amntrans AMNESTY HEARINGS 1998-11-12 DURBAN 4 https://sabctrc.saha.org.za/hearing.php?id=52963&t=&tab=hearings https://sabctrc.saha.org.za/originals/amntrans/1998/98110919_dbn_981112dbn.htm MR VISSER: (Continued) The witness, Botha, is still giving evidence. Mr Botha, yesterday you took an oath to speak the truth, do you still consider yourself committed under that oath? That is correct. HENDRIK JOHANNES PETRUS BOTHA (s.u.o.) EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER Yesterday we got to the point where we were discussing the structures, because we haven't got a better word, which was put there in order to combat the onslaught and we were discussing that. Now briefly, this is not now the time and place to give us the whole international security management system as such, but just briefly, it came down to the fact that the head of the security management system, it was a State Security Council under the chairmanship of usually the State President and that there was a pyramid of structures which was created and persevered under the State Security Council which was delegated downwards and the purpose of this was in order to fill the gap between the highest level of management and the ground level and to increase more cooperation, is that correct? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. MR VISSER Mr Chairman, in the other side of the story at page 151 there is a helpful - 151 Mr Chairman, there's an organigram, I'm not going to go into any detail about it, it's self-explanatory and if you would perhaps in the newly marked bundle 3 turn to page 356 to 362, you will find a brief summary of what we are talking about Mr Chairman, with names and etc, a very brief summary. 356 of the newly marked bundle 3, Mr Chairman. It's only a few pages up to 362, very briefly and fairly well summarised Mr Chairman, so that that part can be read at your convenience at any time. Now this is the one side of this issue, not true Mr Botha? There were these national structures which was installed in order to fight the war but really you want to tell the Committee something about what happened on ground level where you had specific problems which wasn't necessarily national problems but which you had to handle on a day to day basis, is that correct? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. MR VISSER Can you tell us then in your own words how you saw the situation, what the problems were and how you decided to address them? MR BOTHA Chairperson, in 1986 there were already existing structures at police head office and they functioned and they functioned under the name of Trevits: Anti-Revolutionary Information Task Team and from time to time there were requests from Trevits with regards to certain information needs which had to be addressed by the different security divisions. MR VISSER Both the police and the defence force or only the police? MR BOTHA The requests were directed at all the intelligence services who operated within South Africa. MR VISSER Is that also national intelligence? MR BOTHA Yes. MR VISSER Did you say the requests were coming from these agencies? MR BOTHA Yes. The request came from Trevits to all the agencies. MR VISSER And this dealt with information? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. MR VISSER I don't interrupt you but while you are going to talk about Trevits, I would like you to also give us your ideas about why there was talk in Tevits about target development and what it meant. MR BOTHA Very well Chairperson. Trevits, as the acts of terror escalated in South Africa, Trevits expanded up to division level and here I refer specifically within the police framework as security branch divisions. Consequently division Port Natal and also later the other two divisions within the Natal borders, Northern Natal and the Midlands, they were incorporated into one province, they formed part of a District Trevits Committee. For the purposes of the gathering of information and as far as Trevits was concerned, we were grouped together with the division Eastern Transvaal which is now known as Division Mpumalanga or Police District Mpumalanga. The reason for this was both the security divisions which bordered with Swaziland which acted as a host country for ANC activities and which was also in the pipeline from Lusaka and it was a through route Lusaka, Mozambique, Swaziland, South Africa. Inside of Swaziland there were certain structures of the ANC there, the Regional Political Military Committee and the Transvaal machinery which dealt with activities for the Transvaal areas and more specifically for Natal, the Natal machinery which was our responsibility. Consequently you will see that there was an overlapping in as far as information gathering was concerned when it went across borders. MR MALAN Sorry Mr Botha, you refer to the RPMC which you describe as an ANC structure, is that correct? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. MR MALAN And if you then say the Transvaal machinery, was that underneath the RPMC? MR BOTHA That is correct. MR MALAN And then the Natal machinery was the RPMC machinery? MR BOTHA It fell under the RPMC. MR MALAN And you when say it was your responsibility, are you talking about the gathering of information? MR BOTHA Yes and as far as it was concerned with the Natal machinery. MR VISSER Maybe at that point, previously Natal was divided into three regions, is that correct? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. MR VISSER Which three regions were those? Port Natal we know about that one, and then? MR BOTHA Division Northern Natal which was from the Swaziland border up to the Tugela River and the Natal Midlands or under the name Division Natal and that included the Natal Midlands. MR VISSER And who was the commander in Natal Midlands, that's Pietermaritzburg, is that correct? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. MR VISSER Who was the commander of the terrorist unit there? MR BOTHA As far as I know it was Colonel Vorster. MR VISSER And he is also one of the applicants in this case? MR BOTHA That is correct. MR VISSER Do you want to continue? MR MALAN Sorry, the commander of Port Natal, who was that at that stage? MR BOTHA Brigadier J.C. van Niekerk and in the same year '86/'87 Colonel Steyn, later Brigadier Steyn became the commander. MR VISSER Let us not get confused, I think Mr Malan wants to know who was the commander of the terrorist unit - oh, not? MR MALAN I looking for the person who had the same status as Vorster. MR BOTHA That was Taylor, that was Colonel Taylor. MR VISSER That was the person who was at the head of the terrorist unit, so in other words to put it clearly, Vorster and Taylor were equals. MR MALAN But Vorster was situated in Pietermartizburg so Vorster was not the commander of the security branch only of the terrorist unit? MR BOTHA That is correct. MR MALAN And Taylor was also the head of terrorist unit in Port Natal. And the Northern Natal region? MR BOTHA The security branch commander was Colonel Jaap Burger but I cannot remember who was the commander of the terrorist unit. MR VISSER You were busy saying Mr Botha that it was your responsibility to gather information with regards to the ANC machinery in Natal? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. MR VISSER Very well, please continue? MR BOTHA To link up to the expansion of structures, at that stage Swaziland was primarily the responsibility of Eastern Transvaal and we in Natal had the attitude that we must wait until infiltration actually took place before we could work with those terrorists. In other words we had to gather information in order to track them where they were residing. MR VISSER Are you busy saying that to a great extent the policy was to act reactively, to wait till things happen and then to start acting? Is that what you're saying? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson, because of the structure we were limited like this. CHAIRPERSON Was it or were you saying till they crossed into Natal? MR BOTHA Chairperson, until they came into our region Port Natal across from the Tugela River, that was because of the limitations placed on us because of the fact that there was no structure in place. MR VISSER To do what? MR BOTHA We couldn't act outside of our division parameters, we couldn't gather information like that, information pertaining to the ANC and PAC. MR VISSER And this limitation was legitimate, it was legitimately predetermined borders, you couldn't go into Swaziland because you didn't have the jurisdiction to do so? MR BOTHA Legitimately yes and we were also restricted because of police regulations. We had to work within our borders. MR MALAN Sorry, I want us to understand each other, what you are saying is that you couldn't operate in the Northern Natal operation and gather information there, but you did have access to information? MR BOTHA Yes we had access to the information, there was no limitations when it came to exchanging information. MR MALAN Why would it be necessary to gather information there in the first place? Why couldn't Port Natal do that? MR BOTHA I'll tell you why it became important to us now. The target area of the infiltrating terrorists was the division Port Natal and they only moved through Northern Natal and Natal and therefore we had a problem and with the expansion of the Trevits structure up to division level, the opportunity was now created for us to work wider than our division borders. Consequently, we now had access to Swaziland and we could now gather information there in order to prevent and also act pro-actively towards any act of terror which was destined at the divisions Northern Natal, Port Natal and Natal itself. MR MALAN In terms of what did the police regulations give you permission to go into Swaziland to gather information, surely it could not be the combination of the three former regions? Were specific capacities created in order to cross the border to gather information? MR BOTHA Not in term of the police regulations, Chairperson, but by means of a document which described the activities of Trevits and because we did intelligence work it was the accepted factors that you act covertly or clandestinely and you gather information in such a fashion within a bordering country. MR MALAN I accept the practice because we've had evidence, but this document you are referring to which described the activities of Trevits, is that available and was it explicitly put like that, as you put it to us? MR VISSER Chairperson, maybe I must answer. This document was already made available to the TRC and then my attorney just whispered in my ear and said that he'll see if he can find this document. He is not at his office right now so it might create a problem, but as soon as we get hold of it we'll submit it to you. Maybe I can just add Chairperson, because it's important here and with regards to Mr Malan's question that previously, some of the Amnesty Committee Members heard evidence before with regards to the Simonstad Council and some of the things that were decided there, one of them was that the separation of the defence force and the police had to be bridged by means of information exchange and linking up to that, because there was such a good relationship between the South African Government and the Swaziland Government and also specifically the security branch and the security branch there, there was also a decision taken that the police, even though this was a strange country or it was not in South African borders, that in the exception of Swaziland the police would have access and that they could act there but the defence force could not act there and I'm not quite sure if that agreement was ever manifested in a written form, but there was a lot of evidence, especially that from General Johan Coetzee and also Pik Botha, that in those years there was very good cooperation and exchange of information did take place and the security branch members were permitted to go and work there and to gather information there and they were permitted by the Swaziland Government to do so. Can you please continue? MR BOTHA Very well Chairperson. With the establishment of these structures it was easier for us to also exchange information with our colleagues at national intelligence and military intelligence. There was a formal structure in terms of a Committee which from time to time had meetings, usually under the chairmanship of the commander of the security division in the Eastern Transvaal, during which information with regards to our target area which was Swaziland, was exchanged. MR VISSER Mr Botha, just to get back because now it's quite important, who manned Trevits, who were the highest officials? Were there middle rank officials or were they ground level officials? Who manned Trevits? MR BOTHA It I can say permanent members of the Region Trevits, then it was the desks office, Taylor and myself and from time to time we were accompanied by our commanders. MR VISSER And did Trevits have executive capacity in the sense that they could give an instruction to a specific division other than that of gathering information, for example to eliminate a target for example? MR BOTHA No Chairperson. MR VISSER Because you see the perception exists that Trevits, because people spoke of target development, that Trevits was the organ which identified a target, for example a person, and that he then could give instructions that that person should be killed. Was that your perception and your experience and your understanding of Trevits? MR BOTHA Trevits was or the component Trevits was purely an information co-ordinating group. We did gather information when we were requested to do so. MR VISSER And that information was that also given through to the higher structures? MR BOTHA That is correct. MR VISSER Let's use an example just to put this whole thing in perspective, let's say for example a decision was made by the State President or the cabinet that because of different reasons which they considered to be good reasons, there must be an attack on the ANC's strongholds in let's say Maputo, would Trevits then have been contacted and to what extent? MR BOTHA Yes Chairperson, we were all the time tasked to gather information with regards to facilities and I refer specifically to houses, through routes, overnight assistance and specific high-profile ANC personalities within that specific host country, his residence, his motor car, all that kind of information had to be developed, in other words we had to get photographs of the locations of the places, we had to get photographs of the person, we had to know what his daily routine and activities entailed. MR VISSER And which car he drives? MR BOTHA Yes. MR MALAN Just before you continue, can I just ask you, if you say the exchange, you exchanged information, is that with regards to intelligence pertaining to the enemy? MR BOTHA That is correct. MR MALAN You wouldn't have exchanged information about your activities other than that of gathering information, for example the instances you are now applying for amnesty for? You wouldn't have made this known to the people in Trevits? MR BOTHA No. MR MALAN And you also wouldn't ask permission from them? MR BOTHA No we wouldn't have. MR VISSER I would have gotten to that but the simple truth is because they did not have executive capacity and they would not be able to give you any permission? MR BOTHA That is correct. MR VISSER Just to get back to the question of Trevits and to conclude it, the evidence that the Amnesty Committees have heard and the Human Rights Committee of the TRC have heard about Trevits is that it was actually aimed at foreign activities so this would fall in with your understanding of these activities? MR BOTHA That is correct. MR VISSER And that Trevits by 1990 came to an end? My attorney shakes his head, I do not understand it properly it seems. I do have it wrong there, can I just state it correctly? The capacities and tasks of Trevits in terms of gathering of intelligence with regard to foreign countries changed in 1990. After the unbanning of the ANC and other radical organisations, as they were viewed in those days, and then they started to work with internal intelligence gathering. Would that be more accurate to state it in that manner? MR BOTHA That is correct, Mr Chairman. MR VISSER Is there anything else you wish to add? MR MALAN Excuse me Mr Visser that I interrupt you, just to get some clarity, up until 1990 there was no internal intelligence gathering? MR BOTHA That is correct, Mr Chairperson. MR VISSER Is there anything else you would like to add? You were saying you always acted in a reactive manner whenever the terrorist fell into your lap did this change at any point in time? MR BOTHA Yes Chairperson. Our capacity to work in Swaziland from there it was expanded to Mozambique and even to Lusaka and because the further away you could gather intelligence from your target area the better you could do planning so as to launch any action. CHAIRPERSON Could I go back a little bit? You said a moment ago that up to 1990 there was no internal intelligence gathering? MR BOTHA No Chairperson, in terms of Trevits who were the revolutionary task team. We were only aimed at foreign countries but after 1990, after the unbanning of the ANC, the focus was shifted internally. CHAIRPERSON But before 1990 there were other police bodies gathering information, intelligence, internally? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. The normal police function of the security police was functioned internally. MR VISSER So I understand that you say that you realised that it did not help to wait for the problem to come to you, you have to go and look for it at the source and stop it there? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. MR VISSER And consequently our capacity was also expanded to technical abilities, not only based on the human informant and we had to look at all capabilities of gathering intelligence and with the combination of other intelligence services capabilities we had total intelligence gathering capacity. National intelligence with their satellite capabilities received information from Lusaka, Defence Force Intelligence had representation in Mozambique and combined with our intelligence capabilities ...[intervention] MR VISSER Just go a little bit slower, this is important for the Committee and they are making notes of what you say and if you go too quickly something might get lost. Please go a little bit slower? You said you capabilities were expanded and better liaison could take place with National Intelligence and the army in neighbouring areas? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. MR VISSER Would you like to add anything to that? MR BOTHA The onslaught came mainly from Swaziland and therefore in 1986, when we had success with an action against the first Area Political Committee that functioned within. MR VISSER Is that Operation Butterfly? MR BOTHA That is correct. MR VISSER And you say because of the successes with the new approach and the new structures, if you want to call it that, that was established and put into action there was a decrease after 1986 because of the successes which you had. Is that what you're trying to say? MR BOTHA There was an increase and after our capabilities were expanded, there was definitely a decrease. MR VISSER We will address the document soon but it would seem from the summary in Exhibit A in the index where the incidents from Mr Taylor's book it would seem that in 1986 there were 36 incidents and in 1987 17 incidents, is that what you refer to? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson and to link up with that it is important to note that as well our focus was aimed at Swaziland and at the end of 1985 and 1986 the onslaught was also launched from Botswana on the division Port Natal and it was also the group of Robert McBride and Gordon Webster. MR VISSER Yes, the Honourable Chairperson is involved in an amnesty application which deals with an attack on the life of Mr Marius Schoon and he heard the evidence of expanded communication network between Botswana and South Africa. This is not relevant here but this links up with what you have to say, they came from Botswana to Natal as where they first came through Swaziland. MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. MR MALAN Would you like to tell us when was Trevits established? I can't remember if you mentioned it this morning? MR BOTHA Chairperson, I experienced Trevits as a structure in 1986 already but I would assume that it was established before that. MR VISSER Mr Chairperson, I have the idea that it would have been a little bit later but we can try and find out what the date. CHAIRPERSON Well he says he's experienced it in 1986, are you saying that you're now giving evidence that the applicant is wrong when he says that? MR VISSER No Mr Chairman, I'm not giving evidence, I'm trying to be of assistance. I'm just trying to tell you that the ...[intervention] CHAIRPERSON You're trying to change his evidence aren't you? He has given evidence saying he experienced it in 1986 and he thinks he was constituted before. MR MALAN Excuse me, why I ask this question Mr Botha is because I have the impression that successes of '86/87 is linked to the changes in 1986 or maybe 1985 but most probably 1986? MR BOTHA That is correct, Mr Chairperson. MR MALAN And just to make sure, the changes were with the three in one? MR BOTHA Trevits as well as within the security branch there was a new approach in terms of getting the information, the establishment of an MK intelligence component. MR MALAN If I can just get some clarity here, this has nothing to do with the establishment of Trevits but with the reorganisation? MR BOTHA Trevits had a role in that, Trevits gave us the opportunity to work in neighbouring countries, in Swaziland and to gather information there. MR MALAN But if I understand you correctly, you were Trevits and with the others you were Trevits? MR BOTHA That is correct but the opportunity was given to us by Trevits because without Trevits we did not have the opportunity earlier here in Port Natal because we were not authorised to work in Swaziland. MR MALAN So your first participation in Trevits was in 1986? MR BOTHA Yes and that is my experience that Trevits already existed. MR MALAN Well if it already existed, how did your participation come about there and how did it come about that the desk officers which you refer to constituted Trevits in it's meetings, what was it constituted of before that? MR BOTHA Chairperson, you might have missed that point. I said that Trevits existed as a structure at police headquarters. MR MALAN I'm with you now, thank you. CHAIRPERSON I'm sorry, I'm not with you completely. Was Trevits a unit which had it's own ranks and then there was this committee that you sat on with Mr Taylor on occasions and there were representatives from all the provinces on that committee, were they? MR BOTHA Chairperson, Trevits only existed as a committee, it was not a structure on it's own. CHAIRPERSON Well who went to Swaziland to gather the information? MR BOTHA The members of the security branches of the Eastern Transvaal and members of the security branch of division Natal. CHAIRPERSON Ordinary members were sent on certain missions? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. CHAIRPERSON Did they remain members of the Port Natal branch or the Northern Natal branch and they merely acted on behalf of Trevits, but Trevits didn't have permanent staff? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. MR MALAN Just to get clarity for myself, you say that the normal members could go into Swaziland now? Those decisions to gather intelligence, was that done at the regional level independently or was that to gather that specific information was that decided in the co-ordinating committee between Eastern Transvaal and Natal, was the planning done there? In other words your intelligence, did you have to liaise with Eastern Transvaal or was the planning done there? MR BOTHA Both were relevant there. MR MALAN But you would have free access to gather your own intelligence and it could happen that you in Eastern Transvaal would be looking for the same intelligence? MR BOTHA That is correct. MR MALAN And gather intelligence independently without knowing of each other? MR BOTHA That is correct Chairperson. MR VISSER Mr Chairman, I must just place on record here that we did not anticipate that we were going to deal with Trevits as a subject and the witness is now giving evidence from his recollections and I must place on record that he may well be wrong with certain of his facts. If it's of importance to this Committee we will attempt to have the documentation couriered here and this witness can continue on Monday, Mr Chairman and deal with it more fully. But at this stage I would prefer not to go any further with Trevits other than just stating the principles, with your leave. MR MALAN Mr Visser, I speak for myself, this is not central but the issue of Trevits you touched on and you spoke of the perceptions that existed and it is important for me that we get more information. We have the source basis and we can pursue it further but I don't think it is primarily relevant to the amnesty application, I agree with you. MR VISSER Thank you Mr Chairperson and then I would like to return to the main road Mr Botha. Yesterday you gave your experiences to the Committee of the political situation, you have explained that to the Committee and you also mentioned that here in Durban you were in a war situation where bombs exploded and where you had to work hard and long hours in order to combat the violence. I would just like you to address the committee as to how you saw this war situation and how you saw your own position, you in particular, in this cadre of regulations and rules in which you had to act as opposed to what you were fighting. Can you just sketch how you saw yourself in that situation and what your experiences were? MR MALAN Mr Chairperson, the revolutionary struggle as it happened here, here in Natal and specifically the focal point of Durban, was much more serious than a conventional war. The enemy had no rules with regard to targets and with their acts of terror or their methods of terror and consequently I at grassroots level made decisions or took decisions which I thought were the correct ones because of the situation and of these decisions, as shown in my application for amnesty, that is why I am here, but I believed that those decisions were justified under the circumstances of what happened here and at all costs I had to stop the wave of terror. MR VISSER Mr Botha, can we now move to Exhibit A, that is a typed version of a written document is that correct? MR BOTHA That is correct. MR VISSER What is this and where does it come from, this Exhibit A? MR BOTHA Mr Chairperson, Exhibit A is an abstract from a register that was kept by Colonel Andy Taylor. MR VISSER Was this an official register or was it his own notes? MR BOTHA It was a non-official register, Mr Chairperson. MR VISSER Mr Chairman the - well a copy of the original is available for inspection by anybody who is interested. The only relevant point pertaining to the handwritten manuscript Mr Chairman is the fact that quite clearly different people wrote with different handwritings into this manuscript, this record. I don't believe, with respect, that anything turns on that. CHAIRPERSON Could you perhaps tell me, does it appear that the different writing is different incidents or perhaps different pages or - what I'm getting at is would someone come and report to him and write down the incident they were reporting or did somebody fill out the pages for him? MR VISSER I follow your question exactly, Mr Chairman, the answer is I haven't that study myself, perhaps that should have occurred to me. We will look at that and perhaps if you want to look at it yourself, the document is available. MR MALAN Can I just ask another question? Mr Botha have you made any entries into that register? MR BOTHA Yes I have Chairperson. MR MALAN And your entries, you did not act as a secretary, you made reports in there? MR BOTHA That is correct, Mr Chairperson. MR MALAN Thank you. MR BOTHA May I just explain Mr Chairman that photocopies have been made in the portrait fashion as they call it in computer language and not the - what's the other one - landscape fashion, so page 1 and 2 should be placed together to form the big page. The time column we have taken the liberty of omitting in the typed version Mr Chairman because mostly we believe that it's not really relevant what time the incidents took place, we left that out. Mr Botha, this Exhibit A starts at 1981 and ends at 1993. I hope that I counted correctly but Sunday just before we came down to Durban I drew up an index and I counted the incidents as it is put there in brackets in the index and I referred to in general a list of politically related incidents in Port Natal. In 1981 there were 9, 1982 there were 8, 1983 there were 9, 1984 it was doubled to 18, 1985 there were 34, 1986 there were 36 of which you have given evidence today and 1987 there were 17 and then there was an increase from 1988 to 21, 1989 - 23, 1990 - 32, 1991 - 35 and in 1992 when the peace negotiations were started there were 52 incidents and in 1993 there were four. I thought I'd mention this Mr Chairman, all of this is in the index, I just placed it on record now, it's in parenthesis after the year and then I've got the page number reference to that. I believed I've counted that correctly, Mr Chairman. Mr Botha, how complete would you say was Exhibit A or is Exhibit A with regards to the entries of incidents? MR BOTHA Mr Chairperson, I think the document is reasonably complete. MR VISSER It is possible that there were other incidents of which an entry was not made in here, is that what you're saying, is that what you're saying? MR BOTHA That is correct. MR VISSER The incidents which are indeed in here, they did happen? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. MR VISSER Could we just address this document in your evidence? MR MALAN Excuse me, I want to know can we investigate this with deeper analysis, there were certain incidents such as false flags like the blowing up of terrorists, is that also mentioned in here? Would those be actions of the terrorists? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. MR VISSER I was just about to address that aspect. MR MALAN Excuse me Mr Visser. MR VISSER No not at all Mr Chairperson, I appreciate it if you ask questions because then do not know how to offer the evidence so as to satisfy your question, please do not apologise. MR VISSER When we have done with this, would you please give a lay out to the Committee as to your insights with regard to Operation Butterfly which later led to the Ramlakan case and specifically the roles of the victims in this matter. We will get to that, but at this instance we would like to address the document itself, Exhibit A, so that you could give certain references to the Committee in as far as it might be relevant in the present application and if we have regard in the first instance at page 12, and we speak of 1985. We know in that year there were 34 incidents and what was the first incident on that page. MR BOTHA It's the incident of the 18th April 1985, an explosion at the Spar Foodliner, Trust Bank Arcade in St Georges Street, Durban. MR VISSER Yes, you see there on the right hand column, there's a reference to the High Supreme Court in Pietermaritzburg and there's a case number. What is that case number? MR BOTHA That case number is the number of the State vs Butu Buthelezi and others. MR VISSER And we refer to that as the Ramlakan case? MR BOTHA That is correct, Mr Chairman. MR VISSER And that is Case CC70/86? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. MR VISSER If we just look at Exhibit A on page 14, the last item there. It looks like Umlazi Bakery. On the 31st July 1985, under that same case number, that was that part of the Ramlakan case? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. MR VISSER And on the next page, page 15, the first item there, Home of Minister Rajabansi - Attack with Explosives, Suspected mini-limpet. MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. MR VISSER And these two last items on that page - Two mini-limpets explode in O.K. Bazaars in the one in West Street and the last one is Mini-Limpet explodes in Game. That's the Game shopping centre, not true? MR BOTHA That is correct. MR VISSER West Street. On page 16 - Mr Chairman are you able to keep up? On page 16 the first item, that's also a part of the Ramlakan case. Spar Foodliner, Trust Bank Building, West Street, Durban. And then we go to page 17, the third last item there is the Mobeni Post Office, Grimsbury Road, Mobeni. That was part of the Ramlakan case, is that correct? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. MR VISSER And the second last item is the next one, Chatsworth Magistrates Court? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. MR VISSER And then we can refer you to page 18. First item on that page is Albert Street, Volkswagen Combi and that's under the same case number? MR BOTHA That is correct. MR VISSER Sorry, we're running a bit ahead of ourselves now but ...[intervention] CHAIRPERSON Did you deal with page 13? MR VISSER I haven't Mr Chairman, in fact I'm coming to that right now because I'm dealing with it slightly on a different basis and the basis as you will immediately hear from my next question. The members or the activists who acted under the code name Operation Butterfly, were they also divided into separate units? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. MR VISSER And those units or people who were part of the unit, did they commit acts of terror for which they were charged but not necessarily in the Ramlakan case? MR BOTHA Chairperson, I do not understand the question. MR VISSER What I'm aiming at is the following and now let's look at page 13. Those two - in the first place, the Stanley Bhila incident, maybe I'm expressing myself badly, Stanley Bhila, he's mentioned in the first item on page 13? MR BOTHA That is correct. MR VISSER He is also under the case number of the Ramlakan case? MR BOTHA That is correct. MR VISSER In terms of Exhibit D there's an extract submitted there to this Committee pertaining to the charge sheet against accused number 7 and we believe that is Mr Bhila? MR BOTHA That is correct. MR VISSER Now the fact of the matter is, in the Ramlakan case Mr Bhila was accused of these items that we find in Exhibit D, but were those the only things he was accused of or was he also accused of terrorism by only being part of the group etc. MR BOTHA Chairperson, unless I can have a look at the charge sheet, I can tell you exactly what he was accused of, but if I do remember correctly, it was the complete spectrum on the law against terrorism. MR VISSER And as far as incidents could be linked to specific accused, were there then accused for that specific act of terror? MR BOTHA That is correct. MR VISSER The only point I'm trying to make is in the case of Zondo for example, in your application you said that one of the most prominent incidents which took place under the command of Operation Butterfly was the Amanzimtoti bomb? MR BOTHA That is correct. MR VISSER But that case was not part of the Ramlakan case? MR BOTHA No, that's correct, it wasn't. MR VISSER Now we've made that distinction, now let's look at page 13. We've already handled Mr Bhila and it refers to the Port Natal Administration Council at the office in Lamontville and that's the same item which is referred to in Exhibit D? MR BOTHA That is correct. MR VISSER There he is not accused in the Ramlakan case - I'm sorry, he is accused in the Ramlakan case as well with regards to DLB's" MR BOTHA That is correct. MR VISSER That is not mentioned specifically in Exhibit A under his name? MR BOTHA That is correct. MR VISSER I think that's the best way I can explain this Chairperson, there are certain gaps to that extent. CHAIRPERSON Now can we get hold of the indictment? MR VAN SCHALKWYK Mr Chairman, if I may be of assistance. The indictment before you is not the final indictment. It was amended at a later stage and two further accused were added. The one you have only refers to ten accused. Unfortunately, I went to - well I went to the registrar and unfortunately their records is an absolute shambles but eventually the charge sheet ended up by laying against twelve accused various charges as count one terrorism and then a number of separate alternatives in respect of each of the twelve accused. CHAIRPERSON You see they were charged together with terrorism? MR VAN SCHALKWYK Indeed so. MR VISSER I dare say that would probably also appear from the - not that I've seen it before - but it should also appear from the one that's before you now Mr Chairman. CHAIRPERSON One we have as Exhibit D relates only to the specific counts against Bhila? MR VISSER Yes. MR MALAN Can I just ask another question please Mr Botha? Page 13, the two cases we are talking about now, without referring to the record and maybe just to save ourselves some trouble, the two incidents, the Lamontville one, Lamontville Administration Council offices and the restaurant, I assume that some of the other accused were also found guilty on these incidents and that Bhila and Ntwene were acquitted on the basis that there was no evidence that could be brought in against them, the individuals. MR BOTHA No Chairperson, the only accused for those two incidents respectively and as far as the judgement of Judge ...[indistinct] is concerned ...[intervention] MR VISSER No, that's not necessary, let's deal with this now, in the Ramlakan case if you look at page 13, the very first item, there we have Stanley Bhila and he was accused of this Port Natal or Lamontville incident but we know that Bhila was found not guilty? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. MR VISSER Now the question which Mr Malan is asking you is, was this concerned with improper identification or why was he found not guilty? Was it because of a lack of evidence and what evidence, how did it happen? MR BOTHA The state witness refused to testify at the very last minute. MR VISSER Who was he? MR MALAN Lula Melikate. MR VISSER Mr Chairman, we've been given a document. The heading of that reads Operation Butterfly 1985, it consists of 6 pages. I believe that's the document to which my learned friend Mr Prior referred to this morning in your chambers when he said that he had given us summaries of the evidence of witnesses. I believe this is the document. It may be as well, Mr Chairman, to deal with this on the basis of an exhibit number, I believe the next exhibit is H if I'm not mistaken? CHAIRPERSON Alright, I agree. MR VISSER Thank you Mr Chairman. Why I'm referring to this right now Mr Chairman, is that you will find the name of the person that has just been mentioned by the witness at page - page 2? MR NGUBANE It's page 1 under "Internal". MR VISSER I'm sorry? MR NGUBANE It's on the very first page under "Internal". ...[indistinct] kwaMashu, Umlazi, Lamontville. MR VISSER I'm indebted to my learned friend. It's indeed on the first page under the heading "Internal - Various Units in kwaMashu, Umlazi and Lamontville, Chatworth, Lilamele Khate - Regional Commander. This is the witness which the witness has just referred to who at the eleventh hour in the Ramlakan case refused to testify which led to the release from all charges of Mr Bhila and Kumezo and incidently also one other person who was acquitted not true? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. MR VISSER Who was that? MR BOTHA Sipho Stanley Bhila. MR VISSER Yes but except for Bhila and Kumezu, it was also Buthelezi who was acquitted? MR BOTHA Yes, accused number one, Dudu Zwele Charity Baby Buthelezi. MR VISSER Now we are busy talking about page 13. Mr Malan has just referred you to the restaurant attacked where Pumezo was accused of in the Ramlakan case and we know that he was found not guilty because of reasons you've already indicated to us. There is also another incident were Pumezo, according to Exhibit A was involved and that was the incident, well not according to Exhibit A but on page 35, there are certain incidents mentioned, is that correct? MR BOTHA Yes that is correct, Chairperson. MR VISSER And if you go one page back to 34 and we look at the third incident from the top - which I'll ask you to mark in the meantime Mr Chairman - the 5th and the last incident. Sorry, my attorney points out to me that it's the 4th incident, one of 12 August 1998, 15 August 1998 and 26 August 1998. MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. MR VISSER Mr Chairman, there in the right you can write down kwaMashu unit, there will be evidence led to that extent at those three incidents that is. And then Mr Chairman on page 36 there are two incidents, a second and a third dated 3 November 1988 and 4 November 1998 and there you can also write in kwaMashu unit at those two. Mr Chairman, one of the more important ones is also at page 36, the very first one. That entry there, refers to an explosion at Phoenix, the railway station. That is exactly where the kwaMashu 3 were killed. MR MALAN Where is that, on what page? CHAIRPERSON 36. MR VISSER Page 36, the first item. So you can also write in there Mr Chairman, kwaMashu 3, just for purposes of identification. So these three there and then the previous three which I've referred you to. If we can now go back to page 35. You are now going to give evidence with regards to the integration of Zandile as the intelligence which you gathered from her, is that correct? MR BOTHA That is correct. MR VISSER And that information, because we're now busy with this exercise, we'll call that intelligence, that intelligence referred to all the incidents on page 35? MR BOTHA That is correct. MR VISSER Mr Chairman you can at this stage just make a note of Pumezo for all those incidents at page 35. The Amanzimtoti bomb is handled on page 18 of Exhibit A, the second item dated 23rd December 1985 and that's the case where Mr Zondo was found guilty and he received the death penalty? MR BOTHA That is correct. MR VISSER Page 18, 18 Mr Chairman, with regards to Zandile, can you please look at page 22 of Exhibit A. We are running ahead with the evidence because we are going to come back to this, but whilst we're busy with Exhibit A, we can just finish this. Please look at the fourth incident dated 31st July 1986. Who was that person who was killed there? MR BOTHA Lieutenant Raju of the security branch Durban. MR VISSER And can you just tell us how he got killed? MR BOTHA He was killed by a hand grenade attack on his house in the early morning hours whilst he was sleeping. MR VISSER And your evidence is going to be to the extent that it was who, who was responsible for this according to your intelligence? MR BOTHA Units under the command of Zandile. MR VISSER And do you have names? Who is David Majurai? MR BOTHA David Majurai part of a unit within the Butterfly unit, Chairperson. MR VISSER But this incident does not fall under the Ramlakan case? MR BOTHA That is correct. MR VISSER And the last item there, 7th September 1986 page 22. The Pick 'Pay Supermarket, Old Mutual Centre in Montclair? You also refer to that item or it's referred to in that item during the interrogation of Zandile, is that correct? MR BOTHA That is correct, Mr Chairman. MR VISSER And what became apparent from that? MR BOTHA That the people who were responsible for that act of terror where a person actually died, were David Majarai and others. MR VISSER And lastly is the incident on page 29, the first incident, 12th April 1987. Detective Warrant Officer Lembedi? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. MR VISSER And he died, as is alleged here, in a shoot out with terrorists in a certain area Umbumbulu, is that correct? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. MR VISSER Who is that Lembedi, Mr Botha? MR BOTHA It's Warrant Officer Lembedi who was a member of the security branch, Durban. MR VISSER What I really want to know from you is that the same person which is referred to here by Rosslee and Wasserman and others in the Bhila incident? MR BOTHA That is correct. It's Michael Lembedi. MR VISSER And according to the intelligence or information we're going to get to now, who was responsible for his death? MR BOTHA It was the unit under the command of Zandile. MR VISSER Without going into too much detail, those are the features I think, with respect, appearing from Exhibit A. It has other values as well but those are the features on which I wish to concentrate, Mr Chairman. MR MALAN Whilst we're busy with this Lembedi incident. In the shootout were all the terrorists killed? MR BOTHA No Chairperson. This was a trap. Michael, Spyker Mhieza and I imagine there was a third member as well. They were en route to an investigation in that area. They were looking for this group of terrorists, locally trained terrorists who hid themselves in that area and in this trap Michael was shot dead and the other members injured. MR VISSER Including Spyker Mhieza? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. MR MALAN My question is, did you arrest any of the people who were responsible for this trap? Did you know their identity, did Mhieza not know them? MR BOTHA No Chairperson. MR VISSER Mr Botha, can we then go on to a discussion ...[intervention]. CHAIRPERSON ...[inaudible] know the identity? MR VISSER Are you asking me, Mr Chairman? No he didn't - they did know the identity at the time, the witness said Mr Chairman, at the time of this incident. Later on, later on of course there was information that came to the fore and we're going to lead evidence about that. MR MALAN Sorry, Mr Visser. Mr Botha, the question is really, according to this register you never prosecuted anyone? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. MR MALAN Now if the units were known, why not? MR BOTHA Because the units were not arrested or because they take the escape to Swaziland. The specific circumstances around this unit I do not know. MR MALAN But how do you know it's this unit if Mhieza didn't know it? MR BOTHA During this incident, they worked with information which said that people were giving, people training in that specific area. MR MALAN Maybe I can make it easier. Do you accept that all the units were under Zandile's control? MR BOTHA No, this was information she gave to me whilst we interrogated her. MR MALAN Thank you. MR VISSER We'll get to that now Chairperson. I know this is going on forever and you have to be tolerant but it's difficult to try and present all of this in a sensible manner. Let's get to Operation Butterfly, please tell the Committee what was Operation Butterfly all about or what do you know about that operation? Maybe you can refer to Exhibit H whilst you give evidence, I do not know if you have a copy in front of you but please feel free to refer to Exhibit H. MR BOTHA Chairperson, Exhibit H page 1, that does not give a complete picture of what Operation Butterfly was all about. The information is not complete and consequently one should not use it as a guideline when thinking about Operation Butterfly. Butterfly was the first attempt of the ANC to create an internal command structure which would have existed out of the following. MR MALAN You do not have to dictate to us, you can just give evidence, you don't have to go that slowly. MR BOTHA Chairperson, I'm just trying to give people time to write down. The local members of the structure were not merely trained abroad. Supplementary to them, there were four terrorists who were trained outside the country and they acted as instructors for people who would have been identified or were identified by this internal component. MR VISSER Mr Botha, I'm just going to interrupt you, just to get things together here. In your main evidence yesterday you said or you referred to the shift in training of terrorists, the shift from external to internal, is that correct? This is now the year when it's manifested? MR BOTHA That is correct. MR VISSER The codename of Butterfly stands for an area, political and military committee which meant that externally trained terrorists together with an internal component becomes a command structure which identifies people and military train them and task them to commit acts of terror, a complete operation inside the country? MR BOTHA That is correct. MR VISSER Did they also have something to do with the expansion of structures? MR BOTHA Yes Chairperson, politically as well as militarily. MR VISSER Now let's get to the personalities who were involved with this Operation Butterfly. Can you point out to us maybe with reference to Exhibit H? MR BOTHA If we can start with Swaziland, Chairperson. The name Raymond Lala should be added to that. He was the liaison person between the external and the internal component. He operated under the code name of Bruzia, alias Peter Patel. He's currently the commander of the investigative of Natal, of the detective unit of Natal. MR VISSER Tami Zulu? MR BOTHA Tami Zulu was the commander of the Natal machinery in Swaziland at that point in time. E.G. Lawrence or Ralph, alias Veer, was the chief of operations. A person with the MK name of Rabbit was the chief of ordinance. MR VISSER And would be the tasks of the chief of ordinance? MR BOTHA Supplying of weapons to the internal component. MR VISSER You speak of 1985 now I assume? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. MR VISSER Please continue? MR BOTHA Internally the persons were Bula Melekhate, Dr Sibo Ungoseni Nglomu and Dr V.J. Ramlakan. MR VISSER Very well you have skipped a paragraph there, you previously said that Operation Butterfly consisted of two components, the internal and external component and you have told how they liaised with each other but as to the external component you have missed that those are the externally trained cadres? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. MR VISSER Would you please address that paragraph? MR BOTHA Sibosiswe Sishle Ngomkwa, his real name is Robert Mglanzi. He was later sent in after there was a power struggle between Khate, Glomu and Ramlakan. He was sent in to take overhead command of the Durban A.B.M.C. or Operation Butterfly as it was known in ANC language. MR VISSER Can we refer to him at George Falkudo because it fits in well with the western tongue? Was he in action for a long time before he was arrested? MR BOTHA No Chairperson, after his insurgence into the R.S.A. he was arrested with the rest of the members of Operation Butterfly. MR VISSER Very well. MR BOTHA And the other members who were military trained was Linda Oskar Moni, with an MK name of Stan. MR MALAN Mr Botha, it is all put there, I think you could just refer it, you don't have to go so slowly through the names. MR BOTHA Chairperson, to add there is the name Kevin Qhoboshiane, he was responsible for the political side of the area political military committee. MR MALAN Can you just give the surname please? MR MALAN Qhoboshiane, I will spell it Q-h-o-b-o-s-h-i-a-n-e and that is if my spelling is not incorrect. MR MALAN Advocate Sigodi can tell us whether she agrees with that. ADV SIGODI Well I will agree except for the H after the Q. MR VISSER We'll settle Mr Chairman. Very well, is there anything else you would like to add or amendments or any other explanations? MR BOTHA Mr Chairperson, the units were already identified which had to be trained in kwaMashu, Lamontville, Umlazi and further north in the direction of Tongaat. MR VISSER Anybody there that was mentioned that is of important to these applications? MR BOTHA The unit of Lamontville and I was of the opinion that there was more than one unit in Lamontville was Sipho Stanley Bhila and in Alan Taylor's unit was Pumezo Nxiweni. MR VISSER Alan Taylor is not a person, it's a place? MR BOTHA That's the medical residence of the University of Natal and they were all students there who lived there at this instance? MR VISSER Do you see any other names? MR BOTHA The name of Pila Ndwandwe does not appear under the name of the unit although she was associated with the leader elements of Ramlakan and she lived in the same house as George Fakude and leadership members of the Ramlakan. She was used as the secretary by Fakude and as an assistant nurse by Ramlakan when people were injured and as a courier to carry weapons from Swaziland. MR VISSER And if you have regard to the following page, this is page 2 of Exhibit H and there is a heading which reads MK Machinery 1988 and then reference is made in the left bottom corner, it was Suma's unit and we find three names there of three members of the kwaMashu unit for which application for amnesty is being heard. MR BOTHA That is correct, Mr Chairperson. MR VISSER Please explain that heading to us? Let me ask it in this manner, according to your recollection when was the incident for which amnesty is applied for? MR BOTHA If I recall correctly, it was November 1988. MR VISSER And just above the names I that I have just read to you or which I have referred to you, Vusi Mjali, Sibusiso Nglovu and Phila Khaze and there's the name of somebody else, that is Pila Mdwandwe acting commander? MR BOTHA That is correct Chairperson, she is identical to the person Zandile. MR VISSER By the way, there is no doubt or it is regarded as common cause that she was indeed acting commander because from the documentation in this document H which we received from Mr Prior, there is indeed notice given that a certain Richard Valihu, codename Jones, was called and he also says, in the first paragraph he says Phila Ndwandwe was acting commander in Swaziland from about July/August until her abduction as a result of the arrest of Tami Zulu and Fear - not meaning fear of the ANC - Mr Fear, the codename by the ANC. These are the persons involved with these applications and are you satisfied with the placement of these names under the circumstances under which these names are placed as it appears in Exhibit H? MR BOTHA I am satisfied. MR VISSER This is according to your knowledge how they fitted in together? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. MR MALAN Just one question. We've referred to it that there were two units in Lamontville, were there? You would know if you know the structures. What are you trying to tell us, I'm not sure if we have to take note of it. MR BOTHA Chairperson, this is not a document which refers to one unit. I was of the opinion that names were divided into more than one unit. MR MALAN And if you say you were of the opinion, you say there was more than one? MR BOTHA According to my recollection there was more than one unit. MR MALAN Two or three or ten, how many? MR BOTHA I will have to study the documents to find out exactly how many. MR VISSER We have already referred to Exhibit A where reference is made to incidents which were part of the charges in the Ramlakan case. Can we simply just say now that persons who acted under Operation Butterfly indeed had committed acts of terror and there was later the Ramlakan case with the consequences attached to those? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. MR VISSER Can you please tell the Committee were there any arrests made? MR BOTHA Mr Chairperson yes, a total of 54 people were directly or indirectly involved in Operation Butterfly and from these arrests there were persons who were charged at the end of the day and that was 12 as mentioned. MR VISSER In the amended charge sheet? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. MR VISSER Was Zandile accused? MR BOTHA No Chairperson, she was earmarked as a state witness. MR VISSER With you involved with any facet of the investigation of the Ramlakan matter? MR BOTHA Yes I was Chairperson. MR VISSER Who was the investigating officer? MR BOTHA It was Colonel Andy Taylor. MR VISSER And did you assist him or did you perform other tasks? MR BOTHA We formed independent tasks. MR VISSER Did you have anything to do with Zandile? MR BOTHA No Chairperson. MR VISSER Are you able to say why she did not testify? MR BOTHA Chairperson when she was needed as a witness they could not find her and consequently she was not used as a witness. MR VISSER What according to your knowledge or information was Zandile's movements after the Ramlakan people were arrested and she disappeared as you were asked to testify, what was her movements. MR BOTHA After her Section 29 statement she was released because she was earmarked as a witness and during that time when she was released and until she was needed in court as a witness and we became aware of it later she was involved with the continuance of all these criminals who were not arrested. I refer to a total of 54 people who were implicated directly or indirectly. MR VISSER With Operation Butterfly? MR BOTHA Yes with Operation Butterfly. All of them were not arrested. MR VISSER And they were not all charged either? MR BOTHA No, Mr Chairperson. MR VISSER And what did she do? MR BOTHA She grouped these people once again. MR VISSER For which purpose? MR BOTHA For the continuance with acts of terror and this division. MR VISSER For the purposes of Operation Butterfly? MR BOTHA That is correct, Mr Chairperson. MR VISSER When were the arrests made of the persons who were later charged in the Ramlakan matter, can you remember? MR BOTHA Already before the 23rd December. MR VISSER Of which year? MR BOTHA 1985. The police were aware of the presence of certain of the people who were involved with Operation Butterfly. They were technically monitored. MR VISSER What does that mean? MR BOTHA We had authorisation to tap their telephones and one of the persons which we tapped was Dr Ramlakan's house as well as houses in Lamontville of a person by the name of Qonda Msomi. MR VISSER Please spell that? MR BOTHA Q-o-n-d-a M-s-o-m-i. MR VISSER Just to get you back on track, I interrupted you, we were talking of their arrests and you said before the arrests of 23 December there was tapping of telephones. Do I understand you correctly? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson, with the consequence that some of these people were already known to us and we were monitoring their activities and when the bomb exploded at Amanzimtoti on the 23 December 1985 and because of the tapping of their telephones we monitored a telephone conversation between Brazu and Swaziland and the house of Dr Ramlakan where they were congratulated in Swaziland for the act of terror on that day. MR VISSER The Amanzimtoti bomb? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. Because we knew most of these people because of this technical ability that we had as well as informants who were in place and a full scale operation was launched that day and within two days we apprehended about 80 percent of the persons who were involved in Operation Butterfly. MR VISSER Including Mr Zondo? MR BOTHA Including Mr Zondo. MR VISSER And we know he was charged separately for the Amanzimtoti bomb incident? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. MR VISSER Very well, these people who were apprehended and charged, were they released on bail or were they kept in prison? MR BOTHA No Chairperson they were all detainees under the Section 29 and we know what the regulation of Section 29 detainees and after they made their statement they were released in January 1986. MR VISSER What was the position with regard to Mr Bhila. MR BOTHA Chairperson, Mr Bhila was detained under Section 29 until he was charged. MR VISSER Very well and on the 18th February in 1987 was acquitted by Judge Terion because of a lack of evidence? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. MR VISSER Was he in jail all of that time or was he out on bail or do you not know? MR BOTHA I don't know. MR VISSER Could you try and find out for us because it might be relevant to some of the members. Very well, they were arrested, Pumezo himself was he also acquitted with Bhila? MR BOTHA That is correct. MR VISSER What was the reason why the two of them were acquitted, why was there no evidence with regard to them? MR BOTHA Vila Khate did not testify. MR VISSER So your evidence is that Khate was the witness who would implicate Zandile, Bhila and Pumezo in the Ramlakan case and when he refused to testify, Bhila and Pumezo was acquitted. We do not speak of Dudu Buthelezi because she's not involved here. How many of the 12 persons who were eventually charged were found guilty in the Ramlakan matter? MR BOTHA Nine, Mr Chairperson. MR VISSER And for the assistance of the Committee I wish to refer, not to hand it in as an exhibit but just to refer to an extract of the judgement of Judge Terion. From this matter on page 2632 of the record and there's a solitary paragraph that reads "The ANC leaders therefore foresee and they accept and are reconciled to the likelihood that the ANC operations would cause the death of civilians. In these circumstances it seems to us to be idle to argue that the ANC does not intend the probable consequences of it's conduct, namely the killing of civilians." And at page 2639 his Lordship makes the finding on the evidence, that's the third paragraph from the top, page 2639: "On the evidence therefore we find that the state has proved that the following of the explosions were caused by the ANC operators in pursuance of the aims of the ANC" and then 8 incidents are set out Mr Chairman and his Lordship continues: "the places at which the explosive devices were set off and the timing of the explosions as well as the type and the nature of the devices employed make it unreasonable to suppose that the explosions were caused by persons who were not operators of the ANC or for purposes which are unconnected with the aims of the ANC." And it is the basis then from which, are we understanding the short term we had to look at judgment, where these persons were found guilty. Mr Chairman, I've reached the point where we are going to go to the incidents and ...[intervention] CHAIRPERSON I think we'll need a little rest before that. We'll take the short adjournment now. COMMITTEE ADJOURNS ON RESUMPTION MR MALAN Mr Visser, just before we continue, just to conclude the previous points made, Lula Melekhate, I understand he would have been the witness who would have implicated Bhila and Ntwene. HENDRIK JOHANNES PETRUS BOTHA (s.u.o.) Amongst others, he would have testified against them, yes. MR MALAN Would there have been other witnesses who would have testified against them? MR BOTHA I cannot remember. MR MALAN Because if I look at the judgement and if I understand correctly, they were acquitted because no evidence was brought in against them. Isn't that correct? If you look at the - I do not know if we've marked this but it's the continuation on the 18th. If you look at his judgement, page 2549. It says "Accused number 7 and 8, will you stand up please? The state has not lead any evidence to connect either of you with any of the charges." But there was a charge of terrorism against all of them. So the State had no evidence against them? MR BOTHA That is correct. MR MALAN And you said that the reason was because Khate didn't want to testify? MR BOTHA That is correct, yes. MR MALAN And then the inference one makes is that he was the only witness otherwise the State would have tried to use some of the other witnesses? MR BOTHA That is correct. MR MALAN Now following that, why did Melekhate refuse, do you know? MR BOTHA As far as I know it was because of intimidation. MR MALAN If you look at the charge sheet and you look at the list of witnesses who were exposed at the beginning of that case then you'll find a list of 72. Some of your co-applicants in the Bhila issue referred us to witness 38 Ndwandwe, who would have testified? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. MR MALAN Why is Khate's name not there? MR BOTHA Chairperson I cannot explain why not. Maybe he was hid because he was a witness. MR MALAN You have no other explanation, do you speculate? MR BOTHA I do not know, yes. MR VAN SCHALKWYK Chairperson I can help you, but I then have to testify. If you see at the end of the charge sheet at the list of witnesses, I think this is Section 114? MR MALAN Yes I've seen that, but I just want to know if Mr Botha has any information pertaining to that because obviously it's a possibility. It's a bit strange that his name was not made known whilst Mdwandwe's name was made known. MR VAN SCHALKWYK Prosecutors are strange people, if I can help the Committee, the whole question around the refusal of giving evidence, I have the pieces here, you can look at it. It was an investigation held by Terion and it's contained in the official documents. The man was represented etc. so it is available if someone wants to have a look at it, I've brought it with me. MR MALAN And do they make reference to Khatle's refusal to testify? MR VAN SCHALKWYK Yes, it's an application which was made, he was defended by Mr Bristow, later Judge Bristow and he was sentenced to four years after a complete investigation and the pieces in the official document is available. MR MALAN Khate was sentenced? MR VAN SCHALKWYK Yes. MR MALAN Thank you very much. MR VISSER If I may just ask through the Chairperson, did he get this sentence because he refused to testify? MR VAN SCHALKWYK That is indeed the case, yes. MR VISSER Chairperson, Mr van Schalkwyk asked to interrupt the evidence because he just wants to request something of you? MR VAN SCHALKWYK It slipped me, Chairperson, after the conclusion of the Bhila issue, to officially ask you if Mr McCarter may be excused, I asked him to stay present until you tell him that he may leave? Of course he is always available to give evidence if need be. Thank you very much. CHAIRPERSON Very well. MR VAN SCHALKWYK Thank you Mr Chairman. MR VISSER Mr Chairman, also my learned friend Mr van Schalkwyk mentioned to me that Mr Prior has approached him again in regard to the possible location of the place where Mr Bhila was killed and his body was thrown over the cliff. We have made our services available, Mr Wasserman is here, if my learned friend or the panel feels that there's any merit in making another attempt we can get in our vehicles and we can go and criss-cross the country and see whether we can see this place. Mr Wasserman is more than happy to cooperate, Mr Chairman. CHAIRPERSON Now I gather from what Mr Prior told us about this is that he had information from Captain Holmes that they had gone down to Oribi Gorge near Port Shepstone to look for the place, nowhere near the Umbumbulu area, but that's when they went after they got information, they went down in a helicopter down there and scoured the area so it seemed that there might be a completely different place that should be looked at now. It may be that this gentleman knows what areas the other chap was familiar with, who led them there. He may be able to say well I know he was very much at home with this area because he did come from that area, didn't he? MR VISSER The Umbumbulu area, yes. MR VAN SCHALKWYK Mr Chairman, it was on that basis, on that level that I approached Mr Visser to see whether our respective clients could not get together again and sort of revisit the whole thing and see whether something is fresher now than it used to be when they went out. It was on that basis that I approached. MR MALAN Sorry Mr van Schalkwyk, your client being? MR VAN SCHALKWYK Mr McCarter. MR VISSER Well Mr Chairman, I'm not certain whether I'm hearing you correctly, if you intended saying that you believed that there is merit and I suppose there is always merit in making another attempt, then perhaps we should put it together, Mr Chairman. Perhaps one should discuss it among ourselves during the lunch adjournment. The only question then remaining would be over the weekend it's hardly likely that we can set it up, so it might be a proposition and that's why I'm mentioning it now, to go out tomorrow and see whether we can go and find the place? CHAIRPERSON I don't know how much any of the applicants would assist in that, what I thought is that if Mhieza could refer to an area that may be the area in question, that the local police could then be spoken to and told we are now looking for somewhere where there's a flat rock above a cliff and they may, as apparently happened when they went to Oribi the last time, say well that must be - I know where it is, we can go there, without troubling all of us to go or something. If they say well look, that doesn't help us at all, that's an end to it. MR VISSER Well the problem that I foresee right at the outset is Mhieza says he wasn't present. CHAIRPERSON No, he may be able to say "but I know Mbele often spoke about these hills." MR VISSER On that basis I will of course approach him, yes certainly. CHAIRPERSON Not suggesting any personal knowledge at all but at least to point us in the right possible area. MR VISSER We'll approach him on that basis, yes. Mr Botha, if we can then continue with your evidence. We got to the point and I was reminded in the short adjournment that we did not conclude the point. After Zandile was acquitted and after she made the Section 29 statement, you told the Committee that she then started and you called it the crumbs, she gathered the crumbs in order to continue with the activities of Operation Butterfly, can you remember that? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. MR VISSER And you also continued saying that all the members of the Operation Butterfly were not arrested so there were people who were available, so what I would like to know from you is, how did you know that? How did you know that she was busy continuing with these activities of Operation Butterfly? MR BOTHA Chairperson, by means of information which we obtained. MR VISSER Did any actions follow, actions against the members of units to which you've just referred, the so-called crumbs then, using your own words? MR BOTHA Yes Chairperson, we did act against them. MR VISSER And what was the consequence of that with regard to Zandile? MR BOTHA The consequence was that during 1987 she left the country. MR VISSER And according to information which you had, are you capable of saying what her movements entailed after that? MR BOTHA Chairperson, by means of information we obtained from other arrested terrorists, we determined that she received six months military training in a camp in Angola after which she returned to Swaziland and she was taken up into the machinery of the Natal structures. MR VISSER And now we are talking about 1987? MR BOTHA That is correct Chairperson. MR VISSER Who was then the MK commander in Swaziland according to your knowledge or memory? MR BOTHA As far as I know, Zulu was the commander of that area. MR VISSER And in terms of the summary which we find in Exhibit H there's reference made to in paragraph 1 on page 4 to the following - yes, Mr Chairman, while I'm here there's a matter which unfortunately I must raise. It has been brought to my notice that the interpreter has been interpreting before the luncheon adjournment, apparently finds difficulty in interpreting ANC because he keeps on interpreting it as the organisation and I'd like to rectify the record particularly as far as the portion of the judgement of Justice Terion was concerned which I read to you, that had been apparently and I say apparently because I didn't listen to it, been translated as the organisation instead of the ANC. We hope that that won't happen again. This paragraph 1 at page 4 of Exhibit H reads: "Phila Ndwandwe was acting commander in Swaziland from about July/August until her abduction as a result of the arrest of Tami Zulu and Fear by the ANC." Do you have any knowledge about what happened to Tami Zulu? According to information or whatever knowledge you had in your possession, can you give comment to this statement? MR BOTHA Chairperson, just to give comment regarding Zulu's command in Swaziland I can say that up until 1987 he was the commander in Swaziland when he was called out of Swaziland by the ANC because of the fact there was a rumour that he was a spy for the South African intelligence service. MR VISSER And in the ANC's statement to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission dated August 1996 Mr Chairman, you'll find at page 96 in the second column, a list of deaths which were recorded by the ANC and under the heading Natural Causes, presumably meaning death by natural causes and then at page 97 under the heading Zambia, you will find at page 98, number 149, the name of Tami Zulu and a date 14 September 1989. Exhibit H goes further and says Charles Ndaba had been deported by the Swazi Police. Do you know anything concerning that or can you agree that or can you dispute it that that statement of Mr Jones or MK Jones? MR BOTHA I agree with it Chairperson. MR VISSER Let's return to your story. The way you understood it was that the two MK commanders who were in place before for some or other reason they were not there any more? MR BOTHA That is correct. MR VISSER And it was then that Zandile took over as acting commander if you might call it that? MR BOTHA That is correct. MR VISSER And it that what MK Jones referred to on page 4 of Exhibit H? MR BOTHA That is correct. MR VISSER And that acting commander is the acting commander of Umkhonto weSizwe? MR BOTHA Natal machinery, that is correct Chairperson. MR VISSER What according to your information - sorry Mr Chairman? CHAIRPERSON You said page 4? MR MALAN The fourth page of this Operation Butterfly. MR VISSER Yes, they're not numbered Mr Chairman, it's not marked so it you can count to the fourth page under the heading New Witnesses, Richard Valihu, MK Jones, I was referring to that paragraph 1 Mr Chairman. What were her activities according to the information which was available to you and members of the security branch in Durban? MR BOTHA Chairperson, her activities in Swaziland entailed to command the structures of the ANC and the Natal machinery in Swaziland itself. The infiltration of ANC trained terrorists to the specific target areas in Natal, instructions to so-called infiltrated terrorists, making sure that they have money and weapons and also give them logistic support. MR MALAN Sorry, can we just get back to the previous point? You confirm that Tami Zulu and Ralph Lawrence or MK Fear was arrested by the ANC and detained by the ANC, do you know anything about that or when did you learn about this? MR BOTHA I confirm that Zulu was the commander and that he was pulled out of that structure and taken to Lusaka by the ANC, the same goes for Fear. I confirm that he was detained by the ANC in Lusaka. MR MALAN When did you know about this? MR BOTHA After they got pulled out we learned this by means of informers. MR MALAN So one should imagine immediately? Did you know about the ANC suspicions that they were informers? MR BOTHA Yes. MR MALAN Do you have any explanation why Ndwandwe was not pulled out considering she was a State witness? MR BOTHA She was not suspected in her command, I think the period of time we're talking about here is big gap. She wasn't even a trained terrorist when she acted as State witness. MR MALAN When did she receive her training, didn't you say it was in '87? MR BOTHA Yes '87 and afterwards she was transferred to Swaziland. MR MALAN But you said the arrest of Tami Zulu, did you not say that happened in 1987? MR BOTHA Yes during 1987. MR MALAN Well isn't that the same time Ndwandwe would have received her training? MR BOTHA Chairperson, she received her training in Angola in the Pango camp and Tami Zulu was in Swaziland. Certain activities happened under Tami Zulu's command and the information we obtained, that is the reason why he got withdrawn. MR MALAN Did you get any information concerning Fear or Tami Zulu by means of your informers or maybe directly from them during that time? Were they informers? MR BOTHA I cannot confirm that. MR MALAN But if they were, you would have known? MR BOTHA If they were informers of mine I would have known, yes. MR VISSER Mr Chairman, again in order to attempt to satisfy the questions of Mr Malan, I refer to the same statement to ...intervention] MR MALAN Mr Visser, I know about that, but you'll also know that there's still a dispute between the ANC and the TRC with regards to findings about the actual facts were and maybe this is information we can use. MR VISSER I can just refer you, it's page 72 of the presentation which we've - the whole Tami Zulu case as presented by the ANC as set out. And according to your informers, was Zandile still in command over the local people in the Durban area, the local activists in the Durban area? MR MALAN That is correct, Chairperson. CHAIRPERSON Who was? MR BOTHA Zandile, Mr Chairperson. MR VISSER Mr Chairman, you must tell me if you want us to refer to her name Ndwandwe but I thought we agreed that we will refer to her as Zandile? CHAIRPERSON Now when did she become in charge of the local people? MR BOTHA We refer to the time when she became commander of the ANC in Swaziland and then she also was in charge of the units within South Africa and specifically in Natal. CHAIRPERSON It was from Swaziland? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. MR VISSER Yes Mr Chairman, just to make it clear, she was in charge of people being brought into the area as well as those who had remained after the Ramlakan arrests, that's as this witness remembers it. Mr Botha, can we now specifically arrive at the incident with regards to Zandile? In your application on page 4 of the newly numbered bundle 2 you gave the dates as the end of October 1988, are you capable of giving us a more specific date or is that the best you can do? MR BOTHA While making this statement, I had no other documents available to me to get a time closer to the specific date. As far as I know it was the end of October 1988. MR VISSER Now, can you please tell the Committee what exactly transpired, we know what was the general factors leading to the interest of the security branch in her, but can you please now tell us what happened, what you did and who did it? I'm referring to page 5 Chairperson, of the application of Mr Botha and at the same time I will refer to page 38 in the application of Mr Steyn, not to say that the others aren't relevant, for example that of Vorster's, but I'll look at these two specifically. You said in your statement that you've read that of Steyn and Vorster, their applications, and as far as with regards to yourself, you agree with that? MR BOTHA That's correct. MR VISSER And then you gave us the background and you've already explained this to the Committee with regards to the Ramlakan case? MR BOTHA That is correct. MR VISSER And her role and her control under the internal fighting units which were responsible for acts of terrorism in your area? MR BOTHA That is correct. MR VISSER Now you also refer to your training, we're not going to go into that again, and you also refer to the fact that the informers in Swaziland was a source of information for yourself and they connected her with acts of terror? MR BOTHA That is correct. MR VISSER Now if we go to page 6 ...[intervention] CHAIRPERSON Your application on page 5 says, if I read it "She was responsible during 1986/1987 for acts of terror." Fourth paragraph. MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. That was while she was still in South Africa. Because of the fact that she gave evidence against her unit, she left the country and received training abroad. MR VISSER It's clear Mr Chairman, there appears to be two phases. First is the phase closely associated with the Ramlakan case, she then goes out, receives ...[intervention] CHAIRPERSON But it's the first phase we've been told she was totally untrained? MR VISSER What's the question Mr Chairman? CHAIRPERSON Totally untrained at that time. MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. CHAIRPERSON So a totally untrained person had control over acts of terror committed internally. How did she come to have control over anyone if she was totally untrained herself. MR BOTHA Chairperson, one has to look at her position she held within the APMC of Butterfly. If one could call it - she lived in the commanding house, if one could call it that, and Dr Ramlakan lived there himself, George Fakude lived there and she acted as a type of secretary and she knew about all the instructions that were given and she also knew about all the activities of the different units and the commanding structure had trust in her. When they were accused, she was the only one who stayed behind as such and she had all this knowledge about who was involved and that's why she got all these people together and regrouped them and from that position she continued doing acts of terror. MR MALAN Are you trying to say in this paragraph, the third last one on page 5 of the bundle, does this refer to her activities after the Ramlakan case started or before? MR BOTHA Chairperson, she was arrested 23rd January 1985, she was released on Section 29 early in January 1986. The rest of the arrested people as well as those who were later charged were still in detention and I cannot remember if there were any of them who got released on bail but she was released early in January 1986, out of the Section 29 detention. MR MALAN Now if one looks at the charge sheet, you had the intention to use her as a witness in the case? MR BOTHA That is correct. MR MALAN And the State gave notice to this extent despite the fact that you knew that she was at the head of all these activities? MR BOTHA When they prepared the case and during the preparation thereof, I think halfway through the year the case was already prepared and it started and Mr van Schalkwyk could help when exactly they started the case. But her notice as a witness was already determined from the start, that's why she got released. The activities of units who stayed behind only escalated during the middle of that year and you'll see that in Exhibit A. When we started looking for her as a witness she was already gone or she was no longer available or we couldn't find her. MR MALAN Fine, you may continue. MR VISSER On page 6 you jump to the interrogation and I want to take you back to the facts surrounding that which had happened. Before that time and General Steyn refers to that on page 38 and he says that there was a submission made to him by Taylor and yourself, can you remember that? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. MR VISSER Please tell us about it? MR BOTHA Chairperson, Zandile was at that stage already the commander in Swaziland. Her activities there were monitored by informers and her activities and instructions, two people in South Africa were also reported by means of technical abilities and informers. We knew so much about her that by times we intercepted weaponry which was meant for units which was in South Africa. Units that were sent into the country by her who were involved in skirmishes with the police and were arrested or killed and with this knowledge that we had and further planning that was made by her, submission was made to General Steyn at that time, Brigadier Steyn. MR VISSER And what was the purpose of this submission, what did you tell him? MR BOTHA Firstly that we had to abduct Zandile from Swaziland and that we have to attempt to recruit her as an informant. MR VISSER And did you think that you would be successful to recruit her as an informant having regard for her attitude in the Ramlakan matter? MR BOTHA Chairperson, it was not written in stone that she would be recruited and at that stage it was discussed by myself and Colonel Taylor and we informed Brigadier Steyn that the possibility that she had to be eliminated if the recruitment process did not succeed. MR VISSER Just hold on, are you trying to say that in October of 1988 you regarded her as so important, such a key person that you decided that she had to be eliminated? MR BOTHA We considered that, yes Chairperson. MR VISSER And you also stated that you decided to try and recruit her as an informant and see what happens? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. MR VISSER Would she be of any value as an informer? MR BOTHA Absolutely Chairperson and from her position in Swaziland, if she had succeeded, she would have been worth much more to us. MR VISSER She was outside your jurisdiction at that point, wasn't she? MR BOTHA Yes Chairperson. MR VISSER And you could not act against her in the normal course of your activities to arrest her? MR BOTHA No Chairperson. MR VISSER Is this where the idea of the abduction came about? MR BOTHA That is correct Chairperson because one could not get the commander to come to the Republic. MR VISSER What was Steyn's reaction to that? MR BOTHA After our submission he agreed with our proposal and we continued with the implementation thereof, we received approval for arranging the abduction of Zandile. MR VISSER Let's just have a look who was involved in this operation, what were the names of the persons who were involved in this operation? MR BOTHA The persons involved was Colonel Taylor, myself, Colonel Vorster from Pietermaritzburg, Colonel Sam du Preez, Warrant Officer Laurie Wasserman and Sergeant Brand Visagie who prepared the vehicle with which we abducted her. MR MALAN Excuse me, from where are you reading this? MR BOTHA This is my application for amnesty. MR MALAN Thank you. MR BOTHA Excuse me Mr Chairman, on page 38 the names are all stated there, in Brigadier Steyn's application. MR VISSER And you have read from Brigadier Steyn's application and you did not mention his name because he did not name himself there? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. MR VISSER Let us deal with Mr Visagie. It might be an appropriate time Mr Chairman to place on record, Mr Visagie is not in the country, he is in America. He's not able to attend these hearings although he has made application for amnesty. His application is on the basis that he was aware that the vehicle that he was asked to prepare, as it were, was for the kidnapping of Zandile, or at least a person, the unlawful kidnapping of a person. I believe it's of Zandile itself. I'm referring to page 86. Yes, indeed it refers to her personally, Mr Chairman, I'm reminded. It's page 86 of the same bundle, bundle 2. You will see that the bottom of the page he says that he had knowledge that the security branch intended to abduct Zandile from Swaziland he describes his task in the following fashion, he says "My task was to find out what her address was in Swaziland and to confirm it and then to pass on the information to the relevant security branch. Furthermore I was responsible for the preparation of the vehicle with which she was to be abducted from Swaziland." And he says, over the page at page 87: "I was not involved in the execution of the operation and found out later that she indeed was abducted as it was planned and in the process I have probably made myself guilty to a conspiracy" That is the extent of his application. Mr Botha, you heard what I have read now with regard to Mr Visagie, is there anything else that you want to add in terms of this evidence to which you concur or not? MR BOTHA Chairperson I agree but I would like to add that he did not have to determine the address of Zandile but he had to monitor her movements. MR VISSER And for that purpose did he go to Swaziland? MR BOTHA No Chairperson, we had the suspicion with the communication that she had locally to find out where she was. MR VISSER: And it was his task to do that? MR BOTHA That is correct Chairperson. MR VISSER And as far as you know, Mr Visagie, was he involved in any other activities? Was he not present when she was abducted the day or at her murder? MR BOTHA No Chairperson. MR VISSER Why was Mr Vorster called in, why was Mr Vorster involved because he was from Pietermaritzburg was he not? MR BOTHA Chairperson at that stage we were one province with the police division in one and he handled the terrorist desk in Pietermaritzburg, his task was also to gather information with regard to terrorist activities in Swaziland and he had the ability to share intelligence with us which would supplement or would be successful in the implementation of this operation. MR MALAN Could I just follow up on this? It seems strange to me that such a large contingent will go over to execute this operation? If you were successful in abducting her and convincing her to become an informant then all this information would be available to Mr Vorster? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. MR MALAN Then why did he come along to execute the information, why did he have to get the information there? MR BOTHA No, he did not have to get the information there but beforehand, through informants, he could give assistance with his intelligence and if we were successful with her recruitment and it would not be strange then, he would be aware of all those people and they all worked in one group with intelligence gathering. MR MALAN But you had co-ordinating structures to exchange intelligence, why did you have to contact somebody else, it seems strange to me that everybody had liaised with Trevits or with their regions but everybody had to go to get the intelligence first hand. MR BOTHA No Chairperson, I don't know what information you are referring to. MR MALAN I refer to the intelligence you allege that you would have gotten from Zandile? MR BOTHA But we first went and abducted her. MR MALAN To get information from her? MR BOTHA Yes. MR MALAN But Mr Vorster's role was not to help with the abduction? MR BOTHA Because he had information that could help us, his informers in the Republic and Swaziland who could help us to abduct somebody in a strange country is not as easy as we are talking about it here now, we had to keep things in mind, the locality of where we could launch it from, the activity of other activists who might spot us and so on, though much had to be done. MR MALAN Maybe then you have to continue so we can learn some more of this whole process. Not that I have any plans to abduct anybody, I just want to understand. CHAIRPERSON You say you recruited her as an informer? MR BOTHA That was the intention, Mr Chairperson. CHAIRPERSON That would have been by threats of what would happen to her if she didn't agree to be an informer, would it not? MR BOTHA It would be part of it yes. CHAIRPERSON Yes, it wouldn't be a voluntary agreement by her? MR BOTHA No Mr Chairperson. MR VISSER As you discussed the matter, did you know then that she would not comply to work with you as an informant? MR BOTHA No, at that stage when we discussed the matter we did not know. MR VISSER You had suspicions? MR BOTHA Yes we had regard for it. MR MALAN Excuse me, you say that they thought that she would not work with? MR BOTHA Well if she didn't work with us she would be eliminated. MR MALAN But I think the question that Mr Visser put to you that your suspicions were that she would not co-operate with you? MR BOTHA Yes we anticipated it. MR MALAN Anticipate is something else, anticipate says something about a possibility, you went to abduct her and in your mind the possibility that she was not going to work with you, you did have regard for it? MR BOTHA That is correct. MR MALAN Well when you abducted her you thought that she might not work with you? Could we not infer from this that the first purpose was to eliminate her except if she worked with you? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. MR MALAN Now why do you say in your application that the purpose was an abduction and the whole application is structured on the basis that the cooperation was not found and other possibilities had to be considered. You application says: "We went and abducted her to recruit her as an informant", your application does not mention that you told Steyn beforehand that "we might have to eliminate her if we do not receive her cooperation" while your evidence tells us now that the possibility existed that you were going to kill her but if she was willing to work with you then you would save her life and keep her as an informant? MR BOTHA That is correct. MR MALAN Is that what you say in your application? MR BOTHA What I say in my application and what I now say, when I drew up this application two years ago, it was under other circumstances, I had to do it quickly, it was two days before the closing date. If we did not do it then we would have been prosecuted, that was the basis of my application, I could not consult with the rest of the applicants so the wording is not as I give evidence here today but my evidence here today is far as the extent of what happened so here and there there might be some shortcomings in my written application which I would supplement by my verbal evidence here before you today. MR MALAN Let me tell you the difference. In your application you say your purpose was to abduct her, to get her as an informant and in your application you say she refused to give her cooperation and afterwards you considered several options to get her back, what would happen and you say at the safe house you took the decision an you considered many options and the only one that remained was elimination? MR BOTHA I did not consider the options or I did not weigh up the options. MR MALAN Was it Steyn? MR BOTHA No. MR MALAN But Steyn says it in his application but your evidence now is that you told Mr Steyn "we are going to abduct her and the probability is that we would kill her" you played open cards with him, "we are going to kill her but we would save her life if we can recruit her"? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. MR MALAN Very well. MR VISSER To ask the question in the following manner, for you, what would have been the first prize? MR BOTHA If we could recruit her as an informant. If I could just inform the Chairperson, this process was not strange to us, this was our success, on the contrary, for Natal. The terrorists who infiltrated we would turn them within twelve hours and then we would send them back and use them and we always had the priority to gather intelligence because without any intelligence we are powerless. MR MALAN Can I just take it a bit further here? Excuse me for interrupting you but you say it was not strange, this was the pattern, this was the norm. Persons who give you trouble, you kill them but if you could turn them in the process you would probably tell them you would kill them? MR BOTHA Let me tell you Chairperson, the turning of any MK terrorist was always the priority. MR MALAN This was the first prize? MR BOTHA No Chairperson, this was always the first priority, the turning of an informant, that we have to understand. MR MALAN Although the chances were one percent? MR BOTHA Even if the chances were one percent, if we can turn him that he can supply us with intelligence. This was the exception to the rule where they were killed, the exception to the rule, not the practice. We had much success that is what I'm trying to say. MR MALAN Well I will accept that but I would like get back to your evidence which is the problem now, your evidence here and it is evidence that is being led. You said that you went, you would abduct her and in the case that the chances you would turn her would not concur with your experience in practice, the probability here would be that you would kill her? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. MR MALAN Then we have two different comprehensions as to what you mean with priority. You would say the first prize would be if she would turn but in the back of your mind you go in there telling yourself I am going to murder somebody but there is the chance that we could turn this person? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. MR VISSER If you wanted to kill her, what would you have done? MR BOTHA I would have killed her in Swaziland. MR VISSER I don't know if you're satisfied Chairperson, can we continue? And now you move to Swaziland, can you recall with how many vehicles you travelled? MR BOTHA Chairperson we moved with a Toyota Minibus, with an Isuzu Bakkie and with Colonel Andy Taylor's Datsun Laurel. MR VISSER And to simplify it, we'll refer to them as Taylor's car, the bus and the 4x4 Bakkie, or just the Bakkie. MR BOTHA With those three vehicles, we travelled from Durban to Onverwagt border post. MR VISSER And who was with you? Who all travelled with you, with which vehicles? MR BOTHA Brigadier Steyn, Colonel Taylor, Colonel Vorster, myself, Sam du Preez, Laurie Wasserman. MR VISSER Let's just stop here. In which vehicle did the first four travel in? MR BOTHA From here to the border post? MR VISSER Yes or can you not recall. MR BOTHA From here myself and Colonel Taylor, Colonel Vorster and Brigadier Steyn travelled together in Taylor's car. MR VISSER And who else was there? MR BOTHA Wasserman and Du Preez and two informants. MR VISSER With other two vehicles, the bus and the bakkie? MR BOTHA That is correct, the mini-bus and the bakkie. MR VISSER And then you travelled to the Onverwagt border post at Swaziland? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. MR VISSER Did anybody enter Swaziland? MR BOTHA Yes Chairperson. MR VISSER And who were these? MR BOTHA Colonel Taylor ...[intervention] MR VISSER Just refer to him as Taylor. MR BOTHA Taylor, Vorster, myself with Taylor's vehicle, we travelled through Onverwagt border post into Swaziland. MR VISSER What happened to Steyn? MR BOTHA He remained on the South African side at Onverwagt border post. MR VISSER At the border post. Was there any housing that you could use? MR BOTHA At the border house there was an empty police house that we used, Chairperson. MR VISSER Mr Botha, if I could refer to documentation, how did you get through the border posts. MR BOTHA At Onverwagt border post? MR VISSER Yes. MR BOTHA With our passports, I used a false passport. Vorster had his own passport and I'm not sure if Taylor used his own or a false passport. MR VISSER You got into Swaziland with a false passport? MR BOTHA That is correct. MR VISSER Wasserman and Du Preez, what happened to the two of them? MR BOTHA Wasserman and Du Preez and the two informants went through the Goolal border posts, or close to Goolal border post into Swaziland. MR VISSER Chairperson, it might be useful to refer to bundle 4, the newly marked bundle 4 page 443, where you will find a photo impression of a map of the Eastern Transvaal and Swaziland. Mr Chairman, you will see the N2 proceeding from the bottom of the page near the number 31 and proceeding in a northerly direction over Imkuzi and you see that the road splits, as it were, and to the right you'll see Goolal and Lavumisa on the right hand side and if you proceeded to the left, that would be to the west Mr Chairman. You will see that a road turns out at Pangola turning north and it then continues over the international boundary between the Republic of South Africa and Swaziland before you reach a place with the name of Hluthi H-l-u-t-h-i. It is at that point where the road crosses the border Mr Chairman, where Onverwagt is, it's not been inserted in this map but that is where Onverwagt is. MR MALAN Would you like to give the co-ordinates because I can't find the roads here. MR VISSER I can't Mr Chairman, because I haven't got the -I've only got the longitude. MR MALAN Is it 31J? 31H? MR VISSER Oh I see, it is precisely between 30 and 31J. MR MALAN Mr Prior indicated to me, thank you. MR VISSER Very well, now that we have the map before us, we can see that you travelled from Kuzi side, is that correct? MR BOTHA That is correct. MR VISSER And the occupants of Taylor's car went to Onverwagt. Wasserman and Du Preez, did they also accompany you to Onverwagt where you left Steyn behind? MR BOTHA That is correct, we all went to Onverwagt border post. MR VISSER And you, Vorster and Taylor went through to the border post? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. MR VISSER And Wasserman and Du Preez and the two informants went down to Goolal. What time of the day was it? MR BOTHA Chairperson I think this was during the afternoon. MR VISSER You're driving to Swaziland and the first place that you find is where it says Hluthi, that's not right at the town but where the eye of Hluthi is, there is a crossing there, it looks like? MR BOTHA That is that correct. MR VISSER How did you travel from there? MR BOTHA From Hluthi we turned right in the direction of Lavumisa. MR VISSER So you travelled back to Lavumisa? MR BOTHA No Chairperson, we drove onwards in the directions of Malome over Sitobela, Sipho Fanene on the way to Manzini. MR VISSER Is that road any good or what do you say? MR BOTHA Up to Sipho Fanene, it's a gravel road and from there to Manzini it's tarred. MR VISSER Wasserman and Du Preez will give evidence as to what happened to them, but what was the plan? That you would go in at Onverwagt and they would go in at Goolal? Please explain to the Committee what the plan was? MR BOTHA Chairperson, the idea was or the plan was that the two informants would drive with the bakkie. After they crossed over the border illegally through the fencing and Wasserman and Du Preez would take the vehicle through the border post and they would give the bakkie to the informants who would travel on their own to Manzini and the two informers had to meet Zandile. MR VISSER Now when was this arranged? MR BOTHA This was an appointment that was set up beforehand. MR VISSER Before this day? MR BOTHA Yes. MR VISSER Mr Chairman, you must forgive me for jumping around but I believe that it would give you a better picture of how these matters stick together if we do just that. In Exhibit H reference is made to this appointment by MK Jones, it's on page 4 and in paragraph 2 he says that Zandile was in charge of the logistics, money, weapons, services etc. and that she had contact with various units internally, internally probably refers to the Republic of South Africa but it doesn't matter and she reported to the political wing in Swaziland. And paragraph 3 says: "One of the units made contact with Fila" that's Zandile "and said that they needed armaments. She gave them a meeting place near Big Bend on a farm near the border" and they didn't turn up and later - and she refers to a Richard and a Bulelani and they arrived, that's what paragraph 4 says and then in 5 this exhibit says that: "Members of this unit phoned Fila and told her they would come into Swaziland for the weaponry a day later." And then he continues and he describes how she got into a bakkie together with two other people, he could not identify because they had Balaclava's on their heads which was pulled up and was on top of their heads and he was three or four vehicles away form them so he couldn't identify them and that was the last time he saw Zandile. Now to return the story you or the informers had an appointment with Zandile. In the light of what we find in Exhibit H that it was about weapons, can you give us any comment on that, or what reasons they used to make contact with her? MR BOTHA What's contained in paragraph 3 and 4 - what's written there, I cannot confirm that. MR VISSER But what you know is that contact was made and it was on the grounds of that contact that this whole operation in Swaziland was launched? MR BOTHA That is correct. MR VISSER What was the purpose why you Taylor and Vorster went to Manzini? MR BOTHA We would observe the meeting and when she would have gotten into the car with the informant, we would have made sure that they were not followed, that the vehicle was safe and that would get her safely and abduct her. MR VISSER The three vehicles you were travelling in, were you in radio contact with each other? MR BOTHA Two of the vehicles were in radio contact with each other, that's the vehicle of Du Preez and the vehicle of Taylor. MR VISSER Taylor's vehicle and what other vehicle? MR BOTHA The bakkie. MR VISSER The bakkie. MR BOTHA Sorry, I apologise, not the bakkie the bus. MR VISSER So the car and the bus were in radio contact? MR BOTHA Yes. MR VISSER The bakkie didn't have a radio in it. When did you see Wasserman and Du Preez the next time. MR BOTHA When we got to the appointed place the bakkie was already there. MR VISSER And what this appointed place? MR BOTHA It was a place at the George Hotel in Manzini. MR VISSER So the bakkie was already there? MR BOTHA It's a one way street, the bakkie was parked in front of the hotel. A whole way behind the bakkie we also stopped, we called Du Preez on the radio, they were parked in the same street in front of us, about a hundred, two hundred metres in front of us and in front of the bakkie. MR VISSER And then what did you see, what happened? MR BOTHA I saw that Zandile came to the bakkie and she spoke to the informants and she got in and she sat between the two of them in the front of the bakkie. I informed Du Preez on the radio that she did indeed get into the vehicle. They left with the bus to a place which we already predetermined where we'd meet and where we'd grab her. We followed the bakkie and we made sure that the bakkie was safe. MR VISSER Carry on? MR BOTHA When we approached the specific point, that's just after the turn off from Manzini to Sipho Fanene, there was a parking area on the left hand side of the road and the bus was already there in place and the bakkie stopped directly next to the bus and we stopped on the left hand side of the bakkie with the result that the informants, when they opened their right door and the sliding door of the bus that was open, one could in one movement take Zandile from that vehicle into the bus. MR VISSER So do I understand you correctly, there was no force placed on her in order to get her into the bakkie. She did that voluntarily? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. MR VISSER Convenient at this stage to refer to volume 4, page 462 which is an article in the Sowetan dated the 3rd February 1995 which pretends to be and probably is as a result of an interview with one Jones, which may or may not be the same person as the one mentioned in Exhibit H but we will suggest probably is and he sets out, Mr Chairman, very much the same as this witnessed has testified to and in the third column Mr Chairman, I'm just looking for it, if you'll allow me a second? Well it's really in the big quotation here, already summarised "The comrades she was supposed to meet were in a bakkie, they were wearing rolled balaclavas on their heads and she obviously thought everything was okay as she went with them" etc. Which seems to coincide and my attorney points out that page 464A of the same bundle, Mr Chairman, there is reference to Zandile in the first column under the heading Fila Ndwandwe, just about some background as far as she is concerned. Anyway, Mr Botha, so you got to the place where you explained to us you'd made the interception. What happened them, the vehicles came to a standstill, what happened next? MR BOTHA The combi's left door was already open, the bakkie's right hand door was also open already, they moved with Zandile, the informers, with Zandile out. I got out, I stood at the sliding door of the Combi. Zandile was taken and her hands were tied together with masking tape. MR VISSER And now she was in the Combi? MR BOTHA Yes she was loaded into the Combi. MR VISSER Very well, so you left from there? MR BOTHA I was in the back of the Combi with her. Wasserman and Du Preez were in the bus. MR VISSER You speak about a Combi and a bus, let's talk about bus only. MR BOTHA And the bakkie was driven by the informers and Taylor and Vorster were driving with his vehicle. We went back in the direction of Sipho Fanene and Sipho Fanene to Big Ben and Big Ben to Ntoko and in the direction Lavumisa. MR VISSER Very well, so you are now driving towards Goolal border post? MR BOTHA That is correct. Just before Goolal border post you have a road turning off to Hluthe, we went off to that dirt road and we drove quite a while and then the vehicles came to another standstill. MR VISSER Now just to give us detail concerning this, what was the weather circumstances at that time? MR BOTHA It had already started raining, it was quite dark, it was quite late, I'd say it was in the vicinity of 8, 9 o'clock. MR VISSER Okay, then what happened when you came to a standstill on the Lavumisa/Hluthe Road? MR BOTHA I transferred Zandile onto the bakkie. Du Preez and Wasserman took over the bakkie. I was on the back of the bakkie together with her, partially covered with a piece of canvas. The other vehicle, that is that of Taylor as well as the bus when back in the direction of Goolal border post where they had to exit Swaziland. The bakkie which was driven by Du Preez and Wasserman drove onwards on the Hluthe road, up till the crossing, turned off and came back in the direction of Onverwagt border post and about a kilometre before the border post the road turns to the left towards the cattle farm of the Swazi King. We drove in there and we were dropped off close to the fence of the border. MR VISSER Who was this now, who got dropped off close to the border fence? MR BOTHA Zandile and I was dropped off there. Du Preez and Wasserman helped us through the fence. At the other side of the fence was Taylor, Vorster and Brigadier Steyn. MR VISSER And this was a predetermined place where you would have met? MR BOTHA Yes. MR VISSER What did you yourself do, did you stay in Swaziland or did you also get through the fence? MR BOTHA I also climbed through the fence with Zandile, we were loaded into the little bus and we went back to the police house at Onverwagt border post. MR VISSER What happened to the bakkie and Du Preez and Wasserman? MR BOTHA They stayed behind in Swaziland because they wouldn't have made it back in time at the border post at Goolal before 10 o'clock. MR VISSER So the border post to Swaziland closed at 10 o'clock in the evening. MR BOTHA Yes, Onverwagt's closes even before that time, about 6. MR VISSER Now you are in the bus, you went back home - or you went back to the police house at Onverwagt's border post and I would like you to tell us what happened there? MR BOTHA At the house at Onverwagts border post I immediately started questioning Zandile, specifically with regards to the activities in as far as Swaziland was concerned as well as the activities as far as the Natal machinery was concerned in Natal. MR VISSER What was Zandile's attitude about this whole abduction and interrogation? How did she react to your questioning? MR BOTHA Initially she was scared and she was reluctant. She was treated quite nicely so consequently she communicated with us freely and she answered the questions. MR VISSER You mean after a while? MR BOTHA Yes, after a while. MR VISSER What was your impression of her when it comes to how she felt about what she told you and her involvement. MR BOTHA Chairperson, as the evening went on, the interrogation went on till about 12.30 that night. One could see that she got quieter and calmer and because we had a lot of information regarding the activities, some of the things only confirmed it for us, some of the things she told us. MR VISSER And it's probably not necessary to mention this but she knew you, not true? MR BOTHA Yes she knew us. MR VISSER Because of the Ramlakan case? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. MR VISSER Except for Steyn, I would imagine, but she knew you? MR BOTHA Yes she knew me and she knew Du Preez and she knew Wasserman. MR VISSER Can you now tell the Committee if you obtained any information from her which was news to you, which was new or which had a lot of worth for you? MR BOTHA Yes Chairperson, in as far as it pertained to the acts of terror which took place before her abduction in Swaziland and her acts of terror which happened in Durban specifically. MR VISSER Please continue? MR BOTHA She told us who was responsible with regards to the people who were responsible and she confirmed it for us and in another sense she gave us information about the units which were involved. MR VISSER So on page 6 of your application you say "Out of the questioning and interrogation of Zandile, certain information was obtained with regards to Pumezo" and then also then you continue and you make a list, I do not expect you to remember all of this by heart but lets look at that list. It refers to the Pinetown post office limpet explosion on the 12th August 1988? MR BOTHA That is correct. MR VISSER So what were you told by Zandile with regards to this incident for example, or what does she confirm that you already knew? MR BOTHA What she told us was that units under the command of Pumezo were responsible for these acts of terror. MR VISSER Is it now all these acts of terror which you list on page 6 and 7? MR BOTHA That is correct. MR VISSER Up until 7th October 1988? MR BOTHA That is correct. MR VISSER Mr Chairman, if you're interested to have the cross-references to Exhibit A, I can give them to you now. MR BOTHA The first incident Mr Chairman is Exhibit A, page 34, as is the second, third and fourth incidents, all Exhibit A page 34. The last incident - I'm sorry, excuse me Mr Chairman, the incident of the 2nd September, that's the second last incident, that is referred to at page 37 of Exhibit A and the incident of the 22nd September of the 25th September are both referred - all three of them are referred to at page 37. Page 37 for those three. Then the 30th September, being the next one, well one, two, three Mr Chairman, the next three, that's the 30th September twice and the 2nd October are referred to at page 35. CHAIRPERSON 35? MR VISSER 35 again yes Mr Chairman, they're not in chronological order. Then the 3rd October, the Redhill post office, it's referred to at page 37 and then Mr Chairman, the incidents both on the 7th October, the CNA in Hill Street and CNA Durban, that's not a duplication Mr Chairman, incidentally. They are both referred to at page 35 again. And while we're about this Mr Chairman, there's another incident referred to at page 8 being reference to the 3rd November 1988 to the Rossburgh railway station, Durban, that is referred to in Exhibit A at page 36 and then just below that there's a further incident at page 8, 4th November, that's the Montclair railway line explosion Mr Chairman, and that's also page 36. I believe I've already referred you to that when we dealt with Exhibit A. But those are the cross-references. Mr Botha, so now you interrogated Zandile and you say your statement that these incidents which you mention here on page 6 and 7 were executed by a unit of Pumezo, is that correct or was it done by himself? MR BOTHA By himself or by members of his command. MR VISSER And in their turn, under the command of Zandile? MR BOTHA Yes as commander in Swaziland, that's correct. MR VISSER Is this what you're trying to say here? MR BOTHA Yes. MR VISSER I know it's a long time ago, but I still want to ask you, was there some of this information which was news to you when you heard it from Zandile or were you already informed by informants and did you already suspect that this information, that you already had it and that she only confirmed it, what was the situation? MR BOTHA There was information which we already knew with regards to the activities of Pumezo. Some of the information we cleared out with her and she confirmed it for us. Other information was new. MR VISSER Are you today able to look back and to say this part was news to us and we knew nothing of that and that but can you make that distinction today? MR BOTHA No I cannot make that distinction today. MR VISSER Can I just ask you, how did you know that some of this was new? MR BOTHA Because the information was in certain incidences that Pumezo's unit was responsible and in the other cases it was an act which was committed but we didn't know who was responsible for it, but she told it was also done by members under Pumezo's command. MR VISSER Mr Chairman, this might be a convenient time to take the luncheon adjournment. CHAIRPERSON We'll adjourn till 2 o'clock. COMMITTEE ADJOURNS ON RESUMPTION MR MALAN Mr Visser I assume that you will continue with something else, can I just ask a question or two? MR NGUBANE Sorry Commissioner before you do that, I'm sorry to interrupt, during the lunch break, I was approached by the family of Phila Ndwandwe and unbeknown to us it looks like they are not happy about the fact that Miss Ndwandwe is referred to as Zandile, they don't want that name to be used of their own personal reasons. They would prefer her to be called Phila Portia Ndwandwe and not Zandile. Thank you. CHAIRPERSON Can we try to meet that? MR MALAN Mr Botha, you mentioned that valuable information with the interrogation before the elimination of Miss Ndwandwe, the information that you received from her was a confirmation of what you had known and in other instances that she told you that Pumezo Ntwene's unit was responsible for, there were other instances which you also referred to, you said it was valuable and this means valuable, would you tell us what the valuable information was? HENDRIK JOHANNES PETRUS BOTHA (s.u.o.) Can I just make a distinction between acts of terror and other acts. Information was that valuable to the information and as far as the acts of terror was concerned, she spoke about who was responsible for Ralph Sukela's death and who was responsible for the death of Lieutenant Raju. MR MALAN Very well, we will wait until we get there and just the other question? Initially I asked you what Vorster's role was and you said that how important it was and everything that was done there and how you would deal with it. After you have dealt with it, would you tell me what Vorster's role was? MR BOTHA It is the same as I have described. MR MALAN Can I ask it in another way, I do not want to waste time. If Vorster was not there, what would have been different? MR BOTHA He's a support in terms of the intelligence in Swaziland. If she did not meet the appointment, we still had an informant network and who could confirm where she was. MR MALAN So you would have stayed there until we found her? MR BOTHA Yes we could have amended our plan. MR MALAN And Mr Steyn's role, why was he with you? MR BOTHA In this instance he regarded it as a serious operation and he wanted to be there personally or he wanted to take control of the operation himself. MR MALAN He wanted to take control? When, because he was not in control of the operation, he travelled with you according to your evidence, he stayed behind at the police house and when he got back he was there but he did not lead the interrogation? MR BOTHA But the operation was still under his control as commander. MR MALAN Of course, but from the station it would have also been under his control, what was the difference whether he sat at the police station or at the house? I wanted to ask why you took so many people, I still do not understand it? MR BOTHA The fact that the brigadier travelled with us in the case of something going wrong on the other side in Swaziland and a decision had to be made whether something had to be arranged then he would have been at the scene to do so instead of him sitting in Durban and he had to communicate by telephone because telephones were problematic in terms of contacting somebody in South Africa. MR MALAN Thank you. The question has been asked, what about radio contact? Was radio contact limited? MR BOTHA Yes it was over a limited distance and in terms of the frequency that was used. MR VISSER (continues) Mr Botha, can we take the reins here? You went through the fence with Zandile or with Miss Ndwandwe and you are back at the police house and you are talking to her? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. MR VISSER And as I understand you, your purpose was to establish whether she was recruitable as an informant? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. MR VISSER And what was the method that was applied to determine if a person could be recruited as an informant? What did you do there with your questioning? MR BOTHA Usually in such an attempt to recruit such a high-profile person one would ask questions what is known to you and which you know the answers already just to see if there's any supplementary information that she could give and if she was holding any information and furthermore one would measure whether, when the offer was made, in terms of cooperation to see what the first reaction was and the first reaction would usually be as how one would perceive the person's own safety. MR VISSER You mean if the person could readily be convinced, would that be his concern, "what about my safety"? MR BOTHA That is correct. The first indication from this person, if the person is recruitable and one would go ahead with the recruitment and one could not handle in the initial process of the recruitment. There are certain signs of body language, of what is being said, of what is not being said which all determine whether this person would co-operate as an informant. MR VISSER Very well, let's just stay on this point. You say one of the things is if such a person would show any signs if they are concerned with their safety, just take it a little bit further? MR BOTHA The position of the person's own safety would be protection in the structure where the person was serving, how would the handling process go about? He would ask about the people surrounding me, who would know or who would not know of this process, how would communication work. MR VISSER Continue? MR BOTHA And from this one draws an inference as to how far you can take the next step of this recruitment process. MR VISSER One would keep in mind then that person is not aware of other informants that's been placed around her? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. MR VISSER Would you expect that such a person would want to become an informant, would want to know such information from you? MR BOTHA In some instances they can draw an inference as to who are possibly informers. MR VISSER Do I understand you correctly you say that as to determine the recruitability of an informant is when this person expresses concern as to his or her own safety, is that how I understand you? MR BOTHA That is correct. MR VISSER So would it be something you would expect from his or her side or what is the position? MR BOTHA It is a sign that has to come from the recruited person as to indicate "I am willing to act as an informer" and the attitude would determine if you are successful or not but in the Ndwandwe case ...[intervention] MR VISSER Or let me ask you this first, did she follow that line, that test, did she pass that test by asking questions? MR BOTHA No Chairperson. CHAIRPERSON You did not say that you said anything to her, that she must be an informer? MR BOTHA Yes Chairperson, you speak directly to this person, you make her an offer. CHAIRPERSON Did you do it? MR BOTHA Yes I did. CHAIRPERSON When? MR BOTHA From the first instance when I started talking to her at the house in Onverwagt. CHAIRPERSON This is not what you said previously? You said and I wrote it in English "I immediately started questioning her about Swaziland and Natal activities" I immediately started questioning her. MR BOTHA That is correct. CHAIRPERSON That's not "I approached her and asked her whether she was prepared to work with us" MR BOTHA That is correct Chairperson and such a direct approach would not work. During the interrogation it led to that. CHAIRPERSON Well it's not what I recollect you having said and I will see that it is recorded that you said it. You're now having it put into your mouth by Mr Visser. MR MALAN Did you not say just now when the question was asked of you did you make the offer to her and you said right at the beginning? MR BOTHA Yes. MR MALAN But you did not make the offer right at the beginning? MR BOTHA Right from the start could be day one, this is where we are now. MR MALAN Please Mr Botha, you did not have her for a day, you just had her for one night. MR BOTHA And the whole day back to Pietermaritzburg, the next day when I left her there, that is all the time. MR MALAN That is day one and finished, this is not something that leads from day one to day two and day three and day four? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. MR MALAN Thank you Mr Visser. MR VISSER But in any way, we will see what the record states but you say that the most important objective for you was to recruit her as an informant because that is where she had the most value and you already that evening when you spoke to her, you referred to her becoming an informer, that is your evidence? MR BOTHA Yes. MR VISSER I was at the point where I was discussing what the test methods are, how you determine if a person can be recruited or not and you said one of the indications of recruitability is when this one person expresses concern as to what would happen to him or her, what about his or her safety in the situation where he would be placed and you said that if it comes from the person itself, it's a positive indication but in her instance it did not come. That is how I understand you? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. MR VISSER And then my question to you would be, if it does not come from the person, could you not at some stage could suggest it to her - "Let us talk about your safety, who are the persons who surround you, what are their names, what are their movements?" Do you not take that step yourself although it would be of less value to you then, but do you not ask her about that? MR BOTHA Regarding the identification of a person's body language or who would be willing, the person would say that they are willing, "I would like to work with you", they make the offer to us, "I do not want to be a detainee, I would rather work with you" and in this instance no such offer was forthcoming from her side and we went through the normal testing methods to find out if she was willing and her high profile and with regard to her history, we had to determine from her body language whether she would be a valuable informer. MR VISSER Why are you so hyper-cautious here, please tell us? What would have happened if she went back to Swaziland and you did not recruit or it would seem to you that you had recruited her as an informant but she was not honest and she goes back to Swaziland, what would the repercussions be thereof? MR BOTHA One of two possibilities Chairperson. Firstly if she would co-operate as an informant then she would know under which circumstances she was abducted and brought to us. Those informants are already known an she would be directly responsible for them or the safety of them and there cooperation with us. If she would pretend to work with us and betray us then she would betray the informers also. We have learnt these lessons before and that is why we had the option where if there was any doubt as to the cooperation of the person rather than not do it. MR VISSER: What about the structures in Swaziland where you already had informers placed, that if she pretended to be an informer and she is not honest about it and she goes back would you expect that something would have happened there? MR BOTHA There could be a witch hunt or a witch hunt could have followed, looking for informers in Swaziland. MR VISSER Who precisely questioned Ndwandwe? MR BOTHA The evening at Onverwagt border post I primarily worked with her and from time to time Brigadier Steyn, Taylor as well as Vorster put questions to her and spoke to her. MR VISSER When you reached the end of the session of the first evening, what were your convictions or what was your summary with regard to the recruitment of her as an informer? MR BOTHA Firstly that we would not succeed in recruiting her. MR VISSER Or that you did not succeed? MR BOTHA Yes, that we did not succeed. MR VISSER And the following morning arrives, you all went to sleep? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. MR VISSER And it's the next morning and earlier you said that the idea would be to recruit her as an informant and to place her immediately in Swaziland. MR BOTHA That would be the ideal situation. MR VISSER Why is that so ideal? MR BOTHA Because there would not be so much suspicion if other persons were around who were watching her movements in Swaziland or who knew her movements in Swaziland. MR VISSER In other words she did not have to give any explanations if she was absent for a short while, is that what you're saying? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. MR VISSER Or she could explain it easier other than if she was away for a long period? MR BOTHA That is correct. MR VISSER Now it is the next morning, did you speak to her again? MR BOTHA I spoke to her again, Chairperson. MR VISSER And Du Preez and Wasserman, did they join you from Swaziland? MR BOTHA They arrived at about after 7 of that morning and the decision was that since we could not recruit her there was no purpose in staying there because we would just attract attention. MR VISSER And what did you decide to do then? MR BOTHA It was decided to leave with her and the appointed place was the safe house or safe farm which was used by Colonel Vorster in the surrounding area of Pietermaritzburg and to take her there. MR VISSER And this is what you did? MR BOTHA That is correct, we left for Pietermaritzburg, we went to the farm, it was the first time that I had been there. MR VISSER This was a farm by the name of Elandskop? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. MR VISSER And in which vehicle did you travel? MR BOTHA I travelled in the mini-bus with her. MR VISSER And what happened on the way to Pietermaritzburg, between yourself and Miss Ndwandwe? MR BOTHA I questioned her and I still tried by means of questioning and the conversation I had with her to recruit her and to do an evaluation as to her recruitability. MR VISSER: Can I just ask you in general. In your application you give certain information that you received from her and you gave evidence to that and I wish to ask you, can you remember today which information or what information you received from where? In other words in a sense of at Onverwagt border post in the police house or in the bus on your way to Pietermaritzburg or as we later heard during interrogation at the farm? MR BOTHA Chairperson, in terms of the test for her cooperation, the acts which she confirmed was committed by Ntwene and some of his unit as well as supplementary information was given to us the first evening and more information was given on the way. MR MALAN Excuse me, I did not hear? The confirmation of Ntwene's involvement, when did she give this to you? MR BOTHA The first evening already. MR MALAN At the police house? MR BOTHA The police house yes. MR VISSER And you received supplementary information on the way to Pietermaritzburg and my question is can you recall today what you received from her at the border post and what information you gathered from her in the Combi? MR BOTHA I can recall that the information with regards to Sukela and Raju was gathered while we were on our way to Pietermaritzburg. MR VISSER And other than that, you can't remember? MR BOTHA No Chairperson. MR VISSER Let's go directly to the farm, you arrive at the farm, is there a house? MR BOTHA Yes there was a house. MR VISSER And you are in the house now? MR BOTHA Yes we sat in the house. MR VISSER Do you continue with the interrogation? MR BOTHA I still continued interrogating her. MR VISSER Did she give any new information there? MR BOTHA No Chairperson. We were going around in circles, I was of the opinion that I got that I wanted, that there was nothing else and I also put in my report that she would not succeed as an informant. MR VISSER At what time did you arrive at the farm? MR BOTHA It was during the morning, about 11 or 12. MR VISSER And you came to the conclusion that she couldn't be recruited? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. MR VISSER And what did you do then? MR BOTHA I handed her over to Colonel Taylor. Brigadier Steyn and Vorster were also present, I think Wasserman and Du Preez were also there and I left for Durban with the informants. MR VISSER And was this the last that you dealt with her? MR BOTHA This is the last time I dealt with her, yes. MR VISSER Who according to your knowledge took the decision to eliminate her? MR BOTHA Chairperson, I think the decision was already taken, in as far as I know the final decision was made by Brigadier Steyn and Colonel Taylor. MR VISSER And when you left, did you know she was to be eliminated? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. MR VISSER According to your knowledge? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. MR VISSER And that is basically because according to you she could not be recruited as an informant? MR BOTHA That is correct. MR VISSER This is why she was abducted in the first instance but taking that step or what was between her and that step was her cooperation as an informant. MR BOTHA To stop her activities from Swaziland and the activities as it manifested here, her elimination was on the cards, yes. MR VISSER Yes, but she could have prevented it, if I could put it as such, if she could convince you that she was willing to be an informant? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson. MR MALAN On the construction you have just given us now, is it not true that you took the decision to eliminate her and that Steyn and Taylor just executed it and they just agreed because you were the one who had to determine whether she could be an informer? MR BOTHA That is correct. MR MALAN And if you could determine that she could not be an informer and then her sentence was sealed? MR BOTHA Yes Chairperson, we had that option before we moved, we travelled to Swaziland. MR MALAN But you were asked who took the decision to eliminate her and then you said Taylor and Steyn, you knew that she was going to be eliminated, but I want to know from your construction, is it not true that you took that decision because you had the knowledge there whether she could become an informer or not, that was your function? MR BOTHA That is correct, Chairperson, in effect I took that decision. MR VISSER With respect, Chairperson, I tried to make it as clear as possible that I was talking about who gave the instruction to go over to the final step, the physical step. Of course the evidence is clear that before they even had abducted her that this option was on the table, we know that. Before I forget, Chairperson, in Volume 2 page 38 is the application of Steyn. Please excuse me a moment? On page 38 in paragraph 1 of Steyn's application reference is made to a hand grenade attack on Lieutenant Raju and there's a date in brackets, two dates are below each other, during October 1988 and August 1988, that is wrong. The month is correct but the year has to be 1986. With Exhibit A on page 22, the date is given as the 31st July 1986 with regard to Raju and Sukela is given on page 25 as the 17th September. The dates are totally wrong. And the same mistake is repeated in Vorster's application, Mr Chairman, on page 98, it's in the middle of the page, that's exactly the same mistake that Steyn made. CHAIRPERSON Both in affidavits? MR MALAN Both dates have to read 1986? MR VISSER Yes Chairperson, not 1988. Mr Botha, you say on page 7 of your application, you refer to the 4th November 1998, it's on page 7 of the application. What happened then? Or maybe I should just finish off the last incident by saying that we know from the history that she, that's Ndwandwe, was eliminated there at the farm and she was buried there, you heard that later? MR BOTHA Yes that is correct. MR VISSER Now if we can please go on? You refer at the end of page 7 to the 4th November, that's a few days later to the advent of the incident of Pumezo. From memory, could you please tell the Committee what you can remember in that case? MR BOTHA Before this date of the 4th November, we once again by means of our informers succeeded and in this case one specific informer in making contact with Pumezo. An appointment was made with him and he came to this appointment. MR VISSER: This might create confusion and I think we have to be very careful with words. Was the appointment made by the informer with Pumezo in order to speak to you or was it made it by the informer to speak to the informer. MR BOTHA The appointment was made and he had to meet him in person. MR VISSER And who would have been this person? MR BOTHA I cannot remember exactly what was arranged but he adhered to this appointment and at the predetermined place, myself, Du Preez and Van der Westhuizen arrested him, if I can use that terminology. He was taken to a safe house close to Verulam, it's a place from where we operated covertly. MR VISSER It was a safe house? MR BOTHA That is correct, where that evening he was detained. During his detention he was cuffed, handcuffed as well as leg irons and he was questioned. MR VISSER What was the purpose of the questioning? MR BOTHA The purpose of the questioning was primarily aimed at units under his command and their activities and the DLB's which he knew about and which was under his command as well as any other activities of grouping that he knew about. MR VISSER Including the identifying of other people? MR BOTHA That is correct. MR VISSER In his case, was there also talk of recruiting him as an informer? MR BOTHA It always remains an option in fact, not quite an option but it's always there. MR VISSER Let's get to the end of this, was there any possibility to recruit him as an informer? MR BOTHA No Chairperson, in his case the option of recruitment was there but it was not my intention to recruit him as an informer. MR VISSER The evening of the 4th November, did you get any information from Pumezo? MR BOTHA Yes Chairperson, I did. The fact that the previous evening they were involved in an act of terror and that was Rossburgh railway station where a limpet mine exploded and that same evening a further act of terror would have been carried out at the Montclair railway line. MR VISSER Mr Botha, is Pumezo assaulted that evening during the interrogation? MR MALAN Excuse me, we've just got to consider something, Mr Prior please? Sorry Chair. ADV PRIOR Mr Chairman, it's just been brought to my intention that the families of Ntwene and the other kwaMashu three are not here, are not present. They are scheduled to arrive because the hearings were anticipated to do Bhila and then Ndwandwe, Ntwene, they were given notice in that fashion although their representative is here I just foresee problems and if we can maybe resolve it. I know it's going to create some logistic problem with the hearing. CHAIRPERSON Where are they? ADV PRIOR The Ntwene family are from the East London area and arrangements were made to get them up here on the weekend. CHAIRPERSON Surely this is something that should have been discussed before, Mr Prior. We knew that Mr Visser was going on with this applicant. ADV PRIOR The way the hearing was scheduled and the way the notices went out, the hearings pertaining to or the evidence pertaining to the various deceased was broken up into four events. I must say it escaped me that we'd run into this sort of, not really a logistical problem but a problem with the same applicants giving evidence in respect of them all, it never dawned on me that we'd run into this problem. MR VISSER Mr Chairman, if I may, Visser on record, I have total appreciation of the problem of my learned friend. We have put a lot of work behind us with this witness, Mr Chairman. We are nearing the end of his evidence. We would certainly have no objection to accommodate the families of the victims and as my learned friend says, if he forsees problems with us going on with the evidence without them being here, we would certainly accommodate him. What I'm suggesting, Mr Chairman, is not that he stands down and somebody else goes on and that we interrupt his evidence, what my suggestion is if it would accommodate my learned friend is that we adjourn today and continue whenever they're here. CHAIRPERSON On Monday? MR VISSER Are they only coming on Monday? CHAIRPERSON Yes. No, Mr Visser, that is not a proposition. ADV PRIOR Mr Chairman, may I have a few moments, so I can just speak to logistics and see if it's at all possible to get them on a plane this evening, to be here tomorrow? CHAIRPERSON Very well, we'll adjourn for a few minutes. COMMITTEE ADJOURNS ON RESUMPTION HENDRIK JOHANNES PETRUS BOTHA (s.u.o.) ADV PRIOR Mr Chairman, sorry. I apologise, I should have indicated to my learned colleagues that we were going to reconvene, Mr Chairman. CHAIRPERSON Do we need Mr Visser here? ADV PRIOR No. CHAIRPERSON Mr Prior has suggested to me that he may be able to get these people here by tomorrow morning. If we should adjourn until tomorrow and see what he can do to sort things out. If they are not here by tomorrow then we will have to see what else we can do, apparently they have to fly from East London. ADV PRIOR Mr Chairman, I'm happy to report that since I spoke to you last, it's been confirmed that at least one member of the Ntwene family from East London has been contacted, arrangements are now in the process of being made to get him here by tomorrow morning. The members of the family of the other three deceased, the kwaMashu three, will be here tomorrow. So with your leave I ask the matter to stand adjourned until tomorrow morning at 9 o'clock and may I also place on record I am indebted to the attitude of Mr Visser for the applicants in supporting the adjournment. Thank you. CHAIRPERSON I haven't seen him doing that. MR VISSER I'm nodding my head up and down but I'm not objecting to the postponement, Mr Chairman. CHAIRPERSON We'll adjourn till 9 o'clock tomorrow morning. COMMITTEE ADJOURNS