TRC Final Report

Volume 6

Section 2

Chapter 8

Subsection 5

Distribution of awards

37. In addition to prioritising the speedy delivery of payment to victims, it was also necessary to synchronise the receipt of payment with an official communication from the President’s Fund, informing victims of the outcome of their applications.

38. Payments were, in the main, made directly into individual banking accounts, using an electronic banking system (the BDB Data Bureau System). Whilst this was the quickest and most secure way of effecting payment, one had to ensure that the letter from the President’s Fund reached the recipient by post before the money was transferred into the individual’s account. Postal delays were potentially problematic in that a recipient might be unaware that a payment had been made, or might spend the money without realising where it came from or what it was intended for (for example, to facilitate access to a recommended service). This early warning system is essential and should be maintained for the future, even where the payment is sent by registered post (in this case by the Department of Justice). Pressure to deliver should not compromise providing such crucial information to recipients.

Challenges relating to payment

39. The President ’s Fund reports two major problems with effecting payment:

a Invalid account numbers: The RRC, lacking the authority to check the validity of account numbers with banks, was unable to pick up errors in this respect at the application form checking stage. Where an account number turned out to be invalid, the Preside n t ’s Fund would try to contact the recipient by post or telephone and request that a valid bank account be submitted .

b Valid accounts that had closed down: As a result of the pervasive poverty of most victims, accounts that had been opened for the purpose of receiving payment quickly became dormant in the absence of funds being transferre d . Although special arrangements had been made with the Banking Council of South Africa to avoid this frustrating situation, many banks were not flexible.

In the event of the transaction being rejected due to closed bank accounts, the Pre s ident ’s Fund would contact the recipients and inform them of the situ a t i o n .

Alternative methods of payment

Requests for cheques

40. Some recipients would request that the payment be made by cheque. This practice was agreed to only in exceptional cases, and only after the Pre s i dent ’s Fund had made direct contact with the requesting individual.

Postbank payments

41. The Postbank is not on the BDB (electronic banking) system. Requests made to deposit into post office accounts were forwarded to the post office head offic e . Composite cheques were made out to batches of recipients – usually about ten at a time – and the funds were then paid into their accounts.

Special banking arrangements for victims

42. The RRC set up meetings with the General Manager of the Banking Council of South Africa to propose an arrangement whereby recipients of reparation, already of limited income, might encounter an ‘account friendly’ service that would accommodate minimal financial traffic or activity. The dilemma, as indicated above, was that, if the time between opening an account and being paid interim grants exceeded a certain number of days, the automatic banking system of any given bank would close down the account.

43. In November 1998, the Banking Council informed the RRC that a number of banks had responded positively to its request and were willing to use special savings accounts to assist victims of gross human rights violations. This positive response must be qualified, as the banks in question, although helpful in bringing the RRC’s direct attention to existing products, did not initiate any new or tailor-made banking products. The banks that indicated their co-operation were : ABSA, First National, Cape of Good Hope, Meeg Bank Limited and Mercantile Lisbon, Saambou and Standard banks.

44. In retrospect, the most positive aspect of these discussions with banks through the Banking Council was that the RRC was furnished with a list of contact personnel in the banks. These lists were distributed to regional offices, enabling regional co-ordinators to contact the personnel in the event of a reported problem. The banks’ official ‘co-operative’ stance provided the necessary leverage to get bank accounts re-opened without resistance. In the main though, victims were obliged to use the banking products of various banks without special arrangements being made.