exports, did you travel to these countries?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: What was the purpose of it?

MR MAREE: To receive business or to get business from those countries. Because I didn't have people on the grassroots level, I don't have experience, so I wen to the Chambers of Commerce in these countries and they referred me to companies, gave me names and contracts with companies I can do business with, so I can then choose whom I want to deal with.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And this was in the furthering of your business in terms of the blue plan? You had no illusions that you would then, or the fact that you could move freely in those countries, that it can be an advantage for the CCB?

MR MAREE: That is correct, that was the purpose thereof.

CHAIRPERSON: When you say it was the purpose thereof, when you were to focus on Natal, ...

MR MAREE: To give me freedom of movement, Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but I mean your function in the CCB wasn't it to focus on KwaZulu Natal?

MR MAREE: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: So in what way would it be beneficial to the CCB if you could wander around freely in Namibia or Zambia or Swaziland or Botswana?

MR MAREE: Not necessarily to do that. On the course we were told that we must access freedom of movement wherever we want to and that's what I tried to do there.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr du Plessis.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Thank you Mr Chairman. And then perhaps just to clarify the point which was touched upon by the Chairperson a few moments ago, if I understand you correctly, these activities of yours, the establishment of Lema, the exports, the movements in the African countries, all of this took place in January, February, March, April of 1989, the initial months?

MR MAREE: Yes, the first few months of 1989.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Now as a result of this successful establishment of Lema and the exports particularly, was there any movement in the CCB as a result of this, especially with regard to its functions?

MR MAREE: There was another company which I established, yes. I also established Lema in Windhoek, in Namibia.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Was it a branch of Lema?

MR MAREE: Yes, it was a company on it's own, it was Lema, Namibia.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Was it also an incorporated company?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: In Windhoek?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And regarding these activities of yours, was there ever any change with regard to the CCB's plans with you?

MR MAREE: Yes. Later I was called in by Mr Burger and I was asked whether I would be interested in working in Germany.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And then with regard to Africa, can you give us an indication of when the Germany offer came about?

If we could just establish the course of time. We've examined January to April, that was the African situation and then emanating there from, did you follow any courses or anything like that?

MR MAREE: Out of my own, I followed a business management course because I was a layman, I didn't really know much and I needed to learn more.

MR P DU PLESSIS: At which institution?

MR MAREE: At Executive Education. It was a very basic Management course.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Who paid for the course? The CCB actually?

MR MAREE: Yes, the CCB.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And this question that you would focus abroad and ultimately in Germany, was this your own initiative or was it from the CCB?

MR MAREE: From the CCB.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And was this based upon your successful activities in other African Countries, as you have just explained to us?

MR MAREE: I think it was based upon my blue companies which had been successfully established that they functioned efficiently.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Was your function then at that point when you were asked to focus or concentrate on foreign countries, was your focus still specifically on KwaZulu Natal in the sense that it was your job?

MR MAREE: I was told to work in Natal, but I viewed this over the long term and I thought that I should first establish a sound basis.

MR P DU PLESSIS: That would include Capall?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: The company that included Capall?

MR MAREE: Yes, it gave me the freedom to move to Durban because I had to work in Natal. I had a reason to go to Durban without any questions being asked.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Now the establishment of blue plans and the establishment of a credible front for the CCB, was this a sort of crises management which was executed over the short term, or was it a long term plan? What was your perception?

MR MAREE: It was my perception that it was a long term plan, that it had to be done proficiently. That is what I tried to do. I tried to establish a sound basis. I viewed it in the long term and I was also told that it was a long term thing.

MR P DU PLESSIS: So you were told so? Why were you told so?

MR MAREE: I was told so by Mr Burger, Mr Verster and during the course.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Was any pressure exerted on you to deliver so-called production with regard to the projects and execution of such projects?

MR MAREE: No, it was said that this was a significant phase, the establishment of an efficient blue plan.

MR P DU PLESSIS: You see, because questions have been put here, among others, by the Chairperson that it seems somewhat difficult to understand that the person Chappies Maree, as he is known, is in disfavour with Mr Slang van Zyl with regard to production. It would appear that you were there for nine months, and with the exception of Gavin Evans, nothing happened.

MR MAREE: Yes, it must be so, we had different working methods. My blue plan entrapped me in the sense that I found myself in a situation for a number of months where I didn't know anything about business, but I had to deal with businesses and staff members and I was caught up in the whole idea of running a business, rather than delivering production.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Later we will deal in specific terms with Gavin Evans, but it is common cause that in approximately March 1989, an instruction came your way with regard to Gavin Evans?

MR MAREE: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And that you indeed executed your instruction with regard to that. It is not common cause as such perhaps, but you could perhaps inform us regarding this. What was your precise instruction?

MR MAREE: I was given a document, or at least a document was shown to me by Mr Basson and I was given an instruction to trace Gavin Evans’ address and his place of employment. I had to try and trace him between these two.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Very well. We will deal with the details later. Did you do so?

MR MAREE: Yes, I did.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And you sent the information back?

MR MAREE: Yes, I gave them feedback.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Did you continue with the project?

MR MAREE: No, I didn't.

MR P DU PLESSIS: It is on record that Mr van Zyl ultimately received an order to execute a project regarding Gavin Evans.

MR MAREE: I understand that.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Were you involved in the execution of that project in any way whatsoever?

MR MAREE: No.

MR P DU PLESSIS: As I've said, we will return to the details of that later. Why were you not involved? Why was it taken away from you?

MR MAREE: Because I must have taken too long with it. It wasn't that it wasn't important to me but I was caught up in the blue plan business and the establishment of these businesses, so I was more in Natal to establish Capall, than what I was here at that point.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Were you told what you were supposed to concentrate on when the Gavin Evans project was taken away from you?

MR MAREE: What I had to concentrate on?

MR P DU PLESSIS: Yes what you were supposed to do.

MR MAREE: In Natal?

MR P DU PLESSIS: No, in general.

MR MAREE: I was involved with the blue plan.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Very well. So were there any problems in the CCB with regard to the fact that you had to continue with the blue plan?

MR MAREE: No, I assumed that they were happy that this was done.

MR P DU PLESSIS: That it was going well?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: You've already referred to the course that you did for a month. Was it a full-time course?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And that was for the month of May?

MR MAREE: Yes, it was during May.

MR P DU PLESSIS: So that brings us to the end of May 1989.

MR MAREE: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Which is five months on from January at that point.

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: After the completion of this course, which you did with the good blessings of the CCB along with their finance, what happened furthermore with regard to CCB activities? Were you still involved with the blue plan?

MR MAREE: Yes, I was.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And were there any other projects, so to speak, which came to your side, or any other instructions that you had to execute for the CCB?

MR MAREE: Yes, there were.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Could you explain this to us?

MR MAREE: I had to do a placement of a person in Namibia.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Who was this person?

MR MAREE: Donald Aitchison.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Do you have personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the recruitment of Mr Aitchison?

MR MAREE: No.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Did you regard Mr Aitchison as an aware or an unaware, or unconscious member?

MR MAREE: An unconscious member.

MR P DU PLESSIS: From whom did you receive the order?

MR MAREE: From Mr Burger.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Very well. If we examine the time schedule surrounding Aitchison’s placement, can you recall more or less when it would have been?

MR MAREE: Approximately June, July or August in 1989.

MR P DU PLESSIS: July or August?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Just to view this in context, during these periods did you often travel abroad?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: With reference to African countries, that is?

MR MAREE: Yes, that is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And in this period of June, July and August, during this time, did you visit any European countries?

MR MAREE: Yes, I did.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Which country specifically?

MR MAREE: Greece.

MR P DU PLESSIS: With what purpose?

MR MAREE: Once again, the expansion of a company, to try to promote my blue plan, with a businessman, I went with a businessman to try to establish this.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Did you only go to Greece at that stage?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Who financed this?

MR MAREE: The CCB.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And so it was official business in promotion of the blue plan?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And nobody complained about it?

MR MAREE: No.

MR P DU PLESSIS: You stated that you also visited Namibia and that indeed you incorporated Lema as a company in Windhoek.

MR MAREE: That is correct. I could not do or practice the company as a singular unit, that is why I had to establish Lema B in Windhoek.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Can you recall precisely when this was? We can use a general time period if you want.

MR MAREE: It was approximately with my return from Greece.

MR P DU PLESSIS: So it would have been in July or August as well?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: More or less the same time when Aitchison was placed?

MR MAREE: Yes. The company was registered before Aitchison was there.

MR P DU PLESSIS: So it was shortly before that?

MR MAREE: Yes, because I had been there previously to purchase a company in Namibia.

MR P DU PLESSIS: What sort of company?

MR MAREE: It was just to look for a company to acquire in Namibia. I knew what I was doing at that point, because I wanted to establish Lema there.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And did Lema in Namibia do any good business?

MR MAREE: No, it didn't, it was registered, but it didn't.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Was this particular company incorporated with Aitchison in mind?

MR MAREE: No.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Did it not have anything to do with that?

MR MAREE: No.

MR P DU PLESSIS: It was still a bona fide expansion of the blue plan?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: This trip to Greece and the examination of Europe, upon whose initiative was this done?

MR MAREE: The CCB.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Once again, the question originates that originally you were told to examine KwaZulu Natal and the next thing you find yourself in the Greek Islands, which is a little far from KwaZulu Natal. How did this happen? Was this the long term vision regarding the activities?

MR MAREE: At that stage I didn't know, now I know that there was.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Were you told to expand to Europe?

MR MAREE: Mr Burger told me, and that is what I tried to do.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Very well and eventually you went to Germany as well?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: When was your first time that you visited Germany, can you recall?

MR MAREE: August, approximately, I cannot recall precisely, it was August 1989.

MR P DU PLESSIS: You went to Germany?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And was this once again an instruction?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: To do what?

MR MAREE: To do a pre-study for a transfer to there.

MR P DU PLESSIS: So at that point it was the vision that you would ultimately settle in Europe?

MR MAREE: Yes. Mr Burger called me in and asked me how I would feel about settling permanently in Germany, about being stationed there and I was in favour of it. They sent me to Germany to expand the blue plan of Lema once again, to give me movement room to contact German companies and that is what I did. I placed advertisements in newspapers, made contact with business people, I examined the schooling systems and went to establish office space and to obtain housing. I went to examine the scene for this.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And you did it in the end?

MR MAREE: Yes, I did.

MR P DU PLESSIS: So at that stage the entire focus of your activities was actually from the internal side to the external side?

MR MAREE: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And during this same period of time that we have referred to, you received an instruction to handle Aitchison?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And did you indeed physically meet with Aitchison?

MR MAREE: Yes, I did.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Where?

MR MAREE: The first time was at a hotel in Norwood, thereafter in Swaziland and then again in Namibia.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Very well. And was funding made available by the CCB for the establishment of Aitchison?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: In Namibia?

MR MAREE: Correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, unfortunately I will have to deal with the whole Lubowski/Aitchison saga in view of the questions that have been put here to different witnesses, so although Mr Maree did not ask for amnesty in this regard, there's nothing in terms of my instructions he had to ask for amnesty for. I have to place this within the bigger picture, when we're dealing with Mr Gavin Evans, so at this stage I'm dealing with this. Therefore you say that you went to establish Aitchison there?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And did you also meet him personally in Namibia?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And did you conduct the establishment there?

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry just before you proceed. This word establishment, what did it entail to establish Aitchison? Was that just to recruit him as an unaware member, or did you employ him at Lema, fix him up with a job, or what are you talking about when you say you had to establish Aitchison?

MR MAREE: He was already recruited Sir, so I had to establish him in South West, in Namibia, by settling him in, getting him housing and seeing if I could get him a job and a motor vehicle and moving his family there.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Perhaps we could deal with this briefly. So with regard to Aitchison, if we understand your evidence correctly, it was not a short term thing?

MR MAREE: No, I was instructed to place Aitchison in Namibia and there was also a plan for him to be a so-called English sleeper because Namibia was on the verge of its reawakening at that stage.

MR P DU PLESSIS: If I recall correctly, the election took place approximately during August in 1989.

MR MAREE: Yes, that is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Was funding made available by the CCB as well?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And you said that he had to take his family there, did he have a family?

MR MAREE: I don't know if it was his wife, I think he also had two children.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And the lady who was going with him?

MR MAREE: Yes, so originally there was a problem, he would have had to wait a month because the school times for the children were not suitable and I had to get quotes for his family, the Defence Force wanted three quotes for the transportation of his furniture to Namibia.

MR P DU PLESSIS: So he was established in Namibia at that point, but his family was yet to follow?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And the arrangements for this were underway?

MR MAREE: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And he agreed to go and stay there?

MR MAREE: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And at that point, was there any particular instruction which Mr Aitchison had to execute there that you knew of?

MR MAREE: Yes, he had to try and get a job, but I also told him that the job wasn't the most important, because we would be paying him a salary while he was there.

MR P DU PLESSIS: So he was already receiving funding?

MR MAREE: Yes and there was also a problem with housing because in Windhoek there wasn't a lot of housing because UNTAG was in Windhoek at that stage, so all the housing was occupied, but he did find a garden cottage with somebody.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And that was also another reason why his wife and family couldn't join him, because the housing situation hadn't been sorted out yet.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And he did get a job. Did you find the job for him, or did he find it himself?

MR MAREE: No, he found it himself. He was a journalist and a cartoon sketcher so he managed to get the job himself.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Did you have any instructions for him with regard to illegal activities that he had to execute there with regard to the political situation and the intimidation or murder of persons?

MR MAREE: No, nothing whatsoever.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Did you yourself have such orders which you would ultimately have to send through to him?

MR MAREE: No, not at all.

MR P DU PLESSIS: If I understand you correctly, your instruction was merely to establish him there for later usage.

MR MAREE: Yes. I did not recruit him either, I was simply given a document and I was told to go and meet this man and to establish him in Namibia, that is all.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Very well. We are now aware of the fact that at a certain point Adv Anton Lubowski was murdered in Namibia, the date being the 12th of September.

MR MAREE: Correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Where were you on the 12th of September?

MR MAREE: In Johannesburg.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Had you visited Namibia at any point during that time?

MR MAREE: I was in and out of Namibia. Four days before Mr Lubowski's death I was in Namibia.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Did you have anything whatsoever to do with the death of Lubowski?

MR MAREE: No.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Did you have any knowledge that it was going to happen?

MR MAREE: No.

MR P DU PLESSIS: We will deal with the following matter at a later point. By nature of the situation it became known to you that Mr Aitchison was indeed arrested.

MR MAREE: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Now with regard to his recruitment by a certain Knox police officer who introduced him to Mr Barnard who was then handed over to Mr Botha and brought in to the CCB, did you have any knowledge of that background?

MR MAREE: No.

MR P DU PLESSIS: You said that you regarded him as an unconscious member.

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: It would appear from the evidence that he was conscious.

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: If this whole situation had been known to you, would you have placed your man there?

MR MAREE: It was my order. If I had known, in retrospect it is easier to say, but I think I might have acted differently.

MR P DU PLESSIS: It is clear that there was no particular cut-off date or point with Mr Aitchison.

MR MAREE: Yes, from my side I followed it through as such.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Someone else other than Mr Botha who received him from Mr Barnard.

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: While we are on the subject, were you at any stage aware of Mr Barnard's application?

MR MAREE: No.

MR P DU PLESSIS: You or any other members?

MR MAREE: No, not at all.

MR P DU PLESSIS: I beg your pardon?

MR MAREE: I knew Mr Barnard from the police, but I didn't know about anything else.

MR P DU PLESSIS: So you knew him?

MR MAREE: Yes, I knew him.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Were you aware of his involvement with the CCB?

MR MAREE: No.

MR P DU PLESSIS: With Region 7 specifically?

MR MAREE: No, not at all.

MR P DU PLESSIS: In terms of the structure as it existed then, would Mr Barnard's application - let me rather not deal with that. You have stated that you were not aware of his application.

MR MAREE: Yes, that is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: After it became known that Aitchison was arrested, what were the actions thereafter or the reaction at the very least?

MR MAREE: I was called in and told to break off all contact with Aitchison, which is what I did.

MR P DU PLESSIS: So regarding you, ...

MR MAREE: My cut-off points were correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: After Aitchison’s arrest, did you continue with your CCB activities in the sense of the proposed establishment in Germany?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: So it was not suspended?

MR MAREE: No.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And did you return to Germany?

MR MAREE: Yes, I did, in December of that year.

MR P DU PLESSIS: December 1989?

MR MAREE: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: So were further funds made available for you in that regard?

MR MAREE: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: The trip to Germany at that point, was it still with the objective that you were supposed to establish yourself there?

MR MAREE: Yes. Me and my partner from Lema went together. He was not aware of what I was involved with, but I took him with to Germany. The Defence Force paid for it. We went to make acquisitions and while we were there, we dealt with the other business that he was indeed aware of, that we were looking for contact points and persons in Germany.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And while you were in Germany, were there any developments in South Africa with regard to the CCB?

MR MAREE: Yes, there were.

MR P DU PLESSIS: I'm referring to the arrest of Calla Botha in December.

MR MAREE: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Also the arrest of Mr Slang van Zyl in January, just the following year, 1990.

MR MAREE: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Which then threw the entire CCB into turmoil.

MR MAREE: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And what emanated from that? Did you receive any orders from that?

MR MAREE: While I was in Germany or in Europe, I received an instruction to remain there, but that my partner had to return. This was the first time when my partner was informed of what was really going on because I didn't really have any other choice. My co-ordinator told me what had happened, he told me that Mr Botha had been arrested and that Mr van Zyl had been arrested. He returned after I had informed him precisely of what was going on. The other staff members still didn't know what the real situation was and he returned to inform them of the actual position. I remained and waited for further instructions.

MR P DU PLESSIS: This entire movement which took place surrounding the CCB was established to a greater extent by the fact that the police of Namibia, which at that stage had become independent and particularly Jumbo Smit, was conducting investigations in South Africa into the Lubowski case and it was in terms of this that you were instructed to remain where you were?

MR MAREE: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: You've already said that with regard to the Lubowski murder you did not perform any role nor did you have any knowledge of the incident itself.

MR MAREE: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: But by nature of the situation, there are fingers which pointed in your direction over the years and particularly those of a certain Judge Levy, you are aware of his finding that the CCB in Region 6 and particularly your name was mentioned and that you were to have been involved in the matter according to his findings.

MR MAREE: I deny this.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Very well. The final point with regard to the Lubowski matter that I would like to deal with is the report of the TRC to the State President, which was submitted here as Exhibit D. This matter is dealt with in terms of Lubowski. There are just one or two aspects about this that I would like to touch upon with you. Before I get to that, however, after your involvement with the CCB, we know that the Harms Commission came into being early in 1990.

MR MAREE: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And you returned from Germany?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And you were here at the time of the Harms Commission being in session?

MR MAREE: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And subsequently the CCB was disbanded and your services were terminated with the CCB by means of a package system?

MR MAREE: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And it is common cause that from 1991 onwards you once again became involved with the South African Defence Force but with the Department of Covert Collections?

MR MAREE: Yes, the DCC.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And until when were you involved there?

MR MAREE: Until 1993.

MR P DU PLESSIS: That is the same matter regarding which Mr Wouter Basson gave evidence, namely that there was an investigation by the Goldstone Commission of Inquiry and as a result of this your services were promptly terminated?

MR MAREE: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Just to return to the report which I've already mentioned, the TRC report. Mr Chairman I see that the pages are not numbered, it's Exhibit D, one of the pages deals with the killing of Anton Lubowski, but it's not numbered in my bundle or my Exhibit, it's paragraph 1.4.1. and further.

MR LAX: As far as I remember we referred to the specifics paragraphs for record purposes and perhaps you should just continue to do that. They're all numbered, as far as I understand.

MR P DU PLESSIS: We'll refer to them by paragraph then. They deal there in paragraph 1.4.6. with the fact that Judge Levy then made certain findings in which you and Chappies Maree were implicated. Are you aware of that?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And then I can see that Mr Ferdi Barnard's name is also mentioned here as well as a Charles Wilscoat, formerly Nielsen, do you know of such a person?

MR MAREE: No.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Mr Ferdi Barnard, you do confirm that you knew him before your involvement at the CCB?

MR MAREE: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: The other people are Joe Verster, Staal Burger, Abram Slang van Zyl, Calla Botha and yourself and Wouter Basson and it is then Region 6 as well as the Director General, Joe Verster. Then Johan Niemoller is mentioned, do you know anything about him?

MR MAREE: No.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Then Schutte we've already dealt with, you also say you do not know him. Then there's reference to a Christoffel Nel and if you follow the evidence here, it is very clear that it is one Derek from the CCB, this is in paragraph 1.7., did you know this person during your involvement at the CCB?

MR MAREE: No, I did not.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Paragraph 1.4.8., said that:

Now at that stage, we now know that you joined DCC.

MR MAREE: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: That was in 1991?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: We are now talking about 1989 with the death of Lubowski. Did you have any contact at that stage with DCC?

MR MAREE: No, I did not even know they existed.

MR P DU PLESSIS: The Defence Force, DCC?

MR MAREE: Well I did not know anything about them.

MR P DU PLESSIS: At that stage, did you know Brig Koos Louw at that stage?

MR MAREE: No.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And Major Geoffrey Burton Price?

MR MAREE: I only met him later when I joined the DCC.

MR P DU PLESSIS: What was Price's background?

MR MAREE: He was an ex-Rhodesian from the CIO.

MR P DU PLESSIS: What is CIO?

MR MAREE: Central Intelligence Organisation.

MR P DU PLESSIS: From the old Rhodesia?

MR MAREE: That is correct yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: In other words, he had a military background?

MR MAREE: Yes, he had a military background from Rhodesia, that is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Very well. Then there's reference made in paragraph 149:

If I'm correct, I think it was also Rich Verster. Do you know this person?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Did you know him in 1989?

MR MAREE: No, I met him at a later stage. I heard about him before he was involved in - I think he went to jail for - I think some Zulu clan hired him to shoot another clan and I think he went to jail for that.

MR P DU PLESSIS: He was a convicted murderer?

MR MAREE: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS:

That refers to Lubowski,

Out of this it's very clear that Rich Verster was involved at DCC during the Lubowski murder, 12th September, 1989. Are you aware of that?

MR MAREE: No.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Are you aware of the fact of the activities of DCC in Namibia?

MR MAREE: No, I wasn't.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Of any other Intelligence organisation in Namibia?

MR MAREE: A lot of them were involved, but I personally did not know of any operations by any intelligence organisation or any country's Intelligence Services.

MR P DU PLESSIS: At that stage, that is September 1989?

MR MAREE: That is correct, yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Then I have to deal with that. There is a quote from evidence or a testimony of Rich Verster with reference to certain people that I'd like to ask if you know them.

Now resulting from this, we've already dealt with Koos Louw, Tolletjie Botha, the former head of DCC, did you know him?

MR MAREE: Yes, I knew him, not then, later when I was transferred.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Is it correct if I say that he is dead?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Was he also the Commander while you were there?

MR MAREE: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: But in September 89 you did not know him?

MR MAREE: No, I did not know him, also not Koos Louw.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Here they make mention that immediately after Lubowski's death, DCC or Rich Verster's evidence was aware of Aitchison’s existence as well as his arrest, or certain information was sought after his arrest. Do you know if DCC knew about Aitchison?

MR MAREE: No, not at all.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And you did not do anything that would make that information available to them?

MR MAREE: No.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Then lastly, on this aspect, it is possibly so that Mr Aitchison was indeed responsible for the death of Adv Anton Lubowski. Were you at any stage aware of this? Did you contribute to it in any way?

MR MAREE: No.

MR P DU PLESSIS: There are other aspects that I'm not going to go into now, where Aitchison’s apparently said that he had to kill Gwen Lister and for that he had poison, do you know anything about this?

MR MAREE: No, not at all.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Did you at any stage have poison or tablets in your capacity as a member of the CCB?

MR MAREE: No.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Do you know if any poisonous materials were found at Aitchison?

MR MAREE: No.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Nothing was said about it?

MR MAREE: No, I never heard about it.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Very well, I think this concludes this whole situation, concerning this, placed in context as well as with your business activities. To then come back to the whole matter, the reason why you are here, the whole matter around Gavin Evans, we've already placed it in perspective that these events surrounding Gavin Evans were in March 1989, is that correct?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: You've already said to us what your instructions were, what you received from the co-ordinator Mr Christo Brits, real name Wouter Basson, who already testified. At that stage were you aware of what the final project would entail concerning Gavin Evans?

MR MAREE: No, not at that stage.

MR MAREE: Out of your involvement in the CCB, did you consider the possibility that what you are doing may lead to the project concerning Mr Evans, that may include his elimination?

MR MAREE: Yes, I did realise this.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And this is now also why you indeed applied for amnesty?

MR MAREE: That is correct, yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Maybe, while we're dealing with this point, with regards to the other projects that we dealt with, the other members and the whole situation around the planned death of Mr Dullah Omar, the Athlone Bomb and the Apie project, did you know anything about that?

MR MAREE: No.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Then just to come back to Evans, the name that was given to you, what was this?

MR MAREE: It was Gavin Evans.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Was the name Michael Evans ever given to you?

MR MAREE: No, it was only Gavin Evans.

MR P DU PLESSIS: So did you know what information you had to get and how you had to deal with the situation?

MR MAREE: Yes, it was around Gavin Evans, I knew he was a journalist at the Weekly Mail. He was a sports writer and that's how I identified him. I could not - because I did not have people on ground level, it would be really difficult to do it yourself, you have to use other people to do it. I could not personally make inquiries concerning his address.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Just on that point, you say that this person was a sports writer. Was he known to you beforehand during that time?

MR MAREE: No.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Were you aware that he was a sports writer?

MR MAREE: No, after I made certain - I found this out at a later stage, actually.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Did you have a physical description?

MR MAREE: Yes, there was a photograph available.

MR P DU PLESSIS: A photograph?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: So you could then identify this person as Gavin Evans?

MR MAREE: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: After your information functions, what did you do with the photograph?

MR MAREE: I gave it back to Wouter Basson.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Is it possible that this is the photograph that was then at a later stage made available?

MR MAREE: Yes, I'm sure it was the same photograph.

MR P DU PLESSIS: We are now talking about March 1989, you said that you could not go and look for the address yourself, why is this?

MR MAREE: I could have done it yes, but I saw it as a covert operation and it would not work if I did it myself.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Did you have anybody to assist you?

MR MAREE: No, I couldn't use anybody to go in, to find out where he worked and to monitor his work.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Were you willing to take the same risk as what Mr Botha ran and not be caught out?

MR MAREE: No, but what I did - I was not aware that Mr Botha did this.

MR P DU PLESSIS: But this was only at a later stage?

MR MAREE: Yes, but what I did was that I pretended over the telephone that I was a friend of his, because he did not want to give his address. This was at the newspaper where he worked. I then got somebody else on the line and I asked them where he lives and this lady gave me his address and that is then the address that I gave to Mr Basson.

MR MAREE: Could you inquire about further facts that surrounded him?

MR MAREE: No, it was not that I thought that it was a very small project, but at that stage I was quite involved in my blue plan and that is why I didn't really give more attention to it.

MR P DU PLESSIS: So you did not physically do any monitoring to gather more information concerning his movements?

MR MAREE: No.

MR P DU PLESSIS: This address that you found out, did you then give this to the co-ordinator?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And were you then in any way further involved in this project?

MR MAREE: No that was the end of my part.

MR P DU PLESSIS: There was evidence of Mr van Zyl that he thinks, he's of the opinion that you were present when he received the instruction to bring the people from the Cape.

MR MAREE: That is not true.

MR P DU PLESSIS: To execute this project, he then later under questioning said that he's not quite sure about. Were you there?

MR MAREE: No, I wasn't.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Did you have any contact or role in the execution of the project concerning the planning of the death of Mr Gavin Evans?

MR MAREE: No, not at all.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Did you at any stage make a pre-study concerning Mr Gavin Evans in the formal sense of the word, concerning the CCB and how they functioned, how they planned his death, that he would be killed with a knife, that it would look like a robbery, etc?

MR MAREE: Well, the address that I got from this lady from the Weekly Mail, I handed it over to Mr Basson and that was the last aspect that I dealt with. I had nothing further to do with it.

MR P DU PLESSIS: It is so that you deal with this aspect concerning Mr Gavin Evans in your amnesty application that appears or that is then based on the document that was written or submitted in December 1991 and at that stage you were represented by this same legal team as Mr Burger and Basson.

MR MAREE: That is correct, yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And these documents were all compiled by the same person?

MR MAREE: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And you also take responsibility for this document?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And is it also so, I'm not going to deal with it in detail, but that there are certain mistakes contained in this document, especially surrounding the question if you would then have gathered information surrounding Mr Gavin Evans or that he was involved in undermining operations against the State?

MR MAREE: It was not my task. It is written there though, but it was not my task.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And then if you then could find evidence that he was involved in undermining operations against the State, that you would then act against him. Was that the instruction that you were given?

MR MAREE: No, it was not the instruction. It appeared in the application as a mistake.

MR P DU PLESSIS: You've already said that Gavin Evans was unknown to you, but when they gave you instructions to find the address, did you know what organisation he belonged to?

MR MAREE: I knew that he was from the ECC and that's what Mr Basson said to me, End Conscription Campaign.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Was this organisation known to you?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: This was now independently of any information that you had?

MR MAREE: Well, that was from the newspapers and everybody knew about it.

MR P DU PLESSIS: What were the activities of this organisation, was that the destabilisation of the Defence Force?

MR MAREE: Well, that was to break down the morale of the Defence Force in that they do not follow orders, that they were called up to serve and they did not.

MR P DU PLESSIS: And to add to this, this whole involvement of the CCB, was this based on any specific political philosophies that you personally followed or supported?

MR MAREE: Well, the politics did count yes, I was in the police for 20 years. I grew up Afrikaans. I also supported the apartheid Government, although you do not find them anymore, everybody just disappeared overnight.

MR P DU PLESSIS: But you are willing to admit it?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: With hindsight you can look back and say that yes, it didn't work, that it was not necessary?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR P DU PLESSIS: What was your opinion concerning the Republic of South Africa at that stage?

MR MAREE: I saw it in the same light, or because I was involved in the cover things, I saw it in the same way as the Israelis saw their homeland, that it belongs to them and that the sovereignty of it must be protected.

MR P DU PLESSIS: That the Israelis are still doing now today.

MR MAREE: Yes, that is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Although we do see today that it's not necessary in this country, that we can live together.

MR MAREE: That is correct.

MR P DU PLESSIS: But at that stage that was your political philosophy, that you wanted to protect the State or the Government and your functions in the CCB, you saw that in the light of the philosophy as you just explained it. Is that why you were willing to destabilise the enemy of the State of that time?

MR MAREE: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you Mr Chairman, that is all in chief.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr du Plessis. I see it's exactly 11 o'clock, so it will be a convenient time to take the short tea adjournment. We'll have a 20 minute tea adjournment. Thank you.

LEON A MAREE: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr du Plessis, do you have any questions you'd like to put to Mr Maree?

MR H DU PLESSIS: Thank you Chairperson.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR H DU PLESSIS: Mr Maree if I understood your evidence correctly, then you were simply involved in the Evans case because you had to find an address?

MR MAREE: That is correct.

MR H DU PLESSIS: You do not have any knowledge whether or not it was submitted as a project to the Chairperson and if so, by whom or what was said to him when this was allegedly done?

MR MAREE: No.

MR H DU PLESSIS: I have nothing further, thank you Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Wessels.

MR WESSELS: No questions thank you Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Martini?

MR MARTINI: No questions thank you Chairperson.

MR COETZEE: No questions thank you Chairperson.

MR VAN ECK: No questions from my side, thank you Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Kahanovitz?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR KAHANOVITZ: Mr Maree, when you had to establish Mr Evans' address, I assume you were aware that the reason you were being called on to perform this task was that it was related to some or other plan to take steps against Mr Evans?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: What were the nature of the steps that were likely to be taken? What had you been told at that stage?

MR MAREE: I hadn't been told anything.

MR KAHANOVITZ: But, were you given any file, apart from the photographs that you've referred to?

MR MAREE: No, I was not.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Alright. So you were ...

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Kahanovitz, if I may just intervene. Didn't you ever - am I mistaken, I thought you said Mr Basson showed you a document.

MR MAREE: Yes, I wasn't given a file, he showed me a document with his address on, that's correct.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Thank you. So he showed you a document with his address on it?

MR MAREE: Sorry, I beg your pardon, with Gavin Evans’ name on it and a photograph.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Yes. What else was on the document?

MR MAREE: I can't remember.

MR KAHANOVITZ: So you were aware that steps were to be taken against Mr Evans, but you weren't informed of the detail?

MR MAREE: That is correct.

MR KAHANOVITZ: But you would have been aware, given the nature of the CCB's activities, that in all likelihood, those steps would be unlawful?

MR MAREE: Correct.

MR KAHANOVITZ: So to use the words from your training course, it would have been anything from breaking his windows to eliminating him?

MR MAREE: Correct.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Now I take it from your evidence-in-chief that you are quite happy to talk about external activities?

MR MAREE: I am.

MR KAHANOVITZ: And it would appear to me that the reason for that is that you are saying "Yes, I was deployed outside of the Republic, but there is nothing which I did outside of the Republic which was illegal.

MR MAREE: Yes. In some European countries, there are operations which I won't talk about.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You see, because I'm a bit confused. I distinctly got the impression from your evidence-in-chief that you were being led as a witness who was giving us a summary of the broad spectrum of your activities.

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Inside and outside of South Africa.

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: I didn't hear you say in your evidence-in-chief: "I'm telling you about some of the things that I'm involved in overseas, but I'm not telling you about certain other things that I'm involved in overseas.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, may I just speak to my client for a moment please?

MR MAREE: I'm prepared to speak about any overseas operations, anything where I was involved in, which I have made available through my lawyer. In certain instances I prefer not to mention names of people who assisted me overseas for their own safety.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Just forgetting for a minute about naming names, did you - so you're saying whether or not your activities were illegal, you are prepared to talk about them?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Have you, in your evidence-in-chief broadly covered both your lawful and unlawful activities outside of the Republic?

MR MAREE: Yes, I have.

MR KAHANOVITZ: So you're telling us you haven't left anything important out?

MR MAREE: Correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Kahanovitz, just on that question. What unlawful activities did you have overseas, because you've just answered a question saying you've covered both your lawful and unlawful activities overseas and my interpretation of your evidence, well I didn't hear, I can't recall having heard anything unlawful overseas.

MR MAREE: Mr Chairman, certain things I may have done overseas, may amount in that country to espionage or something, it could just be going through that country and doing something, that I've done, but there was instruction to go and do anything unlawful overseas, that's what I mean.

MR KAHANOVITZ: If I understand, just in broad terms, all you ever did overseas was, let's forget about Namibia for a minute, all you ever did was establish business contacts. It may be that at some stage in the future, that business front or those business contacts were to be used for some other purpose.

MR MAREE: That's correct.

MR KAHANOVITZ: But as I understood your evidence, up to the point that you left the CCB, whatever business initiatives you had launched outside of the Republic were never used for purposes of spying, for instance.

MR MAREE: That's correct.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Or for any other unlawful purpose.

MR MAREE: Correct.

MR KAHANOVITZ: What you appear to be saying in your evidence-in-chief was that you were aware that if Staal Burger says to you: "Here Mr Maree, here's the money to go to Germany. Go to Germany, here's the money to start a business, etc, etc, he's not doing that for your personal benefit, he's doing that because he intends to deploy you at some stage in the future to perform CCB activities?

MR MAREE: Correct.

MR KAHANOVITZ: All you're really saying is up until the time that the CCB was disbanded, you were never informed what the nature of those activities would be.

MR MAREE: That's correct.

MR KAHANOVITZ: But surely it must have been intimated to you what the nature of those activities would be?

MR MAREE: No, it wasn't.

MR KAHANOVITZ: So you were happily going off to - planning to go and live in Germany and you had no idea in your own mind after you'd moved your family there, moved into a house, established business and so on and so forth, you had no idea in your own mind what tasks you might be called upon to do.

MR MAREE: No, I think that would be speculation. Any intelligence work, you'd have to put a base down and then you would receive your instructions as to whatever you had to do once you were there.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Yes, but we know you weren't working for the NIA or a pure intelligence gathering organisation. We know you were working for the CCB.

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: And that the CCB did not exist for the purposes of gathering pure intelligence, that's been the evidence all along.

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: So if you were being sent to Germany, you weren't being sent there merely to collect information.

MR MAREE: I don't think you quite understand. Everybody in the CCB weren't operators who had to go and eliminate people, there were back-up people as well and logistics people to help people, so everybody, if you worked in the CCB, it doesn't necessarily mean that, as the evidence said that's what the CCB does, there has to be back-up.

MR KAHANOVITZ: What do you mean when you say there has to be back-up?

MR MAREE: For example, in Europe, arranging safe houses, finances, logistics.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Yes, I can understand that you need to find out where the target lives, you need to plan escape routes.

MR MAREE: No, that's not what I said, no, that's not my evidence.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Well what are you going to use your safe house for?

MR MAREE: No, no, not for me. If somebody else in the unit needed to use it, the host agent in that particular country, because he would know the local conditions, could assist in doing that, arranging a house and things like that.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Right. So you were going to be the CCB's man in Germany?

MR MAREE: Well, this is what I presumed, yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Alright. Why Germany?

MR MAREE: I don't know.

MR KAHANOVITZ: So you went through all these stages and you agree to move to Germany and you had absolutely no idea in your own mind why the CCB was in the least bit interested in Germany?

MR MAREE: No.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you not ask? Did you not say well, why not Belgium, or some other country?

MR MAREE: No, Sir, they asked me or they told me that they need somebody established in Germany and I went along with it. I had no reason to ask why.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You see, it's easier for us to understand here when we know that the ANC had bases, if you talk about Zambia and so on, or Angola, everybody understands that evidence and why the CCB might be interested in operating in Zambia or Angola. Why might the CCB need a safe house in Germany, that's what we don't understand.

MR MAREE: I can't answer that. I don't know. I didn't make the decision.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Okay. But what's also interesting is, I don't know if you were here, but neither Mr Burger certainly made no mention of the evidence that you've just given, so he can't help us. Do you speak German?

MR MAREE: No, I don't.

CHAIRPERSON: Whereabouts did you actually establish in Germany?

MR MAREE: In Stuttgart.

MR KAHANOVITZ: And you also have no idea why it would be Stuttgart, as opposed to Berlin or Munich?

MR MAREE: No, I don't.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Mr Burger just told you go to Stuttgart.

MR MAREE: No, no, I went to Munich first and then from there to Stuttgart.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Yes, but who said: "Go to Stuttgart?"

MR MAREE: I did it on my own.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Why Stuttgart?

MR MAREE: That's where my business contacts for the Lema contract was with them, most of the businesses were in the Stuttgart area, that's why I decided on Stuttgart, in place of Munich.

MR KAHANOVITZ: And what kind of business was Lema going to do there?

MR MAREE: I placed advertisements for German business partners in German newspapers.

MR KAHANOVITZ: To perform what sort of business?

MR MAREE: Trade with South African business.

MR KAHANOVITZ: But what form of trade? What was going to be sold?

MR MAREE: I asked for German products in South Africa, agricultural products and from South Africa, the other way around, sorry. Agricultural products from South Africa electronic stuff from Germany and I received on that about 20 or 30 replies with people we would like to meet and most of them were from the Stuttgart area.

MR LAX: Can I just interpose, Mr Kahanovitz, while you're looking at your papers? What puzzles me is that you seem to have gone to establishing a base in Germany without any guidelines whatsoever. You see, if one's going to establish a base somewhere, surely you must have in your mind a broad picture of what objectives you're going to have. What purpose is that base going to serve. What are the broad nature of the operations that are going to be conducted, so that you can have an appropriate structure in place to serve whatever purposes you're going to need. You didn't have any of that.

MR MAREE: What I had, I think, is I had a reasonably successful blue plan here and I think they wanted the same thing in Germany, if I could establish the same kind of base in Germany.

MR LAX: But you see you're saying: "I think this is what they wanted."

MR MAREE: Well, there was nothing else given to me Sir, this is what they told me. As what you've done here, see if you can establish in Germany.

MR LAX: You see it just sounds so improbable that here they would go and spend all this money, send someone to Germany, move your family there and you, the person on the ground, don't actually know what it is that you're setting all this up for. You're setting it up as the blue plan. so this was just an extension of your blue plan, without any other guidelines at all?

MR MAREE: Nothing at all. I was to establish myself in Germany as what I had done in Natal and in Johannesburg.

MR KAHANOVITZ: And what have safe houses to do with blue plans?

MR MAREE: No, this was speculation when you asked me.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Alright. So you're saying the only thing you could think of when I asked you what you might be doing in Germany was that you speculated that it might have involved, at some stage in the future, finding safe houses?

MR MAREE: No, your question was what did I think somebody could be used for in Germany and as an example I said maybe to get somebody a safe house or something like that.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Would it make more sense to you if your version was something along the lines of: "We had a discussion about where I should be placed in Germany. It was said to me that the ANC has got an office in Berlin therefore it was suggested that I place myself in Berlin so that we could monitor their activities"? I would understand your evidence if that had been your evidence.

MR MAREE: I can't give that evidence because that's not what happened.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Alright. Now weren't you sent to Europe to arrange for the import of high tech military equipment?

MR MAREE: During the stay in Germany if something like that had to come up, as I testified in the criminal case, then I was to try and acquire that, yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Tell us about this criminal case.

MR MAREE: I can't remember the accused's name anymore. There was somebody caught taking currency out the country.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Yes.

MR MAREE: And he said the CCB and I in particular went to the Reserve Bank and drew ten million rand or something. I was responsible for it, so I testified on behalf of the State that this was not the case.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Alright. But did you not give evidence in that case that you were sent by the CCB to operate as a covert agent for the import of high tech military equipment and that to this end you had undertaken a four month trip to six European countries in early 1990?

MR MAREE: I did not testify, if you check the record, that I ran an agent in Europe.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Excuse me.

MR MAREE: I did not testify that I ran and agent in Europe.

MR KAHANOVITZ: I wasn't asking you if you ran an agent, I'm asking you whether you gave evidence to the effect that the CCB sent you to Europe to attempt to broker business deals to purchase high tech military equipment.

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: They did?

MR MAREE: No. That was my evidence and that was part of the brief while I was there if this did come up, I was supposed to do that.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Now understand correctly. You agree you gave that evidence?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: But are you telling us now that that evidence might not have been true?

MR MAREE: No.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Alright. Well if your evidence was true, it follows that the CCB sent you to Europe to try and broker business deals to purchase high tech military equipment.

MR MAREE: I can't understand what the difference is. I agree with this.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You agree with me. Fine.

CHAIRPERSON: I think what Mr Kahanovitz is getting to you, was that your brief when you went to Europe or part of your brief was to go and try to broker deals to get military equipment back to South Africa.

MR MAREE: Yes, this was not with the initial planting. This happened at a later trip to Germany.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Can you ...

MR MAREE: There was more than one trip to Germany.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Yes, what year are we talking about when the purchase of military equipment first ...(intervention)

MR MAREE: 1990.

MR KAHANOVITZ: 1990. Alright. Did you go on a four month trip to several European countries in early 1990?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Did you broker business deals for the acquisition of raw material for the South African Defence Force?

MR MAREE: I tried.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You tried. Did any of those deals succeed?

MR MAREE: No.

MR KAHANOVITZ: There was still a United Nations Resolution in effect at that stage, as I understand, that weapons could not be sold to South Africa?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: In other words, you were attempting to engage in what has been referred to as sanctions busting?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Now ...

MR MARTINI: Sorry Chairperson, in the interests of time, what is the relevance of this to the acts for which this applicant seeks amnesty? I'm only objecting to this just because of time constraints.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Do I need to answer?

CHAIRPERSON: He's asked for it, but my understanding is that the evidence-in-chief was led to include the activities of Mr Maree, no only in Namibia but also abroad, to put the whole operation relating to Evans in perspective. That's what Mr du Plessis said.

MR MARTINI: Sure Chairperson, but there must be relevance to what we're doing here, otherwise we could carry on for ...

CHAIRPERSON: I think if - Mr Kahanovitz, you realise that we are limited with time and we are essentially only concerned with the Gavin Evans operation.

MR KAHANOVITZ: I understand that Mr Chairman. I will - I think the point is fairly obvious, but I'll make it more obvious in a minutes. Mr Maree, if I can endeavour to summarise your evidence then, up to a particular stage you were sent to Europe to establish contacts to get to know the territory, so on and so forth, but you didn't yet know that one of your functions would be sanctions busting.

MR MAREE: No.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Is that - in 1989 while you were establishing business contacts and so on and so forth in Europe, you didn't yet know that you would be asked to assist in sanctions busting?

MR MAREE: Mr Chairman, the sanctions busting, I wasn't given a specific task to go and do this or do this, in a general brief while I was overseas and I could make contact, I was supposed to do that, but I wasn't given a specific brief, "Go to this armaments factory and procure arms".

MR KAHANOVITZ: I'm just trying to understand why in your evidence-in-chief and why when I was asking you questions to please explain the purpose of your presence in Europe, you made no mention whatsoever of the fact that you were eventually deployed to assist in the procurement of arms and that therefore that was one of the purposes of establishing yourself in Europe.

MR MAREE: I don't think we understand each other. That wasn't the main reason that I was there.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Your lawyer was asking you questions-in-chief right and you gave evidence about going to Germany and so on and so forth. Correct?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You remember that? You were then asked questions, where it seemed unclear to both myself and to the members of the Committee as to exactly what the purpose was of deploying you in Europe, remember those questions?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Throughout that evidence you at no stage said: "Eventually it became apparent to me for what purpose I was being deployed or what one of the purposes was of my deployment in Europe, namely to assist in the procurement of arms."

MR MAREE: I take your point, but I don't think its - that wasn't an instruction of mine: "Go to Germany and procure arms", that's why I didn't mention it in my evidence-in-chief.

MR KAHANOVITZ: But you subsequently, on your own evidence, you subsequently received an instruction to do just that.

MR MAREE: No, I said if during my trips in Germany I can get this, I should do it. Nobody gave me instruction: "Go and procure this particular arm." If it came my way, I was supposed to try and do this.

MR KAHANOVITZ: So if you happened to be travelling on the underground and you happened to overhear a conversation about somebody might want to sell arms, then you would just sort of take it up with them, if happened to come your way. Is that your evidence?

MR MAREE: No, that's not my evidence.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Well, you agree with me you have to do something.

MR MAREE: But I didn't do anything.

MR KAHANOVITZ: But you've already agreed that you gave evidence to the effect that you travelled on a four month trip in an endeavour to broker deals for the acquisition of war materials.

MR MAREE: That was part of the four months trip.

MR KAHANOVITZ: That's doing something, do you agree with me?

MR MAREE: Yes, okay.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry. Just to clear it up Mr Maree, you said you went in 1989 to establish yourself in Stuttgart.

MR MAREE: Yes, Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: And that you were going to get your family across and everything else and check out the schools, housing, etc, so why now are you talking about a four month trip to Germany? Weren't you in Germany sort of like on a semi-permanent basis, having a home there?

MR MAREE: No, not yet Sir. I went on a trip first to establish contacts and check on the housing and schooling. I returned and I went later again a second time.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Kahanovitz.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Just to clarify. The second time, did you in fact physically move to Germany?

MR MAREE: No.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You told us you were called back to South Africa and you were here at the time of the Harms Commission.

MR MAREE: That's correct.

MR KAHANOVITZ: I assume then that you were subsequently told: "Go back overseas".

MR MAREE: That's correct.

MR KAHANOVITZ: By the way, as far as I understand you gave no evidence at the Harms Commission.

MR MAREE: No I didn't.

MR KAHANOVITZ: I assume they were endeavouring to trace your whereabouts to subpoena you to give evidence.

MR MAREE: No, they weren't.

MR KAHANOVITZ: They weren't interested in you.

MR MAREE: No, I gave a statement to Mr McNally, but he didn't call me.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Alright. You also said in your evidence-in-chief that when you were establishing these businesses in, business contacts in Zambia, Botswana, Swaziland, Namibia, Lesotho, so on and so forth to give you freedom of movement.

MR MAREE: Yes. Sir.

MR KAHANOVITZ: What would you do with your freedom of movement once you had it?

MR MAREE: That was part of the covert work. You must have freedom of movement so that you can move freely without being compromised.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Yes, that I understand fully, but if your evidence was: "I needed to be able to go to Lusaka, so that I could do this, that and the other", then I can understand your evidence. You say: "I need to establish a business in Lusaka, so that I can have freedom of movement in Zambia", but that's not your evidence. Your evidence appears to be, you needed freedom of movement to go to these countries, but we don't understand what you were going to do once you could get there.

MR MAREE: I didn't know either, I hadn't received any instructions.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Alright. And what any of this has to do with operations in Natal, could you explain that?

MR MAREE: Sorry, I don't understand.

MR KAHANOVITZ: This freedom of movement that you would have in Southern Africa, how would any of this relate to the fact that you were tasked to perform operations on behalf of the CCB in the province of Natal?

MR MAREE: Natal was given to me but I hadn't performed any operations there, but to make it that I could move to Natal without any suspicion or without questions being asked, that's why I opened a second company, so I could move to Natal and have freedom of movement in Natal.

MR KAHANOVITZ: I understand that. That gets you as far as Durban, but now you want to travel from Durban to Lusaka.

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: If you can freely travel from Durban to Lusaka, how does that relate to your activities in Natal?

MR MAREE: I don't understand what you're asking me.

MR LAX: Perhaps I could help you. It's really quite simple. You were to focus on KwaZulu Natal, correct?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR LAX: And in order to do that, your blue plan entailed starting Lema in Jo'burg, setting up Capall in Durban, then you had a linkage between Jo'burg and Durban, you could move between Jo'burg and Durban and then based in Durban, you could move around Natal.

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR LAX: However, working in KwaZulu Natal is one thing, working in Zambia and Namibia and Swaziland is a completely different thing.

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: What is the relevance of working in Zambia and Namibia and those places in relation to working in KwaZulu Natal? You see just to compare you to Mr van Zyl, for example, he was supposed to work in the Cape and he set up structures so that he could do that and he did, but he didn't work in Swaziland, he didn't work in Lesotho, he didn't work in Namibia.

MR MAREE: Okay.

MR LAX: He was based in the Cape and he moved between Jo'burg and the Cape and one would have thought that you would move between Jo'burg and KwaZulu Natal, but instead you end up in Germany and Namibia and all over the place and you don't do any work in KwaZulu Natal, so that's what's puzzling everybody here. Do you understand?

MR MAREE: Ja.

MR LAX: Well not everybody, but it's certainly puzzling me because your primary focus of your job was to work in KwaZulu Natal. Your blue plan was supposed to be to facilitate that.

MR MAREE: My blue plan, I did it so that I can have access in Natal. Because I had a company exporting to Africa, I had to move to - I had to go to these countries, not for any operations, to do my blue plan. There was no other thing that was intended there.

MR LAX: But you see, that's what also puzzles me. If your job was to work in KwaZulu Natal, then Capall was sufficient to facilitate that.

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR LAX: Why do you need a company that's trading with the rest of Africa, which doesn't have anything to do with being based in KwaZulu Natal.

MR MAREE: No, no first of all, the first company, Lema, was a company that worked with the rest of Africa. Natal didn't - Capall didn't work with the rest of Africa.

MR LAX: Precisely, that's precisely the point, do you understand?

MR MAREE: I'm sorry, I don't understand what your point is.

MR LAX: You see, we were led to understand, your evidence comes in the context of the evidence we've already heard and the evidence we've already heard is that people were regionalised and that you were given KwaZulu Natal to work with.

MR MAREE: Okay.

MR LAX: The purpose of the blue plans was to provide cover in your areas of operation.

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR LAX: So why establish Lema which has got nothing to do with your area of operation, because it's between Jo'burg and the rest of Africa? Just hear the rest of the question. Rather than just establish Capall which provides a good base in Durban for you to work in the rest of KwaZulu Natal?

MR MAREE: Okay, Lema was established before I was given Natal. That was in January of 1989, I think, so that was established first and then Capall was established after that.

MR LAX: So when were you given KwaZulu Natal?

MR MAREE: I'm not sure. I'm not sure, Sir.

MR LAX: Well then how do you know Lema was established?

MR MAREE: Well, as soon as I got out, Lema was established first of all, myself for a blue plan and the reason why I opened up Capall was when I was given Natal, I had to move away from Jo'burg, that's why I opened a second company.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Kahanovitz.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Do I understand - let me rather ask you the question this way. Did you recruit any unaware members in the province of Natal?

MR MAREE: No, I didn't.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Did you conduct any red plan activities on behalf of the CCB in the Province of Natal?

MR MAREE: No, I didn't.

MR KAHANOVITZ: So the long and the short of it is that your evidence is that you did nothing for the CCB in the province of Natal?

MR MAREE: I did not operations for the CCB, no.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Now the purpose of the blue plan was to provide a cover for your red plan activities?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: And the bottom line is you established the cover but you never used that cover in order to engage in offensive activities in the province of Natal, that's your evidence?

MR MAREE: Well the evidence, it hasn't been established, I was busy establishing it. I was in the process of doing a good cover up.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Alright. And you don't find it at all strange that at no stage during that period Staal Burger came to you and said look, jobs A, B and C need to be carried out in Natal, please take the necessary steps?

MR MAREE: No.

MR KAHANOVITZ: That's not strange?

MR MAREE: Not at all.

MR KAHANOVITZ: And on the other hand, Mr Burger is quite happy for you to be establishing blue plans in several other parts of the world.

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: But it seems that you were performing tasks in just about everywhere else in the world, except for Natal.

MR MAREE: Well this might be so, I was establishing blue plans, which I was given instructions to do and I did that.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You appear to have been the CCB's first multi-national operative. Now just to deal with your amnesty application, if we can go to page 20 of bundle A

paragraph B at the top of the page of paragraph 8, it's the same question I put to various other of the operatives who used the same form, you say you were in Special Forces from 1988 through to 1991.

MR MAREE: That's correct.

MR KAHANOVITZ: But your evidence has in fact been that you left Special Forces in order to become part of the CCB.

MR MAREE: No, it wasn't my evidence at all.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Well, what is your understanding? Weren't you told that you must uncouple yourself from the SADF?

MR MAREE: No, I'm the wrong witness. I'm a policeman, not the SADF.

MR KAHANOVITZ: I'm not going to go through this. I'll leave this for argument. Now the date that you give on that page for the Evans incident, March 1989, now is that when you were instructed to establish his address?

MR MAREE: I can't remember off-hand but I'm taking it according to this ...(intervention)

MR KAHANOVITZ: No, I'm not asking you according to, I'm asking why you put the date of March 1989 there, what the relevance is?

MR MAREE: I presume at that stage it was fresh in my mind. I could recall that.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Alright.

MR MAREE: That must have been the information that I gave the attorney too when he asked me.

MR KAHANOVITZ: I take it from your evidence that at that time the CCB didn't have a single unaware operative that was available to it in the whole of Johannesburg, because you said you couldn't find anybody whom you could send to try and establish Mr Evans’ physical address.

MR MAREE: I didn't have anyone. I don't know about the other operatives there, I didn't have one.

MR KAHANOVITZ: But why can't you just go and find yourself a criminal like Mr van Zyl and ask him to find out where Mr Evans lives? I don't understand the problem.

MR MAREE: People worked differently. That's not my method of working.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, just on this. You were a policeman for many years, Murder and Robbery, to establish the address of a person who is not on the run, who is unaware that somebody is trying to find his address, who goes to work to and from his home every day, got no reason to hide, what's the difficulty with that? Couldn't you have just phoned up a friend or contact to say look, give me this guy's address, or just establish it yourself with ease, especially with your police background?

MR MAREE: I could do that but I would have to compromise myself by letting the people know where I was and get somebody from the police they would want to know what am I trying to do. So the whole idea that I thought I was trying to do is not compromise myself and I did use a telephone and try, so nobody could trace it, do inquiries by telephone.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you look in the phone book for his address?

MR MAREE: He wasn't there.

CHAIRPERSON: He wasn't there. You looked?

MR MAREE: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Kahanovitz.

MR KAHANOVITZ: I thought Mr Lax had a question. Alright page - by the way, what do you do for a living at the moment?

MR MAREE: I'm a farmer.

MR KAHANOVITZ: What happened to these companies that were established?

MR MAREE: I still have them.

MR KAHANOVITZ: How are they doing?

MR MAREE: Very well.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Page 23 of bundle A, you're asked to say on whose orders you carried out these tasks. You mention the name of Staal Burger and you mention the name of Joe Verster.

MR MAREE: Yes Sir.

MR KAHANOVITZ: But you don't mention the name of Gen Webb, why is that so?

MR MAREE: I didn't receive orders from Gen Webb, I got them from, some from Joe Verster and some from Staal Burger.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Alright. Let's go to the body of your application. Now I've read this application, well it's very short, I read it carefully, there's no mention in here of the fact that you were responsible for the province of Natal, do you agree with me?

MR MAREE: I do.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Any particular reason why you left that out?

MR MAREE: Didn't do anything wrong in Natal.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Because you did nothing there?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Alright. Nothing wrong there. Were you ever asked to account to the Government or the State for the income of profits derived from businesses which were set up with CCB money?

MR MAREE: No, I wasn't.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Would you care to make an estimate of the extent to which you have financially benefited?

MR MAREE: With the initial input from the Defence Force?

MR KAHANOVITZ: Well let's take a yard stick, by the end of 1990, approximately a year, a year and a half, maybe two years, depending on which date which company was established, how much money did you manage to make from these various companies that you'd established?

MR MAREE: I used the money from Lema to finance the other two companies and I didn't draw a salary, because I drew other people in without involving the Defence Force, the company paid for their salaries then and this was on the course which Mr Verster set out, this was the way it should actually operate so you don't draw money from the Government, the company must run itself.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Alright. So at the end of 1990, how many companies did you have operating?

MR MAREE: Three.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Three. What approximately was the total turnover of those three companies?

MR MAREE: In 1990?

MR KAHANOVITZ: Yes.

MR MAREE: I'm going to have to guess here, I honestly don't know.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Yes.

MR MAREE: Maybe R500 000.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Alright. Now just returning then to your application at page 28, just read paragraph 3 to yourself, or maybe read it into the record.

MR MAREE: NO TRANSLATION

MR KAHANOVITZ: Right. Now it's clear from the way that this is phrased, that there's considerable doubt as to whether anything that you did in fact amounted to an offence.

MR MAREE: That's correct.

MR KAHANOVITZ: And the reason why it's phrased in that way becomes apparent when you read paragraph 4. Just read paragraph 4 into the record.

MR MAREE:

MR KAHANOVITZ: Now, why were you in doubt as to whether your conduct amounted to an offence?

MR MAREE: I was of the opinion that I hadn't done anything wrong, my legal advice was that I should have foreseen that even if it was a compartment of the crime, that it forms part of the crime.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Alright. so your thinking was that: "If all I did was establish the guy's address, that can't be a crime"?

MR MAREE: Ja, but my legal advice was not that. That was my thinking, yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Good advice that you got. Now, you've already agreed that the first sentence in that paragraph, that your instructions were to monitor him to establish him, sorry in order to establish whether he was involved in activities undermining the security of the State, that's false?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Now the next sentence is also false. It must be so because the two are logically linked together.

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You agree with me, it's false?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Now, the final sentence of that paragraph:

That's also false?

MR MAREE: No it's not.

MR KAHANOVITZ: But your evidence-in-chief has been, "I was tasked to establish his address. I took a while to do it, but I did it." Nothing to the effect of: "I couldn't establish his address because I was sent overseas on another project."

MR MAREE: I understand, sorry, I understand that. Maybe the wording is not correct, yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: No, no, it goes a lot further than that. I'll tell you why you've inserted that sentence there in that way, because it's in line with the fact that the entire paragraph is a lie. What you're telling the reader is the following. You tell the reader that you were going to establish whether he was involved in activities undermining the security of the State. That's the first thing you say. The second thing you say is that you realise that after you'd carried out that monitoring activity, that information might have been used for purposes of his elimination. Are you with me?

MR MAREE: I'm with you.

MR KAHANOVITZ: But then you go on to tell the reader that you actually never got round to monitoring him because you went overseas which is why it can't be said that you've committed an offence. In essence you say: "I was asked to monitor him, but I never got, but I couldn't monitor him, even though I was asked to, because I was sent out of the country.

MR MAREE: That's what it says, yes. I understand.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Well, the whole thing is a lie.

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Yes. I was just going to - it appears a lie but this was the legal people that drew up, it wasn't - as a previous witness also has said, we can say what we want to, but this comes from our legal people. I'm not pushing the blame to anybody.

CHAIRPERSON: Because usually if there's a distortion, it's to reduce the culpability of the writer. Here it's just the opposite. You know if you say: "Look I had the task to establish the address, I did that, I didn't really know why they wanted the address except I believed that it was to take certain steps against Mr Evans of which I didn't know whether it was to break his window or kill him, I didn't know, but just to get his address", which is very, very straight forward, simple, it's against the law with that knowledge that steps might be taken against him, you might have been an accessory before the fact. I don't know if it can be said that you were a conspirator, but in any even that would be for argument, but nothing too serious. It's just difficult to comprehend, now this version then comes in, that you were there to monitor him which never happened.

MR MAREE: No, it didn't happen.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Kahanovitz.

MR LAX: You see, sorry, your purpose wasn't even to monitor him, it was just to get his address.

MR MAREE: To establish an address, yes.

MR LAX: Monitoring is something quite different.

MR MAREE: I agree.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Alright. I'm just, I want to clarify. You're now - Mr Basson's evidence, I just want to see if you agree with his evidence. Mr Basson says that Staal Burger instructed you to use indirect members to trace Gavin Evans' whereabouts, is that correct?

MR MAREE: I don't think he told me directly, I would have done that myself, I can't remember Mr Burger giving me that instruction.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Well somebody has to tell you to establish his address.

MR MAREE: No, that I can do, but telling me that I must do it with an indirect member, that I would do by myself.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Well, I'm just putting to you what Mr Basson's evidence was. Mr Basson said you dragged your feet in doing this.

MR MAREE: That may be his perception, yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Well, is it a correct perception?

MR MAREE: Well I dragged my feet in this particular thing, but the reason for that was that I was trying to run two or three businesses at that stage.

MR KAHANOVITZ: How long do you think it would have taken you to - or, you knew that he worked at the Weekly Mail, correct?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: So his work address you could establish by looking it up in the phone book?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Home address?

MR MAREE: That I did not know.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Yes, but how much work was involved, you were involved in all these other things that you didn't have the time.

MR MAREE: We can sit and discuss it now, but at that time, the reality of the situation was that I was, it wasn't a major thing in my life to do this, to trace this address.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Maree, how long did it in fact take you to get the address, from the time Mr Basson spoke to you until the time that you provided it?

MR MAREE: Two days, Sir. Two days and three telephone calls.

CHAIRPERSON: Two days?

MR MAREE: Ja. I didn't want to phone continuously ...(indistinct), so I give two days to redial again.

CHAIRPERSON: I was under the impression that it was far longer than two days.

MR MAREE: Oh, no, no, sorry, how long it took me to actually trace?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR MAREE: No, no, it took long since I was given the instruction, it took much longer than that, sorry.

CHAIRPERSON: What sort of period are you talking about, months or weeks?

MR MAREE: Months.

CHAIRPERSON: Months. Yes, thank you.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Did they bother you at all and say: "Where's this guy's address? What are you doing about it?"

MR MAREE: No they didn't.

MR KAHANOVITZ: They didn't bother? Alright. Now I just want to put - Mr van Zyl, I put to him your version to the effect that you were never involved in the framing of any plans to eliminate Gavin Evans. That is your version?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Mr van Zyl gave evidence to the effect that your version is untrue. Mr van Zyl's understanding is that you were indeed involved in the framing of plans to eliminate Evans and that Evans was your project.

MR MAREE: This is not so.

MR KAHANOVITZ: If that's Mr van Zyl's version, is he not telling the truth?

MR MAREE: He's not correct, no.

MR KAHANOVITZ: I see. I want to give you yet another version, that of Joe Verster's. This appears, you don't need to go there but just for the purpose of the record, at page 190 of Bundle A, paragraph 1.1 he says the following:

Now you'll note your name's not mentioned.

MR MAREE: That's my evidence, yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: So for a start Verster doesn't mention you, we've also received no evidence to the effect that Calla Botha was given instructions to monitor Gavin Evans. Are you aware of any evidence which supports that?

MR MAREE: No, I'm not.

MR KAHANOVITZ: No, you're not. Your alias, was that Stefan le Roux?

MR MAREE: That's right.

MR KAHANOVITZ: I just want to refer you to the diary entry in Mr Basson's diary of the 9th of May 1989, where it refers to the priority targets of various people. Next to your name it says Evans and the figure 2 appears, the number 2. Maybe I must just show you the page. Maybe if your lawyer can just show you the diary entry for the 9th of May.

MR LAX: Just to make it clear, the 2 is not in relation to your name.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I see the 2, my one the 2 is next to Deon.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Sorry, the question was not properly put. Next to your name only the name Evans appears. Now ...

MR DU PLESSIS: Sorry, could we just get a date?

CHAIRPERSON: 9 May.

MR MAREE: Okay, I see it.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Now van Zyl's evidence has been that Evans was your project and by that he meant that you originally were tasked to eliminate Gavin Evans. Now it could also be argued that this diary entry in fact supports that evidence because we know that Mr van Zyl was tasked to eliminate Dullah Omar, we know that Calla Botha was working on Bruce White, we know that Staal Burger was working on "von Finkelstein". Why are you, according to this diary entry, then tasked with Evans?

MR MAREE: I can't answer, that's not my diary. I can speculate.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Yes?

MR MAREE: The name was given to me by Basson who wrote the diary and he didn't show me documentation to trace Evans. Maybe you should ask Basson.

MR KAHANOVITZ: But you see this is in May. You've told us that to the best of your recollection, the steps you took to establish his address were in March, isn't that so?

CHAIRPERSON: That it took some months.

MR KAHANOVITZ: So you're telling us that it may well be that you still hadn't established his address in May?

MR MAREE: It's possible Sir, I don't know.

MR KAHANOVITZ: And your speculation is that that would be the only reason why your name would be linked to Evans in May.

MR MAREE: That's not the only reason, it could be one of the reasons, I'm speculating.

MR KAHANOVITZ: What other reasons could there be?

MR MAREE: I don't know, I'm speculating.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Alright. Then return to Bundle A, page 30. We've already agreed that the general nature of the evidence contained in paragraph 4 is false, but this statement that you were sent, the top of page 30:

Were you in fact sent out of the country at that stage on a project?

MR MAREE: Yes, I was.

MR KAHANOVITZ: What project are you referring to there?

MR MAREE: If I can recall correctly, I'm thinking off the top of my head now, it was to Greece. It wasn't a project, it was setting up, doing a business deal with a businessman in Greece.

MR KAHANOVITZ: What kind of business deal?

MR MAREE: We were trying to buy a rent-a-car business on the Island of Rode. This was not funded by the CCB, it was part of my blue plan, part of Lema's thing.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Was this an independent business initiative of your own?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: In fact it had nothing to do with the CCB?

MR MAREE: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: The use of the word project is then clearly incorrect.

MR MAREE: It's incorrect. I considered it as a project because of my blue plan, but it wasn't a project as in an operational project, no.

MR LAX: But you surely wouldn't have been given an order then either.

MR MAREE: No.

MR LAX: So that's also not true.

MR MAREE: No.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Right. Paragraph 5, just read that into the record.

MR MAREE:

MR KAHANOVITZ: I'm just going to put it to you, that paragraph's also false because at the time you drafted this statement, you were aware that plans were implemented for his elimination, correct?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You were also aware that the reason why you were asked to establish his address, was part of the planning phase of that conspiracy to eliminate Mr Evans.

MR MAREE: No, I disagree with that.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You're sent off by the CCB to find out where the man lives, correct?

MR MAREE: That's correct.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You find out afterwards that a plan was implemented to eliminate him.

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You put 2 and 2 together, what does it tell you? Why was I sent to establish the man's address?

MR MAREE: I'm ...(intervention)

MR KAHANOVITZ: Because they wanted to kill him.

MR MAREE: No, I'm missing the point here. This was - when the statement was made I was aware then, but not at the time when I was tasked to get his address.

MR KAHANOVITZ: I'm putting it to you on the basis that you drafted, you signed this statement at the time that you were aware, even on your own version, that a plan had been implemented to eliminate Mr Evans, correct?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: At the time you ...(intervention)

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: So you ask yourself, you're aware even at that time, you've already admitted this in your evidence, "They sent me to find his address. I knew that the reason that they were doing that was because they intended to take steps against him."

MR MAREE: I understand, sorry.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Correct?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Subsequently you find out what the nature of those steps was, they wanted to kill the man. Correct?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: So you say to yourself, why did they send me to find out his address? Because they wanted to use that information as part of a plan to kill him. Correct?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: So therefore to say:

is wrong, because you were involved in the preparatory stages of the implementation of that plan.

MR MAREE: If we look at it the other way, that's why I'm applying for this. That's why I'm applying for amnesty in the first place.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Why were you doing work in the Transvaal on Mr Evans?

MR MAREE: I don't know.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Well, we don't know either. We're told that Mr Botha was given the Transvaal and we're told that you were given Natal. But we're now told that you were the guy who was checking up on Evans in Transvaal. Could you explain that to us?

MR MAREE: No, I can't.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You've got no idea?

MR MAREE: No.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Well we don't either.

MR P DU PLESSIS: Sorry Mr Chairman, but there was also evidence that although specific problems were allotted, that it didn't mean that the operative couldn't operate anywhere else.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, no we're aware, but I think the question was fair, if he knew why he was given that.

MR KAHANOVITZ: But it also appears at this stage of the game that you could operate anywhere in the world, so maybe ... Now Mr van Zyl says in his evidence that an in-house was held in March 1989 regarding Gavin Evans and he says that you were in fact present at that in-house.

MR P DU PLESSIS: But Mr Chairman, he also, questioned by myself, conceded that he may be incorrect.

MR KAHANOVITZ: I just want - I'm putting Mr van Zyl's original evidence to you.

CHAIRPERSON: But what do you say to that?

MR MAREE: No, it's not true.

MR KAHANOVITZ: In fact Mr van Zyl not only testified that you were at that in-house, Mr van Zyl says that you relayed, let me put this question in context. Mr van Zyl was being asked: "Why do you say that Evans was Maree's project?" and one of the reasons he gave, was he says that you relayed certain information to him about this project.

MR MAREE: No, that's not true.

MR KAHANOVITZ: So, just for purposes of the record that's at page 1374, of the typed record. Do I take it then that your evidence is that in fact you never even discussed the Evans project with van Zyl?

MR MAREE: No, I didn't.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You had no reason to ever have a discussion with van Zyl about the Evans' project?

MR MAREE: No.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you, as a member of the CCB, after attending that initial course, ever have occasion to have contact with your colleagues, Mr van Zyl, Mr Botha and others?

MR MAREE: Yes, I did, we had weekly meetings.

CHAIRPERSON: You had weekly meetings. Sort of scheduled, every week you had a meeting?

MR MAREE: Yes, Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: Even if there wasn't anything really specific to discuss?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Now ...(intervention)

MR LAX: Sorry, just while we're here. These weekly meetings, how did they work?

MR MAREE: We would arrange, each one would get a turn to book an hotel room and we'd meet at that particular hotel room and that's how we'd meet.

MR LAX: Yes, but what would happen? Would you all be present together in the same room?

MR MAREE: We were initially present together. If there was work to be done, each one would come in separately to speak to the Co-ordinator and Mr Burger, so I wouldn't be present if van Zyl was meeting them or if Botha was meeting then and so too, they wouldn't be present when I was meeting them, but we would be there to do our administration and car logs and finances.

MR LAX: And would you have general meetings where all of you were present and general matters were discussed applicable to all of you?

MR MAREE: Yes. I think so, yes.

MR LAX: What sort of issues would be discussed there?

MR MAREE: Maybe medical - I'm just trying to think off-hand now, medical bills and more administrative kind of stuff.

MR LAX; You never discussed policy together?

MR MAREE: No.

MR LAX: So you all understood the guidelines better?

MR MAREE: I think informally we did that, yes, but not at a formal meeting.

MR LAX: Thank you.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Were you told to concentrate on Trade Unions in Natal?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Who told you that?

MR MAREE: Mr Burger.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Mr Burger. What was going to be the purpose of those activities?

MR MAREE: No, I don't know, it was in the initial stage, he gave me advice, "If you're working in an hotel, see if you can get into Trade Unions and into the Motel Indian Congress", that was my ...

MR KAHANOVITZ: In the sense that that was the enemy?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Right. And did you ever do anything about it?

MR MAREE: No, I didn't.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Did you have difficulty adjusting to your new job in the CCB?

MR MAREE: I had difficulty in adjusting, not in the CCB, I had difficulty in adjusting to my blue plan, getting these businesses going. I didn't envisage that it would run away with me. I battled to keep up with the business world because it wasn't my forte at all. That's why I went on courses, to try and keep up, it grew too quickly so I couldn't, I was in a catch 22 position.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You see, if someone in the CCB had to say the following, I just want you to comment, if they were asked: "Why did you appear to do so little in Natal?" and the answer they gave was: "Well, you had difficulty adjusting to the working methods of the CCB", what would your comment be? In fact you had, let me phrase it a bit stronger, you had a lot of problems.

MR MAREE: Ja, I did have a lot of problems trying to run two companies with no experience, I had major problems there, yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: In other words you're telling us you were so focused on your business that you didn't really have the time to get involved in the Natal Indian Congress and the Trade Unions?

MR MAREE: Well, the business to me, as I said, initially it didn't go about the money, it was important to me to establish it because without that I couldn't function.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Yes, I understand your evidence, you say you can't separate the two issues.

MR MAREE: Yes, Sir.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You had to establish your business first.

MR MAREE: That's what I tried to do.

MR KAHANOVITZ: That's what you saw as your priority.

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR LAX: Can I just say this though, or ask this if I may? Those sorts of issues about dealing with business and being inexperienced and basically being stretched to the limit, that's got nothing to do with not being able to adapt to the military style of management.

MR MAREE: No, the military, I had no problem with the military, I was in the police for 23 years, so I have no problem with that.

MR LAX: Well you see the focus of the comment that Mr Kahanovitz put to you was put in that context. You were a policeman and you weren't used to the military way and that was why you had trouble fitting in.

MR MAREE: Well my opinion is not that, maybe the military would have a different opinion to that, yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Just for sake of completeness, the source of that evidence was Wouter Basson, that's at page 2264 of the record. He says:

Now evidence has been produced that there was an interest in Jay Naidoo. Were you ever asked to look into Jay Naidoo?

MR MAREE: No, I wasn't, Sir.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Evidence was produced at the Harms Commission and the Harms Commission found that there was a CCB plan to kill an attorney in Durban, Mr Mhlaba and that plan was to be implemented on the 13th of March 1989.

MR MAREE: No, I never heard of him before.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Never heard of him. Alright. Now as regards the Omar project, were you at any stage during 1989 aware that there was such a project?

MR MAREE: I'm just trying to think, no, not in 1989 no.

MR KAHANOVITZ: So you never attended a single cell meeting where it was mentioned that there was such a project?

MR MAREE: No.

MR KAHANOVITZ: And in fact the first time you ever heard of the Omar project, was when it was divulged at the Harms Commission, is that what you're saying?

MR MAREE: That's correct.

MR KAHANOVITZ: So you guys never chatted amongst yourselves?

MR MAREE: No, I didn't. Maybe that's what Basson meant, that I wasn't, coming from a police barrack, you're inclined to work alone and in the military you work maybe in a bigger group. I believe - with any of my operations I tried to cut off and do it professionally. Nobody must know what I'm doing and I expected the same from them.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Yes, but there's already been evidence that cell meetings were held at various hotels, you would arrive there, somebody would be making a presentation or somebody would be about to make a presentation, so you would overhear things that weren't necessarily your project.

MR MAREE: Yes, I never overheard anything about ...

MR KAHANOVITZ: You never heard anything, alright. And I ask you the same question in relation to the Early Learning Centre project.

MR MAREE: Also not, no.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Project Apie?

MR MAREE: No.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Now, is it so, would it be correct to say that you mainly worked outside of the Republic of South Africa?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: And would it be correct to say that that work was being done on behalf of Region 6?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Now, I want to deal with your involvement in the Namibian elections. Now evidence has already been produced that the CCB was going to focus its attentions on Namibia in the pre-election phase. Did you attend the meeting where various projects related to Namibia were discussed?

MR MAREE: I can't remember it off-hand but I know that there were instructions that Namibia was a priority, yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Priority. Were you aware of the fact that production bonuses were promised to people for successful projects completed in Namibia?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You were?

MR MAREE: I can't remember specifically who said, but I can recall hearing a conversation to that effect, yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: That there would be financial rewards for a job well done.

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Do you have any recollections to what sort of figures were mentioned?

MR MAREE: No.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Now, we know that you were Aitchison’s handler.

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: What is your understanding of what the word handler means?

MR MAREE: A handler is a person who guides somebody else in covert work, you look after this person's interests.

MR KAHANOVITZ: What did you, when you introduced yourself to Donald Aitchison, what did you tell him you did for a living?

MR MAREE: I told him I was from the Security Police.

MR KAHANOVITZ: That sounds like a fantastic cover.

MR MAREE: I didn't need a cover because I already received a CV, he was - I was handed him from somewhere else and on his CV he was ex-Rhodesian and he was this big operator, so ...(intervention)

MR KAHANOVITZ: Can I just clarify, in fact he was an Irish citizen.

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: But he fought on behalf of the Rhodesians.

MR MAREE: In Rhodesia, that's correct yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: And he styled himself as, amongst other things, a mercenary.

MR MAREE: That's right.

MR KAHANOVITZ: But you - are you saying you didn't need to create a cover for Aitchison?

MR MAREE: No, I didn't need to create a cover because my instruction with him was to put him as a sleeper, so I can't go and tell him I'm a businessman and you must then go and be a sleeper, it just doesn't work like that.

MR KAHANOVITZ: So what did you tell him? You said: "I'm from the Security Police and I want you" to do what?

MR MAREE: We need - first of all I just questioned him a bit when we spoke to see if he knows about Intelligence work and he obviously had ...(indistinct) background, he knew what a speaker was and I explained to him that that's what I wanted him to do. He must settle himself in for 5 years, because at that stage the election was just about to come on, so that we could reactivate him after the election, three, five years time.

MR KAHANOVITZ: But I understand your evidence to be that you didn't know how he came to be recruited.

MR MAREE: No, I didn't.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Who put you in contact with Aitchison?

MR MAREE: Mr Burger.

MR KAHANOVITZ: He told you to go and meet this guy in a hotel?

MR MAREE: Ja, he gave me the telephone number of Mr Aitchison and his CV yes and told me I must go and meet this guy.

MR MAREE: Ja, he gave me a telephone number of Mr Aitchison and his CV, yes and told me to go and meet this guy.

MR KAHANOVITZ: How did Mr Burger get introduced to Mr Aitchison?

MR MAREE: I don't know. I don't know if he was introduced to him.

MR KAHANOVITZ: So he just says: "Phone this guy at the hotel, he may be of use to us. You go talk to him"?

MR MAREE: No.

MR KAHANOVITZ: What does he say?

MR MAREE: He said: "Phone this guy", he gave me Mr Aitchison’s CV "and place him in Namibia."

MR KAHANOVITZ: And you don't ask any questions as to where this CV comes from or anything.

MR MAREE: No, well a CV was given to me, I don't ask him for that. There were obviously questions in regard to Namibia, what he must do. He must be a sleeper, that was instructions.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You see what I don't understand in your evidence-in-chief you said that it came as a great surprise to you after Aitchison was arrested, to discover that Aitchison before meeting you had met Ferdi Barnard and had met Calla Botha.

MR MAREE: It was.

MR KAHANOVITZ: But how is it possible, forget about you for the moment, as I understand the chain of events was that Calla Botha told Staal Burger about Aitchison’s existence, that's how Staal Burger came to know about Aitchison.

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: And he must have told him that he'd met the guy, so how could it be a surprise to the CCB that Aitchison knew Calla Botha.

CHAIRPERSON: He didn't say it was a surprise to him.

MR MAREE: It was a surprise to me.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Except it goes, well maybe we can canvass this issue with Mr Botha when he gives his evidence. He deals with it in his statement. But if I understand, your evidence is that if you'd known that Aitchison knew who he was really working for at the time that you'd recruited him, because he'd spoken to Mr Barnard and Mr Burger, you wouldn't have used him.

MR MAREE: Definitely not.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Just to clarify for the record, why?

MR MAREE: Because I would have been compromised.

MR KAHANOVITZ: So he played along and when you came and told him you were from the Security Police and so on and so forth, he just played along.

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Now after Aitchison was released from detention in Namibia, he made a statement to the South African Police. I just want to put certain allegations contained in that statement to you, just for purpose of the record, that statement, I don't have a copy of the statement anymore, it was handed up as an exhibit at the inquest into the assassination of Anton Lubowski, but I still have our heads of argument from that matter where we deal with the contents of that statement. Statement dated 14 January 1991 and it was taken by Lieut Col Eager of the Brixton Murder and Robbery Squad. Now Aitchison says that you contacted him, he obviously knew who you were by the time the statement was taken, and arranged to meet him at the Ascot Hotel in Norwood Johannesburg. This is the first time they met, correct?

MR MAREE: That's correct.

MR KAHANOVITZ: He said you asked him if he was willing to go to Namibia and you told him to go there and hire a house, correct?

MR MAREE: That's correct.

MR KAHANOVITZ: He says at that stage you didn't tell him what he would be required to do, once he got there.

MR MAREE: I beg your pardon?

MR KAHANOVITZ: He says you didn't tell him what he would be required to do once he got there.

MR MAREE: Ja, I think - he was a sleeper, that's what he was supposed to be doing.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Yes, but what was he going to do when he woke up?

MR MAREE: I'll use different terminology so you can understand.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Yes, I understand the concept of a sleeper, but what - you obviously both had a common understanding that he was going to be utilised for a particular purpose after he had established himself. What was that purpose?

MR MAREE: There was no purpose explained to me.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Alright. You gave him your pager number to contact him in the future.

MR MAREE: Correct.

MR KAHANOVITZ: He says in August 1989 he had meetings with you in Swaziland and Johannesburg.

MR MAREE: I met him on a few occasions in Swaziland, yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: By the way, part of those meetings in Swaziland were to give him money.

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: What was he going to use the money for?

MR MAREE: His sustenance, to live.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Why were you meeting him in Swaziland?

MR MAREE: I timed that with my company things for Lema, so have a cover to be at a particular place at the right time.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Why didn't you just deposit money into his bank account in Windhoek? Why do you have to go and meet in Swaziland just to give him money, that's what I don't understand.

MR MAREE: I'm not sure what the particular thing, he had some problem and I made a plan to be in Swaziland to give him that money at that time.

MR KAHANOVITZ: What was his problem?

MR MAREE: I don't know. I can't remember particularly what the problem was.

CHAIRPERSON: We don't really need all these fine details Mr Kahanovitz. I'm not wanting to stop you, but just to remind you, we're not going to make any findings on the dealings between this witness and Aitchison, we're not briefed for that.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Aitchison says that you gave him explosive devices which were to be used to sabotage SWAPO vehicles.

MR MAREE: No.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You deny that? I thought you might. He says that you told him to give these to a man by code name Taxi who would place them

MR MAREE: Never heard of him.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Alright. He says you told him to take photographs of the house of Gwen Lister, the editor of the Namibian, establish what car she drove and take notice of who her contacts were.

MR MAREE: No.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You deny that.

MR MAREE: Absolutely.

MR KAHANOVITZ: He says that at this meeting where he received his instructions, you were in possession of a photograph of Anton Lubowski.

MR MAREE: That's not true.

MR KAHANOVITZ: He says that you gave him the registration number of Lubowski's car and you told him to keep a look out for it.

MR MAREE: No, that's not true.

MR KAHANOVITZ: He says he met with you on the 10th of September 1989 at the Kalahari Sands Hotel in Windhoek where you gave him an instruction to attempt to use poison to murder Gwen Lister.

MR MAREE: No.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You deny that?

MR MAREE: Absolutely. The meetings in Namibia were at the Sands Hotel.

MR KAHANOVITZ: He said at a subsequent meeting he discussed with you the difficulties that he was encountering in executing the plan to poison Gwen Lister.

MR MAREE: No, his problems were with housing.

MR KAHANOVITZ: He said that he returned to the cottage that he'd hired on a particular day thereafter and he found a parcel that had been left there for him, containing an AK47 and two magazines, this was on the 11th of September, 1989, the day before Adv Lubowski's assassination.

MR MAREE: I can't comment about that.

MR KAHANOVITZ: He says that you phoned him and told him to take this "parcel" to the Kalahari Sands Hotel between 8 and 9 o'clock in the evening on the following day.

MR MAREE: No.

MR KAHANOVITZ: He says, he denies, Aitchison denies involvement in shooting Lubowski, what he does say is that after Lubowski was shot, he phoned you, you told him that he should go to Lusaka for a few days and that you would meet him there.

MR MAREE: This is not true.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Now the meeting that was held in Johannesburg, that's referred to in Mr Botha's statement, were you here yesterday when we dealt with the instruction being sent to destroy the guest register at the Norwood Hotel?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Were you at that meeting?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You confirm that an instruction to steal that hotel register was given at that meeting?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Do you confirm that you were instructed to go into hiding?

MR MAREE: No.

MR KAHANOVITZ: That's incorrect.

MR MAREE: I was - there was no plan at that stage. When Botha took the register, I wasn't given instruction then.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Excuse me?

MR MAREE: At what stage are you - at this meeting?

MR KAHANOVITZ: Yes. Mr Basson said ...

MR MAREE: Not at that meeting, no.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Well whether it - were you at any stage in or about, or let me rephrase the question. Were you at some stage shortly after Lubowski's assassination instructed to go into hiding?

MR MAREE: In December and January 1990.

MR KAHANOVITZ: No, that wasn't Mr Basson's evidence. Mr Basson, or both Mr Basson and Mr Botha agree that at this meeting, or let me read you what is said about what happened at this meeting. He says that there was this emergency meeting. Sorry I got the name of the hotel wrong, it was at the Indaba Hotel or the Rosebank Hotel and that everybody was worried about Aitchison’s detention and he says:

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Were you particularly worried?

MR MAREE: Yes, I was.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Why were you particularly worried?

MR MAREE: Because I'm directly attached to this guy, I'm handling him.

MR KAHANOVITZ: So you thought maybe this guy killed Lubowski.

MR MAREE: Well, he was arrested, it was a problem for me, absolutely.

MR KAHANOVITZ: But why might he have killed Lubowski?

MR MAREE: No, I didn't say he killed, I don't know, but I'm connected directly to this guy who had been arrested.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Alright. Now, but it struck you as conceivable that Aitchison merely off his own bat had decided to assassinate Lubowski, is that your evidence?

MR MAREE: No, I don't think off his own bat.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Who might have asked him to do it?

MR MAREE: I'll be speculating. At that stage in Namibia, everybody was running around in Namibia, not just the CCB and Military Intelligence.

CHAIRPERSON: But what Mr Kahanovitz is asking you, did you perceive that it was possible that he might have been the person who ...(indistinct - speaking simultaneously)

MR MAREE: That he might have been used, yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Because he was the kind of person who you were aware, if you offered him enough money, certainly he'd said to you: "If you pay me, I will kill someone".

MR MAREE: No, he didn't say that to me.

MR KAHANOVITZ: But we've already had evidence that he held - Mr Burger has already admitted that Aitchison held himself out as a hit man.

MR MAREE: Yes, but he didn't tell me that. He didn't tell me: "Give me money, I'll kill somebody."

MR KAHANOVITZ: What does it mean to say if someone holds himself as a hit man? He's saying to you: "If you pay me enough money, I'll kill someone for you."

MR MAREE: That's the evidence of Mr Burger. I can't judge by Mr Burger, that's what Mr Burger understood by it.

MR KAHANOVITZ: What did you understand?

MR MAREE: I understood Aitchison to be an ex-mercenary, or ex-Zimbabwean operator and at one stage I told Mr Verster and Mr Basson: "I'm concerned about him because he's playing James Bond. The CIA is following him, the KGB is following him around. I'm trying to calm him down." So I was concerned that he's playing games, he's playing spy-spy and I reported that to...

MR KAHANOVITZ: What quality did he have that led you to utilise him in Namibia?

MR MAREE: He didn't have qualities that I would use. He was put on me to place there, so I didn't recruit this guy.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You see the only quality is, and I use that word advisedly, that I'm aware that Aitchison purported to have, was an ability to kill people.

MR MAREE: Yes, I understand what you're saying. I’m saying, I didn't go and recruit him, so I wouldn't have - he's not the guy I would have put in Namibia.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Now, just to return to that meeting. What Mr Botha says:

at the same meeting,

MR MAREE: I think Mr Botha's timing is wrong there. This only came in in December of 1989.

MR KAHANOVITZ: But Mr Botha's evidence makes sense and this is in fact confirmed by Mr Basson yesterday. If you're worried about being linked to Aitchison and Aitchison has been arrested and you wish to avoid arrest and detention, it makes sense for you to go and lie low.

MR MAREE: The facts prove that I didn't lie low at that stage. I mean if it makes sense or not, I didn't, I only went in December of 1989.

MR KAHANOVITZ: I'm open to correction, but I have a fairly clear recollection of the evidence yesterday from Mr Basson, was that you did in fact go and lie low.

MR MAREE: I went overseas in December of 1989.

MR KAHANOVITZ: So the bottom line is, if anybody says that subsequent to that meeting, you went to lie low because you were worried about being arrested or detained, arising out of the assassination of Adv Lubowski, that evidence is untrue?

MR MAREE: I missed the gist of your things, give them again.

MR KAHANOVITZ: If anybody says that after this emergency meeting you went to lie low because you were worried that you might be arrested or detained on suspicion of involvement in Adv Lubowski's murder, they're not telling the truth. Is that your version?

MR MAREE: No, that meeting, at that meeting it didn't transpire. I didn't go and lie low after that meeting.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Did you ever go and lie low because you were worried that you might be arrested for Adv Lubowski's assassination?

MR MAREE: Yes, that's what I explained to you, in December 1990, that's what we're arguing about.

CHAIRPERSON: 1989.

MR MAREE: 1989, sorry, yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Your version is after, I forget who, the first person who was arrested, was it Mr Botha or Mr Barnard?

MR MAREE: I'm not sure which was arrested first.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You gave evidence-in-chief - was it Botha?

MR MAREE: Barnard first and then Botha.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Mr Barnard.

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: You said at the time that those people got arrested, you left the country.

MR MAREE: Yes, I left the country in December 1989.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Alright. And one of the reasons that you left, the CCB was about to be exposed, that was the concern.

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Okay. And in addition you were worried that you might be arrested for the Lubowski assassination.

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Because you were aware that Jumbo Smit from the Namibian police was doing investigations.

MR MAREE: Correct.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Mr Chairman, if I can just have five more minutes, I'd rather then just finish before lunch.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you, that would probably be the most convenient thing to do Mr Kahanovitz.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Were you aware of a plot to assassinate ...(indistinct) Hamutenya in Namibia?

MR MAREE: No, I wasn't.

MR KAHANOVITZ: No you weren't. Daniel Tjongarero from SWAPO?

MR MAREE: No.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Nico Bessinger?

MR MAREE: No.

MR KAHANOVITZ: So you were visiting Windhoek on a regular basis, purely to speak to, to handle Aitchison?

MR MAREE: To handle Aitchison yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: And I assume, run your business.

MR MAREE: And the business, yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: So this whole SWAPO campaign directed, excuse me CCB campaign, directed against the Namibian elections, you played no role whatsoever.

MR MAREE: No, I think I played a role. I think the reason why Aitchison was given me in retrospect is because I had established a company there and that would slot in there. It would give me movement to go and handle him there.

CHAIRPERSON: But I think what Mr Kahanovitz is asking, besides setting up your blue plan there and establishing Aitchison, he's asking you, did you play any role at all in the CCB operations relating or concerning the Namibian elections?

MR MAREE: No, I didn't.

MR KAHANOVITZ: So, do I take it then that all these projects to doctor oil, poison water holes, burn vehicles, kill people, you had no involvement whatsoever in any of those projects?

MR MAREE: I had no knowledge of them at all.

MR KAHANOVITZ: If I might just have a minute? You said in your evidence-in-chief that somebody contacted you while you were in Germany and told you to not come back because all hell's broken loose.

MR MAREE: Ja, Mr Verster.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Is it Mr Verster? What did he tell you?

MR MAREE: He told me that I was to remain in Germany and I would be contacted and told when I should return.

MR KAHANOVITZ: But why did he not want you to return?

MR MAREE: Well that was the period that I was lying low for Namibia.

MR KAHANOVITZ: In other words, words to the effect of: "The Namibian police are looking for you, don't come back to South Africa, you could be arrested."

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR KAHANOVITZ: Alright. Where is Donald Aitchison today?

MR MAREE: I don't know.

MR KAHANOVITZ: No further questions, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Well let's see how long it will be. Do you have any questions Mr Hockey? Sorry Mr Rheeder do you have any questions? Ms Coleridge?

MS COLERIDGE: I do, Chairperson, just a few.

CHAIRPERSON: Should we handle it now before the lunch adjournment?

MS COLERIDGE: It won't take very long, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I think let's finish this witness then we can start ...

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS COLERIDGE: Mr Maree, what were you other codenames besides Le Roux?

MR MAREE: I just had one, Stefan Le Roux.

MS COLERIDGE: And you said you had a partner that dealt

with you in your business, 89, 90.

MR MAREE: Yes.

MS COLERIDGE: What was your partner's name?

MR MAREE: Mr Ehlers.

MS COLERIDGE: Mr Ehlers. And you said that once you, after Calla Botha and van Zyl were arrested, you informed your partner about the dealings. What did you inform him about?

MR MAREE: I explained to him that the company that I set up and I brought him into was a front company and that he would be much more active in the company, he would take over the company and he did that then and to inform the staff too what the - because it was going to be in the newspapers anyway.

MS COLERIDGE: And so he knew that this company was a front company of the CCB and he knew that this involved certain illegal activities, is that correct?

MR MAREE: He knew that, after I told him in 1990, yes.

MS COLERIDGE: And is he still your partner?

MR MAREE: Yes, he is.

MS COLERIDGE: And then just in relation to your operations, was your operation called, by the CCB, was it called Lema?

MR MAREE: My project name?

MS COLERIDGE: Your project name.

MR MAREE: I can't even remember what, it wasn't called Lema, no.

MS COLERIDGE: And what was the other operation, Toddler, which was your operation?

MR MAREE: That was the project name for my blue plan, yes, Toddler.

MS COLERIDGE: So it was just in relation to your blue plan?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MS COLERIDGE: And then just in relation to the DCC, we know that lots of CCB members, about 30 odd of them, worked for the DCC after 1990.

MR MAREE: Yes.

MS COLERIDGE: And you were one of them.

MR MAREE: I was one of them, yes.

MS COLERIDGE: Your companies that you had at the time, was that also used as front companies for DCC?

MR MAREE: No, that was finished then.

MS COLERIDGE: But you still have these companies today?

MR MAREE: I still have these companies going at the moment, yes.

MS COLERIDGE: So who operated those companies at that time?

MR MAREE: My partner.

MS COLERIDGE: And why did you leave the DCC?

MR MAREE: We were - after the Goldstone, Judge Goldstone raided the offices and all the CCB people were paid off.

MS COLERIDGE: Was it because you were involved in illegal activities besides intelligence work, because wasn't the DCC ..(intervention)

MR MAREE: No because I was ...(indistinct) and for DCC I was working in overseas countries as well, I wasn't working internally.

MS COLERIDGE: So you're saying, were you dismissed?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MS COLERIDGE: For doing nothing, basically?

MR MAREE: Yes.

MS COLERIDGE: Thank you Chairperson, I have no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you have any re-examination Mr du Plessis?

MR P DU PLESSIS: No thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Lax, any questions?

MR LAX: Thanks Chair, I've just got two. You said that at one point, this was if you'd realised what the implications of

your order to go to Namibia might have been, in retrospect you might have acted differently. That was your evidence. What did you mean by that?

MR MAREE: In regard to the person I placed there?

MR LAX: Yes. I'm not sure what you meant, that's what I'm trying to understand.

MR MAREE: No, I understood the question to be if I had to recruit somebody, why would I recruit somebody like Aitchison and in retrospect, I didn't recruit him, so I had no option, I took him for what he was. If I had to recruit, think of somebody to put as a sleeper, I would not choose him, I'd have chosen somebody else.

MR LAX: You also said that at the time you were worried about him.

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR LAX: What did you do about it?

MR MAREE: I reported it to Mr Verster and Mr Basson.

MR LAX: Did you not recommend that he be removed from there?

MR MAREE: Well, I explained to them and they said I should leave him there. As I say, he had a phobia about being a spy and everybody is following him around and the KGB and CIA and he was taking photographs of people following him around and I was concerned about that.

MR LAX: It seems, you've read Aitchison’s CV.

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR LAX: And you would have had no doubt after reading that what kind of person he was.

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR LAX: And yet you continued to handle him.

MR MAREE: Yes, that's what I was trying to explain to you that if I had to recruit somebody, I would not have chosen him, I would have chosen somebody else.

MR LAX: Now besides visiting him from time to time, or speaking to him on the phone, how did you actually handle him?

MR MAREE: I handled him as you say by phone and speaking to him. Nothing had been ...(indistinct) I was only just supposed to settle him in and this is what I was trying to do, by trying to get him accommodation, trying to get his house, trying to get his kids there and trying to get his furniture and his wife there. That was my initial ...(indistinct) to try and get him settled there.

MR LAX: The impression I certainly get about him was that he was playing a double game with you.

MR MAREE: I agree with you.

MR LAX: You didn't pick that up at all?

MR MAREE: No, I didn't think that he was playing a double game, but I thought he was playing James Bond, I wasn't aware that he was doing something else, but as I said, I was concerned and I did bring it up with the people, I'm not happy with him.

MR LAX: Because if half the things he says in his statement are even vaguely true, he was quite busy in Namibia.

MR MAREE: Apparently.

MR LAX: And yet you didn't pick that up as his handler at all.

MR MAREE: No.

MR LAX: Thanks.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Sibanyoni, any questions?

MR SIBANYONI: Just one, Mr Chairperson. Your partner, you said he accompanied you overseas and the cost was paid by the Defence Force.

MR MAREE: Yes.

MR SIBANYONI: Was your partner not aware of that?

MR MAREE: No. No at that stage he was a minor partner and he was under the impression that I was putting the money in personally, he wasn't aware that the Defence Force was putting this money into the company, so I paid for his ticket, but in reality the Defence Force was paying for his ticket.

MR SIBANYONI: He didn't know that?

MR MAREE: No, he didn't know that, no not at all, no.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you Mr Chairperson.

MR LAX: Sorry, just one last thing. Your other business, Capall, did you notify that partner?

MR MAREE: I notified him as well and I gave him the company when I withdrew because I was too far away from Durban to run it.

MR LAX:. So do you still have interests in those companies?

MR MAREE: I have interests in Lema yes. Not in Capall.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Are there any questions arising? No questions arising. Mr Maree that then concludes your evidence, you may stand down now.

MR MAREE: Thank you Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. We'll now take the lunch adjournment.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you. Mr Coetzee, I take it, is Mr Barnard going to be the next applicant?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Mr Chairman, Mr Barnard is ready to testify. He will testify in Afrikaans. He can be questioned in English, but will answer in Afrikaans.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------FERDINAND BARNARD: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Coetzee.

EXAMINATION BY MR COETZEE: Thank you Sir. Mr Barnard, how old are you?

MR BARNARD: 42 years old, Chairperson.

MR COETZEE: Where and when did you matriculate?

MR BARNARD: 1975, Roodepoort High.

MR COETZEE: And after school, what profession did you follow?

MR BARNARD: January 1976 I joined the South African Police Force where I worked until 1984, when I was sentenced to 20 years due to murder and other offences.

MR COETZEE: And while you were serving the police, what unit were you a member of?

MR BARNARD: Honourable Chairperson, I was a member of various units. I was originally with the Uniform Branch and then I went to the Detective Branch. I followed many courses at the Detective Branch, then I went to the Tracing Unit, then to the Unit for gang violence, which was established in Johannesburg. It was a specialist unit. From there I went to the Narcotics Branch where I remained until I was remanded to custody.

MR COETZEE: And while you were serving your sentence, did you still have any contact with police or State organisations?

MR BARNARD: No. I had individual contact there with persons who were still favourably inclined towards me or with whom I was friends, but I did not have full-time liaison with the police as an organisation as such.

MR COETZEE: There has been evidence from one Theuns Kruger, did you know the person?

MR BARNARD: Yes I knew him in prison.

MR COETZEE: And was there any communication between you and him with regard to further period of service, were you to come out of prison?

MR BARNARD: That is correct, we were in the same section in prison and he was also a person who was a trained Special Forces operative, before he knew me. He encountered problems in the operational area because they abducted a person and he gave the order for the person to be killed. It was a botched abduction. They abducted the wrong person and he gave the order for the person to be killed. We had various discussions over the period that we spent there together. We were there for almost three years where we had daily contact with each other and I saw that highly placed Defence Force persons would visit him on a regular basis.

MR BARNARD: Honourable Chairperson, there were only six years effective imprisonment that was given to me, the rest was concurrent and I served three years before I was released on parole.

MR COETZEE: Very well and did you then join the CCB?

MR BARNARD: That is correct.

MR COETZEE: And you served in the CCB until when?

MR BARNARD: I'm not entirely certain of the circumstances surrounding the point when everything was finally scaled down, but I was there until the end of all physical operations, which was approximately 18 months.

MR COETZEE: That was until the disillusion of the CCB?

MR BARNARD: That is correct.

MR COETZEE: And during this period, at a certain stage, you were in detention. Could you please explain the circumstances of this detention to the Committee?

MR BARNARD: What took place is that Donald Aitchison was arrested in South West Africa in some or other manner. The Defence Force traced a pager which was registered under a false name to me. They liaised with Brixton Murder and Robber on this side and I was apprehended for questioning.

MR COETZEE: In terms of Section 29 of the Internal Security Act?

MR BARNARD: That is correct and after two interrogation sessions during which I reported to the CCB, it emanated that I was detained in terms of Section 29.

MR COETZEE: And for how long were you in detention?

MR BARNARD: Approximately three and a half months. I think it was 3 months and 21 days.

MR COETZEE: After the dissolution of the CCB, what career did you follow?

MR BARNARD: I was released from detention and they gave me some money to go on holiday. It was the Defence Force that gave me the money. Two weeks after my return, I was immediately recruited, or my recruitment commenced as such with DCC of Military Intelligence.

MR COETZEE: And for how long were you involved with DCC?

MR BARNARD: Until its disbandment, as per the evidence of the previous witness, when everything was scaled down, when they all lost their jobs.

MR COETZEE: This was after the Goldstone Commission?

MR BARNARD: That is correct.

MR COETZEE: And that is the overview of your involvement with State organisations? With the disbandment of the DCC and also the CCB, was there any overt denial that you were involved in these organisations?

MR BARNARD: Chairperson, nobody wanted any kind of contact with me. The Defence Force denied that I was a member of the Defence Force or any of their structures. At a certain stage Minister Roelf Meyer, in Parliament, during a debate which I also followed on television, once again betrayed me there. If there is one greater liar than I, it would be him.

MR COETZEE: Mr Barnard, you refer here to yourself as a liar, could you just put this into context? Why are you referring to yourself as a liar?

MR BARNARD: Chairperson for the last 12 to 15 years I have been lying non-stop, under oath, not under oath, it was part of my daily existence. Firstly as a result of the activities that I was involved in, it would happen that one could not tell the truth about anything. Everything that one said with everyday, would be a lie, one would lead a double life. That is how it developed. That for the protection of myself and the Defence Force and the Government and so that my activities could not be traced back to me with various Judicial Commissions of Inquiry, including the Goldstone Commission and the formal post mortem inquest into the death of David Webster and my criminal trial and also before the Harms Commission, everything with the exception of my name and address was a lie. It was either fraud or the truth that was completely twisted. We all lied and when I saw we, I say I and the Defence Force for whom I worked.

MR COETZEE: If we could look more closely at the CCB and your recruitment into the CCB, were you ever told what the purpose of your recruitment was, for what reason were you being recruited?

MR BARNARD: Chairperson, originally I wasn't completely certain of who these persons were, what their specific function was. I thought it was an Intelligence organisation, but with my recruitment strange things happened and this bothered me and that made me go to Theuns Kruger to go and make further inquiries, but what these people wanted and were intensely interested in from the very beginning and I might as well include DCC in this, they were interested in my criminal contacts, my contacts in the criminal underworld, the networks that I had due to my contacts as a policeman, the informers that I had handled, I had to expand and develop this.

MR COETZEE: Were you told for what purpose it was important for them that you would have these contacts and networks at your disposal?

MR BARNARD: Initially I was told that it would be for the purposes of collecting intelligence, but later it became very clear that that would not be the purpose.

MR COETZEE: Could we then begin at this stage, who is the person that recruited you, with the exception of Theuns Kruger who introduced you?

MR BARNARD: Joe Verster personally recruited me.

MR COETZEE: Were there any other persons involved, with the exception of Joe Verster?

MR BARNARD: With the exception of him, there would be Danie Phaal, he was the Security Head of the CCB, he used names such as Frank, Johan and James on certain occasions as well, but it was Danie Phaal and then ...

INTERPRETER: The interpreter did not get the second name.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, we just got a message through from the interpreter saying: "Didn't get the second name". Danie Phaal and ?

MR BARNARD: Lafras Luitingh.

CHAIRPERSON: Lafras Luitingh.

MR COETZEE: It is generally known that Lafras served as your handler at a certain point while you were in service at the CCB.

MR BARNARD: That is correct.

MR COETZEE: Was that from the very beginning, since your recruitment?

MR BARNARD: That is correct.

MR COETZEE: After your recruitment with the CCB, did you receive any training?

MR BARNARD: I did not receive any training.

MR COETZEE: Were you informed of what the nature of your tasks would be?

MR BARNARD: Not at the very beginning. I had two administrative tasks, such as safe houses and places of co-ordination, dead letter drops, post office locations, the dead letter drops.

MR COETZEE: As you understood your tasks, you would be applied for regular legal Defence Force actions and tasks?

MR BARNARD: No, Chairperson, I knew that what we were going to do would be illegal, but I viewed this in the light of the circumstances and as I thought, I was so indoctrinated and brainwashed at that point, throughout the years, it had started since I joined the police and it was also due to my childhood and my upbringing that I felt that there was a high intensity situation of warfare in the country and that I was part of that war, that I would fight that war but by means of illegal methods.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Coetzee, if I could just ask a quick question while we're on this being employed by the CCB. Were you paid a salary?

MR BARNARD: I was paid a fixed salary with benefits, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And did you have to have a blue plan?

MR BARNARD: That is correct, Chairperson, I had a blue plan to establish. As all the others received full medical benefits, vehicles, annuities, I received everything in the same way.

CHAIRPERSON: Why I ask the question was because you referred to Lafras Luitingh as your handler.

MR BARNARD: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Because normally the handlers dealt with unaware members. Why was it that you as a full member, ordinary member of the CCB on the same basis as your colleagues, had to have a handler?

MR BARNARD: Chairperson it became very clear to me that I was handled in a different way. There was definitely a different plan with me and I was handled in a different way to the other members.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Coetzee.

MR COETZEE: Mr Barnard, if we could just return to the tasks and the fact that you realised that these would not be regular legal tasks, was it ever indicated to you what would take place if you were ever captured, or if you were ever exposed as being part of such illegal actions?

MR BARNARD: Yes, Chairperson, of course it was quite important to me because I was already on parole and I still had obligations in terms of my parole. I made inquiries as such and I was given the fullest assurance that there would be support systems which had been created by the Defence Force, which would ensure that if we were to encounter problems regarding something that we did in an illegal or legal action, that we would not be prosecuted.

MR COETZEE: Did you occupy a position in a command structure? With the exception of the fact that you had a handler, were you also subordinate to a Commander?

MR BARNARD: Yes, well overall to Joe Verster, I would assume.

MR COETZEE: Was that the highest level of the conscious command structure that you were aware of?

MR BARNARD: No. I was aware that the line went as far as Gen Joep Joubert, although I never met him and I was also aware that it went as far as Gen Webb subsequently.

MR COETZEE: When you say subsequently, do you mean that this was after the dissolution of the CCB, or were you already aware of Gen Webb during your period of tenure with the CCB?

MR BARNARD: During my period of tenure.

MR COETZEE: And if we get to the remuneration system and the establishment of the blue plan, what was your blue pan?

MR BARNARD: After I was discharged from prison an insurance company gave me a job and I worked in their underwriting division and then ultimately I began to do investigations and risk evaluations for them. That was part of my blue plan because I was so established in the Insurance world and investigations and so forth, there had been many successes, I had disclosed a number of fraud scams for example with vehicle insurance and panel beaters who were working with individuals in insurance divisions and so forth. I basically carried this over and established it privately and still did the same work and also other work.

MR COETZEE: If we could look at your remunerative package, when you began there, did you receive any scale of remuneration? Was that explained to you?

MR BARNARD: Yes. A fixed salary was offered to me and in conjunction with this I would receive R700 odd worth of housing subsidies and another allowance for single persons, an annuity, full medical cover and a vehicle which I could purchase for the amount of R30 000.

MR COETZEE: What was your salary when you began there according to the package?

MR BARNARD: I think it was R2 400 but along with the benefits, without operational expenses, it was approximately R4 000.

MR COETZEE: You said that there was a six month period during which there was the basic inactive establishment of the blue plan. Was that the same with you in terms of your application?

MR BARNARD: That is correct.

MR COETZEE: If we could then go to the criminal infiltration and the network, were you told why it would be important to infiltrate the criminal world and to recruit informers?

MR BARNARD: Yes, Chairperson, the point of departure, as it was conveyed to me by the top structure of the CCB hierarchy was that the MK as well as APLA and PAC liaised very closely with the criminal networks and criminal lines and that they actually walked hand in hand with one another and for that reason access would be needed in that part of society.

MR COETZEE: Your tasking in terms of how to act in such situations within the underworld, were you given any specific guidance or were any guidelines provided to you regarding how you should go about infiltrating such persons and what you were permitted to do and not permitted to do?

MR BARNARD: I basically had cart blanche regarding who I would recruit. They just had to have the correct type of access and by that I mean they would have to be persons who had access to foreign countries and African states and where possible they would not move with South African passports. It included all sorts of criminals. One has the tendency to view criminal in a very restricted sense. One would view such a person as someone selling dagga on the street corners. In fact there are white collar criminals who occupy high positions in the corporate world, who are international figures from here to Tanzania and back.

MR COETZEE: And before we look at the particulars, let us look at the point where you were later recruited for DCC, was this also your task, the continuation of the crime infiltration and such?

MR BARNARD: Even more so, even more concentrated than with the CCB. It was also said to me that they would do anything to maintain the network that I had established by that point and that they wanted to develop it even further. I was financed and that finance grew by the week. It basically snowballed.

MR COETZEE: Could you slow down please? Mr Barnard, what was the result of this basic infiltration into the crime network, if we could examine the consequences it had on you.

MR BARNARD: Chairperson, I could explain it as such. To effectively penetrate criminal networks in places where it would matter and I'm not talking about your average mandrax merchant because they're a dime a dozen, to infiltrate persons who had actual access, firstly to establish yourself in a convincing manner, you would have to do illegal things necessarily, there would be no way in which such persons would trust you if you just told them a story or tried to con them. That is not the way it worked. Secondly, unfortunately it is the case that when one is with such persons, one would have to acquire their language, one would have daily contact with them and one would be tested. Sometimes that test would be the ultimate thing and you could of course refuse and withdraw but that wouldn't leave you anywhere, so you would have to be prepared to go the extra mile.

MR COETZEE: And did you go the extra mile so to speak?

MR BARNARD: To the limit.

MR COETZEE: What did that include?

MR BARNARD: By nature of the situation Chairperson, I began by committing minor crimes and offences, with these persons. I would recruit someone who is a truck driver bringing mandrax in from Zambia because there was a limited number of methods in which to smuggle things into the Republic, so I would depart from the point that I would approach that truck driver because I linked the mandrax smugglers with that man. If he told me that he wanted an AK47 or whatever, I would see to it that he would get whatever it is that he wants. I knew that it would be for an illegal reason, but I would make sure that he would get it and at the end of the day it went as far as my addiction to cocaine, which was more with DCC than when I was at the CCB, but I was highly addicted to cocaine.

MR COETZEE: You have just mentioned this example. You became involved in offences which were not necessarily within the context of political application. Do I understand you correctly?

MR BARNARD: Yes.

MR COETZEE: This is all very interesting Mr Barnard, but what is the political connection to this? What was of Governmental interest? It was definitely not crime prevention when it came to your application in the CCB and later DCC?

MR BARNARD: No, that's what the police is there for. The reason behind it was that MK and the PAC and there were studies about this, it was conveyed to me as such, that they were in close liaison with one another. Any organisation, a liberation movement or even the police would have a criminal element and I had to focus on that. The connection between MK and crime, APLA and crime, that is what it was about.

MR COETZEE: And did you glean any valuable information from this? Was there anything which was worth while, or was it simply an idle waste of time?

MR BARNARD: No, Chairperson, for the times in which we were living, we had many successes.

MR COETZEE: Very well, Mr Barnard, after the CCB was disbanded and after the DCC was also disbanded due to the Goldstone Commission's exposure of these elements, what happened?

MR BARNARD: Chairperson, they consistently denied that I was involved with any of these organisations and when the bomb exploded, I was left behind just like that. Nobody did anything to help me out of the situation that I found myself in, there was no debriefing, there was rehabilitation of any nature whatsoever. What happened was that the weak, spineless politicians of that time ran away and they sat like the proverbial three little monkeys, see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil. They ran away. They ran away with their tails between their legs, like the cowards that they are.

MR COETZEE: And you yourself, what did you do? The following day after the exposure of the DCC, did you put on a suit of clothing and get a job? Did you sell cars? What did you do?

MR BARNARD: I couldn't do that, Chairperson, I was in a situation where on a daily basis I committed crimes. I led two lives, one was the life of a criminal, the other was the actual life that I had and at a certain point there was no more distinction for me. I will admit readily today that I committed crimes which had absolutely nothing to do with politics. You don't just become a cocaine addict and a crack addict with a habit of R2,000 a day and then just leave it. I did everything, everything that they have said about me is the truth and then some.

MR COETZEE: Now Mr Barnard, you are here today before the Amnesty Committee, you have been sentenced to two life sentences and something like 63 years imprisonment. You have applied for indemnity regarding the attempted murder of Adv and now Minister Dullah Omar and Bruce White, in as far as they may be offences or crimes. What is your purpose? Why are you here today?

MR BARNARD: Chairperson I submitted this application and not with regard to the other charges, whether they were politically motivated or not, the only reason why I submitted this application as I can recall, is because I knew that Slang van Zyl had already disclosed this in previous affidavits and had incriminated me in these affidavits, otherwise I would never have done so. It was not my initial plan to apply. I simply did it because I thought it would create a safety net for me because I felt that if there was any future situation I would be able to testify if Slang van Zyl gave such evidence.

MR COETZEE: And today, what is your reason today?

MR BARNARD: Initially I didn't want anything to do with the TRC or amnesty process, I was still caught up in an old thought pattern but due to events which have taken place here, especially during the previous two week session of the Amnesty Committee, I was shocked to my very core. It led me to re-think everything and to re-evaluate everything and I decided that for the first time in 12 years, in the spirit of reconciliation, I would tell the truth. That is why I am here, in the spirit of reconciliation.

MR COETZEE: What do you want to tell the Committee?

MR BARNARD: Chairperson, in all the time that I was involved in both these organisations, I was under the impression because I was indoctrinated and brain-washed and I'm not trying to escape my own accountability, I was under the impression that what I did was justifiable in terms of the struggle that was waged during that period in time.

And that is basically all I can say.

MR COETZEE: As you have already stated, upon various occasions you have lied regarding what took place and your involvement in things that took place. Why would anybody believe you now?

MR BARNARD: Chairperson, I am not here to keep others happy. I am now doing what I feel is right, what I feel I should do. I am prepared to take a polygraph test for the evidence that I am giving here any time, in front of the television cameras, I will take the test, that will indicate that I am certain of the fact that I am telling the truth.

MR COETZEE: Let us go to your tasks within the CCB. We have heard that you established a blue plan. You received your pagers, your post boxes, what was the first project or task that you received from the CCB?

MR BARNARD: The first that I can recall is that I recruited a person by the name of McQuillan. If I recall, that was the very first and I think it was in October 1988. During that time, October 1988, Lafras Luitingh made certain overtures to me regarding recruitment in the organisation. He also gave me false identity documents, a false passport, a police appointment certificate and it was also during this time that I rented the apartment in Ponti under his instruction under the name van Staden, so my active period began in October and during October I also recruited McQuillan.

MR COETZEE: You have referred to the name van Staden. Was that your false name?

MR BARNARD: No, Chairperson, the name which was given to me was Rudy Erwee, the CCB gave me that name, but I completed documentation for the false passport and ID and that was done under the name of H J van Staden.

MR COETZEE: And with the recruitment of McQuillan, was the name given to you to attempt to recruit him, or was this something that emerged spontaneously?

MR BARNARD: This was one of the first fruits that I reaped from the network that I had begun to establish. He was an international gold and precious stones smuggler. I had come to hear of him and I originally came to know of him through the Indian Mafia. A figure in the Mafia approached me and asked me if I would be prepared to provide security for him. This man was coming from Zimbabwe and they wanted to conduct a gold transaction with unprocessed gold of 10 kgs and he wanted to determine whether or not there would be a police trap. As a result of this, I identified George Mitchell who was with him. He was a former policeman from the narcotics desk at John Vorster Square. I had various meetings with them. The business was conducted and from discussions with Mitchell and later McQuillan, I realised that McQuillan was a suitable person for the activities of the CCB. I reported this to Lafras Luitingh, I told him that there was such a person, because McQuillan was in and out. This business with the gold was conducted on a fortnightly or three weekly basis and I became acquainted with McQuillan and he told me he had a military background. I gave him the cover story of CCB, the consortium of business persons and when I told him this for the first time, he told me that he thought I was working for Military Intelligence or National Intelligence, that was his suspicion and that if this was correct, he would be prepared to provide me with information but not in Zimbabwe where he and his loved ones resided. He also told me that he had extensive contacts in Europe and in London. Among others, he showed a passport to me and I saw that he was well read.

MR COETZEE: You also then reported this to Lafras Luitingh?

MR BARNARD: Yes, that's correct.

MR COETZEE: And was there indeed interest concerning the recruitment of McQuillan?

MR BARNARD: Yes, there was a lot of interest, Honourable Chairperson and Lafras Luitingh came to me and he told me that I must chase McQuillan concerning if he had people who could do hard-line work and he referred to the killing of people, the poisoning of people and the planting of bombs in Europe especially.

MR COETZEE: How did it come that you had a discussion about the killing of people? How did it come that this formed part of your frame of reference, that people would be killed?

MR BARNARD: Honourable Chairperson, it was spontaneous. he informed me more and more.

MR COETZEE: This is now Lafras Luitingh?

MR BARNARD: Yes, he informed me more and more and I realised that the same thing that was told to others on a course, was told to me on a one on one basis, amongst others by Danie Phaal, as well as Lafras Luitingh and they told me that we're not going to work in a very soft way, we're going to be hard with them.

MR COETZEE: You didn't have a problem, or you had a problem with it or not?

MR BARNARD: No, I didn't, I just did not want to join any right-wing organisation. I was so naive that I believed that if the Government was involved it was also justified. Another point that created this perception with me or strengthened it was that when I was recruited by Joe Verster, I went as to go for an ordinary job interview. I went with a briefcase, with the qualifications that I had. I had my matric certificate, I had legal subjects, I had various courses that I underwent in the police, some of them were quite advanced. I underwent certain courses in Unisa, I had a BA degree, I took those qualifications with me and they didn't want to see it. When I took it out, he said: "No, well congratulations, you've got the job" and they did not want to see it, not him or Danie Phaal and then they told me: "What cars can you steal? What cars can you open and What weapons can you work with?"

MR COETZEE: And could you steal cars?

MR BARNARD: Yes, I can still steal cars.

MR COETZEE: I am sorry if we now deviated from the point, but I would like to highlight this point. Evidence was led by the other witnesses, or applicants, that the CCB explained that they did kill and was this explained to you in such a way?

MR BARNARD: Yes.

MR COETZEE: Mr McQuillan was recruited or he was identified, and what happened then? What was his application, or what did his recruitment entail?

MR BARNARD: Mr Chairperson, the situation was created where Lafras Luitingh called me one day and he told me we must now get McQuillan to become active and this was about Klaas de Jonge and then he gave me 15 000 American dollars with which I must task Mr McQuillan and that's what I did.

MR COETZEE: What was his task?

MR BARNARD: He had to go to London, create a safe house in London, he had to recruit criminal elements by paying them certain amounts of money for so-called hard-line work. He had to get hold of a second-hand car that can be used for transportation and he had to set up the whole system and then he had to wait for the tasks. A further 15 000 dollars would be handed over to him for payment and for further tasks but I would not have been involved in that.

MR COETZEE: Very well, it was told to him or it was told to you what would happen to Klaas de Jonge.

MR BARNARD: Mr Chairperson, yes. Klaas de Jonge project, I received pieces of information concerning this and what I could infer from discussions that I had with Lafras Luitingh, was that the South African Government and especially now the politicians of the day, were very angry at him. It was about the fact that he escaped from police custody, went to the Dutch embassy, which was a very great embarrassment for the Government, he sat there for months and he waived at the cameras and I followed this in the media at that time. Lafras Luitingh then for example told me and the words that he used was that: "The cunt must die" and this comes from the top, from the President's level.

MR COETZEE: Was this tasking of McQuillan, would this lead to it, the tasking of McQuillan? Did you understand it in such a way?

MR BARNARD: Yes and they wanted to kill him. The whole project was geared towards that, the killing of him.

MR COETZEE: Very well, Mr Barnard, I do not want to tell you not to use these type of words, but your language at this stage is probably influenced by your environment. Maybe you can just explain to the Committee or the Chairperson what the situation is.

MR BARNARD: Mr Chairperson, I apologise if I use such language. It is not really about my circumstances in the prison, but in the past I testified where a Chairperson told me that I must call a spade a spade. Unfortunately there are certain circumstances where I will in future evidence in discussions between myself and Slang van Zyl, where it will come up again, where I want to create the circumstances, for example in Apie, where I want to create the idea about what exactly happened between the two of us and I'd like to call a spade a spade then.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, well Mr Barnard, we'd prefer it if you don't swear when you, in discussion as such, but if you have to use swear words to quote people, obviously we want you to tell us exactly what was said.

MR BARNARD: I understand it in such a way and I will keep it in mind. I would also like to indicate when it happens, if it will help, I don't know.

MS COLERIDGE: Chairperson, could the applicant just speak a bit slower? The interpreters are struggling. Thanks.

MR COETZEE: With regards to McQuillan, did anything else happen after the recruitment of McQuillan concerning the project?

MR BARNARD: Mr Chairperson, Mr McQuillan was sent to London. He received the 15 000 dollars from me. He flew to London and after approximately 10 to 12 days he returned and he contacted me, but Lafras Luitingh told me that I must break all contact with him, that they will contact him in London, but from London he must give me a number, what he was doing and what I then entered into the system, but McQuillan kept on contacting me on my page number. I then went to him, made contact with him and he handed over an envelope. This envelope was sealed. I opened the envelope and inside the envelope I saw a breakdown of how the 15 000 was spent, inter alia how the safe house was established, how the vehicle was purchased, the contacts in place and he also mentioned an Australian would be flown in to do such a project. I was not satisfied. I felt that this happened because of my initiative and I was not known in this and it was very clear that the project was going on and that he had tasks that were not mentioned to me.

MR COETZEE: What happened then?

MR BARNARD: I resealed the envelope and I handed it over to Luitingh. He was not very happy that I had contact with McQuillan and I told him that this man does not want to meet them because he was connected to me, I experienced it that he was more satisfied if he worked through me and I mentioned it to them. He was also not very satisfied about it but things continued. Then at one stage it happened that he came to me, Lafras Luitingh, and he told me that the McQuillan project had to be suspended. I asked him why. He told me that McQuillan, there was a leak and that the whole world knew about the 15 000 dollars that was paid over to him.

MR COETZEE: Were you involved in the Security break?

MR BARNARD: Mr Chairperson, no, although I had an idea that they were trying to place the guilt in front of my door, but right from the beginning, with my dealings with McQuillan, I reported to Luitingh and they had to check him out. McQuillan had CIO connections and also Intelligence connections in South Africa as well as George Mitchell. I then decided to suspend all contact with him and I left it there.

MR COETZEE: And then there was nothing else concerning him?

MR BARNARD: Mr Chairperson, well I wondered about this issue and the fact that they disinformed me about it and I do not want to go into it, but it seemed that it was not true.

MR COETZEE: Very well. What happened then? What occurred after the McQuillan situation? What was the next project in which you were involved in?

MR BARNARD: Mr Chairperson, it's actually very strange, I cannot say it was directly the following project, some things happened in between, but I would like to testify what happened, but to complete the McQuillan incident, in February 1989 he contacted me, his first excursion to London was in October 1988, this was in February 1998 and after I was told that he is the devil, I mustn't go close to him. He contacted me, he phoned me on the South African time and he said he was in Athens in Greece and that he had very important information from the London network, if I was interested in it and amongst others he placed it on my pager that: "It's in your own interests". Before I called him back, I reported this to Lafras Luitingh. He told me that I must stand by and a few minutes later he called back and he told me that I must phone McQuillan on this international number and find out what he wanted. I did this.

McQuillan then reported to me that members of the Irish Republican Army, it was also a family member of his, had a person with them, Alvaro Figerido, who was an Angolan Informations Serviceman, I do not know if he was part of the Intelligence or not and he had in his possession a document with a three or five year plan between Angola, Cuba and Russia against the Republic of South Africa. This was a plan over three or five years and amongst others, maps that indicated training camps of the ANC in Angola, of which the South African Government did not know. I received this information telephonically and I then again conveyed this to Lafras Luitingh telephonically. He then told me that I must wait at the phone, phone McQuillan and wait there.

After the phoning, he phoned me back in about two hours, that was now Lafras Luitingh and he told me to ask McQuillan to find out where he is and that he must come back to South Africa and come and book into an hotel here and give me a contact number. He still had my pager number. He had to contact me and then I would come and see him. All these costs would be covered and he would also be paid for his trouble. I conveyed this to McQuillan and he made himself willing and he then flew over. He contacted me shortly afterwards. He was in the Johannesburg Millpark Holiday Inn. I went to go and see him there after I had a meeting with Lafras Luitingh. I cannot recall how much money he handed over to me in an envelope.

I went to go and see McQuillan in the hotel room. I debriefed him as thoroughly as possible. I also made notes. I also handed over the money to him. While I was with McQuillan in the room, I received a page. Lafras Luitingh paged me. I phoned him from the hotel room and then he told me he's in the shopping centre in the Holiday Inn, I think it was called Metal Box. I then had to inform McQuillan that I was going to withdraw and that other people were going to come and see him and he had to wait in the room. I mentioned it to McQuillan. He was not very happy about it. He wanted to add that I had to remain behind, but this was my instruction and after Luitingh told me that if I leave the hotel, I must go to the roof parking, he will meet me there. I did this. I went to the roof parking area and provided him with all the information. He made a phone call to somebody and I think he gave me two or three thousand rand and he told me that all the heads are very glad. This was my production bonus. He gave me the money but he told me not to have any contact with McQuillan again. I then withdrew.

At a later stage however I asked McQuillan, as we had contact with each other on a weekly basis, how things worked out. He was very satisfied. He said: "Yes, we scored a few marks" The documentation that was referred to was given or handed over, but he did not want to give me any further details. I then received pages from McQuillan again, five or six in a row and at long last I decided not to listen to what Luitingh told me and I went to go and find out what McQuillan wanted. He then told me that he was once again tasked by the people to go back to London. He acted as a connection between the people in the IRA, Figerido on the other side and the two agents from South Africa. The same people who went to go and see him in the Holiday Inn room were two white men and these were the same people who met him in London. The meeting took place in London and after the meeting, they gave each of his contacts 500 pounds. He said that was a large amount of money. He did not tell them exactly how much. This was in pounds that was paid over for this documentation which Figerido had in his possession. He was not very satisfied about that first meeting. This is now the first meeting between Figerido and the IRA people and the agents on the other side and they wanted to exclude him from any other further dealings and I said: "Well, I can't do anything about it, it's out of my control" and afterwards he spoke to his people and they informed him that Figerido was tasked initially he wanted to get political asylum in South Africa and he was then convinced to go back into the system from where the CCB will then task him for further projects. What they were, I do not know and if they materialised, I do not known, but at more than one they showed their satisfaction for what we did.

MR COETZEE: You now mentioned a bonus that you received, a production bonus. Was this now apart from the salary that you received?

MR BARNARD: That is correct, it had nothing to do with my salary.

MR COETZEE: The whole concept of production bonuses, was this explained to you with your recruitment?

MR BARNARD: Yes, Mr Chairperson, I was told that there would be a yearly bonus or two yearly bonus that I will automatically qualify for and then they said: "If you had a successful project or executed a successful project it would be a performance bonus" and that's how I understood it. If you perform, you get a bonus and I received a few of them in my time in the CCB.

MR COETZEE: This is now the whole McQuillan project and all the information that he provided you with, but what further tasks did you receive? If I can just ask you before we get to that, there was mention made from various sources that because of the McQuillan Security break that you were then suspended or you were alone, you were working alone, what was the end result of this?

MR BARNARD: Honourable Chairperson, I would rather see it as, or I experienced it as a warning. What happened was that McQuillan disappeared, or left, and then in March or April of 98, I think it was March 98 McQuillan contacted me. Sorry 89, I'm sorry. Then he was at the Sandton Security Branch and he was then interrogated by Col Viktor of the Security Branch.

MR BARNARD: ...team where I was the Captain for three years. We were on the recruitment team on the same sort committee and I knew him very well and then without making contact Luitingh, or anybody else, I decided to assist McQuillan. I then drove to him and I discussed it with Col Viktor and Col Viktor told me that this person is walking around doing strange things, he received information and McQuillan, the two reports about Figerido and also notes that he made and then the report that I received from the sealed envelope, he had copies of this and he wanted to know who I was working for, who was the head of this organisation. I tried not to tell him all of it, but I got away with what I could and I got McQuillan to go free and the situation that was created, I reported to Lafras Luitingh. They were not very happy about it but the damage was done.

Then I was told to lie low somewhat but it wasn't really a very big problem, it wasn't that I was discharged, or that I was put out, all that was said to me was that certain decisions had been taken and that in future things would be handled differently and that it would function abroad possibly and it was decided that during the next co-ordination session, I would receive my salary every three months.

MR COETZEE: And then from that point onwards you still received your salary as usual, you still enjoyed the benefits and maintained your vehicle, nothing was taken from you.

MR BARNARD: No, nothing was taken from me.

MR COETZEE: And after this incident, you were paid three months in advance regarding your salary.

MR BARNARD: Chairperson, that was approximately at the time of the David Webster incident. I recall that the first time that I was addressed regarding David Webster was approximately at the same time David Webster was shot, on the 1st of May and I had the meeting with him and Joe Verster. I was briefed at that stage and at first I received a salary every two months and then in July I received a salary which would serve for July, August and September and the amount that I received comprised my salary along with the benefits, which was R4 000 to R4 200 per month.

MR COETZEE: You referred to the David Webster incident, could you explain this incident to us from the very beginning? Where did you hear of Dr Webster? What was your task regarding Dr Webster?

MR BARNARD: Chairperson, during my period of tenure with the CCB, I read the newspapers regularly. For example, I focused on the Vrye Weekblad, the Weekly Mail, the New Nation and that sort of publication and that is how one would be informed regarding the prominent persons, which activists were more prominent and so forth. For the first time I read about Dr Webster in those publications. He was on the Support Committee and he figured quite prominently but what happened was that during one of these co-ordination sessions, Mr Lafras Luitingh made me come into pondok, but not to the place where our apartment was. I wasn't aware of this building, it was known to me as the Penthouse Suite. I had to go to another number. This was in the Ponti building and Joe Verster arrived there. I was addressed regarding two persons, one was Jay Naidoo, the other was Dr Webster.

Mr Verster made it clear to me and before I lose my line of thought, I must just say that not one of them was aware that I knew who they were. Joe Verster and Lafras Luitingh didn't know that I knew who their real identities were, they thought that I only knew their false names.

MR COETZEE: What were their false names at that point?

MR BARNARD: I knew Lafras as Louis and I knew Joe Verster as Jack van Staden, but Theuns Kruger had already informed me of their actual identity except they didn't know that I knew.

Then Mr Verster addressed me about the two targets and he emphasised it quite strongly that David or Dr David Webster was an absolute priority target. Not a target for recruitment, a target for elimination. Mr Verster at this point already had a file in his possession, the file was given to me. In the file was an A4 size black and white photograph of Dr Webster. I think he had a beard at that point. He was clearly recognisable. It was a recent photograph in comparison to the photos that appeared of him after the shooting in the media. There were two addresses in the file, one was Dunbar Street, the other one was Eleanor Street, I cannot recall the numbers and there were approximately three to four registration numbers of vehicles and a few newspaper clippings.

I formed the impression that someone else was already working on Dr Webster before he came to me. Verster said that I was the guru of Johannesburg because it was commonly known that in the suburbs of Johannesburg, I moved about day and night and that the area was very familiar to me. Among others, I was warned by Lafras Luitingh and Joe Verster that I should not make obvious inquiries or draw unnecessary attention to myself, because Dr Webster would fall. This man was going to fall, that is what they said.

MR COETZEE: You've used the phrase "would fall". What did you understand by this phrase at that point?

MR BARNARD: In all the time that I worked with these intelligence organisations, the word fall over, or fall, all those things would mean only one thing and that would be that the person would be killed, he would be eliminated. All the other things that you have read in the media indicating that to eliminate someone was to put him or her out of action or take them out of the system is not true, it meant one thing only and that was to kill.

MR COETZEE: You were indicated to that Dr Webster had to fall. What was your specific task there? What did they say to you in terms of: "Mr Barnard, do this and this and that"?

MR BARNARD: I had to establish precisely what Mr Webster's routine and movements were. I had to determine at which one of the addresses he was residing because there was uncertainty about this and I began working on this.

The same task was given to me regarding Jay Naidoo, although it was not as strongly conveyed to me. With Dr Webster I was told that he was an absolute priority and I became involved with that.

MR COETZEE: Could you explain how you went about your work? What did you do?

MR BARNARD: First I took a drive and established the physical lay out of the addresses which were made known to me. I did not see any vehicles there, not upon my first visit to these locations. I went there on an irregular basis at irregular times, in the morning, in the afternoon, at night. If I came back from a night club I would drive past there first. If I went with my girlfriend to Bedford View for breakfast, then we would drive past there, that is how I became aware of registration numbers and the like. Eventually I visually saw Dr Webster on two occasions when he was disembarking from his bakkie at the address at Eleanor street.

MR COETZEE: Did you report back to Lafras Luitingh or to Joe Verster regarding your observations at the house?

MR BARNARD: My initial report was to Lafras Luitingh. I gave him all the information that I had gathered. It was a very difficult area to have an observation in because it was a one way street, there was not traffic on both sides. It was also a cul de sac. One couldn't hang around in the area for too long without drawing unnecessary attention.

CHAIRPERSON: A one way cul de sac, so once you drive in you stay there, you can't get out of it.

MR BARNARD: Yes, it was actually a t-junction, where you can go right or left.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, a t-junction, so it couldn't have been a cul de sac, otherwise ...

MR BARNARD: Perhaps I have put it incorrectly. I reported it to him and I was told that I would have to make a presentation in the Ponti building. I attended this and it was also attended by Joe Verster.

MR COETZEE: The Commission has heard various forms of evidence regarding submissions and presentations which were made, what was the nature of the presentation that you made?

MR BARNARD: Chairperson, I did not have the same experience as the others have described with regard to the precise details and so forth. My experience was somewhat different. There was a board with pages and a koki and by means of these instruments, I made my presentation, indicating that Dr Webster could only be killed as an occasional target, it was difficult to establish his routine. I did not regard Wits University where he worked, as an option, due to traffic and the security considerations, the fact that there was uniform security at the University itself, therefore I foresaw that Dr Webster would have to be killed as an occasional target and that was my presentation.

MR COETZEE: That would mean, if the situation or opportunity presented itself?

MR BARNARD: Yes. I also made submissions regarding a weapon and I submitted that a shotgun be used because I foresaw that he could possibly be killed in a drive-by situation, which eventually happened and I could not be certain at what time of the night or day it would take place and I thought that if one shot was fired by a shotgun, it could also be mistaken for the sound of a vehicle backfiring, that was also part of my presentation.

MR COETZEE: And this presentation that you made, while you were doing it, who was present?

MR BARNARD: Me, Lafras Luitingh and Joe Verster.

MR COETZEE: Was there any written submission with the exception of what you wrote on the board? Did you supply any documentation?

MR BARNARD: No, there was no documentation.

MR COETZEE: And with this submission that you made regarding the opportunity or occasional target status of Dr Webster, what was the feedback from Lafras Luitingh and Joe Verster?

MR BARNARD: Luitingh was like Mickey Mouse who sat there and who had seen a snake. He didn't say anything, Joe Verster did all the talking. Lafras would fall in every now and then, nod his head and add a few things. I was told to continue.

MR COETZEE: Were you given any time framework within which you had to execute the operation?

MR BARNARD: There was no specific time framework or schedule, but I was told that it was absolutely urgent. I must just add that I made inquiries regarding why Dr Webster had to be killed. I wanted to be certain that I was killing a terrorist. The reasons given to me for the killing of Dr Webster were that he was a left-wing radical student organiser and that he was recruiting such persons for membership of underground situations, that he was a founder member of just about every organisation which was aimed against the sovereignty of the State, such as JODAC, Nusas, the End Conscription Campaign, the Parents Support Committee, that is what was conveyed to me. The most serious stipulation was the fact that apparently he had been busy with the compilation of a report or a document which would be sent by him or presented by him to the United Nations and it had something to do with something that Dr Webster had discovered which emanated from his field of study, which was anthropology. This was in the Kosi Bay vicinity. It had to do with arms supplies and I don't know what else. It was a transaction between Renamo on the South African Government. They wanted to stop that. It was so serious by nature that if I could not get hold of Dr Webster under convenient circumstances, I was told to penetrate his home and kill him.

MR COETZEE: Did you personally follow up the information regarding Dr Webster's involvement? Did you verify the information?

MR BARNARD: No, I allowed myself to be led by the organisation completely and that which I had read about him, but one couldn't kill every activist who differed from the Government of the day, because at the end of the day we might as well have built concentration camps like the Nazis, chased everybody in there and gassed them in the chambers. I was under the impression that this was an absolute priority target, that this man was indeed virtually a terrorist.

MR COETZEE: But your information regarding him came from Lafras Luitingh and Joe Verster with the exception of the public information that you gleaned from the media reports?

MR BARNARD: Yes, that is correct and as a result of what I was involved in, I couldn't make inquiries here and there to verify the information, that was not how it worked. On the contrary, I was discouraged from taking such action.

MR COETZEE: Because of the security aspect?

MR BARNARD: Correct.

MR COETZEE: You have already testified that you had monitored him even in the presence of your girlfriend and that you monitored the activities of Dr Webster. When you made this submission and you were clearly told to proceed with the execution of this operation, what did you do?

MR BARNARD: Without telling anybody, I approached Calla Botha. I had come a long way with Calla Botha, I trusted him, I knew that he was involved in the organisation. I was a sort of a cowboy, but I wasn't the type of cowboy who could drive a car, fire a shot, get away and keep the car on the road, so I figured that I would need someone to work with me. I never disclosed this in the organisation. I approached Calla Botha. I told him about the nature and the scope of the project. I gave him all the information that I have just given you and we decided that we would make various excursions to Dr Webster's residence and every time we would prepare operationally as if the job was on for that particular time.

MR COETZEE: Mr Barnard, did you make any preparations regarding, I don't know what skills you had at that point with regard to shooting from a moving vehicle, but did you make any preparations for the execution of this project?

MR BARNARD: Chairperson, George Mitchell testified that I borrowed a short-hand shotgun from him and that I did some shooting on a farm in Natal. I've always justified this during cross-examination before the Committees and during my criminal trial by saying that I had been shooting guinea fowl out of season. In fact I was actually practising to shoot from a moving vehicle within a limited space at a certain time, with a modified short-hand shotgun. I was practising.

MR COETZEE: And the shotgun that you got from Mitchell, was this the gun that you eventually used in the shooting of Dr Webster?

MR BARNARD: This shotgun was already back in Mitchell's possession two weeks before the murder and I used a shotgun that I obtained and modified myself. I took the butt off and fitted it with a pistol grip to shorten it. I shortened the barrel by six inches, approximately, and that is how I used it.

MR COETZEE: And the firearm that you obtained for this, where did you obtain it from?

MR BARNARD: It came from my private stock.

MR COETZEE: If I may ask you as follows, Mr Barnard, did you obtain it from the CCB? Did you request it from the CCB? Was it ever issued to you by a CCB official?

MR BARNARD: No, I had enough weapons to supply the CCB with, I didn't need any weapons from them.

MR COETZEE: Mr Barnard, you were ready, you had practised using the shotgun, you had involved Mr Botha already, you can now tell the Committee how the execution took place.

MR BARNARD: Chairperson, Mr Botha and I made several excursions to Dr Webster's residence, without any success, at various times of the day and night. Every time we were operationally ready, we had the false number plates, we had balaclavas, which I obtained for us, until the day of the 1st of May, which was the day upon which Dr Webster was killed. I once again picked up Mr Botha at his apartment which wasn't far away. We were operationally prepared.

We drove to Dr Webster's residence as we had upon previous occasions. We drove around the block two to three times because we would have to drive down three street blocks in order to get back to his residence. Every time we drove past. We stopped at the top point with the nose of the car pointing in the direction of the one-way street. There was a cafe on the corner. I would do the shooting and Mr Botha drove the vehicle. Both of us had balaclavas on our laps and the firearm was tucked in next to my leg in the front of the vehicle. We decided to wait a while.

We waited approximately 45 minutes, perhaps even 50 minutes, then Dr Webster's bakkie came past us from the back and stopped in front of the house, at the residence in Eleanor street. The car faced in the same direction that our car faced down the one-way street. I focused on him completely, cocked the weapon, I took it off the safety, I put the balaclava on my head and Mr Botha did the same. He moved forward and when Mr Webster disembarked from the vehicle and came walking past the back of the bakkie, he then opened the bakkie, we moved towards him very slowly. We were approximately two metres away from him. He was standing with his back towards me. I called him by his name. I said: "Webster". He then turned around, as he did so I stuck the shotgun out the window and shot him at point blank range. I fired one shot, Dr Webster collapsed on the ground, we drove away somewhat faster, but we didn't want it to look as if it was a car chasing away.

We removed our balaclavas. I looked back and saw that there was a vehicle coming after us. I "respun" the weapon. I had another weapon in the car as a back-up. I thought that it might be somebody who would be wanting to make a citizen's arrest. I would have shot the occupant if he had continued to pursue us, but the car stopped. We drove back to the West Rand. I dropped Calla Botha off and went to my house.

I made a report to Brenda. Her evidence in this regard during the trial was the truth, the fact that she knew about it, that she had watched the car or the house with me. I did not make the report to everybody as I had said, but I did report to her and while I am telling the truth and it is the time in my life to tell the truth, I must just say that I made this admission to Jacques Pauw, the Journalist. I tried to discredit her during cross-examination. I wanted to make it look as if he was after sensationalist stories and that is why he gave this evidence against me in the Supreme Court, the fact that I made the submission to him outside a restaurant in Melville is completely the truth. I had been using crack, I had been drinking and once I started sobering up, I realised that I had made quite a serious blunder and he could have made it much worse if he wanted to during his evidence, so with his journalistic integrity, even though we do not sit by the same fire, his evidence in this regard was completely correct and I would just like to admit this because it is something that has been bothering me.

MR COETZEE: Mr Barnard, after you shot Dr Webster and you drove off and dropped Mr Botha off, what was the next step which was taken, or which occurred after the incident?

MR BARNARD: The balaclavas and the gloves and the shotgun that I had, as well as the number plates which were on the vehicle when the murder was committed, I got rid of all of these items.

MR COETZEE: Did you report this to any institution?

MR BARNARD: When I returned I listened to every news report or media report that I could obtain. It came to me as a shock because I had not realised what the nature and scope would be of that which had taken place. I knew that there would be a reaction because I had shot people on numerous previous occasions, but there was never such a reaction. Although this was an assassination, it bothered me and I began to contact Lafras Luitingh.

MR COETZEE: You said that you had shot people previously, is that with regard to the cases for which you were sentenced to imprisonment?

MR BARNARD: Yes, and also as part of my service in the South African Police.

MR COETZEE: But you had not shot anybody previously for the CCB?

MR BARNARD: No.

MR COETZEE: Did you indeed make contact with Lafras Luitingh?

MR BARNARD: Chairperson, for two to three days I struggled to get hold of him. I don't know exactly how long it was, but he eventually came back to me and we set up a meeting at the Hyperama in Florida, where we had had previous meetings.

MR COETZEE: What was your contact method?

MR BARNARD: It was a pager.

MR COETZEE: And when you saw him at the Hyperama, was he alone?

MR BARNARD: Yes, he was alone, but I wasn't alone. I took Calla Botha with me. Mr Botha was in the vehicle while I got out to go and meet Luitingh. Lafras Luitingh and I didn't really get along very well and I cannot say that I didn't trust him, but there was something about him that bothered me, I wanted someone to be there, that is why Botha came along, because it had been told to me previously that one could do a job and then simply be taken out just like that.

MR COETZEE: Do you know if he saw Mr Botha there or not?

MR BARNARD: I don't know. I doubt it. He never told me subsequently that he had seen Mr Botha there.

MR COETZEE: What took place between you and Lafras Luitingh at the Hyperama?

MR BARNARD: I made my report to him and I said: "Listen, you've got to do some damage control here. You've said that you've been able to squash things." He congratulated me and he asked me to tell him briefly what had happened. He wanted to know what I did with the vehicle and the firearm. I told him that I had destroyed the items. I didn't tell him what vehicle I had used, I didn't tell him what exactly I had done with the firearm. He wasn't really interested in any further details. He then went to the boot of his car where he removed a brown A4 envelope and handed it over to me. He said it was a production bonus and also that Joe was very happy. I drove away from there with Mr Botha. We stopped at a certain point. I opened the envelope and inside there was R15 000 in cash. I gave R5 000 to Calla Botha, R5 000 of that money.

MR COETZEE: Very well, Mr Barnard, this is now common knowledge, that afterwards allegations were made concerning the death of Dr Webster and it was from one side to the other side, there were speculations in the media from various involvements of various people. What did you do? Did you then continue as normal with your CCB activities? What was the damage control, if there was such a thing.

MR BARNARD: Well, Mr Chairperson, what I did is that I was lying low. I was told to lie low, I will be contacted again and that's what I did, but as I have said to you before, at a previous opportunity Mr Luitingh told me that I will be applied in a different way and in July, after the death of Dr Webster, Mr Luitingh again contacted me. I cannot recall if it was at the Hyperama or not. At the Hyperama the area was so big in Florida that we divided up in three sectors, so we'd say: "I'll see you in number one, or two or three" and I assume that I saw him there again. I think it was somewhere in July and he handed over R12 000 in cash, which would then be the three months salary, then I did not hear from him again for quite a while. I followed the stories in the media and then in June I was contacted by another member of the CCB in a different region and I was despatched to South West Africa, Namibia.

MR COETZEE: Before we get to that, Mr Barnard, we have now heard that certain investigations were made at that stage, even in the CCB itself. Were you ever approached by Defence Force members concerning an investigation?

MR BARNARD: It's the strangest thing, Mr Chairperson, nobody every approached me. Joe Verster did not approach me and Lafras Luitingh knew what I did, but the investigative team as I know over the years, got to know, it was Krappies Engelbrecht and Witkop Badenhorst, still today haven't spoken to me about this. Nobody asked me about it.

MR COETZEE: Very well. I'm attempting to follow it in a chronological order. Before we continue, was there another incident in which you were before the Webster incident, that you'd like to refer to?

MR BARNARD: Mr Chairperson, I cannot place it in perspective when the Rosskamp incident took place, but I was involved in the Rosskamp incident. I personally, with Calla Botha, burned out Anton Rosskamp's vehicle in the neighbourhood Yeoville. The information that Brenda Miller gave with this regard that I injured my hand in this operation is correct.

We arrived at Rosskamp's vehicle that evening. I wanted to pick the lock of the vehicle. I had the right equipment with me. It was quite easy to get in. I've done it before at various opportunities. When I started I saw that there was an alarm light in the vehicle. I wasn't quite sure if it was a dummy light, or if it was really an alarm. We did not want to - we wanted to be sure if there was a full tank of petrol. We decided first to withdraw to a garage close by. We decided that we are going to complete this job.

We took a four pound hammer. I held it. We then decided that Calla Botha will drive the vehicle. We will drive next to Rosskamp's vehicle. It was a densely populated area. There was a lot of traffic on that evening. There are a lot of blocks of flats. I will get out of the car, I will smash the window of the vehicle with the hammer. Mr Botha will then be ready with a tank of petrol, approximately 20 litres. He will then walk towards the vehicle, throw this into the vehicle, then I will walk back and as he goes back to the vehicle, I will then light the Blitz and then set the car alight, which we then did. The reason for this setting alight of the vehicle and the reason why I didn't want to put petrol on the outside of the vehicle and out of experience I knew and somebody also taught me this, that high octane petrol causes a chemical reaction and if you throw it with force in a restricted area, the gas will immediately set alight and that will create a large explosion. It will shoot a windscreen of a vehicle out as high as a lamp post. Well originally I also read in the media that they speculated that Mr Rosskamp's vehicle was damaged with an explosives device, but it was done in this way.

MR COETZEE: Why Mr Rosskamp's vehicle? Why were you tasked with this?

MR BARNARD: Mr Chairperson, actually I did not have anything to do with it, I was once again approached by Mr Botha as I approached him in the Webster case, we have come a long way, there's a feeling of trust between the two of us. In all the people that I have met over the years, and if I had to chose one to accompany me on a sensitive issue, I would always chose Mr Botha. I was in various tight spots with him, things that had nothing to do with the CCB, or officially with the CCB, but it had to do with - I know that he's somebody that can react under pressure, I know he will not sell me out. There's a feeling of brotherhood between us, a blood tie between us. He approached me and then I decided to assist him in this. His information came from some coloured gangster member concerning Mr Rosskamp and his activities.

This information was then again placed in the system, it came back, it was verified according to him and certain information was attached to it and this coloured gangster will then be tasked to burn the vehicle of Mr Rosskamp. This thing did not work out because this gangster, I think he was a dagga smoker or a dagga smuggler, he did not deliver, he ducked and dived and turned and we decided to continue with the project so we can get it over and done with and we decided we could do it ourselves, and that's what we then did.

MR COETZEE: There was also the incident with- the Bruce White incident. Can you also just explain this and place it in context, how and when this occurred?

MR BARNARD: Mr Chairperson yes, at that stage myself and Mr Botha practised twice daily in a gym and also then at the Roodepoort Rugby Club. We both played. He mentioned to me that he received this task to work on Bruce White and that he had a problem, or problems. He's alone on the corner, there were not a lot of details, he had a photograph of him and a little bit more information. There was an address of the Urban Foundation, I think it was in Fox Street in Johannesburg. I then decided to accompany him there and over a period of two days we were there three times. At the last opportunity, members of the Brixton Murder and Robbery Branch arrived and they asked us what we are doing there on the corner of the street. It was a mistake I made because I spoke to a security guard at the building and I inquired from him where Mr White was parking. We were a little bit frustrated. It was a mistake and it was my mistake and it was not Mr Botha's mistake. I did not know how sensitive Mr White was and if this thing was reported and this then led that we were confronted on the corner of the street and asked to drive behind the detective to the Brixton Murder and Robbery branch so that we can give an explanation because the Captain who reported it over the radio, did not want to accept our explanation. We then went to the Brixton Murder and Robbery offices. We found Capt Zeelie and we gave an explanation, an explanation that we worked out on the way there. This explanation was not acceptable to him because of certain very obvious reasons and later that evening I fabricated an explanation by going to a person and then to pretend that I was looking for a vehicle that an insurance company was looking for that was a white BMW vehicle. I then turned the whole thing that I took the relevant details of the vehicle and handed it over to Mr Botha and he then presented it to Capt Zeelie that if the guard misunderstood me, I was asking about a white BMW, but here is a vehicle that ...(indistinct) and there's a reference to an insurance company and this explanation was then accepted.

MR COETZEE: Do you know what the purpose was of the monitoring of Mr White?

MR BARNARD: Mr Chairperson, I had it in mind that he was going to be eliminated although nobody told me this. the whole purpose of the CCB was the maximum disruption of the enemy. You cannot disrupt somebody to the maximum if you do not kill it and I think that's what they wanted.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry why did you speak to Capt Zeelie? Wasn't he Security Branch?

MR BARNARD: He was a former Security Branch member. He later went to the Brixton Murder and Robbery unit.

MR COETZEE: Would you have, for example, spoke to him about the CCB and your involvement in the CCB? Would that have been acceptable?

MR BARNARD: No, it would have been a large security break. I had to lie as I usually lied.

MR COETZEE: Mr Chairperson I see it’s quarter to four. I know that at quarter to four Mr Barnard is to be returned.

CHAIRPERSON: Unfortunately the Correctional Services have to leave early with Mr Barnard in order to avoid the traffic jams. We'll then adjourn until half past nine tomorrow morning. Yes.

MR WESSELS: Mr Chairman, may I just place on record at this stage, unfortunately the matter is now being postponed until tomorrow. I foresee that there will be a considerable amount of publicity that will be given to this version of Mr Barnard on television tonight, in the newspapers tomorrow morning, prior to us having our opportunity to cross-examine him and to illustrate that what is being said here is just another lot of his lies that he has now dished up here for the Commission and I'd like to place it on record at this stage, that in so far as his evidence is concerned about the Webster matter, that will be disputed and it will be shown that what he is saying here is a complete fabrication of the truth.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Wessels.

CHAIRPERSON: We'll then adjourn until half past nine, the same venue, tomorrow.