TRC Final Report

Volume 2

Chapter 7

Subsection 43

549 Thus, while the involvement of security force individuals and structures in ‘third force’ violence was to some degree corroborated, lines of command and accountability, were not established. It is not clear whether senior security force personnel so involved represented their own, state or right-wing agendas. In a rapidly changing political situation with shifting alliances, is probable that there were several agendas involved.

550 At the same time, levels of political intolerance were extremely high and, indeed, little instigation was required to generate self-perpetuating cycles of violence.

551 In conclusion, the Commission did not make significant progress in uncovering the forces behind the violence in the 1990s. In view of the extent to which violence continued beyond 1994 and ongoing allegations about sinister forces, the Commission recommends further investigation in the following areas:

• A comprehensive review of intelligence practices. The former government’s encouragement of covert practices led to a serious lack of accountability. Moreover, the liberation movements themselves were forced to act in a clandestine way. In order to develop a new ethic among the security forces, it is imperative that the intelligence culture be subjected to intensive review.
• An investigation into front companies. The private security industry in particular needs intensive scrutiny, as security companies frequently provided a cover for security force operatives.

THE COMMISSION FINDS THAT, WHILE THERE IS LITTLE EVIDENCE OF A CENTRALLY DIRECTED, COHERENT OR FORMALLY CONSTITUTED ‘THIRD FORCE’, A NETWORK OF SECURITY AND EXSECURITY FORCE OPERATIVES, ACTING FREQUENTLY IN CONJUNCTION WITH RIGHT-WING ELEMENTS AND/OR SECTORS OF THE IFP, WERE INVOLVED IN ACTIONS THAT COULD BE CONSTRUED AS FOMENTING VIOLENCE AND WHICH RESULTED IN GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS, INCLUDING RANDOM AND TARGETED KILLINGS.

THE COMMISSION FINDS THAT, DURING THE 1980S, SUCH NETWORKS ESTABLISHED ‘PARTNERSHIPS’ WITH PRO-GOVERNMENT INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS AT A LOCAL LEVEL WHO THEN ACTED IN CONCERT TO PERPETRATE SUCH VIOLATIONS. FURTHER THAT THE SANCTION OF ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES BY SECURITY FORCE OPERATIVES DURING THE 1980S PROVIDED THE BASIS FOR THEIR CONTINUATION IN THE 1990S.

THE COMMISSION FINDS FURTHER THAT SUCH NETWORKS FUNCTIONED AT TIMES WITH THE ACTIVE COLLUSION AND/OR KNOWLEDGE OF SENIOR SECURITY FORCE PERSONNEL, AND THAT THE FORMER GOVERNMENT, EITHER DELIBERATELY OR BY OMISSION, FAILED TO TAKE SUFFICIENT STEPS TO PUT AN END TO SUCH PRACTICES.

THE COMMISSION FINDS THAT THE SUCCESS OF ‘THIRD FORCE’ ATTEMPTS TO GENERATE VIOLENCE WAS AT LEAST IN PART A CONSEQUENCE OF EXTREMELY HIGH LEVELS OF POLITICAL INTOLERANCE, FOR WHICH ALL PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT ARE HELD TO BE MORALLY AND POLITICALLY ACCOUNTABLE.