Truth Commission Special Report Amnesty Hearing - 54817 Type: AMNESTY HEARING Starting Date: 30 September 1997 Location: PORT ELIZABETH Day: 2 Names: GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT Case Number: 3920/96 URL: https://sabctrc.saha.org.za/hearing.php?id=54817&t=&tab=hearings Original File: https://sabctrc.saha.org.za/originals/amntrans/pe/mother2.htm --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- CHAIRPERSON: It is the 30th of September 1997. We are proceeding with the applications that we have been hearing since yesterday and the panel of the Committee is constituted as yesterday. We have just finished hearing Mr Lotz and there is a request as to whether he can be excused from further attendance, and I believe that can be done, unless somebody has problems with it, subject of course to the condition that he would be available should he be needed. ADV BOOYENS: He is available, Mr Chairman, he is a cellphone call away. He would obviously not be available within five minutes or so, but we can get hold of him, he his not leaving town or anything like that. In that regard, may I perhaps also ask, we have handed to you in chambers an affidavit by Mr Lotz, in which he just expands on his application, where we ask for an amendment to his application, to cover certain other offences, not necessarily other offences, but offences which might flow from the same incident. Does the Commission require me to read it into the record or is it adequate that my Attorney handed it over to you in chambers? CHAIRPERSON: Because it is a loose paper, it maybe just get displaced, maybe you should just read it into the record. ADV BOOYENS: Certainly Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, the affidavit reads: I the undersigned, Gerhardus Johannes Lotz declare under oath as follows: On the 29th of September 1997 I have already proposed by amnesty application, additionally should be added to paragraph 9(a)(1) offences and as well as any other offence or omission and more specifically, perjury and an attempt at defeating the ends of justice as appears clearly from my evidence before this Commission". And it is signed by the deponent and confirmed. CHAIRPERSON: Well, the amendment is granted. ADV BOOYENS: As the Committee pleases Mr Chairman. ADV FORD: Mr Chairman, may I take this opportunity, I am sorry to interrupt, merely to place on record Mr Chairman, that we have been confronted, I am talking about my Attorney and myself, with some difficulties. For reasons which aren't clear, we were not furnished with a full copy of the amnesty applications, we were not aware of that obviously until certain documentation was referred to yesterday. Yesterday for the first time we came into the possession of the applications of the applicants Ras, Kok and Du Toit and certain portions of the application of the present applicant today, Mr Nieuwoudt, Mr Chairman. We have studied what is now available to us, we believe that it may well require an application to recall at least Mr Van Rensburg, to deal with certain issues which are dealt with more clearly in these applications. I just wanted to place that on record. There is an outside possibility that that may also involve Lotz, but I do not anticipate that to be so, Mr Chairman, thank you. CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, why would you say that Van Rensburg might be recalled? ADV FORD: Because of certain further information which has become apparent from the documentation which we now have relating both to the fraud aspect and to the Goniwe aspect, if I can refer to it in those terms Mr Chairman, and certain other information which has also become available. But I do not wish to deal with it at this stage Mr Chairman, I merely wish to place it on record. CHAIRPERSON: Well, you will motivate that application as and when ... (intervention) ADV FORD: Certainly, when I bring it, Mr Chairman, I will motivate it. ADV DE JAGER: Mr Ford, kindly for our own household purposes, when did you receive the applications and when did you receive the further documents? ADV FORD: Mr Chairman, through you Mr Chairman, we were formally instructed some ten days ago when we got the batch of documentation which we believed to be full, the full documentation relating to the applications. During the first part of the hearing yesterday, it became apparent that certain of the applications had not been made available to us. I got from Mr Brink his copies, his bound copies, we don't have such bound copies, indexed copies of the applications, I got it from him and over lunch time yesterday we were able to make copies of all those documents which we had not been furnished with, but obviously we didn't have time to peruse them. Last night and this morning we have spent time perusing them and trying to investigate and consider certain of the other issues which are raised there. ADV DE JAGER: Thank you. Mr Brink, I take it you would kindly take it up with the office in Cape Town, why wasn't the victims' representatives furnished with full copies of the documents? MR BRINK: I have made a note of that already Mr Chairman. CHAIRPERSON: I sincerely hope this is not going to cause some delays in our proceedings, because in our view, there is no reason why we shouldn't dispose of this matter by Thursday evening, Thursday. I sincerely hope that every attempt would be made to try and help Mr Ford where necessary and Mr Ford, you will make use of such time as would be available to you to clear up such issues so as to avoid delay in the matter. ADV FORD: I certainly will Mr Chairman, and it is certainly not our intention to delay the proceedings, thank you. CHAIRPERSON: Yes. ADV BOOYENS: Thank you Mr Chairman. I call Gideon Johannes Nieuwoudt. GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: (sworn states) EXAMINATION BY ADV BOOYENS: Mr Nieuwoudt you are applying for amnesty in the matter and you have your amnesty application in front of you? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so. ADV BOOYENS: I refer to the first page thereof to the point where you start with your personal summary on the second page of that, do you confirm the correctness of that? Mr chairman, this is at page 296, it starts off at page 296 of the record. MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so. ADV BOOYENS: Do you further confirm the contents of paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of the application? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: The personal summary illustrates where your political convictions were shaped and indicates that you later became a supporter of the National Party government and the basis for that? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: On page 300, that is page 5 of the application, you deal with the general background and your experience in the Security Branch, is that correct? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV BOOYENS: Do you confirm what appears in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4. Is that correct? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is correct. ADV BOOYENS: In paragraph 5 you refer to certain annexures. Perhaps we could just tell the Committee that annexure 3 appears on page 377, annexure 4 on page 385, annexure 9 appears on page 421 and 422 and annexure 12 appears on page 435, is that correct? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: Did you enclose these annexures as corroboration of the fact that the broad masses in the 1970's and 1980's had become very politicised? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: You also in terms of paragraph 6, these annexures 5 and 6? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: On page 304, that is page 9 of your application, you refer to the four pillars of the revolutionary war and the opposition against the National Party government? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: And then you further elaborate in this paragraph on this aspect and how it ultimately developed that there was this so-called - that the politicisation led to a mobilisation for so-called people's war, is that correct? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV BOOYENS: You then continue on page 304, paragraph 7, to sketch the history further as well as in paragraph 8? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: Paragraph 9? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct, yes. ADV BOOYENS: And up to paragraph 12? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: What you mentioned here, did you obtain that from literature and your own experience on the ground as a Security Policeman, in other words was it only theory or was it also happening in practice? MR NIEUWOUDT: It was happening in practice and I also got this from literature. ADV BOOYENS: On page 12 you deal with the extension of the structures and the New Year's message of 1986, and the combat units of MK who launched attacks on strategic targets, is that correct? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV BOOYENS: In paragraph 13, I think the word police officers should be added because in that list, the people that were killed were also warders and people like that? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is correct. ADV BOOYENS: Did you obtain these details from murder and robbery documentation? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, from their registers. ADV BOOYENS: Perhaps we can just tell the Committee, I have forgotten for a moment that the Committee members are not from Port Elizabeth so we can just go through KwaZakhele, that is Port Elizabeth district? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: Page 309, Swartkops, that is also a police station here? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: The same goes for New Brighton? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV BOOYENS: Adelaide is not in Port Elizabeth, is it? MR NIEUWOUDT: It is in the Eastern Cape, yes. ADV BOOYENS: And then we have Swartkops again. And then 13.1.13 there is a Grahamstown incident? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is Eastern Cape. ADV BOOYENS: Cradock is also in the Eastern Cape, although the case was in the Somerset East, that is the Eastern Cape? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: Once again KwaZakhele. Paragraph 14, there you deal with the damage to police vehicles and an amount is mentioned there, that is obviously in terms of the money in those years? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: Did you have any personal knowledge of attacks on police officers and that the homes were burnt down? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV BOOYENS: In paragraph 15 you deal with the political intimidation and the economical intimidation which deals with the intimidation of black councillors, consumer boycotts and the rent boycotts, is that correct? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: The boycott against the councillors caused a large number of them to resign as you've set out there? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV BOOYENS: And you mention the specific case of Mr Linda whose business was burnt down? MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct. ADV BOOYENS: In paragraph 17 you deal with the consumer boycott and in paragraph 18, you deal with the unemployment situation? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: If we can just get the statistics here, these you obtained from Manpower? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: And those were only the unemployment cases that were actually registered? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: In paragraph 19 you talk about the Amabutu, what is that? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is a terminology which was used, to mean the army of the people. ADV BOOYENS: And annexure 14 to which you refer, is on page 389 is that correct? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: On page 316, that is page 21 of the record, you state that you are applying for amnesty for the murder and other offences relating to those four people there mentioned? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV BOOYENS: Particulars which may be of importance here are the following. For how long had you known Mgoduka, Faku, Mapipa and Jack? MR NIEUWOUDT: Warrant Officer Glen Mgoduka had worked for the Security Branch since 1977 and he worked with me. We shared an office along with Mr Marx. Mr Faku joined the Security Branch in 1980, and he was also part of my Unit, that is the black affairs unit. Mapipa joined later, in 1986 when a special investigation team was established as result of the state of emergency which had been declared, that is the state of emergency of 1986. Charles Jack was a trained person whom we used as an informer and he later gave evidence in several court cases and at a later stage during 1983/1984 he then joined us permanently at our Branch. ADV BOOYENS: I think the term is commonly known here, he was an askari? MR NIEUWOUDT: Right. ADV BOOYENS: In other words a person who was trained as an MK and then was turned to work for you? MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct. ADV BOOYENS: And then at page 316 you deal with issues with which we will have to deal with more thoroughly, from page 316, you deal with the circumstances which reigned and which gave rise to the death of the deceased. MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct. ADV BOOYENS: I think it would be a good thing if you commented on the fact that you were the Regional Commander of the Intelligence Unit. Perhaps you can explain the structure of the Security Police from 1983 onwards. MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairman, in 1983 the Security Branch component consisted of the Commanding Officer. After General Erasmus left Port Elizabeth in 1983 and he went to Johannesburg a Colonel Snyman took over as Commanding Officer and there was a Unit that deal with black affairs of which Colonel Du Plessis was the Commander. There were also the Indian, coloured and technical and trade union components. After 1983 after I had become an officer, I was in charge of all information or intelligence and the coordination of that intelligence, viz a vie all the organisations. The four deceased Mgoduka, Faku, Mapipa and Charles Jack were under my command. ADV BOOYENS: You said four, you mean three? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, three at that stage. In 1986 I was transferred to the Special Investigation team who deal with the investigation into emergency regulations issues. In June Mapipa, the third deceased joined us. At that stage Sergeant Faku and Mapipa were part of that investigation team. During June of 1989 I was the Regional Coordinator of the Eastern Cape region and it also included East London at that stage. And we coordinated the intelligence component which was actually an extension of the Intelligence component of the Security Branch and it was under the command of Brigadier Gilbert. ADV BOOYENS: What was the function of the Intelligence Unit, what was your job? MR NIEUWOUDT: Intelligence gathering, the maintaining of updated intelligence, the perceptions that existed and the data bases we had relating to this information, which we obtained. ADV BOOYENS: You say that your tasks were set out in the Police Act, very broadly speaking, I don't think it is necessary to go into that. Paragraph 3, 3.1 creation, extension and maintenance of a covert intelligence capacity in respect of internal as well as foreign intelligence networks, please explain to us in layman's terms what are you talking about here? MR NIEUWOUDT: We didn't have offices at the Security Branch per se we had our own facilities, such as safe premises, operating centres. Part of our duty was to gather intelligence relating to covert actions and we operated under cover in that respect. ADV BOOYENS: In the process, you made use of agents and those kinds of persons? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is correct. ADV BOOYENS: Paragraph 4, page 318, you say that the importance of an effective intelligence network, you refer to that and then you define what you mean by an effective intelligence network, perhaps you should explain to us, you talk about associates, what do you mean by that? MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairman, associates would act as go- betweens between the agent and the handler. And in my case, as is well known in Port Elizabeth, I made specific use of associates to deal with the agents for me in order to protect their identities. ADV BOOYENS: So an associate would be a civilian person who is well disposed towards you? MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct. ADV BOOYENS: As far as the source is concerned, would the source necessarily always have known that he was working for the Security Police or would he sometimes be under the impression that he was working for MI6 or the CIA or something like that? MR NIEUWOUDT: The agent wouldn't know that he was working for the Security Branch. ADV BOOYENS: Were the sources sometimes deliberately brought under the impression that they were working for some of the other intelligence agencies that I have referred to? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV BOOYENS: You are talking about agents there as well, those are underground policemen, policemen who act as underground spies? MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct. ADV BOOYENS: Did you also make use of them? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV BOOYENS: You also relate physical sources, those are informers? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV BOOYENS: Non-physical sources, would that be technology for instance? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV BOOYENS: Interception, monitoring, interception of post, etc. That type of situation? MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct. ADV BOOYENS: The existence of an intelligence network, did that depend on the existence of these people, in other words could you gather intelligence if you did not have these kind of people to work for you? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, we would not be able to. ADV BOOYENS: You refer to the fact that it often takes quite a long time to recruit reliable sources and agents and associates, is that correct? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV BOOYENS: Yes, most people wouldn't make an immediate decision to work for you? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: Then you say that in 1988 a need was identified and in 1989 the intelligence operation was established. You say that on page 318, paragraph 5? MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct. ADV BOOYENS: You mention that there was a real fear amongst associates, agents, sources and informers that they were not assured of sufficient protection as far as their identity and security was concerned? So there was a problem in that regard? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: Your local Security Policemen, such as yourself, could not do the work of the agents and informers, because you were well-known? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: Paragraph 7, the exposure of members and informers, they were intimidated and murdered? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: It was also the declared policy of the liberation alliance? MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct. ADV BOOYENS: As far as the identity of informers were concerned, do you think that there would still be some antagonism to some of these people if they were still alive? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV BOOYENS: You were present here last week during an application when there was reference to a certain informer? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV BOOYENS: I saw it on a poster which was displayed here. MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV BOOYENS: There was a lady in front of the building here, saying that the identity of the informer should be revealed? MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct. ADV BOOYENS: In paragraph 8 you deal with the fact that violence had escalated? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV BOOYENS: We now are moving towards the 1988/1989 era? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV BOOYENS: In paragraph 9, you deal with the so-called operating facility. You already mentioned the fact that that is where you had your administrative centre and that that was not at the police station as such. You made use of other premises for your intelligence business? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: And safe houses and premises, those would be places normally used to debrief agents, informers and such? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: You mention in paragraph 10, something which is probably very well known, that intelligence services throughout the world, make use of cover operations such as these? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV BOOYENS: In paragraph 11, page 321, in July 1989, you came to the conclusion that there was a leak, an intelligence leak from the Security Branch, is that correct? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV BOOYENS: Even before this happened, you had some suspicion that there could be problems? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV BOOYENS: And it related with an operation in Swaziland. Please try and keep it as brief as possible, but please tell us what the situation was. MR NIEUWOUDT: At that stage we had a trained cadre in detention and we were busy interrogating him and he was supposed to make contact with the other members of his cell to infiltrate and I made use of that opportunities, the four deceased were also present during that interrogation. The trained person then wrote a letter for me in which he made contact with the contact person in Swaziland and I used a source as a courier to hand over this letter and the objective was that the ANC would give him the weapons with the view to the establishment of a DLB internally and to be able to exercise control over that. ADV BOOYENS: You sent the source in? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, the source was sent in. Later I learnt that he had been detained in Quatro. ADV BOOYENS: Now Quatro is an ANC camp in Angola? MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct. ADV BOOYENS: Were they detained and interrogated spies and people like that? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is correct. ADV BOOYENS: This source came known to the other side on one or other way and you said it was you yourself and the four deceased who were involved. Did anybody else from your side know about this? MR NIEUWOUDT: Nobody else knew. ADV BOOYENS: This was the first instance, this was before 1989, is that correct? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: Can you remember when this was? MR NIEUWOUDT: It was 1988. ADV BOOYENS: This was the first indication, not even the first, but did you start realising then around July 1989 that there were problems with the intelligence network at the Security Branch? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV BOOYENS: Can you mention other examples? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, I can. I know of two instances where Mr Mgoduka was present where he acted as my associate and we recruited a person under false pretences. And later he was necklaced. In another instance, it happened in the same way. It happened in Lesotho. He was murdered there and I had the suspicion that the information was conveyed to the ANC. ADV BOOYENS: You mention this agent's name. Was that because he was shot dead? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is correct. ADV BOOYENS: The name is Mtoto Mbali. MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: In both cases Mgoduka was with you? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV BOOYENS: Were there any of your colleagues that complained that the effectiveness of the intelligence was not good any more? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: Did that mean that sources were inactive, agents did not report any more? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: You have already mentioned that Mr Mgoduka worked with you. Did the others work with you from time to time as well? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV BOOYENS: In the situation on the ground, it could have been that the black members working with you and would they have known who were your sources? Would the black members know how the sources worked, which methods you were using? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is like that. ADV BOOYENS: If a source had to be arranged, a meeting at a safe house, you were well-known? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV BOOYENS: You were well-known in Port Elizabeth? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV BOOYENS: Could you for example go and fetch this source of did you use the black members for that? MR NIEUWOUDT: I used the black members to go and fetch these sources. Amongst others Mgoduka and Faku and Mapipa. ADV BOOYENS: And were they with you when these sources were debriefed? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV BOOYENS: Did they hear at certain instances which instructions were given to the sources and the agents, for example if a specific person or organisation was targeted, would they have known? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV BOOYENS: You also used other sources, people who were murdered, but according to you do they still have family in Port Elizabeth and therefore you would not like to disclose who they were because according to you it would, the families' lives endanger or they would be ostracised by the community? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, for sure. ADV BOOYENS: You mentioned earlier, and we are on page 23 of the false flag method. What does that mean? MR NIEUWOUDT: This is a method whereby the person who was recruited, that he as I have already mentioned that I am using an associate to execute this covert operation. ADV BOOYENS: This was the person who for example said he worked for the CIA? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: So you became more and more suspicious that this leak in the intelligence network could have come from Mgoduka's side? The initial suspicion was on him? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: But at that initial stage, you only had a suspicion and nothing more? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: As it became clear, also based on what your colleagues had said, was counter espionage also part of this intelligence network? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, it was. At that stage I handled the counter espionage component. ADV BOOYENS: Counter espionage means to find spies working for the other side. MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: On page 324, on paragraph 14, round about August 1989, this idea of the leakage and your suspicions were discussed with Brigadier Gilbert. He told you that you had to investigate this matter to determine whether this leakage was coming from the inside. Whether there was a mole situation. MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: At that stage, because it had become clear that certain parts of your covert operations had been disclosed, and that you had to spend money to find other premises. MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: Paragraph 16 I want you to discuss this in detail. You said security measures were tightened, information was handled on a need to know basis, that was all to prevent that the moles could obtain more information? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: You tried to determine whether there was surveillance instruments in your safety premises and also surveillance was instituted in your own premises? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: And you mentioned the WH11 method, that was monitoring telephone calls? That worked with a sound recorder which was activated by voice. MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: You also said that other monitoring apparatus was also installed at Louis le Grange square and also in the tea room of that building? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: You had a suspicion at that stage regarding Mr Mgoduka, is that right? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: Then you refer to the post which was intercepted according to the WH10 method. MR NIEUWOUDT: Our technical division fetched the post early in the morning, they had a person in the post office who sorted the post, and they had a list of well-known addresses which we have provided them with. Addresses overseas and internally. There were certain addresses in Lesotho. Amongst others the Roma Church in Lesotho, in London a Mr John Smith and in Anreith in Canada and in Eastern Germany. ADV BOOYENS: Did that work as follows, that all post which was posted here to all the post posted in the Port Elizabeth environment and I also think in other big cities, would be taken to the central post office to sort them. MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: You had an agent working there and all the post to a specific address as you have referred to, be intercepted and be put in a post bag for the Security Police? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: And this post you opened, you steamed it open and read it? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: On the other hand, would the same method be used with incoming post? That all post in this specific case, addressed to Mgoduka, that his post would be intercepted? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: And it was then brought under your attention that Mr Mgoduka was receiving post from overseas? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: The letters were innocent, it seemed. ... (tape ends) In this process you mention the Roma Church and an address in Canada and in Eastern Germany. These addresses, what was the meaning of these? MR NIEUWOUDT: Those were contact addresses for the ANC overseas, from where they would obtain their post. ADV BOOYENS: In other words, post would go from here to the Roma Church? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: And all post going to the Roma Church, was suspicious? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: You say Mgoduka worked with you? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: Some of the post which was intercepted on its way to these addresses, and you came to the conclusion that he could have been involved in that? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: How did you draw this inference? He did not sign his own name or used his own address, he did not do that. MR NIEUWOUDT: He did not do that. From the samples of his handwriting and some typed letters from specific typewriters, some were handwritten and the handwritten letters, I could recognise his handwriting because he used to write my reports. ADV BOOYENS: You were already suspicious regarding the typed letters? MR NIEUWOUDT: He made use of his own typewriter which he had in his office. ADV BOOYENS: Was that a mechanical type typewriter? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV BOOYENS: So he usually typed on the typewriter and from the intercepted letters, you came to the conclusion that it was done on that same typewriter? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV BOOYENS: On the basis of what? MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairman, I don't have knowledge and I am not an expert, but on the typewriter I could see that there was a similarity between certain letters, certain typed letters and so I could draw the inference that it was coming from the same typewriter. ADV BOOYENS: If we can just discuss the contents of these letters quickly. These letters was written in a kind of a code language? MR NIEUWOUDT: Definitely yes. ADV BOOYENS: A person, an uninformed person could draw no inference from this letters, it read like a friendly letter? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: Did the Security Branch know that certain words used in certain letters had a certain meaning? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: Could you mention a few examples? MR NIEUWOUDT: Amongst others there is a funeral, it would appear in the letter. You must attend a wedding on such and such a day. ADV BOOYENS: Let us use the wedding example. What did that mean? MR NIEUWOUDT: That means that people would be sent into, people would be sent to Lesotho on a specific date. CHAIRPERSON: And if they actually wanted to attend a wedding or a funeral, what would they say? MR NIEUWOUDT: Then they would come back and say, we would attend that on such and such a day. CHAIRPERSON: The person who sends the letter ... (intervention) MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairman, perhaps you have understood me wrong. If he said he is going to send somebody with a message, he says there would be a wedding on such and such a day. It had nothing to do with a wedding. The date was important. So that means the people had to be sent on that specific date. CHAIRPERSON: I understand you, you didn't understand me, but we will come back to that later. MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV DE JAGER: I think what the Judge wants to ask, if there was really a wedding and they were really invited to a wedding, say for instance come to my daughter's wedding, and he accepts the invitation and says he is willing to come, how would you distinguish between an innocent invitation and an invitation which was encoded, could you comment on that? MR NIEUWOUDT: I can't comment on that, there is the possibility that that could happen. But I would have determined whether there was a real wedding. It could have happened that there was a real wedding. But it could have been an innocent letter. ADV BOOYENS: But what was important regarding the innocent letter was not only the letter, but the address to which it was sent? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: There were too many weddings and funerals mentioned in letters to the Roma Church for example? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: And this was well-known ANC addresses? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: Were these addresses where you would expect that a member of the Security Branch would correspond with people? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so. ADV BOOYENS: A member of the Security Branch rather? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, no. ADV BOOYENS: These were kind of cover up addresses? MR NIEUWOUDT: These were cover up addresses, yes. ADV BOOYENS: And these addresses, those were the addresses where the weddings and funerals were mentioned in the letters? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV BOOYENS: Were you satisfied that some of the correspondence which Mgoduka received, also entailed coded messages? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: You say Mgoduka, Faku, Mapipa and Sehati were not members of the intelligence unit, is that correct? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: In other words they were outside this counter espionage operation? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: But three of them, they have already been associated at the least three years, with the Security Branch? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: If the three of them, or the four of them, pooled their intelligence regarding the Security Branch, the informers, the possible informers, the safe premises, it would have been an enormous source of information? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: You refer to a safe premises at Tesco which he knew about? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: You mention in paragraph 17 that the monitoring apparatus which you installed, that was in the tea room? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV BOOYENS: Also bore fruit in the end? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV BOOYENS: And in paragraph 18 you summarised what you found there. MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: Were the only those four people present in the tea room at that stage? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: Mgoduka and Sehati told you, and they told the other two that they made contact with a family member of Mr Mgoduka who was involved in the liberation struggle? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV DE JAGER: Please be careful, the paper makes a lot of noise. ADV BOOYENS: I am sorry Mr Commissioner. The Security Police had a kind of photo system or a system of photographs which you used for identification? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: You had a photo album of exiles and based on this, you determined that there was a family member of Mgoduka who was in exile? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: If we could possibly just explain. The photo album consists of a separate index, it is especially used for photograph identification? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: I don't seem to recall we have had documentary exhibits this far Mr Chairman, I think this will be the first one. I shall mark it as Exhibit A1 and A2. And you determined that photograph number 2044, was the photograph of Mr Christopher Mgoduka and A1 and A2 are photocopies of the photo album of exiles and also its index? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: If I could hand this in Mr Chairman. We have made copies for all the legal counsel. We have copies for the family. Mgoduka and Sehati said that they had already tried to make contact and the other two said that they were interested to ... (indistinct) MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: Did you discuss this interpretation with Brigadier Gilbert? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: At that stage, two of the members also according to what you have said, had made contact with the ANC and there were two on their way to make contact? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: Gilbert's first reaction was to transfer these people? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: Would that have been successful? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, it would not. ADV BOOYENS: Why not? MR NIEUWOUDT: They could escape. ADV BOOYENS: Let's start from the beginning. Should all four of them had been transferred? MR NIEUWOUDT: Then they would have immediately realised that we know about their activities. The chances were that they would try to escape. ADV BOOYENS: At that stage they were still functioning as moles, if these people had to flee and would be debriefed by trained intelligence operators, were you satisfied that they had tremendous lot of intelligence? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, I am satisfied with that. ADV BOOYENS: You yourself at a certain stage, debriefed various agents who came back? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: Just is not a discussion which took 5 or 10 minutes over a cup of tea, is that correct? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV BOOYENS: Such a debriefing as you have told me, could take a few days? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: And for these four people, the information which they had in their possession, according to you what did that include? MR NIEUWOUDT: They could, not all, but they could identify most of our informers and sketch their profiles. The profiles on the members of the Security Branch could have been exposed. ADV BOOYENS: If you mention a profile that means where he is, where he works, where he lives, where his children go to school, what car he drives, it is all that type of information? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV BOOYENS: Informers, you also include some agents? MR NIEUWOUDT: Agents, some associates and also sources. ADV BOOYENS: And also regarding the physical sources, or rather the physical facilities, the safe premises? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. And also our operating centres. ADV BOOYENS: In other words with an experienced team of interrogators and a tremendous amount of information can be gathered from these people. MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: Did you have any reason to believe that the ANC outside and the military wing did not have this capability or did you know they had this capability? MR NIEUWOUDT: I was satisfied that they have the ability to do this. ADV BOOYENS: You mention in paragraph 22 about your continued discussion with Brigadier Gilbert, that you have mentioned that these members knew about your operations and should it be disclosed that these people were double agents or moles, it would have had a negative influence on the black members in the Security Branch. They would realise immediately that their identity and profiles would be made available to the enemy. Mr Nieuwoudt, an Intelligence network, such as the Security Police had, there is a problem people are murdered, everybody knew about that because they were part of the Security Police and then it would have been difficult to recruit other sources? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: You struggle to find policeman who would work as agents. MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct. ADV BOOYENS: Should such a mole been able to provide the information and the opposition forces use this information, that means this whole intelligence network could deteriorate, fall apart? Could the Security Police function without an intelligence network? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, we can't. It was our ears and our eyes. It was theoretically possible to deploy a network, but that would have taken a long time. ADV BOOYENS: could you in 1989, as far as you knew at that stage, could you afford something like this? something negative like this to happen? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, we couldn't. ADV BOOYENS: You also mention in paragraph 23 an aspect which you have already mentioned, namely that the profiles of the Security Police could put their lives in danger? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: You then gave Gilbert this information and he told you to do further investigations? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV BOOYENS: He also told you that you should perhaps try to talk to them and find out if you could extract any information from them. MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: That is paragraph 24. What happened about that? MR NIEUWOUDT: I tried, but nothing came of it. ADV BOOYENS: Did they act? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV BOOYENS: This discussion that we are talking about, what it meant was that you confronted him directly and told them that they were spies? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, no, it was far more subtle than that. ADV BOOYENS: Paragraph 25, you refer to the fact that you got information via an informer in Lesotho? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV BOOYENS: And that the information was to the effect that your safe facilities had already been exposed? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: And that a specific operation regarding a Swaziland operation had been exposed and you came to the conclusion that that was the agent, the agent had been intercepted? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV BOOYENS: Your information also indicated that this specific Swaziland source had been detained in Quatro and that Chris Hani had interrogated him? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: You then activated your sources further and monitored their activities in an ongoing basis? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV BOOYENS: Eventually you obtained the information which is spelt out in paragraph 26? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV BOOYENS: Namely that Mgoduka and Charles Jack had been recruited by Godji Skenyana? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: He operated in Lesotho? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: And it then later became clear that both Faku and Sehati and later Mapipa as well, had been sub-sources for Godji. That Mgoduka was the principal agent and the others had given him information. MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct. ADV BOOYENS: What was the degree of reliability of this Lesotho source? You had certain methods to test sources? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: It was usually compared to information from other sources to see how reliable it was? MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct. ADV BOOYENS: In other words, if the agent says there was to be a bomb at a certain place, and if the bomb exploded, that would act as corroboration. MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV BOOYENS: Now the source in Lesotho who gave this information, had he been used by you for quite some time? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. CHAIRPERSON: Mr Booyens, when you come to a convenient point, you should tell us, because we should adjourn quarter to. ADV BOOYENS: Certainly Mr Chairman, if I can just finish this aspect of the source then that would be a convenient stage. The information which he had given you in the past, was that reliable? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV BOOYENS: So you get the information from the source and independently of that, you had already monitored conversations, intercepted letters etc, and you knew that some of your people had physically disappeared and these four people were the only ones who had known about this? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV BOOYENS: You also knew that there was a safety and security leak in the Security Branch? MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct. ADV BOOYENS: So these objective facts, did that corroborate the information that there were moles in the Security Branch? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV BOOYENS: We will continue with paragraph 27 after the adjournment. Mr Chairman, subject to your, what you say, this may be a convenient stage. CHAIRPERSON: Yes, we will adjourn and resume at eleven o'clock. COMMISSION ADJOURNS ON RESUMPTION CHAIRPERSON: We are continuing with the evidence of Mr Nieuwoudt and Adv Booyens was busy leading him. You can continue Mr Booyens. GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: (s.u.o.) EXAMINATION BY ADV BOOYENS: (cont) Thank you Mr Chairman. We go to paragraph 27 on page 331. The information which you got that Godji had in early December, contacted him about the identification of a police vehicle from that well placed informer, the same one which gave you the previous information? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV BOOYENS: And in the same period, there was a correspondence from Police head quarters which you received that there was revolutionary planning for the 16th of December which was also known as Heroes Day and it also fit in with the information that acts of terror were planned for that day? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV BOOYENS: You have attached the coded message as per Annexure 19. MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct. ADV BOOYENS: The planing of a bomb underneath a Security vehicle, it could be argued that you knew that there would be such a bomb and that you could have prevented it? Would there be a hundred percent chance to stop the bomb planter? MR NIEUWOUDT: No. ADV BOOYENS: You then realised that security measures should be beefed up before that date? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is correct. ADV BOOYENS: It will be suggested to you that the information had already all come out, in other words the horse had already been bolted, why now close the stable door and for that reason it wasn't necessary to take the drastic actions which ultimately was taken. What is your comment on that? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I don't think that they were in possession of all the information. I believe that they would have to be debriefed for a considerable period and I can give you an example. When the people apply for asylum in Lesotho, photographs are taken of these people so there would have to be a photograph identification and that would take time. They would have to write an autobiography of themselves, and that would have to be checked first. So according to me, I don't think they already had all the information at their disposal. ADV BOOYENS: One of the methods which you used on this side and we have already referred to it, was to have a photo identification for people whom you had arrested or turned to find out which people they actually knew? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: Would it be possible for this to happen on the other side, on the ANC side if these people had gone over to the ANC, for them to have an photo identification to identify further sources which they had perhaps seen as Security head offices? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV BOOYENS: According to paragraph 28 you discussed the matter with Brigadier Gilbert? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: He knew that your intelligence network was becoming less effective? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV BOOYENS: And you were already aware of the fact that there was a large number or a large amount of sensitive information in the ANC's intelligence network's hands? MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct. ADV BOOYENS: In paragraph 29, you mention that the ANC could not make use of this information to such a great extent. It is not clear, could you perhaps explain what you mean here? MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairman, the ANC could not use some of this information. Apparently they had not received all the information and they wanted to ensure they could not act immediately, to also protect their own sources. ADV BOOYENS: In other words, if the ANC acted too sharply, then the inference would be that they had sources inside? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is right. ADV BOOYENS: You refer to the situation of the possible transfer that could exert pressure on Security people because it cold become known that there were moles? MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct. MR NIEUWOUDT: In paragraph 31, you refer to the fact that you and Mr Gilbert discussed the matter and it was clear that drastic measures were needed since the intelligence unit could not be utilised to maximum efficiency in the struggle at that time? The efficiency was decreasing? MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct. ADV BOOYENS: After all these facts had been placed before him, Brigadier Gilbert told you that you should eliminate the people? MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct. ADV BOOYENS: You mentioned that the second sentence should read he according proposed that this operation be managed in such a way that the blame for the elimination could be placed on the ANC's shoulders? MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct. ADV BOOYENS: Because as it reads at the moment, it sounds as if it was your suggestion, but it was actually his suggestion? MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct. ADV BOOYENS: The decision to eliminate the people ... (intervention) CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, which sentence are you referring to? ADV BOOYENS: Sorry Mr Chairman, paragraph 32 should read he accordingly suggested to me, not I suggested to him. The roles are just reversed. ADV DE JAGER: Could he perhaps explain to us how this fault happened, how this occurred that this sentence appears in the documents, it has a completely different interpretation and if you want to retract it, you must realise it has been done under oath. ADV BOOYENS: Yes, I am aware of that. I am not sure how the mistake happened, but it had to have happened during the drafting of these documents. I noticed the mistake when I went through the documents during consultation with my client and during consultation he told me that the suggestion that the operation should take place in this place, had come from Gilbert and not from his side. Unfortunately I cannot answer as to how the mistake crept in. In a document as weighty as this, I am sure mistakes occur. CHAIRPERSON: The mistake does not lie in the misprint, but in the version itself. ADV BOOYENS: Yes, Mr Chairman. On page 334, paragraph 33 you mention that the fact that the decision was made to eliminate the people, wasn't taken lightly. Were you convinced that in the circumstances there were no other way than to eliminate these double agents or moles? MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct. ADV BOOYENS: You were given an order by Brigadier Gilbert that it should be done? MR NIEUWOUDT: I received a direct order from Brigadier Gilbert. ADV BOOYENS: On page 334, paragraph 34, you refer to the fact that as a result of this, Brigadier Gilbert told you that you should commence provisional planning? MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct. ADV BOOYENS: You already realised at that stage that you couldn't use local personnel to actually carry out the elimination and that you would have to get help from outside? MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct. ADV BOOYENS: Approximately two days after the order had been given, Brigadier Gilbert met you? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: And he arranged for you to fly to Pretoria? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is correct. ADV BOOYENS: Did he also give the order that the authorization should be obtained for the plane ticket? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: Could you arrange for the authorization yourself or did it have to be done through the Commanding Officer? MR NIEUWOUDT: The latter, it had to be done by the Commanding Officer himself and he had to get authorization from head office to give that authorization. ADV BOOYENS: In so far as it is relevant, the requisition order is available on which it appears that General Van der Merwe gave authorization for the plane ticket, is that correct? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: We've only got one copy available Mr Chairman, perhaps I could just hand that to the Commission of the requisition. It is part of a court record. Your secretary could perhaps just make copies for us and I will hand it in. Brigadier Gilbert told you to go to Pretoria? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: And the Brigadier Van Rensburg, the first witness that you should come into contact with him? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: That would happen the next day? Brigadier Gilbert also told you that there were allegations that two of these people Mgoduka and Sehati were involved in certain fraud allegations, is that correct? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: These allegations of fraud, did it have anything to do with the decision to eliminate them? MR NIEUWOUDT: No. ADV BOOYENS: Do you confirm what is said in paragraph 35? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: The afternoon of the 12th of December you flew to Pretoria? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: Let me put it in this way, Mr Van Rensburg says that you arrived at his house at six o'clock that morning. Why was it done at such a strange time? MR NIEUWOUDT: I received instructions from Brigadier Gilbert that I had to make contact with him early the morning at his house. ADV BOOYENS: You did not know what the reason for that arrangement was? MR NIEUWOUDT: No. ADV BOOYENS: You then arranged through a police contact and the morning of the 13th of December you went to Brigadier Van Rensburg's house? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: You knew Mr Van Rensburg since his days in Port Elizabeth? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV BOOYENS: And at that time he was the Commanding Officer of C10? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: Under which Vlakplaas resorted? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: And in this discussion between you and Gilbert it was mentioned that you should get assistance from outside and mentioned Vlakplaas in this regard? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: While you were at Brigadier Van Rensburg's house, Mr De Kock arrived there? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: Did you arrive there before Mr De Kock or did he arrive afterwards, or did you come there together? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I arrived before Mr De Kock at General Van Rensburg's house. ADV BOOYENS: And did he tell you what Gilbert had told him? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, he did. ADV BOOYENS: And did you provide him with further particulars? MR NIEUWOUDT: I did. ADV BOOYENS: Did you give him a more complete picture of the conclusions you have arrived at? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, I did. ADV BOOYENS: And it was suggested that he could possibly investigate it himself. At that stage he wasn't stationed here any more, is that correct? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: And the investigation was an investigation which had to be done locally? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: At a certain stage, did you tell Brigadier Van Rensburg after he had asked you who were the people who were involved? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: And did you provide the names of the people to him? MR NIEUWOUDT: I did. ADV BOOYENS: The names of all four people? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV BOOYENS: And did he know some of them as he has given evidence? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, he knew some of them. ADV BOOYENS: After Mr De Kock had arrived there, was he also told the reason of this operation? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, we did that. ADV BOOYENS: Could it have been that only the fraud was mentioned or as it concerns you, a whole picture was given? MR NIEUWOUDT: As I can remember we mentioned the fraud. I don't know whether it was at an earlier stage before Mr De Kock arrived or whether I mentioned it to General Van Rensburg or while Mr De Kock was present. But what I can remember is General Van Rensburg told us that he was in a hurry because he had to go to a meeting. I can't remember exactly in detail what was said. What I have referred to already is that three of these people were involved in Goniwe and I mentioned their names regarding that matter. ADV BOOYENS: And the fact that they were double agents? MR NIEUWOUDT: And the fact that they were double agents, yes. ADV BOOYENS: Did Brigadier Van Rensburg as he has testified, did he give instructions to Mr De Kock to assist you in this regard? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, he did. ADV BOOYENS: Did you and Mr De Kock then leave Van Rensburg's house? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, I accompanied Mr De Kock to his house. ADV BOOYENS: Did you walk or did you go by car? MR NIEUWOUDT: We walked, because the distance from Van Rensburg's house to De Kock's house was a short distance. It is about 50 metres. ADV BOOYENS: Did you have transport? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I did not. ADV BOOYENS: Did you go with Mr De Kock in his vehicle? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: Did you go to the technical support system where you met Waal du Toit? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: And then a discussion took place regarding the detail of this operation? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: In other words that was just a technical discussion of how this should be executed? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: Afterwards you and Colonel De Kock left for Vlakplaas? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: And there, like you mentioned in paragraph 39, he said to Vermeulen, Snyman and Ras, he gave instructions to them to accompany you to Port Elizabeth? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: You left on the same day? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: And that evening late you arrived at Port Elizabeth and you provided accommodation for them for the night? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: Did you know Mr De Kock beforehand? MR NIEUWOUDT: No. ADV BOOYENS: That is, did you know him personally? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, that was the first meeting I had with Mr De Kock. ADV BOOYENS: You confirmed in paragraph 14 that this Jetta vehicle which was blown up, that you fetched it from Louis le Grange square and made it possible for the bomb to be planted? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: The bomb was a remote controlled bomb? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: And you mention here what happened afterwards, further events regarding time and place were discussed? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: You also had gathered intelligence that a certain terrorist Mandla Makhubela, that he was in 124 Hinza Street in Motherwell? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: And this information, was this used to instruct these four people who had to be eliminated, to go and do surveillance? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: You informed Colonel Roelofse regarding this person in Hinza Street, is that correct? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: Colonel Roelofse was not informed regarding the exact purpose of this operation? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: Then you went to New Brighton police station and you had discussions with these members. A photograph of this supposed terrorist was shown to them? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: Mgoduka was not present. You made arrangements to go and fetch him from his house? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: And from there telephone calls were made with his Divisional Commander and you told his Divisional Commander that he must come to work? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: You decided that they would not use the usual vehicle because it was part of observation. MR NIEUWOUDT: Faku recommended this. ADV BOOYENS: And you told the applicant Mr Lotz that he had to bring the Volkswagen Jetta to a certain point. MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: You say that this vehicle had a SAP registration. That wasn't on the number plate, it was a false number plate? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: Page 339, paragraph 46. Did you arrange that these four members, I am sorry, we are still busy with Mr Lotz. Did Mr Lotz have any previous knowledge of this operation? MR NIEUWOUDT: No. ADV BOOYENS: After he had left the vehicle there, the bomb had to be put there? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: Was that after he had left? MR NIEUWOUDT: If I remember correctly, Mr Snyman and I had a discussion with Mr Lotz and at that stage, Martiens Ras activated the bomb. ADV BOOYENS: The four deceased arrived there at the Motherwell crossing? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: They got into the vehicle, is that correct? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: They got into the Jetta? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: That is paragraph 48. It was round about 23h50? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: After they had driven for about 100 metres, they activated the sender and an explosion took place? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: You also mention on page 341 that you investigated the scene and you found a VZD3M detonator there? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: Was this from the Eastern Block? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV BOOYENS: In other words this was used by infiltrators? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: Messrs Snyman and Ras did not have any knowledge of that? You did that on your own? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: Just by the way, you detonated the bomb? You pushed the button? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: Did you have a problem doing that? MR NIEUWOUDT: I was hesitant to do that? ADV BOOYENS: Why? MR NIEUWOUDT: Because those were my colleagues. ADV BOOYENS: Did you that same evening contact Colonel Gilbert? At a certain stage Mgoduka was not present and at that stage did you make contact with Brigadier Gilbert again? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: Initially it seemed that only three of these victims would have been there? What did you discuss with him? MR NIEUWOUDT: I told him that because Mgoduka was not there, he was not working, I suggested that we should postpone this operation and he pertinently instructed me that I have to go and fetch Mgoduka from his house and that he had to accompany them as well. ADV BOOYENS: After this explosion, did you mention it on the radio that there had been this explosion? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: Mr Lotz came back to the scene? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: And he realised that the motor vehicle that he had driven a little while ago, had been blown up? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: What did you tell him? MR NIEUWOUDT: He was shocked and I told him that this was an authorised operation for which head quarters had given permission and he should not worry about this any more and he should keep quiet. ADV BOOYENS: The statement that you make that head quarters gave permission. Was that based on what Gilbert had told you? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: So Gilbert, before you went to Pretoria, he told you that he had cleared this whole matter? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: You made false statements in which you blamed the ANC for this explosion? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: And this became part of the inquest? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: Justice took its course and then eventually you, Mr Du Toit and Mr Ras were convicted for these murders? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: You have already described your broad political view points, but let us come back to the purpose, specifically the political purpose you wished to obtain with this specific case. As you have understood it, what was the function of the Security Branch, in other words what was the basis of the Security Branch? MR NIEUWOUDT: That was the protection of the government of the day. ADV BOOYENS: And to execute this task, the Security Branch had to gather intelligence for this purpose? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: The fact that this intelligence network was negatively influenced, would this effect the ability to protect the government of the day? MR NIEUWOUDT: It would, yes. ADV BOOYENS: And would it in the end make impossible the purpose to protect the government of the day? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV BOOYENS: And you regarded it as your task and as your duty to prevent something like that, in other words the overthrowing of the government? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, I did. ADV BOOYENS: Did you support the government of the day? MR NIEUWOUDT: I did. ADV BOOYENS: And did you believe that it was necessary that you should act in such a way under these circumstances? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: Why kill these people, why not less drastic measures? MR NIEUWOUDT: It was for the protection of the intelligence network. For the protection of the government of the day, that it should not be overthrown by violence. ADV BOOYENS: Would detention by virtue of security regulations Section 29, of the Internal Security Act, why according to you would it not have worked? MR NIEUWOUDT: I feel that they would still have been able to have contact with other police officers wherever they were detained and after a while, after an indictment had been served they had access to their legal counsel. ADV BOOYENS: And to visitors? MR NIEUWOUDT: And to visitors. ADV BOOYENS: Section 29 detention could not be done all the time? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: You could not have kept them there for an unlimited time? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: Were there cases known to you where intelligence was smuggled from Section 29 detainees? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so. ADV BOOYENS: So that could not have worked? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: Should there have been sufficient evidence to accuse them successfully and send them to jail, would that not have been sufficient because they still would have been able to provide the intelligence? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: We have already referred to the question of transfer, that would not have worked either? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: You also refer in more detail to the political purpose you wish to achieve on page 48, paragraph 10 (a). MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: Do you confirm that that is correct? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is correct. ADV BOOYENS: And paragraph 10 (b), I think you have already referred to that, do you confirm that? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: Paragraph 11 (b), just one sentence. And an instruction from Security head office which was now known to me, you don't know on which Gilbert's assumption that it was cleared by head office was based? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV BOOYENS: You did not ask? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I did not ask. ADV BOOYENS: If the Commission would just bear with me Mr Chairman. That concludes the evidence Mr Chairman, thank you. NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY ADV BOOYENS. CHAIRPERSON: Mr Hugo? CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HUGO: I am Hugo on behalf of the first applicant. Mr Nieuwoudt, just a few aspects. CHAIRPERSON: The first applicant by the way we do it for the purpose of, who is the first applicant, Mr De Kock? MR HUGO: Mr De Kock, Mr Chairman. That afternoon of the 12th of December, did you arrive there in Pretoria? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I arrived there that evening. MR HUGO: Where did you stay that night? MR NIEUWOUDT: I stayed in a safe premises in Midrand between Johannesburg and Pretoria. MR HUGO: What arrangements were made for your transport from the airport to this safe premises? MR NIEUWOUDT: A person, a certain Sergeant, I can't remember his surname, he lived on these premises, he was a guard there and he fetched me from the airport that evening. And from there we went to the safe premises. MR HUGO: And I assume that he took you to Nongwe Park the next morning? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. MR HUGO: Having arrived there, did you go directly to Van Rensburg's house? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. MR HUGO: How long did this discussion between you and Van Rensburg last before De Kock arrived on the scene? MR NIEUWOUDT: Oh, it was not long. If I could take a guess about four to five minutes. If I can take a guess, I can't remember exactly. MR HUGO: During this time, did you have enough time to discuss the main points of the motivation as discussed by Van Rensburg, to discuss all these things? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. MR HUGO: During this time before Mr De Kock arrived on the scene, did you touch on this aspect of fraud? MR NIEUWOUDT: It could have been possible, as I have already said, I can't remember in which context whether it was before Mr De Kock had come there or while he was there, I can't remember specifically when that was mentioned. MR HUGO: But you did mention this fraud aspect to Van Rensburg? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. MR HUGO: And I believe that Gilbert would have mentioned it to him as well? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, I think so. MR HUGO: And then according to your version, Mr De Kock came there four or five minutes later. Did you repeat the motivation which you have mentioned to Van Rensburg earlier? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. MR HUGO: And to the best of your recollection Mr De Kock was also explained this matter of the fraud? MR NIEUWOUDT: According to what I can remember, I told him that the fraud had complicated this matter even further. MR HUGO: The aspect or the fact that the Goniwe matter was also related to this, was that also explained to De Kock? MR NIEUWOUDT: The Goniwe matter was mentioned pertinently and the three people who were involved in that, I mentioned those people. MR HUGO: I put it to you that Mr De Kock is going to say that when this discussion took place at Van Rensburg's home, only the fraud aspect was mentioned. Do you want to react to that? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, it was not like that. Mr De Kock is perhaps making a mistake. MR HUGO: Mr De Kock is further going to state that the Goniwe matter was for the first time brought under his attention when he returned to Van Rensburg and told him that he had a problem to receive instructions to kill other colleagues only on the basis of fraud? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, it could not have been like that. What I can distinctly remember is that General Van Rensburg was in a great hurry because he had to attend a meeting, or give a lecture at a meeting and this is why I draw the inference that Gilbert said I had to meet Van Rensburg at his house. That was the only reason I could think of and in any case, I did not have transport so I can't understand that Mr De Kock could say that. ADV DE JAGER: Could it not have been that he could have gone back to Van Rensburg the next day? MR NIEUWOUDT: That could have been, yes. ADV DE JAGER: Or even later that afternoon? MR NIEUWOUDT: That could be possible. MR HUGO: Are you sure that during this discussion where Mr De Kock was present, that four people were mentioned who had to be eliminated? MR NIEUWOUDT: I am dead sure of that. MR HUGO: I am putting it to you that Mr De Kock is going to say that during this discussion only two people of the Security Branch was mentioned to him. Two people who had to be eliminated and then also a third person, and as Mr De Kock says in his submission a previous ANC member who was working for them. MR NIEUWOUDT: No. I mentioned four people. MR HUGO: Did you during this discussion at Van Rensburg's house, mention the fact that cheques meant for trade union organisations were intercepted and these cheques were changed and then the people who had to be eliminated, used it for their own gain? MR NIEUWOUDT: I have no knowledge of this fraud aspect. All I know is that when I had left, Brigadier Gilbert told me that some of the members were also involved in fraud. He did not provide any detail at all. I did not have any knowledge of that. They were not working with me and I don't think it was necessary for Gilbert to mention it to me. MR HUGO: I am putting it to you that Mr De Kock is going to say that he obtained this information from you and that was the reason provided to him, why these people should be eliminated? MR NIEUWOUDT: I deny that. MR HUGO: Mr De Kock is also going to say that you said that pressure was exerted on you to accuse these members and that the result would be that these people should they be accused of this fraud, that these offences would be made public to the police? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I deny this. I don't believe that Brigadier Gilbert would have been able to protect them not to be charged for fraud. MR HUGO: I just want to ask you one more question. Can you remember whether Van Rensburg during this discussion you had with him, at one or other stage, left the room to go and make some coffee? MR NIEUWOUDT: It could have been like that. He might have left the room, he was in a great hurry, so I can't remember whether that had happened. MR HUGO: Mr Nieuwoudt, I am putting it to you that Mr De Kock will say that he can't remember that Mr Van Rensburg, and he is sure about it, that Mr Van Rensburg did not leave the room at any specific time. MR NIEUWOUDT: I am not dead sure, but it could be that he did leave the room at a certain stage, because he was in a great hurry. MR HUGO: How long did this discussion between you, Van Rensburg and De Kock last? MR NIEUWOUDT: If I have to make an estimate, I did not watch my watch, I think about 20 minutes, 20 minutes to half an hour? MR HUGO: So according to you, this discussion was completed round about half past six that morning? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. MR HUGO: And according to you, you accompanied Mr De Kock directly from there to the technical division. At what stage did the members, let me rather rephrase, at what time did the members there start working? MR NIEUWOUDT: Their working hours started quarter past seven, half past seven, that was normal practice. MR HUGO: The offices, were they opened when you arrived there? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, when we arrived there I met Mr Du Toit for the first time. MR HUGO: But my question is office hours start at quarter past seven, half past seven, your discussion lasted half an hour and you said you left immediately for the technical division. I want to know where these offices already open and were they open, why so early? MR NIEUWOUDT: They were there. ADV DE JAGER: Do you know how far this technical division is from Van Rensburg's house? MR NIEUWOUDT: It is far. It is near the police college, it is on the northern side of Pretoria and General Van Rensburg lived on the southern side of Pretoria, near the University. MR HUGO: I want to put it to you that Mr De Kock is going to say that his recollection is that he used his own transport to go to police head quarters and there he contacted Van Rensburg again and there he made arrangements with the technical division? MR NIEUWOUDT: No. MR HUGO: Mr Chairman, just give me one moment please. ADV DE JAGER: Mr Hugo, could you perhaps give us an indication how far is the house and the technical department, how far are they apart? MR HUGO: Mr Chairman, if you can give me a minute just to get instructions on this point. Mr Nieuwoudt, I put it to you that Mr De Kock will say that at that time in the morning, bearing in mind the traffic at that stage, it would take about ten to twelve minutes to go from General Van Rensburg's premises to the technical division? Can you comment on that? MR NIEUWOUDT: I can't deny that, but all that I know is that Mr De Kock went round to his house, if I remember correctly, he collected his moonbag, greeted his wife and it was then that I met his wife for the first time and from there we departed. Because how would I have gotten there, I didn't have transport at my disposal and I didn't personally know Mr Waal du Toit at that stage. MR HUGO: I have no further questions. NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HUGO. CHAIRPERSON: Mr Lamey? CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: Thank you Mr Chairman. I represent Mr Lionel Snyman and I have a few questions to ask to Mr Nieuwoudt. Mr Nieuwoudt, did you and Colonel De Kock leave the technical division together on your way to Vlakplaas? MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct. MR LAMEY: Is it correct that Mr Vermeulen, Martiens Ras had been summoned to Colonel De Kock's office? MR NIEUWOUDT: Please repeat the question, I didn't hear it properly. MR LAMEY: Is it correct that after you and Colonel De Kock arrived at Vlakplaas, that Mr Vermeulen and Ras and Snyman had been summoned to Colonel De Kock's office? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. MR LAMEY: Were you there introduced to these three people, Snyman, Vermeulen and Ras? MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct. MR LAMEY: Is it possible that during this discussion, mention was made by yourself of by De Kock that you had come from head office? MR NIEUWOUDT: I can't remember that specifically. MR LAMEY: What was the communication made to Ras, Snyman and Vermeulen when they were summoned to the office, what was said to them? Was an explanation about the nature of the operation given? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, not there. MR LAMEY: Was that done at a later stage? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, it was done later. MR LAMEY: Where did that take place? MR NIEUWOUDT: That could have been during our journey from Port Elizabeth. MR LAMEY: Was it discussed in more detail then? MR NIEUWOUDT: Not in depth, no details were given. MR LAMEY: Mr Snyman's evidence and his affidavit says that Colonel De Kock mentioned that Deon, that is yourself, would later tell everything, is that correct? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct, yes. MR LAMEY: Was mention made of trouble caused by a member or an askari during this discussion at Vlakplaas with Vermeulen and Ras? MR NIEUWOUDT: Not as far as I can recall. MR LAMEY: What can you remember relating to the operation, the nature of the operation and the motive? MR NIEUWOUDT: There wasn't much discussion at Vlakplaas. I was introduced to the members and I stood outside and I waited. I waited to leave. MR LAMEY: Are you saying there wasn't very much time for discussions at Vlakplaas? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, we didn't spend much time there. MR LAMEY: Mr Snyman's recollection is that there was recollection of an askari who had been causing trouble and that something had to be done about it and that mention was made of money that had been stolen and that he was a threat, a risk to the other Security Branch members and that he had to go back to the ANC, can you recall anything like that being discussed at Vlakplaas? MR NIEUWOUDT: Not at Vlakplaas. As I have said, it could have taken place whilst we were driving. And perhaps I then told them, not in detail, the purpose. MR LAMEY: Are you saying that you later mentioned the motivation for this operation, later when you left Vlakplaas? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. It could have been mentioned by Mr De Kock but I didn't hear that. MR LAMEY: What exactly was told to these people on the way to Port Elizabeth, relating to the motive for the operation? MR NIEUWOUDT: I think I told them that they were playing a double role, and as a result thereof they had put out feelers to go over to the ANC and that on the 16th of December, there was the plan to place a landmine in one of the vehicles and that they were also involved in sensitive operations, some of the members. And that they had also committed fraud, that is all, because I had no details about the fraud. MR LAMEY: Snyman's recollection is also that he had already at Vlakplaas gained the impression that it was to be an organised operation since members of the technical division were involved. Do you know whether that was mentioned then? MR NIEUWOUDT: It could have been mentioned by Mr De Kock, I didn't mention it, but that is so. MR LAMEY: Snyman says that he also thought and that his recollection was that you at some point mentioned that you had flown to Pretoria to discuss the situation in Port Elizabeth with the General and he will testify that that was General Van Rensburg? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is correct. MR LAMEY: In Port Elizabeth, Mr Du Toit and members of the technical division were mainly involved in the installation of the explosive device in the vehicle, is that correct? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is correct. MR LAMEY: But that Mr Snyman and Vermeulen and Ras, their task was mainly guard duty or to secure the surrounding area? MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct. MR LAMEY: Snyman also says that he from time to time helped with the explosives, can you remember that? MR NIEUWOUDT: No. MR LAMEY: And then is it also correct that on the scene where the explosion eventually happened, that Snyman and Ras' role was to stand near the crossing and that they had been tasked in case something went wrong with the explosion, to shoot the persons? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. MR LAMEY: Were these details discussed beforehand in Port Elizabeth? MR NIEUWOUDT: No. MR LAMEY: How would Snyman and Ras have known that that was to be their role? MR NIEUWOUDT: I think that their Commanding Officer would have informed them. MR LAMEY: Weren't they taken to the meeting place beforehand to see where it was? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, I took them there. MR LAMEY: Thank you Chairperson, I have no further questions. NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR LAMEY. CHAIRPERSON: What was the purpose of taking them there? MR NIEUWOUDT: Because they didn't know the area and we were only supposed to meet there that evening and I therefore arranged to see the deceased at New Brighton and they were to meet at a certain time there. CHAIRPERSON: Didn't they ask you what are we going to do there, to the place where you are taking us to now? MR NIEUWOUDT: I believe that they knew what their task was to be, that they had known that in Pretoria already because their Commanding Officer would have told them that if the bomb did not explode, they had to take further action by shooting the people. They didn't ask me, they were only supposed to fulfil an auxiliary role. CHAIRPERSON: Did you point out specific points where they would have to post themselves? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, that they observed for themselves. ADV POTGIETER: What did you mean when you told them that the people to be eliminated, had put out feelers to the ANC? MR NIEUWOUDT: What I meant was that they had already made contact with the ANC. ADV POTGIETER: In what way? MR NIEUWOUDT: In the sense that they had been recruited by a member of MK. ADV POTGIETER: Why didn't you tell them? Why didn't you tell them that the people had been recruited? MR NIEUWOUDT: As I said, I didn't go into any detail. All I said was that they had defected, they had put out feelers to the ANC and that they were planning to plant a bomb on the 16th, which was the commemoration to show solidarity and that they were playing the role of double agents. And I assumed that they knew what I was referring to. ADV POTGIETER: No, what I am interested in is what you said the feelers that they put out. You are alleging as a fact in your evidence that these people had been recruited and you referred to the Commanding Officer who had recruited them, allegedly, Mgoduka, who had recruited Mgoduka in any event, but you told these people that these people had put out feelers towards the ANC. That is something different, if you put out feelers, it is as if you are still testing the waters, you are trying to make contact and to establish whether you can cooperate with them, isn't that so? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV POTGIETER: But if you had been recruited, then you are already a part of their structure? MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct. ADV POTGIETER: So what was the situation? MR NIEUWOUDT: That they had been recruited. ADV POTGIETER: They had been recruited? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct, yes. ADV POTGIETER: Ras, Snyman and Vermeulen, did you want to mislead them? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, that wasn't the intention at all. ADV POTGIETER: Did you just express yourself incorrectly? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is possible, yes. CHAIRPERSON: Is that how you expressed yourself to General Van Rensburg as well, because - I am asking this because at the end of General Van Rensburg, it was unclear to me as it had been from your evidence until my colleague to my left asked you, it had not been clear to me whether in fact these people had already been recruited or were in the process of being recruited by the ANC. How did you express yourself to General Van Rensburg? MR NIEUWOUDT: If I recall correctly, I told General Van Rensburg that the people had been recruited for the ANC and that they were planning a certain action for the 16th and I further told him that these people, these three, were involved in a sensitive operation relating to Goniwe. That information I got from General Gilbert. And I mentioned the names of all four people. ADV POTGIETER: You see, the annexure to which you refer on page 327 of the record, paragraph 19 of your application, you refer to the document of the inquest proceedings in the case of M. Goniwe and three others and that record appears on page 498 of our documents. It is apparently one of the Advocates representing the parties, Mr Mostert, at the bottom of page 399, he refers to Jack. He says Jack was what was called an askari. And then he explains, in other words he was a trained ANC activist who at that stage was working for the police. And he then says but at that stage he had put out feelers to return to the ANC fold. Then the court asks him, you say he had put out feelers and then he then says, Mr Mostert then says, he put out feelers to return to the ANC fold. My Lord, as far as Mgoduka is concerned, our information is that in respect of Mgoduka too, his loyalty was being questioned. So it is in the same context in which reference is made to this inquest. Reference is there also made to the approach to the ANC, putting out feelers as such. Now, this extract, could that be corroboration for your allegation that these people had contact with the ANC? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV POTGIETER: But once again to put out feelers, reference is made to putting out of feelers? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV POTGIETER: Was this submission to which you referred us in the Goniwe inquest, was that also wrong? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so, yes. ADV POTGIETER: Why do you then refer us to that in your application? MR NIEUWOUDT: Because I testified there and it was put to me. ADV POTGIETER: But why do you refer us to an extract which says that Mr Jack, the askari, had put out feelers to the ANC and that Mr Mgoduka's loyalty was being questioned? MR NIEUWOUDT: I annexed that as corroboration of the facts already sketched. ADV POTGIETER: But that cannot be corroboration of what you allege. You are saying that the people were recruited? MR NIEUWOUDT: But it could have been beforehand, before they were actually recruited in the follow up. ADV POTGIETER: But in your application at page 327, why didn't you say I refer you to the record, but that record is wrong, it wasn't a question of putting out feelers, the people were actually recruited? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, but that was only at a later stage. ADV POTGIETER: That what happened? MR NIEUWOUDT: When they were recruited. They went through a whole process. They also had to be screened first before they were accepted. ADV POTGIETER: Thank you. ADV DE JAGER: On the 13th, what time did you leave Pretoria? MR NIEUWOUDT: If I remember correctly, it was approximately eleven o'clock, twelve o'clock. ADV DE JAGER: And what time did you arrive at Port Elizabeth? MR NIEUWOUDT: I think it was about 10, 12 hours' journey, so it would have been round about eight o'clock in the evening. CHAIRPERSON: Mr Lamey, can I just for clarity, when you put questions to the witness, you put it to him that Mr Snyman will say quite a few things and one of the things that you said he would say was that an askari was mentioned and that he caused trouble etc, etc. What is not clear to me is this askari, when you said an askari was mentioned at Vlakplaas and that he caused trouble, was the askari who caused trouble in Vlakplaas or is it the askari that we talked about in PE? MR LAMEY: No, Mr Chairman, it is referring to an askari in Port Elizabeth. CHAIRPERSON: Oh, I see, thank you. FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: Mr Chairman, may I just proceed to ask one further question to the applicant? Mr Nieuwoudt, on the basis of the information and statements made, and I refer specifically to Mr Snyman, would you agree that Mr Snyman had every reason to believe that based on your communications that this operation in which they were going to assist and play a supportive role, that this operation had to be carried out in the national interest? MR NIEUWOUDT: Most definitely. MR LAMEY: Thank you Mr Chairman, I have got no further questions. NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR LAMEY. ADV DE JAGER: Could you just clarify one point for me. You said you took them out to the place during the afternoon and that they chose their own positions there? MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct. ADV DE JAGER: And the would then have to act if there was no successful explosion? MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct. ADV DE JAGER: So, they would have known where the explosion was to take place? MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct. ADV DE JAGER: Did you give them an indication that it would take place 100 paces from point A or what was the position? MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct. ADV DE JAGER: And did they take up position further on or where? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, where the exchange of vehicles took place. It was about 100 metres from that point, that was where the explosion was to take place. ADV DE JAGER: If you had pressed the button a couple of seconds too late, it would have been passed? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV DE JAGER: So they had to know exactly when you were to press the button to place themselves in the correct position from where they could still shoot? MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct. ADV DE JAGER: You say that they chose that positions for themselves. They must have been able to chose it from information which you had given them? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is why I took them to the scene, correct. CHAIRPERSON: You see, the one thing that I don't understand is how can you take people to a place they hadn't seen before, you take them so that they would know where they would put that evening and they should also determine the positions where they would have to be placed without you, the person who is taking them there to the place that they don't know, discussing with them the purpose of them being there. MR NIEUWOUDT: As I have already said, I took into account the fact that their Commanding Officer had told them what role to play and they were trained people and I took them to the scene and they made their own observations there and they knew in which direction the vehicle was to travel. CHAIRPERSON: But when you arrived at that place, what do you say to them? As far as they were concerned, that place could have been anywhere. You have gone passed a number of places and you come to a particular point and what do you say to them, you just keep quiet? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I said that that was where the exchange of vehicles was to take place. That is where they would switch the vehicles, in other words where the Jetta and the kombi were to be switched and the four deceased would then take up their positions in the Jetta. CHAIRPERSON: Now, that is what you told them? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. CHAIRPERSON: So that it should make sense? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. CHAIRPERSON: Yes, and then? MR NIEUWOUDT: And in the direction in which the Jetta was to travel. CHAIRPERSON: And that's it? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. And they were then able to observe the area and where they could take up their positions. ADV DE JAGER: But the most important thing for them to know, was where exactly the explosion was going to take place, 100 paces or 500 paces away. MR NIEUWOUDT: They knew that it was 100 paces, they were present. It is 100 meter. ADV DE JAGER: Did you tell them that it was going to be 100 meter? MR NIEUWOUDT: They were present when we were preparing the car. ADV DE JAGER: Yes, but the preparation of the car does not tell them exactly when the car would explode. They were present during the preparation, but did you discuss this type of detail, in other words take up position 200 paces further on and if the thing doesn't explode after 100 metres, then you must shoot? MR NIEUWOUDT: I didn't discuss it in such detail with them. But it could have been. CHAIRPERSON: Well, if you speak of so many metres from two points, what are the two points? It must be the point where they would have to place themselves and the point where the explosion is supposed to take place? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. CHAIRPERSON: That you must have told them, otherwise the whole thing wouldn't make sense. You must have told them that people are going to be blown up at this point. MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. CHAIRPERSON: Mr Jansen? CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ADV JANSEN: Thank you Mr Chairman. Jansen is the name on behalf of applicant Marthinus Ras. Mr Nieuwoudt you were in charge of this operation, is that correct? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV JANSEN: You would have been aware of the detail of the operation right down to the finest details? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV JANSEN: You involved head office in the operation because you didn't have the necessary technical and other facilities, is that correct? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. CHAIRPERSON: Why did you say that, Mr Nieuwoudt? I am surprised you agreed to that, unless I misunderstood the evidence? If you didn't have to make use of technical experts, would you have done, would you have proceeded with the operation without the head office? Would you still not have sought the approval of head office? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, as I understood it, Mr Gilbert made those arrangements with head office. CHAIRPERSON: Well, he is asking you, why did you involve head office? Maybe let me ask you that way? MR NIEUWOUDT: Pardon me? CHAIRPERSON: Why did you involve head office? MR NIEUWOUDT: Because we didn't have the necessary abilities to plant the bomb, it had to be done in a professional way. CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Mr Nieuwoudt, you informed Mr Gilbert because he was your senior and you expected Mr Gilbert to get an approval from head office? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. CHAIRPERSON: And whether or not you would have used whatever method or whatever, you would still have tried to make sure that you got the necessary approval, isn't it? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Mr Jansen? ADV JANSEN: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Nieuwoudt, you knew very well what support you required from head quarters, in other words what was it that they had which you did not have? MR NIEUWOUDT: It is like that, we did not have the necessary capacity, but the arrangements were made with Brigadier Gilbert with head quarters. ADV JANSEN: You have just mentioned in answer to a question from the Chairman, that you did not have the capacity to manufacture the bomb, to plant the bomb. At that stage you already knew that a bomb would be involved? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so, yes, because Gilbert had told me that we should create the impression that the ANC was responsible for that. ADV JANSEN: Yes, but that could mean a lot of things. It usually means that Makarov pistols had to be used? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is like that, yes. ADV JANSEN: At which do you say the method or the manner of elimination, at what stage was that discussed with you for the first time? MR NIEUWOUDT: It was when Gilbert gave me a direct instruction and he told me that we had to use a limpet mine to create the impression that the ANC was responsible. ADV JANSEN: The planning had already been done, and that was even before there was contact with head office on the 12th of December? MR NIEUWOUDT: I don't know whether he had already cleared this matter with head office. ADV JANSEN: I want to correct myself, I am not referring to contact with head office, but I am referring to contact with Van Rensburg. Those discussions had to take place before you left Port Elizabeth with Gilbert? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV JANSEN: In other words the details of what the operation would physically entail? MR NIEUWOUDT: All I can remember what Gilbert told me regarding the limpet mine, that it should appear as if the ANC was responsible. That was all, he did not discuss any detail. ADV JANSEN: At least he wanted a bomb to be used? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV JANSEN: And it could mean only one thing, the bomb had to be attached to a car? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV JANSEN: In other words a car had to be involved as well? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV JANSEN: And the person who had to be eliminated, you had to get them into the car in one or other way? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV JANSEN: That detail also had to be finalised before you came to Pretoria, or perhaps you had good ideas regarding this? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so, yes. ADV JANSEN: You see, it is clear that shortly after these discussions on the 13th, definite plans regarding a certain plan B had been made. Vlakplaas operatives Ras, Snyman and Vermeulen were given Makarov pistols or they took their own Makarov pistols, is that correct? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV JANSEN: You knew about that? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV JANSEN: So at that stage you wee aware what plan B entailed? MR NIEUWOUDT: I can't remember that it was explained to me, but what I know is that they had to support this operation should not bomb not explode. ADV JANSEN: What support would these three people be able to give at that stage? In other words the morning of the 13th, what did you think their role had to be? MR NIEUWOUDT: I can't remember regarding what they thought or what Mr De Kock thought by sending them with, but all I know is we have already cleared it out at the technical division. ADV JANSEN: All right, I want to tell you what Mr Ras says. Mr Ras says regarding that aspect in the first place, it was clear to him that the detail of the plan already had been finalised, because they were aware that the technical division would become involved. You won't have a problem with that statement? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, that is correct, that is how I accepted that. ADV JANSEN: Once again he says he can't remember where he was told this, but he did know that their support would entail firstly that they would put these explosive devices on the scene. Because all three of them completed the explosives course? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV JANSEN: And furthermore, they would be part of this plan B if the explosives device did not work, they had to eliminate these people by shooting them? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct, yes. ADV JANSEN: Would you then at least agree that all this detail had been finalised to a great extent before these three people were called in and told that they had to become involved? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV JANSEN: And they were not in a position to change the basic planning? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV JANSEN: The consideration of which operatives had to be chosen for a specific operation, depended on the type of planning? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV JANSEN: It was certainly also at a very early stage clear for these people, that this operation entailed the elimination of police officers? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV JANSEN: So this was an extraordinary situation? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV JANSEN: Mr Ras says in the first place that he can specifically remember that the morning of the 13th, he was with Brigadier Van Rensburg in his office together with Eugene de Kock, that was for a very short time, and he was then told that he had to go to Port Elizabeth for an operation. Do you wish to comment on that part of his evidence? MR NIEUWOUDT: I can't remember before we left to Port Elizabeth, that Mr De Kock had left Vlakplaas. ADV JANSEN: Mr Ras says it was the habit of the Commanding Officer of Vlakplaas and some of the other members, that had to do business at head quarters to go there early in the morning, round about seven o'clock and to go to head quarters at Wagtehuis. I suppose you don't really have knowledge about that, but I want to just put it to you because there is this difference in evidence? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, I don't have personal knowledge about that, but that specific morning I accompanied Mr De Kock to the technical division in Rebecca Street. I don't know that Mr De Kock and Martiens went to head quarters. ADV JANSEN: Furthermore Mr Ras states that he then, it appears from his application, that he then went to Vlakplaas. He made preparations and he met in De Kock's office? You would agree to that? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct, yes. ADV JANSEN: Can you remember which detail of the operation were given to the operatives at that stage? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I can't because Mr De Kock talked to them all alone. I was standing outside. ADV JANSEN: Mr De Kock surely knew how long they would remain in Port Elizabeth? MR NIEUWOUDT: I assumed he did know. ADV JANSEN: How did Mr De Kock know how long they would be in Port Elizabeth? MR NIEUWOUDT: I have no idea. ADV JANSEN: You see one of the most important things of this operation was that as few as possible people should know about this? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV JANSEN: You see Mr De Kock at that stage, was not the Commanding Officer of Vlakplaas, Mr Dave Baker was the acting Commander of Vlakplaas? MR NIEUWOUDT: I can't deny that, I don't know. ADV JANSEN: The point is Mr Nieuwoudt, even some of the senior colleagues were not told the detail of why these operatives were absent, in other words it is important to know how long these people would be absent, so should enquiries be made about where the people were, that these questions could be answered, is that correct? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV JANSEN: In other words you should have told De Kock at which stage, for when this operation was planned and when the operatives would be back? MR NIEUWOUDT: As far as I can remember, we were in Du Toit's office when we discussed the method and then he could have made the observation or drew the inference how long this would take. ADV DE JAGER: In Du Toit's office did you discuss that Du Toit and them had to go to PE that same afternoon? MR NIEUWOUDT: that is correct. ADV DE JAGER: And was it discussed there that it was planned for the night? MR NIEUWOUDT: It was planned for the following day. ADV DE JAGER: Yes. MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct, yes. ADV JANSEN: And you must have been relatively sure that the targets would be available for elimination the next day? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is like that. ADV JANSEN: You see, Mr Ras says that although he did not know all the detail, but his general impression of the whole operation was that it was very urgent. Was that a fair observation? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV JANSEN: Secondly that it was extraordinary circumstances because there was a security breach in the Eastern Cape? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV JANSEN: Mr Ras also says in the journey to Port Elizabeth, because the two of you were in the same vehicle, is that correct? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV JANSEN: Snyman and Vermeulen were in another car, is that correct? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV JANSEN: And he says the merit of the operation was discussed in broad terms, but he can't remember the detail. MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV JANSEN: Furthermore Mr Ras states that as far as he can recall the scene, the so-called plan B would entail that should the explosive device not be detonated, they would have waited for the members to do the so-called observation tasks in Motherwell and on returning, that would possible be early the morning, just before or during the sun came up, that at that stage they would be shot. Do you want to comment on that? MR NIEUWOUDT: It could have been like that. ADV JANSEN: You would agree that when those plans were made, you did make such a plan or agreed to that? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. CHAIRPERSON: Mr Jansen, what is your difficulty? Earlier on you put it to the witness that your clients could not have been in a position to change any aspect of the plan. ADV JANSEN: Yes. CHAIRPERSON: I just want to know what precisely where are we leading to and what aspect of the matter are you dealing with? ADV JANSEN: Yes, Mr Chairman, I think it would be clear that as far as, I think I specifically put the question on the basis that the basic plan or what would be used and the mechanisms, that can't be changed, but obviously at the end of the day, on the actual ground and at the scene, the operatives do to some extent use their discretion, as to how the operation is concluded. There aren't any specific, my instructions isn't that there was any specific rule as to what they can change and what they can't change, that will depend on the operation itself to what extent the operatives have a discretion. But the planning is done on a more senior level and that planning determines which individuals are more likely to be asked to be involved, depending on their qualifications and their experience. CHAIRPERSON: But plan B never even came into operation? ADV JANSEN: No, it didn't. CHAIRPERSON: Why should we be detained about around aspects relating to plan B which didn't even come into operation? ADV JANSEN: No, I accept that Mr Chairman, that it probably doesn't play much role in the present circumstances. I am doing it purely to explain the role of the three Warrant Officers in the fullest possible sense. CHAIRPERSON: Although I don't think there is much argument about the role that it was thought they would play and also the fact that they got instructions to pack and go to PE. They just had to follow instructions as far as I can see things. ADV JANSEN: No, I accept that Mr Chairman. Mr Nieuwoudt, at the end of the day Mr Ras and the other two Warrant Officers were under your command in the Eastern Cape? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV JANSEN: And that what they had done, was a direct consequence of the commands given to them by you or by Mr De Kock? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV JANSEN: And there is no doubt that that what was done would be regarded by them as part of their job or reasonably as part of their work? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV JANSEN: As it pleases the Chairman, I do not have any further questions. NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY ADV JANSEN. CHAIRPERSON: Mr Cornelius? CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR CORNELIUS: Thank you Mr Chairman, Cornelius for the seventh applicant, Mr Vermeulen. Mr Nieuwoudt it is clear that Vermeulen had nothing to do with handling and the placing of the explosive device? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. MR CORNELIUS: It was done by Waal du Toit and De Kock? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. MR CORNELIUS: I just want to clear up something which also bothered Mr De Jager. The idea is created by you that on the scene Vermeulen and Snyman made a certain submission should this operation fail. I just want to put this straight. The applicant Vermeulen guarded the motor vehicles where they were parked, is that correct? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. MR CORNELIUS: And if I look at the submissions it was a far way from the scene where the bomb exploded? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. MR CORNELIUS: Such a distance that the applicant will say he did not even hear the explosion? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. MR CORNELIUS: At that stage when this explosive device was activated, applicant Vermeulen was out of sight and far from the scene? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. MR CORNELIUS: So he was in no position to execute another plan should this explosion fail and so that he could then eliminate the people? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. MR CORNELIUS: I just want to follow on the following, it was clear even from Eugene de Kock's part, that this was cleared at a higher level and that he had to follow your instructions. MR CORNELIUS: Thank you Mr Chairman, I have no further questions. NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR CORNELIUS. CHAIRPERSON: Mr Kemp? CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR KEMP: Mr Chairman, Mr Kemp on behalf of Du Toit and Kok, the fifth and sixth applicants. I only have a few questions to ask. The morning you left Nick van Rensburg's house, did you go directly to the technical division? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, this is how I recollect it. MR KEMP: Now, earlier it was put to you that it could have been around half past six that morning, can you remember more specifically what time it was that morning? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I can't remember specifically what time it was. MR KEMP: Have you met Mr De Kock previously? MR NIEUWOUDT: No. MR KEMP: Did you know Mr Du Toit? MR NIEUWOUDT: No. MR KEMP: And Mr Kok? MR NIEUWOUDT: No. MR KEMP: When you came to the technical division, who did you meet there? MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr De Kock took us to Mr Du Toit. MR KEMP: Is it correct that Mr Kok was not there? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. MR KEMP: Mr Kobus Kok? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. MR KEMP: It was only Mr Du Toit whom I had discussions with. MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. MR KEMP: I am stating it to you that Mr Du Toit as he remembers it, was that this visit took place between ten and eleven o'clock that morning, but he isn't sure. Could it have been at that time? MR NIEUWOUDT: It is possible, but I can't remember exactly what time it was. MR KEMP: Did you do anything else that morning before you went to Vlakplaas, after you had been to the technical division? MR NIEUWOUDT: No. MR KEMP: One aspect I want to mention to you is that when you were in the office of Du Toit, you explained to him precisely what this matter was about, is that correct? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. MR KEMP: Did you explain to him the scope of this operation and the importance of this operation? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. MR KEMP: And also the urgency? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. MR KEMP: And De Kock was also present? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. MR KEMP: The question that some of these members were involved in offences, do you agree that it was never a reason for eliminating them? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. MR KEMP: Because if they were only guilty of offences, they could have been prosecuted in a normal way? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. MR KEMP: It was because of the results and the threats around that? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. MR KEMP: At which stage did you for the first time meet Mr Kobus Kok? MR NIEUWOUDT: It was early the next day when Mr Du Toit contacted me that they had arrived in Port Elizabeth. I met them and I took them to my safe premises and that was where I met Mr Kobus Kok for the first time. MR KEMP: Is it correct to say that when you arrived at Mr Du Toit, you and De Kock also realised that the way in which the people would be eliminated, was by using a motor vehicle with a bomb in it? That was conveyed to Du Toit? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. MR KEMP: Was it mentioned that he should come to Port Elizabeth or just that somebody from his offices should come? MR NIEUWOUDT: I can't remember exactly whether he had said or who should come to Port Elizabeth, but it was mentioned that they should assist us because they were the experts. MR KEMP: Thank you Mr Chairman. NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR KEMP. CHAIRPERSON: When you explained to Mr Du Toit in his office, as to the reason for elimination, how many of you were in there? MR NIEUWOUDT: It was just me, Mr Du Toit and De Kock. Mr Ford. CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ADV FORD: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, I see it is one o'clock, do you wish me to start with the cross-examination? CHAIRPERSON: We lost ten minutes around eleven o'clock, let's go on for the next ten minutes. ADV FORD: As it pleases the Chairman. I am sorry, Ford for the families of the victims Mgoduka and Faku. Mr Nieuwoudt, you have annexed to your application for amnesty and you have referred to it in your evidence in chief, a number of documents including documents from what appeared to be pamphlets or magazines and other documents, other portions of what appeared to be books. Can I ask you what was the purpose of annexing this documentation? What did you wish to convey by it? MR NIEUWOUDT: This documentation indicates the facts and also the resistance operations, establishment of revolutionary bases, the necklacing and that is in support of the anarchy which existed, the unrest situation which prevailed and the people's war concept. ADV FORD: I see so what you are saying is it was annexed for substantiation of the facts which you have referred to in your application. You are not suggesting that you read all this documentation before the Motherwell bombing incident and it led you to certain convictions which influenced your actions? MR NIEUWOUDT: No. Because it was already in existence at that stage. ADV FORD: Had you read any of this documentation prior to that incident, the Motherwell incident? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. I did read some of it. ADV FORD: Were you continuously involved in obtaining whatever information there was relating to the ANC, to perusing that and utilising it where possible? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: Now, just to get some certainty on the hierarchy in the Security Branch in Port Elizabeth at the time, do I understand that Brigadier Gilbert was your senior officer at the time? MR NIEUWOUDT: At which stage? ADV FORD: We are talking about the time immediately before, and at the time of the bombing incident, Mr Nieuwoudt? MR NIEUWOUDT: He was the Divisional Commander of the whole Eastern Cape region. ADV FORD: And you reported directly to him? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: And Colonel Roelofse, what was his position? MR NIEUWOUDT: Colonel Roelofse at that stage was the Commanding Officer of the Investigative Unit. ADV FORD: And Mr Van Wyk, I think it was Captain Van Wyk, was he also known to you? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. He was also part of the Investigative Unit resorting under Roelofse. ADV FORD: We know from Mr Van Rensburg's evidence that for some time, he was stationed in Port Elizabeth and a member of the Security Branch. You were also in Port Elizabeth at that time? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: And were you in any way under his command at that stage? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, he was second in charge at that stage. And at that stage I was under the command of Roelofse and I was assisting the Investigative Unit. ADV FORD: Did you ever find it necessary or did you ever on any occasion bypass you seniors to go to head office in Pretoria for authority for any operation? MR NIEUWOUDT: No. ADV FORD: You would always go through your senior locally? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: Getting some perspective in so far as the time sequence is concerned, Mr Nieuwoudt, as I understand it, I think you refer to it as an Intelligence Unit, or words to that effect, was created in June 1989, is that correct? MR NIEUWOUDT: It is the Intelligence Unit. ADV FORD: And you were in charge of that? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: And in respect of the activities of that Unit, you reported directly to Brigadier Gilbert? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: When was it for the first time, that you identified the possibility of a leak in that Unit? Or was it in that Unit? MR NIEUWOUDT: It was round about August. But the leak did not exist only in our division, but also in the whole Security Branch. ADV FORD: I see. What brought the possibility of a leak to your attention? MR NIEUWOUDT: Because of the elimination of some well-placed informers and also covert operations which I launched. ADV FORD: And where did these take place, the elimination of these informants? Locally or out of the country? MR NIEUWOUDT: Some of them took place locally and others overseas. ADV FORD: Now, when did it first come to your attention or when did you first form the suspicion that Warrant Officer Mgoduka might be involved in the leak? MR NIEUWOUDT: That was in August 1989 that that suspicion was caused. ADV FORD: And what precisely was it that brought your attention to the possibility of the involvement of Warrant Officer Mgoduka? MR NIEUWOUDT: It was precisely the elimination of my agents. And also of other members' agents. ADV FORD: And if I understood your evidence earlier and the application, you then kept these certainly Mr Mgoduka under observation as a result of that, after discussing it with Brigadier Gilbert? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: And how long did it take before you reached some certainty that in your mind, that Mr Mgoduka was in fact putting out feelers or in fact had been recruited by the ANC? MR NIEUWOUDT: That was about two weeks, in December, that was a whole process which led to the final stage. ADV FORD: And precisely when was the incident when you allege that you heard the discussion between the four deceased in the tea room? MR NIEUWOUDT: That was during that same time. ADV FORD: Mr Nieuwoudt, but precisely when, can you recall? MR NIEUWOUDT: I can't remember the exact date, but the reports were presented to Gilbert and also the sound recordings were given to Gilbert, we listened to those. ADV FORD: Do you have copies of that documentation? MR NIEUWOUDT: I do not. ADV FORD: Did you make a transcript of the tape which you allege you listened to? MR NIEUWOUDT: I did. ADV FORD: Do you know where that is? MR NIEUWOUDT: I have provided everything to Brigadier Gilbert. ADV FORD: And of course Brigadier Gilbert is now deceased, so he is not here to answer any of this? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: Now when did you decide, because you returned at some stage to Brigadier Gilbert, you had decided that the, if I understand your evidence, that the situation was getting more critical and that further steps needed to be taken? MR NIEUWOUDT: This was about two days before my departure to Pretoria. ADV FORD: Are you aware whether or not Brigadier Gilbert had discussed this with anybody at head office in Pretoria at that stage? MR NIEUWOUDT: I don't know, but he assured me that he had received instructions from head quarters. ADV FORD: Did you make any investigations as to what precisely the order or the instruction, what it covered? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I did not question his instruction. ADV FORD: Are you suggesting that when you went back to Brigadier Gilbert he had already made the decision that these persons should be eliminated? MR NIEUWOUDT: I would say so yes. ADV FORD: The allegation has been made and you have agreed with it, that this matter was extremely serious at that stage. It was of great and critical urgency and importance at that stage? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: You have also suggested that there was a period during which the post of Mr Mgoduka was being monitored? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: Presumably that had taken some time? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: Over what period of time would that have taken place? MR NIEUWOUDT: I think it lasted from August, September up till November. It was done continuously. ADV FORD: Getting to your first suspicion of Mr Mgoduka, was it a certainty in your mind that he was now leaking information to the ANC or was it merely a suspicion? MR NIEUWOUDT: At that stage it was just a suspicion I had, but when I identified it, I realised that he was involved. ADV FORD: All right, can I ask you this. What precisely was it that finally convinced you that Mr Mgoduka had turned, that he was conveying information to the ANC? MR NIEUWOUDT: It was the information I obtained from the informer that he was recruited by Godji Skenyana. He was the MK Commander in the Eastern Cape and that was my confirmation. ADV FORD: Now, you have suggested that you have intercepted letters, if I understood your evidence, from Mr Mgoduka, addressed to these various addresses, the Roma Church, John Smith in London and two other addresses you mentioned as well? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: How long had Mr Mgoduka been a member of the Security Branch? MR NIEUWOUDT: Since 1977. ADV FORD: Was he actively involved in the activities of the Security Branch? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, he was. ADV FORD: He was aware of all the different avenues open to the Security Branch to keep people under observation? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: He was aware that phones were tapped? MR NIEUWOUDT: He should have known about that. ADV FORD: He was aware that post was intercepted and was read? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV FORD: He was aware that a big bag was opened at the post office, if your evidence is correct, where anything addressed to these specific addresses were thrown into and referred to the Security Branch? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: Presumably Mr Mgoduka having been a member of the Security Branch for that long, was not an absolute fool? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, that is correct. ADV FORD: Are you suggesting that in those circumstances with that knowledge, he wrote letters to the Roma Church, he wrote letters to John Smith in London? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: Where reference was made to funerals and to weddings? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct, that is what I can remember. ADV FORD: You don't have any copies of those letters I take it. MR NIEUWOUDT: No, all my reports from the first day on regarding this matter, I provided that to Gilbert. And my post was also directed in the same manner, to him. What he did with that, I don't know. ADV FORD: Would you agree with me Mr Nieuwoudt, that there can be no doubt from what you have told this Commission now, that Mr Mgoduka would have been aware that letters, these letters he addressed, were going to be intercepted by the Security Branch? MR NIEUWOUDT: All letters are not intercepted. Some of those letters would have gone to those addresses, just some were intercepted. And by using code names and not his own name, all those are factors must be taken into consideration. ADV DE JAGER: Did he use a code name or a foreign name? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, the address to which it was sent made use of a code name. ADV DE JAGER: Yes, but who signed the letter? MR NIEUWOUDT: It was signed by a code name, he didn't write Glen Mgoduka, he used a code name. I identified it on sight, his handwriting. ADV POTGIETER: And you drew an inference that he was using the office typewriter? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I think he used his own typewriter which he had in his office. ADV POTGIETER: Yes? MR NIEUWOUDT: But I also identified some of the letters on sight. ADV POTGIETER: So these are all inferences which you drew? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is so. ADV POTGIETER: You are not a handwriting expert? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is so. ADV POTGIETER: So you wouldn't be able to say whether it was Mr Mgoduka's typewriter which had been used to type the letters? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, but I could see that there was a similarity. ADV POTGIETER: Yes, but you couldn't say as a fact that it had been typed on that typewriter? MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct. ADV POTGIETER: But you relied on a hearsay allegation by an informer to the effect that Mr Mgoduka had been recruited by the ANC? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV POTGIETER: That is all you had? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV POTGIETER: And on the strength of that, you came to the conclusion that had been recruited and he was working for the ANC and that he should therefore be killed? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: Mr Chairman, do you wish for me to continue, I see it is now quarter past one? CHAIRPERSON: I think we will adjourn until two o'clock. COMMISSION ADJOURNS ON RESUMPTION CHAIRPERSON: Mr Ford? GIDEON JOHANNES NIEUWOUDT: (s.u.o.) CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ADV FORD: (cont) Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Nieuwoudt, there is an aspect of your application which is not clear to me and I would like you to have a look at page 321 of your application, or 321 of the record, page 26 of your application. Do you have it before you? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, I have. ADV FORD: And starting at the bottom paragraph 11, "during July of 1989 it came to my attention by the personnel and operators, that there was a serious security leak in the information network at the Security Branch and this leak led to sensitive information being exposed. The exposure of this operation led to the death of a very sensitively placed informer and the intelligence capacity of the Unit, was detrimentally effected by the loss of this source." And then you refer to annexure 15 as well as annexures 8, 9 and 25. Now, if we can start with annexure 8. Annexure 8 is an issue of Sishaba, dated May, 1986, is that right? MR NIEUWOUDT: Just a moment please. ADV FORD: Page 412. CHAIRPERSON: Mr Ford, excuse me, where are we now? ADV FORD: I am sorry Mr Chairman, it is page 412, annexure 8 of the application. Maybe I could put the question to you Mr Nieuwoudt, this annexure was presumably referred to for a purpose. Where in that annexure does it refer to the sensitive operation which had been exposed? CHAIRPERSON: I am going to interrupt you a little bit. I would like to appeal to those people who arrive late in the hearings, not to make a noise for those who are already listening, please. MR NIEUWOUDT: Could you please repeat the question. ADV FORD: The issue of Sishaba you say it is, which is annexure 8 at page 412, where if at all, does it refer to the sensitive operation which was uncovered? MR NIEUWOUDT: What I would like to indicate, if you look at page 5 of Sishaba, page 415 of the record, just underneath where it says forward freedom, we have seen them attacking the community councillors and the informers. ADV FORD: I see, so there is no reference at all to this specific incident that you are referring to? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: And similarly annexure 9 at page 419 ... (intervention) ADV BOOYENS: If I may assist my learned friend, Mr Chairman, nowhere in the annexures does it refer to the specific one. I have checked that as well. ADV FORD: Well, then perhaps, Mr Nieuwoudt you can explain what the reason for annexing them, was? They appear to have been annexed with specific reference to this incident? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, what it deals with is the death of the informers and as I have already explained, the unrest and riots which had been and the establishment of underground structures, the mobilisation and the politicisation of the masses and the people's war which eventually took place. ADV FORD: I see, so none of these annexures are of any assistance in identifying the leak which occurred in the Security Branch neither are they of any assistance in dealing with the issue of whether Mgoduka was involved at all? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: Then I will ask you to turn to page 323, Mr Nieuwoudt, and to the second portion of paragraph 13. "It was clear that it was Warrant Officer Mgoduka or it had to have been Warrant Officer Mgoduka", and I emphasise had to have been. You are not referring to a suspicion, you are referring to a certainty. It was clear that it must have been him, am I right? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: Why was it so clear? MR NIEUWOUDT: Because it was only the two of us who had knowledge of that operation. ADV FORD: Was there not a possibility that this source could have made a slip up of his own in his undercover position and could have been identified for other reasons? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is possible, but I had applied the necessary security measures. ADV FORD: No, no, no, that is a general term which is not going to assist you, what does that mean Mr Nieuwoudt? MR NIEUWOUDT: I applied the necessary security measures and I was certain that it didn't come from my side. I believed that it came from Mgoduka's side, that is what I believed. ADV FORD: Why? MR NIEUWOUDT: Because that source had been eliminated. ADV FORD: But then I return to my question, why couldn't it have been possible that he made his own slip up? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is possible, one can't exclude that possibility. ADV FORD: Why then did you say that it was clear that it must have been Warrant Officer Mgoduka. MR NIEUWOUDT: I repeat, I believed that I had applied all the necessary security measures in dealing with an informer and I was of the view and believed, that that was the position. ADV FORD: And this was the starting point which led to the execution of Mr Mgoduka at a later stage? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct, yes, that was the prior events. ADV FORD: On the following page Mr Nieuwoudt, you say in the light of this, I was uncertain whether he could have been the source of this leak. It was however, noticeable that during the riot period, his home was never attacked, even though he lived amongst his colleagues who did indeed suffer during these attacks. The vehicle which he drove, was also not attacked. Where did he live Mr Nieuwoudt? MR NIEUWOUDT: In Mabiza Street, New Brighton. ADV FORD: Are you certain of that? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: My instructions are that he lived in KwaMagxaki? MR NIEUWOUDT: That was only at a later stage. ADV FORD: When was that Mr Nieuwoudt? MR NIEUWOUDT: After KwaMagxaki had been developed, he then bought the house. ADV FORD: Well, that seems to follow, I am asking you when that was Mr Nieuwoudt? MR NIEUWOUDT: I can't give you an exact date, but it was only at a later stage. ADV FORD: Well, what you are saying is that - let me ask you this, how long had he been living in KwaMagxaki? Can you tell us that? MR NIEUWOUDT: That was probably from 1987 onwards, but I am not entirely certain. ADV FORD: So for a period of at least one and a half years, he had been living in KwaMagxaki? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: KwaMagxaki was a reasonably upper class area? Is that a fair statement to make? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: And a number of policemen lived there? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: None of them had any problems in so far as attacks of their houses were concerned, is that right? MR NIEUWOUDT: Not there. ADV FORD: And the real suspicion about Mr Mgoduka, the first indication occurred in July 1989? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: And you had no indication that before that he was in any way putting out feelers or in any way involved with conveying information to the ANC? MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct. ADV FORD: Well then why would the absence of attacks on his house in that period, when there were no attacks on other policemen in the area, have played any role whatsoever? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, because before the development of KwaMagxaki the other Security Police homes had been attacked, his home was never attacked. And that was strange and I can remember that before that he had lived next door to an ANC activist who had been involved in the recruitment of people and distribution of pamphlets, it was quite some time earlier, and he didn't give us that information when he was in Mabiza Street. ADV FORD: And when did you find that out Mr Nieuwoudt? MR NIEUWOUDT: That was early in the 1980's. ADV FORD: I am sorry, when you found it out? MR NIEUWOUDT: When it came to our notice, yes. ADV FORD: So are you saying that long before 1989, you suspected Mr Mgoduka's loyalty or you questioned it? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, it didn't arise with me. We must take into account that some of my sources had been eliminated much earlier, which he had been involved, so it all gave rise and contributed to the final phase in which there was recruitment and so forth. ADV FORD: I see. Mr Nieuwoudt, you then carry on in paragraph 14 about your discussion which you then immediately went to discuss the matter with Brigadier Gilbert and you say the fear existed that other undercover operations as well as safe houses and premises would be exposed. Is that right? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: Now, the Intelligence Unit of which you were the Commander, had only been on the go for a month at that stage, is that right? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: Presumably you hadn't developed any real number of safe houses and what do you refer to them as facilities with respect to your specific Unit? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct, but the Unit had already existed in 1988. I further developed it and got it off the ground. Captain Van Vuuren had told me that there were safe premises available at the time. ADV FORD: Now, when we refer to a safe premises, I presume you refer to no more than a house which is presumably rented with no reference to the police, there is no involvement of the Security Branch in so far as the public are aware in relation to that house? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: So to replace a safe house, is really no more than terminating that rental and finding another one, is that right? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: And presumably your Unit would have been interested in setting up and maintaining your own safe houses, unrelated to the other Security Branch safe houses? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, they formed part of my Unit. So I used their facilities. ADV FORD: I am sorry, what formed part of your Unit? MR NIEUWOUDT: Captain Van Vuuren who already at that stage had a safe house, formed part of my Unit. ADV FORD: But was there any reason why your Unit could not establish its own safe houses? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct, but there were cost implications and contracts to be drafted and there were many other factors to be taken into consideration, needed authorization from head office, and all those things had to be considered, it wasn't such a simple matter of just going out and finding a house. ADV FORD: You are not suggesting that these four men were killed just because it was a matter of spending a bit more money and a bit more red tape? MR NIEUWOUDT: No. ADV FORD: And the operating premises that you refer to later, what precisely did that entail? MR NIEUWOUDT: Those were also premises where all the operatives and the handlers performed their administrative duties. ADV FORD: Once again, a bit of money, a bit of arrangement, you could have organised a new operating premises without too much problem? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct, but there was a lot more to it than that. It wasn't such a simple matter and you had to motivate it properly and head office would have to consider the matter. ADV FORD: We are talking about a calculated decision to kill four people Mr Nieuwoudt, as opposed to the proportionality, as opposed to a little bit of inconvenience and a little bit of cost of changing your houses? MR NIEUWOUDT: I didn't make the decision to eliminate them. It was Brigadier Gilbert. Whether he considered those factors, I don't know. ADV FORD: But we know, because you have told us, what Brigadier Gilbert's immediate reaction was, transfer them. He didn't want to kill them. You pushed him into that, didn't you? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I did not. ADV FORD: By repeated returns to Brigadier Gilbert and which is apparent from your application, you pushed him into that? MR NIEUWOUDT: No. I couldn't give him orders. It is unacceptable, I don't agree. ADV FORD: Well ... (intervention) CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, it is not suggested that you gave him orders. I think what is being put to you is that you impressed on him the fact that these people should be eliminated, in other words, you were not quite happy with the transfer? You impressed on him that the best thing would be to eliminate them? MR NIEUWOUDT: I only made a suggestion to him. I didn't place any pressure on him. ADV FORD: So the suggestion that they should be killed, came from you Mr Nieuwoudt? MR NIEUWOUDT: No. No. ADV FORD: Well, what suggestion did you make then Mr Nieuwoudt? MR NIEUWOUDT: What I said, I told him what the implications were as I saw it and it wouldn't help to transfer them. ADV FORD: Well, Mr Nieuwoudt, I want to take you to page 327 of your application, paragraph 21, where you say Brigadier Gilbert's spontaneous reaction was that these people should immediately be transferred from the Security Branch and that he was prepared to immediately make the necessary arrangements with head quarters. This was after listened to their talk in the tea room as you have alleged, this was after you had been monitoring them, this was after you had intercepted Mr Mgoduka's post. Brigadier Gilbert still thinks that an appropriate procedure is to transfer them. The idea was that these people would be transferred to a centre outside of the Eastern Cape to prevent any further damage being done to the information network. And then you go on Mr Nieuwoudt, however, I focused Gilbert's attention on the fact that this matter was a lot more complicated and sensitive since these particular members had been attached to the Security Branch for quite some time. What are you trying to tell us there, Mr Nieuwoudt? MR NIEUWOUDT: Mr Gilbert didn't know the members, and he didn't know the circumstances. And I simply explained the issues to him. That is what I mean. I drew his attention to that fact. ADV FORD: Are you suggesting Brigadier Gilbert didn't know the persons under his command? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is not what I am saying here. ADV FORD: Or how long they had been with the command? MR NIEUWOUDT: I believed that he knew. ADV FORD: Mr Nieuwoudt, was this anything other than an attempt to convince Brigadier Gilbert that the only way here was to kill these persons? MR NIEUWOUDT: No. ADV FORD: Maybe you didn't understand my question. MR NIEUWOUDT: What did you have in mind? What I brought to Gilbert's attention was that transferring would not be a solution, because they could escape and then all the information which they possessed, they would be free to convey it to the ANC. ADV POTGIETER: You did not agree with them being transferred, so what did you have in mind? MR NIEUWOUDT: At that stage I didn't have anything in mind. ADV POTGIETER: Would you have been satisfied with a transfer? MR NIEUWOUDT: If that is what he decided, I would have, yes. ADV POTGIETER: And you would have accepted it? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV POTGIETER: And you wouldn't have had further problems with that? MR NIEUWOUDT: The only problem which I would have foreseen would be that they could defect to the ANC and endanger our security network by exposing information and that they could identify informers and policemen, etc. That is what I had in mind. ADV POTGIETER: So those are all the possibilities that existed? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV POTGIETER: But if the idea was that they should be transferred, you would accepted that? MR NIEUWOUDT: If that was his order, that is how I would have accepted it. ADV POTGIETER: So one could have solved the problem by means of transfer? MR NIEUWOUDT: I don't know. I couldn't make that decision. ADV DE JAGER: Mr Nieuwoudt, if I am transferred and I have the names of four informers, and I go to the ANC and I give them those four names, what would happen them? MR NIEUWOUDT: In my view, they would have been eliminated and our intelligence network would be prejudiced. ADV DE JAGER: So the only solution was you had to either put them in a prison where they weren't able to convey the information and weren't able to defect to the ANC? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV DE JAGER: Now, why was that not a solution? MR NIEUWOUDT: Because according to knowledge that I had, some people had already leaked information by means of visitors which they had received in prison, so there are many ways in which the information could be passed on. ADV FORD: Mr Nieuwoudt, while we are on that, you referred in your evidence to Section 29 of the Internal Security Act, is that right? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: Your powers went a little bit further than that at that stage, didn't they? There were certain Security Emergency Regulations in place, is that right? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: And we all know about Section 3 of those Emergency Regulations, arrest and detention of persons? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: We all know of the prohibition on visits? MR NIEUWOUDT: Not under the Emergency Regulations. ADV FORD: You are not aware of that? Are you suggesting that people detained under the Emergency Regulations, could have visitors at will? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: And they could have access to their legal representatives at will? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: I see. We will come back to that Mr Nieuwoudt. If I could then deal with the next sentence in this paragraph I was dealing with at 328. "The matter was further complicated by the fact that these members possibly had knowledge of covert offensive and defensive operations and could exert a certain influence on the other black members at the Security Branch? That sound to me Mr Nieuwoudt, like you didn't really know whether they had, you simply speak of possibly had knowledge, you weren't really certain of whether these people had information in this regard? MR NIEUWOUDT: All I knew at that stage about the covert operations in which he had been involved, was the Swaziland one and the Lesotho one, where he had been involved. Where all four of them had been involved. ADV FORD: What did you mean by to exert a specific influence on the black members, what did you mean by that? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is what I said at the outset, that if he defected or exposed information and structures, then they would be able to compile a proper profile of the members in the Security Branch. And that could be severely prejudicial, that was my view. ADV FORD: You are not talking about them trying to exercise some influence amongst their colleagues by trying to turn their colleagues as well within the Security Branch, you are not suggesting that? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I was more concerned about the damage to the Intelligence network and threat to informers. ADV FORD: Now at what stage did this take place, your second visit to Brigadier Gilbert, how much longer? A month later, two months later? MR NIEUWOUDT: I don't have an independent recollection, but it could have been a month before that, before December. ADV FORD: So from July 1989 through to shall we say November or early November or end of October 1989, Mgoduka and the others were allowed to continue as normal? MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct. ADV FORD: There was no attempt to limit their involvement with Security Force activities? MR NIEUWOUDT: No. ADV FORD: No attempt to keep them away from safe houses and other such premises? MR NIEUWOUDT: No. ADV FORD: Presumably the development of your Information Network and the recruiting of informers, is an ongoing thing. People are being recruited all the time? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: There was no attempt made to prevent them from acquiring knowledge relating to the identity of any new informers? MR NIEUWOUDT: No. ADV FORD: Why not? MR NIEUWOUDT: I didn't. ADV FORD: Well, didn't you think it important to try and limit the damage? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, they weren't under my command at that stage. ADV FORD: Well, under who were they? MR NIEUWOUDT: They were under the, or some of them were under the Investigation team and some of them under the command of the Black Affairs Unit. ADV FORD: Mgoduka was under Roelofse, is that right? MR NIEUWOUDT: No. ADV FORD: Who was under Colonel Roelofse? MR NIEUWOUDT: Mapipa and Faku. ADV FORD: And who was Mgoduka's senior? MR NIEUWOUDT: Colonel Scheepers. ADV FORD: Did you go and speak to these senior officers? MR NIEUWOUDT: No. ADV FORD: To tell them of your suspicions? MR NIEUWOUDT: No. ADV FORD: Why not? MR NIEUWOUDT: As I have already said, my Unit reported directly to Brigadier Gilbert. If he thought it was necessary, he could have done it, I didn't know about that. ADV FORD: Now, your next attempt if we understand your application and your evidence, was that you were going to - I am reading page 329, paragraph 24, the purpose was that I would on gradual basis by means of discussions with these four people, would communicate and try and illicit information from them about these activities in order to determine the graveness of the risk. Now precisely what chance, as subtle as you may have been Mr Nieuwoudt, did you think there was of you getting these people to reveal their involvement with the ANC to you? MR NIEUWOUDT: That was an attempt which I made to have discussions with them. ADV FORD: I understand that, you have told us that. I am asking you what possible prospect did you foresee of getting them to talk to you about that? MR NIEUWOUDT: I thought they possibly trusted me enough because at that stage we had never had any arguments or altercations. ADV FORD: You thought at this stage where there already had been letters written to the ANC, there had been these talks about feelers being put out, there had been talks about going over to the ANC, you thought they were going to say to you Mr Nieuwoudt, we actually think of going over to the ANC, what do you think about that? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I don't think they would have said that. ADV FORD: Well, what did you expect from them Mr Nieuwoudt? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is what I thought at that stage. I thought they would perhaps let slip some bit of information which would give me some clue, make sense. ADV FORD: Now, you then go on to deal with the Lesotho, where one of your informants, it appears, advised that the ANC was fully aware of the location of our specific facilities and that the issue of infiltration had been exposed. Now, if I understand your evidence, you escribed that to Mgoduka and or the others? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: So it was quite clear to you then that a significant amount of information had already been conveyed? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: You had no way of knowing how much information had been conveyed? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, but as I have already said I did not believe that they had passed on all the information that was at their disposal, to the ANC, but the knowledge they had of this specific operation, they did pass on. ADV FORD: Well, what led you to that belief? What possible reason did you have for believing that? MR NIEUWOUDT: I thought that all four of them were involved, and the next day a person was arrested in Swaziland and I didn't hear anything from them. I later found out after they came back, that they had been in Quatro. ADV FORD: Mr Nieuwoudt, you are not answering my question. I am asking you what led you to believe that they hadn't disclosed all the information available to them, to the ANC? MR NIEUWOUDT: As I have explained there is a lot of other information, it would have taken quite some time to debrief them and to extract the information from them, so they would have had to be physically present at the ANC to give them all the information and that is why I believed that they didn't pass on all the information. ADV FORD: So you are saying that they had probably given over everything which they knew on an off the cuff basis, but a trained interrogated could have gotten more out of them, is that what you are saying? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: Were the Security Police in the habit of allowing trained ANC interrogators into places of detention to interrogate detainees? MR NIEUWOUDT: No. ADV FORD: So what possible chance was there then of any interrogation taking place if they had been detained in terms of the Security Regulations? MR NIEUWOUDT: As I said the could still send messages through. ADV FORD: No Mr Nieuwoudt, your reasoning behind why they should not have been transferred and why they should not have been detained, as I understood it, was that - or why they shouldn't have been transferred is that if they then walked over or went over to the ANC, they could end up in the hands of a trained interrogator and further information could be gathered from them? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: Other than for that, you had no reason to suspect that they hadn't given the ANC all the information that they had? MR NIEUWOUDT: As I have understood it, they had to have been on the ANC's side and somebody would then have had to debrief them over a couple of days to extract the information from them. ADV FORD: But you could have stopped that immediately. At the drop of a hat by detaining them in terms of Section 3 of the Emergency Regulations. MR NIEUWOUDT: I couldn't, because then they would still pass on some of the information. ADV FORD: Mr Nieuwoudt, you are evading the question. You had no reason to suspect that they had not conveyed all the information available to them, save for that which would be obtained by a trained interrogator, that is what we are talking about? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is what I believed at that stage. That is how I saw it and that is what I believed. ADV FORD: Well, then what possible further harm could they have done to anybody if they had been detained in terms of the Emergency Regulations? MR NIEUWOUDT: They could give further information because what we are dealing with is the total concept with the Intelligence Network. So there were other informers and Security members and policemen whose lives could have been in danger. And their profiles. ADV FORD: But Mr Nieuwoudt, you already know that they have disclosed at least one safe house, you already know that they have disclosed at least one informer, why do you think they hadn't disclosed all the rest? MR NIEUWOUDT: As I have said I believed that they could have given more information because they could have damaged the network pertaining to the other members of the Security Branch, and perhaps they could have identified more members of the Branch and other informers. ADV DE JAGER: I think the question is they had given information. On what basis did you assume or accept that they hadn't already given all the information which they possessed? Why do you think they were holding something back which they would have given at a later stage and perhaps would have been able to smuggle from jail where they were not being debriefed? If they had already passed on anything which they could without being debriefed by an expert, and in prison there would be no expert to debrief them, so there could be no further passing on of information. If you perhaps understand it like that, I think that is what the Advocate is trying to put to you. MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so, but as I understood it at that stage, there was no guarantee to ensure that the information could not be leaked and ... (intervention) ADV DE JAGER: I understand that there was no guarantee that the information could not be leaked, but you are saying that you believed that they had already conveyed all the information which they had, so then the horse was already bolted and there was nothing more that they could do to cause damage? MR NIEUWOUDT: As I have said, I did not believe that all the information had been conveyed, that is what I am saying. I didn't think they had already passed on all the information. ADV FORD: I am sorry we are going in circles here Mr Nieuwoudt, because we get to your statement I believe. You are talking about a decision to kill four people. What I asked you before and which I will now ask you again is what led you to believe that they hadn't given all the information? MR NIEUWOUDT: As I have said, that is what I believed at that stage. Because the ANC did not immediately extract all the information from them, they would do it on a gradual basis. They do it in stages, not all at once. Because they also had to test his credibility, they don't just accept that the person was telling the truth. He might have been a double agent. CHAIRPERSON: What we are talking about here is the giving of information, not the extracting of the information. Is that correct? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. Yes, but at that stage I believed that they hadn't yet furnished all the information. CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but the question is why on what basis did you have that belief that they hadn't yet given all the information. MR NIEUWOUDT: Because they would have had to be debriefed properly. CHAIRPERSON: Well, I think he is saying his sole reason for so believing is that they had not been debriefed. I don't think we can take it further than that. ADV FORD: Thank you Mr Chairman. Just getting back to an aspect which I referred to earlier Mr Nieuwoudt, I am going to read to you from subsection 7 of subsection 3, or shall we say regulation 3, sub-regulation 7 of the Security Emergency Regulations of the time. No person other than the Minister or a person acting by virtue of his office in the service of the State or of the government of a self governing territory, shall have access to a person detained in terms of this regulation except with the consent of and subject to such conditions that may be determined by the Minister or a person authorised thereto by him. Do you understand that? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: Was that how you understood the Emergency Regulations at the time? MR NIEUWOUDT: Which one are you referring to, is it 85 or 86? ADV FORD: I am referring to Security Emergency Regulations, number R86 of 1989. Which given under my hand signed P.W. Botha, 8th day of June 1989. MR NIEUWOUDT: As far as I know, if he has consent from the Minister for somebody to visit him, and his legal counsel, they were there daily involved with them. ADV FORD: But we are talking about circumstances where you specifically don't want him to get permission to consult with his family or with his legal representatives and then you advise the Minister accordingly and he doesn't give the permission. MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct, but as I have said that access to legal representation, you cannot prevent that. ADV FORD: But isn't that precisely what that section says. No person without the consent of the Minister shall have access to him? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct, but he approaches the Minister directly. ADV FORD: Are you suggesting the Minister would not have conferred with those who had ensured the detainee's detention before granting such consent? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, what I am saying is that he will get the recommendation from the Commanding Officer. ADV FORD: And how simple would it have been for you then to say no, sir, do not give the people consent, he is in possession of sensitive information which can lead to injury and death of other people. He mustn't have contact with other people. You could have done that? MR NIEUWOUDT: It could have been like that. ADV FORD: Then there was no need to kill these persons, was there? MR NIEUWOUDT: I did not make that decision, I did not want to kill them. ADV FORD: You then refer also at page 329 of your affidavit Mr Nieuwoudt, I am reading the last sentence, and the direct consequence of the leaking of this sensitive information was that a source was detained in the Quatro camp in Angola to be interrogated and then we refer to annexure 15 and 20. Now, annexure 15 deals with the party triumphant from 1969 to 1975 through to mutiny in 1984. Could you explain how this had any relevance to this incident in 1989? MR NIEUWOUDT: All I wanted to indicate there was that the people were detained in the Quatro camp. Some of them were detained in Quatro camp after the unrest. ADV FORD: And then we have also, or the Commission with respect, is referred to the unsigned statement of one Maqonga, annexure 20 at page 490. MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: That deals with, if we are to place any reliance on this whatsoever, with what happened to him in 1985 and I think that is the latest date I can find in that affidavit or what purports to be some sort of statement. MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: What earthly relevance has that got to an incident in 1989? MR NIEUWOUDT: As I have already said this was just in support of the fact there was a Quatro camp where people were detained and interrogated and this was precisely what happened to Maqonga. ADV FORD: And then over the page, Mr Nieuwoudt, you deal with this interrogation was done by the late Chris Hani and the purpose was to create a profile of myself and the role of the Intelligence and the role of the SACP/ANC alliance. Well, now it became personal didn't it, there was a profile being set up of you? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: A profile which could have been used to attack you? MR NIEUWOUDT: It was possible yes. ADV FORD: Well, in so far as the Intelligence Unit, that is the Unit which you say came into being in June 1989, is that right? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: Well, not too much could surely have passed in the time in the few months from its creation to when this information was being made available to you, Mr Nieuwoudt, or is that an incorrect statement? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so. ADV FORD: Why was this other then for the personal profile of yourself, why was this of any great relevance? MR NIEUWOUDT: All I am saying here is after that informer who was exposed, when he came back, he told me that, that is why I included that. This was why I mentioned this. ADV FORD: Where did you get the information that the interrogation was conducted by the late Chris Hani? MR NIEUWOUDT: I heard it from my source. ADV FORD: Did you speak to this man personally? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, I did. ADV FORD: Where did that take place? MR NIEUWOUDT: Here in Port Elizabeth. ADV FORD: So this man was able to move from Lesotho to Port Elizabeth and back again? MR NIEUWOUDT: No. ADV FORD: Well, how did he know what was happening in Lesotho then? MR NIEUWOUDT: In this case I am referring to Quatro, that is in Angola. That is not in Lesotho. ADV FORD: I am sorry, I am referring to the beginning of that paragraph where you say information was received via an informer in Lesotho. Could you explain the mechanics there? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is like that. We had a whole intelligence network where he conveyed the information to me via courier. ADV FORD: I am sorry Mr Nieuwoudt, your informer was in Lesotho, is that what this paragraph is saying? MR NIEUWOUDT: Is that the previous paragraph? ADV FORD: It is 25, no it is the same paragraph. MR NIEUWOUDT: It was like that yes. ADV FORD: What is so? Was your informant in Lesotho? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: And you spoke to him in Port Elizabeth? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: So then he moved from Lesotho to Port Elizabeth to speak to you? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, he used the intelligence network and that was how he conveyed the information to me. ADV FORD: But you spoke to him personally, Mr Nieuwoudt, you just told us that. MR NIEUWOUDT: I was under the impression you were referring to this case of Chris Hani. I am on page 35 already. I am sorry if I have misinterpreted you. ADV FORD: We are talking about the same thing Mr Nieuwoudt, it is the same paragraph. MR NIEUWOUDT: No. ADV DE JAGER: I think you are at cross purposes. He received information from a informer in Lesotho, but he is annexing an affidavit which was made much later which confirms what the informer said to him that there was a camp like Quatro and there were people detained in Quatro. I think that is the only reason why he is annexing this, as I understood his evidence why he is annexing those annexures. MR NIEUWOUDT: That is like that. ADV FORD: Is that so? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV FORD: Well, then we get back to what my real question was and that is the informant from Lesotho, did you speak to him personally? MR NIEUWOUDT: No. ADV FORD: You got it conveyed to you? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: How many people were involved in the conveyance of this information to you? MR NIEUWOUDT: I worked this according to a courier system, where his report to me was in writing, it was encoded and he was doing target analysis in Lesotho and that information was conveyed. ADV FORD: So you had a written report from your informer in Lesotho? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: Do we have that? MR NIEUWOUDT: No. ADV FORD: Brigadier Gilbert got that? MR NIEUWOUDT: No. ADV FORD: Who got that? MR NIEUWOUDT: It went to the Security Branch and in 1991, these files were sent to head quarters. ADV FORD: So if you were so able to intercept mail and documents going out, did you have any reason to suspect that the ANC weren't able to intercept documents coming this way? MR NIEUWOUDT: It was possible, yes. ADV FORD: So the ANC might well have intercepted written reports from this man? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I don't think so. Not in that instance. The only documents they could get hold of were those documents provided by the four deceased, but it could not have come from my own source. ADV DE JAGER: Could they not intercept in one or other way the letter from the courier? MR NIEUWOUDT: If that information was known to everybody in the network, it could have happened. ADV FORD: Mr Nieuwoudt, you are an experienced Security Policeman, you have referred to a lot of the literature, you have referred to John McEwan, is it? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: Do you know of work by Brigadier Fraser, are you aware of that? MR NIEUWOUDT: I can't think of that now. ADV FORD: Okay, you read extensively in so far as literature is concerned, relating to security, insurgency, counter-insurgency, intelligence, counter-intelligence? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: What is the value of a Security Police operation of a double agent? When you have somebody who is feeding information both ways, as it were? Is that an important thing to have, is such a person important to the operation of a network? MR NIEUWOUDT: If he is a double agent, no. ADV FORD: What about somebody who believes, who has turned, as you say Mgoduka and the others have done, who has turned and he is feeding information to the other side, you know that he is feeding information. He doesn't know that you know, you can feed him disinformation and he will in turn feed it to the people whom he is working for, would you agree with that? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: And it is vitally important to have such a person, would you agree with that? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct, but I can explain that it can cause an additional problem. ADV FORD: What is that? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is that the ANC will realise that we have knowledge or that we know that he is a double agent and they will use him any more. ADV FORD: But you can make good use of him before that happens, surely Mr Nieuwoudt? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, it could be, I am just posing an example. ADV FORD: Well, then you don't kill such a person, you use him, don't you? MR NIEUWOUDT: It is so, but I did not decide to have him killed. ADV POTGIETER: And Mr Nieuwoudt, if the other side finds out that this person, that the opposite side knows that he is a double agent, it is not your problem, it is a problem for them, isn't it? MR NIEUWOUDT: It is a problem for them and they had to make a plan with him. ADV POTGIETER: In other words, it is not necessary for you to provide him with disinformation because he has no purpose? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: And if he has become worthless Mr Nieuwoudt, then there is no point in killing him, is there? MR NIEUWOUDT: I am repeating, I did not make that decision to kill them. ADV FORD: You then say in paragraph 26 of your affidavit, at 330, Mr Nieuwoudt, I started to intensively monitor these four members and it indicated that Mgoduka and Charles Jack was recruited by Godji Skenyana. What do you mean you intensively monitored them? MR NIEUWOUDT: I used sources on them, I monitored their post, I infiltrated their friends. All those things, all those intelligence operations I used. ADV FORD: Well you are already tapping their phones, you are already intercepting their post, what else did you do? ADV BOOYENS: No, with respect, I think this far the evidence was only Mgoduka's post was monitored and his phone. ADV FORD: Is that so Mr Nieuwoudt? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: Did you then start monitoring the post of all four of them? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. All of them and their friends as well. ADV FORD: This information which you say confirmed beyond all doubt that they had been recruited, where did that come from. MR NIEUWOUDT: From an informer who lived in Lesotho very near to Skenyana. He was a trained person, he was an agent. ADV FORD: Did you speak to that man or that person personally? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, he was handled on the same basis on my network. And other people, my associates, went in where they debriefed him. ADV FORD: Did you have any reason, or was there any way of being certain that this wasn't disinformation that you were being fed to cause problems in the Security Branch in Port Elizabeth? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I did not have any reason to believe that. ADV FORD: What I am suggesting to you Mr Nieuwoudt, is that it might well have been the ANC or whoever was on the other side, feeding you disinformation to cause problems in your Security Branch? Did you investigate that possibility? MR NIEUWOUDT: As I have already mentioned, I believed that they were involved, that they were recruited, that is what I believed. That is how I saw that. ADV FORD: You have told the Commission that already. I am asking you what your basis was for having such a firm belief. Whether you thought of investigating the possibility of disinformation? MR NIEUWOUDT: As I have already told you, I don't think it could have been disinformation. The evidence was that my informers were eliminated. Some of them were detained in Quatro. That was why I believed. ADV FORD: But you made no attempt to confirm that in any other way? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I was sure that the information I obtained from that informer was positive. His information was evaluated and therefore I had no reason to doubt his information. ADV FORD: Mr Nieuwoudt, then at page 331, you state that two weeks prior to 16 December 1989, they are talking about Godji contacted Warrant Officer Mgoduka to identify a South African Police vehicle for the purpose to attach a limpet mine underneath this vehicle. Do I understand that Mgoduka was to do no more than identify the police motor vehicle? MR NIEUWOUDT: That was the information we obtained. That these four people had to identify the vehicle. Mgoduka was the principle person in this regard. What instructions he gave, I did not know. ADV FORD: But there was no question of them personally putting a limpet mine under the motor vehicle, they were only going to identify it.? MR NIEUWOUDT: That was so. ADV FORD: Did you every tell anybody that your information was that they were going to blow a motor vehicle up by use of a limpet mine? MR NIEUWOUDT: As I remember, I conveyed the report to Brigadier Gilbert, the report about what they were involved in. ADV FORD: My question is have you ever told anybody that they personally were going to blow up a police motor vehicle? MR NIEUWOUDT: As I have already said I told Gilbert that. ADV FORD: But that wasn't your information, your information was that they were going to identify the motor vehicle? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct, but I believe what the informer said that they would provide a limpet mine to them on the 16th of December to show their solidarity and also to test them. ADV FORD: Are you making this up as you go along Mr Nieuwoudt, because this isn't contained in your application? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, no. ADV FORD: All you are talking about here is Mgoduka to identify a South African Police vehicle with the purposes of putting a limpet mine under this vehicle. MR NIEUWOUDT: It is so, here I have stated that who would place the limpet mine, I don't know, but the purpose was to put a limpet mine under this vehicle. ADV FORD: But that was precisely why, because it was unclear here why I asked you moments ago, if the only information was that they would identify a police motor vehicle, not place the bomb themselves and you agreed with that? Are you changing that now? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, for those purposes. CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, sorry, I don't understand this argument. You divide that sentence into two parts Mr Ford? ADV FORD: That is so Mr Chairman, and I am leading with the question that I asked him. CHAIRPERSON: Why did you divide that sentence into two independent portions? ADV FORD: No, Mr Chairman, I asked him to do that. I asked him if his information was only that they would identify the motor vehicle and not personally be involved in the bombing and he confirmed, because it was unclear, that is why I asked him. He confirmed that and now he is saying Mr Chairman ... (intervention) CHAIRPERSON: It doesn't matter to me what his answer is. If the question was not on a proper footing, it doesn't matter to me what his answer is. I am worried about the only, you say to us that you asked him whether that was the only thing that had to be done. ADV FORD: Yes, Mr Chairman. CHAIRPERSON: But you knew that the sentence didn't end up there, you knew that it went further to say that, to state the purpose. ADV FORD: That a limpet mine was going to be placed under the car? CHAIRPERSON: Yes? ADV FORD: Yes, Mr Chairman. But without identifying the person who was going to do that, which is specifically why I asked him the question. Mr Chairman, may I just clear up the question then if there is uncertainty. I don't want to mislead the witness. CHAIRPERSON: Yes, maybe you should do that. ADV FORD: Yes, thank you Mr Chairman. What is your evidence Mr Nieuwoudt, was the information from your informant that they would only identify the motor vehicle or were they also going to be involved in the placing of the bomb? MR NIEUWOUDT: As I have said, they had to identify a vehicle for the purposes of putting a limpet mine there. ADV FORD: They would do the bombing themselves? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: I see. ADV POTGIETER: Did you consider the possibility that that could have been disinformation? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, not at that stage as far as I can remember. I did not consider that possibility. ADV POTGIETER: Especially in the light of the fact that they were busy to obtain on a fraudulent way, funds which belonged to the liberation movements? MR NIEUWOUDT: I don't have any knowledge of that. ADV POTGIETER: It could have been that the liberation movement decided if that was what they were doing, we would place that disinformation in your system? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, it could have been like that, but that informer was an evaluated informer and I could trust him. ADV POTGIETER: But you say you did not consider that option, that possibility? MR NIEUWOUDT: No. ADV FORD: Thank you. Mr Nieuwoudt, if I could then go to page 332, this is paragraph 29 of your application. Do I understand the contents of that paragraph correctly to mean what you stated earlier, that the ANC would only use small amounts of information given to them, they wouldn't use all the information, because that would reveal their source? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: Well, that must have immediately made it clear to you that the ANC must have already have substantial other information, or have certain other information if they are only using a portion of it. ADV BOOYENS: With respect Mr Chairman, that doesn't necessarily follow. It doesn't quantify what information, it is just an opinion that he expressed. I will concede the paragraph is not very clear. ADV FORD: Who drafted this Mr Nieuwoudt. MR NIEUWOUDT: My Attorney. ADV FORD: Presumably you read it? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV FORD: And you were satisfied with the contents thereof? MR NIEUWOUDT: Your Honour, it is so, but it is ambiguous. This was my opinion. ADV FORD: Well, let's go to something which isn't ambiguous, at 333, 31. I immediately told Brigadier Gilbert that this state of affairs necessitated drastic measures because the Intelligence Network was of no use for the Security Branch. You made it quite clear to Brigadier Gilbert that you thought that drastic measures were necessary? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: Could that mean anything else to him but that you were suggesting that these men should be killed? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I did not tell him that they should be eliminated. ADV FORD: Yes, I know, you have already said that. I am saying can this sentence mean anything other than that you suggested that, that it was implicit in what you were saying to them, that they should be killed? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so, yes. ADV FORD: So you for yourself decided that the only way out, was to kill them, at that stage? MR NIEUWOUDT: No. ADV FORD: Then we go on to 32, Mr Nieuwoudt. Brigadier Gilbert instructed me to launch an operation to eliminate these people. Then I suggested to him that this should be managed on such a way that the blame could be placed on the ANC. ADV BOOYENS: Before my learned friend carries on, that specifically was, that is the one sentence that was specifically amended, he said that there was some error in it. I think in fact even Mr De Jager queried it as to how it happened. ADV FORD: That is precisely so Mr Chairman, that is why I want to deal with it with the man who says he has read through the application and he was happy with it, how such an unambiguous sentence could have been contained in it. Could you answer that Mr Nieuwoudt? MR NIEUWOUDT: During consultation I realised that this was not the case. These words were switched. ADV FORD: Mr Nieuwoudt, you were sentenced to 20 years imprisonment for this incident, is that right? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: This is your only chance other than the possibility of an appeal which may or may not succeed, of not serving that 20 years, is that right? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct, but I did not give the instruction to eliminate them. And this was why I brought this under his attention when we consulted. ADV FORD: Are you suggesting that you did not consult in detail with your Attorneys before this was prepared? MR NIEUWOUDT: We did, yes. Everything was tape recorded and typed. ADV FORD: And you read through it before you signed it? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: And you were happy with it as it then stood? MR NIEUWOUDT: After that, when we discussed this in depth, I did read through that and I signed it. There were many other applications I handed in. ADV FORD: Mr Nieuwoudt, it is a matter which has been touched on from time to time and there seems to be differing views in this regard, but you are a explosive expert yourself, is that right? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: And you have undergone certain courses with regard to explosives and dealing with explosives? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: You are capable of setting a bomb? Preparing a bomb, fusing it? Setting it off? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: The intention at all times was that this was going to be the manner of elimination of these four men? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct, yes. ADV FORD: Why couldn't you do it yourself? MR NIEUWOUDT: Because I was not so professional. We needed more professional operatives. I am not a technical expert. ADV FORD: Well, there was little professionalism about plan B, was there, shooting the men in the car as they drove past as an alternative? MR NIEUWOUDT: That was only plan B, if A did not succeed. ADV FORD: Your trip to Pretoria was authorised from head office if I understand your evidence? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: Head office in Pretoria? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. Could I just explain here. If I receive authorization, it is authorised for the requisition of a vehicle - for that I have to have authority from head office. It was done in writing or by telephone. ADV FORD: If the Commission will bear with me. The reason I am asking Mr Nieuwoudt, is that this requisition which is being handed in as an exhibit, is signed by - I don't know if it is signed by, but the authority appears to have been given by General Van der Merwe, is that right? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: And what was his position at the time? MR NIEUWOUDT: I think he was the Commissioner of Police. ADV FORD: Do you have any reason to believe that he would have granted such authority without being fully aware of the nature of the operation? MR NIEUWOUDT: I don't know. I can't comment on that. ADV FORD: Were you ever in other circumstances required to put in requests for air tickets and the like? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, I was. ADV FORD: And did you have to disclose fully the nature of the operation and what was involved in order to do so? MR NIEUWOUDT: I just received approval from the Commanding Officer and he obtained the authorization. ADV FORD: Now you say in paragraph 34 of your affidavit, at 334, on the afternoon of 12 December 1989, I was called to Brigadier Gilbert's office and he told me that approval was given for this covert operation. Presumably your evidence is that you have no idea who that authority came from? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: At the same time he gave me a air ticket and said I had to fly to Pretoria where I had to contact Van Rensburg early the next morning for the logistical support to be discussed. MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: Now, you knew Mr Van Rensburg well? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: You were actively involved with him in the Security Branch in Port Elizabeth? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: He was present in Port Elizabeth at the time of the Goniwe murders, is that right? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct, yes. ADV FORD: Mr Lotz, who testified yesterday, do you know him well? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, I know him, he worked with him. ADV FORD: Do you know of any relationship between Mr Lotz and Mr Van Rensburg? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, I know. ADV FORD: What is that relationship? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is his father-in-law. ADV FORD: Then you say at this stage Gilbert told me that Eric Strydom contacted him regarding allegations of a fraud regarding Mgoduka and Sehati. We did not discuss this any further because the operation had been launched already. I understand that you mean that as far as you were concerned, it played no role whatsoever in the decision to kill these men? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: Now, you have heard in so far as the questions which were put to you by my learned friend, Mr Hugo, that Mr De Kock's evidence is going to be that in fact in the first instance that was the only thing that was mentioned? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is incorrect. ADV FORD: Can you think of any reason why Mr De Kock would be lying about this? MR NIEUWOUDT: I don't think that he is lying, perhaps he has just forgotten about that if I have to speculate. ADV FORD: Mr Nieuwoudt, I want to read to you briefly a section from the application for amnesty for Mr Ras and Mr Ras hasn't testified yet, but we must assume that he is going to testify in accordance with what is contained in these documents. MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: I am reading from page 262 in the middle. While we were having a braai here in Port Elizabeth with Carl Edwards and others, he also discussed this matter. Carl Edwards mentioned that the operation was done with money by the ANC. They intercepted the money and channelled that to the State. That was the instruction by P.W. Botha and if they defected to the ANC, this would lead to embarrassment for the Security Police and the government because of the large amount of monies entering the country in support of the ANC and other organisations, that was the only counter-measure to prevent these donors. And it resulted in only new cheques being written and when these cheques - an d it could be assumed that they used the money for their own gain. And that would cause that no further donations would be made to the organisations. I did not have any knowledge of any monies of this kind which was meant for the treasurer. Were you aware of such procedure, such an undertaking or that this was happening? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I don't have any knowledge of that. I heard of that the first time during my hearing. ADV FORD: Well, when Brigadier Gilbert told you about the suggestions of fraud against Mgoduka and Sehati, did you ask any further questions about that? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I did not. ADV FORD: Why not? MR NIEUWOUDT: It was not necessary. ADV FORD: But surely you were going up to brief Mr Van Rensburg and Mr De Kock if need be, as it turned out, you needed to be fully aware of all the relevant considerations in this matter? MR NIEUWOUDT: Brigadier Gilbert did not discuss this matter of fraud, this was not why they were eliminated. ADV FORD: Would you say the primary reason then Mr Nieuwoudt, for the decision to eliminate the four men was the possibility of them revealing information to the ANC? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, and also the planting of the bomb on the 16th of December. ADV FORD: Well, that you could have stopped merely be detaining them, they didn't have to kill them for that? MR NIEUWOUDT: And what about the members of the Security Branch, the Information Network, how could we combat then the ANC/SACP alliance and prevent the overthrow of the government of the day. That was the total spectrum we had to take into consideration. ADV FORD: You were aware of the operation in which, what are frequently referred to as the Goniwe 4, were killed, is that right? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, all that Gilbert told me was that some of these people were involved in the murder of Ford Galatha, Goniwe, Sparrow Mkhonto and the other one. ADV FORD: Well, then there could have been no doubt in your mind that that operation was also a Security Police operation? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. It was a sensitive operation. ADV FORD: And when you went to speak to Mr Van Rensburg, it was one of the factors which you mentioned to him? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: And he knew immediately what you were talking about? MR NIEUWOUDT: I assume so. ADV FORD: You did not have to explain to him what you were talking about? MR NIEUWOUDT: I don't know whether he knew about everybody who was involved in the Goniwe murder. And I just mentioned to him what Gilbert had conveyed to me. ADV FORD: Well, we know that you two were involved besides this incident Mr Nieuwoudt, you two were involved in instances where for instance, last week I understood you testified that two young activists were killed by yourself and Mr Van Rensburg, is that right? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: And presumably I didn't hear the evidence, but I presume that you got authority for that? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: And you would have been aware that the decision to kill the Goniwe four, authority would have been required? MR NIEUWOUDT: I believe so, yes. ADV FORD: And the authority, if we were to understand your evidence here, would have been gotten firstly from the senior man or one of the senior men in Port Elizabeth and subsequently from head office in Pretoria? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: Were you aware that Mr Van Rensburg was involved in that? MR NIEUWOUDT: No. ADV FORD: Did you have any reason to suspect that he was involved in that? MR NIEUWOUDT: In which case? ADV FORD: The case of Matthews Goniwe and his three colleagues. MR NIEUWOUDT: I don't know. I don't have any knowledge of that case. ADV FORD: But what we know without question is that Mr Van Rensburg didn't have to ask you any questions about what you were talking about when you mentioned the Goniwe 4? MR NIEUWOUDT: All that I conveyed to Van Rensburg was what Gilbert had told me, namely that three of these people were involved in the Goniwe incident, and I mentioned their names. All four of those people involved in this incident. ADV FORD: Yes, but the question I am asking you Mr Nieuwoudt, is simply this, if Mr Van Rensburg wasn't already either involved himself or already aware that the Security Forces or the Security Police had been directly involved in that killing, he would have asked you but what about the Goniwe, we had nothing to do with that? MR NIEUWOUDT: I don't know, he did not ask me that. I don't know whether he was involved. I don't know which role he played, I was not involved in that. So I cannot draw that inference. ADV FORD: Do you know if his son-in-law, Mr Lotz, was directly involved in that murder? MR NIEUWOUDT: No. ADV FORD: You still don't know? MR NIEUWOUDT: Now I know. ADV FORD: Well, what do you know now? MR NIEUWOUDT: That they applied. ADV FORD: Who is they? MR NIEUWOUDT: General Van Rensburg and Lotz. ADV FORD: And if as you say Brigadier Gilbert conveyed to you that three of the persons involved had also been involved in the Goniwe murders, if they did go over to the ANC, if they did convey the information to the ANC, they would have blown the whole story in so far as the Goniwe murders were concerned? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: And that, it appears, would have implicated Mr Van Rensburg and his son-in-law? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is what I know now, yes. ADV FORD: When you spoke firstly to Mr Van Rensburg, were you under the impression that he was fully aware of the whole operation, what was intended or did you have to brief him specifically as to what was required, what the problems were and what the intention was in so far as the elimination of these persons were concerned? MR NIEUWOUDT: I don't think that I gave him the operational details. What I did tell him was what the members' involvement would be and what they would be responsible for and the information at our disposal at that stage. ADV FORD: Did you tell him about the fraud? MR NIEUWOUDT: Maybe I mentioned it to him, and maybe Gilbert also mentioned it to him. I don't know, but I did mention that two of them were involved in fraud. I may have mentioned that. ADV FORD: Just getting for a moment to the involvement of all four these persons. Up to now, if I read your amnesty application and the evidence you have given Mr Nieuwoudt, you have been very specific about your information regarding Mr Mgoduka and Mr Sehati. That is also known as Mr Jack, is that right? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: Up to now, the only information you have given in so far as the other two, Mr Faku and Mr Mapipa is concerned, is the initial conversation in the tea room, or am I wrong? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, they were also present during the operation where my source was eliminated and the other one was detained in Quatro. The four of us. ADV FORD: Well, you didn't need for of them to tell the ANC about that, one of them could have done it just as well? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is correct, but you asked me what the activities were and they also took some of my informers to the safe houses. And they were also recruited for the ANC and Mgoduka was the principle. ADV FORD: Did you have specific information that they too had been recruited? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is the information which I got from the source. ADV FORD: Mr Mapipa had only been involved since 1986? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: But if I understand your evidence in so far as the safe houses are concerned, and the like, his knowledge would have been as good as the others? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: Now, when Colonel De Kock arrived, Mr Van Rensburg was still present? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct, yes. ADV FORD: Did you go through the whole explanation from start to finish again or did you just deal with certain aspects? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I only explained to De Kock in what these people were involved and their roles in the operation and that they were involved in the Goniwe matter. As I said I can't remember exactly whether I at that stage when De Kock was there, whether I mentioned the fraud matter, that they were involved in the fraud or whether I mentioned that before De Kock arrived. I can't remember that. ADV FORD: You see, as it was put to you by the Commissioner Potgieter earlier, the suggestion certainly seems to be that there was a potential for Mgoduka, Faku and the others, to be prosecuted on charges of fraud and the reaction to that was to threaten to convey information to the ANC. Did you understand that? MR NIEUWOUDT: Not all four of them, only two of them. ADV FORD: Just two, Mgoduka and Sehati? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: But if they had conveyed the information in regard to the Goniwe killings and in regard to the fraud itself, the taking of money intended for the ANC, nothing else was required. Both operations would have been blown? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: And it was then vitally important that they be silenced for those aspects, would you agree? MR NIEUWOUDT: It wasn't a primary factor to eliminate them regarding the fraud. ADV FORD: Well, that is what you say Mr Nieuwoudt. I am suggesting to you that your evidence regarding the giving of information concerning safe houses, the identifying of informants and the like, is something which came afterwards. The primary consideration was that the information relating to the Goniwe killings, should not be made public and the information regarding the taking of money from the ANC should not be made public? MR NIEUWOUDT: The fraud was not a factor with me. ADV DE JAGER: Mr Nieuwoudt, we accept that the fraud was not a factor, but if they were charged, they could have exposed the whole network? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV DE JAGER: And what the Advocate is putting to you is that they were threatening to do just that. If I understand it correctly, they virtually blackmailed you and said to you just you dare to prosecute me and I will expose everything, they were using that to stop you from prosecuting them for fraud. If I may use an example, it is exactly what Nofamela did later on? MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct. ADV DE JAGER: When he wasn't saved from the gallows, he revealed everything? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV DE JAGER: Is that not what you feared? MR NIEUWOUDT: I did not see it like that at that stage, but it is so that Gilbert could have considered that when he made his decision, I don't know. ADV FORD: Mr Nieuwoudt, after the bombing you if one has regard to your evidence in the so-called Goniwe inquest, and other statements which you have made, and what you have told the Commission today, were present. You were present on the scene together with Ras and Snyman. And you planted the detonator as it were. The detonator which you had previously prepared. MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: What was the purpose of that? MR NIEUWOUDT: To throw the other operatives off the scent. ADV FORD: I don't know if you will agree with this Mr Nieuwoudt, but on a perusal of your cross-examination in the Goniwe inquest, would you agree that that detonator which you planted, could never have set off the explosives which were in fact set off? MR NIEUWOUDT: It may. ADV FORD: So you believe it could still have been used? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: Now, being an explosives expert, you would expect I am sure that where a terrorist bomb had gone off, especially where members of the Security Forces are concerned, that at the very least, the matter would be fully investigated, a report obtained from an explosives expert, full attempt made to identify the explosives used, and the like? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct, yes. ADV FORD: Now, you weren't personally involved in the investigation of the bombing, were you? MR NIEUWOUDT: No. ADV FORD: The Investigating Officer as has already been said was one Captain Van Wyk? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV FORD: Under the authority or control of Colonel Roelofse? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: Did the investigation of bombings fall well within their powers or within their experience in this regard, do you think? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. Could I just explain that the bomb operatives would put in his statement his explanation and the investigation could then proceed. ADV FORD: The investigation of this matter, do you know was a video taken of the scene? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: Do you know when the video first came to light in the course of the Goniwe inquest? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, it was whilst I was testifying. ADV FORD: Was there any mention of the video in the investigating diary? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, I think so. ADV FORD: You think so? MR NIEUWOUDT: I think so because he was on the scene. Van Wyk was himself on the scene. ADV FORD: A sketch plan came to light during the course of the inquest, is that right? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: Was there mention of that in the diary? MR NIEUWOUDT: I think so because I think photographs were taken and on the video you can see where the fingerprint expert had taken certain measurements on the scene, so there must have been a plan and I think the Investigation Officer requested it as such. But I think the person who dealt with that was Constable Retief, and he was then transferred. I think that is where the matter ended. ADV FORD: Was there a report from an explosives expert? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV FORD: Who was that? MR NIEUWOUDT: I handed in a report. ADV FORD: Well, that couldn't have been of much use, could it, seeing that you were involved in the placing of the bomb? MR NIEUWOUDT: Correct. ADV FORD: In that report, did you make any attempt to identify the explosives used? MR NIEUWOUDT: No. ADV FORD: Did you make, was there any suggestion that you conducted any investigations in so far as the identity of the explosives were concerned? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I did not. ADV FORD: Were any specimens taken in an attempt to analyze these from the scene? MR NIEUWOUDT: No. ADV FORD: In those circumstances, how was it ever going to be possible to analyze the origins of the bomb? MR NIEUWOUDT: We were all on the scene, all the operatives. We couldn't take any samples, because it was contaminated and in any event, you can't determine the origins of the explosive device. The samples would only tell you what it was made of normally, so there isn't any concrete ... (intervention) ADV FORD: The point is I am making, Mr Nieuwoudt, there was no real attempt made to do any of that, was there? MR NIEUWOUDT: No. ADV FORD: Mr Bizos in his cross-examination of Colonel Roelofse in the Goniwe inquest, referred to it as a parody of an investigation. Do you think he was wrong? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I don't think so. ADV FORD: Have you read through the investigation diary of that incident, Mr Nieuwoudt? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, I did. ADV FORD: Do you know how many times the notation is made investigation proceeding? MR NIEUWOUDT: There were many of those, many of those notes. ADV FORD: In your experience as an officer, what is the purpose of an investigating diary? To explain precisely what investigation is being conducted? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, what kind of diary is this now? ADV FORD: The investigating diary which related specifically to the bombing, Mr Chairman. ADV DE JAGER: In other words you did everything in your power, to actually cover this up? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. CHAIRPERSON: I think we can accept that Mr Ford. ADV FORD: I certainly accept that this witness would have done that, I am trying to identify because if other persons were also involved in the cover up Mr Chairman, then it is appropriate and proper that they should also be brought to justice. CHAIRPERSON: Proper that what? ADV FORD: That they also be brought to justice. That is why I am asking these questions, Mr Chairman. CHAIRPERSON: But you must remain within the parameters of this particular application. ADV FORD: Mr Chairman, as I understand it, one of the requirements of an applicant in one of these applications, is that there should be a full disclosure of facts. If there are facts which are available to any of the applicants, which indicate that any other person committed a criminal act in relation to this incident, then those facts too should be brought to light. If I am wrong, then I will desist. CHAIRPERSON: No, you are wrong. The Act does not say a full disclosure of all the facts, it says a full disclosure of all the relevant facts. The word relevant is there, it is used there with a very good purpose. ADV FORD: Yes, Mr Chairman. Am I to understand then that the facts relevant to the cover up which took place afterwards, are not relevant? Because if that is so, then I will stop, then I am wasting ... (intervention) CHAIRPERSON: Well, the cover up must be relevant first. What do you want to bring first? We shouldn't argue about what came first, the chicken or the egg or what should come first. The cover up in the sense that you want to canvass it, must be relevant before the non-disclosure thereof can be said to be material and that it should have been disclosed. ADV FORD: Mr Chairman, I am trying to ascertain whether there were any other members of the Security Police in Port Elizabeth, especially those in higher office, who were well aware of what had happened, the operation which took place, and were involved in the cover up which took place afterwards. I am trying to do no more than that. CHAIRPERSON: Well, yes, but don't go beyond the limits. ADV FORD: I will certainly desist if you tell me I am so doing Mr Chairman, I will stop it immediately. CHAIRPERSON: I am just about to think that you are just about at the limit. ADV FORD: Well, may I ask one or two more questions Mr Chairman? Mr Nieuwoudt, having regard to the positions in which both Colonel Roelofse and Captain Van Wyk held in the Security Branch, your evidence as I understand it is that they had no knowledge of the operation either before or after? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: And as far as you are concerned, nothing relating to the investigation thereafter in any way changes your view in that regard? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. I may mention that I misled the people at the scene by placing that detonator there and even my experts were misled. They made the assumption that it was an ANC operation. So I misled them, but nobody else knew about it. ADV FORD: Let me only put this to you then Mr Nieuwoudt, the documentation available, documentation which was referred to in your trial, the reports referred to a limpet mine, is that right? MR NIEUWOUDT: Not in my statement. That is the statement which the Magistrate made. Somebody used that terminology and also explained it like that to the Doctor. That is why Advocate Mostert told me that I had misled them. Well, I did mislead them initially on the scene and because I had left a limpet mine detonator there, they made the assumption. The Magistrate and the Doctor and the person who had issued the press statement. The policeman who released the press statement, all made mention of a limpet mine. ADV FORD: The report which was forwarded under your signature to Pretoria, if my recollection is right, also made mention of a limpet mine, is that correct? MR NIEUWOUDT: That was an administrative report relating to a damaged vehicle and I simply signed the post. I didn't even read the contents. It was simply to comply with the requirements of the quartermaster regarding a damaged vehicle and somebody else drafted the report, I was the Unit Commander and I simply signed it without reading it. ADV FORD: Would you agree with me Mr Nieuwoudt, that by the end of the evidence in this regard, it was quite clear that the bomb in question could not have been a limpet mine? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so. ADV FORD: And had a proper investigation been conducted, that could have been ascertained by an explosives expert? MR NIEUWOUDT: No. ADV FORD: Well, let me take it, you weren't a professional, you have already told us that? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct, but you could not from the scene there, you wouldn't be able to determine what kind of explosive device had been used. Nobody would be able to determine that. ADV FORD: The proper people to conduct the investigation and to furnish such a report, would have been those who were professionals, would you agree? MR NIEUWOUDT: Even the forensic laboratory will not be able to tell you how big the charge had been, what type of charge had been used. They would only be able to tell you what kind of elements had been used in the manufacture of the explosives. That would be all that they could tell you. They wouldn't be able to tell you how big it had been, what kind it had been etc. Only the type of explosive used. ADV FORD: Mr Nieuwoudt, out of the literature which you have read and which you've told this Commission you have read, would you agree with me that it is everybody agrees, in as far as the literature is concerned, that in so far as counter-insurgency, counter-intelligence is concerned, the elimination of people is an absolute final resort? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: And that if there are any other ways of - was there any way of avoiding killing people, it should be done? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV FORD: What I am putting to you Mr Nieuwoudt, that even if all your other evidence with regard to the involvement of Mgoduka, Sehati, Mapipa and Faku is correct, that there were other ways. MR NIEUWOUDT: I repeat what I said, I left it in Brigadier Gilbert's hands, he gave me the order. He made the decision. It wasn't necessary for me as far as I was concerned, it wasn't necessary to eliminate them, but that was my order. ADV FORD: Mr Chairman, if I may just have a moment. CHAIRPERSON: Before you resume. I think we should admit this as Exhibit B. I don't think we did, did we, the requisition for the tickets? MR BRINK: The voucher for the plane ticket, yes it is before you. Exhibit B. CHAIRPERSON: The voucher for the ticket is then Exhibit B. ADV FORD: Thank you Mr Chairman. Finally Mr Nieuwoudt, would it be fair to put to you that had you not conveyed the information which you did, to Brigadier Gilbert, if you hadn't urged upon him the urgency and the importance of the situation, and how complicated it was, and urged upon him that drastic steps were required, the men would not have been killed? MR NIEUWOUDT: I had my information which I believed was correct, that I conveyed to him. I gave him a full report, he listened to the tapes himself and he made that decision that those persons should be eliminated. ADV FORD: Thank you Mr Chairman, I have no further questions. NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY ADV FORD. ADV POTGIETER: That order was to commit an offence. Do you agree with Mr Van Rensburg's evidence that a member had a choice in the sense that if you didn't want to obey a so-called order to commit an offence, then you could refuse? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, not in the culture which I found myself, one did not question one's superiors. I was indoctrinated and told that we had to fight the ANC as the enemy, so the order which I was given, I trusted implicitly and obeyed implicitly. ADV POTGIETER: Was Mr Van Rensburg wrong when he said that a member in those circumstances had a choice. That was his very clear evidence yesterday? MR NIEUWOUDT: I can only speculate. I don't know what General Van Rensburg meant, but the way I interpreted it was that I never questioned an order given by a superior. I followed it blindly and that is why I am in these circumstances, because I was loyal to my Security Branch and towards my Commanding Officer and to my country. That is why I did this. ADV POTGIETER: Thank you. CHAIRPERSON: Mr Brink? MR BRINK: Just one question Mr Chairman. Mr Nieuwoudt I am referring to the so-called funeral and wedding letters, you know what I am talking about? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. MR BRINK: In what language or languages were they written, can you remember? MR NIEUWOUDT: That was written in English and also in Xhosa. MR BRINK: Did you have apart from the four people who were killed, did you have other Xhosa speaking people on your staff? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. MR BRINK: Thank you. ADV POTGIETER: Mr Nieuwoudt, you might be able to help me with one aspect, Snyman and Vermeulen and Ras, were they Warrant Officers? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV POTGIETER: All three of them? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. If I remember correctly at that stage. ADV POTGIETER: Did you not trust them completely or what? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I trusted them completely. ADV POTGIETER: You didn't tell them about the Eastern Block detonator? MR NIEUWOUDT: No. I deposited it there without being noticed. ADV POTGIETER: Did you tell anybody else about it? MR NIEUWOUDT: No. ADV POTGIETER: You didn't tell Gilbert or anyone else? Perhaps the two experts, Du Toit and Kok? MR NIEUWOUDT: No. ADV POTGIETER: Why not? MR NIEUWOUDT: Because Gilbert had told me that it should look, made to look like an ANC operation and I knew that on several such scenes we had picked up some of these detonators and I knew that if it had been done by the technical division, then there would be no proof. And that is why I left that detonator there to point a finger at the ANC. ADV POTGIETER: But didn't you think of asking Du Toit and Kok, why didn't you ask them look if I plant this thing on the scene, would it lead to any problems? Another expert perhaps, could be able to work out that this was a planted detonator. MR NIEUWOUDT: No. ADV POTGIETER: That that detonator couldn't or wasn't able to detonate this charge? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, but it could. ADV POTGIETER: Yes, that is your opinion. But you didn't think of asking anybody about this? MR NIEUWOUDT: No. ADV POTGIETER: And the other aspect, you took a detour with Snyman, Ras and Vermeulen. You drove to the scene? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is when we loaded the vehicle with explosives. ADV POTGIETER: Yes, on page 336 of the record and you say on the last line of paragraph 40 you say I took these people with a detour to the scene so that they couldn't later be able to identify the premises? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is so. ADV POTGIETER: Why did you do that? MR NIEUWOUDT: I acted pro-actively to ensure that there would be the necessary compartmentalisation and that we operated on a need to know basis in case of future cases testimony. In case any one of those people had to testify in future cases, they wouldn't be able to identify the place. ADV POTGIETER: But they knew what was happening? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV POTGIETER: They would then carry out plan B, or at least two of them would? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV POTGIETER: Is that also a decision which you took on your own? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that was one of my security measures which I put in place. ADV DE JAGER: So in fact you put plan C into operation as well? ADV POTGIETER: Just in case the people who was supposed to carry out plan B, decided to change their minds? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV POTGIETER: And decided that they would rather tell the truth, then at least they wouldn't be able to identify this place? Is that how you tried to guarantee the success of the venture? MR NIEUWOUDT: Those are precautions which I took. ADV POTGIETER: Was that because they were subordinates? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes. ADV POTGIETER: You couldn't always be hundred percent certain that there would be no problems in future once the questions start to be asked. MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. ADV POTGIETER: Thank you. MR NIEUWOUDT: Thank you. CHAIRPERSON: When Gilbert suggested that these people should be transferred, you didn't think that would solve the problem? MR NIEUWOUDT: I didn't think that it would solve the problem. I immediately thought that they would abscond. CHAIRPERSON: What did you think would solve the problem? MR NIEUWOUDT: If I think back now I don't know what I would say, but then I left it in his hands, I didn't think about it. I didn't think what could solve the problem. CHAIRPERSON: You see, you and Gilbert were it seems to me, in good terms and I get the impression that he was actually open to suggestions from you. He was quite prepared to discuss this issue with you and I would like to know why you wouldn't have, if you were not happy with the transfer, in the course of this discussions with him, why you didn't put your mind to use and come up with some other suggestions. MR NIEUWOUDT: If I think back to the events, he didn't ask me for suggestions or comment or anything like that. I simply told him what I feared. CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but he didn't have to ask you for an alternative suggestions, I mean he is putting across his suggestion. His own suggestion and if you are not happy with it, surely he didn't have to ask you for your own input. The whole purpose of your being there with him, was precisely to discuss the problem and to come up with a solution? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I merely gave him the information which I had and I sketched the consequences which could arise. And then I left the decision to him, with all respect. CHAIRPERSON: Is the impression not correct as conveyed by the uncorrected version of your affidavit, that you came up with the suggestion that they should be eliminated? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I had never at any stage considered that they should be eliminated. I had no action against them as far as that was concerned. CHAIRPERSON: So while Gilbert suggested one solution namely that they be transferred, as far as you are concerned, you just didn't have any other solution, any alternative solution. Your mind just didn't come up with anything? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. The only thing I was concerned about was that should they be transferred, it could just exaggerate the problem and that they could abscond and that they would still be in a position to expose our whole Security Network. My security lines would have been cut off because they were my eyes and ears. And that is why they were of crucial importance for me. CHAIRPERSON: Perhaps I should also ask you this. Why didn't you take these people, detained them, assaulted them and tortured them as you used to do in the past, extracting information and admissions from them? I mean you used to do that, the Security Police used to do that in the past? We know now, you used to deny it, but now you don't? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is correct. CHAIRPERSON: Why didn't you get them in, detain them, assault them and torture them, put big tubes in their faces, suffocate them like it used to happen until they brought all this information as opposed to killing them. Why didn't you do that? MR NIEUWOUDT: That is so. But I repeat we were there to prevent that the information be leaked. And I left the decision in Gilbert's hands. CHAIRPERSON: But I can assure you if you had tortured them the way that we know people used to be tortured, I am not so sure that they would ever have dared to leak, take out any other information. They would have been in serious trouble? That could have solved the problem maybe. MR NIEUWOUDT: Maybe, it is possible. CHAIRPERSON: Why didn't you think of that? MR NIEUWOUDT: I did not at that stage, with all respect. CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I hear you, thank you. ADV POTGIETER: Just a follow up question. You never at any stage formed the opinion that the only solution in the circumstances was to eliminate the people? MR NIEUWOUDT: No, I didn't. I never formed that opinion. ADV POTGIETER: You didn't see that as the only way out, the only way to deal with the situation? MR NIEUWOUDT: Yes, that is so. ADV POTGIETER: Thank you. CHAIRPERSON: Mr Booyens, re-examination? ADV BOOYENS: I have got no re-examination Mr Chairman. NO RE-EXAMINATION BY ADV BOOYENS. CHAIRPERSON: Mr Hugo, I notice that it is already four o'clock and - just a minute. ADV FORD: I thought you were addressing me Mr Chairman, sorry. CHAIRPERSON: No, no. Actually I was trying to address myself to Mr Hugo. MR HUGO: Mr Chairman, nine o'clock tomorrow morning will suit us if you want to start at nine o'clock. CHAIRPERSON: So we will adjourn and then start at nine o'clock tomorrow morning with your client, Mr De Kock. MR HUGO: Mr De Kock will start at nine o'clock. CHAIRPERSON: We will adjourn until nine o'clock in the morning. COMMISSION ADJOURNS 145 GJ NIEUWOUDT PORT ELIZABETH HEARING EASTERN CAPE/AMNESTY ADV BOOYENS 201 GJ NIEUWOUDT MR HUGO 209 GJ NIEUWOUDT MR LAMEY 213 GJ NIEUWOUDT COMMITTEE 218 GJ NIEUWOUDT MR LAMEY 222 GJ NIEUWOUDT ADV JANSEN 234 GJ NIEUWOUDT MR CORNELIUS 235 GJ NIEUWOUDT MR KEMP 238 GJ NIEUWOUDT MR FORD 312 GJ NIEUWOUDT COMMITTEE 320 GJ NIEUWOUDT