special State Security Council Hearings 1997-12-04 CAPE TOWN 1 LUCAS DANIEL BARNARD https://sabctrc.saha.org.za/hearing.php?id=56377&t=&tab=hearings https://sabctrc.saha.org.za/originals/special/security/ssbarn.htm MR LYSTER: Good morning ! I want to welcome members of the public here today and Dr Neil Barnard. There are not many people to welcome. It seems that the testimony that is being given in Johannesburg today has captured the minds of the, or the imagination of the press, but let me assure you that we are nevertheless very interested in what you have to say today, and we are looking forward to a constructive two days of hearing. I say two days because we hope to hear evidence this morning from Dr Barnard and this afternoon from General Magnus Malan and tomorrow from Mr PW Botha. There is a possibility as Mr Botha has gone on record to say that he does not intend to comply with the subpoena, so there is a possibility that he will not be here tomorrow, and we may use tomorrow to continue evidence of Dr Barnard and General Malan if there are issues which we still have to cover. This hearing is a public hearing held in terms of Section 29 of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, and it is a continuation of a hearing which was held in October this year in Johannesburg and in Cape Town and was postponed because of the inability of Mr Botha to be present through illness and the fact that General Malan was out of the country. As I said earlier on we had hoped to hear evidence and we still do hope to hear evidence from the person who was Chair of that Council, State Security Council and State President Mr Botha, a position of enormous power and influence. It is unfortunate that he has stated publicly that he does not intend to comply with the subpoena served on him. He has gone on record to say that he does not intend to go on his knees before this Commission. Of course he is not required to go on his knees and he is not even required to apologise to the Commission. All he is required to do is to present himself here and to answer questions truthfully. However we will until tomorrow morning when Mr Botha is due to appear before making any further comment in that regard. Dr Barnard was represented here today by Mr Albertyn from De Klerk and Van Gend and Mr Nick Treurnicht of the Cape Town Bar. The evidence will be led by Advocate Chris MacAdam. I think those are all the introductory comments I need to make. MR TREURNICHT MR LYSTER LUCAS DANIEL BARNARD (sworn states) DR BARNARD "I the undersigned Lucas Daniel Barnard declares as follows. I am the Director General of the Provincial Administration of the Province of the Western Cape. On the 14th of July 1979 I appeared before a Special Committee of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The statement I made at the decision is attached as annexure LB.1. To avoid duplication I refer to paragraph 2 in which my terms as Director of the National Intelligence Service and the Department of Constitutional Development and the circumstances of why I left this department are detailed. I make this statement against the following background: More specifically the Commission wants to know whether any discussions of the State Security Council authorised illegal activities or whether it could be regarded as authorising illegal activities. Before I refer to the specific incidences required, I want to emphasise the following. There are certain organisations and individuals which is not in my favour because of their own political agendas and they said that while I was member of National Intelligence that I was involved in illegal activities. This is why I want to refute these allegations. I wish to refer to specific incidences for which my evidence is required. My own views are as follows. To put my evidence in the following context I will use the following details. My views regarding the strategic role of the State Security Council, the various structures and also the role and task of the NI during this period; furthermore, actions of the Government of the day in regarding the security situation with reference to actions in neighbouring States or other States; actions regarding internal opposition groups or liberation movements, and the role of National Intelligence in negotiation politics. Firstly then, the strategic security situation in the period under discussion. This statement is concerned with a period, the beginning of 1980 to April 1994. The conflict which South Africa experienced during those times was not a new phenomenon. Before the colonial times there was also violent conflict in South Africa. It was not exclusively related to South Africa. The struggle for political power was underlying this conflict. The conflict and the way it was solved here, and elsewhere moved away from the conventional forces, which waged war in a conventional way, and in this time the difference between the soldier and the civil person disappeared. In South Africa the conflict was a result of the fact that various population groups were excluded from political decision-making - "who" decided "who" should govern the country, and how it should be done. The application of this brought a tragic framework, nothing was left out of consideration. On the military area, people who had to bring the Government to a fall, were trained world-wide. Intelligence structures were developed which had to gather security information. On economic terrain, boycotts and sanctions were orchestrated against South Africa. On a social level and especially in the way of churches and in schools mobilisation was enforced, and said that no education was possible before political liberation. The realisation that the use of weapons was impossible, brought about strategic concepts of Total Onslaught and total counter-strategy. This included that other areas, other terrains of life also had to be included. The conflicts in Southern Africa were not without blood-pouring and the concern of many of the members of the SSC at that stage, my own as well, was that such a development in South Africa had to be prevented. At that stage there was terror in the cities, there were motor bombings and bombs planted, without any concern as to who were blown up like in Northern Ireland and in Latin America. At that stage also planes were also hijacked and it was general knowledge that ..(indistinct) in the city was creating panic in citizens. There were also other factors that the SSC had to take into account. It was throughout, my point of view that the conflict would not be able to be countered and could not be ended if there was continued violence or political (en die ekonomiese aanwend) The co-ordination and economic use of manpower and the security structures as well as the welfare departments were necessary. There were great discrepancies between people with regards to the use of the Security Forces on the one hand, and the attempt to uplift people socially and economically, especially the military and the police, initially, pleaded for a renewed attempt in that direction. While welfare departments wanted more socio-economic upliftment attempts, the SSC came to the conclusion that in a revolutionary conflict the battle for the hearts and minds of people was more important than the physical battle on the security front. It is clear from the policy documents, that the Commission made available to me. In the late eighties members of the SSC spent more and more time in developing more effective methods to curb the political conflict in South Africa and the possibility of seeking process was very important. The members of the SSC were throughout convinced that such a political settlement cannot be sought in chaos, but that the actions of the security forces had to bring about stability so that a political settlement process can be guaranteed that it will be in a peaceful way. The members of the SSC were kept up to date by Intelligence publications and National Intelligence assessments as well as other documents that were given to them during these information meetings with regards to revolutionary organisations. The evaluation of such information from time to time took place. It was clear in these discussions that giving over was never an option and that the South African Government with the power at its command, had to protect the physical integrity of the State and its citizens, the structures of the Security Management System, and their tasks. The SSC was under the political power of the Government of the day. Possibly as a result of the fact, that, because of the Total Onslaught policy, the idea of National Security was an all encompassing concept, and the strategy, and the constitutional, economic, social, also entailed the security terrains, and it was suggested that the SSC was actually the Government of the day. On the 30th January 1984 the Prime Minister reacted as follows in Parliament, and I quote - "When the SSC now takes certain decisions, the Chairman takes it personally to the Cabinet and presents it to the Cabinet. The Cabinet still has the right to discuss any decision of the SSC and to disregard it." In a press statement, which was supplied by the Secretary of the SSC on the 21st September 1983 it was said that a decision taken by the SSC had to be finally approved by the Cabinet. To the best of my knowledge and as far as I can remember the SSC functioned as follows: It gathered twice per week under the chairmanship of the State President. If necessary, special meetings were held. I remember that every year, one week before Christmas such special meetings were held in order to discuss the security of the country during the Christmas season. Special meetings were also held to discuss the security actions, which was regarded as important for the security and the management of the State. The institution and the relief of States of emergency was also decided on special meetings. Meetings of the SSC were also attended by the permanent members as determined by statute. Additional members were co-opted. It was also used to use other officials or to invite them from time to time to attend various meetings and to inform the SSC to the best of their ability and to use experts. Matters which were discussed on a specific State and which were regarded as relevant to security were contained on these agendas. This was divided into the following categories: the necessity of physically security action to avoid threats to the Government from overseas and internally, furthermore, general relationships between States and the consequent security implications for South Africa. In this regard the situation in the previous South West Africa during those years, took a lot of time from the SSC. Furthermore, the increasing international isolation of South Africa on diplomatic, economic, cultural, academic and sport terrains and specifically the role of economic sanctions and boycotts, as well as the strategies to circumvent this. Other matters such as the supplying of passports and various transport matters to people were regarded as politically sensitive people, as the supply of visas to opponents of the Government. In my opinion the discussions in the SSC were held on a professional and high level. The agendas and the minutes of these meetings are available and give enough information in this regard. The members of this Working Committee were those officials to which are referred in Section 4 of the Act on Security Information and the State Security Council number 64 of 72, as well as other Heads of departments, which according to the circumstances were necessary for the preparatory administrative work of the SSC. As in the case of the SSC itself, many middle level managers and other experts were invited from time to time, to inform the members of the SSC regarding certain matters. There was also an extensive system of inter departmental sub committees of the Working Committee. Certain State Departments were grouped according to line function activities to give expert advice to the Working Committee. For example, there was an inter-departmental Committee regarding the control of aliens, and this provided advice regarding matters pertaining to the supply of passports and visas, and the illegal stay of aliens in South Africa. The contents of the preparatory documentation which served as input at these committees is of great importance for the development of an informed and balanced historical perspective regarding this specific period and the views of various role players, regarding events in South Africa. I had no access to that. If that means that the Commission does not intend to refer to that, important information will not be taken into consideration for their report. The co-ordination of the Intelligence activities of the South African information community was co-ordinated by a body that was known as the Co-ordinating Intelligence Committee in short, CIC. In paragraph 10.1.6 and 10.1.10, I deal with this in more detail. After the proclamation of the General State of Emergency on the 12th June 1986, the security management of the country was bettered by the National Security Management System in order to make it more effective. The existence of this management system must be placed in the following historical perspective. For practical purposes, I was at all times against the implementation of such a force and I was of the opinion that the South African police had to be made stronger rather. Addendum K to the bundle of documents that the Commission made available to me, reflects this. In the terminology of the revolutionary conflict this entailed that the battle for the hearts and the minds of the people had to be won. Various departments with critically important welfare functions, however, had a shortage of funds and skills. Accordingly a better co-ordinated management mechanism had to be developed in order to use funds and skills optimally. Against the background of the above two considerations, a Vice Ministy of Law and Order and Defence was created who was responsible to make sure that on security terrain the Defence Force as well as the Police co-ordinated in a harmonious way, and that the security forces and the welfare departments could be managed in a co-ordinated way in order to counter the revolutionary onslaught in an effective way. This system required a network of Management Committees in various functional areas and on various hierarchy levels. Certain committees functioning on National level were backed by committees on Provincial and/or Regional levels and sometimes even on Local level. This system initially encountered some resistance. Departments and Administrations regarded this as an interference in their responsibilities and others were of the opinion that it was an attempt to militarise the State. The Management Committee was a well-meant attempt to gain an integrated use of manpower, funds and skills against the revolutionary onslaught to make this possible. It was not sinister and is definitely not unique. Next, the role and task of the National Intelligence in this time. During this time that is concerned in this report, I was Head of NI and my contribution to the SSC was in that perspective. My view regarding the Central Intelligence Services like NI was throughout that it is in main in contrast to other departmental Intelligence organs, and like for example Military Intelligence Services or Police Intelligence Services. It had to deal with a universal Intelligence task which is to gather Intelligence regarding happenings and events that related to undermining the State power. Intelligence, Security Intelligence is only useful if it can be weighed up in an expert way and if it can be given to the political decision-makers in time. It is fundamentally important that such information must be given to the political decision makers in time and one of the problems of Intelligence Services world-wide is to give these political decision makers the information in time and to help them to understand the importance thereof. The evaluation of Security. The evaluation of this information, it could not be coloured by personal ideas, it would be very short sighted. No Government or Intelligence Service can in the long run use the security information for political or ideological point scoring. Intelligence Services are responsible for giving Intelligence and information to other State Departments which can be an embarrassment to the State departments and which sometimes has nothing to do with the political role plays ideological convict. Because of their unique manpower and capabilities of the Intelligence services they are sometimes used for secondary Intelligence responsibilities. Intelligence services should thus be act in the fullest confidence and have the ability to covert diplomacy, confidential discussions, the handling of security in the State dispensation and other forms of clandestine activities on military, economic, constitutional, social and other terrains and to handle all this. The CIC, like Intelligence Services world-wide, worked on a "had to know basis", according to which individuals were only concerned with the information they required to execute their various tasks. This compartmentalisation principle was for security reasons so when certain sources and information could not be harmed and if a member from one information service would become a member of a hostile information service. Activities of the CIC was supported by a system of sub-committees which did the necessary preparatory work. These sub-committees were amongst others, firstly, Covert Information Gathering, then Open Information Gathering, then Technical sub- committees, then Evaluation sub-committees which was later known as the Branch National Interpretation, then, Counter Espionage sub-committee and lastly, Intelligence Security sub-committee. In the case of the South African Defence Force in general and the division Military Intelligence specifically, the emphasis was placed on the military street from our neighbouring and other States. There was a way of thinking in the Defence Forces emphasising the standpoint of a foremost defence strategy. This strategy according to the classical theory of international politics and strategy was based on the supposition that buffer zones between opposing States or even groups of States had to be developed to serve as a basis for inter-State power basis. The Department of Foreign Affairs had against a strong attack to isolate South Africa had to maintain diplomatic relationships. This department was thus involved or worried about the influence which cross-border operations and economic actions against South Africa, by our neighbouring States would have on inter-State relationships. Members of this department had the standpoint that security activities in South Africa should be of such a nature that it would not lead to further isolation or economic boycotts. In this way the department contributed to it, that the voice of international thought, morality and influence could still be heard and was taken into consideration in the SSC and other security structures. World-wide it had happened that some departments, sometimes acted in subjective line function. It often happened that departments interpreted decisions to give themselves the advantage of an interpretation which would enforce their own position and their control over forces and manpower. This leaves scope for individuals to promote their own careers or because of other considerations to manipulate instructions or decisions for their own benefit. It is also true that in large bureaucratic institutions such as the public sector in a State where hundreds and thousands of people work in the public sector, that there is a danger that decisions and instructions are not formulated, conveyed or interpreted in a correct way. And also a degenerating security situation associated with attempts to undermine the power of the State and this leads to a greater pressure in the work situation and there can be certain misunderstandings. Actions of the Government of the day, in the first place, actions in neighbouring States and other countries. I accept that my input is required regarding the emphasised parts of the documents presented to me as Annexures A to L . Before I do this, I give my viewpoints regarding activities in neighbouring States. Revolutionary movements, cross-border activities against civil and other targets in South Africa became a threat for the security of the State and the citizens. These States which allowed that the revolutionary movements which became part of these activities and which operated from their countries also became part of the contravention of International Law. Included in the state of these States to respect the sovereignty of the other States it is also their duty not to allow or to promote terrorist activities from their soil and to do all steps which might be necessary to prevent that. In this regard I would like to point out that States who were members, or in which members of revolutionary organisations were, were in any case warned repeatedly not to allow their territory to be used for those purposes. Nevertheless, the members of the revolutionary organisations co-ordinated violent cross-border actions from these neighbouring states, and it was necessary for the State to defend itself in certain actions and to act against these people in neighbouring states. In terms of International Law as I understand it, self-defence actions against such members of revolutionary organisations who were present in neighbouring states is allowed. I cannot recall any decision or discussion of the SSC in terms of which an unlawful cross-border operation was authorised or which could reasonably be interpreted as being a decision to allow unlawful operations. NI and myself also was of the opinion that cross-border actions were authorised by International Law and was in principle not against it. It was sometimes expected from NI to give its opinion on intended cross-border security actions. This was not in all cases done. The fact that during some of these operations certain so-called non-combatants died, it was an unfortunate occurrence due to the vagueness of the border between soldiers and citizens. In addendum A of the bundle of documents which was included in the first notice, my commentary was required with regards to paragraph 8 thereof. My commentary is as follows: After the conclusion of the Lancaster house accord people were sent to report on the events in Zimbabwe, Mr Neil van Heerden from Foreign Affairs and Admiral W.N. Du Plessis of Division Military Intelligence and a member of NI were also there. After they came back, they reported to a committee, of which I was the Head, they reported on what they heard and I informed the SSC with regards to their reports as is clear from the addendum. One of the various aspects that was mentioned was that there was an attempt on the life or an planned attempt on the life of Mr Mugabe of the then Rhodesian security forces. If I recall correctly part of the suggestion that was discussed by the SSC was that if such an attempt, if it was successful would have very bad consequences and would be very negative. I gathered that my comment is necessary on this document because somebody is of the opinion that paragraph 7.8 thereof indicates that the SSC is involved in an assassination attempt on Mr Mugabe. This paragraph and the background facts as explained above shows that such an inference is completely unfounded. Furthermore, the use of the liberation theology in churches; furthermore the creation of non-government organisations which would in each and every terrain of life put up resistance and orchestrate financial help from foreign goverments, welfare organisations, banks, church, universities, city councils etc. In this comprehensive organisation of internal resistance climate, the UDF and later also the MDM and various other organisations like the PAC, AZAPO, and the SACP and others had a very important planning and co-ordinating role. Against the background of this comprehensive internal and foreign revolutionary onslaught against the then Government, various security and welfare steps were taken to counter this onslaught. Secondly the planning and implementation of a political agreement process in a milieu of optimal security stability to ensure a peaceful transition. This process was not without problems. And I during the start of this process of settlement politics and they took the standpoint that only the State and its organs in the final instance would have to undertake these negotiations, and the execution of this process. And we took a standpoint against the attempts of economic leaders, academics, church leaders, cultural leaders to act as facilitators. This point of view was that such persons did not have political responsibilities and this could not bear the brunt of the political results of the discussions. Very early during these discussions with Mr Mandela, we reached the agreement that the political settlement process in South Africa between the South African goverment and the liberation movements had to be negotiated and that facilitators from overseas would not be used in a manipulating role. During discussions with Mr Mandela in May 1988 in the Pollsmoor prison in Cape Town, after we had been planning that for a whole year. I remember that in the next year, next years, approximately 48 discussions took place and some of them took 8 to 9 hours. The discussions with Mr Mandela led to the widely published meeting between Botha and Mandela in Tynhuis, and this led to it that a process could be institutioned to enable the further planning of a negotiating process. Concurrent with this and when Mr De Klerk became head of the government and his important February debate in Parliament for clandestine meetings with the external wing of the ANC under the leadership of Mbeki took place in Europe. In such a way planning was done to manage the political settlement process in South Africa. The rest of what happened afterwards is not important regarding the purposes of the perspectives, which are required from me. I want to say, that if the real facts regarding, the political settlement process in South Africa, had to be recorded as true and as objectively as possible and to show that it was historically and correct to show that the SSC and its sub structures, and the individuals which had leadership roles in those structures, possibly played the most incisive role to make the political settlement process in South Africa a reality. Firstly, there was an intense struggle on the one hand to maintain and, on the other hand to obtain political power, which was total in extent planning and the potential for conflict. Furthermore, there was a total onslaught, which required extensive counter-measures that is undeniable. During this conflict the various parties sometimes used unconventional and unorthodox methods to achieve their objectives. Furthermore, the activities of the revolutionary movements which was sanctioned, presumably on the highest political level was, however, if you look at it from which point of view, they were illegal. I refer specifically to attacks on innocent civil targets, which led to bloodshed and death. Although the State Security Council, to the best of my knowledge, never authorised any legal activities it has now become known that some members of security forces became part of the most gruesome atrocities possible. This was the tragic result which came after the intensification of the conflict. Please allow me to suggest that you should not against the background of the knowledge which you have now that people when they were involved in the struggle and things were at its worst that they did not know about these things. I also want to suggest that you should take into consideration that the thousands of people who only did their duties according to their own insights and they have been humiliated because of these things which they now know about. To brand them now, as that they were part of this, even to make it so difficult for them to still believe in their own human values, this would be a bad day for the national reconciliation process. Furthermore, in the "stormingdrang" of this revolutionary conflict representatives of all parties often neglected instructions, took the law into their own hands and sometimes they disregarded the boundaries of human activities. Such actions is not only part of the time of conflict in our country but it still remains a tragedy. What we cannot deny, however, is that the security structures were used to maintain a relatively stable community structure which made it possible to initiate the politically negotiation settlement process. In a state of total anarchy it would not have been possible, and I want to reiterate my standpoint. The SSC and its structures established the base for the new South Africa and the establishment of a structure, a climate and ability to make possible the activities of this Commission. MR LYSTER HEARING ADJOURNS ON RESUMPTION MR LYSTER Thank you, photographers and others can please take their seats, we are going to start now. Thank you Mr McAdam if you would like then to proceed. MR McADAM DR BARNARD Yes, the task that was described in the affidavit was very competent and cannot be classified as such a wonderful Intelligence Service, but it did its job. MR McADAM The quality of selection of members of NI training, what kind of selection and training was that people who would then act as operatives and people who dealt with Intelligence? DR BARNARD . NI had a training academy known as National Intelligence Academy where training was given on all aspects of Intelligence. MR McADAM During this period, that is during the mid-eighties, did you have any indications of actions by your members that were illegitimately unlawful? DR BARNARD No. There was no such indication. MR McADAM As I understood your submissions, the primary aim of the SSC was the countering of the revolutionary onslaught on the country? DR BARNARD Yes, the State Security Council was brought to life by the Act on State Intelligence. The activities are set out in that Act. It was not only about the countering of the revolutionary onslaught, but the Council had to discuss any threat to the State, it was therefore not only to do with revolutionary onslaught but anything to do with the safety of the State. MR McADAM: Would you regard NI as an important role-player in the State Security Council? DR BARNARD Yes, it definitely did play a role, an important role. MR McADAM Was there close co-operation between the NI, the Military and the Police in directly combating terrorism? DR BARNARD I think in my statement I spent sometime on that to indicate that the Safety Departments, the Military and the Police worked closely together in various matters. I also indicated that due to the cultures in these departments they often disagreed about the nature of the security threat and we often disagreed quite sharply about the actions to be taken by the Government to combat the onslaught. MR McADAM Would these differences then be minuted during these meetings where NI for example said that it cannot support the views of the Military or the Police? DR BARNARD In the documents of the SSC no such disagreements were reported. The differences between departments were not necessarily minuted because of practical considerations but there were such differences. MR McADAM If we look at your submission where you dealt with the decision of the Defence Force to participate in operations in the neighbouring countries you indicated that it had been necessary to act against armed terror groups who resided in those neighbouring States. Did I understand your submission correctly? DR BARNARD MR McADAM I understand that you made a certain remark on the Defence Force can you please repeat that. DR BARNARD The operations launched by the Defence Force, I just want to make sure that these actions were purely military actions against terror groups. The operations of the Military that I was aware of, with respect, were operations without any doubt, exclusively planned against bases of terrorists and terror groups. And Mr Chair, I indicated in my submission that it was also the case that "innocent", as I called them, non -combatants died, but that the planning as far as my knowledge or to my knowledge, was never aimed at anything else than terrorist groups. I have no information of anything like that and I have no knowledge thereof. MR McADAM These innocents would then be people who were in the same house as terrorist and it would then be impossible to tell them to leave the house before the attack is launched? DR BARNARD I think that this is one of the sad realities of a revolutionary conflict when one operates in such an area that that is necessarily the case, yes. MR McADAM These operations would then necessarily exclude political and not military targets? DR BARNARD To my knowledge there were never any political targets only military targets. MR McADAM I would also then assume that it would also exclude elimination of people by means of poisons or assassinations or car bombs? DR BARNARD Yes that would be excluded, to my knowledge. MR McADAM And the cross-border operations that were done by the Military by the Defence Force, were they ever discussed and approved by the State Security Council before they were executed? DR BARNARD Mr Chair,the documentation that was supplied to me by the Commission does not contain any indication whatsoever, that any operation, at any stage was authorised by the State Security Council outside of South Africa. What happened was that the principle, that is the document that you supplied me with, perhaps I should use it. You supplied me with a document marked D. It is about an Extraordinary Meeting where a point of discussion had been Lesotho. I think it might be necessary for me to read to you what it says. It says "Lesotho - Minister Botha reports that Lesotho was warned about the presence of ANC terrorists in the country. Only a refusing answer was received". The next paragraph says: "The Meeting approves that stricter actions be taken against Lesotho and that stricter measures be taken against Lesotho and six steps were envisaged. 1) Diplomatic negotiations; 2) Selective border control measures; 3) Intensifying these measures; 4) Practical closing of the border; 5) Repatriation of workers; 6) What is here formulated as, violence across the border. It was approved after lunch by the Meeting and then it says:- "Furthermore the Governments of neighbouring States had to be informed by telex". The principle therefore that the South African Government in principle would allow the Defence Forces to act against the military targets in neighbouring States was in principle approved by the State Security Council but individual actions was for security reasons never discussed by the State Security Council. MR McADAM And with these military attacks on neighbouring States, would NI be involved in these?. DR BARNARD NI would in no way be involved in such operations except in terms of CIC, to which I have referred, where it would have been possible that information could be wanted and if we had received information on military targets, we would have known that this was the policy of the Government. And if we had information on these targets, if I can call them that, we would supply the information to the Intelligence community. MR McADAM Perhaps you could help us. We have an amnesty application with a senior member of National Intelligence. He avers in his application and I accept that the document was served on your attorneys, I was informed that, that was the case...(intervention) DR BARNARD If you can just tell us who it was? MR McADAM Jan Anton Niewoudt. DR BARNARD Yes we have received that very late, but we have received it. MR McADAM The crux is that he explains a system that was developed. He developed a target dossier and gave that to the Head of the Defence Force. It was then given to the Minister of Defence and then to an/or the State Security Council or the Cabinet and then it was then approved, then a working group would have then been compiled. The purpose of this working group would have been how the target had to be eliminated and he avers that a member of NI was at all stages involved. Can you comment on that averment? DR BARNARD There are so many questions in that question of yours, can you just explain to me exactly what you want to know, what exactly your question would be? MR McADAM In the first place was whether a member of NI, would have been a member of that working group? With regards to how the elimination of these targets would have taken place? DR BARNARD MR McADAM We are referring to the time before Trevits when this work group was established. According to Mr Nieuwoudt he was a Major and then he was promoted to a Commander, that the targets discussed for elimination were not only military targets based on military actions it also included political leaders who were senior members of illegal organisations who were hiding away in these neighbouring States and these methods entailed poisoning, car bombs and assassinations. DR BARNARD MR McADAM DR BARNARD MR McADAM So, such actions would that be directed against the Government of the day? DR BARNARD Yes. MR McADAM And a member of NI, would he be involved in this discussions? Would you accept that he would report back and say that they were busy with illegal actions and certain steps should be taken against them? DR BARNARD My answer is "No, the SSC and the structures I know of, at no stage made any decisions regarding this matter. MR McADAM: So NI would not have been involved in any discussion to eliminate people, to eliminate political people? DR BARNARD What do you mean by eliminate? MR McADAM To kill. DR BARNARD No, no they were not involved in that. MR McADAM Can you think of any reason why a senior officer of the Defence Force in such a position would allege that there was one of NI members present when the execution took place. MR TREURNICHT I just want to mention that this question does not follow on the information provided in the amnesty application. In the paragraph 9 it says "The following members of the South African Defence Force also had knowledge, they had knowledge. All played certain roles in planning this operation... MR McADAM: On the previous stage mention is made of the planning of the operation and that was after a target was decided on, and authorisation was provided to act against that target. DR BARNARD MR McADAM And, if we go further on, CIC was established and you were the chairman for a long period? DR BARNARD That is correct. MR McADAM And, if I understand you correctly CIC was only for Intelligence purposes, not to eliminate or to kill people? DR BARNARD That is correct. MR McADAM And during that period with your time at NI and a member of the SSC did you have anything to do with Johan van der Merwe of the South African Police? DR BARNARD Like all Commissioners of Police, Johan van der Merwe was a member of CIC and I saw him there, he was a member of the Meetings. During that time he was Commissioner of Police . MR McADAM Did you have any liaison with William Schoon who.was the Commanding Officer of the Police Counter Insurgency Unit? DR BARNARD MR McADAM You can perhaps help us by giving comment on amnesty applications by Brigadier Schooon where they are asking amnesty for an attack in Lesotho where innocent people were killed and where they alleged that the authorisation for that operation came from CIC. DR BARNARD MR McADAM Did CIC receive any instructions from the Defence Force or the police for assistance regarding information of people belonging to illegal organisations? DR BARNARD MR McADAM Is it correct to say that Trevits was a sub committee of CIC? DR BARNARD MR McADAM DR BARNARD: MR McADAM Once again a senior member of military Intelligence is Mr van der Westhuizen. He also refers to a mechanism according to which targets were identified for elimination. He alleges in his application that at a certain stage there was friction between the police and the Defence Force regarding an attack in Swaziland and they were reacting on information obtained from NI and therefore Trevits was established to avoid this type of problems. This you will see on page 13 the rest of that specific statement. DR BARNARD I have it Mr Chairman. What is your question? MR Mc ADAM I just want to determine whether that statement according to you is wrong or correct. DR BARNARD MR McADAM Perhaps you can assist us and tell us how a person like Mr van der Westhuizen who had a senior position in the Defence Force, he has long been involved in the Defence Force could make such a wrong conclusion regarding the purpose of Trevits. MR TREURNICHT: MR LYSTER MR McADAM If the document as a whole is read, as a whole the clear impression is that Trevits was one of the structures which was involved in planning or gathering information with the aim of killing people. If we look, for example, at the bottom of page 14 "The members of Trevits not only looked at Intelligence but also looked at the ANC structures within our identified areas". DR BARNARD Respectfully can I answer, is there any question I have to answer? MR McADAM I just want your comment that a person in this position would be under such a wrong impression regarding the purpose of Trevits. DR BARNARD MR McADAM Well in the first place on page 13 that the establishment of Trevits was because of the failed action of the ANC....(intervention) MR TREURNICHT May I assist my colleague Mr Chairman. If he looks on page numbered 3 of this application he will find at the bottom of that the following: a general description of Trevits which I submit is in line with w hat I have suggested earlier on. "Trevits was an inter- departmental work group and it enhanced the working of projects. The inputs of the various working groups and Trevits is one of those working groups enhanced the process of target identification. The so-called target dossiers were held at Headquarters". MR LYSTER M McADAM DR BARNARD Mr Chairman I have already made my standpoint but that was not the case. That would be wrong if you draw the inference that, that was the purpose of Trevits. I want to place it on record that I do not agree with that, it is wrong. M McADAM And possibly just to conclude there are various applications by former members of Trevits for matters where they provided Intelligence which led to the killing of people. I am only putting facts which should be considered by the committee in the end. This is not a personal attack on you. But I just want to give you the broad picture according to which we are working. A lot of publicity was given last year at a public meeting of a Brigadier of the Security Branch which committed varied assassinations in South Africa and he alleged that when he attended Trevits meetings the people who had to be eliminated were discussed, information was obtained to enhance this elimination and to establish where they were staying, were there people with weapons nearby whatever. Would you like to comment on that? DR BARNARD MR McADAM The first question I want to put to you is the year 1985. Was that a watershed year in the revolutionary onslaught against the country at that stage? DR BARNARD Mr Chairman, unfortunately I did not receive any documentation as to before 1985. The question you are asking is, yes 1985 and afterwards the revolutionary climate and conflict in South Africa escalated drastically internally and overseas, and this also led to the declaration of the State of Emergency. MR McADAM DR BARNARD Please ask your question.....(intervention) MR McADAM Can you confirm, was that the background to that area at that time. iIs that so? DR BARNARD MR McADAM Did that situation cause a big problem for the country of the day? DR BARNARD Certainly it led to the problem that a Government had to find a negotiated political settlement because it had to do with people who did not have political power and they tried to use violence and conflict to obtain political power. In my presentation I also said that many people were frightened that there would be a revolutionary takeover, but the argument was we cannot get a negotiated agreement with its broad divisions of all the peoples in this country if we work in a revolutionary climate. We had to create a stable climate where this negotiated settlement could be reached. MR McADAM: Would you say that the primary policy of the Government of the day was that we should counter this problem to find a peaceful settlement so we can negotiate it with the oppressed people? DR BARNARD The answer is yes. MR McADAM Then I would accept that it would not be that we had to enforce stronger military action against the masses. DR BARNARD: Mr Chair it is clear that due to the escalation of the revolutionary onslaught the murders committed and bombs that exploded in Wimpy Bars etc. the actions I have already described, because of the climate and the growing revolutionary dilemma surrounding that it would by necessity require increased security forces. It was, however, never about a point of departure that the problems in South Africa could be solved by the military and it had to be solved in such a way that a political solution could be found. MR McADAM DR BARNARD Yes, Mr Chair I agree that the climate had been one of mass resistance of problems in schools and it is true that "certain parts" and I say that in inverted commas, "certain areas" were not governable in the ordinary sense of being governable. It therefore, was not only certain people, the majority of people who were excluded from political rights started mobilising themselves. M McADAM And also what would have happened, I put it to you, with the policy of the ANC of making the country ungovernable they would act in public and would then basically tell people not tO - they would order people to break the law and they would then challenge the country and the Government basically, saying that you cannot arrest me because this would cause further unrest. That was the actions of the ANC. DR BARNARD That was one of the problems of the Government at that stage. MR McADAM Was it important to you that these prominent leaders who were acting in such a blatant way that they would be part of the negotiating processes? DR BARNARD It would of course be good for the country if one could get leaders of all sides not to spend their energies on destabilising the country but to get them to take part in negotiated settlement politics in South Africa. MR McADAM Would it then be true that information be gathered on these people so that this information can be transferred to the people who wanted to obtain this negotiated settlement, to convince this person to take part in the negotiation? DR BARNARD Yes, the answer is yes. MR McADAM I am surprised that at that stage, and we have to look at the Eastern Cape, at that stage suddenly the three leaders of Pebco disappears, a prominent organisation in East London and then Fedora who was behind all the unrest in the Eastern Cape. They were either murdered or disappeared from the face of the earth. DR BARNARD With respect I do not understand what the question is. MR McADAM I want to determine if you knew that this happened. DR BARNARD All South Africans know about this unfortunate incident where these people were murdered. MR McADAM What did your department do to investigate either the death or the disappearance of these people? DR BARNARD MR McADAM But these people were important to you for the negotiating process and you are an Intelligence service. The one disappears after receiving an order to meet the British Ambassador at Port Elizabeth airport and the other is found dead and the car was burnt, they were burnt out and you want to tell us your Intelligence information was never tasked to find out what had happened and who had been involved? DR BARNARD Mr Chair I have answered that question I am not going to try and answer it again. That was the task of the NI. I cannot answer the question any better than I did answer the previous question.. MR McADAM On page 11 of your submission you clearly said that the State Security Council was kept up-to-date on the plans of the revolutionary organisation. If that had indeed been the case, you would have looked very carefully at these people and you would have been interested in finding out what happened to them, who had been responsible for their disappearance and the murders. At that stage there was international concern and questions were asked. DR BARNARD I have trouble understanding the question. On page 11 of my submission, I want to read the whole sentence paragraph 8.12.5. It starts with, in the middle thereof "The members of the SSC were kept up-to-date by means of special Intelligence publication and National Intelligence assessments they were kept up-to-date". This is about the transferring of Intelligence to enable the State Security Council to be informed at all times. The incidents you are referring to concerned very unfortunate murders in the country. I have already twice said that NI was not there to investigate murders or other criminal matters. It was not its statutory task. If NI investigated those matters it would act contra to the statute which brought it to life. It was not our concerns, it was not our task and that is why we did not do this. MR McADAM Was there any involvement in JMS of the SSC? DR BARNARD MR McADAM What influence did JMS have on the local commanders of police, can you tell us? DR BARNARD In this case the management system attempted also on local level to deal with the battle of the hearts and minds of people so that we could win the negotiated settlement politics. I do not always think they acted correctly, they made mistakes from time to time, but the point of view and the position was a co-ordinated attempt to build schools and to bring about economic development, to enable economic development. MR McADAM: Are you in possession of the amnesty application of Harold Snyman? DR BARNARD Yes I have it in my possession. MR McADAM: He recently testified at an amnesty application on the kidnapping and murder of the Pebco 3 in the Port Elizabeth area. He avered that he had decided to eliminate these people because of pressure on him by the JMS system and also by senior members of the State Security Council. DR BARNARD Mr Chair is this the document you are referring to, can you refer me to the page you are referring to I would just like to follow that up. MR McADAM: If you would look at page 4 the second paragraph. "By means of the State Security Council arrangements were made that the JMS was addressed by members of the Government as well as the top structure of the State Security Council. I can remember that at various occasions we were addressed by Botha, Malan etc. During these visits it was stressed that the current security situation had to require drastic steps in order to control. Enormous pressure was exercised by the ... ( it is impossible to interpret at this speed). I apologise I was just informed. I will read this slower again. Then we will look at page 5 which is paragraph 5 middle paragraph. "This situation was discussed at the JMS and it was clear that the normal legal options like detention and restrictions of political activists did not have the wished results, the required results". If we then go to page 6 the middle paragraph thereof. "At this stage pressure was exercised by the JMS and political figures on the security forces to bring about stability and to bring the situation under control". There is then reference to things that PW Botha and Malan said as well as things that other political leaders said, where things were said, ...."like fire must be fought with fire" and "we are in a guerrilla warfare situation" and also a reference to the total onslaught and communist expansionism; the taking over that we are looking in the face and the western lifestyle as well as the well known black danger statements by means of the intensified JMS actions I gained some knowledge which indicated that the political activists of Pebco were a threat, a serious threat to the Government because their activities were causing chaos in the black areas". "It was decided to neutralise these activists by killing them". and then he explained how they proceeded to eliminate these people. DR BARNARD Thank you I just want to know what is the question. MR McADAM: "The decision to neutralise these four activists by killing them could not be taken lightly". and it caused a lot of problems for me and he was struggling with his conscience. And then on page seven the long paragraph 4/5ths from the bottom - "And then consequently I instructed them that some of the leadership elements from Pebco should be eliminated to stabilise the situation." He said I gave the instruction. My point of view is that the contribution of political leaders and senior officials did not have anything to do with the climate in which people had to be eliminated or killed. It had to do with motivating people who during a difficult time and with limited human resources and with international isolation to make a contribution to stabilise the country to make a contribution. But this Colonel Snyman at that stage was 58 years of age and he was the commanding officer of one of the most important security branches in the country. What surprises me is that he had made such a decision all on his own without feeling that his action was justified with the pressure from above. MR TREURNICHT MR McADAM Just to determine why this person would refer to the JMS system established by the SSC. Why he is mentioning pressure from members of the SSC if the SSC did not play any role in the factors he took into consideration before making his decision. DR BARNARD MR McADAM: DR BARNARD MR McADAM MR McADAM Apart from the evidence supplied during previous hearings regarding the SSC and the security forces....(intervention) DR BARNARD If it refers to those documents provided to us numbered A-L...(intervention) MR McADAM DR BARNARD MR McADAM: DR BARNARD: Just give me a minute please. I have it thank you. MR McADAM: If we look at page 22 and that is in response to a question by Glen Goosen, I see the transcipt is all in English so I can proceed in English. DR BARNARD I have no problems Sir. MR McADAM In the middle Mr Goosen said "I understand you correctly that there is no general authorisation or necessarily a general policy that certainly unlawful actions could be carried out, but that unlawful actions were carried out were authorised in particular instances and that senior members of either the State Security Council or senior members within either the police or the military or the......" ....(intervention) DR BARNARD: MR McADAM DR BARNARD: Unfortunately our page 22 or my page 22 certainly does not say what you are reading now Sir. I can show you. MR McADAM: It seems that there is a mistake. Page 21. It appears to be 21. Do you have the right page? I just go back to what Mr Goosen said. He then goes onto the following page at the middle where General van der Merwe then says. "Mr Chairman I have already testified before the Amnesty Committee and before the investigation team and I have confirmed that certain instructions were given with the approval of the Minister..." and he is referring there to the Minister of Safety and Security. "I have no doubt at all that he would have informed the State Security Council, consequently if that is denied that the previous Government in this case specifically in State Security Council did not have knowledge of certain unlawful actions that is not true". Can you comment on this statement by the General? DR BARNARD On page 22 which had just concluded I want to do from the back to the front. General van der Merwe says "Mr Chairman, I have already testified before the Amnesty Committee and before the investigative team and I confirm that certain instructions were given with the approval of the Minister. I do not doubt that at all that he would have informed the State Security Council". Now back to page 21 . He says that he can draw the inference that at some stage the SSC authorised it and then van der Merwe said - "I do not agree". MR McADAM It would also not surprise you that the Minister of Law and Order also applied for amnesty, for actions during these times. DR BARNARD MR McADAM: DR BARNARD It starts with - "Now further to the academic aspects..." is that were we are? MR McADAM: I see we have wrong page numbers. My page begins - "No, no, Chairman - thank you General". One of my members can just help you to get to the correct page. DR BARNARD: MR McADAM DR BARNARD: We have it. MR McADAM: "By their very nature covert operation rarely to my knowledge discussed or written about". He then goes onto quote, report about the Intelligence symposium held by the Intelligence service Head office in Pretoria on the 25th June 1982. "When survival is important it is often necessary for a service to resort to secret actions which does not comply with the laws, morality, norms or values which controls the public actions of the State. Secretly both defensive and offensive is important coverage is used to allow the operatives to execute secret instructions". He goes on to say, "When I was instructed to present a paper at the symposium on the use of cover and secret operations as well as on the recruitment of long term deep cover agents or moles I discussed the contents of my paper with my colleagues and found no disagreements with the views expressed. At the symposium I was not challenged on my views. This report was also circulated to the highest level as the distribution list shows". He then goes on on the next page to say. "I had no doubt that secret, violent and other actions against the revolutionary enemy were an accepted and approved procedure and our overall arsenal of counter- insurgency weapons". He then goes on and this is again at my page 102. At the top of the page it says - DR BARNARD: MR McADAM Sorry, can I just ask you whether you yourself received any military training. DR BARNARD: MR McADAM And are you aware that in the South African Defence Force there is a division known as special forces? DR BARNARD MR McADAM Could you briefly outline for us, as you know it, the task of special forces. DR BARNARD MR McADAM: And when you refer to cross-border actions what do you mean by that ? DR BARNARD Secondly the responsibility to gather intelligence regarding targets. MR McADAM And would you agree with the statement that in summary special forces are generally highly trained top level military operatives skilled in the conduct of operations. They are trained to use specialised weapons in many instances and generally are trained to carry out operations which would include, as you correctly say as in other countries in the world, actions which may lead to deaths, that sometimes special forces are brought in in military conflicts and take actions which may result in deaths. DR BARNARD You have mentioned a lot of concepts here specifically what are you referring to. MR McADAM Sorry I will try to put it more crisply. Would you agree that it would fall within the perview of the task of somebody in special forces to take armed action which may result in the death of a military target? DR BARNARD Yes. MR McADAM DR BARNARD MR McADAM Now earlier you told us that the functions of Trevits was the identification of targets but you maintained that it was not the function....(intervention) MR TREURNICHT No, Mr Chairman that was not the evidence. MR McADAM I beg your partdon. Earlier you told us that one of the tasks of Trevits was the collection of information in respect of Intelligence targets. DR BARNARD MR McADAM Correct. But they gathered that information for a purpose, that information would be handed on to another group of people, not Trevits, for action to be taken . DR BARNARD For the steps which those people could have taken, yes, that was why the information was provided. MR McADAM Correct. And included in the groups that Trevits passed information to were in fact, you could say the people acted on the information co-ordinated by Trevits were two groups - firstly special forces and secondly the security police, would you agree with that? DR BARNARD MR McADAM DR BARNARD This standpoint I cannot establish that, I do not have information against that and I cannot confirm. MR McADAM: And you earlier identified, you earlier asserted that in respect of the information collected by Trevits that that information was used for the purposes of internal operations. DR BARNARD MR McADAM In respect of information co-ordinated by Trevits and acted on internal to the country by special forces, would you not agree that it is at least forseeable given the nature of special forces and the tasks that they are designed to carry out, that when Trevits gathers information or co-ordinates information and it is acted upon by an institution such as special forces it is at least forseeable based on what one understands the tasks of special forces to be that that may result in deaths. DR BARNARD MR McADAM DR BARNARD I am very sure that the information, Trevits information and the information contained in the information databases and these information databases to contain information regarding internal activities. I am not going to say that it led to the death of people. MR McADAM But what do you think special forces would do with information provided to them by Trevits? DR BARNARD I think that is a question you should ask a representative of Trevits MR McADAM: No, but Trevits is a structure which falls under your department DR BARNARD No, Mr Chairman that is not correct. MR McADAM Dr Barnard you testified earlier that Trevits was a substructure of CIC, correct? And you were the Chair of CIC...(intervention) DR BARNARD Please complete your question first MR McADAM Sure, you testified earlier that you were the chair of CIC and that Trevits was on the evidence you testified earlier possibly one of the substructures of CIC. DR BARNARD MR McADAM But would you not ....(intervention) DR BARNARD MR McADAM: I beg your pardon. DR BARNARD It was a body through which activities were co-ordinated for the Intelligence community. I was the chairman for that regarding military Intelligence. It was not under my personal authority. MR McADAM DR BARNARD MR McADAM: And when a structure gathers information which is subsequently acted upon would you not agree that one has a responsibility to at least enquire as to how that information is used and what steps are taken based on that information? DR BARNARD MR McADM: DR BARNARD MR McADAM DR BARNARD MR KHOISAN: Mr Barnard when you are looking at the situation of the Lesotho raid of December 1985, do you accept responsibility for the end product, the fact that several targets were ANC people were eliminated, they were killed and as you put it a lot of collateral damage occurred, do you accept responsibility for that? DR BARNARD Mr Chairman I certainly do not accept responsibility for that. MR KHOISAN: MR TREURNICHT Mr Chairman ... (intervention) MR KHOISAN: MR TREURNICHT MR LYSTER: I think we should take as short a time as possible for lunch and try and get back here at 2.45pm. HEARING ADJOURNS ON RESUMPTION MR LYSTER MR TREURNICHT MR LYSTER MR TREURNICHT What you see is that Schoon is surmising as to what van der Merwe did. MR LYSTER Did Brigadier Schoon there say that authorisation was obtained from CIC from CIC? MR TREURNICHT He says, he gave this (verslag) to van der Merwe and then he goes on to say "....and on the same day at CIC he discussed it and got the authorisation MR LYSTER Ja, Mr McAdam. MR KHOISAN MR LYSTER MR McADAM MR LYSTER MR TREURNICHT: Mr Chairman. MR LYSTER Mr MacAdam do you want to continue with general questions to Dr Barnard? MR McADAM Chairperson on my page 99 it starts off - "Now by their very nature covert actions were rarely to my knowledge discussed or written about. I append here to document 21 and I quote the report of the National Intelligence symposium held at National Intelligence Head office Pretoria "when survival is important it is often necessary for a service to resort to secret actions which does not comply with the laws, morality, norms or values which controls the public attitudes of the State. Secrecy both defensive and offensive is important. Coverage is used to allow the operatives to use secret instructions. When I was instructed to present the paper to the symposium on the user of cover and secret operations as well as the recruitment of long term deep cover agents or moles I discussed the contents on my paper with my colleagues and found no disagreements with these expressed. The symposium I was not challenged on my views. The report was also circulated to the highest level as the discretion list show". Turning to the next page and then the second paragraph Mr Williamson expresses the opinion - Turning over to the next page he deals with fact, and I propose to mearly summarise key features of that page and not read it out, is that there was a conflict between some officials from the Police and Justice and Foreign Affairs department who wanted the counter-insurgency programme to be conducted strictly in terms of law and if possible for the law to accord with acceptable western norms. "On the other extreme we had officials especially from the counter insurgency element to the police and the military who felt that a democratic State using democratic methods could never withstand a concerted Soviet-backed revolutionary effort. Their solution was to spend democratic freedoms and militarise South African society. Now the upshot of this debate was a mish-mash of compromise". Turning to the next page and to then pick up from the third paragraph, The operational procedures were designed by people who knew the law in order to circumvent proof of legal responsibility for the deed by the upper echelon. Such covert action leading to mysterious explosions deaths etc cannot said to be unusual in South African political life". Turning to the top of next page. With the benefit of hindsight it appears that that upper eschelons, especially the politicians, were so keen to be as what I say legal arms length from covert action that they abdicated their responsibility to exercise close operational supervision of such actions and so lost significant operational control. Nevertheless. they can never deny responsibility for the budgets used to fund covert actions". Then if we proceed to skip to my page 112 and towards the bottom Mr Williamson is then quoted as saying - Turning over to the next page at the very top - MR LYSTER You want to formulate that into some sort of question. MR McADAM In the first place Doctor, would you accept this explanation or exposition that was read? DR BARNARD Mr Chair I cannot accept it. MR McADAM DR BARNARD MR McADAM In your submission you mentioned that you, in your department were involved in negotiations with especially the ANC. DR BARNARD Yes, we played a very pertinent role in that respect. MR McADAM Did the ANC as part of that process express any concerns about the fact that prominent political people were murdered or disappeared? DR BARNARD In the period of time when the discussions took place with Mr Mandela in 1988 in May and also after that during the discussions with Mr Thabo Mbeki and other members of the ANC in Europe, specific names of political figures did not receive any attention from either one of the parties. The discussions were aimed at finding a way to get Mr Mandela out of prison on certain provisions so that he could participate in the negotiation process. In the second place the ANC had external wings, had an external wing in overseas to suggest how these people could come back to the country to participate in the political process. The question that you asked later on at the Groote Schuur meeting, discussions were about general amnesty and the atrocities they were committed . It was discussed how these things could be addressed it was also addressed at the Pretoria minute. I can say that I was quite sad that at a certain incident where during the Pretoria minute political amnesty was discussed but no agreement was reached due to the views of a Cabinet minister of the then Government. That is a pity because here at the Truth Commission we are now addressing the issues of political responsibilities and this is of you can address much earlier. MR McADAM Would you agree that in the propaganda that was spread by the ANC from 1985 until the unbanning of the organisation there were various accusations that the South African goverment was busy using the South American elimination tactics. DR BARNARD MR McADAM DR BARNARD That is then very important and it must be stress that the South African goverment could not just simply leave its security forces in order to ensure that there is peace in the country when one of the main parties to negotiations did not want to stop violence. MR McADAM : Was it brought to the attention of the security forces that human rights violations were committed by the military and by the police? DR BARNARD MR McADAM What did you do about this information I discussed? DR BARNARD I discussed it with my colleagues of the Defence Force and the police and I told them that it seemed to me as if in the executive levels, I must stress this, this is a very important point, at the executive levels regarding the policy that we wanted to implement these people were acting illegally. I do not have any proof thereof but I suspect that it is happening and that that would be something that is very important to consider. Then Mr Chair it is not the task of the Head one department to make sure that these matters are addressed in other departments. I would like to repeat I had discussions with them and indicated to them that at the executive level there are people indulging in illegal actions, I did not have any information to prove this but I informed them that they had to investigate the matter. MR McADAM At what level did you address the questions at the departments? DR BARNARD Mr Chair I had just said the Head of the Defence Force and the Commissioner of Police. MR McADAM What was their reaction? DR BARNARD They said colleague we thank you for the information, do you have any factual evidence? I said no, I read it and I see it in the papers and they said that they would to the best their ability pay attention to the matter or attend to the matter. MR McADAM The National Intelligence service under which Minister did it resort? DR BARNARD National Intelligence services functioned under the auspices of PW Botha the State President. MR McADAM Did you monitor that after you have transferred this to the Head of the Defence Force and the Commissioner of Police it was taken any further. DR BARNARD As the process proceeded such actions were taken it was not my responsibility to invigilate what was going on in South Africa at that stage lawfully and unlawfully. At more than one stage I brought that to my colleagues attention and I would stand by my answer that I have just given. MR McADAM DR BARNARD MR McADAM Did you at any stage give this information directly to Mr Botha ? DR BARNARD MR McADAM What.... DR BARNARD If you can just give me a chance I told him, Sir it seems as if there are problems regarding the communication, I said that there must be some misunderstanding somewhere. I do not have facts to verify this but it seems to me as if members of the security branches could possibly be involved in some of these things which are illegal and we cannot be involved in illegal actions. MR McADAM What was his reaction? DR BARNARD He said that he was also very worried about it that he would deal with this at a political level. MR McADAM Can you remember in which year this was? DR BARNARD It is difficult to say...... MR McADAM DR BARNARD I cannot remember all the details of the events but this kind of thing would have occurred during the discussion between the Head of the Intelligence Services and the Head of the State under which he acted. It would have been around somewhere 1986 the emergency the State of emergency I was still at NI at the stage when Mr de Klerk came into office MR McADAM: Was there anything official from the State Security Council which said that these channels had to be cleared or that the junior officers had to.....? DR BARNARD I would like to understand your question please can you just repeat it for us please. MR McADAM You said that you conveyed these concerns to Mr Botha and he also indicated that he also had the same concerns what I want to determine is did the State Security Council formulate any policy to curb such actions? If we refer to the documentation there was an in-depth discussion of for example the combatting of activists, the various methods of dealing with them was there a similar document on control over the Security Forces? DR BARNARD Sir, I am very sure that if you had found any such document you would have been able to use that to verify such statements, and the fact that you do not do it must be clear that it was not discussed with the State Security Council. MR McADAM Is it correct that members of the National Intelligence Services could also have worked for the security branch of the South African police or military Intelligence before that and then they were transferred to National Intelligence? DR BARNARD All officials in any State can be transferred from department to department. In the Bureau for State Security that was formed in 1969 it was formed from people who were previously involved in State departments, that is true and in the run of time it did not occur that much but people in the Intelligence services also transferred from one department to another. MR McADAM Did your department at any stage gain knowledge of the existance of a military component called the CID, Civil CCB excuse me the Civil Co operation Bureau? DR BARNARD The answer is no. MR McADAM There are certain aspects other people would want clear up. DR BARNARD This matter regarding the Wit Doeke and the fact that they acted in Cape Town in certain stages was reported in the Intelligence documents I referred to. MR McADAM Would you have been involved in any support of these Wit Doeke? DR BARNARD MR McADAM DR BARNARD Yes I know about that. MR McADAM Do you know about the allegations made at that time that you were involved in that attempt? Is your answer then that I am aware that NI was involved? DR BARNARD MR McADAM: And those allegations a great deal was based on a member of the Intelligence Services? DR BARNARD MR McADAM So you would deny any official involvement in that? DR BARNARD Yes definitely. MR McADAM There was a criminal case in which some of these people were accused in the court and most of them were members of a reconnaissance unit. Were any investigations instituted by the Government why these people become involved in such a lawful action? DR BARNARD MR McADAM DR BARNARD Yes I have it. MR McADAM I want you to look at page 9 at the bottom 3.2.1.3. DR BARNARD Yes I have the place thank you . MR McADAM "The activities of the comrades or the street committees as communication channels or as communication channels regarding a community organisation or intimidation will be to make ungovernable by the leader elements by operation Vasvat to clandestinely make them the target of the Wit Doeke". And then we go to 3.2.5. "The activities against and the intimidation of anarchists and revolutionaries by the vigilantes or hamanagalala including for example an organisation such as Inkatha should be strengthened, expanded and enforced as a natural counter-measure against anarchy. After order had been established it should be tried to recruit these people as law enforcement officers to render service in various communities. Can you comment on that? DR BARNARD MR McADAM What is bothering me regarding this is on page 10. Mention is made about making vigilantes clandestine targets and then also actions and intimidation by vigilantes must be done through Inkatha and it should be expanded as a natural counter- measure against anarchy It seems to me you can assist me. I did not write this document but it shows support of the vigilantes and their actions. DR BARNARD MR McADAM Your department, did you give any inputs in the development of this policy? DR BARNARD Mr Chairman I just want to come back to the heading of this document. MR McADAM DR BARNARD Yes that is what the document is saying. MR McADAM Are you aware of the fact that these vigilantes were people who took the law into their own hands? DR BARNARD Yes the possiblity was there that they took the law into their own hands. The National Intelligence service did not manage them. Our task was to gather Intelligence regarding all that and to provide to the authorities. MR McADAM That Intelligence that you have gathered for example would you have indicated that this vigilante group, although they were against the ANC, that they intended attacking squatters and that the military and the police should come in and by way of blockades or whatever should stop this violence? DR BARNARD MR McADAM Would it be applicable that people participating in violence would be appointed as law enforcement officers? DR BARNARD DR BARNARD MR McADAM So according to your view that was wrong role interpretation of the real profession? DR BARNARD MR McADAM: And lastly while listening to your evidence NI with the illegal abduction of people from overseas? DR BARNARD No. MR McADAM MR McADAM: DR BARNARD I think my standpoint is not that I did not know of such groups. There were such groups. But my standpoint was that the NI did not give any legal authorisation to these structures and that remains my answer regarding that question. MR McADAM I just want to go back to the Seychelles incident just for a moment and that was you said that your department had knowledge of it and you explained how you came to have that knowledge and so on. The question is what did you do about that knowledge? What steps did you take to prevent that thing from happening when you were aware that it was on the go? DR BARNARD After I had become aware of that and after I had returned to Pretoria from Durban I and a senior member of NI who were present with the discussion with Mike Ward. We made an appointment with PW Botha I informed him regarding these possibilities and I also told him there was a possibility of military involvement in this matter. After I told him that, he told me that he wanted to discuss this matter on a political level wiith his colleague. He asked me to address this matter with the Head of the Defence Force because this could have negative results for South Africa. That was the last thing I heard about this Seychelles incident. MR McADAM DR BARNARD Before I answer your question what specifically are you asking? Are you asking between the executive actions on grassroots level and the evidence of the people in the top echelons, is there a discrepancy? MR McADAM DR BARNARD On the other hand, and that is the second point I want to put, is that certain people who were involved in the middle, who were in the middle of the struggle on grassroots level and as I said there were no angels involved on both sides, and in this climate sometimes and have already committed atrocities, which are unacceptable and I cannot justify that at all. It was absolutely unacceptable. But that was the climate in which the activities or the actions of those times should be understood. MR McADAM DR BARNARD MR McADAM DR BARNARD I think I have already indicated to you that after these murders occurred I discussed the matters with colleagues of mine involved in the security structures and I said to them, that while I do not know who are responsible for these murders that this would not facilitate that we could have a peaceful negotiated settlement in South Africa. Such actions were worked in a destabilising manner on the negotiations and that would definitely then reflect my position. MR McADAM DR BARNARD MR McADAM Then, sort of physical line functioning, restructuring and stuff like that. DR BARNARD I have no doubt in my mind that exactly as in the governing of a country that there must be checks and balances between the executive and the judiciary, there must be checks and balances to deal with this. The security people have to be a) under political guidance and b) that there must be taken care that they do not indulge in unlawful actions. Thank you. MS WILDSCHUT DR BARNARD Thank you Chair I just want to make sure is it 10.1.25 on page 30? Chair I do not wish to comment on this from the point of view of commenting on a political party submission. MS WILDSCHUT DR BARNARD The second point I want to make is I say in my submission that the most important departments taking part in that time disagreed with each other or there were differences between them. The police, the Military and the National Intelligence worked closely together. It was in their line function. And as a matter of fact and of course officials disagreed. It is also relevant that there was the granting of a budget. We have to budget, if you can just grant me a minute, must we leave hospitals or schools or what must we cut out of the budget? In this people take certain stances on certain matters and people might on purpose often say things wrongly. An official has an empire and he does not want his turf to be decreased or made smaller. That is a point that one must remember. South Africa in those years was not free from differences between departments who disagreed with each other. I think it was healthy that we disagreed with each other. MS WILDSCHUT DR BARNARD MR LYSTER DR BARNARD MR LYSTER DR BARNARD Mr Chairman I want to ask you to give me a chance to make my arguments. Then it goes on. "The State cannot afford declaring a State of emergency and legislation providing wider powers to the security situation is necessary to prevent the Republic from taking more drastic steps. An element of this legislation, a necessary element is the ability to remove revolutionary elements from the community by detention, undetermined detention where only judges, magistrates, doctors and senior police officials would have access to them". I want to repeat - "a very important element of this legislation is the ability to remove revolutionary elements from the community by detaining them where only lawyers, judges, doctors and senior officials have access to them". MS BURTON DR BARNARD MS BURTON May I follow up with a question on a differen topic. Mr MacAdam I put a question to you about the role of groups such as the Wit Doeke. Groups who were perhaps in conflict with other sections of the disadvantaged population and therefore might be used as potential allies for the State. I think that it is very easy to understand that the State, charged with the need to create stability, would seek such allies as more-or-less classic divide and rule strategy. I think it is possible, really possible to understand the argument that you are making about stability having to precede the political changes and I can understand that. But as I understand it the Intelligence gathering structures would also identify the groups or individuals who would be opposing such groups as the Wit Doeke. And also helping to forment or suggesting ways in which conflict between such groups could be formented. Now if that is so, and there may have been indications that that may have been so and I realise that Intelligence people would not carry out such actions but might be identifying the possibilities, then surely that is contributing to instability rather than to the kind of stability you are talking about. I would like your comments on whether the Intelligence work was in fact gathering that kind of information and perhaps making that kind of suggestion. DR BARNARD MR McADAM "In the way in which the revolutionaries and their associates used democratic installations and methods...." MR LYSTER That brings us to the end. If there are any issues which we come across we would like to be able to put them to you in writing through your counsel. We will certainly let you know if there are any matters which need any further clarification. MR McADAM MR LYSTER DR BARNARD HEARING ADJOURNS