MR POOE: Thank you Chairperson, I am going to call one the operatives in the Dolphin Unit and that is Mr Mohammed Ichbahl Shaik.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Shaik, do you have any objection to taking the oath or would you prefer to give an affirmation?
MOHAMED ICHBAHL SHAIK: (sworn states)
MR SHAIK: Your legal representative will lead you Mr Shaik.
MR POOE: Chairperson, we have prepared a brief statement dealing with the background of Mr Shaik, how he became involved in politics and how he became as MK operative. We have also then dealt with the specific incidents in respect of which he is applying for amnesty and into which the Committee is presently inquiry and about on which the Committee will make a decision.
There are matters of editing that need to be done although I do have sufficient copies to hand out. If I hand out copies to the Committee and to our learned friends for convenience I would like to hand out on the basis that there may be editorials to be done and that would be effected in the course of late this afternoon. I would otherwise defer the handing out if I cannot hand in the statement on that basis.
CHAIRPERSON: I think we can hand in the statement on that basis, we'll be tolerant Mr Pooe.
MR POOE: As it pleases you Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: I think at this stage, subject to any amendments that may be made, maybe we will receive this as then as - and refer to it as Exhibit B.
MR POOE: Exhibit B, yes it would be.
Mr Shaik, you have before you a document Exhibit B which is a brief statement by yourself covering your background, your recruitment into MK, your training as an MK operative and the establishment of the Dolphin Unit, the general background on the operations of Dolphin and then you deal lastly with your specific role and involvement in the matters that are being considered by the Committee. You then set out on page 4, a conclusion to your statement.
Now you have indicated to me that there are matters of editing that you require done and those will be done in due course and an amended statement will be handed in to the Committee.
I want to fist Mr Shaik perhaps to take the Committee through your background and tell them a little bit about yourself and you can read from your statement.
MR SHAIK: Mr Chairperson, Honourable Members, I first wish to bring to your attention that before I proceed any further, while Mr Visser was cross-examining Mr Ismail earlier today it was brought to my attention that a certain incident for which I had thought I'd applied for amnesty has actually not been included in my amnesty ...[intervention]
CHAIRPERSON: Is that the Roodepoort incident?
MR SHAIK: That is the one yes. That was purely an administrative omission, either on my side or my legal team's side. It would be foolish of me or ridiculous of me to have tried avoiding that deliberately as out of 31 acts I omit one. I therefore ask you to take that into consideration in terms of me making a full declaration, thanks.
MR POOE: And you will in due course explain fully your involvement in that particular operation?
MR SHAIK: Can you now take the Committee through your statement, firstly dealing with the background and proceeding section by section.
"I was born in Vrededorp(?) on the 26th August 1958. I'm the second of four brothers. Growing up in a group area one became aware of apartheid policies from an early age. The forced removal of my family to the Indian group area of Lenasia contributed to my politisation.
During the 1979/1980 education crisis, I being the student leader at the ML Sultan Technikon became politically active. I abandoned my studies in the mid '80's and then became quite involved in mass political movement such as anti-SAIC campaign, the UDF, residents associations etc.
The ...[indistinct] called for democracy. The anti
apartheid forces and the disproportionate response by
the State convinced me that the ANC's call for an
armed struggle was a justified one. At this point in
time I must mention that I come from a middle class
family, I was quite comfortable at the time. To
having been involved politically was only to my
detriment. However, it made complete sense to me
because of the violence and the ...[indistinct] of the
My recruitment into MK. After mentioning to Mohammed Ismail a friend of mine, that I wish to be recruited into MK, he arranged a meeting with an ANC commander in Swaziland. Mohammed Ismail and I travelled to Swaziland in 1982 where we met Rashid Aboobaker Ismail. I had known him since my youth. I was quizzed about my political background, disposition and allegiance. I was briefed about the implications of joining MK and how detrimental it could be if caught.
Mohammed Ismail and I were established as a unit called Dolphin of which I was the commander. It was explained to us that we would be involved in sabotage operations within the country. It was explained to us in terms of ANC political guidelines which targets we would be required to attack.
The nature of operations which were envisaged for us required a motor vehicle to which a DLB or a dead letter box would be added or fitted. We were accordingly instructed on our next return trip to Swaziland to bring the motor vehicle for having the DLB fitted"
MR POOE: These discussions, who did they take place with?
MR SHAIK: These discussions took place between Aboobaker Ismail, Mohammed Ismail and myself.
"My training as an MK operative. On my second trip to Swaziland in 1982 we returned with the vehicle. The vehicle was duly fitted with the DLB. I received basic training in the use and maintenance of pistols and the assembly and storage of limpet mines.
On this occasion I receive detailed instructions on what constituted legitimate targets and what did not. I was instructed to keep within the mandate the ANC provided. Our instruction were to reconnoitre and attack government buildings, economic installations such as railway lines, sub-stations, homeland government structures, police or security force personnel or building or anything which could be identified strongly with the bureaucratic arms of government.
Also I was to launch attacks in order to achieve maximum propaganda during issues such as strikes boycotts etc.
MR POOE: What was said about civilian targets, and perhaps you can continue reading your statement.
MR SHAIK: It was very clear, it was categorically stated that at no time must civilian targets be attacked for the mere sake of it being civilian targets. Our emphasis, our direction should at all times exclude civilians. As I say in my statement
"Strong emphasis was placed on avoiding civilian lives at all times. It was at this time that we received materials necessary for operations. These consisted of pistols, ammunition, limpet mines, detonators etc".
MR POOE: Could I just interrupt you there Mr Shaik, this second trip that you undertake also in 1988, you indicated that the first one you met with, Aboobaker Ismail who has testified here, the second trip and your meeting and these discussions have - who is this that you're talking to on this occasion?
MR SHAIK: On the second occasion?
MR SHAIK: I'm still talking about Aboobaker Ismail.
"The general background on operations of Dolphin. Mohammed Ismail was part of the Dolphin Unit until 1985. We were jointly involved in most operations. Thereafter I continued with further operations on my own. Initially I was expected to first discuss my operations with my commander Aboobaker Ismail before I launched any attack. This was to ensure that we operated within the mandate and guidelines laid down by the ANC.
After a number of operations, most of which gained wide publicity, we were then given permission to use our discretion on the selection of targets, provided that we remained within the guidelines. We were however still expected to report to Aboobaker Ismail after each operation had been carried out.
The report backs were meant to enable the ANC to keep proper records of incidents, to claim responsibility and on a continuous basis to monitor whether we were staying within the laid down policies.
I continued attacks up to around July 1986 after which I left for military training in the GDR(?). I returned to South Africa and continued sabotage operations until I was instructed, during approximately the middle of 1988, to cease all sabotage activity.
I then became involved in ordinance which involved the receiving and supply of arms, ammunition and explosives. I continued this function until the formal disbanding of MK on the 16th December 1993"
MR POOE: Mr Shaik, you have applied and listed in your application 31 operations and subject what you've indicated to the Committee about your omission, those are the applications for which you are seeking amnesty?
MR SHAIK: Yes, including the one which is 32.
MR POOE: You are however setting out in the rest of your statement your involvement and participation only in certain of these operations?
MR SHAIK: Yes, I am willing to commend with anything but to be specific, this is what the TRC has asked me to do and that is what I'm replying to.
MR POOE: Yes. Chairperson, these are, from the list of ...[indistinct] which are presently before you in which he is explaining his personal involvement.
Perhaps you could then take the Committee through these incidents, starting with the incident of 26 of August 1983.
MR SHAIK: I have listed in my application - okay, let me start with the actual incidents. The first incident was the Ciskei Consulate, 26 August 1983.
"I chose the Ciskei Consulate as it represented the discredited ...[indistinct] system. The ANC led campaign to discredit the homelands governments was under way at the time. There also existed intense repression at the time which continued until 1994. This was deemed a legitimate target.
Reconnaissance of the target revealed that all offices
on the floors, on the particular floor, were vacated at
the latest by 5.30pm. The cleaning staff only became
active on the floor in the later hours around 8pm.
Mohammed Ismail and I reconnoitred the target the day before the operation was carried out. The following day, I on my own placed the charge at 5.30pm. The explosion took place around 7.30pm. According to reports one person was injured"
If I may just point out at this stage for the sake of expediency and practicality I cannot give a complete account of every action I've done but under cross-examination I'm willing to discuss the modus operandi of things.
MR POOE: Did you do the reconnaissance of this particular target with Mohammed Ismail?
MR SHAIK: Yes, most of the reconnaissance I did on my own. Reconnaissance, it's a lengthy process and it's a continuous thing. Most of it I did on my own and in one instance we did reconnaissance together when I felt I just needed his approval or his reassurance.
MR POOE: Did you - you, as I understand your statement, you planted the charge?
MR SHAIK: I collected the, I assembled the material, I, yes, I did everything with - I did everything on my own.
MR POOE: Yes. Now when you say you placed the charge, what precisely do you mean, what did you place and where did you place it?
MR SHAIK: Whenever I refer to a charge I'll be referring to an explosive device and in most instances limpet mines. I placed the charge directly at the doorstep of the Ciskei Embassy on the given floor.
MR POOE: Now you say that according to reports one person was injured, is this information that you were able to verify or are you simply relying on reports for this purpose?
MR SHAIK: I'm simply relying on newspaper reports, not only in this instance but in all cases.
MR POOE: Okay, perhaps then you could go on to the next incident and this is the incident which has been omitted and you've given an explanation to the Committee from your ...[intervention]
CHAIRPERSON: Just one point of explanation. With these limpet mines, you said you placed it at half past five, it went off at about 7.30, is it a time bomb?
MR SHAIK: It's a timing device.
MR SHAIK: The incident we're about to discuss now, I don't know, you know legally if it makes any difference at times but such was the nature of operations in South Africa that at times this called the Roodepoort District Commissioner's Offices, from my reconnaissance. I now find out that it's called the Security Branch Headquarters but I'll refer to it as I know it.
CHAIRPERSON: Perhaps - I know it as it is referred to here, I don't know anything else but if you know about the incident then perhaps you can give us a description of the place and what the office was or what the target was.
MR SHAIK: As I know it it was the District Commissioner's Office for the Soweto Branch of the South African Police. This was done on the 17th of August 1984. I identified the target as a legitimate one as it was occupied by police members only. I did about four days reconnaissance and noticed, and noted that civilians did not use the floor.
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Shaik, what was the date again?
MR SHAIK: The date here, it says 17 August 1984.
MR SHAIK: I used two SPM(?) limpet mines and placed them directly outside the doors of the South African Police with about 10 minutes detonation time, the reason being that I was quite keen that the explosion takes place according to plan and that had a longer detonation time been set it would have allowed for maybe civilians coming on the floor or somebody else who wouldn't be there and that would not have been desirable.
Since it was on the second floor the street below was not a very busy street I expected very minimum civilian casualties. According to reports five policemen and two civilians were injured and there was extensive damage to property. I feel the operation was successful and it was in keeping with the ANC policy of attacking enemy personnel.
I'd like to say something on that matter. It's been reported after that in the press, once again I'm going by press reports, I have a copy of it, that an ANC insurgent responsible was killed in a shoot-out with the police in Soweto a few days later, if that's of any relevance to the Committee.
MR POOE: Perhaps we can pause at that point and maybe I should ask you this so that you can clarify it for the Committee, did you yourself this operation or did you delegate someone else to carry this operation? In other words, did you recruit someone else to carry out this operation?
MR SHAIK: No, where I did work with someone it would only have been Mohammed Ismail, I will indicate that at the appropriate times for sake for reference. At all other times I operated completely on my own, in the receiving of weapons, assembly of weapons and the execution of the operation.
MR POOE: Let us deal with an issue that Mr Visser brought up, that one Mbani Johannes Mosilela died in 1984 during a skirmish with the South African police and that same person had been identified, picked out in an identity parade earlier on as someone who asked for directions to this particular place, police station. Now, do you have any knowledge of this person, was he ever in involved with you as part of your unit?
MR SHAIK: No, I've never heard of the man, I cannot say. Can I continue?
MR POOE: You may continue with the next incident.
"On the railway police radio room Johannesburg on the 24th August 1984. I identified the target as a legitimate one as it housed railway police and government departments. I timed the charge to explode after 5pm, after which time the police radio room was the only office occupied while other offices on the floor were vacated.
The charge was placed directly outside the entrance to the radio room. Being a few floors up civilian casualties on the street below was expected to be to a minimum once again. The operation was in keeping with the ANC's policy of attacking enemy personnel. It was successful. Four policemen and two civilians were injured"
MR POOE: Again you rely on reports and as you have said you rely on newspaper reports mainly for the figures you give of the casualties?
MR VISSER: May I ask Mr Chairman at this stage, whether we're going to see these reports at any time or whether they're available or not?
MR SHAIK: These reports, when I say reports I mean press reports Sir.
CHAIRPERSON: Are they in the Johannesburg Daily newspapers?
MR SHAIK: Yes, they were at the time in the Citizen, Rand Daily Mail. I have clippings of them but unfortunately I left them at home but I could make them available if you would like.
CHAIRPERSON: Seeing that Mr Visser might want to see them, maybe you could make, just have them available just in case if you do have them.
CHAIRPERSON: Otherwise I'm sure that you know, the libraries normally keep copies of newspapers, one can always go back and try to trace.
MR POOE: To the extent that anything turns on them Chairperson, we will endeavour to do so.
MR POOE: We're not in any way trying to say that these figures are correct, that's why we put a proviso ...[indistinct] that these are not our figures.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I understand that.
MR SHAIK: In fact at times they might be inaccurate.
MR SHAIK: It might not be to my benefit to mention these things.
MR POOE: Chairperson, Mr Visser has indicated to me that we are close as possible to 5 o'clock and I think perhaps ...[intervention]
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I think we're at 4 o'clock and one of the main reasons why we adjourn at four, why I want to adjourn at four is because the interpreters spend all day interpreting and it's very difficult and hard work for them and for us to continue late is really not fair on them. So we will now adjourn for the day and we will reconvene and start tomorrow morning in this hall at half past nine.