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TRC Final Report

Page Number (Original) 177

Paragraph Numbers 47 to 55

Volume 2

Chapter 3

Subsection 6

47 Security Forces also used ‘ambush’ tactics against civilian protesters in the Western and Eastern Cape. These, like the ‘Trojan Horse shootings’ in Cape Town, resulted in fatalities and injuries.

48 In this period of crisis, arguments for a new approach to the policing of gatherings began to emerge. The ‘third force’ model was first raised at the State Security Council (SSC) on 4 November 1985, when the Working Committee of the SSC, together with the Security Forces, was tasked to investigate “the possibility of a third force, parallel to the SADF and the SAP”4. It was envisaged that such a ‘third force’ would avoid the danger of politicising the police or the army; would allow the police to concentrate on their primary (crime-related) task; would allow the army to deal with civil war-type insurrection and insurgency in line with its traditional defence function, and would create a force with appropriate training and equipment for such work. The meeting noted that similar models existed in countries such as Germany, Italy and the USA.

49 A ‘third force’ working group was set up, chaired by Deputy Minister of Law and Order Adriaan Vlok. This group was involved in processing a number of proposals on the creation of a possible ‘third force’ including:

a An SAP submission drawn up by Major General AJ Wandrag which proposed that special riot police should work in parallel with the SAP and SADF in combating unrest. The proposal did not support the establishment of a ‘third force’, but recommended instead that the counter-insurgency and unrest components of the SAP be expanded and re-organised under a centralised command structure.

b The South African Army report, prepared by Brigadier Ferreira, argued that a ‘third force’ “should be able to deal internally with all security aspects relating to a revolutionary onslaught and should therefore have the full capacity required” (Commission translation). This should include a unity of command; the full intelligence capacity to deal with national security; the full permanent and part-time operational capacity to deal with a domestic revolutionary onslaught and the full capacity to launch communication operations and psychological warfare. It was the army’s view that, if a ‘third force’ was limited to dealing with unrest, it should be created as part of the SAP. If, however, it was intended to deal with the total revolutionary onslaught, it should resort under the SADF because of its greater and more sophisticated resources.

50 Both proposals drew on models of counter-insurgency and counter-revolutionary warfare, rather than less militarised conceptions of public order policing. The overall tendency was to see crowd control and anti-terrorist action through the same lens and as paramilitary functions.

51 On 11 and 13 March 1986, the working group appears to have agreed that, rather than establishing a separate ‘third force’, the existing capacity of the SAP’s counter-insurgency and riot units would be expanded and re-organised. The group also recognised that whatever was decided in regard to this issue was not going to solve the problem of the ‘stygende rewolusionêre bedreigingspiraal’ (escalating revolutionary threat spiral). It thus began to turn attention to the issue of creating a ‘special capacity’ to deal more broadly with the revolutionary onslaught. Overall co-ordination and monitoring were identified as particular gaps and there were a number of proposals: for a co-ordination centre or ‘warroom’; for the upgrading of the interdepartmental Security Committee (GVS, the Afrikaans acronym for the Joint Security Staff), and for the full activation of Joint Management Centres (JMCs) country-wide.

52 At the SSC meeting of 12 May 1986, where the proposals were tabled, the minutes note that the chairperson (Mr PW Botha) said that the security forces must work together on the establishment of a ‘third force’; that such a force must have a developed capacity to “effectively root out terrorists”; that it must be willing to be unpopular, even feared, and that the subversives must be dealt with using their own methods.

53 While many of the other proposals regarding co-ordination and monitoring were implemented, the ‘third force’ Botha wished for was not established. The minute of the SSC meeting of 8 May 1989 records that General de Witt reported that the “establishment of the municipal police and the extension of the SAP’s unrest unit did away with the need for the creation of a ‘third force’ ”.

54 In 1990, a similar proposal regarding the establishment of a ‘third force’ was raised but the proposal was again rejected by the security forces. An amended version of the idea was manifest in the creation of the Internal Stability Unit (ISU) in 1991 – a separate division of the police specifically tasked with public order functions, instead of a separate force outside of the police or army. The decision to create the ISU was announced in a 1991 speech by the then Minister Adriaan Vlok. He said that he expected the Unit to grow to a strength of 17 500 by 1997/98 – an indication that unrest was seen as a long-term feature of the South African policing landscape.

55 The ISU developed a reputation for abuses of power and the unaccountable behaviour of its members, which began to embarrass even senior police managers during the Peace Accord period. In a paradoxical twist of history, some township residents begin to call for troops, rather than the ISU, to patrol the townships.

4 ‘Third Force’ here refers to a ‘force’ which is established between the military (the 1st force) and the police (the 2nd force). It does not carry the same meanings as the notion of a ‘third force’ which developed currency in South Africa in the 1990s which intends to imply the covert use of violence.
 
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