amntrans AMNESTY HEARINGS 1999-08-24 DURBAN 10 LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN AM4508/96 https://sabctrc.saha.org.za/hearing.php?id=53626&t=&tab=hearings https://sabctrc.saha.org.za/originals/amntrans/1999/9908100903_dbn_990824db.htm ON RESUMPTION CHAIRPERSON The procedure was so far that Mr Mac Maharaj was interposed and he was a witness on behalf of the victims. We have three witnesses left of the applicants, Mr Chairman. These witnesses are all operators, to call them that, for want of a better expression, who followed orders of Mr Botha. What we did, however, Mr Chairman, because you did not hear the evidence of Mr Botha who gave evidence about all the facts, we are going to lead Mr Wasserman slightly out of turn, Mr Chairman in order to give you some background and we will lead his evidence, not fully, but just to give you some background of the incident and we therefore call Mr Wasserman. He is available and ready to take the oath. He has no objection to taking the oath. He will give his evidence in English, Mr Chairman. LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN (sworn states) EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER Mr Wasserman, you have given evidence before the Amnesty Committee hearing the incidents presently in this cycle here at Durban, although there was a different Chairman. Is that correct? MR WASSERMAN Correct, Sir. MR VISSER Do you repeat and incorporate your previous evidence and the references you made to other evidence also in your evidence today? MR WASSERMAN Correct, Mr Chairman. MR VISSER Your amnesty application appears in the Ndaba bundle at pages 40 to 54 where you deal with this specific incident at page 50, is that correct? CHAIRPERSON Correct, Mr Chairman. MR VISSER You have also drafted, or a document was drafted on instructions from you, setting out a synopsis of your evidence, which you now have before you and which, Mr Chairman, we beg leave to hand in as Exhibit K, do you also confirm the correctness of the contents thereof, subject to your evidence which you are about to give now? MR WASSERMAN Correct, Mr Chairman. MR VISSER Will you tell the Committee if you will, what you recall about this incident, in paragraph 1 at page 2? MR WASSERMAN Yes, Sir. Mr Chairman I'm reminded that the incident in question took place in the period 7 to 15 July 1990. I first became involved in this incident when I was summonsed by Maj du Preez to the C R Swart Square offices of the Security Branch in Durban. At the offices I found a person being held who had apparently been arrested by an askari. At some stage Col Botha requested to speak to us in another office. Present there were Col Taylor, Col Botha, Maj du Preez and myself. It may have been that van der Westhuizen might also have been present. Col Botha informed us that the person held, i.e. Charles Ndaba, MK Zwelakhe, was his informant. I remember being surprised by this news in view of the high profile of Mr Ndaba. It was made clear during the discussion that Ndaba's arrest was a big mistake and that he would have to be released. Botha asked Taylor to ensure that the askari did not spread the story that he had arrested Ndaba for the fear that it might become known that Ndaba was arrested by the Security Branch and immediately released, thereby raising the question whether he might be an informer of the Security Branch. It was decided to transfer Ndaba to a safe-house in Verulam which we made use of at the time. This was in order to allow for some time to pass in order to monitor the situation. and allow Botha an opportunity of briefing or debriefing Ndaba. MR VISSER At C R Swart Square, was Mr Ndaba assaulted in any way in your presence? MR WASSERMAN Not in my presence Mr Chairman. MR VISSER Could I ask you just perhaps to go slightly slower so that the interpreter can keep up with the interpretation, Mr Wasserman? MR WASSERMAN Yes. MR VISSER Please continue. Paragraph 7. MR WASSERMAN At some stage during the day we were informed that Ndaba had a prior appointment to meet with Mr Mbuso Shabalala and it was decided that he should keep the appointment. We went to the appointed spot with him in order to monitor the meeting in case Mr Ndaba's arrest that day, might have placed him in danger because we were not certain whether the ANC might have received information about it. At the time we suspected that there was an ANC mole who had been infiltrated into the Security Branch at C R Swart Square. This suspicion was later confirmed although not proved. MR VISSER Well, we know from the evidence of Mr Maharaj that this was in fact so. MR WASSERMAN Correct. MR VISSER Please continue. MR WASSERMAN At the appointed place, Col Botha, Sgt van der Westhuizen and Ndaba got out of the car and walked to the pre-arranged meeting place. They then disappeared from sight. We were then called on the radio by Botha who gave us the position and description of a car into which Ndaba had got into. Du Preez and I drove to a point where we could observe the car and stopped. We knew that a secret signal had been agreed upon in advance for Ndaba to give should he feel threatened. At some stage Ndaba gave the signal and we immediately left our vehicle and approached the blue Toyota Corolla. MR VISSER Can I just stop you there? Did you actually see him give the signal or was it that you were told? MR WASSERMAN I never saw the signal being given myself. MR VISSER Were you told to move in? MR WASSERMAN Yes. MR VISSER By whom? MR WASSERMAN By Maj du Preez. MR VISSER By Maj du Preez. MR WASSERMAN Yes. MR VISSER Alright. MR WASSERMAN We "arrested" Ndaba and Mbuso Shabalala, who's MK name was Jack. MR VISSER Now can I just ask you for some clarification there? You see Mr Botha gave evidence to say that his recollection was that only Mr Shabalala was "arrested", but not Mr Ndaba. What was your impression? What was the situation there? MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, at the "arrest" of Shabalala, Ndaba was also "arrested", it would appear as though he was arrested and he was taken away by Mr van der Westhuizen. MR VISSER Yes. Why did, in your mind, why was it important to make it appear that Mr Ndaba was also being arrested, together with Shabalala? MR WASSERMAN This would indicate that Mr Ndaba was not getting preferential treatment and he was also arrested. MR VISSER Yes, not to raise suspicions with Mr Shabalala. MR WASSERMAN That is the correct position. MR VISSER What precisely was your part in this "arrest"? Who did you deal with? MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, du Preez and I entered the back of the vehicle and pulled Mr Shabalala into the back, where he was detained by us. MR VISSER Was he sitting upright, or what was the position, when you pulled him to the back? MR WASSERMAN Yes, he was sitting upright Mr Chairman, then we pulled him over the seat, to us in the back of the vehicle. MR VISSER Yes. And after that had happened, was he then in an upright position of what? MR WASSERMAN He was placed down on the seat with this head down. MR VISSER Yes. Could he see outside what was happening with Ndaba from the position in which he was in? MR WASSERMAN He would be unable to see. MR VISSER Alright. What happened then? MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, du Preez and I transported Shabalala in his vehicle to the safe-house on the instructions of Mr Botha. While Botha and Ndaba followed in Botha's vehicle. MR VISSER Shabalala's vehicle, what was that? What was the make and the colour of the vehicle? MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, it was a blue Toyota Corolla. MR VISSER Right. What happened at the safe-house? MR WASSERMAN At the safe-house we locked Shabalala into one of the bedrooms. In view of the fact that Ndaba was already a Security Branch informer and given his status in MK, he was previously acting Commander of MK Natal Machinery in Swaziland, I was given to understand that we might not be interested in any information which Shabalala might be able to give us, nor were we told we had to attempt to recruit him as an informer. He was simply detained and as far as I know not seriously questioned. Neither Ndaba nor Shabalala were assaulted or ill-treated in any way throughout the period in which they were kept at the safe-house. MR VISSER Did you have conversations with Mr Shabalala? MR WASSERMAN Periodic conversations, yes, Sir. MR VISSER But not any attempt at interrogation or recruitment, as you said. MR WASSERMAN None at all, Mr Chairman. MR VISSER Alright. Go on. MR WASSERMAN I was aware of a dilemma which was coming about as this arrest of Shabalala. We did not know whether Shabalala might not become suspicious that Ndaba had led us to him. ADV BOSMAN Mr Visser, can I just come in here? Mr Wasserman I would like you just to clarify paragraph 10, where you state that, "he was simply detained and as far as I know not seriously questioned." Are you aware of the members of C20 who questioned him? MR WASSERMAN I'm aware of the presence of C20 at that place but I didn't participate with them in any questioning. ADV BOSMAN Do you know whether they questioned him? MR WASSERMAN They did talk with him. ADV BOSMAN Thank you. MR WASSERMAN Yes. MR VISSER Thank you to Commissioner Bosman. Would you please continue then? MR WASSERMAN The problem became compounded when it appeared that Shabalala in fact suspected Ndaba of working with the police. I remember him saying as much an I might add that Shabalala was robust and aggressive throughout. During the period 7 to 14 July, du Preez, van der Westhuizen and myself guarded Shabalala and Ndaba in turn. At some point during the weekend, Col Botha briefed us that he had obtained information from Ndaba which pointed to a massive operation run by the ANC SACP to incite a people's revolt. It was clear that the information was of fundamental importance and that it would probably materially affect the negotiation process which was under way at the time. On the 12th of July 1990, as far as I can remember, Maj du Preez and myself were conducting an observation. MR VISSER Now, perhaps you could just fill us in a little bit. Tell us about this observation. Where was it? MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, we were observing a place called the Knoll. MR VISSER K-N-O-L-L? MR WASSERMAN Correct, Sir. MR VISSER Yes. MR WASSERMAN And we were observing the movements of persons entering the premises and leaving them. MR VISSER Alright. And just continue then. MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman at the time of conducting an observation, at the time Mr Siphiwe Nyanda became aware of our observation and this necessitated his arrest for fear that he might warn others of the police, that the police were onto them and for fear that he might go into hiding. MR VISSER What, how did you arrive at the conclusion that your cover was blown, so to speak? MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, we followed Mr Nyanda from the Knoll quite a long distance into town. MR VISSER Was he walking and you walking, or what was the position? MR WASSERMAN No, Mr Chairman, he was in a Toyota Cressida. He was alone. MR VISSER And you followed him with what? MR WASSERMAN Du Preez and I were in a Nissan, Nissan Sedan. MR VISSER Yes. And what happened then as far as the arrest was concerned? MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, we anticipated that Mr Nyanda had cottoned on to our surveillance and we then moved in, blocked his vehicle. MR VISSER Did you call other, did you call for assistance on the radio? MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, there was a second vehicle accompanying us on the surveillance. MR VISSER Alright. You blocked him in. MR WASSERMAN We blocked him in on the road and du Preez and I alighted from our vehicle and he was formerly arrested and placed into our motor vehicle. MR VISSER What happened to his motor vehicle? MR WASSERMAN One of the members in the second vehicle of ours then commenced to drive that vehicle. MR VISSER And where did you go? MR WASSERMAN We proceeded directly to C R Swart Square. MR VISSER Now, just continue with what is stated in your statement. MR WASSERMAN Carrying on from the statement it states. MR VISSER He was arrested with? MR WASSERMAN Yes, Sir, he was arrested with certain weapons in his possession, photographs of which appear in The Other Side of the Story at the last page. MR VISSER Now, perhaps that does not set out the position accurately as it could have. When you say he was in possession of these weapons would you just explain to the Chairman how it came about that they were found and when they were found and where they were found. MR WASSERMAN Yes, Mr Chairman. And upon arrest, we transported Mr Nyanda in our vehicle to C R Swart and another member drove Mr Nyanda's car to C R Swart Square and the vehicle was cursory searched and gone through by myself, but no weapons were found in the vehicle during the cursory search. It was at a later stage that a thorough search was done on the vehicle and then the weapon was recovered and that is the one that appears on the last page of The Other Side of the Story. MR VISSER What kind of weapon is that? MR WASSERMAN I'm not sure of the weapon. No, I see it, I have heard, it's got a silencer on it and it's a 45 calibre, but the actual make, I don't recall. MR VISSER Is it not a common weapon that you were used to? MR WASSERMAN No, Mr Chairman. MR VISSER That you're accustomed to. MR WASSERMAN No, it's not a common one carried by liberation forces. MR VISSER Alright. So in fact the weapons, to put it accurately, the weapon was discovered later not at the same time as the arrest, but it was discovered in Mr Nyanda's car? MR WASSERMAN Correct, Sir. MR VISSER Were you present at all when the weapons were taken out of that car? MR WASSERMAN I was not, Mr Chairman. MR VISSER And you wouldn't know what exactly was found there? MR WASSERMAN I would not, Sir. MR VISSER Alright. Now there was evidence by Mr Botha and Mr Steyn that Head Office had given instructions, I believe it was on the 11th that there should preferably be no arrests before the 16th of July which was later on so that there could be time to notify various institutions, intelligence organisations, embassies etc. At the time when Mr Nyanda was arrested, had that instruction been conveyed to you? MR WASSERMAN No, Mr Chairman. MR VISSER Now, let us assume for a moment that you had an instruction, that you had received an instruction, that you should not go ahead with arrests. Given the circumstances as you experience them and as you've told the Committee now, what would you have done in regard to the arrest of Mr Nyanda? MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, we would have gone ahead with the arrest of Mr Nyanda. MR VISSER Why? MR WASSERMAN Due to the fact that he had detected, his counter surveillance had proved positive, he had detected us and he would have warned other parties and they would have gone into hiding. MR VISSER They would have gone into hiding. Yes. Alright. Please continue. MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, at some stage Ndaba became anxious and indicated that he intended to divulge his role as an informer to the SAP, to the ANC. I was aware that Botha was making attempts to convince him to desist from the idea. Although I cannot remember the details or the date thereof, we were informed from time to time about the progress or rather the lack of progress which Botha had with these attempts. The next important moment which I recall was when Botha informed us that Ndaba persisted with his intention of taking his chances with the ANC and as such could not be allowed to go free under any circumstances because of the knowledge that Ndaba possessed about other informants and couriers of the Security Branch. Botha informed us that there was no other option than to eliminate Ndaba. The decision that Ndaba was to be eliminated, changed the situation for Shabalala. Where previously he could not have been released for fear of him compromising Ndaba, that consideration fell away. Col Botha nevertheless decided that Shabalala should also be eliminated by reason of the fact that he would tell the ANC that he would be abducted by the police and that he was unlawfully detained and that he would also in all probability have told the ANC that Ndaba had been detained with him and of his suspicion that the police had killed him. During the period of time when negotiations were under way, these revelations would have caused a sensation that would have embarrassed the National Party and the Government. We were thus instructed by Col Botha to assist with the elimination of both Ndaba and Shabalala. MR VISSER As we know, this took place during the day of the 14th of July 1990. MR WASSERMAN Correct, Mr Chairman. MR VISSER Please continue. MR WASSERMAN I recall that on a particular night, we took Ndaba and Shabalala out of the house and drove off with them in a VW kombi on the North Coast road on the pretext that they were being moved to another safe-house. Van der Westhuizen, who had picked a spot earlier during the day, drove us to the river mouth of the Tugela River. We stopped near the bushes at the river mouth and van der Westhuizen and I got out under the pretext that we wanted to relieve ourselves. In fact, we went to the river mouth to make sure that the coast was clear. When we returned Botha said that everyone had to go for a leak and seeing that we had a long road ahead of us. We got out of the kombi and I remember that I was close to Ndaba and Shabalala because after they had relieved themselves, I touched them both on the shoulders with a downward motion, and instructed them to sit. MR VISSER Where were you now? Were you still at the kombi, or where were you? MR WASSERMAN No, Mr Chairman, we had walked 20 to 30 metres away from the kombi. MR VISSER Were you on the banks of the river mouth? MR WASSERMAN We were on the banks of the Tugela River mouth. MR VISSER Alright. MR WASSERMAN Virtually immediately two shots were fired, one by Botha who shot Mr Ndaba and the other by du Preez who shot Mr Shabalala, both in the head. Both died instantaneously. Each was given another shot to make certain that they were dead. I went back to the kombi where van der Westhuizen was keeping observation and to the best of my recollection, he helped me carry the hessian cloth, concrete pole and wire to the scene whereafter he again went back to the kombi to keep observation. MR VISSER Now these articles, were they brought along with you from wherever you were before you went to the River Mouth? MR WASSERMAN Yes, Mr Chairman, they came from the safe-house. MR VISSER From the safe-house. MR WASSERMAN In Verulam. MR VISSER Alright. MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, we tied the pole and wrapped the hessian around the bodies of the two men with binding wire and they were placed in the water alongside the bank of the River Mouth. Before the bodies were placed into the river, their clothes were removed and placed in a black plastic bag which we took along with us back to the safe-house in Verulam. We remained a while to make sure that we cleaned up the area of all possible signs of what had happened and to make sure that the bodies did not come afloat. We then returned to Verulam where we burned the clothes. MR VISSER Yes. I think Botha said you also burned some branches with which the blood was swept away. Do you have any recollection of that? MR WASSERMAN Yes, Mr Chairman, there was some branches, but some branches were thrown into the river. MR VISSER Alright. Please continue. MR WASSERMAN Later that same evening on the orders of Col Botha, du Preez and I took out the Toyota Corolla out of the garage and drove some distance to a dumping sight near the tarred road but in a rural area. There we searched the car and doused it with petrol and set it alight. We remained in the vicinity of the burning car just long enough to be certain that it would be burned out completely. MR VISSER Later Mr Wasserman, did you attempt to find this site again and to point it out to the Investigation Unit Inspectors of the TRC? MR WASSERMAN That is correct, Mr Chair. MR VISSER Were you able to find this site? MR WASSERMAN We weren't able to find the site, Mr Chairman. MR VISSER Alright. Please continue. MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, my attention has been drawn to allegations mad by one Thuzi and Zungu. MR VISSER Can you just stop there for a moment, please? MR VISSER Mr Chairman, we are referring to Exhibit G, page 15 where you will find a statement by one Zebron Thuzi. My attorney tells me its F. I'm sorry it must F, yes, I'm sorry Mr Chairman and also in F you will find at page 19 the statement of one Phillip Zungu (Z-U-N-G-U). These are the documents which are now being referred to Mr Chairperson. Perhaps, more specifically, I might draw your attention to, if we first look at Mr Thuzi's statement, there's a build-up at page 16 in paragraph 7 and 8 where he was told according to him by Taylor to go and sleep in a certain place and where the next morning he went to the workshop and he found Taylor, du Preez and Lawrie, which is an obvious reference to Mr Wasserman and the next paragraph Mr Chairman, is paragraph 9, where he talks of a chopped up vehicle which he describes as a light blue Toyota Corolla and then he goes on in paragraph 10 to say, the Monday in the afternoon, du Preez arrived with a white bakkie and although he says he helped him off load the chopped up spares, he's sure to have intended to say that he helped him load the spares which was chopped up, Mr Chairman and then in paragraph 11 there's a reference to the engine which stayed there for 2 or 3 weeks and he says that he took for himself the seat part of the rear seat and he says that he's still got part of it left Mr Chairman and also I think he mentions a carpet, which he also took. That is a summary of his evidence and then page 20, Mr Chairman, and paragraph 6 there's a reference to spare parts of a motor vehicle, an engine and a gearbox and he makes the statement at the bottom of page 20 of Exhibit F: "The vehicle had previously been a light blue Toyota Corolla." Thuzi he says, made a report about the vehicle and then he saw that some of the parts were removed by du Preez and Wasserman in a White Isuzu bakkie, he says in paragraph 7 and that the engine remained behind for some time and later he himself helped to load the engine onto the same bakkie. Now that his what we are referring to now is it not, Mr Wasserman? MR WASSERMAN Correct, Sir. MR VISSER Now will you just tell the Committee, this place which is referred to as a place in Camperdown by these two witnesses, what transpired there? MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, this was Col Taylor's headquarters. It was Col Taylor's askari farm. MR VISSER It was a farm was it not? MR WASSERMAN Yes, Mr Chairman it was a farm with two houses on it and a workshop. MR VISSER And who were accommodated there? MR WASSERMAN The askaris were accommodated there. MR VISSER And you say there was a workshop on the farm? MR WASSERMAN Correct, Mr Chairman. MR VISSER And did you ever visit that workshop? MR WASSERMAN I did, Mr Chairman. MR VISSER And did du Preez also visit that workshop? MR WASSERMAN He did, Mr Chairman. MR VISSER And what did you go and do there? MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, there we worked on many motor vehicles. We resprayed them, we fixed them up. We would fix them. MR VISSER What was that in aid of? MR WASSERMAN In the course of our duties and infiltration methods we would change the appearance of vehicles and the colours of vehicle on numerous occasions, Mr Chairman. MR VISSER Yes. And were some of these vehicles also used by the askaris? MR WASSERMAN They were Mr Chairman. MR VISSER Will you then just continue at paragraph 31? MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, I have no recollection of a blue Toyota being chopped up at the farm, but I cannot place it in dispute. What I can say, however, is that if that happened, it was not Mr Shabalala's vehicle because I am absolutely certain that that vehicle was destroyed by fire. MR VISSER What do you say about the allegation that you were present when certain parts of a chopped up vehicle was loaded onto a white Isuzu bakkie? Can you recall that to mind? MR WASSERMAN No, Mr Chairman, that's incorrect. MR VISSER You say it didn't happen. MR WASSERMAN That didn't happen, Mr Chairman, MR VISSER Did you have anything to do with the loading of an engine at any point in time? Is that possible? MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, yes I would, well, vehicle parts, tyres, jacks, that kind of thing. MR VISSER Engines? MR WASSERMAN Parts of engines, yes. MR VISSER Not whole engines? MR WASSERMAN Never a whole engine. MR VISSER Alright. Can you explain to the Committee why you were motivated to participate in these events? MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, my actions to participate in the events to this incident and to associate myself therewith, were prompted by my complete belief that what I did, I did while executing my duties as a policeman, the way that I saw it, as my obligation during the time of conflict and political violence at the time. We were not engaged in a conventional war where the sides could be identified and attacks were limited against visible enemies. It was an unconventional war situation as was explained by Gen Steyn in his evidence. During this conflict, we as Security policemen were conditioned by speeches of politicians and directions by our senior officers, to do everything that was in our power to confront the revolutionary onslaught at all costs. There were times when in terms of the prevailing legislation of the time, it was not possible to solve all the problems that came one's way. The present case is perhaps an example of such an instance. in view of the above, I was of the bona fide belief that what I did in the present instance in order to combat or derail the revolutionary onslaught and to protect the government and National Party from political embarrassment, fell within my express or implied authority. I did not participate in the events for any personal gain, or driven by personal spite or malice and I received no reward. MR VISSER Mr Wasserman, can I just briefly refer you to Exhibit J which was handed in by the previous witness, Mr Maharaj? Mr Chairman, if it would meet with your satisfaction, I do not intend to go through each of those items with Mr Wasserman, I'm simply going to ask him whether he agrees with what I put to the witness, yea or nay, but if you feel that I should, then I'll go through the exercise, Mr Chairman. CHAIRPERSON Well, has he gone through them? MR VISSER Mr Wasserman, were you here during the cross-examination of Mr Maharaj? MR WASSERMAN I was, Sir. MR VISSER Were you present when I put to him certain explanations of what certain letters of the alphabet that precede numbers and other letters in Exhibit J mean? MR WASSERMAN That's correct, Mr Chairman. MR VISSER Did you agree with the evidence which I put to him about the meaning of those letters? MR WASSERMAN Yes, Mr Chairman, as best as I heard. MR VISSER Mr Chairman, I can go through them all again if you require that. Not much turns on it, Mr Chairman, with respect. CHAIRPERSON Well, there's one I would like to ask him about. We haven't been told about. MR VISSER Yes, certainly. CHAIRPERSON What is PNV for? MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, PN is the division of Port Natal, V for Veiligheidstak, Security Branch, V. CHAIRPERSON Sorry? MR WASSERMAN V is for Veiligheid. So that identifies, that prefix shows that its Port Natal Security Branch. CHAIRPERSON And the 4? MR WASSERMAN The 4 means Black, the subject that you are about to, that reference is going to be the reference number of a black man. MR VISSER And PNV 1 would have been a reference to what? MR WASSERMAN A Port Natal subject, Security subject, white. MR VISSER And 2? MR WASSERMAN Would be the same, but a coloured subject. MR VISSER And three? MR WASSERMAN Port Natal, Security Branch, coloured subject, Indian, 3 would be Indian. MR VISSER Did that always remain the position, or did that change at some point? MR WASSERMAN No, Mr Chairman that was countrywide but the prefix in front would change for the relevant division. MR VISSER Yes, but the 1, 2, 3 and 4, the racial classification if I may call it that, did that remain the same or did that change? MR WASSERMAN It was a national referencing system, it stayed the same. MR LAX Just while we're on the subject, so the V therefore refers to a Security subject, Veiligheids onderwerp? Would that be correct? MR WASSERMAN Yes, Mr Chairman. MR LAX In other words somebody who was MR WASSERMAN Enjoying the attention of the branch. MR LAX Under the attention of the branch? MR WASSERMAN That's correct. MR LAX Yes. And if one looks at page 11 of that annexure. MR WASSERMAN Yes, Mr Chair? MR LAX If you look next to the name Ndaba, in the second line of that entry after the photograph reference, under "Afdelings verwysing" PNV4 what's the stroke V for? MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, that indicates that that V before the number, that that was an interim file, so PNV4, Port Natal Security Branch, 4 - black, the V is an interim file and as that file grows the V would drop away and get the next figures after that 4 stroke, would then be what the new file would be. MR LAX So this implied that that person was newly brought to your attention? MR WASSERMAN Not necessarily, Mr Chairman, sometimes the V would remain for a considerable period of time, it was merely an administration thing. MR KNIGHT And why, I'm just interested, the next entry in respect of Zandile, has the same reference. Both at a regional level and at an H Q level. The only difference is that at an HQ level, there's no PN in brackets behind it. MR WASSERMAN I can point that out, Mr Chairman. What happened round about this period of time, a new computer system, reference system was being installed at S H Q and they were doing away with the 1, 2, 3, 4 reference numbers and everybody was just getting a V, for Veiligheid and then the next number would just be how the computer would get it and the PN would show the division or the region from which the suspect emanated from, so if that was OTV then you'd know that Ndwandwe came from Oos Transvaal. MR LAX Okay. MR VISSER Perhaps just to add to the question which Commissioner Lax has just put to you, to make it absolutely clear, wee files kept by the Security Branch only on suspects or on a variety of people? MR WASSERMAN On a variety of persons, Mr Chairman. MR VISSER Because at page 11 of Exhibit J1 one has Buthelezi, Gatsha, for example, who also has a file. Both at divisional level as well as at Security Head Office. MR WASSERMAN Correct, Sir. MR VISSER Yes. Now you applied ...(intervention) MR LAX Just one last aspect, before we move away from there. If you could just clear up an aspect that occurred to me at any rate. On page 12 there's a "Verspreiding" heading and items 1 to 5 indicate obviously departments, items 6 to, I can't read the others but 12 at any rate look like file references, is that correct? MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, the first five, L1 and L2, were desks at Headquarters. CHAIRPERSON Were what? MR WASSERMAN Desks. Security desk at Headquarters. MR LAX So what would L stand for and A? MR WASSERMAN No, Mr Chairman. MR LAX You've got L1 and A1. MR WASSERMAN Yes, Mr Chairman, I think section A was ANC general affairs and L, I forget what it was, I think it might have been an analytical section. MR LAX Alright. MR WASSERMAN I don't - there were many of those. MR LAX But the others are clearly some of the same reference numbers as appear in the previous list. MR WASSERMAN Yes, Mr Chairman, then the O Transvaal, Northern Natal, that would have been the other regions that this report was distributed to, then after that, NV9/126 Swaziland, that Port Natal, Security Branch 916 was the number for the ANC, that was our reference number for ANC, then the numbers underneath that, PN 666, that would be a copy to the source file of the agent, PNV 22/29/16 was the Inkatha file, so there would have been a copy made for that, for some reason, it will be in the contents of the report, I can't comment now. MR VISSER Would that have been an Inkatha file kept by the Security Police, or kept by Inkatha? MR WASSERMAN No that's the Security Branch's code reference for Inkatha. MR VISSER Alright, continue. MR WASSERMAN PNV 13/436, that was, now I can't recall but I heard today maybe the UDF file, so a copy would have been placed in that. PNV4/35 as we've seen now, was Mangosotho Buthelezi's personal file, so copy 10 would have gone into that. Copy 11, PNV4/V/139, was the intermittent file for Mr Ndaba and then number 12SV 665 Port Natal was Zandile's file, that would have been filed in that file. MR LAX ...the evidence of Mr Maharaj is this went to 15 different departments and in fact it only went to about 3 other stations, the rest are all sub-files within your own filing system. MR WASSERMAN Yes, Sir, all at Port Natal, PNB. MR LAX I just wanted to correct that apparent inaccuracy. MR VISSER Yes, Mr Chairperson we did in fact draw attention to the very fact that you mentioned, that Commissioner Lax mentioned, when we cross-examined Mr Maharaj, because that appears from page 1 to which regions the report was sent, where you will find Oos Transvaal, Natal and Noord Natal in the right-hand column, Mr Chairman, but I didn't realise that there might be a problem with that. CHAIRPERSON Just let's go on to the next one. V6665/PN. Would that be an informer. MR WASSERMAN Page, please Sir. CHAIRPERSON Page 12, the list you've just been looking at. MR LAX That's Zandile. She's Filla Portia Ndwandwe. MR WASSERMAN No, Mr Chairman, at that stage PN following a V number it merely says Port Natal, subject of Port Natal. MR VISSER That was the file of whom? MR WASSERMAN The one we're referring to now was of Zandile. Filla Ndwandwe. MR VISSER Ndwandwe, yes. And reference, Mr Chairman, has previously been made to that very reference and you will find the first one at page 2, paragraph 2.6 of Exhibit J1. MR LAX Can I just round this off? CHAIRPERSON Sorry, I'm confused, the one I was looking at is on page 1, it's only two sixes, 665. MR VISSER Yes, but that is... CHAIRPERSON I got the numbers confused. MR VISSER Yes, but that's preceded by PN which denotes an informer as I understand it. CHAIRPERSON Yes, but I wondered if in the filing system you put the, you might put the informer behind, because its a four letter number against the three for informers, so no its a different. MR VISSER Mr Wasserman ...(intervention) MR LAX Sorry Mr Visser, just one last aspect. It's also clear from the front of that annexure on page 1 that a copy went to DNI and AMI. MR WASSERMAN No, Mr Chairman. MR LAX It didn't go to them? MR WASSERMAN No, we excluded them. MR LAX You excluded them. I just wanted to be clear about that. MR WASSERMAN Yes, Mr Chairman its not going to National Intelligence, not going to military Intelligence. MR LAX Thank you. MR VISSER It says "Beperk" Mr Chairman, it means excluded. So they didn't get it. Just one aspect which I didn't understand correctly and I did not put quite correctly to Mr Maharaj and to which you have drawn my attention, the synopsis given in paragraph 2 I put to Mr Maharaj, was done by yourself, is that correct, or is that incorrect? I'm talking about Exhibit J1. MR VISSER Was that synopsis written by you or by someone else? MR WASSERMAN No, Mr Chairman, it wasn't written by myself. MR VISSER Was that also done by? MR WASSERMAN Capt at that time Botha. MR VISSER Capt Botha. MR WASSERMAN Yes. MR VISSER I'm sorry about that Mr Chairman, I was under the impression that this was done by Wasserman, but I was clearly incorrect, he's drawn my attention to that. And what follows thereafter in paragraph 3 and following is what the information was that you received from the informer, clearly. MR WASSERMAN That is correct, yes, Sir. CHAIRPERSON So Botha being your Commander is the person that receives this information and from then on he's got to deal with it? MR WASSERMAN On this occasion that's how it happened, Mr Chairman, he processed the report and the Intelligence ...(indistinct). MR LAX Sorry could I just be clear about this? So you didn't actually draft this report? You compiled the information in a sense and reported it to Botha. You prepared this document? MR WASSERMAN That is correct, yes, Mr Chairman. MR LAX Thanks Mr Visser, I just wasn't clear about that, I just wanted to make absolutely sure. MR VISSER Yes, but I must concede Mr Chairman, that I gave rise to the uncertainty because I misunderstood it myself. Yes. Would you then look at page 1 of Exhibit K? You applied for amnesty for the abduction or man stealing or the unlawful arrest of Mr Mbuso Shabalala, the unlawful detention or deprivation of liberty of both Mr Ndaba and Mr Shabalala, the murder of both these gentlemen and well, what weapons were used at the time to assassinate Mr Ndaba and Mr Shabalala? MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, use was made of two Scorpions, sub-machine gun pistols. MR VISSER For so far as it may be accepted or assumed that you were as it were also in possession of those weapons, you also apply for amnesty in regard to the unlawful possession of such ammunition and weapons as were with you on that particular evening. MR WASSERMAN Correct, Mr Chairman. MR VISSER You apply for malicious damage to property in regard to the Corolla vehicle in regard to the vehicle of Mr Shabalala. MR WASSERMAN Yes, Sir. MR VISSER And any lesser offence or delict which may be supported by the facts, is that correct? MR WASSERMAN That's correct, Mr Chairman. MR VISSER Mr Chairman, would you allow me a moment? Yes, perhaps you may be able to shed light on this and perhaps not, please say what your knowledge is. Do you know who of Mr Nyanda and Mr Gordhan was arrested first on the 12th of July? Do you have knowledge of that? MR WASSERMAN Mr chairman, I'm of the firm opinion that we arrested Mr Nyanda first. MR VISSER Would the information about that have gone out to other people, about that arrest? MR WASSERMAN It would have, Mr Chairman. MR VISSER Did you know where van der Westhuizen was on that particular day, what his duties were? MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, he was doing a surveillance and observation at Brickhill Road. MR VISSER Brickhill Road? MR WASSERMAN Yes. MR VISSER Thank you Mr Chairman. NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR WILLS Thank you, Mr Chairman. Mr Wasserman, I take it, from the evidence, that you were one of Col Botha's most trusted and selected operatives? MR WASSERMAN I think so, Mr Chairman. MR WILLS Yes, he chose to divulge the very secrecy of the fact that this person was an informer, the fact that Mr Ndaba was an informer to you and he wouldn't have divulged that even to the general of the police at that time. MR WASSERMAN Well, I don't know what he said to the General, Sir, but he divulged it to me. MR WILLS Yes and he also involved you in his scheme to hide the fact of the arrest of these two comrades from the other police members. is that correct? MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman there was only one really arrested, the other party was a charade arrest. MR WILLS Mr Wasserman, I'm not wanting to play with words, I'm talking about the two people that you had arrested, detained, illegally abducted, kidnapped whichever you want to phrase it, but the two people Mr Shabalala and Mr Ndaba, my question is that the fact that you had these people was only revealed to you and you were trusted to assist in this plan to hide this fact from other policemen? MR WASSERMAN That is correct. MR WILLS Were you told to hide this fact from other policemen? MR WASSERMAN It was a unit, yes, it was to remain a secret. MR WILLS Yes, because Gen Steyn has conceded during his cross-examination that the members of de Beer's unit, of de Beer's investigation team who were investigating on a national level the Operation Vula, were looking for these people and so you were part of the plan to tell these people that you didn't know where they were? MR WASSERMAN That's correct. MR WILLS Did you stand guard or did you stay, should I rather say, at the safe-house in Verulam, from the time of arrest of Ndaba, that is the 7th of July 1990 until their murder? MR WASSERMAN Intermittently so, Mr Chairman. MR WILLS Where did you sleep at night during that period? MR WASSERMAN In the same house, Mr Chairman. MR WILLS Yes, and the only time you left the house was for the operations. MR WASSERMAN Yes, Mr Chairman. MR WILLS Now it's glaringly apparent from your affidavit and also from your application which just refers to Botha's application and I think, I'm not sure but it was Botha's and possibly Steyn's, that you were not involved in surveillance operations prior to the arrest of Ndaba in regard to the safe houses that are mentioned, Brickhill Road and Knoll. MR WASSERMAN Sorry Sir, when was I involved with them, the surveillance? MR WILLS After the arrest of Ndaba. MR WASSERMAN Was I involved with surveillance after the arrest of Ndaba? MR WILLS No. Sorry if I'm confusing you. It seems to me that the only time you got involved with that surveillance operation was after the arrest of Ndaba, after the 7th of July in other words. MR WASSERMAN Yes, Sir, that's so, my personal involvement yes. MR WILLS Yes, now who else was in your unit, this select unit? I know that it must have involved the other applicants and they are Mr du Preez, Mr van der Westhuizen, but there must have been more persons than that because you were observing two houses, is that not so? So who were you observing, the Knoll, the safe-house known as the Knoll with after the 7th of July? MR WASSERMAN I was with Mr du Preez. MR WILLS And you said that you had a second car. CHAIRPERSON Before you go on, you said a few minutes ago you only started after the 7th of July. How long after the 7th? For how long had you been observing this house when the arrest took place? MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, I'm not too sure, it was a couple of, me personally, it was a couple of days on and off. MR LAX Sorry, can I just clarify something that's arisen, if you don't mind? You only got involved on the 7th? MR WASSERMAN Yes. Mr Chairman, I got involved when I was called to CR Swart. MR LAX And it was only after the 7th that you began to observe anything? MR WASSERMAN Yes, Mr Chairman, I continued with my normal duties, predominantly Swaziland operations. MR LAX You say you continued with your normal duties? MR WASSERMAN I was continuing with my normal duties. MR LAX Up until that time? MR WASSERMAN Yes, Sir. MR LAX Now, in terms of the observations that you went on, can you recall when those were and how many there were? MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, it was many evenings, it was quite a few evenings and afternoons and I would relieve and be relieved. MR LAX Yes. Now who was working with you on all those observations besides du Preez? MR WASSERMAN It was principally du Preez and there were, I think once or twice or maybe even thrice the chaps from C20 were asked to come and accompany the Durban guy. MR LAX And those are the people who are mentioned in the papers who were present at the safe-house? MR WASSERMAN Correct. MR LAX McCarter, van Zyl, I think it is and others. I can't remember all the names, but it's not that relevant right now. MR WASSERMAN It's them. MR LAX I think there's four of them. Now, on the day you picked up Nyanda, who was in the other car? MR WASSERMAN It was members of that C20. I recall only one person's name and that's Roeland. MR LAX And the four of you were staked out there observing this place, the Knoll? MR WASSERMAN Yes, Sir. MR LAX Carry on Mr Wills, sorry to ... MR WILLS Thank you.. Now you say you have knowledge that another person was at the other house in Brickhill Road. I'm sorry, I didn't get the name of that person. MR WASSERMAN That was van der Westhuizen. MR WILLS Van der Westhuizen and who was he with? MR WASSERMAN I don't know. MR WILLS And I would assume that it's probably that there was also a second car there? MR WASSERMAN I have no idea at all what the logistics would have been for that surveillance. MR WILLS Yes, I'm not asking you from your personal knowledge, I'm asking you from your experience as a security policeman and it would seem to me to be a likely scenario that you would have a back-up. I mean you had one, so the chances are that they also would have had one. MR WASSERMAN The chances are, but I think he was surveilling a residence. MR WILLS Yes. MR VISSER If it can assist my learned friend, I can tell him now, Mr Chairman, that van der Westhuizen's evidence will be that he was there alone, if it can assist at all. CHAIRPERSON Can I interrupt for a moment. What is the Knoll? MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, it was a house and the Knoll was the address where it was. CHAIRPERSON Not a residence? MR WASSERMAN Yes, it is, it's a double storied residence. CHAIRPERSON Oh because I thought you were distinguishing, because you were saying van der Westhuizen was observing a residence, so were you, you were both observing residences? MR WASSERMAN Yes. MR WILLS I'm sorry are you not wanting to comment on my question? My question was that in all probability there would have been a back-up at that stage. MR WASSERMAN I would have presumed so, Sir. MR WILLS Yes. And in probability if a back-up was used, because this was such a secret operation, that it would have also been these trusted people from C20? We're talking about after the 8th of, or after the 7th of July now. MR WASSERMAN Sorry, are you referring to van der Westhuizen's surveillance. MR WILLS Yes. I'm saying the chances are, I know that you've already indicated you don't have previous knowledge, or personal knowledge. Well let me phrase it another way. Do you know of any other person other than yourselves, the applicants in this matter in other words, the five applicants, that's Gen Steyn, Col Botha, Mr du Preez, Mr Steyn and yourself and those people at the safe-house in Verulam, C 20, who had anything to do with the two abductees from the 7th of July till the time of their death>? MR WASSERMAN No, Mr Chairman, I know of no other persons involved. MR WILLS Yes. And do you know of the involvement of any other persons in operations relating to those persons that were conducted by Col Botha or were orchestrated by Col Botha? MR WASSERMAN No, Sir. MR WILLS And can I assume that you would have known of other people had this been the case? MR WASSERMAN No, that would not necessarily be correct. MR WILLS Now your evidence is relating to the arrest of Shabalala, is very different to the evidence that was given by Mr Botha. You've alluded to that already. I mean basically the difference is that he testified to the effect that it would have been abundantly clear to Shabalala that Ndaba hadn't been arrested, whereas you're saying that you conducted the operation in such a way that both persons would have assumed that they were arrested. MR WASSERMAN That was my presumption. MR WILLS Yes. And Botha makes no mention of you climbing into the back of the car with your colleague and pulling someone, or pulling Mr Shabalala over the back seat, rather he says that he put a gun, I think it was him who put a gun, Botha put a gun into the stomach of Shabalala. Do you recall that happening? MR WASSERMAN I didn't see the gun in the stomach, but I did pull Shabalala with du Preez over the seat into the back seat and held his head down. MR WILLS Yes. MR WASSERMAN That was my part in that action. MR WILLS So it would have been pointless really and possibly pretty dangerous for all parties concerned to pull someone over the back seat of the car, or pull someone over the front seat of the car into the back, if he'd had a gun in his stomach at that time. MR WASSERMAN Dangerous to whom? MR WILLS Well, first of all the detainee and secondly it could have knocked the gun anywhere and the gun could have gone off, or wouldn't you have noticed that? MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, I didn't even see Mr Botha with a firearm. MR WILLS Well, I'm suggesting that had that been the case, you would have seen it, because you'd be trained to look out for the position of weapons and the position of everybody in this arrest situation. I'm suggesting had that been the case, you would have seen it and you would have noticed it. MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, I didn't notice. CHAIRPERSON What was the time, was it daylight? MR WASSERMAN It was lunchtime, I think, Mr Chairman. CHAIRPERSON You got into the back of the car and you grabbed this man? MR WASSERMAN du Preez got in the one side and I got in the passenger side of the vehicle. CHAIRPERSON And you would have wanted to make very sure that he didn't suddenly pull a gun on you? MR WASSERMAN Yes, I was watching Mr Shabalala. CHAIRPERSON You were watching carefully. Yes. MR WILLS Thank you Mr Chairperson. Something that I wanted to clear up, I know it was a long time ago, I want you to try to the best of your recollection to remember the times for me. I want to know the time when you were called first of all to C R Swart when you saw Ndaba at C R Swart. MR WASSERMAN Mr Chair, I can't be specific at all. I think that was also round midday. MR WILLS And then how long, my understanding from the evidence is that you were one of the first people on the scene when these askaris had arrested and then Mr Taylor came later and then Col Botha came later, is that right? MR WASSERMAN No, Sir, I seem to recall I came one of the last. I think these senior gentlemen were there already. MR WILLS Okay. So you couldn't have seen what happened prior to Botha arriving, obviously? MR WASSERMAN No, Sir, I didn't see what had happened. MR WILLS And the two arresting officers, that is I think Ninela and Sekakane, were they in the office at the stage you arrived? MR WASSERMAN I recall Mr Ninela there Sir but I have no recollection of Sekakane at all on that day. Perhaps he was away. MR WILLS Yes, alright. But Ninela was in the same office at the stage you arrived? MR WASSERMAN This is all happening at the end of the passage. I think he was in the office or out in the passage, but he was there. MR WILLS Yes. Can you tell me how long you were at C R Swart before you left to go to the safe-house at Verulam, approximately? MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, I'd hazard a guess of an hour, an hour or two. MR WILLS And then the drive from C R Swart to Verulam. Can you hazard a guess as to how long that would take? MR WASSERMAN Approximately 30 minutes, Sir. MR WILLS And then it was there that Ndaba was ...(intervention) CHAIRPERSON Before you go on, is that to Verulam or is that to the safe-house itself? MR WASSERMAN The safe-house, Sir. MR WILLS Thank you Mr Chairperson. And then the debriefing of Ndaba commenced at that stage and were you involved in that at all? MR WASSERMAN No, Mr Chairman, Mr Botha kept us on the side, that was his baby. MR WILLS So you didn't even hear anything, what was said at that stage? MR WASSERMAN He didn't allow me to. MR WILLS Now, how long did you stay at the safe-house in Verulam? MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, perhaps another hour, hour and a half, or so. MR WILLS And then you would have taken another half an hour ride approximately back to Greyville? MR WASSERMAN Yes, Sir. MR WILLS And then you say you arrived at Greyville at about what time? MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, not so reliably but perhaps 4 o'clock, half-past 4. MR WILLS You would have been briefed or, I don't know what the military term is, maybe you can help me, you would have been told what was expected of you at Greyville. An operation would have been planned. MR WASSERMAN Correct, Sir. MR WILLS And what were you told? MR WASSERMAN I was informed that Ndaba was due to meet somebody from his unit. The meeting was to take place sometime during the course of that afternoon. It was decided that the meeting should be attended by Ndaba and we were to monitor the meeting and if everything was to go smoothly we would leave it. If the agent gave the sign and Botha informed us that the sign was to be the touching of the head, it would mean that the source presumed he was in danger and then Botha would tell us how to react and 90% of that reaction would be to affect an arrest of the parties that were all around the source at the time. MR WILLS Sorry there's a few things. You say that at the stage that the signal went, it was only then that Botha would tell you how to react? MR WASSERMAN That was my understanding. MR WILLS Yes. So you didn't know what to do if the danger signal was given? MR WASSERMAN React. MR WILLS But you'd have to wait for instructions first. MR WASSERMAN That's correct, Sir. MR WILLS Were you told at any stage to make sure that if the danger signal was given that you were to react in such a way that you wouldn't cast suspicion, or you wouldn't create suspicion in the mind of the informer, Ndaba? MR WASSERMAN Yes, Sir, we were informed to try and protect the fact that Ndaba was involved in the information leading to that, by our actions. MR WILLS And when were you told of this? MR WASSERMAN On departure for the operation. MR WILLS Why didn't you tell me that when I asked about your instructions earlier? MR WASSERMAN I answered that question as relevantly as I did, when I got it. MR WILLS Now you then arrested Shabalala and you say you and one of your colleagues took him back to the safe house in his car. Who was driving that car? MR WASSERMAN That was van der Westhuizen. He drove the blue Corolla, Sir. MR WILLS And what did you do? MR WASSERMAN I stayed in the back holding Mr Shabalala's head down, so he couldn't see anything. MR WILLS Were you injuring him at that time? MR WASSERMAN No, I wasn't injuring him at that time? MR WILLS Were you pointing a firearm at any part of his body at that time? MR WASSERMAN I hadn't drawn my firearm. I wasn't pointing my firearm, Sir. MR WILLS And can you demonstrate how you were holding him down? MR WASSERMAN He was now, he had been pulled over. He was on the back seat and I had my arms around him and I was holding him. His head was between my legs and I was holding his head down onto the floor of the vehicle. MR WILLS And when you got to Verulam, the safe-house, you say you locked him in a room? MR WASSERMAN Correct, Sir. MR WILLS And what happened to Ndaba? MR WASSERMAN I don't know what happened to Mr Ndaba. Once we did that action with, at the Corolla, Ndaba went with Botha. MR WILLS Yes, but the evidence has been that he was also brought to that safe-house. Were you not aware of that? MR WASSERMAN Yes, I was aware of it once I was at the safe-house. Yes, Sir. MR WILLS Well, sorry if I wasn't clear in my question. When did you first see Ndaba again? MR WASSERMAN At the safe-house. MR WILLS And what happened to him? MR WASSERMAN He was taken to a separate room. MR WILLS Was he also locked in the room? MR WASSERMAN Yes, he was. MR WILLS And who went into that room? MR WASSERMAN I went into the room. Botha went into the room. MR WILLS So you directed your attentions towards Ndaba? MR WASSERMAN No I was giving both parties my attention. MR WILLS I understood from your evidence that you left Shabalala in the room, locked, unattended. MR WASSERMAN If he was locked unattended, I would doubt that. Perhaps I had secured him, I handcuffed him. MR WILLS Yes. What I'm trying to establish is that he was alone. My inference from your evidence and correct me if I'm wrong, was that you locked him in the room and he was alone at that stage? I would assume that you would at least have restrained him in some manner. MR WASSERMAN Yes, Sir I did, I handcuffed him formerly. MR WILLS But he was alone in the room? MR WASSERMAN Initially I stayed with him, until other members came and then I would leave. MR WILLS So you were alone in the room with him? MR WASSERMAN Yes, Sir. MR WILLS The two of you, and you locked the room with you in the room alone with him? MR WASSERMAN No, I secured him in the room Sir. I see what the statement says, but I secured him in that room and if I had to leave that room, I would lock that room. MR WILLS Yes and you say you asked him no questions. MR WASSERMAN No I had nothing to ask him. MR WILLS You in fact go further than that and you say you were instructed or advised that he was of no value, don't bother to ask him questions, that's how I understand. MR WASSERMAN At the time that we were briefed of the operation there was no information, or nothing to ask him. I was briefed as such. MR WILLS And who briefed you as such? MR WASSERMAN Capt Botha briefed me. MR WILLS Yes. Now you then, it seems, must have left him in the room and gone with somebody else into the room where Ndaba was? Is that right? MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, I mingled in between the two throughout the course of the time. MR WILLS Well let me get to the point. Were you involved in the room where Ndaba was questioned? MR WASSERMAN No, Sir. MR WILLS So you don't know how Ndaba was questioned? MR WASSERMAN No. MR WILLS You were never throughout the week involved in any situation where Ndaba was being questioned or interrogated by anybody? MR WASSERMAN No, further during the week I was. I thought you were talking about still that day. MR WILLS Yes, okay, well let's establish. That day you weren't and further on during the week, when did you question Ndaba? MR WASSERMAN During the week, well I spoke and interviewed with Ndaba. I never really questioned Ndaba. MR WILLS What were you talking about? MR WASSERMAN I would talk about personalities in Swaziland. MR WILLS What about? Them playing golf? MR WASSERMAN No, them being MK. MR WILLS Yes. And why, I mean are you implying that this is not interrogation? MR WASSERMAN I'm saying it wasn't interrogation. MR WILLS It wasn't. What is your definition of interrogation? Just so that we can speak the same language, what is your definition of interrogation? When I ask you the word, interrogate, what is conjured in your mind by that? MR WASSERMAN What you are doing now, Sir. MR WILLS Is this interrogation? This isn't interviewing? MR WASSERMAN No, Sir. MR WILLS Now, you asked him about MK people in Swaziland. Is that right? MR WASSERMAN Amongst other questions. MR WILLS What else did you ask him? I'm trying to find out what you asked him. MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, it's many years ago, I would have been asking questions pertaining to my desk of MK Intelligence. I can't recall for the life of me one question pertinently. MR WILLS So as I understand it, the focus of your questions was more to establish what he knew about what was going on in Swaziland in MK structures? MR WASSERMAN That's correct, Mr Chairman. I wasn't that aware of what was going on in Operation Vula at this stage. MR WILLS And later on? When did you become aware of Operation Vula? MR WASSERMAN Mr Botha would then, he then brief me more fully on what was happening in this particular instance. MR WASSERMAN And when did that briefing occur? MR WASSERMAN That took place intermittently after we had been at this house. He then took me into confidence and started to tell me more and more what had been happening since he had been handling Ndaba. MR WILLS And this was obviously prior to the death of these people? MR WASSERMAN Yes, Sir. MR WILLS So can I assume that you were fully appraised of the situation in regard to the seriousness of Operation Vula prior to the death of these two individuals? MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, Mr Botha briefed me as he deemed fit, I don't know if I was fully appraised with all the facts, but he briefed us to what he deemed necessary for us to know. MR WILLS Well, let me rather rephrase that and say that you were aware that these two people were involved in this people's revolt, or this insurrection that it was termed later and the seriousness of the situation prior to their death? MR WASSERMAN Yes Sir. MR WILLS And you were aware that both of these people were involved in this? MR WASSERMAN Yes, Sir, according to Mr Botha's debrief. MR WILLS Yes. So did you question Mr Shabalala about his involvement? MR WASSERMAN No Sir. MR WILLS Why not? MR WASSERMAN I was informed not to speak to him and not to try and recruit him. MR WILLS Who told you that? MR WASSERMAN Mr Botha told us. MR WILLS So who spoke to him? MR WASSERMAN I have no idea. MR WILLS Did anybody? MR WASSERMAN Members of C20 might have spoken to him. MR WILLS Do you know if any of your colleagues spoke to him, let's say Mr du Preez? MR WASSERMAN He may have, Sir. MR WILLS Mr Steyn? MR WASSERMAN No, Sir, Mr Steyn never came there. MR WILLS Mr Steyn never came to the Verulam house? MR WASSERMAN No. MR WILLS What about Mr van der Westhuizen? MR WASSERMAN Not in my presence, Sir. MR WILLS Have you questioned people to get information out of them before? MR WASSERMAN Yes. Sir. MR WILLS I would imagine that's quite a big part of your job being a Security Policeman? MR WASSERMAN Correct, Sir. MR WILLS Now, you see what my question is, Mr Wasserman, and what my problem is, is that you become aware of this person who's involved in this major operation which might even involve the overthrow of the negotiations and destabilisation of everything that was going on at the time, and he might have a lot of information, but you don't question him? MR WASSERMAN No, Mr Chairman, I had been informed that there were sources inside there and we were told by Mr Botha to play it gently and leave it at that. MR WILLS But wouldn't it be a fair assumption for me to make that the chances are that Shabalala would have information about Vula that might have helped you? MR WASSERMAN That's a fair assumption. MR WILLS Yes, and isn't it also a fair assumption to make that if you speak to two people and get information from two people, the chances are you can have more information as a result of that just speaking to the one? MR WASSERMAN That's a fair assumption. MR WILLS And isn't it a fair assumption to say that Shabalala might have been extremely valuable to you in regard to getting information about this operation? MR WASSERMAN That is a fair assumption. MR WILLS Yes, so didn't you think it strange that you were asked not to talk to him? MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman there was apparently information emanating from this operation. Mr Botha had told us and that what his reasons were for not engaging in an operation with Mr Shabalala he never made clear. MR WILLS No I'm not asking you whether Botha gave reasons at this stage, I might later. I'm asking you didn't you feel that it was strange that you got this specific instruction not to talk to this person? MR WASSERMAN No, Sir I didn't see it as strange. MR WILLS This valuable, this potentially valuable source? MR WASSERMAN No, Sir it wasn't strange. MR WILLS Well I put it to you, I find it very strange. MR WASSERMAN It's not a strange thing. MR WILLS Can you tell me why, you see there's a - can you tell me why, or rather let me phrase it in a different way. Were you under the impression that Shabalala was giving no co-operation? MR WASSERMAN After a couple of days, I was, Sir. MR WILLS How did you come to that conclusion? MR WASSERMAN If I went into his room to see how he was and things like that and for food, his body language and he wasn't interested in us at all. MR WILLS Do you expect the Committee to believe that? MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, he had nothing to say to me, he wouldn't engage in any discussions with us, he was not interested, he had nothing, absolutely nothing to say to me. MR WILLS But you've just indicated to the Committee that you had instructions not even to talk to him, not even to ask him questions. MR WASSERMAN I didn't ask him questions. MR WILLS No, but I'm saying how can you, if you are, if what you say is true, that you were given orders not to even talk to him and your evidence is that you obeyed those orders, how can you yourself testify to the effect that this person wasn't co-operating? MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, as you've said, I have spoken to people on many occasions. He wasn't to co-operate and I wasn't to question him, therefore everybody was at a position where we knew where we stood. MR WILLS What do you mean, he wasn't to co-operate? How did you know that if you didn't even speak to him? That's my point. MR WASSERMAN I never spoke to him. MR WILLS Then how did you know he wasn't co-operating? MR WASSERMAN I don't have to speak to you and you can see that I'm not co-operating. CHAIRPERSON But you arrested this man. MR WASSERMAN It's a human thing. There was no reason, I was told not to speak to the man. CHAIRPERSON You've arrested this man, you've taken him to a strange house, you have handcuffed him, you have locked him in a room and then you walk into the room and you don't speak to him, you walk out. You walk into the room, you don't speak to him, you walk out. How do you expect him to react? MR WASSERMAN Perhaps in the uncooperative way that he did, Sir. MR WILLS You see, in Mr Botha's application he referred to the person as uncooperative and my understanding is that his lack of co-operation was one of the factors in the assessment of Shabalala, that contributed to the decision to kill him, is that accurate? MR WASSERMAN Well, I made no decision to kill him. MR WILLS No I realise that, but you've been here hearing the evidence. I'm asking you on the basis of the evidence that you heard. MR VISSER Well, I must object to that Mr Chairman, that wasn't even nearly the evidence, with great respect. Far from it. Botha gave his reasons very explicitly, they're contained in Annexure D, Exhibit D, and it certainly does not contain the consideration that the man was uncooperative. It had to do with the protection of Ndaba, Mr Chairman. MR WILLS I'll rephrase, Mr Chairman. Had, surely it would have been a bonus for you if Shabalala had said, "Okay, I don't want to get killed, I'll join you guys and I'll tell you everything you want to know." That would have been a useful thing to have occurred. MR WASSERMAN It would have been, yes Sir, but it didn't happen. MR WILLS Yes and had he agreed to go into your askari situation, it would have been a distinct benefit to you and in those circumstances, it seems to me that it would have been strange to put, to make- sorry if I rephrase - had he gone, if he co-operated with you and become an askari he might have been very valuable in your investigations of this Operation Vula? MR WASSERMAN Yes, Sir. MR WILLS And it is unlikely in those circumstances that he would have been killed, that any person would have taken the decision to kill him. MR WASSERMAN I can't comment on that Mr Chairman. MR WILLS No, but I mean, if, surely logic dictates, let's escape from this particular situation. You capture an ANC person, you interrogate him or interview him, he decides to come over to your unit and assist you in your operations, you keep him on. If he becomes uncooperative and you don't want, and he just indicates clearly that he's not going to co-operate, then the chances are that something else is going to happen to him, possibly he'll be killed. MR WASSERMAN That's not necessarily how it happened always. MR WILLS Yes. I'm looking at probabilities here. If he had co-operated with you and told you at that stage that I am going to be one of your askaris, the chances are he wouldn't have been killed? The probabilities are. MR WASSERMAN The probability exists, yes. MR WILLS Yes. So then, it seems likely that at some stage he would have been asked whether or not he wanted to become an askari or not, and I use the word asked very generously. MR WASSERMAN Well I never asked him that. MR WILLS No I'm not saying you did, but I'm talking about your experience as a Security Policeman, that's the probability. MR WASSERMAN It's a probability. MR WILLS Yes. And the probabilities are that he refused, because he was killed. MR WASSERMAN That's a probability, Sir. MR WILLS Yes. So the probabilities are that his refusal to become an askari were one of the factors that led to his early demise? MR WASSERMAN No, I don't think that was so, Sir. CHAIRPERSON You've been kept - Counsel is asking you again and again about him becoming an askari, isn't the normal practice, if you arrest, detain somebody like this, to talk to him, to see what information you can get from him, if he starts giving information, if he starts co-operating with you, only then do you suggest that he becomes an askari? MR WASSERMAN Correct, yes. MR LAX Can I just be clear? Your evidence so far is that you don't know anything about any of the questioning that happened to him, if it happened. As far as you know, there was no questioning of him. MR WASSERMAN Yes, Mr Chairman. I didn't question Mbuso Shabalala at all. MR LAX And no questioning of him took place in your presence, that's been your evidence today. MR WASSERMAN No, Mr Chairman, there was no sessions of questioning in my presence at all to Mr Shabalala, at all. MR LAX So when the C20 people questioned him, you don't know anything about that? MR WASSERMAN No, Mr Chairman, I don't know if he co-operated or what the situation would have been. MR LAX You don't even know that they did, in fact. MR WASSERMAN I was informed that they did. CHAIRPERSON As I understood you and I may have been mistaken, you said, we were told not to question him. MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, that's myself, du Preez and van der Westhuizen. CHAIRPERSON Yes. The three of you who were in the unit. MR WASSERMAN Yes. Sir. CHAIRPERSON None of you, you were all told to leave him alone, not to question him. MR WASSERMAN Yes, Sir. CHAIRPERSON Not to try to turn him. MR WASSERMAN Yes, correct, Sir. MR WILLS Mr Chairman, just to set the record straight, I want to refer Mr Visser to paragraph 18 of Mr Botha's initial affidavit where he says one of the factors concerning the options relating to Mr Shabalala was the fact that he gives no co-operation. It's listed as the first factor. It's on page 18 of the first application to amnesty of the bundle. Now, did...(intervention) MR VISSER I'm sorry, allow me Mr Chairman to apologise and to say that I stand corrected, but that wasn't his evidence here, but I read it here and it is under the heading of Mbuso Shabalala. "Geleen geen samewerking. Nie bereid om te getuig nie. Nie bereid om beruggewer te word nie" So it would appear that Botha did in fact talk to him about that. MR WILLS Thank you. Were you aware of any of the background of Mr Shabalala, as far as his involvement in the UDF goes? MR WASSERMAN No, I wasn't Sir. MR WILLS Because you used the phrase in your second statement that he had the name "Jack". Are you sure of that? MR WASSERMAN I was informed of that by Mr Botha's debrief of Ndaba, Mr Chairman. MR WILLS Well, my instructions are that Jack was the MK name given to Mr Shabalala's brother, Vuso Shabalala and that Mbuso Shabalala, the person you killed, his MK name was David. Can you dispute that? MR WASSERMAN I cannot dispute that, Mr Chairman. I thought Mr Shabalala's brother was Rexel, that's the MK, or the code name that I knew. But there were many names, some persons had four or five. MR WILLS Wee you under the impression that Mr Shabalala was operating outside the country or only inside the country? Did you know at that stage? MR LAX Which Mr Shabalala? Sorry, Mr Wills. MR WILLS Sorry, the detained Mr Shabalala, the deceased. MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, I'd never heard of him operating externally. MR LAX Were you aware of him prior to this incident? MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, I'd heard of him vaguely via UDF desk discussions, but he'd never come to my attention in the MK ...that I was responsible with. MR WILLS Now, you've heard the evidence of both Mr Botha and Mr Steyn. you've also read the affidavits and so you are aware of the fact that they flew off to Pretoria on a number of occasions during that week from their evidence? MR WASSERMAN I'm aware from their evidence, yes. MR WILLS Yes. Did you not know at the time that they flew to Pretoria from time to time? MR WASSERMAN No, Mr Chairman, I was a sergeant, I didn't know, I didn't have to know if they were flying to Pretoria. MR WILLS And you evidence seems clear on the point that at no stage did they call you together and appraise you of the fact that they'd got these instructions not to arrest by the 16th? MR WASSERMAN No I wasn't informed of that. MR WILLS Yes. And I take it that you weren't informed of the extent to which this Intelligence travelled, that it went as far as the State President. MR WASSERMAN No. MR WILLS Or intended to go to the State President. MR WASSERMAN No, Sir I wasn't informed of that. MR WILLS Yes. You had no knowledge of the fact that prosecutions would not be instituted against these people? MR WASSERMAN No, Sir, I wasn't informed. MR WILLS You had no knowledge that Col Zen de Beer had been appointed to investigate Operation Vula from a national perspective? MR WASSERMAN I became aware of that shortly, yes, that one I was informed of. MR WILLS And how did that information come about, can you tell us? MR WASSERMAN Col Botha informed us that a national team would be appointed, members from all over the country would come and de Beer, the local Durban man, would head up that. MR WILLS And what did he say you must do with de Beer? I mean, obviously you knew your position with these two people from Operation Vula? MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, I had nothing to do with de Beer at all. MR WILLS Why not? MR WASSERMAN I had nothing to offer him. I had no information to give him. MR WILLS Were you not told specifically not to co-operate with de Beer? MR WASSERMAN We would never have even got to that Mr Chairman, I would not have anything to do with him anyway, I had nothing to give. MR WILLS Well, you had knowledge of the fact that you had two operatives under your control, that seems by all accounts were connected to Operation Vula, surely that would be useful for him? MR WASSERMAN I think Mr de Beer was after the information Sir, and I had nothing to give him, so I had nothing to deal with. MR WILLS You had information about the whereabouts of two people. MR WASSERMAN Correct. MR WILLS That is information. That is vitally crucial information to somebody who's trying to solve or to get information on an operation, not so? MR WASSERMAN If I had information, it would have been, but I had no information to give Mr de Beer, therefore I didn't even see him. MR WILLS What I'm suggesting is that you were told not to co-operate with de Beer, is that not so? MR WASSERMAN Yes, I understand the question now, Sir. Yes, Mr Chairman, we were informed not to mention anything about those arrests and those activities, yes. MR LAX But hang on a second Mr Wasserman. You wouldn't have needed to be informed not to co-operate with, this wasn't your first operation that you were involved in unlawful activities. MR WASSERMAN That's correct, Mr Chairman. MR LAX This is in fact almost your last operation. MR WASSERMAN Yes, Sir, that's why I didn't understand ...(intervention) MR LAX You been involved in a stream of killings and unlawful activities all of which you kept hidden for years. MR WASSERMAN Correct, Sir, that's why I didn't understand exactly what the question coming from Mr Wills was. MR LAX But your evidence is that you were actually told to keep it quiet? That's so improbably. You guys didn't need to tell each other to keep it quiet, you knew jolly well that you'd broken the law and this thing had to remain a secret. MR WASSERMAN No, that's correct. But I didn't understand exactly where Mr Wills was coming from. MR LAX Yes, but that's why I'm puzzled by your evidence that you would have got an instruction to keep it quiet. You would have known very well, you were an experienced policeman, you may be a sergeant, but you were a very experienced policeman. MR WASSERMAN That's correct, Sir, I would not have mentioned it anyhow. CHAIRPERSON ...indistinct) at that stage. All they were doing was detaining somebody. MR LAX But even if you hadn't have killed him, you knew that the detention was unlawful. MR WASSERMAN Correct Sir. MR WILLS I just want to dwell on that for a very short while longer. It seems to me from the evidence of both Mr Botha and Mr Steyn, that there was an active decision taken to conceal, it wasn't just a case of hiding the information, there was an active decision to conceal your activities in relation to the arrests of these two people from de Beer, and that is what you were told. That is what was told to you, not, to actively not co-operate with de Beer and to actively conceal the fact that you had these two people from de Beer. Sorry. I'm sorry. MR WASSERMAN I don't understand you sir. MR WILLS Sorry, I'm tired now, Let me try and rephrase. You had a, it seems from my understanding of Botha's evidence is that he made an active decision to conceal the information that he had these two people at the house in Verulam from de Beer. Did you hear that evidence? MR WASSERMAN I heard the evidence yes. MR WILLS Now what I'm asking, is because you were in his select unit, he had opened, you were privy to this operation of his, but he also told you not to tell de Beer anything about that, about the fact that you had these people? MR WASSERMAN Yes. MR WILLS And did you ever have any communications with Mr Steyn, Gen Steyn? MR WASSERMAN No, I didn't. Sir. MR WILLS So it was always, the only communications that came from Steyn, was via Botha? MR WASSERMAN Yes, Sir, that's correct. MR WILLS I want to turn now to the last days, the last day. Did you see Ndaba and Shabalala on Saturday morning, the 14th? MR WASSERMAN Yes, Sir. MR WILLS How wee they? MR WASSERMAN They were fine, Sir. MR LAX They were fine? MR WASSERMAN Yes. MR LAX They weren't shaken up, scared, terrified? MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman to me no not, although Mr Botha had told me Mr Ndaba was an anxious personality. MR WILLS Yes, but to you he looked fine? MR WASSERMAN Yes. MR WILLS To you, you didn't notice anything strange about him? MR WASSERMAN No. MR WILLS You wouldn't have come, told us that he was shaken up, trembling or anything like that? MR WASSERMAN No, he wasn't, whilst he was with me, no Sir, he wasn't. MR WILLS You then say to them, or how was it, who communicated to them that you were going to remove them to another safe-house? MR WASSERMAN Mr Botha was taking the lead in that. MR WILLS Yes, did you witness that communication? MR WASSERMAN No, Sir. MR WILLS What happened, tell me how? I mean, from your point of view, I want you to go into as much detail as you can and I want you to be sensitive to the fact that I'm asking this question because the loved ones of those two people are here, they want to know what happened to their loved ones. What happened that morning? You got - what time did you go to work, or what time did you wake up from the safe-house? MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, I can't recall if I stayed at the safe-house that night, but I do know that we took Shabalala and Ndaba to a kombi, station wagon kombi. MR WILLS And who told you to do this? MR WASSERMAN Mr Botha told us to do it. MR WILLS And when had he told you this? MR WASSERMAN Earlier on in the day, before the evening. MR WILLS What time are you talking about? When did you get into the kombi? What time? MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, I can't recall the time but it was night time, late night. MR WILLS Late night? MR WASSERMAN Yes, Sir. MR WILLS On the Saturday night, the 14th? MR WASSERMAN Yes. MR WILLS And when had Mr Botha told you to put them in the kombi or take them to the kombi? MR WASSERMAN That was minutes- when did he tell me to put them in the kombi? MR WILLS Yes. Or should I rather say, when did you know, you've told us that you got an order, you got an instruction from Mr Botha that you were to assist in their elimination, when did that order come? MR WASSERMAN That was earlier on in the evening. MR WILLS Earlier on in the evening? MR WASSERMAN I can't recall, it was on the day, late afternoon, evening. MR WILLS Okay. And then sometime at night you put these people in the kombi. Did you lead? Did you lead to the kombi? MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, before that Mr Botha told me and then I prepared, he told me how he was going to - he decided to take them to the Tugela, then I got hessian sacking and some Watcrete concrete pole standards and some wire, some binding wire and I put that in the kombi. I then, I had pre-cut strands of wire into predetermined lengths. MR WILLS You had all of this equipment at this house in Verulam? MR WASSERMAN It was a farmhouse. MR WILLS You had it all there? MR WASSERMAN It was all there yes. MR WILLS Yes. MR WASSERMAN I cut wire up in predetermined sizes and also loaded that into the kombi, then when that was all ready, we took the parties out of the house. MR WILLS When you say we, I want you to tell me, who did you take out? MR WASSERMAN I'm unable to state which member I took out, Sir. MR WILLS Were you all three of you involved at this stage, or all four of you? By that I mean all applicants except Gen Steyn? MR WASSERMAN Yes. MR WILLS Were their hands cuffed? MR WASSERMAN Yes they were, Sir. They were handcuffed and blindfolded. MR WILLS Okay. And where did you put them in the kombi? MR WASSERMAN They were led into the back of the kombi, through the sliding door, into the back of the kombi. MR WILLS As I understand your evidence, you weren't present at the time it was communicated to them that they were going to be moved to another safe-house. MR WASSERMAN I don't recall that I was present Sir, although I knew that would be the legend given to them, but I wasn't present when Mr Botha said it. MR WILLS Yes. Now did they show any signs when you were moving them from the room in that house to the kombi that they knew that they were going to be murdered? MR WASSERMAN No, Sir, nothing visible was shown to them. I think that they still believed that they were going to go to another house. MR WILLS Yes, okay, you got them into the car and who was driving the kombi? MR WASSERMAN I recall van der Westhuizen drove the kombi Sir. MR WILLS And where did you sit? MR WASSERMAN I sat behind the people, Ndaba and Shabalala. MR WILLS So you sat in the third row of seats. MR WASSERMAN The third or the second, Sir, I don't know, I can't recall if the kombi had two or three rows. MR WILLS My understanding of a kombi, unless it's been modified, it's got a font seat, it's got a middle seat and it's got a back seat and behind the back seat is the shelf with the engine underneath and a place on the top. MR WASSERMAN That's it, then I was in the middle. MR WILLS And where were the deceased? MR WASSERMAN They were in the front. MR WILLS In the front with van der Westhuizen? MR WASSERMAN No, in the front of the back. In the front portion. MR WILLS Oh, so you were in the back seat of the kombi, they were in the middle seat and van der Westhuizen was driving? MR WASSERMAN Yes, Sir, correct. MR WILLS And where was Mr Botha? MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, I don't recall exactly where he was in the kombi. MR WILLS And the other applicant? MR WASSERMAN No I don't recall. I think Botha might have been in the front with van der Westhuizen, but that's speculation. MR WILLS Yes. MR WASSERMAN And du Preez and I were sitting with, in the rear for sure. MR WILLS Yes. And It's about an hours drive to the turn-off, maybe 15 minutes? MR WASSERMAN Correct, Chair. MR WILLS And what was said in the kombi? MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, there was no conversation. MR WILLS Now I understand this, this is when the old road was in operation? MR WASSERMAN That's correct. MR WILLS So there's about a 15 kilometre stretch on dirt from the turn-off at Mandini to the Tugela Mouth, might be 12 kilometres, but at least 10? MR WASSERMAN I think it is, yes, Sir. MR WILLS Yes, it is and what did you tell them when you were turning off the road? MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, both parties were unable to see where they were going so there was no reason to say anything. MR WILLS You didn't pre-warn them that you were going to stop in order to relieve yourselves? MR WASSERMAN No, Sir. MR WILLS You just turned off the tar road and turned, drove seemingly the 15 kilometres or so, or the 10 kilometres to the River Mouth on the Northern side of the Tugela River? MR WASSERMAN Yes, Sir. MR WILLS And that was a dirt road, that is a dirt road still today. MR WASSERMAN I think it's still a dirt road, I haven't been lately. MR WILLS But it was a dirt road at the time? MR WASSERMAN Correct, Sir. MR WILLS Was there any discussion in the car with the applicants? MR WASSERMAN No. MR WILLS What happened when you stopped? MR WASSERMAN When we stopped van der Westhuizen and I got out of the vehicle. MR VISSER Mr Chairman, may I ask. Seeing that we're trying to complete this incident by tomorrow, what the point is of repeating all the evidence in chief in cross-examination? With great respect. If there's a point, obviously I don't have any problem, but aren't we just wasting time,? We're going through exactly the same evidence as he's given before Mr Chairman. MR WILLS Mr Chairperson, I am asking additional questions. I don't recall there being any questions asked about conversations taking place, who was sitting where, what was said to the parties, this is to my mind, fair in the circumstances. This is the only evidence that the families are going to hear about the last day. CHAIRPERSON I think you should bear that in mind Mr Visser that it was explained that it was explained that they are appearing for the families of the people and they wished to know exactly how their sons had died and we are getting. MR VISSER Yes, Mr Chairman, I'm not getting sensitive to that but Botha also already gave the evidence. But I leave it in your hands, Mr Chairman. MR WILLS Thank you, Mr Chairperson. MR WASSERMAN Yes, Sir. Must I ... MR WILLS Yes, you see, what I'm trying to suggest is that surely at that stage, when you told them that they must get out and relieve themselves, that any person in those circumstances would at least get a suspicion or be at least a little bit scared that something was going to happen to him then, MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, it wasn't evident, perhaps both parties were apprehensive but they never stated, they never said anything and they didn't openly show anything, but I don't know what their feelings would have been at the time. MR WASSERMAN And you said that they must relieve themselves? MR WASSERMAN Yes, Mr Chairman, we all did. MR WILLS Yes, did you take their handcuffs off? MR WASSERMAN No, Mr Chairman, they were handcuffed in front of themselves, not at the back. MR WILLS So who helped them undress, or was it possible with handcuffs on? MR WASSERMAN No, it's possible with handcuffs, Mr Chair. MR WILLS Did you take their blindfolds off? MR WASSERMAN No, they remained blindfolded, Sir. MR WILLS You say you then led them, or somehow they got to the river bank, I'm assuming that the, I think you indicated that it was about 20 metres away from the car. How did they get there? Who led them there? MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, I am of the opinion that maybe Mr du Preez and Botha perhaps led them that way. We all went. The two of them and the three of us, but not van der Westhuizen, he stayed with the vehicle. MR WILLS At all stages? MR WASSERMAN At one stage, after the shooting..(intervention). MR WILLS No, I'm talking about before the shooting. I realise what happened, what he did after. MR WASSERMAN Before the stage, yes Sir. MR WILLS Yes. MR WASSERMAN No, when we got there initially, he took me from the vehicle to this place, 20 or 30 metres or so, then came back and then he stayed there. MR WILLS And you say you made them sit down? MR WASSERMAN Yes, I did. MR WILLS And how did you do that? MR WASSERMAN Well after relieving, we all relieved ourselves, then after that I suggested, "Let's sit here, we're not ready to move yet", then even I sat down. All of us sat down and then the two gentlemen were shot on either side of me. MR WILLS Yes, but the evidence has been to the effect that you made them sit down. Did you ask them to sit down and they co-operated, or did you push them down? Sorry, I know that I was concentrating on something else when you gave this evidence in chief. MR WASSERMAN Yes, Mr Chairman, we had discussed with Botha that I would attempt to get them to sit down. MR WILLS Yes. MR WASSERMAN Surreptitiously and I said "listen, we are not ready to leave, let us sit down" and I placed my hands on their shoulders. MR WILLS Both of them at the same time? MR WASSERMAN Yes, Sir, and started to sit downwards and they sat down with me. Then very, very shortly after that both shots went off, Sir. MR WILLS So even when you were making them sit down, surely then they would have at least gasped or indicated something, because they must have been terrified? MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, I think that they were not aware that they were about to be shot. CHAIRPERSON When did Botha tell you that you should try to get them to sit down? MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, he had made this plan up at the house, at the house in Verulam. MR WILLS We've heard of how you disposed of their bodies, I won't dwell on that. You had given evidence, or there has been evidence that you operated in a number or you had a number of farms at your disposal. You had at least two that I know of, the one in Camperdown and the one in Verulam. Is that not so? MR WASSERMAN That is correct, Sir. MR WILLS Now it seems to be strange that you go to the trouble of taking them all the way to the Tugela River where you could have just done the same job at the farm. MR WASSERMAN That's correct, Mr Chairman and even to me that decision was strange when it came. MR WILLS Yes, it's strange to me as well. MR LAX You see, particularly in the light of the fact that you already killed somebody on that farm before and buried them there. MR WASSERMAN Yes, Mr Chairman, I had no idea where this plan of the river had come from, it was totally out of normal context. MR WILLS MR WASSERMAN Yes, Mr Chairman. MR WILLS This was prior to your amnesty application? MR WASSERMAN MR WILLS Now I've spoken to the Investigating Officer, Mr Holmes and I was hoping at this stage to have the statements and I've just spoken to him. Did you know that Capt Holmes was the Investigating Officer? MR WASSERMAN No, I didn't know that. MR WILLS Well, I've spoken to him telephonically and unfortunately I'm not in a position to verify this with documents, but at this stage he says to me that he has information that Ndaba and Shabalala were not killed at the same time. you deny that obviously? MR WASSERMAN I deny that emphatically. MR WILLS He also indicated to me that he had information and I don't know what the state of this information is, but that Ndaba was taken out in a Natal Parks Board boat and his body was blown up some miles off the coast. MR WASSERMAN No, that's incorrect, Sir. That's nonsense. CHAIRPERSON This evidence appears to be vital to the whole application. If it is true, if there is such evidence, it is quite clear there has not been full disclosure. What arrangements are being made to have this evidence made available to the hearing? MR WILLS Mr Chairperson, I've asked Capt Holmes to give me that evidence. I spoke to him on Friday last week. he indicated to me that he would have this evidence available by Monday afternoon. Unfortunately when I got hole of him, I only traced his number down on Friday, when I got hold of him on Friday afternoon he was in some operation in the Eastern Cape and he was expected back to his offices on the Saturday. He indicated to me that on the Saturday he would look through the information and give it to me. I spoke to him on the Monday morning, he indicated that he'd been delayed in the Eastern Cape but that he would endeavour to give the information to me. I'm still expecting it Mr Chairperson. I have asked the Truth Commission, in the form of Ms Deborah Quinn, to assist in this process but we haven't been successful at this stage and that's, I don't have any power to get hold of this information other than that. I am expecting affidavits to come through. Mr Chairperson I didn't, I raised this information at this stage obviously because it would be fair for me to put this to this witness. The information I've just revealed now was given to me as a result of a telephone conversation with Capt Holmes on Monday morning after the cross-examination of Mr Botha had been completed, but I would certainly appreciate assistance from the Committee as far as getting Holmes here. It would assist me greatly. CHAIRPERSON It seems to me that if there is such evidence, it should be made available, it should be put to the witness. Is it possible to continue his cross-examination on other aspects and to continue, we will do all we can to make sure such evidence, if it is evidence, is made available and can be put before the Committee. Obviously it's something which should be put to Botha certainly if it's going to say that his version is completely false and we have to put to the other applicant. MR VISSER Mr Chairperson, we agree with you. The - Please allow me say that it is startling that after two years down the line when everybody knew in the TRC of these applications, that we should be faced with this 90% through our, or 80% through our applications. It is just really unacceptable, but Mr Chairman, as usual we will not complain, we will fall in, because clearly we want to know what the truth is and we agree with you, but can my learned friend just tell us everything that Holmes told him? We now know of two things. Is there more, may we ask, Mr Chairman? And what's - surely my learned friend must have asked him, "But why do you say this, what is this based on? Is there somebody that can tell us?" I mean surely there must be more information? MR WILLS The only, I mean I don't know if I'm obliged to answer questions about consultations I have with witnesses but be that as it may, the only information that I have got related to that, but related to the two facts that I've given and to my recollection of the telephone conversation I had with Holmes, the impression I gained was this was through his investigations and I assumed it was through information contained in the dockets. I did request that statements be faxed to me to the number at, in the media room. MR VISSER May we assume that this is then all that he said? These two points. MR WILLS At that stage, yes. MR VISSER Mr Chairman, may I ask, I don't see that there should but could there be any objection to my attorney talking to him so that we can find out exactly what he's got and when it can be brought to you because Mr Chairman, we can't just keep on postponing the completion ...(intervention). CHAIRPERSON I want our investigator to take over now through our Leader of Evidence and we will be responsible for such evidence then being made available. MR VISSER I suggest that my learned friend completes the cross-examination of this witness, pending on whatever may come out from Mr Holmes. MR WILLS Thank you Mr Chairperson, I've just got one issue that I want to raise which is related, that is, in your experience as a Security Policeman, surely, or isn't it common practice that when you have an informer who supplies you with information about persons who may at a later stage be arrested, that it would be a common practice to keep that informer in order to communicate with that informer to corroborate information that is gleaned from the persons who are arrested or detained by some other means? MR WASSERMAN That would be a usual practice, yes Sir. MR WILLS Yes, so it would be quite an unusual thing to have killed this informer at this stage? MR WASSERMAN That is correct, Sir. MR WILLS Do you know why? Are you able to advance any reason to the Committee why this unusual step was taken? MR WASSERMAN No, Mr Chairman, personally I am unable to really know why this step was taken. MR WILLS Thank you Mr Chairman. MR LAX Mr Wills, can I just clarify something? The two issues that arose from your discussion with Mr Holmes were that they weren't killed at the same time and which of them was allegedly blown up at sea? CHAIRPERSON Ndaba. MR WILLS Yes, Ndaba. MR LAX I just wanted to be clear, so my note is correct, thank you. MR WILLS That completes my cross-examination, thank you. NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR WILLS MS POSWA Thank you Mr Chair. CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS POSWA Mr Wasserman, you state in paragraph 4 that you were surprised by the news of Mr Ndaba's arrest in view of the high profile. Can you explain what you mean by this? MR WASSERMAN No, Mr Chairman, not the arrest. MR LAX He was surprised that he was his informant, not by the arrest. Sorry, just to get the question right. MS POSWA What do you mean by high profile? MR WASSERMAN Well Mr Ndaba was a high profile, according to my knowledge, he was a high profile MK Commander from MHQ. CHAIRPERSON He was Commander of the operations in Natal, wasn't he? MR WASSERMAN He was at one stage, then he retreated. CHAIRPERSON Did you also know that Mr Shabalala was high profile, similar high profile? MR WASSERMAN No, I was unaware of his status, Sir. MS POSWA When did you come into contact with the name Ndaba? When did you first come into contact with his name? MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, I can hazard a guess. It would have been in my Swaziland Operations, probably 84/85, at a guess. MS POSWA Oh you were in Swaziland 84/85? MR WASSERMAN No I operated in Swaziland, but I was in Durban basically. MS POSWA Okay. Now you say that, to your knowledge, no assault took place at C R Swart? MR WASSERMAN Not in my presence. MS POSWA Not in your presence? MR WASSERMAN No. MR LAX Sorry your mike please. MS POSWA Sorry, and you were in the presence of these two all the time that they were there? MR WASSERMAN No, I was not in their presence all the time. MS POSWA You were not? Okay. MR WASSERMAN No, Mr Chair. MS POSWA Now you say when you proceeded with the arrest of Shabalala at the meeting-place by Greyville Racecourse, you explained how the whole operation occurred, but I'd just like to highlight the fact that Mr Botha in his evidence, said that what he had, what your objective had been at that stage once Ndaba gave the signal, it was to protect Ndaba, would you agree with that? Your objective, your common objective, once the signal had been given by Ndaba that he was in danger? MR WASSERMAN Yes, Mr Chairman, any action taken by us was to protect Ndaba. MS POSWA Your objective of the whole action? But your account here has just been that your, the object of your, of the whole operation was to arrest both of them? MR WASSERMAN No, Mr Chairman, that's the wrong impression, I hope that's not the impression ...(intervention) CHAIRPERSON Well, I gathered from the evidence, that he said the intention was to create the impression that they had arrested both of them after it had gone wrong. MR WASSERMAN That is correct, yes, that's the impression Sir. MS POSWA Okay, so you wouldn't agree with Botha's assertion that in fact Ndaba could have gleaned, Shabalala could have gleaned from that whole operation of arrest, that Ndaba was not being arrested? MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, it is possible that he did glean that, that we were attempting to stage a charade that he would not glean that. MS POSWA Thank you. We have evidence from Mr Botha yet again that Shabalala refused to be recruited, what do you say to that? MR WASSERMAN That's very possible and I was not present when Botha even tried once to recruit him. MS POSWA I don't think I got the reason precisely why you were told not to try to recruit him. Why was that? MR WASSERMAN That reason was never given to me. MS POSWA In the usual course of your business of arrests you would have tried to turn a person over, would you not? MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman we would have engaged in a questioning session should the reaction of that person be as such, then one might have tried a recruiting job on that personality. MS POSWA Had you previously been told not to try and recruit an arrested person? MR WASSERMAN Many times. MS POSWA You have been. MR WASSERMAN Yes. MR POSWA And you never questioned it? MR WASSERMAN No, not at all. MS POSWA Okay. On paragraph 12 you say that Shabalala was robust and aggressive throughout, can you just expand on that? MR WASSERMAN Well, Mr Chairman, if I attempted to have anything to say to Mr Ndaba, correction, to Mr Shabalala, he would have absolutely nothing to say to me. MS POSWA Is that aggression? MR WASSERMAN Well, perhaps not in the strict sense of the word, however he would have nothing at all to do with me. MS POSWA Is that what you mean by robust and aggressive? MR WASSERMAN Perhaps abrasive is another word, but it was definite from his reaction that there would be no dealings between the two of us. MS POSWA This just doesn't add up. You were told not to have anything to do with Mr Shabalala but you are able here to assert that he was robust and aggressive. The two just don't tie up. MR WASSERMAN Well, Mr chairman, I would have had to go and see that he was okay in the room, that perhaps he needed to relieve himself, we had to take him food, we had to take water, so those were the dealings that I routinely would have had with him, but I never had discussions over activities and actions that he might be doing. MS POSWA So, in hiss aggression what did he do, did he refuse when you said you may go and relieve yourself? MR WASSERMAN No. CHAIRPERSON Did you have to be present when he had to relieve himself? MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, there was no toilet facilities right in that room, so he would have had to be taken to do his ablutions and we took them. CHAIRPERSON And have his handcuffs taken off? MR WASSERMAN Yes, Sir. CHAIRPERSON It must have been most humiliating. MR WASSERMAN I think so, Sir. MR LAX Sorry, sorry if I may interpose. The word robust, what do you understand by the use of that word? Why did you choose that word? MR WASSERMAN I think it should have been rather more proud and forthright, but robust was selected. MR LAX Because robust means to be physical, to be more than just body language, which is what you used in evidence in chief. MR WASSERMAN Then perhaps it's the wrong word, I didn't understand robust to be that. MR LAX And aggressive has a similar denomination. MR WASSERMAN It's words selected in consultation. MR LAX It's just that the impression imparted by the use of those two words together, gives one the impression that he might even have tried to physically attack you back. MR WASSERMAN No, Sir, he didn't. MR LAX At no stage? MR WASSERMAN No. MS POSWA Thank you. We'll go now to the observation at the Knoll. Can you just clarify? Where was Gen Nyanda arrested? MR WASSERMAN He was arrested going up the road towards Overport, I don't recall the name of the road. MS POSWA And before the arrest you were observing the resident, called the Knoll. MR WASSERMAN Correct, Mr Chairman. MS POSWA When he left the Knoll, you followed him? MR WASSERMAN That's correct. MS POSWA Why had you been asked to observe that place? MR WASSERMAN Mr Botha had informed us that this was a safe-house for the ANC. MS POSWA An ANC safe-house? MR WASSERMAN Yes. MS POSWA Had he told you who to observe there? MR WASSERMAN I don't recall which names he mentioned, but we were to record all particulars of all personalities exiting and leaving. MR POSWA Did you know Gen Nyanda? MR WASSERMAN I knew Kibusa. MS POSWA I knew the name Kibusa and I knew Kibusa was Gen Nyanda. MS POSWA Okay.. MR WASSERMAN And I knew the face, Ma'am. MS POSWA Okay. So I didn't quite get what you said he did that made you, alerted you to the fact that you were onto him. What did he exactly do? MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, I think his counter surveillance procedure, because he's a highly trained man, I think his counter surveillance procedures had picked us up. His driving mannerisms appeared to both du Preez and I that he was starting to take slightly evasive action and we both came to the conclusion that perhaps he had cottoned on to us. MS POSWA Can you just explain the driving mannerism, what was he doing? Swerving the car, going faster, slower? MR WASSERMAN Nothing as dramatic as swerving the car, however, I seem to recall perhaps and indicator, showing going left and then not going left and then an indicator going right, to see if we were responding behind. That's routine anti-surveillance procedures and it appeared as though those were being practised. MS POSWA And then you went on to say that a particular weapon was discovered in the car whereas you had searched the car and not found the weapon. How do you explain that? MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, my search was very, very cursory. We didn't strip that car at that stage for secret compartments, it was merely a physical search of the vehicle as it was standing there per se. CHAIRPERSON I tend to recollect, but I'm not sure, if it was in this case or something else, that the weapons were found in a secret compartment in the fuel tank? MR VISSER Mr Chairman, I was just looking, I think it was in Gen Steyn's Exhibit H, where he recounts the judgment of the Magistrate in Mr Nyanda's application for bail, but I'm not entirely certain. I'm just looking through that now, Mr Chairman and if I find it, I will alert you. MR LAX It's on page 5 of that annexure. MR VISSER Thank you Commissioner Lax. I'm just looking. I see there's something on page 6 as well about explaining that tanks of a Mercedes and a Cressida, well he was driving a Cressida, was used to smuggle arms. I'm just looking again, Mr Chairman. I'm not sure where at page 5 you're referring to. MR LAX No, in fact you're correct there. It's the second-last sentence of that first paragraph on page 6, talks about "the Accused explained that the tanks were used to smuggle arms and ammunition from Botswana into the Republic. This was done on numerous occasions." CHAIRPERSON It would appear to indicate, if one looks at the sentence just before that the modified petrol tank were found at the house. It may be somewhere else. MR VISSER Yes, certainly this does not narrow it down to a secret compartment in a car, Mr Chairman. My attorney has just pointed out to me something else here and that is at page 96 on The Other Side of the Story where the photographs which I referred to earlier, page 198, I dealt with and it says at page 97 "The photographs 198 illustrate the Toyota Cressida, ND 268230, found in possession of Siphiwe Nyanda, showing the false compartment and the M3A1 45 calibre sub-machine gun with the optical sight and silencer." So according to these commentary Mr Chairman, apparently it's the middle photograph and I'm going to hand it to you again so that you look at it, it would appear to be the seat turned upside down with some sort of compartment. My attorney can just show that to you, Mr Chairman, it gives him something to do as well. MS POSWA So Mr Chair, we can proceed on the assumption that the weapons were found under the seat in a secret compartment. Thank you, Mr Chair. Can I continue? You say that you were told that Ndaba was anxious and indicated his intention to turn himself over the ANC. Would you normally be privy to such information? MR WASSERMAN As Mr Botha wished, I could have received such information yes. MS POSWA Earlier on you said he had not permitted you is some discussions, well which discussions were those? In discussions with Ndaba. You said earlier on that he had not permitted you in the room when he was discussing with Ndaba yet he walks out of the room and gives you the exact information Ndaba gave him, does that make sense? MR WASSERMAN Yes, it makes Ma'am. Then I cannot put questions to Mr Ndaba. MS POSWA Pardon? MR WASSERMAN That means I would not be able to question Mr Ndaba on information. MS POSWA Okay, if you're in the room you would, it would have been assumed that you can question Ndaba, but if you're outside, you couldn't? MR WASSERMAN That's right. CHAIRPERSON And if you're outside, you are relying only on what you are told by Botha. MR WASSERMAN That is correct, sir. MS POSWA When was the decision taken to eliminate Ndaba? MR WASSERMAN I'm not sure when that was taken Mr Chairman, but I was, my participation came about earlier on the day in question. MR LAX When were you informed of that decision and, well let's just first, when were you informed of the decision? On that day? What time of day, can you remember? MR WASSERMAN Mr Chair, as I answered before I cannot give the time but it was earlier on the same day. MR LAX Was it in the morning, was it in the afternoon, was it early evening? MR WASSERMAN Somehow I recall sort of eventide. CHAIRPERSON You said earlier didn't you, afternoon, early evening? MR WASSERMAN Yes Sir. CHAIRPERSON Late afternoon, early evening. MR LAX And as a consequence of that you had certain preparations to perform? MR WASSERMAN That's correct, Mr Chairman. MR LAX And that entailed getting hessian sacking, it entailed getting the Watcrete poles, according to your evidence it entailed cutting bits of bailing wire to certain lengths and so on, is that right? MR WASSERMAN Yes, Mr Chairman, once I'd been informed that it's been decided that they were to be placed in a river and what my part would be I then prepared, on grounds of that instruction. MR LAX And where did you get all that material from? MR WASSERMAN MR LAX Please carry on, sorry to interrupt you. MS POSWA Thank you. Now did the repercussions that this would have, the fact that Ndaba and Shabalala were to be eliminated on the National Party as explained in paragraph 18, did you reach this conclusion on your own, or where did you get this information? MR LAX I was just reminding you to put the mike on, you did it as I mentioned it to you. MS POSWA The concerns raised in paragraph 18. MR WASSERMAN Sorry Mr Chair, I just missed the gist of that question. MR LAX You're being asked, these concerns that you raise here in paragraph 18 about the way the decision was taken and the basis for that decision, where did you, how did you come to know about these concerns? Have I put the question correctly? Did you ...(indistinct- mike not on). MS POSWA Were you personally concerned about the repercussions that the elimination of Ndaba and Shabalala would have on the National Party? MR WASSERMAN I was aware that there would be repercussions, should it be established what had happened. MS POSWA Were you concerned about those repercussions as stated in paragraph 18? MR WASSERMAN What repercussions exactly? MS POSWA Should I read out the paragraph? Paragraph 18 of his statement. MR LAX Mr Wasserman, you can see paragraph 18, it's pretty obvious that there are a whole range of issues contained in it. MR WASSERMAN Yes Sir, I'm aware of the issues but are those repercussions? MR LAX Well during the period of time when the negotiations were under way, these revelations would have caused a sensation and would have embarrassed the National Party and the Government. Those are the repercussions she's talking about. MR WASSERMAN Yes, I concur with that. MR LAX Yes, but the question you're being asked is, did you personally have a worry that that in fact would be the result? MR WASSERMAN Yes, I did. MS POSWA You were not told this by Mr Botha? MR WASSERMAN I believe that I was also told this by Mr Botha, but I did further concur with it by myself. MS POSWA How far did you say the safe-house was from the Tugela River? MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, distance wise... MR POSWA An estimation will do, Mr Wasserman. MR WASSERMAN 80 kilometres. 80/90 kilometres. MS POSWA So your testimony is that for 80 to 90 kilometres, you drove 80 to 90 kilometres in total silence to the Tugela? MR WASSERMAN I didn't speak at all to either Ndaba or Shabalala. MS POSWA But you spoke amongst yourselves? MR WASSERMAN Yes, we spoke amongst yourselves. MS POSWA What would you say the mood was amongst yourselves as you proceeded to carry out this mission? MR WASSERMAN The mood was a sombre mood but we were going at lengths to show that it was not abnormal. Like that, there was nothing, I'd deem it as a normal trip. MS POSWA That is you wanted to conceal it from the two people you were with, Mr Ndaba and Mr Shabalala? MR WASSERMAN Yes, Ma'am. MS POSWA You wanted to conceal it? MR WASSERMAN Yes. MS POSWA If the Chair will bear with me. Now your evidence has been that you did all this in the course of your duties. MR VISSER MS POSWA Mr chair, I do not believe that, I would like to know the mind-set of the applicant when he is carrying this out. Did he believe that he was carrying out his duties, was he aware that the instructions were unlawful in the circumstances? MR VISSER I have no objection to that question. MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, I was aware that these were unlawful instructions. MS POSWA But you carried them out anyway? MR WASSERMAN Correct, Mr Chairman. It was my belief that I was still fighting the war and the conflicts of the past to the best of my ability. MS POSWA What, under normal circumstances, were you required to do when given unlawful instructions by a senior policeman? MR WASSERMAN I beg your pardon. Would you just say that again? MS POSWA What were you required to do once given an unlawful instruction? MR WASSERMAN Usually one would not comply with such an instruction. MS POSWA Why in this case did you? MR WASSERMAN I saw it as part of my duties in fighting the onslaught that we were faced with at the time. CHAIRPERSON The acts were unlawful, they were against the common law of our land, but did you believe these instructions were coming from the government, from the top? Not directly, but the authority was derived from them? MR WASSERMAN Yes, I did so, Sir. MS POSWA No further questions, Mr Chair. NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS POSWA CHAIRPERSON Any questions? MS THABETHE Yes, Mr Chair, I do have questions, thank you. CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS THABETHE Mr Wasserman, at paragraph 10 of your statement, you say that in view of the fact that Ndaba was already a Security Branch informer, you go on and then you say "I was given to understand that we were not interested in any information which Shabalala might be able to give us." What does that mean? I don't quite get the meaning of that statement, "I was given to understand that we were not interested in any information which Shabalala might be able to give us"? MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, I was of the opinion that as Botha was handling Ndaba as an agent, we were not to be, not to go for Shabalala for information as Ndaba was already able to feed on to Botha the information that Shabalala might have been in possession of. MS THABETHE When you say we, who are you referring to? MR WASSERMAN I'm referring to that unit that was involved. That'll be du Preez, van der Westhuizen and myself. MS THABETHE And who gave you that information that Shabalala might not be able to give you an information? MR WASSERMAN That was Botha. MS THABETHE Botha? MR WASSERMAN Yes. MS THABETHE So Botha gave you an instruction that you shouldn't worry about Shabalala because you wouldn't be interested in the information that Shabalala would give? MR WASSERMAN Not to worry about Shabalala, Ndaba has the information. MS THABETHE Right. Now, my next question is, if Botha thought that Shabalala would not have any information that would be of interest to you, you in plural, why was Shabalala detained in the first place? What was the purpose of detaining Shabalala, because Ndaba had already given the information and as far as your evidence goes, Botha said you don't need Shabalala. CHAIRPERSON Shabalala was detained, wasn't he, to save Ndaba? MS THABETHE Sorry Mr Chair, Shabalala was detained to save Ndaba? CHAIRPERSON He gave the signal in the car, didn't he? MS THABETHE That was the reason for detaining Shabalala? MR LAX Do you mean his continued detention? MS THABETHE Yes. MR LAX Okay, well that's subtly different. MS THABETHE Okay, okay, thank you Mr Lax. MR WASSERMAN Now I'm, now I'm mixed up. MR LAX The question is, if Shabalala was of no use to you, because all the information was going to come from Ndaba and that's what you were told and that's what you surmised you told us, what is the point in holding Shabalala, continuing to hold him? Have I put the question correctly? MS THABETHE Yes, Mr Lax, thank you. MR WASSERMAN Well, Mr Chairman, I really don't know the particulars why we held onto Mr Shabalala that long. Mr Botha might know why he was kept behind for so long. MS THABETHE Mr Wasserman, in your evidence you have indicated that Mr Shabalala's head was down when he was arrested. Would you say he saw what happened to Ndaba thereafter? MR WASSERMAN He wouldn't have seen what happened after I had his head down. MS THABETHE Right. Then my question with regard to that is, on paragraph 12 of your statement, you say the problem became compounded when it appeared that Shabalala in effect suspected Ndaba of working with the police. When did Shabalala - and then you go on to say, "I remember him saying as much", when did Shabalala say this? MR WASSERMAN It would have been one of the nights, or one of the days, a couple of days after we had taken him to the safe-house in Durban. MS THABETHE And to whom did he say this? Did he say this to you? Or were you present when he said this? MR WASSERMAN He said it to me. I believe he said it to some of the other people that were there as well. MS THABETHE Maybe I'm confused a bit, I thought your evidence had indicated you did not speak to Shabalala and Shabalala did not speak to you back, so I'm just a bit confused, at what stage did Shabalala speak to you and say that he's suspecting Ndaba might be working with you? MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, after four days, some form of chatting did take place, but there was nothing - there was no questioning on MK activities or anything like that. There was - within four days one has to say something to one another, but it wasn't discussions, interrogations, interviews, it was nothing like that. MS THABETHE Yes, I must say I've got difficulty understanding that, that - I don't know where you say it, but you say he did not co-operate with you, you went in and you went out, there was no conversation and then all of a sudden he says that he suspects that Ndaba is working with the police. Do you have any response to that? MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, I cannot recall, I don't know if other people said to me that they've spoken to Shabalala and he's of the opinion that he was set up by Ndaba. I really don't recall. I spoke to hundreds of MK operators. I cannot exactly recall who said what here but whilst in that house over that period of time, I was informed or I came to the conclusion that Shabalala did indeed at one time have an conclusion that Ndaba may have set him up for an arrest. CHAIRPERSON It wasn't that Ndaba was an informer, but that Ndaba had set him up, but from the facts that Ndaba was the person who apparently led the police to him. MR WASSERMAN Yes, Sir, as an informer yes. MR LAX Can I just raise something here? You may have formed that impression. I'd like to suggest to you that its highly unlikely he said to you he suspects Ndaba. no operative's going to give away the fact that he suspects the other guy you've got there. It's highly unlikely. You see, the reason I say this is that you didn't question Shabalala. MR WASSERMAN No Sir. MR LAX And all you heard about were the attempts by the C20 people to ask him certain questions. He was very uncooperative. MR WASSERMAN Correct, Sir. MR LAX Why would he then admit that he suspected Shabalala? Sorry that he suspected Ndaba of selling him out because by doing that he's automatically admitting to being in a certain position. Do you see what I'm saying? CHAIRPERSON Setting him up. MR LAX Same thing, setting him up, it works the same way both ways. MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, I cannot really put a state of affairs before the Committee of exactly what happened there. During those couple of days I was informed exactly how, or if the question came to me, but Shabalala had formed the opinion or the conclusion or been told by a slip up of C20, I don't know, I cannot pass comment, but that Ndaba was involved in his capture and therefore working with us. MS THABETHE Except that Mr Wasserman, unless this paragraph doesn't give the clear picture. You see this paragraph 12 says "The problem became compounded when it appeared that Shabalala in fact suspected Ndaba of working with the police" And then you go on to say: "I remember him saying as much." So it suggests that you actually heard Shabalala saying this. MR WASSERMAN Yes, it does suggest that, but it might have been somebody saying to me that he had said that. MS THABETHE So it's not true that you actually heard him yourself saying it? MR WASSERMAN I cannot give that evidence before the Committee, that I specifically heard that. MS THABETHE Now my other problem that I would like you to clarify for me with regard to this is, how could Shabalala reach that conclusion or on what basis would Shabalala reach the conclusion that Ndaba was working with the police because when he was arrested, he did not see what happened to Ndaba and the evidence is that they were both detained in the same safe house, so my question is on what basis would he reach this decision because he did not see Ndaba being arrested. He did not see what happened to Ndaba and he might have known that Ndaba is detained in the same safe-house with him. I don't know whether I have to repeat my question. My question is on what basis did Shabalala reach that conclusion that Ndaba is working for the police? MR WASSERMAN No Mr Chairman, I am not able to state on what basis if it was in fact so. I don't know on what basis Shabalala would have known that. MS THABETHE Thank you Mr Chair, I have no further questions. NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS THABETHE CHAIRPERSON Any re-examination? MR VISSER No re-examination, Mr Chairman. NO RE-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER MR LAX You said that when you first saw Ndaba, you didn't - he wasn't ever assaulted in your presence. What was his condition on that morning or that afternoon, early afternoon? MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, when I arrived there, he was sitting in a chair, no signs of assault. MR LAX Now, you've told us about what happened to Shabalala when Ndaba gave the signal and you all converged on the vehicle and what happened to Ndaba in that moment of convergence? MR WASSERMAN No, Mr Chairman, I'm unable to say where he was. I entered straight away into the vehicle at the back, so I don't know what happened to Mr Ndaba, whether he walked away, ran away, I don't know, I didn't visibly see what happened to him, I was putting all my attention onto Mr Shabalala. CHAIRPERSON Had he not been in the vehicle? Had he been standing next to the vehicle? MR LAX No he was sitting in the front passenger seat. MR WASSERMAN Yes, he was in the vehicle Sir. MR LAX So, you don't recall how he got out of the vehicle, if anyone took him out, if any words were spoken to him? MR WASSERMAN No, Mr Chairman, he was the subject of Mr van der Westhuizen's attention, not of mine. MR LAX When did van der Westhuizen then get into the vehicle? MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, he got into the vehicle after Mr Shabalala was in the back with myself and du Preez. MR LAX And Botha? MR WASSERMAN I never saw him until the safe-house. MR LAX So you have no recollection of what Botha did during this "arrest"? MR WASSERMAN After du Preez said "we've got the order, let's go, the signs been given" even prior to that I hadn't seen Mr Botha, Sir. MR LAX You see Botha's evidence was that he approached the driver's seat. He approached and he stuck his hand through the window, he had his firearm in his hand and he told him words to the effect of "Be calm, don't do anything silly". MR WASSERMAN Yes, I recall that evidence being heard. MR LAX But you have no independent recollection of that? MR WASSERMAN No, Mr chairman, I don't recall seeing him, however, he must have placed himself on the spot. MR LAX And as far as you were able to, you didn't see what he did? As far as you're concerned. Your own testimony. You heard him give that evidence, that's one thing. You have no recollection of what he did whatsoever? MR WASSERMAN No, Mr Chairman, I don't. MR LAX Now, you've said that on the 12th van der Westhuizen was busy with observation due to his Brickhill Road, is that correct? MR WASSERMAN Yes, Sir. MR LAX And you and du Preez were at the Knoll? MR WASSERMAN Correct, Sir. MR LAX And we've heard the evidence of Botha that it was only the three of you that were guarding these two, so who was guarding them on the 12th when you were busy with your observations? MR WASSERMAN The C4 members, I believe. MR LAX I beg your pardon? MR WASSERMAN I believe perhaps the C4, the C20. MR LAX You see, he told us that only the three of you were guarding. It's also his evidence that the C20 people had no idea that these people were - anything unlawful to do with them. Now they were never left there unattended at any stage, that's self-evident. How could the three of you be out on other duties, when according to his evidence, you were supposed to be guarding them? At lease one or two of you? MR WASSERMAN Well, Mr Chairman, perhaps he was referring to the Durban members, but if we were not there at all at the time, then C20 were also policemen and they could also do the guarding but they were really, I would presume, to be out responsibility as Durban members. MR LAX Now Botha's told us that the C20 people had no knowledge of the unlawfulness of their detention. What legend did you give them? They stayed there for a couple of days. MR WASSERMAN That's correct, Mr Chairman, I never saw fit to give them any explanation. I'm not sure what Mr Botha would have said. MR LAX But listen, I've been to that house. Let me tell you straight, I've been, I've seen its layout, I observed the exhumation there, it's not a huge house, it's a relatively small house, it's about four or five rooms at the most, if I remember correctly. Are you talking about the house where the body was buried? MR WASSERMAN I don't believe I am, Mr Chairman. MR LAX Pumuza Ncweni? he was exhumed on that farm. MR WASSERMAN No, Mr Chairman, no, sorry Sir, it's a different house. MR LAX Is this a different place? MR WASSERMAN Yes. MR LAX So there were two safe-houses in the Verulam area? MR WASSERMAN Yes, there were two. MR LAX Fair enough, I won't take that aspect any further. If the layout of the house was different, and we're talking about two completely different places, so be it. MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, I think Mr Botha said Blackburn, in his evidence, did he not? MR LAX I think he did. MR WASSERMAN Different house to the other one, which is also at Verulam. MR LAX I think the other one was called Churchill or something like that. MR WASSERMAN Waterloo. MR LAX Waterloo, that was it. Thank you. The last aspect I wanted to just touch on was, surely the fact that nobody questioned Shabalala and that he was not being interrogated would give him the impression that something was strange here? MR WASSERMAN I don't dispute that, Sir. MR LAX Because yesterday Gen Steyn conceded that the whole conduct towards Shabalala would have increased the chances of him suspecting Ndaba and was totally out of sync with what you normally would have done in those circumstances. Would you agree with that? MR WASSERMAN Yes, Sir, it was wrong and it was out of sync. MR LAX Now, if it was the intention from the very beginning to simply eliminate these two people, then it wouldn't have mattered whether they realised Ndaba was an informer or not, whether Shabalala realised, and what it might be argued is that your conduct and the conduct of all of you present there, is consistent with that course of action, in other words with the intention to kill from the outset. MR WASSERMAN Mr Chairman, no, I had no idea that there was going to be any elimination on the outset, I was led to believe that Ndaba was in fact an agent of the branch. It would never have occurred to me that we were to eliminate an agent of the branch. MR LAX Did the fact of Botha's eliminating his own agent not strike you as strange? That he did it himself? MR WASSERMAN It struck me as very strange, Mr Chairman, very strange indeed. MR LAX Thank you Chairperson. ADV BOSMAN I'd just like some clarification on one issue Mr Wasserman. When you were instructed to keep surveillance at the two safe-houses of the ANC, let me first ask you this, who gave you the instructions to go there and to keep observation there? MR WASSERMAN It was Mr Botha. ADV BOSMAN Now did it come up at all that it might be at some stage or other, become necessary to effect any arrests there? MR WASSERMAN No, no, it never became evident upon instructions of arrest, because as far as I was concerned it was to be an Intelligence operation. ADV BOSMAN So there were no guidelines, or no directives given to you in regard to possible arrests? MR WASSERMAN Nothing given to me. ADV BOSMAN How did you consider your position? Did you think that you could arrest or that you should be careful in effecting arrests? MR WASSERMAN We knew that the first principle was to observe and identify all parties visiting these premises and it was a very intricate SACP ANC operation, but as for specifics of arrest, I personally was never instructed one way or the other. ADV BOSMAN The reason why I'm asking you this question, Mr Wasserman, is because it did seem strange to me that Mr Botha did not deem it fit to sort of warn you about not making arrests and he seemed to indicate in his evidence that he was quite comfortable that no arrests would be made. Do you have any comment on that? MR WASSERMAN No, Mr Chairman, perhaps, he was the colonel on the spot, perhaps he should have given a clear instruction one way or the other. ADV BOSMAN Thank you. Thank you Chairperson. CHAIRPERSON Thank you. MR VISSER Mr Chairman, it seems that we've come to the end of this day. Perhaps, Mr Chairman if we might take up a little bit of your time by seeing you in chambers and try to arrange our lives for tomorrow, Mr Chairman. CHAIRPERSON Well, we're going to have to adjourn. Till what time should we adjourn? MR VISSER Tomorrow morning 9.30 Mr Chairman? CHAIRPERSON Well we're now adjourning till 9.30 tomorrow morning. COMMITTEE ADJOURNS