special State Security Council Hearings https://sabctrc.saha.org.za/hearing.php?id=56376&t=&tab=hearings https://sabctrc.saha.org.za/originals/special/security/3securit.htm they are doing their job well and the country has to know what is actually going on and they are doing that, they are telling the country what is going on and they are doing it well. Good luck to all of you. CHAIRPERSON: When is the election!! (Laughter) MR VLOK: No I am finished. Thank you. MR VLOK IS EXCUSED DR BORAINE: Mr Wessels do you wish to take the oath or the affirmation? MR WESSELS: The affirmation. LEON WESSELS: (affirms) CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much. MR WESSELS: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman we come from different backgrounds and we come from different launching pads. I have listened to the witnesses that have appeared before you since yesterday morning. The document I had prepared I had made available to your staff yesterday morning because I knew given the evidence that you were about to receive I would be tempted to change it. I have not changed my document, this is how I felt yesterday and I stand by my statement and you will just have to bear with me, I hope, as I present it to you now. May I further say that I had, listening to Mr Botha and Mr Vlok yesterday, I had the privilege of working with both of them for three and a half years, 18 months with Mr Vlok, which was a privilege, two years with Mr Botha, which was also a privilege and my colleague right next to me and I have seen many sunsets and many sunrises in battle, and I am pleased to be associated with him from this position. I, however, will say what I have to say off my own bat and I don't hold any of them accountable for what I am saying. I say that for my own account. I do remember, Mr Chairman, Abraham Tiro. Many years ago I took a resolution never to forget his tragic death. In life he introduced me to the realities of South Africa. In his death his memory never allowed me to forget the tragedies of South Africa. I remember Mr Chairman the first time we met. You were kind enough to make mention of an area that we share, those were the days of isolating Botha in his laager, making this country ungovernable. We are not afraid to inherit a wasteland. Those were the days of states of emergency, emergency regulations and the steps taken under those regulations that we thought were necessary to save life and property. I remember saying to you then, during that encounter Mr Chairman, that the political climate was such at the time that many people would not understand the fact that we were even speaking to each other. To the government and National Party establishment you were a sanctions activist and a political trouble-maker. I proudly remember, Sir, that I was appointed to this position, and I take it it was because of this position that I am here today, by Mr Botha as Deputy Minister of Law and Order. I think kindly of him and believe that he deserves credit for major initiatives. Those were the days of the Homburg hats, I hated that, but I loved my work. I remember Sir, proud soldiers and policemen now on their knees in front of the Amnesty Committee, I cannot condone those violent unlawful acts, but nor can I condemn the persons. I cannot disown them. We were on the same side and fought for the same cause, namely law and order as we saw it, and also to ensure that this country would not be made ungovernable. Power was not be wrested from us in a revolutionary manner. I cannot disown any of those men and women who were on our side. I do not believe that individually or collectively I ever took a decision that cannot stand the test of daylight here today. Every decision was taken within the ambit of the law as it was known then. The law may be criticised today and I will certainly agree and concede that that law will not stand the test of constitutional scrutiny at this juncture. However, that was the law of the land. I further do not believe that the political defence of I did not know. I want to delete the WE and I want to delete the US. I said I speak of my own bat. I further do not believe that the political defence of I did not know is available to me, because in many respects I believe I did not want to know. I am afraid I am deleting and amending that sentence to that effect. In my own way I had my suspicions of things that had caused discomfort in official circles, but because I did not have the facts to substantiate my suspicions or I had lacked the courage to shout from the rooftops, I have to confess that I only whispered in the corridors. That I believe is the accusation that people may level at many of us. That US is not deleted. We simply did not, and I did not confront the reports of injustices head-on. It may be blunt but I have to say it. Since the days of the Biko tragedy right up to the days of hostel activities, hostel atrocities in the late, late eighties, as we went up to the record of understanding the National Party did not have an inquisitive mindset. The National Party did not have an enquiring mind about these matters. We have to applaud, and we have to give credit to Mr F W de Klerk for the actions he had taken to appoint the Harms Commission and to appoint the Goldstone Commission. I simply believe that it is a pity that there is not a collective political and moral acceptance of responsibility forthcoming from the quarters from which I emanate. It became clear from evidence before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission that even sharply probing judges had been wilfully misled in many cases by key security forces personnel. Not surprisingly some individuals had done the same to gullible politicians not excessively keen to ask pointed questions. Eugene de Kock's recent claim in his amnesty bid I submit is correct, namely, that any National Party politician or supporter, I may add, at the time who believed that we held power because of persuasion and not through coercion was out of touch of reality to put it mildly. With the benefit of hindsight I now believe that we had failed the security forces because we did not offer this country a viable constitutional vision to end the conflict. And secondly, that the relationship between the security forces and the National Party politicians, as a collective, in general, was not an open transparent one, and therefore we did not manage the security forces Intelligence services properly. If we had managed them properly you would not have had to listen to evidence on the one hand they, believing that they acted with authority, us telling you that we did not grant the authority which they believed that they had had. But that has been the subject of a long debate and will continue to be debated in front of your Commission. The observation made by the Commonwealth group of Eminent Persons in their report on page 65 dated the 7th of June 1986, I repeat June 1986, I submit is correct. "We are left with the impression of a divided government, yet even the more enlightened Ministers whom we met seemed to be out of touch with the mood in the black townships. The rising tide of anger and impatience within them and the extent of black mobilisation and so of course are the great generality of white South Africans, only some ten percent of whom we were told have ever seen conditions in a township. Put in the simple way the blacks have had enough of apartheid. They are no longer prepared to submit to its oppression, discrimination and exploitation. They can no longer stomach being treated as aliens in their own country. They have confidence, not merely in the justice of their cause but in the inevitability of their victory. Unlike the earlier periods of unrest and government attempts to stamp out protests there has been during the last 18 months no outflow of black refugees from South Africa. The strength of black convictions is now matched by a readiness to die for those convictions. They will therefore sustain their struggle whatever the cost. The campaign against collaborators and the ruthless elimination of agents of white authority will continue. More and more black townships will be rendered ungovernable and the process of creating popular structures of self-government within them will gather momentum. The number of street and area committees will increase and their functions will progressively". So far the quote of the Eminent Persons Group. Those were the very reasons why it was imperative to launch constitutional negotiations and bring it to finality. To many of us this became a dream of which we never lost sight. Some of us, on both sides of the political divide, however, still had to learn and others are still learning the Chris Hani truism once expressed to me "We concede the fact that we never broke the back of the South African Defence Force and South African Police, but you must concede the fact that you never broke the spirit of liberation in the townships". To my mind this was the basis of the political settlement. When the epilogue of the interim constitution was finally accepted at a very late stage in the negotiation process which gave South Africa its new democratic dispensation many of us gave a sigh of relief. The relief we felt was for the fact that we could have the full truth out in the open without vengeance. A country has to know its history. We hurt one another and the time has come for healing. I believe had it not been for that milestone judgment of Justice Mahomed in the Azapo case brought against the State President we would not have had the situation which we have today as Justice Mahomed had said in that judgment that we were moving away from the shame of the past to the hope of the future, and that that epilogue had granted him the opportunity to make the judgment which he did, and that is why we are all here, and that is why we had felt the relief at that particular moment in December 1993. With the National Party government the question of amnesty and the inevitability of a Commission probing the past was never the subject of penetrating debate where one and all expressed their expectations or anxieties openly. Everybody had played their cards close to the chest and discussions in this regard were inconclusive, often resulting in lobby discussions. This always left me with a feeling of discontent. I don't feel as if I am in the dock today, and I don't feel as if I am being charged with anything which I had done, criminally or otherwise. I don't believe that I am pleading for my innocence here today. I participate in these proceedings gladly, openly, but that particular paragraph does make me a little bit angry in the sense that I would have loved to have seen the State Security Council, as it functioned on which I served as a coopted member under the Chairpersonship of Mr P W Botha today, deal with the accusations that we have to answer here. And I believe that it is a pity that, excuse me for saying this about two great men of this country, namely Mr Botha and Mr de Klerk, that they have had their squabbles with one another that we are not today standing here in front of you as a coordinated team of the Security Council. And that is the next point I make, namely, that the National Management System has had as its prime function the coordination of State activities, and yet listening to the evidence of all of us our actions, we are not here as a coordinated team under the chairmanship of our leaders, the leaders being Mr Botha who was the Chairperson of that State Security Council and the leader of the National Party Mr de Klerk at that time. And you will recall and I remember that Mr de Klerk had said at his appearance where I was present, that he had done his utmost to consult and to coordinate, but the facts speak differently. The facts speak that the officials are talking in one direction, we are talking in another direction and the leaders, the Chairpersons of this, the Chairperson of the Security Council and Mr de Klerk who inherited the leadership did not successfully mould all of us into one team as we are. But I continue to speak of my own bat. I believe that there is a direct link between the National Management System, the Harare Declaration, Mr de Klerk's February speech, the agreed constitutional principles that formed the basis of our constitution and the signing ceremony of our constitution on the 10th of December 1996 in Sharpeville. The National Management system was a holding operation to ensure that negotiations are launched and that the constitutional order was changed through the ballot box and not through the barrel of a gun. That was paramount in our minds. It was foremost in our minds. The Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group in its document on page 42 says it all - "No serious person we met was interested in a fight to the finish. All favoured negotiations and peaceful solutions". General Viljoen in evidence before you said that this was a dirty war, and in many respects it was. People were forced to drink cooking oil; people were forced to eat raw fish and raw meat; and on the other hand there were men with balaclavas from nowhere assaulting innocent citizens and those answers have not yet been found to my satisfaction or to my mind how that all came about. The Harare Declaration, to continue in this thread, proposed steps to create a climate for constitutional negotiations. In the words of an ANC discussion partner, partners, they had to deal with the fact that it was not viable to storm Pretoria with smoking guns and in this way take over power. The door for constitutional principles to form the basis for the final constitution and to facilitate the transitional process was opened in this document. I regret that typing error. On the 2nd of February speech was a statesman's response to his constituency's aspirations that the conflict and political stalemate should be ended. I want to add that if there ever was a civilian in our ranks that was Mr F W de Klerk. I know people accuse him of many things but I will be untrue if I don't publicly state that in our ranks the civilian was F W de Klerk, always, always warning and saying don't allow yourselves to be militarised. That was F W de Klerk. The first one to disband the National Management System was F W de Klerk because he had always felt uneasy with that system. The signing ceremony of the final Constitution on the 10th of December 1996 in Sharpeville was symbolic, but it also signalled the fact that after 48 years, to that day, namely the 10th of December 1948, South Africa was now in step with the universal declaration of human rights. I conclude by saying I am both an African and an Afrikaner. I am a liberated Afrikaner. I am also a proud Afrikaner. Liberated Afrikaners took the reform bit firmly between their teeth when it was necessary. Both our hearts and our minds have been changed. We love this country. We have been liberated from the baggage of an immoral system of government. Afrikaners can now resume their journey, galloping into the future, constructively criticise and participate in the affairs of State. Afrikaners can now hold the government accountable and support it where their actions merit it, campaign for a Volkstaat if they so wish, argue for the respect and recognition of Afrikaans without the baggage of the past. I can think of no reason why Afrikaans-speaking South Africans and their children, or any other Afrikaner, from the cradle to the grave should bear the burden of apartheid. With the framework of the Constitution we will strive for our place and we will fight for Afrikaans. It is right that the book of the past should be opened and must be interpreted, but then we must also close them. We dare not forget what has happened here, and I am not saying we should close the books and forget, but we should stop holding each other hostage in regard to the past and then bully each other mentally. In this way we will never build a country. We have reached the end of a journey on a road marked by pitfalls, political doubts and obstacles. However, the journey always carried forward, the road often became one of tight hairpin bends because I was afraid of negotiating the evils on bareback. I am now more than ever convinced that apartheid was a terrible mistake that blighted our land. South Africans did not listen to the laughing and the crying of each other. I am sorry that I have been so hard of hearing for such a long time. CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much. I think it may be sensible for us to take a break for lunch and return at quarter to two. Thank you very much both of you young men. Thank you, thank you, it is very deeply moving and we want to digest it and those people over there are looking forward to grilling you. We invite you to come for lunch with us. HEARING ADJOURNS ON RESUMPTION CHAIRPERSON: Glen. I don't know which of the twins you want. MR GOOSEN: Mr Chairperson thank you very much. I am going to address my initial lines of questioning until I indicate otherwise to Mr Meyer, so I don't know whether Mr Wessels wants to remain seated there in the firing line as it were, no you are welcome to but - well whichever. Thank you very much. Mr Meyer in reading your statement is it correct, do I understand it correctly that you base your acceptance of political responsibility on the fact that with hindsight, with the benefit of hindsight you recognise that at the time perhaps more stringent steps should have been taken to curb the transgressions which were recurring and that in essence the basis for responsibility that you accept is that of omissions on your part as you explain and perhaps persons other than yourself as well, is that correct? MR MEYER: Chairperson I don't think I have to add anything to what I have actually stated there in the written paragraph in this regard. Obviously it deals with the obvious question, what did our guys at the time do about the situation? And I think one had to ask yourself that question and that is my response to that. MR GOOSEN: Thank you very much. MR MEYER: ...specifically, I am sorry to the wording that is contained there in paragraph 4. MR GOOSEN: Thank you. If one has regard to paragraph 3 of your submission, for a moment I want to leave aside the first bullet point there because that deals, as you have indicated with where there were specific instructions in that instance, regarding the other two aspects on which responsibility and accountability should be apportioned is it correct that there are really two options here? The one is that unlawful actions which were not specifically authorised, which were bona fide on the one hand and there were those that were mala fide in the sense that people abused their opportunities and so on, is that correct, that's the schema? MR MEYER: I am trying to make the distinguishing there between bullets two and three. On the one side I am suggesting that as far as bullet two is concerned there were transgressions that could have been made on the impression that the person might have had that he or she was authorised by implication or that their actions would have carried the blessing of the government. I think that is the one category. And then I am also saying that it could have also happened as a result of over-eagerness on the side of the person that he or she had gone too far as a result of that over-eagerness and interpreted the mandate beyond what was actually a reasonable sort of mandate. But the distinction between that and the third bullet to my mind lies in the fact that the third bullet deals with some cases that have become known, cases that have already served before the court, where to my mind it deals with situations where the person acted on his or her own agenda. There is a clear distinction, to my mind, between the two. I am not saying the first one, that is the second bullet for that matter, necessarily presents one with a clear answer, and therefore I refer to it as a grey area. And also in my discussions with Professor Villa-Vicencio and Ms Rousseau, I think it was indicated that there is this grey area in regard to interpreting where was the limits of implied, an implied mandate or not, but I covered that all under bullet two. MR GOOSEN: Thank you. I take it then that on the basis of that distinction, that schema as it were, you've set out that you would then accept that there may well be instances in which the unlawful killing of a political opponent was as a result of a bona fide action on the part of a security force member, is that correct? MR MEYER: I guess the question of bona fide actions in this regard is relevant. I've also looked into the submission of General Malan in that regard, in regard to this subject of bona fides, and in general it seems to me one can concur with all that. MR GOOSEN: So you would accept that in this schema of responsibility and accountability that it would have been possibly reasonable for a member of the security forces to have unlawfully killed a political opponent of government, correct? MR MEYER: I tend to think immediately of the most recent example that has come to knowledge in terms of testimony last week regarding the Ribeiro case, and I think that is the kind of case in point. But what I am suggesting here in an overall picture is that there are three dimensions, and I don't want to, don't have to go over it again, but this grey area remains grey and one will have to probably go into the facts regarding each and every case separately because in some cases it might be quite easy to determine whether there was an implied mandate. In other cases there might have been no link but that the person who acted still acted on that belief. MR GOOSEN: But in principle you would accept that there may be circumstances, and yes we will have to go into each particular set of facts in say an amnesty hearing, but in principle on this schema you would accept that it may be reasonable for a member of the security forces to have unlawfully killed a political opponent or a person perceived as a revolutionary or a supporter of a revolutionary cause at that time, is that correct? MR MEYER: I think the implication of what I am saying here from that one can make that deduction, but as to the implications that you are suggesting I am not quite sure whether one has worked through all the consequences as far as that is concerned. MR GOOSEN: Does that not then also imply that the level of political responsibility that it is necessary to accept political responsibility for the creation of a climate in which it may have been reasonable for members of the security forces to have unlawfully killed political opponents of the government? MR MEYER: My suggestion would be that the climate was there in any event. I don't think it was necessarily created by the political or military or police chiefs at the point. I think the climate was there and it's for that reason important that one keeps in mind the nature of the conflict to my mind, and that is why I also referred to that in paragraph 5 in a broader sense. There was on the one side daily activities - I can remember during the time I was responsible in the position that I am dealing here with, mainly '87, that there were reports on a daily basis of different acts of terrorism, or the killing of people from necklacing, or the planting of bombs and so forth, and of course that created one side of the picture. We had an on-going situation of action leading to reaction, and reaction leading to further action. So I am suggesting that the climate was there and it might not necessarily have been related even to a specific occasion where one could deduct a specific implied mandate. But the general circumstances might have implied that. MR GOOSEN: I accept that a climate may be there but would you not accept that political leadership, I mean we are dealing here now with State Security policy and for that reason not concentrating on organs of the State and the people that were involved in that, but that politicians, senior leadership of the security forces sustained a particular climate, a climate which rendered it reasonable for members of the security forces to act unlawfully, including the killing of political opponents of the State in certain circumstances. MR MEYER: I would be hesitant to make any specific deduction in that regard. I want to again emphasise what I have stated there in paragraph 2 that I am not aware of any specific such situation and that it definitely didn't happen in these organs of State. What happened of course amongst individuals and what happened in line function departments I can't witness for. MR GOOSEN: But we are talking about the creation of a framework, a policy framework, an approach to the resolution of the problem and that that included statements and policies which when interpreted by the people who were required to implement those policies and reasonably interpreted that they could establish their authorisation for unlawful actions. In those circumstances do you not accept that political responsibility would have to attach? MR MEYER: I am trying to put forward a framework here within which, well for which I am trying to be helpful in trying to find a way forward because truly these questions come up on an on-going basis. I mean just this morning one heard them but I can imagine that the Commission itself is on an on-going basis confronted with these questions and I am trying to put forward a framework that hopefully can be helpful in analysing the situation, but I don't have the detailed information available to make conclusions of that and therefore I think one has to, if this kind of framework is being adopted one will have to go to the details and ascertain. And it's also for that reason under bullet 2 that I suggest it remains a grey area and I don't think it's possible to make a single conclusion on that. MR GOOSEN: I too am trying to deal at the level of the framework because I think that that's where we are. What I am trying to establish is whether in the framework that you are putting forward you accept that the policies, the full ambit of counter-revolutionary policies and approaches adopted by the State Security Council, the Cabinet, whether that framework reasonably interpreted by an operative on the ground could be interpreted to mean that that person has authorisation to commit unlawful acts on behalf of the security forces? MR MEYER: Well I guess that is where the concept of an implied mandate can come in, and it's for that reason that I am suggesting that there is a moral responsibility. But to the extent of which there is such a possibility I can't judge because that is not within the framework of my knowledge. MR GOOSEN: Perhaps just to put the question in this way maybe we can deal with it then conceptually. In your view how could a person, or is it possible that a person could have reasonably interpreted and acted bona fide in that interpretation, in killing a political opponent? And is it possible for you to give an example in which you would regard such action as a reasonable interpretation of events or a bona fide action on the part of the member of the security forces? MR MEYER: I can't think of a good example, it's not one that I would have reached that conclusion on before but in relation to what has been testified, and this is not necessarily in a political context, but in a relationship between the official concerned and his minor, is what became clear through the Ribeiro case. But I don't have other examples that I can think of immediately. MR GOOSEN: On that basis then, I mean we can, I don't particularly want to do it, but we can run through a number of instances that we now know were - involved the killing of political opponents of the former government and we can list many of those and we can ask whether in each one of those instances you would regard that as possibly a reasonable interpretation of State policy in that regard, but we can leave that aside for the moment. The question then is if, if it is possible in the schema that there could have been a reasonable interpretation which permitted the commission of an unlawful act, is it not then necessary that political responsibility should be accepted not only on the basis of omission but on the basis of commission, the creation of circumstances in which operatives on the ground could reasonably interpret policy to authorise the unlawful killing of a political opponent? MR MEYER: I won't necessarily come to that conclusion because I believe there is testimony before the Commission from at least some of those that were politically responsible that would definitely indicate that they have not given such instructions or that if it was implied that they have given such instructions on the basis of a commission, then it's not a correct version, it's not the truth. MR GOOSEN: Mr Meyer I am not talking here about commission in respect of a specific instance, I am talking about commission on the part of members of participants in organs of State such as the State Security Council and Cabinet, commission, collective commission of the creation of a climate in which it was reasonable for a security force member to kill a political opponent. MR MEYER: I don't think one can say that it would have gone beyond the possibility of what I have been stating there in bullet two, I don't think so. MR GOOSEN: So do I understand that you say you would not agree that political responsibility should be assumed then on the basis that a set of circumstances were created by the State Security Council in which operatives could act unlawfully? MR MEYER: As far as the State Security Council is concerned, as far as my knowledge is concerned, definitely not. MR GOOSEN: Would the same apply in respect of statements made, positions adopted by politicians serving in the State Security Council or in the Cabinet in respect of what needs to be done in order to combat the revolutionary onslaught? MR MEYER: Again I don't have knowledge of that kind whatsoever. MR GOOSEN: I think you would agree that you served in a senior position on the State Security Council from 1986, as a member of the State Security Council, you certainly were party to discussions which occurred at that level. You also were as a serving politician in the country at the time must surely be aware of a significant number of statements in which politicians made it very clear, very clear that a revolutionary onslaught and revolutionaries in particular had to be combated with all means at the disposal of the State, and that every possible effort should be made to crush the revolutionary onslaught, not so? MR MEYER: Well I think it's like Pik Botha was saying yesterday, I've read through his testimony and I guess it's like he has indicated in that, that there were probably statements of a general political nature that might have created different impressions but it all depends on how people who have received those messages have interpreted it within the scope of their authority. MR GOOSEN: That's precisely the point. I mean the fact of the matter is we know from a whole spate of amnesty applications that they were in fact interpreted to authorise killings. What I am asking you is if you can comment as to whether you regard that as reasonable interpretation? If you do regard it as a reasonable interpretation should you not accept political responsibility for that? MR MEYER: It all depends again on what - one will have to go into each case and determine what consequences the person who pronounced might have foreseen or not. Even looking at some of the documentation that you have made available to me there are obviously different interpretations that one can reduce from every single such pronouncement, if I am right. MR GOOSEN: But if the interpretation is that we have a general authorisation for acceptance of, I mean you indicated, you say that individuals under the impression that they were authorised by implication, now you accept that that could happen. What I am asking you is whether in the circumstances in which there was an impression that they were authorised by implication whether that would have been reasonable or not? If it is reasonable does it not follow that at a political level responsibility should attach? MR MEYER: I guess the question is actually what one could have adduced from the person who made the pronouncement, what he could have foreseen in terms of consequences, of the consequences or not. And again I think one has to go back to every single case. I don't think - well let me put it emphatically, I am saying to you that from my knowledge that could not have been the conclusion reached in terms of the activities of the organs of State that I was involved in. MR GOOSEN: We are not talking here about specific authorisation, we are talking about the adoption of a set of policy guidelines which you acknowledge would be interpreted by the people who acted. So the question is, you acknowledge that they were interpreted, the question is in those circumstances would it be reasonable, in principle is it reasonable for a person to have interpreted those policies to authorise the unlawful killing of a political opponent? And we get back to that point. If it is not reasonable, under no circumstances could it be reasonable, yes, then political responsibility would only have to attach on an individual who made a particular pronouncement, but if in principle, if in principle it is possible for the interpretation to be reasonable, State policy, then at that level political responsibility must attach, surely? MR MEYER: In the way that you have described it my answer would be no. MR GOOSEN: Now in circumstances where to the Minister of Defence would make a statement to the effect that every effort should be made, terrorists should be wiped out, those who come across the border carrying their limpet mines and so on that they must be tracked down, whether they are inside the country or outside of the country they must be annihilated, them and their supporters or their "meelopers", now in those circumstances would you not agree that that generates a climate in which susceptible to reasonable interpretation, that unlawful actions are authorised? I am not asking that you should condemn the Minster of Defence, he made such a statement, we can get the full quote for you - that's a summary of it. I am not asking you to condemn a former Minister of Defence, I am asking you in principle, in terms of the climate created. MR MEYER: But I guess you are now back with the individual again. You are back with the individual now, or the individual case or the line functionary now again. The previous question was about a general atmosphere as far as what was created by the State as such. I mean you are now referring to an individual Minister and my answer in that regard would be to go to the facts of each and every single case because that is what I am suggesting in bullet two. I don't think it would be correct to assume that - No let me frame it differently. I am not trying to address the individual cases in my submission here, because to my mind that will have to be analysed on the merit of each case. MR GOOSEN: So there is in your schema no scope for collective responsibility other than on the basis of omissions, is that correct? MR MEYER: My reference there is I think quite clear, namely that under bullet two I am saying that there has to be an acceptability, to my mind, on the side of the previous government of a responsibility, a moral responsibility which led to the circumstances. MR GOOSEN: But Mr Meyer that's precisely the point, what is the basis of that moral and political responsibility is it founded upon an acceptance that State policies were susceptible to a reasonable interpretation that unlawful actions were authorised or not? MR MEYER: Is the question not really what moral responsibility means? MR GOOSEN: Let's look at - let's leave moral responsibility, let's look at political responsibility because you refer to political responsibility, what is the basis of that political responsibility? MR MEYER: I am not sure whether I have all the information available on that or all the knowledge available on that, but it seems to me in the context what it's being used here for is to say well if this would have happened to a person in the political position whilst he or she is still in office that could have resulted in the resignation or the sacking of that particular person as a political act, and I think that is the kind of meaning that could be attached to it. MR GOOSEN: And would that be confined then purely to line functional departments rather than any sense of collective responsibility? MR MEYER: I think what is being suggested here and it is something that I understand it also came up otherwise before the Commission is the question of a consideration of a collective moral responsibility because none of those members are still in Cabinet at this stage, so politically they could not be sacked in any event or resign, but it's accepting a moral responsibility in terms of what the Cabinet then as it were had to take responsibility for. MR GOOSEN: So the question as to whether State policy directives were susceptible to reasonable misinterpretation that they authorised unlawful actions that would not feature at all in the scheme of political responsibility which we'll have to attach in respect of those individual matters? You've indicated that, when I asked you what the basis for the acceptance of political responsibility was you'd say well if the line function or the department, the person who made the statement, if that person could, on the basis of those statements be dismissed, politically dismissed for being in breach of the policy in regard to that matter, then and only then would political responsibility attach. That is as I understand your answer to the question. Is that correct or not? MR MEYER: I think there must be some differentiation between political and other forms of responsibility. I am trying to define what political responsibility in this regard would mean. Obviously it is different from criminal responsibility or accountability. But I am trying to put forward again a framework in that regard. I can't give judgement on specific cases. CHAIRPERSON: Ilan I thought you.... MR LAX: Chairperson I want to just deal with the practicality for example and this relates to a point in time before your time Mr Meyer on the SSC. We know that the SSC authorised at times raids into neighbouring states for example and that people were killed in those raids. Not only were those people foreign citizens but there were South Africans and innocent foreign citizens killed in some of those raids. We can take one instance the Maseru raid in December 1985 for example. That raid was authorised almost implicitly if you like by the SSC so we are led to understand, now does that make them collectively responsible say in line with your first bullet? And if not does that make them responsible in line with your second bullet? It doesn't include you personally because you weren't there at that time, but at the same time you are in a position to have been there at a different time and pass judgement and give us your view of the matter. MR MEYER: I guess it's quite difficult. One will have to go into what exactly that decision I guess, that resolution if there was one, amounts to, if one looks at the wording what it amounts to and so forth, one might be able to come to a conclusion. I find myself a little bit in difficulty there because I can't speak of first-hand information or knowledge. MR LAX: You can take it from me that there was a resolution on December the 20th, 1985, that those sorts of raids, that particular raid should be conducted and it was so conducted. We heard last week of other raids and Pik yesterday spoke about a raid that he didn't even know about that interfered with his own working. This is a specific instance where we know that the decision was authorised. You can take it from me, I am not misleading you, it's gospel. (Laughter) In a vernacular sort of sense. MR MEYER: But I guess there would be an argument and I am testing now because I am not quite sure, but there might be an argument about cross- border raids and authorising that. If I remember correctly General Malan also addressed that in his submission to you, and there is a different position in regard to cross-border raids than to what happened internally. I am sort of asking. MR LAX: Well you see we haven't focused much on cross-border raids because individuals that have come before us last week for example were all in one way or another involved in some of the cross-border raids, and because of the whole extradition issue not being resolved they didn't deal with it and so we didn't talk a great deal about it at that point but you are not involved and therefore there's an ample opportunity to deal with it. MR MEYER: It would be unfair to make me either the advocate or the judge in a case like this. CHAIRPERSON: Wynand Malan wants to say something. MR MALAN: I want to, I am thinking back of the time, '85 when it was quoted, one of the concepts that was often discussed is the concept of collective responsibility, Cabinet responsibility. On that basis I want to rephrase the question in a frame that I think will be sitting more comfortable in your mind because it's a frame that has been addressed, within which it has been addressed before. If at the level of Cabinet or then for that matter State Security Council, whatever body, a decision is taken and implementation of that decision follows don't you accept total responsibility for that decision and its consequences? Isn't that really the question? Whether it is political or moral or criminal that's something else, the test is on the outside, it's not your test and frankly this is a bit of a problem that I experience with the line of questioning because I find that a construction is asked from the witness which is more one of a legal, technical or philosophical one whereas what I think is important is whether responsibility is accepted. Now if that responsibility so is accepted in the plain proposition that I put would it not also be true that if, whether that is by negligence or omission or whatever reason, that whatever you did or was done in such a meeting or body, that those who were part of it is by definition saddled with the responsibility? Again whatever kind of responsibility that is, political, moral, criminal, whatever, but the test is not for you to decide, the test is on the outside. My question to you is, are you trying to duck some of the things that you did or are you saying whatever I did I accept responsibility, the construction that follows is something that is on the outside of me? Would you be prepared to go with such a proposition? MR MEYER: I think that is what I tried to put here in a framework, exactly that, but I have the impression that some of the questions indicate that I must interpret what individuals might have had in mind in terms of consequences and so forth and that I can't make a deduction on. So I would go along with an interpretation that you have constructed because I think that is essentially what I am trying to say in bullet two. MR MALAN: And if - sorry Chairperson just for the - and if any construction would be put to whatever was done which would be construed as criminal liability and prosecutions following in a court of law then you will be quite comfortable with accepting the process as the process again? MR MEYER: Indeed. MR WESSELS: Mr Chairman may I just establish something? CHAIRPERSON: Yes, you have a right to speak. (Laughter) MR WESSELS: Thank you. I'd just like to establish, if we play rugby the reserve bench cannot come into play unless he is authorised. If this is a wrestling contest I mean you come in regardless of what the referee says and then he calls you to order. Now Mr Goosen indicated that I am on the reserve bench right now ...(intervention) MR GOOSEN: We are playing rugby.... MR WESSELS: Right, then I remain silent. CHAIRPERSON: It seems to me that you are likely to ask much the same sort of questions, this particular question, and if you feel I mean that there is a contribution you can make why not make it now. The only thing is that you see I mean you keep giving him a chance to work out, if you are going to ask him the same questions so he's working out no, they don't like this answer maybe I am going to try that answer. Alright, do you think you should...... MR GOOSEN: I think Mr Chairperson the idea is simply to - I've been operating on the basis of the framework presented in the submission and I am simply interrogating that and I think obviously Mr Wessels' submission, whilst it may overlap with in some respects it's formulated in a different way and I want to deal with him separately. Mr Meyer I am not asking you to comment on individual interpretations and I will take issue with Commissioner Malan about the external construction of this, it's not a philosophical debate. You put forward a schema which is the basis upon which accountability and responsibility should be adjudged. Central to that second bullet point is a recognition on your part that individuals may have been under the impression that they were authorised by implication. Now yes, accept that when you deal with a specific instance we are going to have to determine whether in that particular instance it was, whether that person in fact was under that impression, was not acting on some other motive. We are not talking about the motive of the person here. We are talking about whether it is possible, as a matter of principle, whether it was possible for security police operatives or security force operatives to reasonably interpret State Security Council and Cabinet National Party policy statements and so on, to authorise unlawful activity, whether it was reasonable? Whether you accept, as a matter of principle that it was reasonable? If you say no, well then the consequence attaches to that in terms of the schema that you've raised. But if you say yes, another consequence attaches. I want to know whether you accept that in principle it was reasonable that such misinterpretations could occur or not? MR MALAN: Chairperson may I just - look really I am not sure that I understand the question. If the question is could have then that's something, but was is a different question then we need to look at the facts. MR GOOSEN: The question was could have. MR MEYER: I was just going to say as one of the possibilities for consideration surely, and that certainly then depends on the specific circumstances, if you say could have. MR GOOSEN: Then in those instances where it is established that it was a misinterpretation, okay, do you accept that collective political responsibility attaches? MR MEYER: Of a moral and political nature, yes. MR GOOSEN: Okay. Thank you. We are going to move on to another element of your presentation. I want to deal with paragraph 5. Let me just check something. Perhaps the panel want to pick up on any questions whilst I am doing the - if the panel wants to pick up on a question to save time. CHAIRPERSON: He has been very disciplined and was waiting to be guided by you. MR GOOSEN: That makes a change Mr Chairperson. CHAIRPERSON: Are you ready. MR GOOSEN: Thank you Mr Chairperson. Mr Meyer, can I refer you to the Strategy, the Revolutionary War, Strategy No. 44. You indicate that part of the total counter Revolutionary Strategy was that a tremendous amount of effort was put into utilising the force of the state in a counter mobilisation plan. In the document, reference is made to at Page 4 of the document. The existence of the anti-revolutionary group loss such as Inkatha or ZZC or the...(intervention) MR MEYER: Can you just help me with the exact reference, I am on Page 4 4 of the document. The paragraph there reads anti-resistance of anti- revolutionary groups such as Inkatha, ZZC as well as the Ethnic Factor in the South African Society, makes the preparation for a coherent revolutionary onslaught difficult and states that it is one of the factors to take into account. And then under Objectives, 6 at the top, there is reference to Groups and individuals to mobilise them and to protect themselves and to assist the Revolutionary actions. Do I take it that that doelstelling is a reference to the fact that grouping such as Inkatha and or the ZCC and perhaps other anti-revolutionary groups could be mobilised to resist revolutionary activities and to protect themselves against those revolutionary activities. MR MEYER: Thank you, it is kind of fun to go through all these old If one looks at the first paragraph that you quoted on Page 4, 8B, I think it refers to what they call Analysis of Capacity under Paragraph 7 you have Analysis of the, what one can say the Revolutionary elements, analysis of the capacities of radical organisations and under Paragraph 8 you there see an analysis of, let us call it the strong points inside of the South African government society and then 8B, is then mentioned as a strong point because there were allegedly certain anti-revolutionary groups that could have been helpful and could have assisted in combating revolution and if you follow that up and look the schedule, I think you will find the answer there in the quest for looking at what the specific actions were that arose from those and if you look at this document it is a schedule, it is unfortunately not numbered. The schedule says objectives and overall conduct and actions against the revolutionary war and if you go to paragraph 6 thereof, I think the last two pages of that, you there find more or less an indication of the kind of actions proposed and contemplated, in order to strengthen and secure society and to which it must be seen. MR GOOSEN: If we go to paragraph 8 on that Annexure where the Delstelling and the Oorhof se optrede are then set out in columns and what corresponds with the objective to mobilise groups and groupings to encourage them to resist which then go through onto the following page. No. 2 there, Counter Revolutionary Organisations must be developed along ethnic lines in order to prevent the political vacuum being exploited by the radical elements and one of the actions under 4, black parents must be organised and supported in order to prepare parental authority and to counter the manipulation of the youth by the radical elements. You were present when I raised some questions in regard to these matters to Mr Vlok, would you say that it was on the basis of these, this the government and the Security forces then, because it falls under Safety, to manipulate differences that occurred within communities, exploit tensions that existed within the communities, to specifically organise and prompt the establishment of organisations based on an ethnic basis and to utilise through that support, those organisations, to engage in active resistance against efforts by revolutionary organisations as defined at the time within communities in which those organisations were organising. MR MEYER: No, that is never how I understood it, in terms of this particular context. I think what one can deduct from what is stated here under for instance 8.2 Paragraph 8.2 is that it was very much in the frame of thinking of the constitutional solution at that stage that we needed a democratic solution based on Group Rights and that was all in that framework. If you look at the original statement, Objectives as defined in the introduction it, it was stated there that the purpose is to develop - oh, here it is, can I read it Mr Chairperson, it is Paragraph 9 of the main document Page 5. To neutralise the revolutionary war against the republics of the democratic dispensation can be developed here in which all the groupings of the population can take part in the government of the country without intention with the stated goal. That was part of the Constitutional thinking at the time that a democratic solution should be arrived on a basis of group or ethnic rights and I think that one should see that therefore also in Paragraph experience where this was a specific intention to play of one group against another on the basis of putting them to a fight. MR GOOSEN: Then can I refer you to the other document which was provided to you which was tabled at the GVS Werkgroup on the 24th January 1987 Strategic considerations in respect of the initiation of the counter mobilisation in South Africa and I refer you to Page 11 of that document where it says at the top the Following measures may be considered, encouraged, distrust ethic and tribal defences and all other divisive factors amongst the enemy, discredit them and their helpers internally and outside the country and as individuals under these organisations. How does that maatreel fit in with the notion that you have just explained in regard to the . . . MR MEYER: I also noted that and can I make a general observation whilst the first document that you have referred to is clearly something that reached the level of the State Security Council, sort of neatly packaged and made sense in terms of what the Councillor have approved by then and what let us say these apparatus were busy with. The second document which to my mind and I have read through it, I came to no other conclusion that it was drafted by an individual and probably many contradictions in that document itself, that one can only come to the conclusion as the person himself said in the very last part of the paragraph of that document, Paragraph 20. "Many more loose ideas may be proposed" and I think that describes the whole document. It is a document of loose ideas and I was every discussed in my presence. I tried to find out what might have been the status of that document but it seems nobody know. It was apparently referred to a Working Group for discussion in January 1987. The point that I am concluding on is to say that for instance in Paragraph D that you have just read out, does not fall, what is intended there is, what is put forward there as a loose thought, definitely did not fall in the ambit of what we were busy with occasion where something like that was executed or planned by the Management Centre. MR GOOSEN: So I take it from that that you would say in respect of the first document that the Over arching conduct and actions and objectives would not be susceptible of an interpretation that ethnic conflict divisions in a community should be manipulated and utilised in order to organise active resistance against enemy organisations I include in enemy organisations the UDF. It is not susceptible of that interpretation. MR MEYER: It might have been but I am saying that it was not part of what I was involved in or know about as far as the official operations of the Joint Management Centre is concerned. CHAIRPERSON: Now, I accepted that you are saying on the basis of the document that that was not authorised, I accept that but you are saying, is it conceivable that in the implementation of this the contra-mobilisation efforts as set out here in this document, the first document referred to, could have been interpreted to mean something closer to the Paragraph D that I refer to in the second document? MR MEYER: I would say that, Paragraph 8 in the original, the first document, I would say definitely had not as far as the official operations is concerned, if that is the right word, have been considered or applied. Let me take you to one specific example which relates to the point thereunder 8.4 which you have also referred to of the first document. There it is stated under Remarks "Contaminated youth or youthful military elements must be removed from society and must be rehabilitated according to acceptable practices" in that regard by the then Department of Education and Training, they established some training institutions for that purpose where rehabilitation could take place, I think whether they were successful or not, that is not the successful or even an attempt of operation under 8.2. MR GOOSEN: So it was never policy for example, that members of the Security Forces would provide with overt or covert support to anti- revolutionary groupings as were defined, anti-revolutionary groupings inside the country in accordance with this policy. That was never policy. far as that is. CHAIRPERSON: Where such coverts support was in fact rendered it was outside of the ambit of approved policy guidelines from that the level of the State Security Council, not so? MR MEYER: No, all that I can say is that it could be interpreted in such a impossible. misinterpretation by that line function department to render that sort of support because that is not what was envisaged. envisaged, from what you have indicated that was not envisaged so therefore if a line function department engaged in such kind of action it would be a misinterpretation, correct? MR MEYER: Yes. CHAIRPERSON: Would you say that it would be a reasonable misinterpretation or not? MR MEYER: I said to you what I understand of A2 was and how it was interpreted to my mind by the both the State Security Council and all its subsidiaries and I think one can say within the overall policy framework at that stage it would have been an unreasonable interpretation. MR GOOSEN: So in respect of say the support for the Witdoeke in KTC June of 1986 in Cape Town, support rendered by members of the Security forces, attempts by the Joint Management Centre in the Western Cape to secure even financial support from the Secretariat of the State Security Council in order to support certain activities of the Witdoeke that that would all be, fall into the realm of an unreasonable misinterpretation of what was envisaged in respect of counter mobilisation of contra mobilisation policies as approved by the State Security Council. Is that correct? MR MEYER: I think so, yes. CHAIRPERSON: And presumably on that basis you would say that then no political responsibility could ever attach in respect of the actions by the Security force members and all the participants in the meetings of the Joint Management Centre in respect of that covert support to the Witdoeke? MR MEYER: . . . but think so, we must just remember that this strategy 44 came into being on the 1st December 1986 according to the document whilst those alleged activities if I remember correctly what you said this morning took place at an earlier stage so one would not necessarily bring it in line with what is stated here in this strategy because the one came after the other. November 1986 when this comprehensive plan is put in place, there was no policy prior to that to provide that support from the, level of the State Security Council. through the documentation and maybe you and I will be proved incorrect, but MR GOOSEN: Mr Meyer, thank you very much, I have no further questions. CHAIRPERSON: Are there any questions from the panel? Yasmin. MS SOOKA: Mr Meyer at Page 2, I think paragraph 4 of your own submission, you say the fact the term regarding deficiencies in the system in use at the time, the fact that so many transgressions took place over a lengthy period is an indication in itself that more vigilant actions was called for and with hindsight and looking at the embarrassing facts now emerging one can argue that more stringent steps should have been taken to curb the possibilities of transgressions taking place and of you go on to take responsibility, but I think the question does face us here is, given the policy of the counter revolutionary strategy the fact that the security establishment was so powerful, how was it, actually know or else they would have taken steps to curb that. How was it possible for the kind of things that did happen to take place and where do we actually say "Where is this gap" I think that is my question, I have heard from the politicians and I am sorry to be asking so many questions in one. But the real difficulty that faces us is where would one say the blame actually lies, you have got the politicians on the top, you have got the State Security Council, you have got the Generals, but somewhere in-between, something went wrong, and I think we would like your view on what it is that did go wrong, because we actually go, you fall short here of taking criminal responsibility or and I think one could actually question that, the whole concept of criteria, the liability of putting in to place things like Vlakplaas, the CCB where you must have a sense that things can go horribly wrong. Now, I think that is what we would like to get an answer on. MR MEYER: I guess nobody had the answer, maybe, and let me try to put that things have developed over a period of time in such a way that in the end we were all part of a frame of mind, politicians, officials, people in minor positions even that believed that there was an enemy that had to be wiped out, the belief that there was not a just cause on the side of the majority of South Africans and the belief that for protection of the minority that was the right thing and the only thing to do. Maybe it was, it was in the end fear that dictated, that is why I refer to my submission to the fact that one had to look at the total spectrum both dimensions of the conflict because that in itself tells something about the demands and the fears that had developed at the time and in that context, it is probably not possible to even put at a specific point or a specific place the blame, it was just overall, that is the feeling that one in general, we probably have reached a stage when in any event the climate was of such a nature that it was not sort of the in thing to raise questions. I listened to the questions this morning and I was surprised in that regard, but it was, it was not the in thing to ask questions, if you hear on a daily basis, especially within government circles that people are being killed as a result of an act of terrorism or necklacing is taking place on a daily basis, that bombs are going off and things like that, you fall into a frame of mind that you stop asking questions because it is not the right sort of thing to do at that moment and I think that is the context that one has to put yourself back into for the sake of creating an understanding. Looking back now, it is easy to make judgement and say "How the hell could this happen" but then it was different and I am not trying to excuse ourselves, I am trying to find out myself why, why could we let this happen, some amongst us were bold and did take the necessary action, some were as bold as to break out of the mould at that stage because they were driven to do so. All that we can say is fortunately we all, we all arrived at a point fortunately, we gained better insight. MS SOOKA: And I think we maybe, one needs to say that we are not sitting in judgement but we want to understand and for the same . . .(indistinct) the answer. CHAIRPERSON: The remarkable answer, I just wondered whether I could take it just a little further, I mean take your construction further, in a way it is a breathtaking response to say publicly and this is one of the incredible things someone who has been in government come before a Commission of this kind and say what you have said just now, you know both of you are saying, yes, well we got to a point where we were as we where and that gives the opportunity for all of us to say, now we are actually are human and we have got weaknesses, but your weakness paradoxically is a strength because it is ultimately really a strong person, a big person, who can say, you know, I am sorry but this is where I was and it almost seems like being, you know, like nit-picking but I wonder whether you would be willing to say that given all the things you say that happened in those years, I mean all the bombardment with Yasmin that, well we have a kind of small judicial thing judging facts and so on, but in that setting it clearly seems possible and I think that is what happened, that people said in order to achieve this goal, I mean that we will resist this total onslaught, anything goes, I mean that no holes barred, and that is where we are now and we are trying now to say what happened how do you coming into the dingus, I see you shaking your head, maybe you have to say something. I mean it is almost superfluous because I think that that is the consequence of what you said, that I mean we were in that kind of a situation and no holes barred. what a great extent happened. Maybe it was because it was not necessarily Security ...(inaudible - recording deteriorates) all of it, it was across the spectrum. And of course the misreading of the situation now is so clear, the whole idea of looking for an answer through counter-mobilisation or counter- strategy in itself was wrong, it missed the point. I can recall we ourselves at that stage, including myself, said yes the answer is political, we were almost taught to say the answer is 80% political and 20% security. But that in itself was a complete misreading of the situation, because the political answers that we sought were not the real answers and that in itself created even more misunderstanding, I think, because the frustration that misreading of the real answer must have caused on the other side, so to speak, on the side of those that wanted to achieve liberation must have caused more and more frustration because it was as if they could not break through with their messages. CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much. MR GOOSEN: I have no questions for Mr Meyer, for Mr Wessels, yes a few. the Chairperson sometimes says some things at the end. MR MEYER: I will wait for my partner. CHAIRPERSON: Alright, thank you. MR GOOSEN: Thank you very much Mr Chairperson. Mr Wessels, one of the disadvantages of being a reserve in a rugby match is that you possibly only come on right at the very end. is going to last, are we continuing tomorrow. (Laughter) MR WESSELS: No, I am not difficult, are we staying until 4.00pm or 3.30, I just want to know how to place myself in answering the questions. CHAIRPERSON: I had hoped for about 3.30 but what do you think? have a great deal to ask Mr Wessels. Thank you. I think Mr Wessels perhaps it picks up on the point that Mr Meyer has just made, the issue that we have just been speaking about. In reference to the portion in your statement on Page 2 where you state "That I further do not believe the political defence I did not know is available to me, because in many respects I believe I did not want to know". and I really just want to ask if you can elaborate on that and if you can explain and what it is you wish to convey, in perhaps more detail. MR WESSELS: Well, I appreciate the remarks made by the Chair and by Roelf and I endorse those sentiments, each and every one of them. I cannot shy away from the fact that I am a National Party, that I was a National Party politician, I was elected on the National Party political ticket, I had endorsed each and every of those policies. The policy simply was since the days of Mr John Vorster that . . . (indistinct) the highest law of the land would be the security of the land, that had to do with the first detentions of people 90 days, 80 days. 16 years later, I was in Parliament, I was debating the Rabie Commission and the framework, the launching pad was still the highest law of the land, is the security of the land. Now amongst that framework, amongst that frame of mind we had put legislation on the statute book. Numbers of them. Security legislation, the Terrorism Act, within them were embodied, sections, clauses which allowed policemen to question, to hold indefinitely people in detention. Subsequent to that we had in terms of Public Safety act we called for states of emergency, we on the basis of that you need to centralise authority in the hands of the executive, did exactly that, now because we did that, I simply cannot see how I can ...(inaudible) back and say sorry I did not know, it was foreseen that under those circumstances people would be detained, people would be tortured, everybody in this country knew people were tortured, they were tortured, you read it in the alternative Press, anybody who had access to the Townships, my sources of information was the Chairman of ...(recording deteriorates and disappears) MR WESSELS: Chairman of this Commission sitting next to him Wynand Malan, Alex Boraine, we did battle on many occasions in Parliament in the face of attacks by Helen Suzman, Boraine and others simply saying the Security forces were a law unto themselves and we argued, vehemently opposed that, we said you are misreading the situation, it is not true and yet it MR GOOSEN: Does it flow from that then that you would accept that it is not directed at you personally, but at in those circumstances, the context that you sketch that senior government officials subject to exactly the same context that you were subject to in effect chose not to know and accordingly chose to create a climate of impunity for Security force members to act. MR WESSELS: I take it I am also permitted to ask a question for you to further particulars, are we saying when you refer to officials, government officials, could you just explain to me what are you talking of, are you talking of politicians or officials of state, non-elected officials? MR WESSELS: I have no question in my mind, I have no doubt in my mind but whatsoever, that that was the policy that you had to know what you had to know. In other words what you did not have to know did not concern you. Let me give you a simple example, for the better, for the better, I was interviewed recently by a gentleman called Jonathan Malanski, he is busy with his doctorate at the London School of Economics, he is busy with research in this country at this particular juncture. He questioned me about a resolution taken at the State Security Council dealing with the release of Mr Nelson Mandela. I believe it was taken in June 1988 and it is minuted as follows that a document was circulated and the document was then drawn in or drawn back and was then destroyed and he asked me what had happened there, because directly or indirectly my name appears in and around that document. The fact of the matter is the following: That the ..(inaudible) Werkgroup the executive of the working group was charged to work a strategy, to establish a strategy to try and facilitate the release of President Nelson Mandela. Now in that discussion it was clear that everybody was not pulling, pushing all the information that they had, it was clear in my mind that Mr Kobie Coetzee, Dr Neil Barnard, Mr Fanie van der Merwe were engaged in their own strategy over and above what we were busy with, that was none of my business. Dr Neil Barnard was not obliged to report to me neither was Mr Fanie van der Merwe, neither was Mr Kobie Coetzee. It was none of my business, I did not want to know they were reporting to Mr P W Botha on that issue and that was how it functioned. My job was to manage the state of emergency and all the information I had to have to manage the state of emergency I was entitled to and over and above that I was not entitled to that. I operated as a Deputy Minister and function under regulated or (help my met die - Engels man) regulations, delegated powers and regulations, over and above that it was not my line function. I was not in the authority to detain people or to release was charged to do something else, to manage the state of emergency and the national management system and I did that. And therefore I am saying in conclusion there was such a policy, Mr Pik Botha mentioned it yesterday as well, that was a statement of fact. MR GOOSEN: Mr Wessels, you have also had the benefit of being present essence some of the testimony that we have heard has been to the effect that there were certain policy guidelines formulated and there was obviously never any intention that that should mean, that unlawful action should flow from it. Unlawful actions did flow from those policy frameworks were in consequence of misinterpretations and we have had discussion about how to interpret the debate about it. The Security forces fought a war in the country and in certain respects they fought a dirty war and that is evident from a number of the amnesty applications, the benefit of having fought that war including the dirty aspects was that the revolution as envisaged did not occur, the revolutionaries did not wrest power from the National Party government as it was. Is it not too much to expect that the Commission should accept that this benefit, that benefit was merely the happy result of a set of mistaken interpretations, a coincidence? MR WESSELS: I must tell you I will not try to duck the answer, to duck the for the way you formulated it, I will, maybe I am not on top of the question, but the following occurred. It was a dirty war on all sides. I sat in discussions where I was defending, so to speak, people who were allies of the government, I am referring to councillors, and no, I am not arguing the legitimacy, the non- legitimacy of the fact, they were councillors and what had been done to them and I had listened to arguments where they had told me in the presence of others what they thought of our policies. None of them were supporters of apartheid, and yet they were subjected to but fierce intimidation. Serious intimidation. And I sat alongside South African policemen being accused by them for not protecting them. So that was the predicament, that was the cleftstick, John Citizen found himself in. I have somebody who has just been decorated for reporting on the work of this Commission and somebody I hold in high esteem who had first educated me about this predicament, John Citizen being called upon to not disclose the whereabouts of an infiltrator, a revolutionary, being forced to remain silent by those people who wanted him to play a specific role, and yet on the same side also being the subject of attacks by the security forces for not disclosing that particular event, that was the difficulty. But let me not run away from the issue, the issue is the following, the Chappies Klopper whom I happen to know, Chappies Klopper told me who he, why and how he and others had attacked the house of Ivor Jenkins, and I said, why did you do that, and I speak very good Afrikaans, just like Markgraaf, I have a very good repertoire of Afrikaans words to explain my anger, I was really the hell in, and I asked him, why did you do that? And he said well we did it because we thought they were giving you a hard time, not me personally, the government. How and why did he believe that? Because we had been making those speeches, the speeches Mr Pik Botha had referred to yesterday, National Party rallies. If you wanted to have an applause from the gathering, then you must see how we try and mobilise people and how we stir them up at meetings, we will really speak to them and get them to react, we will climb every mountain in this country.....used by us and the Chappies just, it was legitimate to instil the fear of hell into Ivor Jenkins and others by attacking his house and shooting his house and never ever did I or anybody give such, never did I, let me speak for myself, did I give such an instruction, never ever, and that is what I said, can I condone that, but I cannot shy away from the fact, that those men and woman and I were on the same side and that That is why I am not sure, I mean we run glibly over this, I am not sure whether the people of South Africa and I say this with respect, the Commissioners and others appreciate that silent feeling of relief when the epilogue was agreed to. There are people who are picking it up, but that epilogue was not agreed to at the World Trade Centre in November of 1993, but it, we had to go the extra mile, we had to go to the Cape of Good Hope Centre in December of 1993 to Cape Town, that is how difficult it was to get that in, that is why I said I will be continuing tomorrow, I have a lot to say Mr Chairman - now I am not biased against this Commission, I think my conduct, opportunity that we negotiated for you, in the epilogue, to ensure that this County will be at peace with itself after you have done your job. MR GOOSEN: Mr Chairperson, I have no further questions, thank you. CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much, both of you, we have had an extraordinary two days. We were very deeply frustrated that especially the military had not come forward for us to be able to know more about what had happened, why it had happened, and I mean, we had thought that this hearing was going to provide us with some of the answers that we were looking for about accountability and so on. I think we have gone beyond that. We are still going to have to try and establish, I mean we have got researchers and these people who are going to be trying to establish facts and we are still going to have our meeting with Mr P W Botha. You indicated earlier that you believed that it was important that your leaders should have been here to help you to become a team. But I think that anyone listening to yourselves is not going to go away with, well, they were fussing over this, they were fussing over that, it is that you have come out and stood, well almost naked, figuratively, and it is a very humbling thing, it is a very humbling thing for us in the Commission, it is very humbling, because some of the things that have happened in the two years that we have been together, have been quite extraordinary, and we regard what has happened in these two days in different ways, but especially the remarkable candour that you have displayed is something that I think sometimes we forget, I mean, that you were the government, you were running the show and now you are coming to give account to us who many of us were regarded in that dispensation as really nothing or worse, I mean, enemies to be neutralised. And I just want to give thanks, I want to give thanks for our country, for our people, I want to give thanks that you two young men should easily to anyone of us, I think and it must be at some cost to yourselves, but we want to give thanks and believe, I mean we believe fervently that the contribution that you have made in the past, but the contribution that you have made today is going to be one that has a remarkable impact. It is going to help give a momentum to this process of seeking to heal our country, because we have been committed to the fact that we want to we can actually get down to the business of holding hands and saying I want to make this country a great country. The pain sometimes is that this could have happened so much earlier, you know, but then, there is a wonderful little piece in the Bible which says, "In the fullness of time, something happens in the fullness of time" we might were not ripe for it to happen. And I just hope you are aware that you have helped, I think, to pour balm on the wounds of very many by what you two and to some extent the other two people have done, and I want to say thank you. I want to thank my colleagues and our team over there and yourselves over there and all of you that, now I understand a little bit actually why the world looks on and marvels that you can sit there and that I can laugh with happening and the miracle that they spoke of in 1994, I think God wants it to persist in part for the sake of the world, because if we can do it here with and there is hope for Rwanda, Sierra Leone and all of those places. I want to pray. God you are good and you do some extraordinary things in this Land. We thank you for the privilege of being fellow-workers with you. We thank you for those who have come forward yesterday and today and for the things that have happened and we pray that these and others similar to this will contribute to the healing of this traumatised of this wounded people, thank you God. Amen. HEARING ADJOURNS 259 MR MEYER/MR WESSELS SECURITY HEARING TRC/GAUTENG