MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, the final amnesty applicant is Mr Willem Nortje.
WILLEM ALBERTUS NORTJE: (sworn states)
EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: Chairperson, I'm almost ready.
Mr Nortje, you apply for amnesty for your participation in the shooting incident of the 12th of June 1988, in these proceedings, is that correct?
MR LAMEY: You have initially completed an application form by yourself, which is found on page 283 up to page 290, an extract from that application, is that correct?
MR LAMEY: What was incorporated in that original application, is it correct that the Piet Retief shooting incident is incorporated therein from a previous statement which you made to the Goldstone Commission? ...(transcriber's interpretation)
MR NORTJE: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR LAMEY: And after you obtained legal representation a supplementary application was filed, which we find on page 291 to page 311, with the extract on the Piet Retief shooting incident which you were involved in, which we find on page 306 to page 311, is that correct?
MR NORTJE: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR LAMEY: You confirm the particulars as it is embodied in the application and as it was supplemented and as will be elaborated on in your oral evidence, is that correct?
MR LAMEY: There is also an overview with regard to your training and background, which we find from page 297 to page 305 of the bundle, is that correct?
MR NORTJE: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR LAMEY: There, amongst others you mention, and I will refer to it briefly, that beforehand you were a member of Koevoet. Would you please tell us, was Koevoet an army unit or was it a police unit?
MR NORTJE: It was a Security Branch operation.
MR LAMEY: And Koevoet, is it correct to say that it was actually a military operational unit of the police in the then South West Africa?
MR LAMEY: After your involvement with Koevoet you were transferred to Vlakplaas, is that correct?
MR NORTJE: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR LAMEY: I wish to refer you briefly to - Chairman, bundle 1D, the supplementary statement of Mr de Kock, which deals with the general background of Vlakplaas. On page 26 to 27, reference is made to evidence of Gen Johan van der Merwe, who was then the Security Chief of the Security Police and where he mentions - and I read it briefly
"Chairperson, as I've already mentioned, Brig Schoon was the Head of the Vlakplaas unit. I asked him to do the task. I had already made use of the C1 unit and I knew personally that with certain incidents they acted across the border and they did their tasks extremely well. And the members of C1 itself, all of them were very experienced and competent members and they had anti-insurgency training and they were capable of working in difficult circumstances and had to do the work with a clear mind and they were actually the only operational unit within the Security Forces."
MR LAMEY: An the emphasis here is where he says that you were the only operational wing of, meaning the Security Police here, is that correct?
MR LAMEY: Was that also your experience?
MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.
MR LAMEY: Mr de Kock has referred in his supplementary submission that Vlakplaas was a covert establishment. Did you experience it as such?
MR LAMEY: You - covert, does that mean illegal operations?
MR NORTJE: That's how I understood it, yes.
MR LAMEY: Vlakplaas also did legal work, is that correct?
MR LAMEY: And just to return to the incident itself. In the supplementary statement you say the date was 1987, beginning of 1988, but now we know that it was on the 12th of June 1988, is that correct?
CHAIRPERSON: You're now referring to the last paragraph on page 306?
So that has to be correct, is that correct?
MR LAMEY: At that stage, or before you received instruction to be part of the group that was eventually involved with the shooting incident, you were with unit C2, is that correct?
MR LAMEY: C2 was also a branch of C-Section?
MR NORTJE: Yes, that's correct.
MR LAMEY: How long were you with C2?
MR LAMEY: And before that you were with C1?
MR LAMEY: And during the team-building function which was held at Island Rock, you were transferred back to C1 under instruction of Brig Schoon.
MR NORTJE: Yes, I asked him to go back to C1, under the command of Mr de Kock.
MR LAMEY: During your participation at the team-building at Island Rock, did you hear of the previous shooting incident where members of Vlakplaas were involved?
MR NORTJE: That is correct, that was on a Friday when the members arrived there and I received bits and pieces of information, but it was clear that there was a shooting incident at Piet Retief, but I did not have the full particulars as to what happened there.
MR LAMEY: You did not know what the exact circumstances were with regard to that?
MR LAMEY: Did it ever come to your knowledge that the people were unarmed during the first shooting incident?
MR LAMEY: No, I want to know, during the, at Island Rock?
MR LAMEY: When later did it come to your knowledge?
MR NORTJE: It could have been the following week or during the following week, but I cannot specifically recall that they then told me.
MR LAMEY: But did it come to your knowledge before you were involved with the second incident, that unarmed people were shot?
MR LAMEY: And furthermore, you say that you departed from Island Rock and the function would be concluded at a hotel in Piet Retief. Can you recall where this place was?
MR NORTJE: Yes, it was at the Moolman Hotel, approximately 25 kilometres from Piet Retief where we met.
MR LAMEY: And you say your recollection was that Mr Pienaar joined you there at some stage?
MR NORTJE: Yes, I have an idea that he had arrived there and had discussions with Mr de Kock. I know later we went to the Security Branch itself.
MR LAMEY: Was Brig Schoon also at the hotel?
MR NORTJE: Yes, he was also there.
MR LAMEY: At the hotel already, did you become aware that an operation was being planned?
MR NORTJE: As I recall everything became clear there, that there would be an operation that evening and it is there where I received my instructions from Mr de Kock, that I should remain with him and the other members and not long afterwards we departed to the Security Branch, where we made preparations.
MR LAMEY: And the further detailed instructions were given to you at the Security Branch in Piet Retief?
MR NORTJE: As far as I can recall, yes.
MR LAMEY: In your statement you mention in paragraph 3 that four ANC MK members would infiltrate the country, did you know that a police minibus would be used?
MR NORTJE: Yes, it was all discussed there. I think we expected that there would be five. That is my recollection, but I think I said four there because I know the four were shot afterwards.
MR LAMEY: Did you know where the information came from about the infiltration?
MR NORTJE: It came from a source which Freek Pienaar handled, as I understood it.
MR LAMEY: What did you understand, would it only be MK members who would infiltrate or did you understand more with regard to how they would come in and what they would have with them?
MR NORTJE: There was already talk of the ANC/MK members who would infiltrate. We had already started making arrangements, because as I recall it was already decided there that an ambush would be set up and that they would be shot dead.
MR LAMEY: Did you understand that they would also be armed?
MR LAMEY: And were you also present where the person who would send the minibus, where he had to stop?
MR NORTJE: I would recall that we drove together when we went to the place earlier that afternoon, when Manzini, the place was pointed out to him, because I know it was during the day when I arrived there the first time.
And the planning which ensued, I was not present all the time, but bit by bit I got the pieces together and Mr de Kock told me what would happen.
MR LAMEY: You also knew of a group which would depart from the Swaziland border, which would let the other MK members infiltrate and that there was a plan with regard to them, is that correct?
MR NORTJE: That is correct, there was a group appointed by Mr de Kock and they would have waited for the people who assisted the MK members, assisted them in infiltrating and they also had to be eliminated.
MR LAMEY: And what did you understand, was there a reason why those people had to be eliminated?
MR NORTJE: The purpose thereof as I understood it, was to protect the source and they assumed that they would also be MK members.
MR LAMEY: It is common cause that you then set up an ambush on the particular road between Houtkop border post and Piet Retief, is that correct?
MR NORTJE: That is correct. After dark, as I recall, we moved in to the place and took up our positions.
MR LAMEY: Can you recall where your position was specifically in relation to the other people?
MR NORTJE: I was lying next to Mr de Kock.
MR LAMEY: Was there a person who had a portable light?
MR NORTJE: The person who had to handle the light was on the other side of Mr de Kock and then the members, I think Vermeulen was next to me and then Flores and then the members from the Eastern Transvaal.
MR LAMEY: Very well. Can you just tell us briefly what happened there.
MR NORTJE: I cannot recall how long we lay waiting there, it was quite a while. The vehicle arrived, the lights I recall, there was a sign that it was indeed our vehicle. I did not mention it, but I recall the indicator was definitely switched on, which would indicate that the people would be armed and which would confirm that they would be armed. And then the minibus passed the place. It actually stopped very quickly, or shall I say it did not stop immediately, it passed, but it stopped very quickly.
MR LAMEY: Past the point where it was supposed to stop?
MR NORTJE: Yes, past the ambush point. And Mr de Kock shouted "Come" and he said whatever he said and we ran. I was just behind him. When he got to the bus, the door opened slightly, he immediately started firing.
MR LAMEY: Could you see anything, could you see a person at the door that was opening?
MR NORTJE: He was busy climbing out with a weapon. That is how I recall what happened. He definitely had a weapon, I saw the weapon. It was from here to about the speaker there, that's how far it was from him when Mr de Kock started firing.
CHAIRPERSON: The witness indicates a point which is about four maybe five paces away from him. Do you agree with that? That's to the speakers in the middle to where you're sitting, about four paces.
MR NORTJE: Everybody started firing, I started firing ...(intervention)
MR LAMEY: May I just take you through this slowly. You say you saw the person climbing out of the left-hand door and you saw the weapon in his hand.
MR LAMEY: What happened at that moment?
MR NORTJE: Well he was basically still sitting, he was just starting to get out with the weapon and then Mr de Kock started firing, he did not have a chance. I think he was surprised because of Manzini that had jumped out so quickly and I don't know if he knew what was going on. Then Mr de Kock started firing and then we all started firing.
MR LAMEY: Do you know whether the light was switched on at this stage and when?
MR NORTJE: The light was switched on at some stage. It happened very quickly. I cannot say that it was switched on immediately when the shooting started, I imagine that the light went on a few seconds after the shooting started, but we had already started moving away because there was this heavy firing at the bus and we moved away from the bus. As we were moving away we were still firing.
MR LAMEY: So what are you saying, while you were firing you moved backwards?
MR LAMEY: And did you also fire shots at the minibus and the people on the minibus?
MR NORTJE: Yes, I fired single shots. I had an HMK sub-machine gun with me, which came from the Security Branch and I emptied the magazine and I recall that I had about 24 rounds in the magazine, because at that stage the magazine was not entirely full and I think it was a 24 round magazine, but I emptied the whole magazine.
MR LAMEY: Very well. When did the firing cease?
MR NORTJE: Mr de Kock shouted at some stage "Cease fire".
MR LAMEY: And afterwards, were you still at the scene and investigated and what did you find?
MR NORTJE: The person that Mr de Kock had shot then fell out of the door. There was somewhat of a hurly-burly there, we were all trying to realise what was going on and what was in the minibus, but I personally did not investigate or do any searching through the minibus, I left that to the Piet Retief people who had taken over the scene because I assumed that it was, that they would do the investigation or whatever the case may be.
MR LAMEY: Do you know what was found on the occupants of that minibus?
MR NORTJE: They were all armed, every person that was there because one was in front, the one that Mr de Kock shot, the one on the middle seat and one sat at the back and they all had weapons with them.
MR LAMEY: Do you know whether those weapons were cocked?
MR NORTJE: I recall that the weapon that was in front left, I had a look at that weapon, it was. I was interested in it to see how close this guy was to shooting and I saw the weapon was cocked and it was off its safety. The other weapons I cannot exactly say that I went and had a look at them, but I know Mr Pienaar and them took the weapons and cocked them, but I did not have a look at them specifically.
MR LAMEY: But the weapon that you had a look at was definitely cocked?
MR LAMEY: Do you know whether that weapon was set on automatic or whether it was sent on single shot?
MR NORTJE: I imagine that it was - or I recall that it was on automatic.
MR LAMEY: And then you also mentioned what you had heard later with regard to the group that the people at the border would eliminate. You mentioned here that they could not succeed in eliminating that person. You have heard that a person had then indeed been killed at that scene.
MR NORTJE: Yes, maybe I should just explain. During this operation it was said - I know somebody was shot there, but at some stage I had forgotten about it, I only know that the most important point was that the person who had got away. I know that Mr de Kock was very dissatisfied because the person had got away and this was something which had remained me. I had forgotten about the person who was shot there, not that I did not know, but I did not think about it afterwards because it remained with me that one person had got away.
MR LAMEY: You have also made a false statement, is that correct?
MR LAMEY: A statement of yours appears in bundle 5 on page 64 to 64, which appears to have been taken down in June 1989, by Brig van Wyk, is that correct?
MR NORTJE: Yes. I just have to say that I did not write out the statement, the statement was just given to me to sign. And I am honest when I say that I cannot recall whether it was attested to before me, but I knew it was false information contained therein and I never read the statement, right up to this week when I had a look at it, because I knew it was false.
MR LAMEY: In your amnesty application you say the main reason with regard to the inquest, to give false statements in the inquest is firstly to omit Mr de Kock's participation and to construct the facts as such so that a proper roadblock was said to be there and that the persons had been killed in an attempt to arrest them.
MR LAMEY: I will not go through everything, but the statement also portrays that you were fired at first and then you returned fire.
MR LAMEY: And that is not the truth?
MR LAMEY: And there was a stopper vehicle with a blue light and the impression is that there was a roadblock and under those circumstances the people were shot after they had fired on you.
MR LAMEY: And that is not true?
MR LAMEY: Before you had made this statement, after the shooting incident in Piet Retief, at some stage did you realise that this version would be made in an inquest?
MR NORTJE: Yes, well at that stage it was logical that the true facts would not be given. As I have said, the statement was drawn up a long time thereafter, but the purpose was to cover the true facts.
MR NORTJE: And am I correct when I say I accept that the reason why this was done was because there was an ambush here and that there was no roadblock, and this would boil down to murder?
MR LAMEY: And it would seem as if Vlakplaas' participation had to be omitted from the incident and that was the reason for Mr de Kock's absence there?
MR NORTJE: Yes, I understood that Mr de Kock would not have been involved in this incident, for whatever reason. I would assume he did not want to have his name once again in another shooting incident.
MR LAMEY: Is it possible because of the first incident?
MR LAMEY: I see in this false statement that with regard to yourself it is just said that you are attached to Security Head Office. That is not wrong, Vlakplaas was a branch of Security Head Office?
MR LAMEY: But it does not say specifically that you were a member of Vlakplaas or C1.
MR NORTJE: Yes, we did omit that purposefully.
MR LAMEY: What it done purposefully?
MR NORTJE: Yes, in all our statements. In this regard we did not pertinently state it as such.
MR LAMEY: In other instances as well?
MR LAMEY: Would it be correct to say it was to protect the covert activities of Vlakplaas?
MR NORTJE: That is correct. I also did not testify in the inquest which was held afterwards.
MR LAMEY: You did not give oral evidence?
MR LAMEY: Were you at the scene when the reconstruction was done?
MR NORTJE: No, I know I saw photos of the scene afterwards, but I cannot recall that I was at the scene.
MR LAMEY: The reason for omitting Vlakplaas' participation and to construct it as such that it would not indicate murder or an ambush, is it correct to make the assumption that with this, covert operations of the Security Police had to be protected and that it would be an embarrassment for the government if it was made known?
MR LAMEY: And with regard to the political objective, you have set this out on page 310 and 311, do you confirm that?
MR LAMEY: And did you also know that from your personal experience, that there were much problems with regard to infiltrations from Swaziland during that time?
MR LAMEY: And which led to acts of terror within the RSA?
MR NORTJE: That is correct, yes.
MR LAMEY: And you also state that Swaziland was a thoroughfare for infiltrations, specifically in the PWV area.
MR LAMEY: Chairperson, I think that's the evidence-in-chief.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR LAMEY
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Lamey. Ms van der Walt, do you have any questions to ask?
MS VAN DER WALT: No questions, thank you, Chairperson.
NO QUESTIONS BY MS VAN DER WALT
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR PRINSLOO: Thank you, Chairperson.
Briefly, Mr Nortje, at the time with these events there were many infiltrators ...(intervention)
MR MALAN: Mr Prinsloo, it would appear to me that you have not listened to his evidence-in-chief. I was waiting for you because that was led in evidence-in-chief, the question that you are about to put.
MR PRINSLOO: But I just want to put this point.
Mr Nortje, your evidence was that 36 persons were going to be infiltrating, did you know about that?
MR PRINSLOO: But there were a great number of infiltrators, as you knew?
MR PRINSLOO: And on this particular evening of these events, according to your statement on page 308, the person climbed out of the vehicle when Mr de Kock shot him.
MR NORTJE: Yes, well at least he was busy climbing out, he hadn't put his feet on the ground yet.
MR PRINSLOO: But all that I really want clarity about, Mr Nortje, is that this incident took place very quickly.
MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.
MR PRINSLOO: Because it was an ambush, these were people who were trained, they were armed, they could shoot at any time and the one who shot first would come off all the better.
MR PRINSLOO: And a member of the Police Force had already jumped out and run past the vehicle.
MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.
MR PRINSLOO: And you saw this at the same time?
MR PRINSLOO: Is it possible, Mr Nortje, that the impression may have been created that this person who was climbing out of the vehicle, who was opening the door to climb out, may have fired? That a person observing this from the outside may have observed this?
MR NORTJE: Well a person who wasn't immediately among us may have had that impression if he had been some distance behind us. It's very difficult to explain this, but there is a difference. Mr de Kock had an uzzi and this person had an AK, and if you have the experience, then you will able to distinguish between the noises. But it is possible at the back may have thought so, but this did not take place.
MR PRINSLOO: If I understand you correctly, your evidence was that you were under the impression that Mr Pienaar was at the Moolman Hotel.
MR NORTJE: Yes, that is still my impression today.
MR PRINSLOO: And you have heard Mr Pienaar's evidence indicating that he was not there?
MR NORTJE: Yes, I have heard his evidence.
MR PRINSLOO: No further questions, thank you, Chairperson.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR PRINSLOO
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Prinsloo. Mr Hattingh, do you have any questions?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman.
Mr Nortje, when you were led regarding Koevoet, which was a paramilitary, it peaked my memory regarding something which Mr de Kock had told us about quite some time ago, but which we have not placed on the record yet and perhaps you have knowledge of this. Are you aware that Mr de Kock also gave the order that members of Vlakplaas be trained in parabat jumping?
MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.
MR HATTINGH: And that these members were duly trained, or at least a great proportion of them?
MR HATTINGH: And there was also a first group of black members of the Security Forces who were trained at parabats?
MR HATTINGH: And the reason for that was because they could be used as a sort of semi-military operational unit at short notice?
MR HATTINGH: The permission was given, according to Mr de Kock. Was written permission given, do you know whether it was?
MR HATTINGH: And this would have been necessary because it was a costly operation and aircraft had to be used?
MR NORTJE: Yes, it was expensive.
MR HATTINGH: And who provided the aircraft?
MR NORTJE: I know that we were at Phalaborwa, we stayed in the army camp, 5 Reconnaissance Commando. I'm not sure who the owner of the aircraft was, but it was paid ...(intervention)
MR HATTINGH: It had to be paid for.
MR HATTINGH: And payment for it was obtained from the Secret Fund?
MR HATTINGH: And the parachutes, I understand that the task force didn't want to provide you with parachutes, that is why you consulted 5 Reconnaissance Commando?
MR HATTINGH: And they provided you with these parachutes?
MR HATTINGH: Just singular aspects. Mr de Kock, according to you - or before I get to that, apart from the parabat training, was regular training given to people at Vlakplaas, with regard to the use of weapons and weapon craft and explosives?
MR NORTJE: Yes, that would be to equip them for possible situations.
MR HATTINGH: So you were always ready on a contingency basis?
MR HATTINGH: You say that Mr de Kock was upset about the man who had escaped and this reason was ambiguous because he said that this person had escaped with the identity of the informer, which he could make known.
MR HATTINGH: And also that that person could have been involved in further infiltration of ANC members.
MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.
MR HATTINGH: The evidence which according to you was evidence that Mr de Kock did not want his name involved with the incident, someone else may have decided that his name should not be implicated in that incident. Is it possible that you may have made a mistake, that this was not him who wanted it, but somebody else?
MR NORTJE: Yes, that is the impression that I got from him, but it may be that the decision may have come from Gen Engelbrecht or somebody else, that his name be kept out of it. But this is just something that I recall him telling me, that his name had to be kept out of the matter, but the final decision, I don't know who took that decision.
MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman, we have no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HATTINGH
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Booyens?
MR BOOYENS: No questions thank you, Mr Chairman.
MR JANSEN: No questions, Mr Chairman, thanks.
MR CORNELIUS: No questions, thank you, Mr Chair.
MR MOERANE: Thank you, Mr Chairman.
Mr Nortje, you have already referred to the false statement that you made in anticipation of the inquest which was to be held at Piet Retief.
MR MOERANE: And this is on pages 55 and 56 of bundle 5.
MR MOERANE: I'm sorry, I'm looking at the previous one. Yes, that's right, 63 and 64.
This statement like the others, seems to have been made on the 26th of June 1989, in the sense that the attestation part of the statement is actually already typed in as the 22nd of June 1989, not so?
MR MOERANE: And your evidence is that you were just presented with the statement which had already been typed out for you to sign.
MR MOERANE: You knew at the time that there was supposed to be an authorised version of the incident.
MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.
MR MOERANE: And that it had to be consistent with what others were saying?
MR MOERANE: And this was all organised by, amongst other people, Brig van Wyk?
MR MOERANE: Are you able to throw light on the identity of the vehicle, whether it was a Nissan E20 or whether it was a Toyota Hi-Ace?
MR NORTJE: I would say it was a Nissan E20. It was a Nissan, yes.
MR MOERANE: Yes. If in fact the vehicle that was at the reconstruction was a Toyota Hi-Ace, would you be able to explain how that came about?
MR NORTJE: Perhaps they didn't have a Nissan, or think about that aspect.
MR MOERANE: So they would have shot up a Toyota Hi-Ace and put sticks through it ...(intervention)
MR NORTJE: I beg your pardon, I think that the same vehicle that we shot at was used at the scene. They would have used the same vehicle, because it stood at the Piet Retief Police Station for quite some time after the incident. And after the reconstruction, I think I saw the vehicle parked there at Piet Retief for quite some time.
MR MOERANE: And the vehicle that you saw at Piet Retief was an E20?
MR MOERANE: I suppose you have no explanation why the Piet Retief people, such as W/O Pienaar describe that vehicle as a Toyota Hi-Ace?
MR NORTJE: No, I cannot explain that.
MR MOERANE: In the last paragraph on page 63, the events are described in the following words
"At that moment, Const Manzini jumped out of the vehicle at the right front and ran around the front of the vehicle. I could see him clearly because the vehicle lights were switched on. At the same time the passenger who was seated in front on the left jumped out and at the same time opened fire."
Now you have told this Honourable Committee that that in fact is false.
MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.
MR MOERANE: But I notice that that particular version has been persisted in by some of the people who are asking for amnesty.
MR MOERANE: Yes. If in fact that person had fired, you would have seen him.
MR MOERANE: Now on page 64 you say - let me not say you say this because you say you are actually not saying that, but it is recorded that you are saying
"I investigated my weapon and saw that I had fired 20 shots."
Now this is actually not what you said.
MR NORTJE: No, that is not correct.
MR MOERANE: But this appears in a false shooting incident report "skietvoorval" report, which was compiled by the officer who compiled that in terms of police standing orders.
CHAIRPERSON: Am I correct from your evidence, Mr Nortje, that you played no role in the compilation of this statement, it was merely presented to you for signature and in fact you said you didn't even read it until this week?
MR NORTJE: That is correct, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: So you had no input before that was drafted?
MR MOERANE: Of course you know that the incident was actually covered up.
MR MOERANE: And that amongst the people that were involved in the cover-up was W/O Pienaar.
MR NORTJE: I don't that personally, but I see here that he must have known what the circumstances were. I don't have personal knowledge of it, but I assumed that he was part of the cover-up.
MR MOERANE: Well one way of covering up is preparing statements and getting people to sign them.
MR NORTJE: That's correct, that's why I know he did not attest to this before me.
MR MOERANE: Yes. You were present when Col de Kock confirmed that Brig van Wyk had actually conducted an incompetent investigation. You heard that.
MR MOERANE: Now you confirm that it was not only incompetent, but that it was also a dishonest investigation.
MR MOERANE: And of course the third person who was involved in the cover-up is a person who is now General Krappies Engelbrecht.
MR MOERANE: Mr Nortje, for those are not very familiar with that unit, Koevoet as you've already testified, was a paramilitary police unit.
MR MOERANE: And you saw service in that unit?
MR MOERANE: And how many of the persons who were involved in the events of the 12th of June, had been Koevoet members? Apart from yourself and Col de Kock.
MR NORTJE: I think the only one who was involved there as well, was Vermeulen. I beg your pardon, Mr Tait was also there for quite some time as well as Ras. I beg your pardon, he was also there.
MR MOERANE: So Vermeulen, Mr Tait, Mr Ras were ex-Koevoet members?
MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.
MR MOERANE: Now would I be correct that although Koevoet in a sense was a police unit, it performed functions of pursuing Swapo fighters and killing them whenever it could?
MR MOERANE: In fact, would I be correct in saying that a culture developed amongst Koevoet members, of obtaining as many scalps as possible?
MR NORTJE: Yes, I'm sure there were some people who viewed it as such, but that was not my opinion. I know that there were people who were head hunters, as you have put it, but to be honest, Mr de Kock and I did not share that perspective.
MR MOERANE: Actually I didn't mean it in a literal sense, I meant it in a figurative sense, that the number of killings was important, not necessarily that you went and actually collected heads. I know that some people did that ...(intervention)
MR MALAN: Sorry, that wasn't his response, I think you misunderstood his Afrikaans. He simply said - he understood it in the figurative sense too and answered it in that way.
MR MOERANE: I see. Did you understand it in a figurative sense?
MR MOERANE: Not in a literal sense?
MR MOERANE: I see. Well just to put it beyond any doubt, wasn't it part of the culture of Koevoet to have a tally of the number of kills that a person had?
MR NORTJE: Yes, it was a factor under those circumstances.
CHAIRPERSON: And to take no prisoners?
MR NORTJE: No, I cannot say that, Chairperson, because we took many prisoners.
MR MOERANE: Didn't that prove troublesome, taking prisoners?
MR NORTJE: No, not at all, we would get them to work for us immediately, with the assistance of the other black members who were with us.
MR MOERANE: Well didn't that prove rather difficult and rather troublesome, trying to recruit and turn SWAPO fighters? In the end, didn't you find that the success rate was very, very limited?
MR NORTJE: No, I wouldn't say that. It wasn't a considerable factor with regard to dangerous situations or the possibility of information leaking out. If circumstances allowed, we would catch certain people and those prisoners that we captured would eventually become part of the team and work for us. There was no danger of information leaking out because we didn't really work with information as such.
MR MOERANE: What I'm trying to suggest is that, isn't it general knowledge that many of these SWAPO fighters that you had captured defected and went back to SWAPO?
MR NORTJE: Yes, there were cases of that.
MR MOERANE: Did you bring your experiences from the Namibian war back to South Africa when you joined C1?
MR MOERANE: Now this modus operandi at Vlakplaas, of performing illegal acts in the fight against the ANC, is it something that you were actually told by someone in authority?
MR NORTJE: No, it was never stated specifically that we may commit illegal acts, but the circumstances dictated that we had to do this. We were protected. If we were not protected we would never have done these things. We did not act recklessly.
MR MOERANE: And who protected you?
MR NORTJE: The senior officials of the police and whoever else may have followed after that. But I assumed that our direct heads would protect us and that is why we continued with our actions. We were not hindered in any way. On the contrary, we were just given more instructions and the whole thing escalated.
MR MOERANE: Are you referring in particular to Brig Schoon?
MR MOERANE: Did you receive instructions from anyone higher than Brig Schoon?
MR NORTJE: No, I did not liaise directly with those persons, I received my orders from Mr de Kock, who in turn received his orders from Brig Schoon as well as Engelbrecht and those people.
MR MOERANE: Well I'll ask you some of the questions that I asked Mr Vermeulen. With regard to rules, did you observe any rules such as how to treat captured persons?
MR MOERANE: So you made you own rules, in effect?
MR NORTJE: It's difficult to say rules, we acted according to the circumstances. But the rules one always maintained the laws in the back of your mind during actions, but as I've said, sometimes circumstances created a situation where you would have to do illegal things or commit illegal acts, but there were no fixed established rules indicating what we were allowed to do and what we were not allowed to do. I don't think that there was anything like that. We were led by circumstances and the commanders who took the decisions were also an important factor.
MR MOERANE: Yes. What you have said to me boils down to what I put to you, that you actually made your own rules. In other words, you decided who was to live and who was not to live.
MR NORTJE: Sometimes that was the case, yes.
MR MOERANE: But you must have known that that was wrong because as the learned Chairperson of the Committee put to one of the previous witnesses, that - or was it Mr Malan, I don't know, that when you had committed crimes, in the reports that you made you covered up and you presented them in the light where they would be seen as legitimate police action.
MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.
MR MOERANE: Now that's where I have a bit of a difficulty because if you, the people took a decision to eliminate a person in circumstances which amount to murder and then you present that in your reports as self-defence, you're actually not carrying out orders of superior persons. Would that be correct?
MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.
MR MOERANE: So in effect, your unit C1 was actually a law unto itself.
MR NORTJE: I wouldn't say that, we still acted under instructions, under command. That was my opinion of the situation. I cannot see that we acted without any rules or prescriptions.
MR MALAN: I think, Mr Nortje, they way I understand the question reference was not made to the individual, but to the unit, which could take its own decisions or which took its own decisions. In other words, with reference to the commander of the unit at the time. I think that is the interpretation of this question if one speaks of the unit. Would you be able to agree with that?
MR MOERANE: Yes, thank you, Mr Chairman, that is what I intended to convey.
Now who actually enforced any order or discipline?
MR MOERANE: So if a person had done something that Mr de Kock thought was wrong or unacceptable, he would discipline him?
MR MOERANE: Except, I take it, when these things were done by the askaris, which made it very difficult for them to be disciplined.
MR NORTJE: Yes, well he also disciplined them.
MR MOERANE: Are you aware of the situations where it was impossible to discipline them because disciplining them would have revealed their identity?
MR NORTJE: Yes, it's difficult to answer this question because I don't really understand what you want me to say.
CHAIRPERSON: I think probably distinguish between informal discipline and departmental discipline, in laying reports and getting in independent investigator etc., legal representation and all that sort of stuff. I think if you could perhaps distinguish between ...(intervention)
MR MOERANE: Yes, I'm talking about formal disciplining where a report would be submitted, a written report and it would go through ordinary and normal police channels dealing with discipline.
MR NORTJE: No, no such disciplinary steps were taken with regard to formal discipline, not that I know of. Not in the way that the police procedure would operate, that they would be charged of certain transgressions and then receive a fine or anything like that. There was no such practice.
MR MOERANE: Yes. In any event that was difficult and it might have led to the disclosure of the askaris and their identities and all that.
MR NORTJE: Yes, I don't even think that those ideas were considered, to discipline them in such a way, but as you have said, it would have led to other repercussions. It simply wouldn't have worked.
MR MOERANE: Now let's come to Mr Manzini. When did you see him for the first time with regard to the events of the 12th?
MR NORTJE: It was that afternoon at the Security Branch, after we had arrived there. I recall that I saw him there for the first time.
MR MOERANE: Yes. Did you go with him and others to the scene?
MR NORTJE: I would recall that we went to the scene with him, yes. It remains in my mind, so I assume that we must have done this because I know where the place is, I know that we visited this place during the daytime. So yes, I do recall it.
MR MOERANE: Yes. And the place where he was supposed to stop was pointed out to him?
MR NORTJE: Yes, that's correct.
MR MOERANE: And the place where the other members who were going to lie in ambush, was also indicated?
MR NORTJE: I don't believe that it was pointed out to him. As I recall, there was an electric pole or a telephone pole and I think the pole was the marker of where he was supposed to stop.
MR MOERANE: Yes. But you see there were other people there, weren't they at the same place and time shown where the persons who were going to commit the ambush would be lying in wait?
MR NORTJE: I beg your pardon, can you please explain to me what you have asked me, I don't understand you. Would he have known where we lay in wait, where the staff would have taken up position, the staff that was going to carry out the ambush?
MR MOERANE: Yes. What I want to find our from you is whether at the time and place when Manzini was shown where he was to stop, the other people were also shown where they were going to lie in wait?
MR NORTJE: No, I don't believe that that was discussed at that point, I think it was done when we arrived at the scene with all the members who would have taken up position in the ambush, because we knew that there was the pole and from there the persons were told where the ambush would be. I don't think that it was spelt out that clearly during the afternoon.
MR MOERANE: Do you recall what recall what was said to Manzini, as to what he should do?
MR NORTJE: I forgot about the indicator light, but I recall, as a result of the evidence which came to light, that he was given the instruction to switch on the indicator if there were weapons in the vehicle and that he would jump out and run. Vermeulen said something about urination, I think that he was supposed to use that as an excuse to stop. He would have to tell them "I need to urinate", and that would be the reason why he would stop. I'm not certain, but I think that those were the things that were said to him, those were the instructions that he received.
MR MOERANE: Well isn't one of the problems, Mr Nortje, that the truth in this matter has been mixed up with a lot of lies, difficult to remember?
MR NORTJE: Well I can simply tell you from my perspective, I'm trying to put it as clearly as possible. The versions from the other persons differ and I cannot explain that, this is simply the way that I remember it.
MR MOERANE: You see because in your statement in support of your application for amnesty, you do not mention the question of the flickering of lights.
MR NORTJE: I did not leave it out on purpose, I didn't think about that minute detail at that stage.
MR MOERANE: If you'll bear with me. I have no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR MOERANE
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Moerane. Ms Lockhat, do you have any questions?
MS LOCKHAT: No questions, thank you, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Lamey, do you have any re-examination?
FURTHER EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: Chairperson, I want to ask one question in re-examination, but I omitted just two short aspects to deal with that in-chief, which I ...
What was your rank at that time?
MR LAMEY: And did you receive any remuneration above and beyond your usual salary for your participation in this incident?
MR NORTJE: No, not that I know of.
RE-EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: And then in cross-examination a question was put to you with regard to instructions for illegal operations. I just want to put it to you, are you aware with regard to the command structure above Col de Kock, that there was an overall commander at head office?
MR LAMEY: And before this incident you were also involved in illegal operations such as for example, the Lesotho operation and the Cosatu House operation.
MR LAMEY: Do you know whether those operations, which were also illegal, were approved from any level above Mr de Kock?
MR LAMEY: Thank you, Chairperson, I have nothing further.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR LAMEY
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Lamey. Adv Gcabashe, do you have any questions?
ADV GCABASHE: Thank you, Chair.
Mr Nortje, just one question. Do you know anything about an aborted or a failed attempt to collect ANC members between the 8th and the 12th of June?
MR NORTJE: No, the reason why I wouldn't know about that is because at that stage I was - I also didn't hear about it on the day of the operation or after the 12th, I was with C2, I was involved with something else, I didn't have access to that sort of information. They also wouldn't have told me about it because we were not working with the operational persons.
ADV GCABASHE: Then one other question. Mr Manzini, in his Section 29 hearing, appears to think that he was shown the place where he had to go to, the day before the incident itself. Would you know anything about the pointing out and the preparations taking two days instead of just one day?
MR NORTJE: No, I don't about it, I only know that on the day that we arrived there the point was indicated to him where we would be that night. It may have happened, but I don't know.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Malan, do you have any questions?
MR MALAN: Mr Nortje, in bundle 6 we have the Section 29 transcription of the evidence of Manzini and we have the information that Ms Gcabashe refers to. Manzini refers very clearly to an abortive incident, he indicates that it may have taken place on the Friday initially and he alleges that Theron took him out to see the place and there is evidence that he went to pick up people, that there was nobody, that he stopped on the right side of the road at the point where the vehicle was to come to a standstill and that there was no-one. He was only shown once where the place was, which would indicate that this does not concur with your evidence that your recollection indicates that you were with him when the place was indicated to him. Do you have anything to say about that?
MR NORTJE: As I recall it we went to the scene that afternoon to see where we would set up the ambush, that is what I recall. I recall that Manzini accompanied us so that we could give him the final plans there. That is what I recall.
MR MALAN: And who accompanied you to the scene, was it you, de Kock?
MR NORTJE: Mr de Kock would have gone with ...(intervention)
MR MALAN: No, I'm not asking who would have gone with, I want to know if you can remember who went with.
MR NORTJE: I'm not certain, I cannot name any names. It would have been the people who were there with us.
MR MALAN: Well why do you remember Manzini if you don't remember any of the others? Could you be mistaken? Isn't it probable that you are mistaken, why would they show Manzini the place twice?
MR NORTJE: It is possible, but that is how I recall it.
ADV GCABASHE: Can I just ask you on the same point, Mr Theron also said he went to show Mr Manzini the spot. Would you recall if he was there? Mr Theron. You can't place him either.
MR NORTJE: I cannot recall him specifically.
ADV GCABASHE: But in any event, Mr Manzini was the only black member who was involved with you at that time?
MR NORTJE: As far as I know yes, there were not any others.
ADV GCABASHE: And there is certainly a time, in respect of this incident, that you were in his company and showing him the spot that he needed to know about?
MR NORTJE: That is what I recall, yes.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Nortje, you would have heard the evidence of some of the applicants, that there was or they were under the strong impression or convinced that a bullet hit the tar on the tar road between them and the vehicle towards which they were running. Could that have happened, from what you saw?
MR NORTJE: If you ask me, I think it was one of their own people who shot there in the road when they approached.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Are there any questions ...(intervention)
MR MALAN: Sorry, Chair, I missed another aspect that I wanted to canvass.
Mr Nortje, you said that the person in the front on the left, you saw the door going open and that Mr de Kock fired a shot. You say that his feet had not reached the ground. In other words he had not yet climbed out, and Mr de Kock fired at him immediately, but your evidence is that he was found next to the vehicle, dead. How did that happen, wouldn't he have been killed in his seat and fallen to the inside instead of the outside?
MR NORTJE: After the shooting he lay outside the vehicle on the ground, so it must have happened during the shooting that he fell out. But when he shot him he didn't fire back, so he must have died instantly or have been seriously wounded, but that's when the shooting took place and when we stopped shooting he lay next to the vehicle.
MR MALAN: If such a great number of shots are fired at a person, wouldn't you expect him to fall over in the direction of the bullet, instead of falling in the converse direction?
MR NORTJE: Well maybe he had it in mind to get out of the vehicle, if he was not yet dead.
MR MALAN: To climb out in the direction of the man who was shooting him, who was about a metre to two metres away from him? That sounds improbable and that's why I'm putting it to you, because it doesn't really concur with the observations of the others, that he climbed out much further than what you recall.
MR NORTJE: No, he collapsed directly next to the wheel where he climbed out.
MR MALAN: Very well, thank you. Thank you, Chair.
CHAIRPERSON: Any questions arising? Thank you, Mr Nortje, that concludes your evidence, you may stand down.
CHAIRPERSON: I see it's now ten past one. This would be a convenient stage to take the lunch adjournment ...(intervention)
MS LOCKHAT: If I may just interrupt you, Chairperson, that concludes the roll in terms of the applicants, Chairperson. Adv Moerane does have a witness, who will be called tomorrow, Chairperson. So I suggest that we hold, that we postpone until tomorrow, that we adjourn until tomorrow, Chairperson, but I shall leave it in your hands.
CHAIRPERSON: I wonder, we'll have to make some arrangements about tomorrow, as to when we'll be sitting. I
know certain people have to catch aeroplanes, etc. Could we just have a short adjournment now, I'd just like to speak to the legal representatives in the office and then we'll come back and make an announcement as to whether or not we're postponing now until tomorrow, or whether we'll carry on today.
CHAIRPERSON: Good afternoon, I apologise for the delay that has occurred in this matter, but we've reached a stage in the hearing where we are awaiting the advices of a legal representative as to what the next step will be. The legal representative concerned has not had the opportunity yet I am told, to properly consult with his client.
We, since lunch have been waiting in the expectation that this would happen each next minute, but it hasn't and time has passed us now, it's almost 4 o'clock. So I think whatever happens now, we've arrived at that time of the day where we would have to in any event adjourn until tomorrow. The expected consultation I'm told, has not taken place yet. So in the circumstances, all that we can do is to postpone until 9 o'clock tomorrow.
I apologise for the inconvenience that has been caused and I hope we'll know at 9 o'clock what he position is, whether we will be proceeding with further evidence or whatever will occur tomorrow, I don't know, I can't say at this stage until I get further advised. So I apologise for the inconvenience and having us all waiting here in vain this afternoon, but unfortunately that is the situation. So we will then just have to adjourn until nine tomorrow morning at this venue. Thank you.