CHAIRPERSON: What language would you prefer to use?
WILLEM ALBERTUS NORTJE: Afrikaans, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Do you have any objection to taking the oath?
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, you may be seated.
EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: Mr Nortje, during these proceedings before the Amnesty Committee, we deal with your amnesty application for your involvement in an attack in Lesotho during December 1985, is that correct?
MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.
MR LAMEY: Chairperson, the initial application from Mr Nortje can be found from page 11 onwards in Volume 1 and it spans up to page 19, where we deal with this specific incident and then from page 21 and further up to page 40 of the bundle is a supplementary application and then the particulars from page 37 onwards.
Mr Nortje, is it correct that you applied also for other incidents in which you were involved as a member of Vlakplaas?
MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.
MR LAMEY: And some of these incidents have already been heard.
MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.
MR LAMEY: Now is it correct that there is an initial application which was submitted in which you yourself completed the form and signed it as it can be found on page 13?
MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.
MR LAMEY: Is it correct that at that stage you had not yet obtained the services of a legal representative or an attorney?
MR LAMEY: Is it also correct that the particulars which are attached as an annexure to that original or initial application of yours, contained sections of statements which you made before the former Goldstone Commission?
MR LAMEY: Furthermore, you gave evidence before the Goldstone Commission and you testified as a State witness during the de Kock criminal trial.
MR LAMEY: The Lesotho incident was not one of the subjects on the charge sheet.
MR LAMEY: Regarding the other aspects for which you testified you received indemnity in terms of Section 104.
MR LAMEY: But you also applied for amnesty for those incidents for which you had been indemnified.
MR LAMEY: Then after you had obtained legal representation a supplementary application was prepared, which can be found from page 21 onwards.
MR LAMEY: And it has been signed by you. This is on page 26.
MR LAMEY: And then there is also an annexure to the application form, which commences on page 27 and deals with a review regarding your background and training. That starts at paragraph 2.
MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.
MR LAMEY: And then in the bundle which has been placed before the Committee, there is also the Lesotho operation during 1985, which commences on page 36. If we could just begin, if you can tell us what your rank was during December 1985.
MR LAMEY: Could you tell us briefly about the period preceding the operation. Let us begin with Ladybrand. Could you begin to relate the background to us from there, how you arrived there, what you were doing there in Ladybrand.
MR NORTJE: Chairperson, as I recall it and as it took place, we were working in the area, in the Ladybrand vicinity with a team - I know that Bosch and I were working there together at a certain stage, as well as Vermeulen and I. At a certain point Adamson was the group leader. We were working in the area and ...(intervention)
MR LAMEY: May I just ask you, to which stage are you referring?
MR NORTJE: Let me say that it was the latter half of 1985, in that vicinity.
MR LAMEY: Can you recall that you worked there upon more than one occasion?
MR NORTJE: Yes, we did. We performed our regular duties with the askaris and at a stage there was an extensive presence of ANC members in Lesotho, we knew that. Our normal duties were to return to Pretoria on about the 25th of the month and then we would remain in Pretoria until the end of the month and usually we would be re-deployed during the first week of the next month. All this information came from Head Office and information that we had picked up on ground. We co-operated quite closely with the Security Branch in Ladybrand, and they had this source and I knew that there were these developments. They had spoken to de Kock at a certain point.
MR LAMEY: Did you yourself have any direct liaison with this source or any source?
MR LAMEY: Therefore you came to hear in a roundabout way about this information?
MR LAMEY: Can you say who the Commander of the Ladybrand Security Branch was at that stage?
MR NORTJE: I would say that it was Capt Fouche, but I know the there was a Lieutenant who was also in control there. I don't know whether or not he was there at that stage. I know that he left the place at one point, but the person that we dealt with was Flip Fouche. I don't know if it was Flip or Frik.
MR LAMEY: The source that you have referred to, whose source was this? Was this a source from Ladybrand?
MR NORTJE: Some at the branch dealt with him. I don't know how things were interwoven or how the operation exactly was planned, but I know that we had already had names such as Leon Meyer and Mary Mini, because they were in the photo album. I cannot say that we already had the information at that stage from McCaskill, but I know that it was in the reports. And in co-operation with Ladybrand, I think de Kock arranged for this information to be sent through to Head Office and ultimately it was decided to launch an operation. But it was a very early stage, so the details regarding that were still sketchy, we didn't know exactly what was going to happen. That is how I recall the initiation of this thing.
Then at a certain stage we moved down to Ladybrand, with the objective that there would be an operation which would be launched.
MR LAMEY: Did you know at that stage precisely what sort of operation it would be?
MR NORTJE: No, we didn't know but we foresaw that because there had already been talk of a possible attack, whatever the case may be. However in my mind I thought that we would have to do with a safe house of sorts ultimately. That is what was going through my mind.
We then went down with - I'm referring to preparations that we made, I think the preparations were that we had initial plans and discussed these plans and all the equipment that we had to take with us, although at that stage we were not very well equipped, our weapons were not very sophisticated, but for example, I took the M79 grenade launcher with, along with a number of rounds, probably 20 round. Mr de Kock instructed me to take it with. We took all sorts of things such as this along, in the event of us going in.
MR LAMEY: Do you mean in the event of an operation?
MR NORTJE: Yes, in the event of us having to go in.
MR LAMEY: But not that you knew at that stage definitely what sort of operation it would be.
MR NORTJE: Yes, because Mr de Kock was the type of person who always made provision for any kind of contingency, therefore we had to be ready to tackle any sort of event.
MR LAMEY: Please continue. What happened further?
MR NORTJE: We then moved down, I would say 10 days and I would like to abide by that, if it had to be changed it would probably be to seven days, but it wasn't shorter than a week that we had already been there and the reason why I say this is because we had to make certain preparations, we had to undertake reconnaissance on the border. I know that we initially would have crossed the border at another point, but the finer details were developed during that week.
MR LAMEY: Let us just take it somewhat slower, Mr Nortje. When you refer to that week, to which week do you refer?
MR NORTJE: The week preceding the attack, before the 19th.
MR LAMEY: In the week of the attack?
MR LAMEY: Did you then undertake reconnaissance?
MR LAMEY: What sort of reconnaissance?
MR NORTJE: We drove along the river on the southern side of the border, as well as the northern side, in order to locate spots where it would be easy to cross the border.
I know that we went to the river one night to see what it would look like at night. I would recall that we entered Lesotho, specifically Maseru on one occasion and patrolled the area in order to familiarise ourselves with our surroundings, the road to the river. These were the regular preparations that we would undertake before an operation. But as I've said, at that stage we had not yet worked out the definite precise detail of how this operation was going to take place, because Mr de Kock was in daily with the source and the office at Ladybrand and he would give us feedback regarding possibilities. But it didn't come to a head until the night we executed the operation.
MR LAMEY: And what developed with regard to the source? You say that you didn't have direct liaison with the source, what happened?
MR NORTJE: It became clear that the source was in close contact with Leon Meyer specifically as well as the rest of his group. I know that he mentioned more names but this is simply something that I remember. We couldn't have identified everybody in the photo album.
MR LAMEY: Was there a photo album?
MR NORTJE: Yes, there was a photo album and I think that at one point we showed him the photo album and we tried to identify the persons.
MR NORTJE: The Morris person. I can recall that, it is a name that rang a bell, but I have read that he was the District Commander. There were other names which were mentioned by McCaskill, but I cannot recall that we identified them specifically in the photo album.
MR LAMEY: But which names did you recall, or can you recall?
MR NORTJE: Leon Meyer and Mary Mini.
MR NORTJE: Chairperson, it was definitely during that week that we were there that these developments took place, that these situations occurred.
CHAIRPERSON: Was this in Lesotho?
MR NORTJE: There in Ladybrand.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, that is why I'm asking.
CHAIRPERSON: So he came from Lesotho to Ladybrand?
MR NORTJE: Yes, that is how I understood it. Upon other occasions they went in and saw him there, but I do know that he came out from Lesotho as well.
MR LAMEY: Very well. What happened further, what were the further developments regarding planning, that you are aware of?
MR NORTJE: The two vehicles that we used ...(intervention)
MR LAMEY: Just a moment, before you get to that. Was there any talk of how - or at which stage before the operation took place, did it come to your knowledge that this operation which you eventually launched, would take place?
MR NORTJE: According to me it was during that week preceding the attack. It may have been three days or four days, because I know that we prepared the vehicles. And certain things happened which resulted that there was already talk about this function or meeting that had to be arranged for them.
MR LAMEY: When you refer to that, what do you mean?
MR LAMEY: Did you hear that a party would be arranged?
MR NORTJE: Yes, and that this would take place at his home which he was renting, Mr McCaskill's home.
MR LAMEY: What was the purpose behind the party?
MR NORTJE: In order to bring the entire group together, this group which was planning to infiltrate with Leon Meyer. That was the primary objective.
CHAIRPERSON: In this photo album, you state that you were looking for photographs of members of the Leon Meyer group and that McCaskill had come through a few days before the time and had identified persons, did he identify the entire group?
MR NORTJE: No, Chairperson, I cannot tell you because I did not work with him directly. The information that I have is fragmented. The branch at Ladybrand also had a photo album and they would have shown it to him as well and he may also have identified persons for them at that stage as well, but I cannot recall specific persons at the moment.
CHAIRPERSON: So you cannot say whether or not he identified the entire group?
MR LAMEY: Did it come to your knowledge at any point in time, when the infiltration was to take place?
MR NORTJE: I must say that there was information indicating that McCaskill had been approached to transport the group through and I think it would have been on the Saturday, that's why we went in on the Friday, because he would have brought the people through on the Saturday. Perhaps I could just add that the fact that we couldn't wait for them was based upon a certainty that if we had allowed him to travel with them, with Meyer and the others, they could have said at the eleventh hour that they wanted to take on another direction or go to another place and that is why it was decided to attack them on the inside.
MR LAMEY: At one place where they would all be together.
MR LAMEY: Who were the members who would be part of the team to execute the operation?
MR NORTJE: It was Mr de Kock, me, Vermeulen, Coetser, Adamson and Bosch.
MR LAMEY: Very well. In your statements you mention Douw Willemse, what is your position regarding that?
MR NORTJE: It was a mistake to mention his name. The fact that he was not present with the medal parade led me to believe that he was not present. At a certain stage I worked with Douw Willemse in that area or he worked with me, and that is why I mentioned his name initially.
MR LAMEY: In your statement you also mentioned the presence of members of Special Forces, can you inform the Committee about this.
MR NORTJE: There is just something that I must add regarding the vehicles. We prepared the vehicles because there was a fault with the car doors and that was also something that we did in that seven to ten day period. Bosch and I had to go to a certain place to have the car doors fixed to ensure that they would open and close properly. There were two Jettas and they were the vehicles which we used specifically for this operation. Apart from this we also had our own vehicles there.
MR LAMEY: Very well. Just to return to the aspect regarding which I wanted to examine you, could you just explain, the evening of the operation or the day of the operation - I beg your pardon, I just have to interrupt myself here, in your statement you mention members from Special Forces, could you elaborate on that?
MR NORTJE: One evening during this time that we were there, the day when the rubber dinghies were purchased, we went to Bloemfontein ...(intervention)
MR LAMEY: That was in the week preceding the attack?
MR NORTJE: That is correct, because we realised after our reconnaissance that we had conducted alongside the river, that the river was flowing very strongly and that we needed some form of a boat or raft to assist us. We went through to Bloemfontein that day. I recall that all of us went there, the entire group, and I would recall that we stopped at the Thaba'Nchu Sun on the evening of our return and that is where we encountered members from Special Forces.
I must just say that Mr de Kock was quite concerned at their presence there, he wanted to know what they were doing there. I don't believe that they would have told him what they were doing there, they might just have said that they were working in the area or whatever the case may be, but Mr de Kock was quite paranoid about the situation and immediately on the following day, he had an argument with Flip Fouche and accused him that he wanted to use the source McCaskill for the Defence Force and that there was something behind this whole story that he wasn't aware of.
I wasn't present during the argument, but he returned and he was quite upset about it. Ultimately this didn't take place, but there was a possibility that they might have wanted to become involved in the operation and de Kock stated that he saw Sakkie van Zyl later and that Sakkie van Zyl had said that they wanted to be involved in the operation. I believe that I'm right in what I'm saying and that what I heard was indeed correct.
MR LAMEY: Very well. The source, Mr McCaskill to whom you have referred, indeed succeeded in arranging a party.
MR NORTJE: Yes, that took place eventually.
MR LAMEY: Could you just explain to the Committee, on the day of the operation how it took place, how did you leave Ladybrand and how did you enter Lesotho and elaborate from that point onwards.
MR NORTJE: During this time, de Kock and Adamson were actually the persons who liaised with him when they entered Lesotho.
MR LAMEY: Did Lieut Adamson work in that area regularly?
MR NORTJE: Yes, but because he was a Lieutenant, Mr de Kock kept him with him and they arranged the planning and so on together.
On that afternoon we received our orders, we assembled the weapons, tested the dinghies, inflated the dinghies, we dealt with the equipment and the weapons, the magazines, this was all part of the preparation. I kept Mr de Kock's weapon with me, he asked me to bring it over for him. The weapon with the magazines.
MR LAMEY: Mr de Kock stated that it was a Pache.
MR NORTJE: That's correct, yes.
I myself had the Uzzi, which I used during the Maponya incident. I still had that Uzzi.
MR LAMEY: That is another incident for which you have applied for amnesty.
MR NORTJE: Yes. It was fitted with a silencer. We also had pistols and I had the M79 with approximately 20 rounds, which I also carried on me. The plan was that we would cross the river at 10 o'clock that night and that afternoon at 5 o'clock they went over.
MR LAMEY: When you say that they went over ...
MR NORTJE: I will come to that in a minute. Mr de Kock went over. I would recall that Mr Bosch was with him. Adamson was definitely with him. It was the three of them. The other three of us would cross the river and there would have been a team of black persons who would have assisted us, who lived on that side of the river. They were askaris. Nofomela was there. There were more members, there were approximately ten members consisting of blacks, who went with but stayed on this side. That afternoon they went through ...(intervention)
MR LAMEY: Do you know how they went through?
MR NORTJE: Through the border post with the two Jettas. We drove with the cruiser. If I recall correctly I drove the cruiser. We drove to a spot near the river and unloaded the vehicle. We put everything in the dinghies and pushed them over and once we got to the other side we realised that there was a fault with the one dinghy.
MR LAMEY: Who was present during this?
MR NORTJE: It was me and definitely Vermeulen. I'm still confused regarding Bosch and Coetser, however - I am not certain regarding the two of them, but there was definitely one more of them because we were three in total.
MR LAMEY: But it definitely wasn't Adamson and de Kock?
MR NORTJE: No, Definitely not. On the other side we exited, we put on our clothes again and we prepared everything. Now I am not certain whether they were waiting for us there already or whether they were driving in the direction of coming there. I gave Mr de Kock his weapon. I know we also had balaclavas. We drove from there. I cannot recall what the arrangement was. Mr de Kock and Mr Adamson were the people who spoke to Mr McCaskill.
MR LAMEY: My I just interrupt you there. You say that you had balaclavas on, were you covering your faces with the balaclavas?
MR NORTJE: I put mine on my head, I didn't have it rolled down, it was too warm. This was my precaution against identification.
MR LAMEY: Very well, continue. Your face was open ...
MR NORTJE: Then we drove and at some point we stopped and Mr de Kock said that we had to wait there. This was myself, Bosch and Vermeulen who were driving in the one Jetta.
MR LAMEY: Did you see the house at that stage?
MR NORTJE: I'm not certain, but I cannot recall whether I went to have a look where it was. I had an idea where it was because they said that it was not far from the border post and right next to the highway. At some stage I may have seen the house because you can see it from the side of the road.
MR NORTJE: Yes, earlier. But I would not have known how to get there at night because I was in a place where I did not know exactly what it looked like because in the dark it looks quite different.
MR LAMEY: So you had to wait at a point.
MR NORTJE: Yes, we had to wait at a point.
MR LAMEY: Can you recall with whom you went?
MR NORTJE: I was in the car with Vermeulen and Bosch. I this specifically because at some stage a patrol vehicle of the Police passed us and lucky for us they did not stop. It felt to me like we sat there for a whole hour but it couldn't have been that long.
After a while he returned and he fetched us. We went to the place where - they say the post office, I cannot recall what the building looked like, but I do accept that it was at the post office and there Mr de Kock - there they found McCaskill there and they spoke to him. I did not climb out of the car. Not one of us - because I was wearing all this clothing and I had the firearms with me I did not get out of the car, I remained in the car.
Mr de Kock, I recall he walked across the road and he had his weapon in his hand and this was after the three of them had left.
MR NORTJE: McCaskill, Adamson and Coetser.
MR NORTJE: Yes, he returned and he said "Joe has left the party."
MR NORTJE: Leon Meyer. And then we realised that it was getting late. It was difficult to keep persons in one place if you didn't have a specific reason. That was one of our fears, that persons would start leaving the party. He then said that Leon Meyer - I'm not certain whether he said his wife was with him, but he said that Leon had already gone home. And the other remark he made was that McCaskill's sister or cousin or something to that effect, may still have been in the house. But he said it for a moment and left it there, we didn't discuss it again.
So I had this in the back of my head that there was someone at the house. At that stage I still believed that we would go there and kill everyone in the house, that was the purpose.
MR LAMEY: Who would did you expect to be in the house?
MR NORTJE: I expected - after all the talk that it would be ANC and it would specifically MK members, I thought that there may be people who may be armed and I assumed that those members would at least have had pistols with them, even if they were going to a party. Because if I was in that vicinity that is what I would have done. But no mention of weapons was made. I do not recall whether Mr de Kock asked him whether there were weapons or not and by myself I thought that there may be weapons, but we expected MK people. I did not have detail as to who was there, no-one told me that there was going to be women in the house, that there would be innocent persons in the house, I just recall McCaskill said that his cousin or someone was still in the house but she would be taken out.
MR LAMEY: Do you know of any arrangement that McCaskill had to secure his family?
MR NORTJE: Yes, I don't know whether I heard this before or after the time, but there was something to that effect, that he would remove his people who were in the house.
MR LAMEY: Very well. Let us return to the point that Coetser, Adamson and McCaskill left there, is that correct?
MR LAMEY: After Mr de Kock told you that Leon Meyer had left from the party.
MR NORTJE: Had left the party, yes.
MR NORTJE: We then drove to the house because Mr de Kock knew exactly where the house was. We came up on the bottom side of the house and the house, as I can recall, on that block there were three houses next to each other before one could get to the following street. We stopped on the corner away from the corner where the house was and there we told Mr Bosch to drive around a little, or that he had to meet us there again. I'm not certain whether he drove off or whether he waited there but anyway, Mr de Kock and I walked up the street.
MR LAMEY: What was Bosch's role?
MR NORTJE: He only had to drive the car.
MR LAMEY: Did he have to pick you up afterwards?
MR LAMEY: And you climbed out, who else?
MR NORTJE: Mr de Kock, Vermeulen and I. We walked in the direction of that block and while we were walking I saw, because the back door of the house, I could see it as we came walking, or shall I say I saw someone exiting the back door - no, he had already exited the house, he was almost at the car when I saw him walking and he would get into the car and I told Mr de Kock "That guy just came from the house and he's going to drive off now." We walked together and then he shot him through the left-hand side window of the car, or through the windscreen.
MR LAMEY: Where was the person when he was shot?
MR NORTJE: He was already sitting in the car as I recall. At that stage things did not go as we had planned it, we thought that we would meet the people in the house.
MR LAMEY: So you had a complication here.
MR NORTJE: Yes. I thought that the people would hear the shots in the house although it was a silent weapon. I then ran in by the back door and when I came in I hesitated for a moment because I saw a woman standing behind the stove.
MR LAMEY: You say you saw a woman standing behind the stove?
MR LAMEY: So why did you hesitate?
MR NORTJE: Because at that stage it was fractions of a second that I hesitated. Possibly the idea - whether Mr de Kock indicated that his family would still be in the house, that was the moment it took me. I think that is why I hesitated, or that is what I was thinking about.
MR NORTJE: What did the person look like to you?
MR NORTJE: She was a large woman. She was not very tall, she was shorter than I am but she was plumper. And then I rushed passed her, she then ran and she grabbed me and she told me "Don't shoot them, don't shoot them", but at that stage I could not stop, circumstances did not lend themselves to it. I went there to shoot those people and I could not turn around anymore. I continued.
There was a woman sitting in front of me and I started shooting and I turned the weapon but the firearm got stuck on automatic and I fired between 20 and 25 rounds, because that weapon had a quick mechanism and when I ceased firing, then there was a person that had hidden in the bathroom but my firearm was empty. He had then already shot the person who had grabbed me and I then told him that there was someone in the bathroom. We then kicked open the door and then there was a person close to the ceiling. He shot him.
MR NORTJE: Mr de Kock shot him. It was a male person. We then had a quick look through the house. We went outside, or Mr de Kock went outside and I came after him and he asked me how many people were there. I then went back, I went into the one room, I took the mattress and I threw the mattress off the bed, but I did not find anyone there. Everyone that I saw there was dead. I then only counted the three women that I had shot and the man who was in the bathroom and then the woman in the kitchen.
MR LAMEY: How many people did you count, according to your recollection?
MR NORTJE: I counted five in the house and then the one that was outside, that was the sixth one.
MR LAMEY: After the events in that house, what happened further?
MR NORTJE: I recall the issue of the television, one of us grabbed the television, it was McCaskill's television.
MR LAMEY: Before we get to that aspect, the person who was shot in the kitchen, did you and Mr de Kock have a discussion about that?
MR NORTJE: Yes, I would want to recall that when we came outside he asked me, "Why did you not shoot the woman?" So I told him I was not certain. I think that is what he asked be because he wanted to know why I did not shoot her and then I told him I was not certain. I don't know whether I told him whether I thought it was family of his, but I assume that was the discussion.
MR LAMEY: But you said you're not certain.
MR NORTJE: Yes. And then we immediately withdrew because we were afraid that the neighbours might have heard something and I think Vermeulen, later he spoke about someone he saw looking out a window. We then withdrew and the rendezvous point was once again at the river.
We all drove down to the river, we went straight to the river and at the river Mr de Kock told us to set alight the vehicles because we would not be able to get out with them, it was too late. We set alight the vehicles and we placed the equipment in the rubber dinghy and some of the other stuff we carried because the other rubber dinghy was broken, and we went back into the river.
MR LAMEY: Did Adamson and Coetser join you?
MR NORTJE: While we were waiting there, when we went back after a while, they came there and McCaskill was with them. We all crossed the river then, after we had set alight the vehicles. The other members met us on the other side. I think - I know Mr de Kock went to make a call at some stage and he said that he called the Lesotho Police and we all went back to the farmhouse.
MR LAMEY: Did you at some stage find out who the person was who was shot in the kitchen?
MR NORTJE: It was Mary Mini, but I think on the photo she was much younger and that is why I did not recognise her.
MR LAMEY: But how did you find this out eventually? Or how do we know that it was her, or how do you know it was her?
MR NORTJE: The description was a factor and then we also received feedback from the Ladybrand Security Branch and we once again had a look at the photo and we realised that the face that I saw there was basically the same form, so I assumed it was her.
MR LAMEY: Very well. Did Mr Coetser and Mr Adamson make any report that you heard of, as to what the incidents were where they were?
MR NORTJE: The information that I received or that I heard, and this had to be during some discussion or at the debriefing, but it went along the lines that McCaskill knocked on the door, Leon's wife opened the door, she grabbed the weapon, she grabbed Coetser's weapon and what they were telling here, as Mr de Kock was telling it makes sense to me, as I heard the story.
MR LAMEY: So if it is so that two persons were shot in that house, then according to the numbers that you would have in the back of your mind it must have been approximately eight persons.
MR LAMEY: In your initial statement you refer to seven, is that incorrect?
MR NORTJE: Yes, I have thought about this afterwards and as I counted it, it was eight.
MR LAMEY: Mr de Kock's recollection is more, nine, nine to ten. I think he said nine or ten, I'm not sure.
MR NORTJE: That was in the initial reports I think.
MR LAMEY: Very well. Mr Nortje, then I would just like to ask you, in bundle 2 before the Committee, pages 63 to 65, there is a document which purports to be a statement of yours in 1996. There's a date 1996, not the rest of the date, have you any knowledge of this statement?
MR NORTJE: Chairperson, I don't know anything about this statement. I have read it. There are things that - you have heard what I said now and those things are the same as it appears in the document, I may have just omitted the attack later at the border post. That happened ...(intervention)
MR LAMEY: Were you present there?
MR NORTJE: No, I was not. And then the other issue of the R30 000, I think that is a bit too much because at that stage sources would not receive so much money, that couldn't have been.
MR LAMEY: But do you recall how much money the source received?
MR NORTJE: I am not entirely certain but I thought about it afterwards and the number that I had in my mind was about
MR LAMEY: But you were not involved in any payments?
MR NORTJE: No, I was never involved in any claims or any payments or anything to that effect.
MR LAMEY: But you do not know where this document comes from?
MR LAMEY: Do you recall whether any enquiries were made with the Evidence Leader of the Committee, to find out where it was received from?
MR LAMEY: Then I would just like to ask you with regard to singular aspects. I assume that Mr McCaskill's legal representative will make certain statements to you, but I would just like to ask you with regard to certain aspects, with regard to the statement of Mr McCaskill. In paragraph 7 of page 69, Volume 2, he mentions a meeting that was arranged with Leon Meyer in a bar and then he speaks of
"I had previously arranged with Eugene de Kock for he and his men to sit next to us."
Were you present on such an occasion at the hotel where Leon Meyer visited and met you there?
MR NORTJE: Not that I know of.
MR LAMEY: Don't you have any knowledge of this?
MR LAMEY: And then in the following paragraph mention is made of a braai that had taken place at Ladybrand and then Mr McCaskill mentions your name there along with Blackie Swart. First of all, if my recollection is correct, then Mr McCaskill made the concession that it could not be Blackie Swart but in as far as he refers to you still, I would like to ask you if you were present at a braai in Ladybrand where Mr McCaskill was also present.
MR NORTJE: I heard when they referred to it but I cannot recall it. I cannot recall that I was at such an occasion. As I have said, much has happened but I cannot recall that pertinently.
MR LAMEY: And what he says further about the discussion that had taken place there, do you recall anything about it?
MR LAMEY: May I just ask you, I know there's another aspect that I need to touch upon. And then in paragraph 13 on page 70, he refers to another party which would have been held at George Kapedi's place and he says
"I only spent forty five minutes at the party and then left to meet de Kock at the post office in Maseru. They, de Kock, Nortje, Vermeulen and Joe Snortjie(?) came to meet me there. I took them to the venue. We then left to the Victoria Hotel. They asked me to go back to the party. After the party I went home and nothing happened."
MR NORTJE: I don't know about this.
MR LAMEY: Was there another party at any other stage? A place which was arranged and a party which was aborted?
MR NORTJE: Not that I can recall. Mr de Kock was working with him in that area, but I cannot recall that there was any planning with regard to this. I cannot place that.
MR LAMEY: Did you only go into Lesotho once for the reason of an operation where a party was arranged?
MR LAMEY: Mr Nortje, you request amnesty for murder, conspiracy to murder, accessory to murder, attempted murder or any other offence which might flow from the facts, is that correct?
MR LAMEY: Did you - on that particular day were you also in possession of a false passport?
MR LAMEY: But you did not use it at any border post?
MR NORTJE: I used it many times but not on that day.
MR LAMEY: With regard to this operation?
MR LAMEY: And then the firearm that you had, do you know whether this was a legally issued firearm?
MR NORTJE: I received the firearm at Vlakplaas, I don't know where it came from. I assume that it was an issued weapon, although not to me.
MR LAMEY: So would you then also request amnesty for - it's more than what stands here, namely the illegal crossing of the border and transgressions which are related to that, the possession of a false passport?
MR NORTJE: I don't know, the passport was officially issued to me.
MR LAMEY: But it was not a legitimate passport.
MR LAMEY: And then the other aspect, any offence which might be related to the Weapons and Ammunitions Act.
MR LAMEY: Chairperson, I don't know whether it would be in order to perhaps deal with this in more detail during argument, perhaps be more specific then.
Mr Nortje, a final aspect. Would you like to use the opportunity here and now to tell the family and the victims something?
MR NORTJE: I want to, Chairperson. The people look at me every day and they look at me badly. I do not know what to tell you. I can only say that I am sorry. I do not know you, I do not even know the people I killed and I do not expect of you to forgive me, but I do ask for forgiveness. That is all that I can say.
MR LAMEY: Mr Nortje, a final aspect. The political objective as it is set out on page 39 or 40, do you confirm what is written there?
MR LAMEY: May I ask you as follows, do you have any reason to differ with the political motivation of the operation as it was explained by Gen van der Merwe? You have heard here that he gave that instruction, you did not know it.
MR LAMEY: Were you yourself aware of a threat from Lesotho at that stage?
MR LAMEY: And did it come to your knowledge that there was information with regard to a specific group who were on the verge of infiltrating the country?
MR LAMEY: You also received a medal.
MR LAMEY: Did you receive any other remuneration except for your normal salary, for this operation?
MR LAMEY: And then with regard to instruction and approval, you received your order from Mr de Kock.
MR LAMEY: And you understood that your presence in Ladybrand and the operation there had the knowledge of Brig Schoon.
MR NORTJE: Yes, as I have said here.
MR LAMEY: Chairperson, that would be the evidence. As it pleases you.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR LAMEY
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Hattingh, do you have any questions?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Yes, thank you, Mr Chairman.
INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone.
MR HATTINGH: I would like to commence with the two statements of yours which appear in Volume 2, the first of which appears on page 65. You have already been questioned about this and you say that you do not know where this statement comes from, is that correct?
MR HATTINGH: When the Goldstone Commission brought out its report with regard to Vlakplaas activities which eventually led to Mr de Kock's trial, you were one of the persons who testified before the Goldstone Commission.
MR HATTINGH: And briefly after you testified you then for your own safety were taken to Denmark.
MR HATTINGH: And there in Denmark you were questioned by members of the Special Investigative team which had then been appointed to investigate these allegations in the report and it was generally known as the D'Oliveira Investigation Team.
MR HATTINGH: And there you made various statements. I say various but it was more than one, is that correct?
MR NORTJE: Ultimately it was only the one statement, the chief statement. There were many questions but ultimately there was only one statement.
MR HATTINGH: And in which language did you make that statement?
MR HATTINGH: Did you ever afterwards upon any occasion, make any statement in English?
MR HATTINGH: Now this statement which starts from page 63, the copies in our bundles are not signed.
MR HATTINGH: Did you ever sign such a statement?
MR NORTJE: I did not make this statement.
MR HATTINGH: Do you know where this statement comes from?
MR NORTJE: I have no idea, truly.
MR HATTINGH: Let us just deal with the facts therein. I am on page 63, there you say, more-or-less in the middle of the page
"Elvis was friends with some ANC members. Many Mini of the ANC was also a friend of his."
Did you ever have this knowledge that a person by the name of Mary was a friend of this person called Elvis?
MR NORTJE: I can say that he must have known her because I think that is where we received the name, the person's name we received from him.
MR HATTINGH: But that she was a friend of his?
MR HATTINGH: The following sentence
"This Elvis guy set up the whole thing. He was a source for Capt Fouche of the Security Branch."
Is that correct? Did you know a Capt Fouche there?
MR NORTJE: That had to be Frik or Flip Fouche.
MR HATTINGH: But was he a Captain there?
MR HATTINGH: And was Elvis his source?
MR NORTJE: Not directly his, but it was one of his people's sources.
MR HATTINGH: And then lower down the page you say
"He, Elvis, had to report every night to us."
Is that correct as such, that he reported to you every night?
MR NORTJE: No, I think the last few days before the attack, he must have contacted Mr de Kock on a daily basis but I cannot say that he was there every nigh, it doesn't right.
MR HATTINGH: But Mr Nortje, you are once again using an expression which may possibly indicate that you do not have personal knowledge. Do you know from your own personal knowledge that Elvis reported to you every night, even until briefly before the attack?
MR HATTINGH: So you could not have said something like this from your own knowledge, is that correct?
MR HATTINGH: And then the statement continues
"The party had been planned but it kept on getting postponed as the guests could not attend."
In your evidence-in-chief you have already said that you do not have any knowledge of any other party that was arranged during which the attack would take place and which was then aborted, is that correct?
MR NORTJE: No, the party as I have it, was the party which would have been arranged at his house.
MR HATTINGH: And that's the only party which you have personal knowledge of?
MR HATTINGH: You did not know that there was a party as it says here, planned, but it had been postponed regularly because the guests who had been invited could not attend. You do not have any such knowledge?
MR HATTINGH: So you could not have supplied this information in this statement?
MR NORTJE: No, not as it is stated there.
MR HATTINGH: And then the third-last paragraph reads
"Leon Meyer and Jackie Quinn had already left the party and gone home by the time we got there, but Elvis knew where they stayed."
As I understand it, it means that when you arrived at the party, Leon Meyer had already left the party, is that correct?
MR NORTJE: No, that is not correct.
MR HATTINGH: You did not say anything like this to anyone?
MR NORTJE: No, because I would not have said this, I knew that is not how it happened.
MR HATTINGH: Very well. Did you ever, whether you were in Denmark or thereafter, did you ever make a statement with regard to this Lesotho attack?
MR NORTJE: Not that I know of, Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: So the information here could not have been received from statements which you had earlier given to the investigative team?
MR NORTJE: I do not know where this thing comes from, I have no idea.
MR HATTINGH: I think you have already been asked by your legal representative with regard to the allegation on page 65
"Elvis was paid about R30 000 to R40 000 cash for this information."
You say you did not supply that information.
MR NORTJE: The amounts are a bit too high. As I have said, the sources could not have received so much money. They did not receive R5 000 per head, so 5 X 6 is 30 and that's the closest I could get it, but as Mr de Kock said, R2 000 sounds just about right. And the amount of R25 000 was more.
MR HATTINGH: But you also said here today, Mr Nortje, that you were not present when he was paid.
MR HATTINGH: Therefore you did not have any knowledge as to what the amount was?
MR HATTINGH: So you could not have supplied this information.
MR NORTJE: I cannot recall that I said this.
MR HATTINGH: But could you have, did you have such information?
MR HATTINGH: So it's not an issue that you could not recall it, you could not forget it because you did not have the information in the first place.
MR HATTINGH: Very well. But then also with regard to, as it was known during your application, the Chand family in Botswana, with regard to that incident you also applied for amnesty, is that correct?
MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.
MR HATTINGH: And on page 66 we find a statement which is apparently a statement of yourself with regard to that incident.
MR NORTJE: Yes, that's the same incident as the first one.
MR HATTINGH: Do you know about that incident and do you know where that come from?
MR NORTJE: I did not make this, but once again the information is not entirely incorrect.
MR HATTINGH: But you did not make any such statement in English, with regard to the Khan or the Chand family, as they were known?
MR HATTINGH: And that application has already been heard, you have already received amnesty with regard to that incident, is that not so?
MR NORTJE: That's correct, Chairperson.
MR HATTINGH: And during the proceedings of that application was a copy of this statement submitted?
MR HATTINGH: So once again you do not know where this comes from?
MR HATTINGH: And it was also not signed by you.
MR HATTINGH: Very well. With regard to this attack, your evidence with regard to this attack, you testified that it was ten days but you said it could be seven days before the time, is it possible that your earlier information and the information that you had gathered in that regard and the realisation that this could lead to action, could you be confusing this with the preparation for this attack, or the commencement of the operation for this attack?
MR NORTJE: Do you mean that before the seven days I had to know?
MR HATTINGH: Let me make it clearer. You were already working in that area for quite some time, is that not so?
MR HATTINGH: And during that time you had obtained information with regard to ANC activities in Lesotho, is that correct?
MR HATTINGH: Did you not realise then that at some or other time some action may be taken against these persons in Lesotho?
MR NORTJE: Yes, we must have discussed it, yes.
MR HATTINGH: Yes, and information with regard to such intention of action could have been obtained?
MR HATTINGH: Is it not that you may have foreseen that attack and you're confusing that with the real preparation that had taken place for this specific attack? In other words, that the preparation for this attack, I think Mr de Kock said, three to five days before the attack had started.
MR NORTJE: The detail with regard to - I agree, the initial planning we did not have that detail, it was something that we had discussed but the detail with regard to this and the thing with McCaskill, was definitely a few days, not ten days, maybe less, but we had already known then that something like this would happen, but the finer detail only came when we started buying the rubber dinghies and that must have been five days before the time.
MR HATTINGH: Mr Nortje, you have heard Mr de Kock's evidence with regard to this.
MR HATTINGH: And his evidence is that on some day he was asked at Head Office to make a submission which he then did and that afterwards, a question of two or three hours later, he received instruction to continue with the planning for the operation and the logistics thereof. In other words, the buying of equipment and whatever. That was the first time that they realised that there would be an attack. Can you dispute that?
MR NORTJE: No, I cannot dispute that they had discussed it and that at that level those preparations had been made, but ...(intervention)
MR HATTINGH: I shall put it even briefer. You cannot dispute that the instruction to continue with this operation was given three to five days before the operation actually took place.
MR NORTJE: No, the final decision may have been received then but I was not there.
MR HATTINGH: And before that there may have been speculation with regard to the possibility of such an attack at some point in time, is that not so?
MR HATTINGH: My learned colleague has just drawn my attention to something that I did not deal with, with regard to the previous statement, will you just return to page 67 of bundle 2. Do you know - Wouter Mentz was also a member of Vlakplaas, is that so?
MR HATTINGH: He also applied for amnesty with regard to the Chand incident, not so?
MR NORTJE: Yes, that's correct.
MR HATTINGH: But his application for this incident was not heard along with yours, his was heard before yours, is that correct?
MR HATTINGH: And indeed, when your amnesty application with regard to the Chand family was served before the Committee, Mr Mentz already had judgment passed with regard to his application, is that correct?
MR HATTINGH: And is it correct that Mr Mentz received amnesty for all the persons who were killed in that house except for two children?
MR HATTINGH: And is it correct that when your application served before another Committee, it was surmised or determined for the first time that there were two children in the house, but not in the sense that they were minors, they were adult children somewhere in their early 20s?
MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.
MR HATTINGH: And upon the fact that the previous Committee had thought that the children were minors, Mr Mentz did not receive amnesty for that.
MR HATTINGH: Now I would like to refer you to page 67, at the top of the page
"The children, two of them, were in bed with their heads under the blankets. I shot one and Tait shot the other one. I picked up the blanket and saw one. He was about 14 to 15 years old. I heard later that they were paralysed, which explained why there was no reaction from them."
Did you ever say that the children you saw were 14 or 15 years old? Or may I ask you as follows, was there light in the house?
MR NORTJE: No, it was very dark and I cannot recall that I even looked.
MR HATTINGH: Can I refresh your memory, Mr Nortje? Mr de Kock's evidence with regard this, if I recall correctly, was that only later you determined that children were shot and you in regard felt very bad about that.
MR HATTINGH: So you cannot even recall that you had a look?
MR HATTINGH: Would you have said that those children, that it was children and that one of them was approximately 14 or 15 years old?
MR NORTJE: No, that is why I do not know about this statement. In any case it's not my manner of speaking, as you would realise.
MR HATTINGH: Mr Chairman, I notice that it's 4 o'clock, I'll be a little while with this witness still.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, we'll adjourn till half past nine tomorrow.