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TRC Final Report

Page Number (Original) 472

Paragraph Numbers 273 to 281

Volume 3

Chapter 5

Subsection 44

Crossroads and Khayelitsha, 1986–1989

273 In line with the McCuen ‘oilspot strategy’ through which politically compliant communities were rewarded, the state made available millions of rands for upgrading Crossroads. ‘Mayors’ Ngxobongwana and Hoza were able to consolidate their control of their camps in conjunction with the local authorities – the Crossroads Town Council and the Lingelethu West Town Council in Khayelitsha respectively. These areas were to remain ‘sealed’ to the resistance movements until the end of the decade, although elements of opposition in Khayelitsha did exist. As ‘mayors’, Ngxobongwana and Hoza were able to draw upon the resources of the Town Councils to extend their patronage base.

274 These two leaders were able to run these areas as virtual private fiefdoms, establishing an extensive network of control through financial extractions and informal judicial control of the population. The amasolomzi (informal community police) established a brutal reputation, being linked to numerous violations. In the second half of 1988, numerous urgent interdicts were applied for in the Supreme Court36 against Hoza and/or his amasolomzi by Khayelitsha residents, particularly those linked to the Joint Action Committee, a body which threatened Hoza’s political supremacy in the area. The statement of Fumbatha Sidwell Mcabangeli [CT01018] gives a picture of the situation. After he and several others laid charges about the beatings and torture that took place in the ‘jail’, he was again beaten and held at the ‘jail’. The actions of the amasolomzi and the informal courts were both supported and encouraged by the local authorities and security forces as ‘tribal courts’ aimed at keeping law and order.37 People’s courts run by ‘comrades’, however, were vigorously crushed and the ‘comrades’ charged with sedition.

275 Political challenges or threats were not tolerated by Hoza or Ngxobongwana, leading to several incidents of violence. In Khayelitsha, the Joint Action Committee (a body opposed to Hoza) was subjected to ongoing harassment and attack by Hoza and his group. In Crossroads, Prince Gobingca, erstwhile witdoeke leader, fell out of favour and was violently ejected from Crossroads in July 1987. Gobingca himself was shot and injured, and up to thirty homes of his supporters in Crossroads were torched, driving out these potential opponents. During the campaign by the resistance movements against the 1989 ‘whites only’ election, conflicts between Hoza, Gobingca and Jerry Tutu erupted in violence leading to the deaths of at least five people.

36 See for example Supreme Court cases No. 13490/86, 10114/88, 4207/89, 6641/89, 5588/89 and 10288/89, most of which are applications for restraining orders against Hoza, the solomzi homeguards, and the Lingelethu West town councillors. 37 A remarkable SAP instruction in the information book of the Khayelitsha Police Station, presented in Supreme Court case No. 13082/86, graphically illustrates this attitude. The entry states that the informal courts and headmen are rendering an invaluable service to the SAP and should be supported.
KTC splits: September 1987 – April 1988

276 A further example of covert contra-mobilisation activities, that is, the fomentation of conflicts, can be seen in the constant sharpening of conflict between two opposing groups in KTC. Towards the end of 1987, tensions developed between the two sections of KTC squatter camp – the first arrivals in 1983 who were largely township dwellers (called Old KTC) and the later arrivals of 1984 who were migrant refugees from Crossroads. Although both were aligned to the UDF, differences existed between the two groups ranging from their organisational practices to their housing demands.

277 Deteriorating relations came to a head in late 1987, causing several deaths on both sides. These deaths as well as numerous other assaults, shooting injuries and arson signalled the start of a period of conflict lasting until March 1988. Most of Old KTC fled and settled in neighbouring Tambo Square. The UDF attempted to mediate, but ultimately the ANC in exile was compelled to intervene. Activists and squatter leaders were flown to Lusaka from 9–18 March 1988 where attempts to build unity bore some fruit.

278 It was widely believed that the conflict was fomented by the security forces. Peace efforts were bedevilled by anonymous ‘Stratcom’-type pamphlets that were distributed at the time, which stirred up conflict by making allegations against organisations and individuals. Armed white plain-clothes men in balaclavas were seen moving around the area in the middle of the night. Significantly, this conflict took place just months before the October 1988 municipal elections, in which the state was concerned to win as many allies as possible.

Rural vigilantes

279 In certain rural areas, the Commission found evidence of close collaboration between local vigilantes, the security forces and the local Development Board. In Zolani, Ashton, an interdict was applied for against the local vigilante group, the amasolomzi.

280 The following quotes from testimonies illustrate the complicity between the amasolomzi and the police and the brutal consequences. Mr Ntando Pringle Mrubata [CT00130]:

When I was coming out of the house I could hear that there were some of the vigilantes nearby. And then the minute they saw me Pani said, ‘here is this dog we’ve been looking for’, and then I knelt down and I realised that I was unable to crawl. I also could feel that there was something on my legs but I didn’t understand what was happening ... I could feel that my feet were burning. My comrades told me that when I lost consciousness they were chased away by [a policemen] and amongst them were also vigilantes … I completely regained my consciousness on a Sunday [in hospital]. They told me that I was shot … I am now a cripple … I lost the hips and I think the sockets were affected and then I had to be amputated …

281 Mr Sipho Sixishi [CT00755] told the Commission:

Whilst I was still asleep I heard a huge cry, then I woke up. I could see that there were people … [a member of amasolomzi] came in and he started to hit me with a stick, I was surprised … I was grabbed and shoved outside of residence… and again I was hit on the head with knobkierie, there was also a policeman. Matroos beat me continuously. And the police together with amasolomzi pushed me into the van … the van was full … they were picking up everybody on their route … We were taken back to Worcester and that’s where we were detained for a few days … After a while we were taken to the doctor because Mrubata and I were severely injured. I could feel that my eye had ruptured … I could feel that it was painful. After a while I was operated … when I woke up, I could realise that my eye had been removed.
IN ASHTON AND ZOLANI, THE VIGILANTE GROUP AMASOLOMZI WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR NUMEROUS SHOOTINGS OF AND ASSAULTS ON RESIDENTS. THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT POLICE AND AMASOLOMZI CO-OPERATED WITH EACH OTHER IN HOUSE-TO-HOUSE SEARCHES IN ZOLANI, DURING WHICH MANY RESIDENTS WERE ASSAULTED. PROMISES OF JOBS AT THE LANGEBERG KOO FACTORY WERE USED TO PERSUADE PEOPLE TO JOIN THE AMASOLOMZI AND A NUMBER OF MEETINGS WERE HELD ON THE FACTORY PREMISES TO PLAN AMASOLOMZI OPERATIONS.
 
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