CHAIRPERSON: Everybody, we said yesterday when we adjourned that we would start today with the evidence in chief of Mr Du Toit.

ADV DE JAGER: Full names?

MR DU TOIT: Petrus Lodewykus Du Toit

PETRUS LODEWYKUS DU TOIT: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Visser?

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, an application for amnesty by the Applicant for any illegal or unlawful act or omission by him in regard to the death and the later disposal and cover up of the death of Mr Stanza Bopape. Mr Chairman, just a few matters of householding importance, if I may before we commence. The Application of Mr Du Toit, of General Du Toit, you will find at Page 138 of Volume 1 and I have some amendments which I wish to move Mr Chairman.

At Page 138, there appears to be a typing error in Paragraph 4 that is in as far as it refers to his identity number. The number you will observe in the middle has 5005, which should read 5065.

CHAIRPERSON: While just looking at this Mr Visser just above I see Lodewykus in the Application whereas on the statement that I have before me it’s with a "c".

MR VISSER: It is in fact a "k" Mr Chairman. Thank you Mr Chairman. It must be a "k", as on the Application form. The Application form is correct. Mr Chairman, the second amendment is again the one in Paragraph 7(a) which should read, Nationale Party and (b) which should read "supporter", those are the only amendments which I wish to move. Thank you Mr Chairman. And I would ask you to grant those amendments.

CHAIRPERSON: I take it there is no objection to those? Thank you Mr Visser then Paragraph 4 of the Application form is amended by deleting the second "0" as it appears in the identity number and substituting that with a "6" and deleting the "nie van toepassing" in both paragraphs 7(a) and (b) of the Application form and in 7(a) substituting it with the words "Nationale Party" and in 7(b) the word "supporter".

MR VISSER: May it please you Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman then lastly, in order to attempt further to assist in saving time, bearing in mind that we’re only here until Wednesday next week and bearing in mind the number of witnesses which it is envisaged will still be called to give evidence, we have made available to you what is basically our consultation notes Mr Chairman.

General Du Toit has signed your copies and he will confirm the contents under oath. Perhaps Mr Chairman this being thus the case we could go over the general background very briefly in his case if you will allow me to do so because obviously there’s a great measure of similarity about this. They all came basically from the same situation.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser then this will be received as "Exhibit R"?

MR VISSER: As it pleases you Mr Chairman. If I man then continue to lead the evidence of General Du Toit.

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: General, you are aware of the contents of your Application which we have submitted to the Committee, is that correct?

MR DU TOIT: Yes, I’m aware of what’s in there.

MR VISSER: Do you confirm the correctness and the truth thereof?

MR DU TOIT: Yes, I confirm that.

MR VISSER: In your Application on Page 143 of Volume 1 you asked the Committee to incorporate some of the documentation which is already in the possession of the Committee and refer to the same documents as those referred to by Erasmus and Van Der Merwe and then also the submission of Van Der Merwe of the 21st October in the amnesty application of Brigadier Jack Cronje and four others is not true?

MR DU TOIT: That’s correct.

MR VISSER: You listened to the evidence of General Van Der Merwe or which handled or dealt with the time span when the struggle was reigning in our country’s past and specifically 1988 and I want to ask you are there aspects concerning that evidence with which you differ or are you satisfied to comply with that evidence of General Van Der Merwe both in his evidence in chief as well in the cross questioning?

MR DU TOIT: I comply with that completely.

MR VISSER: And then do you request the Committee to see that as also your evidence concerning this aspect?

MR DU TOIT: That’s correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: General Du Toit, on Page 1 of "Exhibit R" you set out your career in the South African Police and to summarise, on the 22nd December 1955 you joined the South African Police and on the 28th February 1994 you retired from the police with pension, is that correct?

MR DU TOIT: That is correct.

MR VISSER: The time span which is now important, 1988 would that be 2.12 on Page 1, you became a Colonel. In 1987 and you were promoted to second in command, that means the deputy divisional commander of the Witwatersrand, that happened in 1987?

MR DU TOIT: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And just an amendment, it’s the security branch?

MR DU TOIT: Yes of course, it was the security branch of the Witwatersrand.

MR VISSER: And at the end of ‘88 you took over from General Erasmus who was then transferred from the Security Branch in the Witwatersrand?

MR DU TOIT: That is correct.

MR VISSER: That would mean that during the decease of Mr Bopape you were the deputy divisional commander of that branch of the security branch?

MR DU TOIT: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You were born on the 14th December in 1937 in Boshoff in the Free State, is that correct?

MR DU TOIT: Yes.

MR VISSER: And is it correct that I understand from you that you, the same as General Van Der Merwe and Erasmus, you grew up in a very similar milieu and similar circumstances. That is to say in a conservative Afrikaans household. You were members of the Dutch Reformed Church and supporters of the National Party?

MR DU TOIT: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You also said in the notes, this is now from "Exhibit R" in paragraph 3.6, you said that your parents were supporters of the National Party and of course they were supporters of the apartheid regime and you didn’t see anything wrong with that and that’s the way you were brought up?

MR DU TOIT: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And the same as General Van Der Merwe and Erasmus you had the experience that there weren’t really any important people in your life. Now in the circumstances you were growing up who criticised the policy?

MR DU TOIT: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: In the sense that maybe he should, maybe you should just submit 3.8 to 3.12 to the Committee.

MR DU TOIT: I’ll do that. I grew up in the aftermath of the second world war where the political emotions between the Nats and the SAPS was very high. I did not grow up with the perception that there was a black nationalistic political problem. A person adapts to what you experience since birth. In later years when black nationalism came to the front I started becoming aware of that.

It was still not in my experience that there was a one-sided and a complete condemnation of the government’s apartheid’s policy. There were different opinions about that. Important people reverends, teachers, politicians defended this policy in public and they justified it as well. Most of the people I came into contact with believed in this policy and also supported it. I experienced the apartheid policy as that of separate development and not a situation of suppression. For me the colour of a person’s skin did not play any important role.

MR VISSER: General, you joined the police and now I would like to ask you, your working circumstances did it create an impression with you and certain experiences you had, certain incidences you came face to face with and now you were supporting the government at that time and did these experiences enforce your belief in the government and apartheid?

MR DU TOIT: Yes.

MR VISSER: And concerning these personal experiences you’ve given us examples in Paragraph 4. You said that, in 4.1 you were involved with certain sensational trials. For example, Mombares and the ...[inaudible] trial. In which capacity were you involved in these trials?

MR DU TOIT: I was part of the investigating unit in these specific trials and I also gave evidence.

MR VISSER: Maybe you can just continue from 4.2?

MR DU TOIT: I read, very few acts of terror in the Witwatersrand to which I was not exposed, the Ellis Park car bomb, the Wits commandment car bomb. I was in the building myself when the bomb exploded and I believed it was aimed at the commandment and who was in the building and also the magistrate’s court bomb and that was also in 1987 and that’s just to mention a few. In the Witwatersrand we had as many as four acts of terror in one week.

Chairperson, as far as the magistrate’s court bomb, was one of the acts of terror which touched one the most deepest. I observed and I saw policemen who were killed, who were seriously injured. One specific incident that will always stay with me was one policeman who was seriously injured. He was shot full of holes and the weak, after he left he received 97 pints of blood.

MR VISSER: The Magistrate’s Court bomb, is that the one in Krugersdorp?

MR DU TOIT: No, the one in Johannesburg. And that was in 1987. I continue, in these incidents people were injured. For example in the Ellis Park bomb the man was still alive when I got to him. He was very seriously burnt and he later died and a lot of people were seriously injured there.

And the same happened at the magistrate’s court bomb and other explosions and also mentioned the Wimpy Bar in Johannesburg, Checkers in Rosebank, Tony Factors building in Johannesburg etc.

MR VISSER: What happened there?

MR DU TOIT: In most of those cases it was limpet mine explosions. During the struggle of the past where a lot of people were dead or died and were injured and a lot of damage was done to property because of the behaviour of radicals who attacked the apartheid policy this caused the general policemen to motivate to support the system even more.

Even if it was only indirectly in the execution of his duties in order to maintain law and order and to maintain internal security. We as policemen felt that we were the last line of defence against total anarchy and chaos. Later in my career I had access to publications of radical organisations, for example, the ANC, PAC and other organisations.

The aggressiveness and the encitation towards violence once again enforced our idea that we had to fight the revolutionary onslaught with everything within our power. Since 1993 the revolutionary struggle got more intense and since 1985 the unrest also increased. I want to place it in perspective that me, as a policeman, did not see the execution of my duties as colour selection.

I also believed that was the opinion of most of my colleagues. We saw our duty as the maintenance of law and order and the protection of all races and groups of the communities against violence and intimidation.

MR VISSER: If I can just stop you there General. Now we have the idea that you as a policeman is supposed to and also forced by law and should be seen as acting legally and in order to maintain peace within the country and at the same time you were placed in the dilemma, as we know in the case of Bopape where you were forced to act illegally. How do you feel about this dilemma you found yourself in?

ADV DE JAGER: Is it correct to say that he was forced to act illegally?

MR VISSER: Yes maybe that’s not quite correct. Let’s say when you actually did act illegally. This contradiction, why would you say that happened? If you look at the circumstances in which you were working.

MR DU TOIT: The circumstances Chairperson under which we worked and also the revolutionary onslaught against us which knew no limits, and which did not follow any rules or regulations necessitated us to act the way we did in certain extraordinary circumstances.

MR VISSER: You can continue with 4.10.

MR DU TOIT: Certainly. The members of the South African Police in execution of their duties as policemen and women had no reason to criticise the State and Government which they were forced to serve and to protect.

MR VISSER: The rest of the paragraphs are very much the same as the previous witnesses, you conclude that paragraph by saying that your practical experiences and all the other aspects you’ve mentioned touched you very deeply to such an extent that you did everything within your power to fight against the revolutionary onslaught. Is that not correct?

MR DU TOIT: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: As far as the pressure on you to solve problems were concerned, the Human Rights Committee as well as the Amnesty Committee they’ve heard evidence pertaining to that quite often and today there can’t be any doubt that you guys who were in management positions received a lot of pressure from above within your own divisions and also from politicians, is that not correct?

MR DU TOIT: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Do you confirm as well the basis on which the struggle was fought and that of African National Congress as is set out in your document?

MR DU TOIT: Yes.

MR VISSER: And I would like to get to the facts concerning the death of Stanza Bopape and your specific role regarding this. Can you just tell us exactly how you became involved in it and what your role was? Maybe I’ll just give you a bit of guidance. Were you the person who spoke to Stanza Bopape and who detained him according to Section 29?

MR DU TOIT: That is true Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Today as you are sitting here can you still remember all those occurrences with detail or what is your position?

MR DU TOIT: Chairperson I can recall it well that I arrested him and detained him. The facts which I had concerning his detention with regard to the notification and which such detainee must sign and the requirement was that the Act of which he was suspected of having committed should be told to the person. I cannot remember the exact wording thereof.

MR VISSER: Just to make it a bit more understandable and to place it in a more comprehensive context, if you will allow me Chairperson. We handed you a document which is a copy of the old Section 29 on the Law of Internal Security, it’s got a 36 on the right side of the page and another document which contains Section 54. The documents did not receive exhibit numbers, they were handed in on the basis of authority.

In order to correct the whole question of the applicability of what we have here in terms of 29 and 54 of Law 74 of 1982. I understand that in 1988 certain amendments were made to this Act or am I wrong?

MR DU TOIT: I don’t think to the Act at that stage.

MR VISSER: I am wrong Chairperson. The documents you have in front of you now were exactly the same way they were in 1988. I was under the wrong impression so this is exactly the way they were in 1988. Chairperson I realised that Sub Section 2 of Section 54 in these copies we have is amended.

CHAIRPERSON: Is 1992? Just the one paragraph was deleted in 1992 by the looks of things.

MR VISSER: Clearly you are correct Mr Chairman. My second statement was also incorrect and that is that the Section 54 was apparently not the way it read in 1988. That must be the position. General can you just tell us, according to your memory. Mr Chairman may I first of all point out that we have not been able to obtain that old Section 54 anywhere. The police certainly can’t help us with it and I have not been able to find it in our law library either.

It’s one of those things but Mr Du Toit can perhaps tell us in what sense, according to his recollection it varied from what you have in front of you today. Can you just do that for us General? If you look at Section 54.

MR DU TOIT: Chairperson, Sub Section 1, except for (d), I cannot remember the amendment there. Sub Section 2, I cannot recall what it entailed, detention according to Section 29 for offences refers to Section 1, 2 and 4 were the only offences according to which a person could be kept under Section 29 but really Chairperson I cannot remember Sub Section 2 and what exactly it entailed.

MR VISSER: To make it short, the important amendment, did that pertain to the role the Commissioner played?

MR DU TOIT: It could be but I cannot remember.

MR VISSER: One of the important amendments concerned the period of detention and the visits by the magistrate. It’s a question of legal arguments but there was an amendment concerning the capacity of the ...[inaudible] with which you could have kept arrested and kept in detention. This is what’s in front of us in Section 29(1), is that not correct?

MR DU TOIT: That’s correct.

MR VISSER: And Section 29(1), if I might just read it in order to prevent the interpretation I’m going to read it in English.

And then there’s a proviso how this was regulated. In other words we have the situation here that you had reasonable suspicion or you had to have reasonable suspicion that he would be a person who did commit an offence or had intention to commit an offence or that he had information pertaining to what the law addresses here and that he does not want to give that information then you could arrest such a person and detain him until he has given satisfactory answers to all questions. Am I right there?

MR DU TOIT: That’s correct.

MR VISSER: If I could just say to the satisfaction of the Commissioner and Sub Section 3 of Section 29 made provision for the fact that he could be detained for thirty days from the day of his arrest or the exception of when the Minister gets written permission that he can be detained longer and that is for reasons that you had to give?

MR DU TOIT: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Was it your experience that Applications were made on the part of detainees that were brought to the higher courts?

MR DU TOIT: I was involved in many certain instances.

MR VISSER: Was it your experience that the courts looked closely at the facts and circumstances of cases where there were Applications for the release of detainees in terms of Section 29?

MR DU TOIT: That’s correct.

MR VISSER: What influence did this have on you with the judgment of the facts to determine if you had reasonable suspicion in cases of Section 29 detainees in general?

MR DU TOIT: Chairperson, the impression that I had was that we had to follow the strict regulations of the Law and in many cases the indications of the judges from the higher courts had to be noticed and had to act in strict accordance to that with the detention of persons ...[inaudible] Section 29.

MR VISSER: Very well. You say you can recall that you detained Mr Bopape in terms of Section 29 and what can you recall was the situation pertaining to Mr Bopape?

MR DU TOIT: Chairperson, there were discussions with Colonel Van Niekerk and possibly with the other interrogators, deputy officer Mostert, Engelbrecht, possibly looked at their notes but it is normal practise that you had to take notice of all the facts that you had available at that stage in terms of such a person that you wanted to detain.

MR VISSER: You are not on trial here because you detained Mr Bopape but can you just conclude that you have listened to the testimony of Colonel At Van Niekerk and others who testified what Mr Bopape was suspected of in June 1988. Would this agree with the type of facts that you had to be aware of to when I believe to detain him in terms of Section 29?

MR DU TOIT: That’s correct.

MR VISSER: Before he was detained in terms of Section 29 there was also an allegation in these pieces that he was detained before that in terms of Section 50 of the Criminal Procedure Act, do you recall that?

MR DU TOIT: That is so Chairperson.

MR VISSER: If you can return to Paragraph 6 and then you can tell us what your role was?

MR DU TOIT: On the 10th June 1988 Chairperson during the late afternoon while during interrogation by deputy Mostert I, the facts came to me in terms of Bopape and I spoke to Bopape. I informed him that his detention in terms of Section 50 of the Criminal Procedure Act.

MR VISSER: Excuse me if I could just interrupt you. Mr Chairman I see that there’s a paragraph with a wrong number. We are now at page 13, if you were confused as to where we were, I’m sorry I didn’t realise that I said 6 but it’s 7. It should read 7, page 13. Excuse me General, please continue. You have to please repeat, the afternoon of the 10th June you said during the late afternoon while Mostert and Engelbrecht were interrogating Bopape at some stage the facts came to you in terms of Bopape and you addressed him, that is what you just said now?

MR DU TOIT: That’s correct.

MR VISSER: Please continue.

MR DU TOIT: I informed him that his detention in terms of Section 50 of the Criminal Procedure Act was to be ended and he was arrested in terms of Section 29 of the Act of Internal Security. Just to clarify in this case this person would not be addressed by myself if only the interrogators would be present and a person would be asked if he wanted an interpreter. I cannot remember if we used an interpreter in this matter. I can also not remember who the other members were who were present.

MR VISSER: What do you remember surrounding the facts of Mr Bopape?

MR DU TOIT: The reason for the acts was the following in terms of his detention I had reason to believe firstly that Bopape was a trained terrorist, secondly that Bopape was a member of Mapongo Group that were responsible for explosions in Pretoria and also that Bopape was probably, had a part in terrorist attacks in the Vaal triangle and Pretoria.

MR VISSER: Were you also aware at that stage that he refused to give information in connection with what he was being suspected of?

MR DU TOIT: If I recall correctly I was informed that up to that stage he did not want to give us any information.

MR VISSER: But you have already said that he was interrogated by Mostert and Engelbrecht?

MR DU TOIT: That was the reason why they were interrogating to see if they could gather information from him.

MR VISSER: Of course. If you could go back, excuse me, can I just ask you this. Did you explain to Mr Bopape what Section 29 entails and what his position is and what is asked of him?

MR DU TOIT: That is so, Chairperson. There was a prescribed document that had to be completed, a notice that he, I think it’s Annexure B.

MR VISSER: Annexure B appears just after Page 6. Oh well I see there are more than one Page 6, I have a problem with the sixes today. It’s close to the end of the document, about five or six pages from the end of the document. And you then to keep it as brief as possible, you completed the necessary forms and you spoke to him and asked him certain personal information and you completed the document and afterwards he was detained in terms of Section 29?

MR DU TOIT: That is correct. I would just like to point out also that with Annexure B as far as I can remember it was not in the same form and during judgment in a high court there was an amendment made and if I can recall correctly it was after sub paragraph B there was a space left and the instruction was that we had to give briefly the reasons for detention in this form, in written form.

MR VISSER: So what you are saying that Annexure B as it was in 1988 is not the same as the one that we have before us now. It had a space where you had to give reasons on the basis that you gave notice that you have reasonable suspicion that he was a person who was described in Section 29 1(a). In Mr Bopape’s case he was a person in terms of (a) or (b) of Section 29 or both?

MR DU TOIT: I would say he was in the category of both of these.

MR VISSER: I know you cannot recall in this particular case but could you tell the Committee in your experience, or let me ask you this, was Mr Bopape the only person that you detained in terms of Section 29 or were there others? In your experience as a police officer?

MR DU TOIT: I literally Chairperson detained hundreds in terms of Section 29.

MR VISSER: Can you just give us an idea? How long this process took from when the person sits before you speak to him, on average, how long did it take? And I do not want to speak of exceptions but the normal average case?

MR DU TOIT: I would say approximately a half an hour Chairperson.

MR VISSER: After the detention in terms of Section 29, Mr Bopape did you have anything to do with him afterwards, did you see him or were you aware of what happened to him until Sunday the 12th June?

MR DU TOIT: Not during that time, before Sunday the 12th.

MR VISSER: Well out of context yes, we can just return to Page 11, Paragraph 6, could you just tell us what happened on the 12th June 1988?

MR DU TOIT: Chairperson, on Sunday 12 June 1988 in the evening General Gerrit Erasmus who was then Brigadier contacted me telephonically and requested to come to his office at John Vorster where our offices were and I attended a meeting in Brigadier Erasmus’ office where the following were present. Myself, Brigadier Erasmus, Major At Van Niekerk and Captain Zeelie.

There Chairperson I was told that the detainee that I was aware of, Stanza Bopape died during interrogation, suspected of presumably a heart attack during shocks administered to him.

MR VISSER: What was your reaction when you heard this? Your personal feelings when you heard this?

MR DU TOIT: Chairperson I was shocked and I was upset because of the death of the detainee and because of the methods used.

MR VISSER: What was your attitude to torturing of detainees by the police?

MR DU TOIT: I was against it.

MR VISSER: And did you do anything to make this known?

MR DU TOIT: I cannot recall exactly what I said that particular evening.

MR VISSER: No, I’m speaking of in general?

MR DU TOIT: In general the members that I worked with who were under my command I told them not to participate in these acts.

MR VISSER: You heard what General Van Der Merwe said. He said he knew that if he did not act correctly and was caught he had to bear the consequences himself.

MR DU TOIT: That is so.

MR VISSER: Please continue.

MR DU TOIT: I was also informed, this is now General Van Der Merwe was told not use the normal procedure and that a mock escape had to be arranged. That had to happen the same evening.

MR VISSER: Excuse me General, I would just like to come back. These are consultation notes. I know that the language you people use, please just explain to us in discussion with head office people who do not know your language would probably mean something else. What do you mean with headquarters?

MR DU TOIT: I think I just said General Van Der Merwe’s office.

MR VISSER: For yourself and security branch, head office was General Van Der Merwe?

MR DU TOIT: Not necessarily.

MR VISSER: But that is what you mean?

MR DU TOIT: Yes.

MR VISSER: Continue.

MR DU TOIT: I was informed that it was arranged with Brigadier Visser of Middelburg to accept the body and to dispose of it and it was also arranged that I would be informed after the mock escape was completed so that I can visit the scene to report on this escape.

MR VISSER: And now you hear this pandemonium that has broken out here. You can just get up and walk away from it, isn’t that true, or can’t you?

MR DU TOIT: One possibly could but in the light of camaraderie that existed at the time and your responsibility, I did not get up.

MR VISSER: And then consequently you say, please continue. You reconciled yourself with the decision that was taken?

MR DU TOIT: In the light of the circumstances that prevailed there and I was fully aware that I was fully aware of.

MR VISSER: Were you also convinced that if you did not act in this manner as was decided that there would be serious problems?

MR DU TOIT: That is so Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Did you see this as a real risk?

MR DU TOIT: I was previously involved with incidents where persons died in detention and I knew what the implications was thereof.

MR VISSER: We’ve heard from General Van Der Merwe and Erasmus that it was a bad time in this particular case because it was so close to Soweto Day and there was already, made many arrangements for mass actions and marches during the year of 1988?

MR DU TOIT: That is so.

MR VISSER: Now General you went to look at Mr Bopape’s body? Is that correct?

MR DU TOIT: That’s correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Where was this body?

MR DU TOIT: The body was if I could recall correctly on the main floor. The corpse was on the ground. It was covered and as far as I can remember with a blanket. He was lying on his side, on his back, as far as I can recall he was on his back, stretched out. He was dressed.

MR VISSER: Did you pick up the blanket to see?

MR DU TOIT: Yes I did.

MR VISSER: Did he have his shoes on?

MR DU TOIT: I cannot recall if he had his shoes on Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Can you remember what clothes he was wearing?

MR DU TOIT: At this stage I cannot recall what clothes he was wearing but he was dressed.

MR VISSER: Did you remove his clothes?

MR DU TOIT: No Chairperson. I did not remove his clothes. I just looked at his face mainly in order for me to realise or to know that he had no apparent marks of torture or assault on him.

MR VISSER: Why did you do that?

MR DU TOIT: It’s been done.

MR VISSER: Why? Why did you want to know whether he had marks on his body?

MR DU TOIT: I cannot say why I did it. I did it. Maybe because I was upset and also a person wanted, as a senior officer to make sure that there weren’t serious bruises to the body.

MR VISSER: If you for example now found that the body did have marks or bruises indicating, for example a broken arm or leg indicating torture. Would that have influenced you to act against these members?

MR DU TOIT: I believe that would have been the case. I think I would have gone back to Brigadier Erasmus and I would have confronted him with that.

MR VISSER: What did you find? How did the body look, as you saw it there?

MR DU TOIT: Chairperson I couldn’t see any signs or bruises on the body.

MR VISSER: Now this is in the evening?

MR DU TOIT: Yes, it’s in the evening.

MR VISSER: Was there electric lights there?

MR DU TOIT: Yes there were.

MR VISSER: So you could clearly see?

MR DU TOIT: That is correct.

MR VISSER: What was expected of you? In this whole scenario, the removal of the body, and the Eastern Transvaal and the mock escape? What was your intention? Or what were you supposed to do?

MR DU TOIT: With regards to the further developments in this case, yes. It was agreed that a mock escape would be arranged by Major Van Niekerk and that they would notify me as soon as it was completed. As in all circumstances I would go out and visit the scene.

MR VISSER: What was the reason for that? Was that practise? That a policeman of your rank would visit the scenes of an escape?

MR DU TOIT: That is correct Chairperson. Detainees according to Section 29 were to us a very serious issue and maybe because of that if anything abnormal happened then a senior officer would go to that scene to learn the facts because he had certain responsibilities and duties to perform. For example to set up a report firstly. To orally and by telephone to report the service officer in head office and then he would notify for example the commissioner, it would depend on circumstances and then also the local divisional commissioner and everybody else who had to know.

MR VISSER: If this escape happened in another division and not in the Witwatersrand department would it also be your duty to make a report?

MR DU TOIT: It was practise that we would also write a report if there was an escape and the escape docket would be done by the detective branch but we would also give our head office the particulars of the escape.

MR VISSER: What I mean is, if the escape happened in Eastern Transvaal, would you as being involved with the Witwatersrand division would you also write a report?

MR DU TOIT: Chairperson, if the person escaped from the detention of members in the Witwatersrand we would write a separate report or it would happen in co-operation with the Eastern Transvaal and then I wouldn’t visit the scene but it would be another senior officer from that specific department.

MR VISSER: Was it also part of your duties to make sure that a dossier was opened and that the local branch of the police where this escape took place be notified or was that someone else’s responsibility?

MR DU TOIT: Chairperson, no it was not my responsibility to open a dossier. It would ours to notify the detective branch and then it would be the responsibility of the relevant personnel to open a docket.

MR VISSER: General, were you part of the planning of the mock escape?

MR DU TOIT: I was not.

MR VISSER: You were informed about how it happened after it happened?

MR DU TOIT: That’s correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: But you were aware of the fact that it would happen, not in the Eastern Transvaal but as understood in the Dias vicinity?

MR DU TOIT: That’s correct Chairperson. The scene and the vehicle from which the escape would have taken place was still in the same position when I visited it and the members did the necessary pointing out to me.

MR VISSER: Later that night, did you receive a phone call in which you were informed that Bopape escaped?

MR DU TOIT: Yes, I received a phone call.

MR VISSER: You realise that the story of the mock escape is now completed and is it afterwards that you went to the scene of where it happened?

MR DU TOIT: That’s correct.

MR VISSER: You said you found the car there. Can you just tell us where it was with regards to Johannesburg, how far away was this from Johannesburg?

MR DU TOIT: It was De Duur. And I’m under correction but I think 30/40 kilometres from Jo’burg.

MR VISSER: Was there a veld there?

MR DU TOIT: It’s bush, it’s open ground.

MR VISSER: In Paragraph 6.9, you said that you contacted the service officer and that you gave him all the information concerning the escape? All I want to ask of you was this, after you went to the scene of the crime or before?

MR DU TOIT: No it was after I went there and I made myself known with the facts.

MR VISSER: Afterwards you participated in making it seem real that the escape took place. Let’s conclude this now. Were you present when the discussions took place to which General Erasmus referred when the father of Stanza Bopape visited John Vorster Square?

MR DU TOIT: Yes I was present.

MR VISSER: And it seems to have been the 21st July 1988?

MR DU TOIT: That is true.

MR VISSER: What I want to ask you is, according to your memory, can you remember that whole issue concerning the escape was discussed with these people. Now was this discussion between you and Erasmus on the one side and the father of Stanza Bopape and his attorneys on the other side?

MR DU TOIT: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: The next day.

CHAIRPERSON: Is this the next day after the discussion or after the mock escape?

MR VISSER: Sorry Mr Chairman. Let’s return to the 13th June, that’s the day on which Bopape would have escaped. Was it Captain Van Niekerk?

MR DU TOIT: No it was Major at that stage.

MR VISSER: Did you ask a memorandum of Major Van Niekerk?

MR DU TOIT: Yes. If I remember correctly. It’s now early hours of the morning after we concluded everything there. I asked Major Van Niekerk to write a memorandum regarding this incident in order to inform head office about what happened.

MR VISSER: And would this be the memorandum which we find in Volume 5 from Page 39?

MR DU TOIT: That is so Chairman.

MR VISSER: And as far as you can remember this memorandum was sent to head office in Pretoria?

MR DU TOIT: That is correct.

MR VISSER: You set out in Paragraph 8 why you decided to participate in this and we spoke about it a little bit and you confirmed that in your case it was also the motivation why you thought it would be the correct thing to do at that stage.

MR DU TOIT: I confirm that.

MR VISSER: Now let’s go to Paragraph 9. Maybe if I can do this, Chairperson it’s a bit out of context. There’s a statement, an affidavit of Volume 3 of a certain Mr Beke Nkosi or Simon Nkosi as he was also known and it’s on Page 652 and may we just sketch the background of the pages that go beforehand.

In his affidavit he said how he was arrested together with Stanza Bopape on the 9th June and how he was detained in Roodepoort Police cells together with Stanza Bopape and how he after Stanza Bopape was removed he was also transported to Johannesburg and then we get to Page 652 on Monday the 13th June and we know Chairperson, if we look at Page 56 at the top, he said that he went to Court and then it was decided not to take him to Court, he was not taken to Court, he was taken back by Syverts and Joe.

And then Paragraph 60 of that document he says that he was questioned regarding a list of names and between 1.45 and 2.15 he was informed that he was going to be detained in terms of Section 29 and then from Paragraph 61 onwards he refers to a police colonel then entered and explained the rights of a Section 29 detainee to me.

And afterwards he was taken to the district surgeon, a doctor Krause in Harrison Road. I want to ask you, can you remember this incident? Do you know about this incident?

MR DU TOIT: Chairperson, yes I can remember this incident. Not very clearly but I can remember.

MR VISSER: Could it have been another police colonel, other than yourself?

MR DU TOIT: No. Chairperson I was the only colonel in that branch at that stage.

MR VISSER: Can you today remember any of the facts regarding this Mr Nkosi?

MR DU TOIT: What I can remember was that he was also involved with the group. The detail I cannot remember.

MR VISSER: Okay. If we can then return to Paragraph 9 of your notes which is "Exhibit R". In Volume 3, on Page 756, an affidavit of a certain Mr John Motomele Mokoleng and he told a long story which I’m not going to repeat, I’m sure it will be handled later. What I would like to know of you is what did you personally have to do with of the allegations concerning this Mokoleng? Could you just tell us about that?

MR DU TOIT: Chairperson, yes. I was involved with that together with Krappies Engelbrecht. It brief, it was concerned with the person who made allegations about graves and if I remember correctly that one of these graves in the Rustenberg vicinity was marked with the name Stanza Bopape.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, for your reference, it’s Page 758, Paragraph 6.13. Which year was this?

MR DU TOIT: If I remember correctly it was 1993.

MR VISSER: And was part of your investigation the exhumation of certain graves and what was the result of this?

MR DU TOIT: It was all negative. Nothing was found except that all these acts were committed at all times in the presence of the media.

MR VISSER: Just quickly tell us, what exactly were these actions?

MR DU TOIT: Chairperson, the people pointed out certain places where these graves would then be and after quite an effort and we went here and there and eventually he pointed out a specific place and we arranged for mechanical spades, the ones you dig holes with and we got hold of that in the afternoon and we started digging in the evening at this place where the graves then would have been and it was pointed out. But we didn’t find anything.

MR VISSER: How many places were pointed out? Places then where there would have been graves?

MR DU TOIT: There was this one place and there was another one at a police station in the Western Transvaal. I think it was Fochville but I’m not 100% sure, it was one of the smaller police stations where he also pointed out and specifically the grounds around the police station and said that people were also buried there.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, the reference to that is at Page 759, Paragraph 6.17 and 6.18 of Volume 3. Before you step away from this, I just want to know one more thing. Can you just give us an image. You go now with mechanical machinery and you start to dig. Would that mean that Mokoleng would say here exactly is a grave and that you only had to dig exactly the size of a grave, you would only dig there and then you would go away or what exactly happened? Did you dig up more than you were pointed out?

MR DU TOIT: I believe we dug holes of about maybe 10 square metres to make sure that there might have been graves.

MR VISSER: You dug up bigger areas than was pointed out?

MR DU TOIT: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Did you find any human remains in any of these places?

MR DU TOIT: No, nothing.

MR VISSER: General Du Toit, I’m going to conclude this evidence in chief. The Chairperson gave us permission yesterday that if we can later think of anything else we could go back to that but I think that the arrangement was now that we present your evidence in chief as well as that of Mr Erasmus and to give Mr Rautenbach the best of opportunities to prepare himself for the cross questioning. To conclude that of General Van Der Merwe and then also to cross question yourself if you wanted to do that.

Then to conclude with regards to the notes you’ve handed in in order to assist the Committee so that everything would not be repeated again. As far as you did not repeat it word for word you can do it now and you confirm the correctness of "Exhibit R"?

MR DU TOIT: That’s correct, I confirm that.

MR VISSER: Would you give me a minute please Chairperson? That will be the end, thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Visser. I see it’s 2 minutes to 11 which is 2 minutes to the document deadline Mr Steenkamp. You haven’t heard anything have you?

MR STEENKAMP: Mr Chairman the documents are on their way. Most probably they will be here in five or six minutes’ time. It’s not because of our delay the documents are not here.

CHAIRPERSON: No I realise that Mr Steenkamp, it’s not your fault at all. Mr Rautenbach you’ll obviously have to have time to peruse those documents to prepare yourself for the cross examination of all three generals who have given evidence and also Mr Prinsloo and Ms Van Der Walt will need time to peruse them to decide whether they have any further questions to put to the generals who have testified.

I’m told that the volumes are fairly voluminous, the papers that are to come, that have been referred to in each of these applications. It would seem that perhaps the way to go at this stage would then be to adjourn for the day now. I’m told by Mr Steenkamp that the documents only arrived from Cape Town late last night at half past ten or something and then copies had to be made and that they should be here at 11.

Hopefully they will be and I’d ask you please if you could wait to get them or make arrangements to get them as soon as possible and then would you be in a position to, it’s difficult for you to say but do you think you may be in a position to commence tomorrow with the cross examination of General Van Der Merwe?

MR RAUTENBACH: Judge I think I will be in a position to start with the cross examination. I can actually take it one step further and say that even if the documents arrive later, I’m still going to do my best to be able to proceed tomorrow morning. So I think at this stage one can accept that the plan will be that I will start tomorrow morning with the cross examination.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, whether you’ve got any further cross examination of General Van Der Merwe but if, I think what we will try to do tomorrow is, well what we will do tomorrow, Mr Prinsloo and Ms Van Der Walt, do you think you’d be in a position to be ready tomorrow? Is that we’d commence the cross examination, the further cross examination of General Van Der Merwe, if indeed there is any arising out of these documents and then after that, with the cross examination of General Erasmus and then General Du Toit.

I don’t know if we’ll complete that tomorrow because tomorrow I have already informed the legal representatives who will be adjourning at lunch time because we have to catch aeroplanes. So unfortunately then at this stage, because of these circumstances we have no option but to adjourn this matter until tomorrow at half past nine. So we adjourn until tomorrow in this hall at half past nine. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Rautenbach, have you had an opportunity to read those documents and are you in a position to put any further questions to Gen Van der Merwe?

MR RAUTENBACH: Yes, Mr Chairman.

JOHAN VELDE VAN DER MERWE: (s.u.o.)

FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR RAUTENBACH: Mr Van der Merwe, I've gone through these documents that forms part of your application and there was a limited time in the light thereof, I would sometimes ask questions that were actually in some instances just to clarify some things and in other instances I would just like to refer you to parts of your testimony, and could you confirm that. And I would like to concentrate on certain items which could be relevant to these specific procedures concerning the Stanza Bopape incident.

The first annexure to your testimony or statement was the application of Gerrit Erasmus and following on was the establishment before the law and that it would come out of the book, the other side of the story.

GEN VAN DER MERWE: That's correct Chairperson.

MR RAUTENBACH: Concerning this submission and the publication that was released, this was written by Gen Staedtler, is that correct?

GEN VAN DER MERWE: That's correct.

MR RAUTENBACH: Am I correct furthermore to say that during the years 80 the general, and the early 90's he was called occasionally in criminal procedures of political activists where he told the Court from the police's side what the ANC was and what they stood for?

GEN VAN DER MERWE: That is correct Chairperson.

MR RAUTENBACH: And then I had a look at Exhibit P46. This was submissions that you made on 21st of October 1996.

GEN VAN DER MERWE: That's correct.

MR RAUTENBACH: May I just ask you General, this submission that you made at that stage, what was the purpose of that submission?

GEN VAN DER MERWE: Chairperson, it was following up on the request that we received from the legal representatives from Brig Jack Cronjé and other members who applied for amnesty at that stage in terms of certain misdeeds that they were guilty of, and I volunteered to give testimony at their hearings in terms of aspects that played a part in the influence of the situation that moved them to do these acts.

MR RAUTENBACH: And this particular submission that you made - and I would just like an explanation, I would just like to ask you, your reference to yourself, to the hand grenades that was tampered with, to have them explode, that's what you referred to and then you referred to Khotso House where the instruction came from Min Vlok who said he received it from PW Botha to destroy Khotso House. Is that correct?

GEN VAN DER MERWE: That's correct Chairperson.

MR RAUTENBACH: And what I would like to know, is there any reason why at this stage nothing was mentioned of Cosatu House and your involvement there?

GEN VAN DER MERWE: Yes Chairperson. There were many other incidents that one could mention, but I just mentioned a few just to illustrate that we were involved with irregular deeds.

MR RAUTENBACH: And then General I would just like to take you to the testimony that you submitted. The page number that I have before me in the bundle that I have is pg 81. That would be it seems to be the first part of your testimony. This was during the Cronjé amnesty application. On pg 81 the following you said, and why I ask it of you: it's once again a translation. What you said in Afrikaans was translated into English and at this stage I would just like to read sections of it to you.

CHAIRPERSON: ...[indistinct] 81.

MR VISSER: I was just wondering whether that's -I think it refers to Exhibit P45. I'm not sure. His evidence.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, it's the evidence at ...[indistinct] application, page 81.

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman, thank you.

MR RAUTENBACH: The paragraph that I would like to refer to you is the following: I would just like to read it to you and I'd like to hear if you want to confirm this. We speak of persons when we refer to divisional commanders, among others Gen Erasmus.

Can you confirm this? If you confirm this, do you want to add anything to it? You have the right to do so.

GEN VAN DER MERWE: No Chairperson, I confirm it and I have nothing to add to it.

MR RAUTENBACH: And then I would like to refer to pg 87, the answer with reference to a question which was put to you by Mr Du Plessis. The question was:

And your answer was:

And just not to let circumstances influence the members, do you confirm what you said there in terms of the instructions that were given by the State Security Council?

GEN VAN DER MERWE: Yes Chairperson. There is also testimony that was given that the general policy was as far as it is action against terrorists outside the country, we were bound to what happened in the country. But in terms of what happened in the country yes, I confirm it.

MR RAUTENBACH: And then you were asked by Du Plessis, and that's on pg 91, and the following you said:

Your answer was

Could you just confirm?

GEN VAN DER MERWE: Yes, that is correct. But once again we have to read it with what I had explained, that there was confusion amongst the people, that there was a grey area. There were certain perceptions, and there I deal with the factual situation. I do not deal with the subjective situation.

MR RAUTENBACH: If we could just stop a moment here, it seems to me if you can agree with me what you are actually saying, you say without there being instructions forthcoming from the government and without instructions coming from the Commissioner of Police, the perception was there by your divisional commanders - I'm speaking of persons in the position of Gen Erasmus - divisional commanders, that these divisional commanders as with members at grass roots level there was a perception that caused them to act as they did?

GEN VAN DER MERWE: Chairperson yes, let's just distinguish here. There was of course several instances that were irregular. And during that trial I put it, that's why I referred to examples of the hand grenades where the Minister was involved himself; he gave his approval of such an irregular incident. I explained the Khotso House where it was told to me the State President gave his approval for that. And in certain instances from the government side it was expected from members to act irregular, that was clear. And at that opportunity I explained you had to look at the common person who was exposed to gruesome incidents where in those circumstances he had to try to fight against a majority and he had to act super-humanly to protect people. There was no doubt there, what did the government expect of him and in those circumstances what is expected of him to do his duty and to protect people's lives. So surrounding this there were perceptions that if the government in the one instance expect me to act in this manner then we would think that there were other circumstances that would be expected of him, to use my own initiative where I am confronted with a certain situation and how I have to deal with it.

MR RAUTENBACH: Then many of these actions which were irregular were done that there was no permission, if it was expressive or published, but because of the fact that certain instructions were given by the government to act unlawfully, that you say that people had the perception that they could act accordingly?

GEN VAN DER MERWE: That's correct Chairperson.

MR RAUTENBACH: On pg 110 - I'm not going to read the whole answer to you, just at the bottom you were asked over a specific incident and then you give a general answer at the bottom of the page. In general you say:

GEN VAN DER MERWE: That's correct Chairperson.

MR RAUTENBACH: Then there was testimony - that's on pg 309 it seems to me - yes, this was a continuation of those procedures that took place there on the 27th of February, can I just ask you the following. This is pg 309. I'll just place it in context for you. I would like to put the question to you as well; it was a question put to you by Brian Caledon and the question was:

And your answer was:

Would you like to add anything or confirm it?

GEN VAN DER MERWE: Yes, except for I have to put it pertinently that as far as there - I spoke in general, meaning that I just sketched the exception for you, where there was permission given from the government in unlawful acts. That's why I mentioned the hand grenade incident. Because one has to deal here with a paradox if you look at all the facts here. Because as you know in the case of the hand grenade incidents people did die, and it was with the permission of the government. What I wanted to illustrate there was not a general policy, and there was no general approval that people could act and kill people as they wished.

MR RAUTENBACH: With reference to - I made a note here, and before I ask any questions here - these attacks that were carried out by the security branches, let's speak about the security branch of the Police. It was done to seem as if it was the attack that was carried out by the ANC. Was this on buildings, aimed at buildings, hand grenades from eastern origin? Can you just briefly tell us before I ask the question. I do not know if I want to continue then, I just want to find out.

GEN VAN DER MERWE: Chairperson, I was not involved personally there but there is an amnesty application from members who were involved there, who were connected to the security branch. I know of that. And going on that application, I accept that at high level there was approval for that.

MR RAUTENBACH: General, maybe could you help me: the person of KwaNdebele, the minister who died in a car bomb, do you remember his name? From KwaNdebele?

GEN VAN DER MERWE: Yes, it was Mr Peter Ntuli.

MR RAUTENBACH: In that case, wasn't it in this case according to your evidence where the car bomb was planted by Brig Cronjé and the next day even the ANC denied responsibility for that act. So there was confusion created about who was responsible for the death of people.

GEN VAN DER MERWE: Sorry Chairperson, you mean the ANC accepted responsibility for that?

MR RAUTENBACH: Yes, that's correct. Then I must just ask you, you refer to within the country and outside the country. And it was outside the country, it was not necessary to receive an instruction from the State Security or the government before you can launch an attack. Is that the way I understood it?

GEN VAN DER MERWE: Yes, that's correct.

MR RAUTENBACH: But when you talk about abroad it also includes the former home countries, for example Venda, the Transkei, the so-called TBV states. Is that correct?

GEN VAN DER MERWE: No. They were never really considered as abroad. I'm talking about the neighbouring countries, independent states. And they were also seen as part of South Africa, the homelands, that is.

MR RAUTENBACH: I'll just like to read you something from the record, and maybe there's a misunderstanding. It's pg 329. (Indistinct).

Your answer was

And then the next question:

And your answer was:

GEN VAN DER MERWE: Chairperson, I just contradicted myself because it was actually the case. They were seen as part of South Africa from the point of view from the Police in so much as the governments treated them as independently and they were treated according to the normal diplomatic handling and treated as independent states and seen in that manner.

MR RAUTENBACH: But it would seem from the records, and I'm specifically speaking about (inaudible).

GEN VAN DER MERWE: Yes Chairperson.

MR RAUTENBACH: Then I'd just like to ask you, and it's on pg 26, the so-called - let me just have a look - during those proceedings, pg 26 thereof. The following was mentioned. There was a discussion of what would by meant with elimination. Maybe I'll put the whole question in context, that might make it easier:

Your answer here was:

Before you go any further, before you answer this: what you just said here during these proceedings, did that have to do with a specific document, or was it a general situation it was referring to?

GEN VAN DER MERWE: No Chairperson, it was dealing with a specific document of the notices of the State Security Council.

MR RAUTENBACH: Regarding that I'm not going to take this any further.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Rautenbach.

Mr Prinsloo, do you have any questions arising out of this new documentation that was made available yesterday?

MR PRINSLOO: ...[intervention]

GEN VAN DER MERWE: Chairperson, can I just interrupt you? Before he concludes his questioning; yesterday according to a question of Rautenbach I found a letter written to the Department of Foreign Affairs where it was concerned with the proceedings followed before 1990 and I said I didn't know what it was about. At that stage I just forgot.

I would just like to mention this because he might want to ask questions about it with your permission. Can I just refer you, Volume 5, pg 29 - sorry, pg 30 Chairperson. The last paragraph where it's written as far as it concerns the facts around the investigation of Amnesty International it could not be handled in the same manner as before February 1990. So before February 1990 Chairperson - I only realised this later - we did not answer any inquiries from Amnesty International. We got thousands of inquiries because it was their policy to send names of lists of all the countries of people and lists of detainees and then they sent us letters in order to inquire and it was the general policy before February 1990 that we would not react to that. So that was the difference that came into play. But after February 1990 we did start to answer inquiries.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Prinsloo?

MR PRINSLOO: Thank you Mr Chairman. I have no questions pertaining to the new document Mr Chairman. I do have questions pertaining to an issue which stood over, which I informed the Committee about.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, that is the one where you wanted to receive further instructions from Mr Zeelie. Is that correct?

MR PRINSLOO: That's correct Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR PRINSLOO: General, I received an instruction from Mr Zeelie and his firm Rooth & Wessels, Meyer & Rossouw and it's with regards to Mr Zeelie's application and specifically referring to the Khotso House issue.

And I would just put it to you as follows that according to Mr Zeelie he and Gen Erasmus and a certain Nonnie Beyers who was also a member of the South African Police came to your office here in Pretoria because of one instruction by Gen Erasmus and Gen Erasmus spoke to you in your office whilst Zeelie and Nonnie waited outside. Do you know of such an incident?

Maybe I can give you more information. After the discussions were held with you Gen Erasmus together with Beyers and Mr Zeelie went to Springstof Head Office. Do you know about this?

GEN VAN DER MERWE: Chairperson, I cannot remember this incident. In my amnesty application I would have made mention members confronted me because of the fact that over a period of time I had several thousands of these kinds of interviews and I cannot remember the specific incident.

MR PRINSLOO: I want to be reasonable, but specifically to do with the Khotso House incident.

GEN VAN DER MERWE: No Chairperson, I cannot remember that.

MR PRINSLOO: Afterwards Gen Erasmus - and I put it to you that Gen Erasmus, Nonnie Beyers as well as Mr Zeelie went to Explosives Head Office and there discussions were held with Col Hattingh and also Maj Hammond and Hennie Kotze who was involved with Explosives Head Office.

GEN VAN DER MERWE: No Chairperson, I cannot remember that.

MR PRINSLOO: And then instruction was given to Hammond as well as Kotze and also Mr Zeelie to be involved with the blowing up of Khotso House.

GEN VAN DER MERWE: Instruction by who Chairperson?

MR PRINSLOO: It was given by Gen Erasmus.

GEN VAN DER MERWE: Chairperson, if it's the intent that it's relevant to the blowing up of Khotso House which happened, then honestly I can tell you that it did not happen in such a fashion. My instruction on the specific incident - maybe this is another incident we're talking about here - but in that specific incident which I mentioned here I received the instruction from Mr Vlok. I gave the instruction to Brig Schoon and I told Gen Erasmus that we want him to help us to gain access and Brig Schoon and his team took further steps. Except if you're talking about a completely different incident now. But as far as this incident and the one I mentioned, it did not happen in this fashion.

MR PRINSLOO: There was also a gathering at a certain security house in Honeydew, Johannesburg where Maj Hammond, Kotze, Gen Erasmus and also Zeelie were present. Do you know anything about that? Do you know something about that General?

GEN VAN DER MERWE: Chairperson, may I just ask: what's the purpose of this question? Do you mean it's relevant to the incident where Khotso House was blown up as we mention it in our evidence before this Committee and other Committees? Do you mean this was leading to that incident?

MR PRINSLOO: That's correct.

GEN VAN DER MERWE: No. I have no knowledge like that and it doesn't work, because Brig Schoon and me gave evidence that as far as that incident was concerned I gave my instruction to Brig Schoon and afterwards I told Gen Erasmus that Brig Schoon would contact him and the necessary tapes would be taken by head office.

CHAIRPERSON: This Committee won't be making any findings in regard to the Khotso House incident. I mean we're not going to delve into that, so I don't know what the relevance is of this detail as to what happened prior to the blowing up of Khotso House is in this matter.

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Chairman, this evidence was introduced by the general, and in view of the fact that Mr Zeelie is an applicant in that matter, and he disputes the facts as it's put across by the general, and for that reason I'm just putting that in fairness to the general in view of the fact that Mr Zeelie will testify to this in a later application. Otherwise we accept that he agrees to it, and that's not the case Mr Chairman. That's the only reason.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I think (indistinct).

MR PRINSLOO: I'll just put it short on then.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR PRINSLOO: I'll do that Mr Chairman. Further general, shortly, it is so that Eugene de Kock was not responsible for the explosion. Adjutants Hennie Kotze, Hammond and Zeelie took the explosive into Khotso House and it was placed in the lift and Kotze as well as Hammond was responsible to trigger the explosion.

GEN VAN DER MERWE: Chairperson, no. As far as the execution of that is concerned I do not know. I gave an instruction to Brig Schoon and afterwards he made all the necessary arrangements in accordance with Gen Erasmus, but I cannot say what happened. I cannot give evidence.

MR PRINSLOO: I'm not going to take this any further Mr Chairman. Afterwards Vlakplaas was involved and specifically Eugene de Kock.

GEN VAN DER MERWE: Chairperson, I cannot give evidence as far as the unsuccessful attempt; I carry no knowledge of that. But what I do know about is the successful attempt.

MR PRINSLOO: Thank you Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Miss van der Walt, do you have any questions to put to the witness?

MS VAN DER WALT: No questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, do you have any re-examination?

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Chairperson, there are three aspects, with your leave.

Gen Van der Merwe, this morning you said you contradicted yourself because you firstly answered that the neighbouring states, the independent states, TBVC states was not seen as other international states, if I can call it that. As far as purposes concerning foreign behaviours from other countries. Then my Learned Friend pointed out your evidence where in answer to Judge Ngoepe you answered the questions. I just want to ask you this: and this now concerns the point of view you are holding. But the whole question of foreign actions, how were they seen and how were they handled by the State Security Council? Was it an affair whereby the police was involved or was it the army, South African Defence?

GEN VAN DER MERWE: Chairperson, where it included a military action it was the responsibility of the armed forces. And they only used the information that the security branch obtained. As far as investigations are concerned and movements within the neighbouring states, there the security police was present.

MR VISSER: The fact of the matter general, is that the South African law was applicable in the so-called independent states within South Africa. Is that not true?

CHAIRPERSON: Well, I don't know.

MR VISSER: Am I wrong?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. There was certain of the legislation or much of the legislation that applied in South Africa before 1976 applied in the TBVC states after that, but it was considered to be those states' own legislation and the amendment of such legislation didn't go in tandem between the RSA and the TBVC states. So... [intervention]

MR VISSER: Perhaps I should ask the question slightly on a different basis Mr Chairman.

JUDGE NGCOBO: Sorry, let me just ask: General Van der Merwe, isn't the position this, that in so far as the security branch was concerned and the police in general, they did not regard these states, Venda, Bophuthatswana, Transkei and Ciskei as independent? As separate from South Africa; they could just go in and out of those countries. Is that right?

GEN VAN DER MERWE: That is correct Chairperson. In practice that's the way it happened.

JUDGE NGCOBO: Whereas in so far as the State security council was concerned it treated them as foreign states.

GEN VAN DER MERWE: That is correct Chairperson.

JUDGE NGCOBO: That's how I read your evidence here at pg 329. That's what you make, yes.

MR VISSER: Well Mr Chairman, I'll have to share my fees with Justice Ngcobo because he managed to take care of that point far more efficiently than I was able to do. Thank you. Then there's another aspect. And this was apparent from your previous cross-questioning when it was put to you that there was a strong possibility that the reason why the members of the security police at John Vorster Square, it was decided by them to dispose of Bopape's body was because it was in such a state that it would have caused embarrassment for the government.

The first question I would like to ask you is when you and Gen Erasmus - this is a Sunday afternoon, when you were in your house in Pretoria, when you made the decision, were you aware of such a state of affairs, that the body could have been in such a state or situation that it could have caused embarrassment if it was known?

GEN VAN DER MERWE: Yes Chairperson, that was the decisive factor. That electric shocks were applied and that if an inquest were to follow, it could have been the spark that would lead to the explosion of the whole situation within the country. But as I've already emphasised I had no reason at all to think at that stage that the body could have been in such a state that that would have been the reason why there would have been an embarrassment. So that per se, the possibility of a maimed body did not play a role when you made your decision, definitely not.

MR VISSER: And to refer again to this last aspect, you were asked why you did not try to determine what the exact facts were with regards specifically to the state of the body before you made the decision on that Sunday afternoon. You then said that you believed what Erasmus told you. But what I would like to ask you is would it have made any difference to your decision or the position you found yourself in on that Sunday afternoon whatever the situation was concerning the body?

GEN VAN DER MERWE: No Chairperson, it wouldn't have. As I have already emphasised, I had no reason to think that the version of Gen Erasmus was incorrect.

MR VISSER: General, in Exhibit N for Nellie, para 1.5.2 where you referred to the 9th of February 1997 - that's your evidence - I believe it should read Chairperson, it should be the 27th of February, not the 9th. That's Exhibit N. I have no further questions, thank you Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I'll ask if there's anything, thanks.

MR MOLOI: Thank you Mr Chairman, just one or two points I would just like to clear with the general. General, (indistinct) is that it was of utmost importance that the disposal of the body of Bopape be done as effectively as possible and that it should be ensured that it would not be discovered afterwards. Am I correct?

GEN VAN DER MERWE: That's correct Chairperson.

MR MOLOI: Neither you as the head of the security department nor any other officer involved in this cover-up, bothered at any stage to verify the fact that the body was effectively disposed of. Am I correct?

GEN VAN DER MERWE: That's correct Chairperson.

MR MOLOI: Why is that so, in view of the importance, everyone understandably attached to the effective disposal of the body?

GEN VAN DER MERWE: Chairperson, I've already testified that I was convinced that Gen Erasmus and members of the security branch who every day were confronted with very difficult situations, could deal with this necessarily using their own initiative, that they had dealt very well with delicate situations and had the necessary initiative. And from experience I know that the most dangerous thing one can do after one has dealt with such a delicate situation was to afterwards inquire about it, because firstly that in itself creates a larger risk. And the fact of the matter was that afterwards you could not do anything to the matter to change anything. One could not, if afterwards you were not happy with what was done, take any steps to put it right because that would indeed worsen the situation and would not make it any better. So therefore, after I gave Gen Erasmus the instruction to continue with the decision that we had taken, I handled it normally and my instruction to him and all the other persons that this incident had to be dealt with along the normal way to maintain the smokescreen; or my instruction was to him that I did not contact with anyone else.

MR MOLOI: Which situation would be aggravated by inquiries? Because I would like to believe that any inquiries would relate to the people already involved in the cover-up. From Gen Erasmus, up to the person who actually disposed of the body, they were already involved anyway. How would that really create a further problem? That's if you followed up and wanted to ensure that the body has been effectively disposed of?

GEN VAN DER MERWE: Chairperson, I did not know who Gen Erasmus, except for Brig Visser would involve. And secondly it would not make any sense to find out afterwards if this whole issue was dealt with effectively because I would not be able to correct it. And along with that, the moment one inquires about it, you had to liaise with other people and there was always the risk that during those liaison processes, information that you could cover up, during that process could be found out and if one could go back to look at the normal procedures in so far as the normal crimes, the biggest fault that most criminals do was to go back and to find out if everything was secure.

And most cases that was one of the largest factors that led to that how we found the person, because he went back to the incident, or in some or other manner wanted to inquire about the incident and therefore it was a dangerous thing to do.

MR MOLOI: Correct me if I'm wrong. I understood your evidence to be that you and Gen Erasmus decided that the body be disposed of at a point near a border with the RSA as one of the means towards ensuring that it would not be discovered. Am I correct?

GEN VAN DER MERWE: No Chairperson. We considered it as a possibility but I put it to Gen Erasmus for practical reasons they had to decide, that is indeed so; that was just as dangerous to sit in an office and decide. And the people who had to execute these decisions had to comply with the decision instead of giving them the opportunity where they knew the circumstances on grass roots level better than we did; to use their own initiative.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, I think what Mr Moloi is referring to was during your testimony it was said that it was decided to involve Mr Visser because Gauteng was a highly populated area and the body should be disposed of far away. And when that was being said, it was mentioned somewhere towards the borders or near a place which had a border with another country.

GEN VAN DER MERWE: That's correct Chairperson, but the idea was - it was just a possibility. At that stage the intention was not that it was an absolute decision that we had to execute, but we thought it would be better. But obviously the practical execution was left to them, and it was just a possibility mentioned by us.

MR MOLOI: Does that mean then that the fact that Van Loggerenberg, who was not involved in that discussion of where the body should be disposed of, who had no instructions whatsoever from whosoever as to where to dispose of the body, was it then a sheer coincidence that he eventually thought of a border between the Republic and Mozambique?

GEN VAN DER MERWE: Yes Chairperson, as far as I'm concerned, yes. There was no instruction in that sense given to use this determined method that Capt Van Loggerenberg used. This possibility that indeed happened, we did not consider this. The idea was just that the only consideration that we gave was to take it from a highly populated area but how, and in which manner and other considerations we left to those persons who were involved with this and had to execute it.

MR MOLOI: I have no further questions, thank you Mr Chairman.

JUDGE NGCOBO: I just want to make a follow-up on the suspect Gen Van der Merwe. As I understand the position the possibility of disposing of the body near the border was merely discussed as one of the options.

GEN VAN DER MERWE: That's correct Chairperson.

JUDGE NGCOBO: Did it occur to you perhaps and Gen Erasmus that - it suggested itself as being a viable option?

GEN VAN DER MERWE: That's correct Chairperson.

JUDGE NGCOBO: And did you perhaps expect that Gen Erasmus for example, when discussing the final details of the disposal would raise this possibility with the members?

GEN VAN DER MERWE: That's correct Chairperson.

JUDGE NGCOBO: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr De Jager, do you have any questions of the witness?

ADV DE JAGER: No thanks.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Adv Gcabashe, do you have any questions?

ADV GCABASHE: General, again on the same point, what was some of the other (indistinct) discussed with Gen Erasmus apart from the disposal in this manner?

GEN VAN DER MERWE: Chairperson, I suggested that they consider that they escape to (indistinct). We did not go into the finer details, but just as a possibility that had to be considered. But I pertinently put to Gen Erasmus I did not want to give the members who had to deal with this incident; I did not want to prescribe to them. I left it to them. I knew from experience that were one sits in an office to arrange something like that and you did not know all the circumstances at grass roots level, things could go wrong.

ADV GCABASHE: On a slightly different aspect general, it's correct that there are very many - there were then and today there are very many honest policemen, ordinary policemen who didn't flout the rules that were set by the SAP.

GEN VAN DER MERWE: Chairperson, I would like to put it in this manner in all reasonability if you would grant me: I would not say for one moment that the people who were involved here were not honest police persons. As we have repeatedly said, they were in a position that was far worse than a war situation and they were put into a situation where they from their side had to comply with super-human demands. And there were other police officers who were fortunate not to find themselves in the same circumstances and were not guilty of the same acts.

ADV GCABASHE: But when one looks at those policemen who were not guilty of the same types of acts, would you say those were in the majority or the minority, in the time that you were the Commissioner?

GEN VAN DER MERWE: Chairperson, obviously the security branch was in the minority. So the majority of the members were not necessarily involved with the situation.

ADV GCABASHE: And yet you are saying from what I understand you to say, these policemen cannot be regarded as role policemen who were not promoting the interest of their employer; the policemen who acted in this manner, such as the ones before us.

GEN VAN DER MERWE: No, definitely not Chairperson. In this whole incident if they had a choice, then everybody would have chosen not to have dealt with such a situation. But unfortunately they were put in that situation and we expected of them to comply with certain demands and we expected of them - exactly this other person who was in this fortunate position that he did - to protect this person from these deeds we expected from them to do the impossible. So definitely not. And therefore I can also say myself and the three Commissioners who preceded me, we accepted moral accountability in respect of all those deeds that were committed in the conflict of the past and where the members bona fide believed that they did it to oppose the struggle.

ADV GCABASHE: (Indistinct) of being from a fairly conservative background as many of the policemen who testified before us, have said they have been, from conservative, NP backgrounds and having very many of you join the force at a fairly young age; to what extent, considering the social influences that you assimilated, what you had become because of what you learnt from childhood. To what extent might those have superseded the task that you were supposed to execute, that of promoting law and order and acting within the rules and regulations and acting in the interests of your employer, the State? To what extent would you say that might have possibly superseded these other imperatives?

GEN VAN DER MERWE: Chairperson, I think in this sense it played a role. It was from the beginning the objectives of the National Party who was the government of the day at that time, to reconcile ourselves with it. And I would like to mention it, as I've already testified, for all practical purposes, we were loyal to the party and the party's interests in many instances was the motivation. In that sense it did play an important role.

ADV GCABASHE: But you are essentially saying that personal malice or ill will stemming from that background of conservativeness - I'll just use that word - would not have played a major factor?

GEN VAN DER MERWE: No Chairperson. Our relationship with Black people - or let me put it in this manner: members of other races was excellent. And even today from several Black persons I receive letters and wherever I move I can give you the reassurance in my career it did not matter to me if my colleagues were Black or white. Indeed Black colleagues were in very difficult situations and they assisted us in the struggle. And reason why, in the one instance I was involved with the hand grenade incident was to protect Black members and their families. It was not for personal gain and it did not concern the interests of a certain population group. And I think all the members, all the Black members who served with me would confirm this.

ADV GCABASHE: One final aspect. The decision you took to withhold this information from the then Min Vlok; now I'm looking at that in the context of a fairly close relationship you had with him. I read that in one of the submissions that you made. How often did you do this type of thing? Withhold information from him, concerning a fairly major decision that he ought to know about?

GEN VAN DER MERWE: Chairperson, it was always the realisation or the understanding that any instance we would give this to Mr Vlok where he was not involved himself; that it could heighten his vulnerability as a Minister. We have to realise that our approach was throughout to protect him and his interest and the interest of the National Party. And in every instance the consideration would have been what was in his best interest when a certain situation arose, to inform him of it; does this help with his situation or would this place his interest at a disadvantage?

ADV GCABASHE: At the risk of repeating myself, I'm not sure that I got a sense of how often you might have had to do this type of thing.

GEN VAN DER MERWE: Chairperson, I cannot now mention incidents, but that was the principle that we dealt along. At this stage there were probably other incidents that we did not inform Mr Vlok of, but at this time I cannot give you a specific incident.

ADV GCABASHE: (Indistinct) essentially amount to an abrogation of the State's power to yourselves. I'm looking at your particular unit; the security branch of the Police. So that you in fact are the ones who are making major decisions, rather than informing the people who the electorate at the time had elected, on particular aspects that were important to the State, and allowing them to guide you. Aren't you then saying essentially that you became the people who took over; and this kept the politicians in the dark on very material issues?

GEN VAN DER MERWE: Chairperson no, not at all. I think each case would be judged according to its own merits and there was no question of that, that we were authority on our own. All the time we acted in such a fashion that in each case we looked at what was to the interest of the government and the public order and our specific duties. And I'm not aware in this regard the situation ever existed that what we did could not be reconciled with the guidance we received from the Minister and the government.

CHAIRPERSON: Judge Ngcobo, do you have any questions to ask the witness?

JUDGE NGCOBO: The matters affecting the workings of the security branch, you've repeatedly mentioned that the members of the security branch could not have been under any illusion that the State would condone their illegal behaviour in their dealings with the detainees.

GEN VAN DER MERWE: That is correct Chairperson.

JUDGE NGCOBO: We've had evidence from some of those members, notable Mr Van Niekerk and Mr Mostert I think it is whose evidence suggest that there appears to have been a practice within the security branch to use torture to get information which was considered crucial by the security branch. Do you accept that?

GEN VAN DER MERWE: Chairperson, I must concede that our people worked in abnormal situations, very difficult situations and as far as I was concerned I told you that there was a definite policy. But immediately I want to concede that at this stage I cannot tell you that in the minds of these members there might not have been a specific perception which was born out of all these circumstances.

The policy was very clear. And me personally never doubted that each member who attacked a person knew that the was doing wrong. It was against the policy. But on the other hand, if you ask me now even despite all of that it's expected of him, if necessary, and things went wrong to pay the price which was attached to his kind of behaviour and he was unwilling to do so, then I must say yes, definitely. Or he was willing to do so. In other words these members would have known that they were doing wrong; that they're taking a risk.

But the possibility that despite of that a perception was in their minds that it was still expected of me to do this. And there'll be silent comprehension of this, and maybe even approval. But the people cannot protect me, because this is the price I've got to pay in this struggle to maintain the smokescreen. And then yes, it could be the case.

JUDGE NGCOBO: Take for example the case of Mr Zeelie for example who was called to head office and was involved what I gather from you and from what Mr Prinsloo has put to you, in the bombing of or putting explosives in the lifts, was it in the Khotso House I think it was? This is a planning of what appears to be on your own terms an act of terrorism which has been planned at high government level with a junior officer. I mean what would that create in the mind of that officer? I mean surely it must create the impression that one could overstep the limit. There will be protection. Because after all from what you have told us, you were fighting an onslaught. I mean isn't it fair to these other members to accept that they may well have believed that you condoned those matters?

GEN VAN DER MERWE: Chairperson, in the case of Mr Zeelie it might not be a good example, but there are many other examples. But there are several other examples where it necessarily caused this perception with certain members. Yes, I concede to that.

CHAIRPERSON: Are with the use of this shocking device on the deceased, we're not dealing with constables here; I mean there were commissioned officers involved in the use of that and they knew well, we haven't got a device here at John Vorster Square but there is one at Sandton. Fairly common knowledge, and then it's used in the passage. So it didn't appear to be confined to just the lower ranks; it was fairly general practice.

GEN VAN DER MERWE: That is correct Chairperson.

JUDGE NGCOBO: You know, despite your assertion that you didn't condone their conduct, nevertheless you did nothing to convey your displeasures to those members, that I am doing this not because I'm condoning your conduct, but simply because I want to save the government the embarrassment. You never said anything of this sort, so as to warn them that this is not going to be tolerated.

GEN VAN DER MERWE: Chairperson, I must say according to Gen Erasmus it was quite clear that these members were very upset. I've already mentioned that in my mind I had no doubt that they learnt a very previous lesson, but at that stage I didn't think there would be any point to, in any circumstances when these members were really aware of the fact that that created a great embarrassment, there would be no point for me in going further and telling them not to do it again. So yes, on the one hand. But on the other hand I believed that these members realised that they acted incorrectly.

JUDGE NGCOBO: When did the Khotso House bombing occur? Do you know? The Khotso House?

GEN VAN DER MERWE: Khotso House, it was during August 1988. It was after this incident Chairperson. This incident happened on the 12th of June 1988 and the blowing up of Khotso House was in August, after that. Also during 1988.

JUDGE NGCOBO: If you look at, I mean shortly after Zeelie had been involved in this incident, he is now being called upon to get involved in an illegal act which is now planned by the government. I mean surely if it is true that it followed the Bopape killing, I mean surely in his mind it must have created the impression what we did with Mr Bopape must have been in accordance with the government policy. No-one is reprimanding me. But far from that I'm being asked to carry out yet another (indistinct).

GEN VAN DER MERWE: Chairperson, I explained and again I concede, I know it's a paradox and it's a contradiction. It's a very difficult situation but there were very clear instructions, and those instructions during inspections and other circumstances which prevailed then was applied in such a fashion that members realised that the actions are not condoned; that they could have deduced that there was silent approval if you look at the circumstances like Mr Ngcobo mentioned; that's true. But on the other hand any member - and this was always the approach - any member would have known that he could not expect to be protected if he made himself guilty of these unlawful acts.

JUDGE NGCOBO: Now in regard to - I gather that you did not inform either the Commissioner at the time or the Minister of Law and Order then of the true facts.

GEN VAN DER MERWE: That is correct Chairperson.

JUDGE NGCOBO: Now why is that so? I mean shouldn't this be the people who shouldn't know more about what had happened so that they can take a decision really?

GEN VAN DER MERWE: Chairperson, as I've already explained: firstly I was confronted with the situation. You must remember I was head of the security branch and the head security adviser and Gen Erasmus was head of the most important - and I think the burning point in South Africa - and we would have placed him in an impossible situation. They would not have had any other choice to comply with what we did. It would have been disadvantageous to them and it would have made them vulnerable and we would have used them as a rubber stamp and it would have been unethical. And because of that reason I took the decision on my own. And in all honesty I believed that it was in the best interest of the Minister and the government and the whole situation.

JUDGE NGCOBO: Why would it be in the best interest of the Minister not to know the true facts? Was this perhaps an attempt to provide him with a plausible deniability?

GEN VAN DER MERWE: No Chairperson; the moment the Minister became involved he would have necessarily - let's just look at what would have happened in the practice if I decided to approach the Minister. Would he have been able to handle this on his own? Wouldn't it have been put to him that he should advise the President and the President would have approached the State security council.

Where would all of this have ended? The Minister had no more capacity in order to decide about this issue than me. I was responsible for the maintaining of law and order. The Minister was purely the political head. So his capacities were more restricted. Even if we looked at his capacities, it was much more restricted than mine. So the Minister by knowing about this, could not have attributed to improve the situation as far as I'm concerned. But if I asked him to help with this, in order to maintain the smokescreen he would have had to answer questions to Parliament and he would have made himself guilty of telling untruths. And right through the whole issue he would have followed the same behaviour we did, and for him and the government it could have been very dangerous. You must remember that we were willing to do this in the interest of that which we tried to achieve, which was public order. Something we considered very heavily at that stage. And also to protect the interest of the government. And if the Minister himself would have become involved it would have meant that those interests we wanted to protect, we would have jeopardised them.

JUDGE NGCOBO: Thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Judge Ngcobo. Mr Visser, do you have any questions arising out of questions that have been put by the panel to Gen Van der Merwe?

MR VISSER: Yes please Mr Chairman.

FURTHER EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: General, Adv Gcabashe asked you a question and the way I wrote it down, it comes down to

Now I'm not sure I understand the question, but I think we've got to clarify this question. In the first place, looking at your backgrounds and your conservative milieu in which you were brought up as you explained, was there any malice or ill feeling because of that which you can make relevant to Mr Bopape's death?

CHAIRPERSON: (Indistinct) the question by Adv Gcabashe. Her question put to the general was: your conservative background that was explained together with other witnesses here; did that play a role? Yes, and the answer was by the general it did play an important role. And then she followed that up and said so it wasn't maliciousness. I don't think she suggested or put it directly that there was personal maliciousness involved. So indirectly - you can ask the question.

MR VISSER: I hear what you say Mr Chairman, and thank you for seeing it in that way. May I just ask the last question, just for the record's sake to make this absolutely clear?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes certainly. Yes, he can answer that question. I'm not stopping that.

MR VISSER: Simply the question is this: was there any malice or ill feeling which was directed to Mr Bopape and which influenced the decision you took on that day.

GEN VAN DER MERWE: Chairperson no, not as far as it was concerns of Mr Bopape and not in general either. It never, ever played a role.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Prinsloo, do you have any questions arising out of questions put by the panel?

MR PRINSLOO: No thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. And Miss van der Walt?

MR VAN DER WALT: No questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Rautenbach?

MR RAUTENBACH: No questions.

CHAIRPERSON: I see that it's now eleven o'clock. We'll take the tea adjournment. Thank you Gen Van der Merwe, you may stand down. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. We will now then proceed with the cross-examination of General Erasmus. Mr Prinsloo, do you have anything?

CHAIRPERSON: General, may I remind you you are still under your former oath.

GEN GERRIT NICHOLAS ERASMUS: (s.u.o.)

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR PRINSLOO: General Erasmus, you heard your colleague, Gen Van der Merwe testified that it was expected of the members to inform the impossible.

GEN ERASMUS: It is absolutely so Chairperson.

MR PRINSLOO: And these members, specifically where you were settled in the Witwatersrand, was the place where there were the most acts of terror and the most incidents and it was a difficult task that they had to perform.

GEN ERASMUS: Yes. These persons, I could say the persons who served under me in the Witwatersrand had to work day and night to (speaker's microphone not on).

MR PRINSLOO: General, there were many instances in your area and specifically where Col Van Niekerk served under you who was a commander there who was responsible for the investigation units.

GEN ERASMUS: That's correct Chairperson.

MR PRINSLOO: What was the standard of the work that Col Van Niekerk performed?

GEN ERASMUS: Col Van Niekerk was an excellent police officer and he was a highly acclaimed officer with the Attorney General.

MR PRINSLOO: And Capt Zeelie also served there?

GEN ERASMUS: That is so Chairperson.

MR PRINSLOO: What was the standard of his work, were you satisfied with it?

GEN ERASMUS: Mr Zeelie was more involved with the explosions and that type of thing, and the was a - he knew what to do there. And as far as Col Van Niekerk was concerned there were many instances where it was required that there had to be a solution.

MR PRINSLOO: If one looks at Helena Pastoors who was vested in your area, who was involved with many instances and was an important participant in the ANC.

GEN ERASMUS: That is so; I was personally involved with the Pastoors/De Jonge incident and it was a difficult investigation.

MR PRINSLOO: Then once again Col Van Niekerk specifically who was in command where Capt Deetliefs was involved, he was very successful.

GEN ERASMUS: That is correct Chairperson.

MR PRINSLOO: In that case, was she also a detainee in terms of section 29 and there was interrogation day and night?

GEN ERASMUS: That is correct Chairperson.

MR PRINSLOO: Insofar it concerned detainees in terms of section 29 where information was an important factor, it was expected of the members to apply pressure to get this information from this person.

GEN ERASMUS: That's correct Chairperson.

MR PRINSLOO: And as in the case of Stanza Bopape, he was also an important participant; he was an important person in the civics, in Mamelodi. He liaised with many important terrorist groups who was a big problem for the community and the country. Do you agree with this?

GEN ERASMUS: Yes, that was the allegation Mr Chairperson.

MR PRINSLOO: And that those allegations were supported and had to be followed up on.

GEN ERASMUS: That's correct Chairperson.

MR PRINSLOO: It was surely fresh in your memory when Bopape was detained in terms of section 29 that there were several acts of terror in Pretoria and on the West Rand?

GEN ERASMUS: That's correct Chairperson.

MR PRINSLOO: Once again it would be required of him or you expected of Col Van Niekerk and his team to get results there, be successful in their attainment of results?

GEN ERASMUS: I expected throughout that they be successful in all these matters.

MR PRINSLOO: And afterwards, after the death of Bopape you acted in the interests of the country and of the members to act in the manner you did, to speak to the Commissioner and to put your case forward. Excuse me, I say the Commissioner; I mean Gen Van der Merwe.

GEN ERASMUS: That's correct Chairperson.

MR PRINSLOO: And then general, another aspect that was already put to your colleague, Gen Van der Merwe, you heard what I said with reference to what Capt Zeelie said about the Khotso House incident? I heard... [intervention]

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, it seems to me with respect that we're embarking here on a trial within a trial. And frankly, it does not appear that there's any reason for doing so. I can inform the committee that the Khotso House incident is going to be investigated to be placed early in August this year, where that incident is going to be fully discussed and investigated by that committee presumably. We will be there. Gen Van der Merwe will be there; Gen Erasmus will be there; Mr Vlok will be there; everybody will be there; where Mr Zeelie could have the fullest opportunity of placing whatever evidence he wishes before that committee. It has really nothing to do with the case at hand. And I'm going to object to these questions Mr Chairman.

MR PRINSLOO: In view of the fact that this evidence was introduced by Gen Van der Merwe, in fairness I wanted to put one particular question to the - I beg your pardon Mr Chairman?

ADV DE JAGER: In previous instances it was held that at this stage you have to place it on record that your client differs from the other version and it is on record that it will be sorted out later.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Prinsloo, Gen Erasmus didn't say anything about Khotso House. So it was allowed when you were - for the reasons put up by yourself when Gen Van der Merwe was giving evidence, because Gen Van der Merwe actually made mention of it. But Gen Erasmus hasn't, and I don't think it's relevant to this matter. Certainly we're not going to take into account the evidence relating to Khotso House and the dispute that may exist between the evidence of Mr Zeelie and any other applicant in this matter with regard to Khotso House.

JUDGE NGCOBO: Let's just - you see Mr Prinsloo, I think we understand your concern, your fears are that when the application for amnesty in respect of Mr Zeelie comes up again, you know he may well be taxed as to why certain evidence wasn't challenged. But I think it would cover Mr Zeelie sufficient enough if you simply indicate where his version would differ from what had been said here. Also reserve the right to give your version at the subsequent inquiry. But we don't have to traverse the whole issue as if it is before us.

MR PRINSLOO: I'll accept that Mr Chairman and his version can be put at an appropriate time when he puts his application before the Committee.

CHAIRPERSON: And I think you can confidently say that Mr Zeelie hasn't jeopardised any of his rights whatsoever regarding that application in this application.

MR PRINSLOO: General, a further aspect concerning Col Van Niekerk. This incident of Bopape's death and you'd realised that there was a problem for the country and so forth, Col Van Niekerk never received a slap on the wrist for this in terms of police regulations. Is that correct?

GEN ERASMUS: That is correct Chairperson. As I understood it at that stage where the escape or the mock escape as such was investigated by another branch. Then they would find negligence in terms of this so-called escape. Then they would make a recommendation as to as to what departmental steps would be taken. I did not slap Van Niekerk on the wrist except to say that he put us in a difficult situation.

MR PRINSLOO: No further questions Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Miss van der Walt, do you have any questions to ask the witness?

MS VAN DER WALT: No questions, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Rautenbach?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR RAUTENBACH: Thank you Mr Chairman.

General, in your answers that you've just given you said that you expected of the members to put pressure on these detainees in terms of section 29 in order to get information from them. Can you tell us what type of pressure did you expect did they have to apply to get this information?

GEN ERASMUS: Chairperson, what I meant with pressure was that they had to do what they could and take into consideration the prescriptions to get this information Chairperson.

MR RAUTENBACH: I want to ask you to be more specific. Pressure, pressure that was applied to get this information. What type of pressure? Can you tell us what type of pressure do you have in mind here?

GEN ERASMUS: Chairperson, I can explain in the following manner: could be a long interrogation, long hours of interrogation, to keep this person awake. Continuous questioning, that type of thing.

MR RAUTENBACH: Is it possible, when you say long hours to keep him awake, can you think of any other type of pressure?

GEN ERASMUS: Not at the moment Chairperson. I did not prescribe this pressure to them.

MR RAUTENBACH: I want to put part of the testimony that was given during these proceedings and ask you briefly what is your comment on it. It appears on pg 472 of the record and that is - 472 of the record - as you know general, the testimony was initially in Afrikaans. It was of course translated into English. If I can read it to you, and you were present when this testimony was given. If you think it was inaccurately translated you must tell me, but I want you to comment on the contents thereof. On pg 472, the question is asked by Mr Visser to Zeelie and the question that is asked is - it's in the middle of the page.

And the answer of Zeelie was

At this stage I do not want to ask you let's look at other applications for amnesty. All that I want to ask you is what is the comment of what Zeelie said your attitude was in terms of illegal methods and assaults during interrogation.

GEN ERASMUS: Mr Chairperson, I read here that he says

As we have testified - and I would like to join with Gen Van der Merwe - if these assaults happened, there would have been investigations by the detectives and it would have been taken further to the Attorney General. Personally I cannot recall that I was present where Zeelie assaulted anybody.

MR RAUTENBACH: And it would seem then from Zeelie's testimony that he used these methods and that he was never charged with it or investigated. How do we explain this?

GEN ERASMUS: I don't think he says that he was not investigated, that he was not charged, that there was no case. But I would like to tell the panel this was standing practice of every detainee throughout to lay a charge of some or other.

MR RAUTENBACH: Are you telling us that Zeelie was investigated at any stage?

GEN ERASMUS: Chairperson, I believe so.

MR RAUTENBACH: You have no more information than that?

GEN ERASMUS: I do not have any further information to this.

MR RAUTENBACH: Then there was a question asked with reference to Zeelie, and you were asked and you said he was an explosives expert?

GEN ERASMUS: That is so.

MR RAUTENBACH: And I would understand from this testimony that aspect of his work, that he did good work?

GEN ERASMUS: That's correct.

MR RAUTENBACH: And what I would like to know from you, was Zeelie involved with these interrogations as in this matter of Bopape?

GEN ERASMUS: At that stage Mr Chairperson, he was part of the investigation personnel and besides his explosive duties.

MR RAUTENBACH: The inference I draw from what you say is it was expected of Zeelie to interrogate people and get information from them?

GEN ERASMUS: That was required of every person who was involved in investigation, to do interrogation.

MR RAUTENBACH: What were his duties if you speak of explosive clearing?

GEN ERASMUS: This was a speciality that he had to deal with. It was a speciality area that he did. What bomb clearing did was to make bombs harmless, visit their scenes and get information as to the fact of what type of explosion was used, and so forth.

MR RAUTENBACH: This seems strange to me. You've answered this partly, but you can comment more on this, that you have a person here who has a speciality area, namely - it was a technical area - he had to be an expert concerning bomb clearing, that it was expected of him to be actively involved with detainees in terms of section 29. Can you explain this to us?

GEN ERASMUS: Chairperson, if he was part of the investigation unit at that stage, there was not a bomb every day. Bomb clearance was not at the order of the day every day, and he does not teach every day. And then he had to use within the South African Police, as I can explain it to you.

MR RAUTENBACH: Tell me general, do you deny - if I can just get a clear answer here - what Zeelie said that this was a manner that was used amongst others, the electrical shocks, that this was something that was present and this was a general occurrence?

GEN ERASMUS: I would never deny that electrical shocks were administered in investigations, but I would just like to say while I was at John Vorster Square, I never saw such an apparatus and it never came to my attention that was used there. Given the testimony that is given here that there was no such things there, it had to be fetched from somewhere, and I would assume that there was not one Mr Chairperson.

MR RAUTENBACH: General, we've also heard and evidence was given that other forms of torture and assaults were used. Is it your evidence that you as divisional commander did not know about this and that it did not happen within the department?

GEN ERASMUS: I would accept that there were assaults, et cetera. The fact whether I always knew about it, I do not know.

MR RAUTENBACH: I just want to understand, you said you could not always know about it. So is your evidence that you were aware of some of the cases and of some of the cases you were not aware?

GEN ERASMUS: Chairperson, as I've already said that the occurrences of which I'm aware led to an investigation by another division and that's what I know about that Chairperson.

MR RAUTENBACH: Are you aware of occurrences took place where no investigation was led? You knew that it happened but you just left it because you thought it was in the interest of gaining information?

GEN ERASMUS: Chairperson, I cannot remember. If there was no charge, it did not come to my attention and I cannot remember. Something like that.

MR RAUTENBACH: I would just like to ask you if you look at the Stanza Bopape case, when this case was brought to your attention if was done by Van Niekerk, not true?

GEN ERASMUS: That is correct Chairperson.

MR RAUTENBACH: And already when he gave the report he said to you that he expected there would be problems because it was close to the 16th of June and he also told you as I understand your evidence that they did not want to handle this affair in the normal way. In other words a plan had to be made in order to conceal this. Is that round about what he said to you?

GEN ERASMUS: That's what I understood from what he's told me, yes.

MR RAUTENBACH: So would I be correct, when you went to Gen Van der Merwe you basically - well, it wasn't a decision made on your and Van der Merwe's initiative. It was really the initiative of junior officers, and what they wanted was that they made a suggestion that an illegal procedure should be taken and all they wanted was your guidance?

GEN ERASMUS: Chairperson, I think if you have to understand it like that, then it wasn't necessary for them to come to me. Then they could have made a plan themselves.

MR RAUTENBACH: Is it not so general that what they really wanted, they wanted backing; they wanted support in their decision?

GEN ERASMUS: For me it's logical that when you have such a serious problem, we never expected it and suddenly you're confronted with this problem, that surely you'll go to your commander.

CHAIRPERSON: Just to get a viewpoint - sorry to interrupt Mr - just with hindsight now, if you look back, wouldn't it have been better if they had made the decision of the escape and the cover-up without involving yourself or Gen Van der Merwe?

GEN ERASMUS: Chairperson, then we would not have been in this situation. If it came out, if it became known they would have had to bear the consequences themselves.

JUDGE NGCOBO: Can I just make one follow-up here? I wanted to raise it earlier on, but I think let me raise it here. It was put to you that Zeelie suggested in his testimony that you approved of the illegal method. That was put to you. And you say you didn't approve of that.

GEN ERASMUS: Chairperson, I couldn't written or orally approve it, because the prescriptions couldn't allow me to do that.

JUDGE NGCOBO: (Indistinct) the written approval we all know that if there were rules and regulations, you couldn't in writing issue an instruction that he could torture. What Zeelie said here was that it was with your tacit approval. He didn't specifically say you gave him written instructions. He simply said it was a tacit approval. Do you accept that?

GEN ERASMUS: Chairperson, I'll accept that.

MR RAUTENBACH: Can I ask you in the light of that answer, if they accepted that it was tacit approval that you've given or tacit approval, would that then be the reason why you didn't take any steps after this incident to reprimand these members?

GEN ERASMUS: Chairperson, here we had a situation where a detainee died because of electrical shocks. The decision was taken and the body was disposed of. I cannot think which steps I would have taken afterwards against these members. Which members I should have taken against them.

MR RAUTENBACH: Just to return to the question, and that is if it is the case that you gave approval, tacit approval that is, to the behaviour of these people - that is to torture Bopape - if it is the case that you gave tacit approval of this, would you agree with me that if that was the case there wouldn't have been any reason to take any steps concerning these members afterwards and you did not then have to reprimand them?

GEN ERASMUS: Chairperson, I'll explain it like this: this tacit approval or perceptions which existed in the minds of these people, it wasn't a thing that I could determine in a concrete fashion. After this incident I cannot think which other steps I could have taken, except for the fact that I should have said that I didn't approve of it.

MR RAUTENBACH: General, can we just return: are you saying now - I do not understand correctly what you've said concerning a question from the panel - are you saying now that you yourself did not give tacit approval as far as the behaviour of these members were concerned regarding the treatment of Bopape?

GEN ERASMUS: Mr Rautenbach, I think there's a bit of confusion here. I think what was meant with tacit approval or condoning, it was generally deduced this approval, but it was not relevant to what happened that specific afternoon. And that they acted in terms of the general approval and you put it as if he was aware of what happened that specific afternoon and that he gave his tacit approval. And I think that's why there's a bit of confusion.

MR RAUTENBACH: Okay, I'll formulate the question a bit differently so we can get to the point of dispute. General, please tell me: when you heard what happened, namely that your members were busy obtaining important information from a detainee under section 29 and that he died in this process because of the fact, presumably because he received electrical shocks, did you yourself give approval to this process or not?

GEN ERASMUS: Chairperson, I said in my evidence I as shocked to learn that the man - the fact that the man had to be questioned, that is so. But this person Bopape, I never saw him; I never knew him. So why I would have given approval that he should be tortured, I cannot understand that. I wouldn't have done that.

MR RAUTENBACH: Yes, but at that stage did you accept in your mind, and you said to yourself in these circumstances I must accept that what they did should be apologised; was that the attitude or not?

GEN ERASMUS: Chairperson, I sat here with a real fact. I was confronted with a dead body. If I was thinking of all those things at that stage after all this time that's passed, I really cannot tell you.

MR RAUTENBACH: General, the question is simply if you want to put it very briefly: you hear what they were busy with, and a man died. At that stage, according to your own decision now, did you say well I must accept this and I'll have to help these people? Or did you not approve of it?

GEN ERASMUS: As far as my behaviour is concerned it's obvious that I accepted what Van Niekerk told me. And that's why I went to Gen Van der Merwe to discuss this with him to see what he can do about it.

MR RAUTENBACH: At that stage you did not make the conclusion that they did something wrong, or did you?

GEN ERASMUS: Chairperson, it was obviously wrong.

MR RAUTENBACH: In the light of that answer I'd like to say to you that if it was wrong, couldn't you think of any way to bring it under the attention of these members that what they did was wrong, and that that what they did should not happen again?

GEN ERASMUS: Chairperson, it's logical for me that each and every one of them as we already said, we are not dealing here with junior officers or children. Most of these people were officers. They knew exactly what they were doing and they knew that it was wrong. So what point would it have had if I told them - or if I did anything else, what would have been the point?

MR RAUTENBACH: The reason why I'm asking you this is - what I've got in mind is at least I would have thought that, even if you followed the path you did by disposing of the body, and I want to put this to you - this is the type of thing I would have expected. If you were not totally part of this, you would have said afterwards, and you would have called them in and said these things happened; you've placed me in a very bad situation and I want to put it clearly to you if it's going to happen again; there's going to be trouble. It's not acceptable. Do you understand that? That's what I would have expected.

GEN ERASMUS: I understand that's how you see it, but like I said I already said to Van Niekerk what you've done caused us to be in a very unbearable situation, me as well as the government. Meaning it's not accepted. But I made myself a part of the situation, and that's why I'm asking for amnesty in this case. And further, any other act on my part, and in all honesty I'd say to you I cannot see whereto it would have led.

MR RAUTENBACH: You know general that after this incident there were several other incidents of unlawfulness, or am I wrong? With regards to interrogation, with regards to police behaviour.

GEN ERASMUS: I would say that there were other incidents, but I cannot say that police members were once again involved.

MR RAUTENBACH: You cannot even say whether they were involved or not?

GEN ERASMUS: Obviously Mr Rautenbach I cannot tell you.

MR RAUTENBACH: Then I would like to ask you, can you just tell us - and I know you're going to say that you have already said it in your head evidence, but I just want it just to be put on record - this report that Mr Van Niekerk gave you, as closely as possible what exactly did he tell you what had happened?

GEN ERASMUS: Chairperson, he told me that Mostert and Engelbrecht questioned Mr Bopape. Electrical shocks were applied and if I remember correctly, shortly after they started using the shocks - he did not describe this in detail, his evidence was given - this man died. That is round about what he said to me. And then I asked him, was this man assaulted by you, and he denied that. He said there was no assault at all. And I asked him whether there were marks on this person's body, and then he talked about marks on the wrists. And I made the conclusion that it was because of the cuffs. And now I've heard of another kind of elastic that they used.

MR RAUTENBACH: General, why did you want to know if the man was assaulted or if there was marks on his body?

GEN ERASMUS: As far as I was concerned those were normal questions the commander would have asked, because he said to me that this man died shortly after the shocks, and that's why I asked it.

MR RAUTENBACH: What would you have done if the information was that there were marks; the man was assaulted. What would then have been the situation?

GEN ERASMUS: If we're talking that this man was seriously assaulted, I definitely would have driven to John Vorster Square and I would have had a look. In the light thereof I said to him that I undertake to discuss this with Gen Van der Merwe, but I don't know what his reaction is going to be. And then I would have gone and see for myself how serious the situation was.

MR RAUTENBACH: And general, if you drove and you went to John Vorster Square and you saw the body and it was quite obvious that he was seriously assaulted, what would you then have done?

GEN ERASMUS: Chairperson, then if I went further with this thing and I let the thing lead the normal course of events and I involved Gen Van der Merwe in this, I do not know but I possibly could have made a different judgment.

MR RAUTENBACH: What do you mean with another judgment?

GEN ERASMUS: Another judgment means that the thing would follow the normal procedure and then they'll have to bear the consequences thereof.

MR RAUTENBACH: So general, what you are trying to say to us is there was a strong possibility that if the body was seriously tortured and there were marks and signs of torture, then in that case it would have been a better possibility and you would have followed the normal procedures, as in this case where there were no marks.

GEN ERASMUS: That is so Chairperson, because I said that this situation - and I explained this to Van Niekerk - caused us to be in a very difficult situation. And so this thing appeared to me as a very extraordinary case and I made the conclusion that the man died from a heart attack.

MR RAUTENBACH: General you see, I want to put it to you I think that any person who was in such a situation would rather - it would make more sense if the body was in a very bad state of torture, to dispose of that body as when it was a healthy body with no signs on it.

GEN ERASMUS: Chairperson, I don't think that would be the criteria, because the fact of the matter remains the man is dead. He's dead in detention and here where he was shocked, it would show at an inquest.

MR RAUTENBACH: What gives you the impression that it would seem quite obvious at an inquest that the person was shocked, if there were no signs? What gives you that impression?

GEN ERASMUS: Chairperson, I remember there was an occurrence many years ago where there was such an incident and where evidence was given by someone who's got about a page and a half of degrees where it was quite evident that when electrical shocks were applied to a person the metal concentration - I'm not an expert - is much higher than in any other part of the body.

MR RAUTENBACH: Please tell me general, if we just look at this stage when you were informed by Van Niekerk and he said to you that we'd barely started and it was really light shocks and this person died. Is that correct?

GEN ERASMUS: That is correct Chairperson.

MR RAUTENBACH: You also heard the evidence of the members who said they were very surprised because of the fact that the man died so quickly because very light shocks were applied.

GEN ERASMUS: That's true.

MR RAUTENBACH: I accept general that you yourself must have been astonished.

GEN ERASMUS: That's correct Chairperson.

MR RAUTENBACH: Now if you were astonished yourself that this man died in these circumstances, did it not occur to you to go and have a look and see what was going on? To drive there to go and have a look at the body and to see for yourself, to confirm that what they said is true; just have a look at the body?

GEN ERASMUS: Chairperson, in my evidence in chief I tried to explain to you that the timespan which already passed - the amount of time which already passed since this person died up until Van Niekerk came to me, must have been more than an hour and a half or more. I'm not sure. So you must understand that time played a factor, it was a definite factor here.

MR RAUTENBACH: And if you had to make another decision, that is when normal procedures would be followed; when you returned to John Vorster Square - now this is after you spoke to Gen Van der Merwe, you went back and there was a meeting in your office. Is that correct?

GEN ERASMUS: That is correct.

MR RAUTENBACH: My notes were a bit unclear concerning the question of when you returned and you were at the office. You did not go and look at the body then, did you?

GEN ERASMUS: No Chairperson. Me and Col Van Niekerk spoke further in my office.

MR RAUTENBACH: And the agreement was made that they would remove the body and then you went home. Is that correct?

GEN ERASMUS: Ja. What preceded that is that I phoned Brig Visser from my home, as well as Gen Du Toit.

MR RAUTENBACH: No, I'm talking about when the meeting was finished. You were in your office and it was on a different floor than the one where they questioned Bopape.

GEN ERASMUS: That is correct Chairperson.

MR RAUTENBACH: After the discussions were finished - and this is how I understand the record, specifically Van Niekerk's evidence - these members then took the body to the car. Did you then go home from the office?

GEN ERASMUS: I didn't partake any further in that no, I went home.

MR RAUTENBACH: Col Van Niekerk, what did he do? Sorry, I'm talking about Gen Du Toit, whatever his rank was at that stage. What did he do? Did he also leave your office?

GEN ERASMUS: Chairperson, me and him left together.

MR RAUTENBACH: Can I just get clarification there? There was a meeting; it was held in your office. After the meeting was finished Col Van Niekerk and I suppose the officers present was Zeelie and Van Niekerk?

GEN ERASMUS: That is correct.

MR RAUTENBACH: After you spoke to the officers you and Du Toit and the two officers between you four, the officers left the office and they went to the other members in order to remove the body. Is that correct?

GEN ERASMUS: Chairperson, at one stage Gen Du Toit left the office, I think together with Zeelie, and he went to have a look at the body. And me and Van Niekerk stayed behind and then Du Toit came back. And only after that did we leave.

MR RAUTENBACH: Did you not yourself think that it was necessary for you to go and have a look at that body, at the corpse?

GEN ERASMUS: Chairperson, as I've already said I accepted what Van Niekerk told me and I think it was sufficient that a senior member - as is the case with Gen Du Toit - that he go and have a look at the body and that he came back, and he said he cannot see any marks on this body.

ADV GCABASHE: (Indistinct) interference actually on the headphones. I don't know if it's all of them. It's terribly uncomfortable. But anyway Gen Erasmus, the question really is at that point, didn't you think it important to go down to the more junior officers and reprimand them as suggested? You know, that was an opportunity to actually directly say to them this is totally unacceptable. And you as somebody who they respected, who they looked up to; they might have taken you quite seriously.

GEN ERASMUS: Chairperson, I already said that if I look at this in retrospect, I cannot think what purpose that would have served. Those people at that stage were under intense pressure and strain and they also suffered from shock, and what other purpose it would have served then to go and reprimand them, I do not know.

MR RAUTENBACH: Which shock are you referring to here?

GEN ERASMUS: Mr Rautenbach, Chairperson, you've never been in such a situation and you can think for yourself how these people must have felt where they were questioning a person and they did not mean to kill him, but with the information to get and he died immediately.

MR RAUTENBACH: Why I ask what shock are you talking of here, we know the testimony is clear - this is the testimony according to all the applicants; this was a war situation where people as it was put were maimed and killed; innocent people. And here was the perception this was an ANC terrorist; he died while being interrogated. I cannot understand why they were shocked.

MR VISSER: (Indistinct) suggested Mr Chairman as the basis for the question that these people were unfeeling towards anybody who they considered to be an ANC terrorist Mr Chairman? Because that's the only basis, and it is not a valid basis for putting the question like that to this witness.

MR RAUTENBACH: The suggestion Mr Chairman is that what is said about their reaction afterwards is a total exaggeration. That's the basis of it. What is your comment on that statement?

GEN ERASMUS: Chairperson, my comment on that statement is I do not accept it, because these men who worked there were all normal persons who had to deal with an impossible situation, but they were not abnormal barbarians who had no feeling.

MR RAUTENBACH: I just wished to say that the statement is that this shock, the shock that the person died, this is astonishing to me that they were shocked.

GEN ERASMUS: I cannot comment on your astonishment.

MR RAUTENBACH: And I wish to put it to you further, when you tell us you applied for amnesty in the matters of Mtimkhulu and Kondile and if I recall correctly Madaka. Or am I wrong?

GEN ERASMUS: Mtimkhulu and Madaka are together and Kondile is another matter. I did apply, yes.

MR RAUTENBACH: I would not want to know the details of those aspects. I would just like to ask when did this happen chronologically with reference to this matter of Bopape.

GEN ERASMUS: Chairperson, it was many years before Bopape. Yes Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: (Indistinct) to Madaka and Mtimkhulu. Thank you Mr....

MR RAUTENBACH: General, I do not want to go into detail here, I just want to ask concerning those matters, was there dealt with the disposal of bodies here?

GEN ERASMUS: No, we did not have to dispose of bodies there. These people were disposed of.

MR RAUTENBACH: In this process did you dispose of the bodies as well?

GEN ERASMUS: We did dispose of the bodies.

MR RAUTENBACH: Did you apply for amnesty with reference to the disposal of the body?

GEN ERASMUS: I applied for amnesty surrounding the whole incident.

MR RAUTENBACH: In that context I wish to ask the following question: if you could give us an explanation concerning Bopape's incident. We've heard even from Gen Van der Merwe that more or less to use as few people in this incident. There was the objective not to involve many policemen in this incident.

GEN ERASMUS: That is correct.

MR RAUTENBACH: This is now in accordance with the need to know principle; the less people who knew, the better.

GEN ERASMUS: That's correct.

MR RAUTENBACH: Reason being general, why in those circumstances would outsiders like Visser and one of his juniors being used, also be involved in this incident? Why would it just have been the persons who were aware of what had happened there?

GEN ERASMUS: Chairperson, I think we've already explained the area in Johannesburg, you know yourself what happened in that area. And the idea to have this perception or this mock disappearance, to do it properly was to do it from - as far as possible from where it happened to get the body away, and that's why I thought I do not know the Eastern Transvaal, but I know it's a remote area, it's bushy, it borders on two neighbouring countries and that's why I thought of Mr Visser.

MR RAUTENBACH: You see, let me ask you this question: maybe I did not understand your answer totally. But you say it is far away, to get the body far away. But we know that the end purpose was to dispose of the body so what does it matter how far the body was removed?

GEN ERASMUS: Chairperson, Mr Rautenbach does not understand me properly. To get the body away from where the incident happened, yes the body is being disposed of but you know yourself that your investigation would be where the incident happened. And they would investigate this escape in the area where it happened, and therefore that body - let's take an example: in a mine shaft or in a hole, it was not buried there anywhere close.

MR RAUTENBACH: Just to take it one step further: what was the importance to you to the fact that it had to be close to the border of the country? Because in your evidence in chief you referred to that there would be a border close by.

GEN ERASMUS: Chairperson, when I refer to a border, this is where a discussion was between myself and Gen Van der Merwe concerning the escape, would be from a police station or a place close to the border. That is where I refer to the border. I did not otherwise refer to a border.

JUDGE NGCOBO: Was the suggestion that the escape must have occurred close to the border supposed to strengthen the case that Bopape had left the country?

GEN ERASMUS: That is so Chairperson. But I also told you that the investigation surrounding Bopape, in other words these allegations which he was involved in, did not lead in that direction, that it would not be logical.

JUDGE NGCOBO: ....have been these kind of options to the members now?

GEN ERASMUS: I did Chairperson, but I think Col Van Niekerk and some of the other members told me and indicated to me that such an act would not be logical because the allegations surrounding Mr Bopape, Pretoria and the West Rand and the Vaal Triangle.

MR RAUTENBACH: And what I deduce from this is that it would not make any sense to have an escape scene in the Eastern Transvaal, because his acts were in this area.

GEN ERASMUS: That's correct.

MR RAUTENBACH: So it would make more sense if the escape scene was in the Vaal Triangle.

GEN ERASMUS: That's correct.

MR RAUTENBACH: And with regard to that, did you all come to the conclusion that it would be a better but not necessarily through, but a local place would be a better place?

GEN ERASMUS: Chairperson, I cannot remember the detailed discussion, but that would be a logical inference.

MR RAUTENBACH: You say you cannot remember the detailed discussion. I'm not going to ask you in detail, but you do remember that what was said there came down to a fact that the escape scene would have to be local rather than the Eastern Transvaal.

GEN ERASMUS: That is correct.

MR RAUTENBACH: Can you remember that the decision was made that it had to be local instead of the Eastern Transvaal?

GEN ERASMUS: Chairperson, further arrangements surrounding this escape I left to Col Van Niekerk. I did not prescribe to him how he had to go about it.

MR RAUTENBACH: Was your impression at least that people would come to the conclusion that the escape scene would be local?

GEN ERASMUS: I did.

MR RAUTENBACH: I'd just like to put it to you that testimony of yours, although it does make sense, it seems to me this discussion, of your testimony with reference to a discussion that took place with Brig Visser, it's unsensible. I will tell you why. It seems from the testimony that Brig Visser was indeed asked to arrange a mock escape. What do you say of that?

GEN ERASMUS: I think where this confusion came in, and as I've just explained to you, I mentioned to Zeelie and Van Niekerk that we, myself and Gen Van der Merwe spoke of a place close to the border where the escape would take place, and that's where I think the confusion came in. I never at any stage mentioned anything to Brig Visser.

MR RAUTENBACH: I find it very strange that a discussion is there and people come to the conclusion that the Eastern Transvaal is not a good place for the escape because Bopape's possible activities was not in that area, and while you discuss this and come to the conclusion that a local escape would be better, that he approaches Visser for an escape.

GEN ERASMUS: I cannot give you an answer to that.

MR RAUTENBACH: When you spoke to Brig Visser - you contacted him, we know that - he said you knew him.

GEN ERASMUS: That's correct.

MR RAUTENBACH: You don't have to tell us the precise words, but what - this was telephonically - what did you want him to help with?

GEN ERASMUS: If I recall correctly I told him in a cryptic manner I have a problem, if he could be of assistance. And I furthermore told him that Capt Van Niekerk would contact him later, after he acceded. And the precise words that I told him at this stage I cannot recall, but I asked him to help me with a problem that I have.

MR RAUTENBACH: In your discussion with him, did you not mention anything of what the problem would be; you just said I have a problem?

GEN ERASMUS: Chairperson, telephonically I cannot say much. So I cryptically told him I have a problem, and if he could be of assistance. And what I added there, I cannot recall at this stage.

MR RAUTENBACH: Can I just find out; I can understand that you told him I've got a problem, help me please. And you've told us that you told him it is in connection with a detainee or it had to do with a package or somebody who is dead, or something to that effect? Or did you just say I have a problem?

GEN ERASMUS: Chairperson, I must have told him it concerns a detainee, in other words a package, something along that vein. But I cannot recall the precise words. This problem, immediately it gives the message that it is a sensitive situation that could cause problems for me.

MR RAUTENBACH: Am I correct when I say that the impression that Brig Visser had to have was that this was a sensitive situation and it could cause a problem for Gen Erasmus?

GEN ERASMUS: I think he must have drawn that inference.

MR RAUTENBACH: And in your mind you thought that he would understand that you have a problem and he has to help.

GEN ERASMUS: That's how I understood it.

MR RAUTENBACH: What made you think that he would help you?

GEN ERASMUS: Chairperson, we knew each other for years, and I did not know if he would help me; I asked him.

MR RAUTENBACH: That he might have understood it as an indirect instruction at that stage?

GEN ERASMUS: I did not know what Schalk Visser's answer would be.

MR RAUTENBACH: I would just like to ask you a question also; it has been asked but just give us your answer. In the sense that you clarified this matter with the Chief of the Security Branch, that's Gen Van der Merwe, except for the mock escape you had to dispose of the body and it was important that this was done thoroughly. Correct general?

GEN ERASMUS: That's correct Mr Chairperson.

MR RAUTENBACH: Did you do anything to afterwards find out if this very important part of this whole operation was done correctly?

GEN ERASMUS: No Chairperson, I did not inquire any further. I just accepted that the people who dealt with it, would do it effectively.

MR RAUTENBACH: General, when was Gen Du Toit contacted with reference to the matter of Bopape?

GEN ERASMUS: Chairperson, I said that Brig Visser and Gen Du Toit, more or less at the same time I contacted them from my house when I was coming back from Pretoria to my office, and from my house I contacted them.

MR RAUTENBACH: Now we know concerning Gen Du Toit, he was a commander to these members.

GEN ERASMUS: He was my second in command Mr Chairperson.

MR RAUTENBACH: I'd just like to ask again: so many times we've dealt with this need to know principle. Why was it important to also inform Gen Du Toit of this incident?

GEN ERASMUS: Chairperson, I would like to explain it in the following manner: Gen Du Toit was my second in command and I informed him as in many other cases, that he had knowledge of what had happened here. Because if I was not present there, that he knew what had happened there.

MR RAUTENBACH: He had nothing to do with this matter and he didn't have to know.

GEN ERASMUS: He was part of us; he was my second in command and it would be difficult not to inform him.

MR RAUTENBACH: And I would just like to ask... [intervention]

JUDGE NGCOBO: Gen Du Toit, he's the person who had initiated the section 29 arrest, wasn't he?

GEN ERASMUS: That's correct Chairperson.

JUDGE NGCOBO: He should have been informed though, on those bases.

GEN ERASMUS: That's why I say, Gen Du Toit would have wanted to know, and would have wanted to know in detail what had happened there with this person that he detained in terms of section 29.

MR RAUTENBACH: And you thought that it was better that he knew everything instead of the mock escape being kept from him.

GEN ERASMUS: Gen Du Toit was a trustee of mine, and I think he would have handled it on the same grounds as I did.

MR RAUTENBACH: General, this discussion - you speak of a discussion between yourself and Le Roux on the 9th of June. Can you recall?

GEN ERASMUS: The Friday Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: The Sunday was the 12th.

GEN ERASMUS: I think it was on the 10th, the Friday during the afternoon.

MR RAUTENBACH: Just this discussion with Le Roux, what did he tell you? What did he inform you of?

GEN ERASMUS: Chairperson, if I can recall correctly - I cannot recall the precise words of this discussion - but what I know that he requested of me to help them with the questioning of this person and it was common knowledge that yourselves at John Vorster Square, after all the problems that was there, it was exclusively fitted for the detention of people and they had a shortage of manpower at that point, to continue with the interrogation. Because it was important that these people had to be interrogated and he requested my assistance.

MR RAUTENBACH: And would I be correct that he basically indicated that he has people in detention that need to be interrogated and that he doesn't have enough manpower?

GEN ERASMUS: I believe that would be the case, yes.

MR RAUTENBACH: At that stage he did not give more detail than that?

GEN ERASMUS: I cannot recall if he gave any detail or if I spoke of the Maponya group I cannot recall.

MR RAUTENBACH: Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you then Mr Rautenbach. Mr Visser, do you have any re-examination?

MR VISSER: No thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Moloi, do you have any questions to ask the witness?

MR MOLOI: Thank you Mr Chairman. Could I just get clear on one point, perhaps just to clear up one point. Gen Erasmus, in the questioning of Mr Rautenbach you seemed to suggest that any conduct or accesses by the security officers would not have been tolerated, because it would be against policy. Did I understand you correctly?

GEN ERASMUS: That is correct Chairperson.

MR MOLOI: In your evidence in chief you also said that the politicians would know, necessarily know about accesses that would take place, because they made such utterances even on television and also went further to say they also advocated elimination of what you then called the terrorists.

GEN ERASMUS: Chairperson, yes. There were several utterances made concerning that.

MR MOLOI: Now in view of that, how then do you say neither you, who also testified that you went all out to resist this total onslaught, how then do you say that accesses by the security officers would not be tolerated?

GEN ERASMUS: Chairperson, I speak specifically of the instructions which were submitted to each member and who then signed it and who was aware of that, and aware of the fact that if he acted in such a way that the detainee would end up in such a situation, state or where he complained about the fact, that he would bear the consequences of his own deeds.

MR MOLOI: But then you believed and knew that even the politicians would approve of such conduct, because of the total onslaught that you had to resist with all the might at your disposal.

GEN ERASMUS: Chairperson, I think I said in my evidence in chief that the politicians wanted or they expected this, that we should fight this resistance with everything within our power, but as long as it doesn't get back to them.

MR MOLOI: Finally is it your evidence now that when you've made contact with Gen Visser in the Eastern Transvaal as it then was, the idea was actually to stage this fake escape, and not to dispose of the body?

GEN ERASMUS: Chairperson, I said I cryptically told Brig Visser that I had a problem, and that he would be contacted by Col Van Niekerk at a later stage. I did not discuss detail with him regarding a mock escape or anything other.

MR MOLOI: (Indistinct) in which way would you expect Brig Visser as he then was to assist?

GEN ERASMUS: Chairperson, I expected - I told him look, I have a problem. And maybe I used the word "detainee". So he would have made the conclusion that there was something drastically wrong and that he would have had to help me with that.

MR MOLOI: But what would you expect him to do General? Because you should have expected something from him. And what was that?

GEN ERASMUS: Chairperson, what I meant with how he had to help me, was to dispose of the body.

MR MOLOI: And in your mind at that stage there was no question of a mock escape when you talked to Brig Visser.

CHAIRPERSON: I think what you mean of Brig Visser assisting in the mock escape?

MR MOLOI: That's what I mean, yes.

GEN ERASMUS: Me and Gen Van der Merwe did not discuss the issue that Brig Visser would help us in the mock escape. And I think you got the thought that he would be of assistance was because it was said that this mock escape had to take place close to the border. I think that's where the thought comes from.

CHAIRPERSON: The point that Mr Moloi is getting at is what you said was when you discussed it with Gen Van der Merwe, you discussed the possibility of having a fake escape in the Eastern Transvaal, somewhere near a border. And then after you spoke to Gen Van der Merwe you drove home and you phoned Brig Visser and Du Toit. And it was only after that discussion with Brig Visser that you went back to the office and spoke to Van Niekerk and they said to you no, to have a fake escape near the border wouldn't be too good, because Mr Bopape's activities had nothing to do with that area; it would be better to have a local escape, because the investigations would be local. So at the time on that evidence when you were speaking to Brig Visser, that factor about it being not a good plan to have the escape in the Eastern Transvaal hadn't been made known to you by Van Niekerk. So I think that's what Mr Moloi is asking.

When you spoke to Brig Visser, what did you expect of him? And now you said to get rid of the body. And now he's asking well, what about the escape? Did you not also expect him to at that stage assist in the fake escape?

GEN ERASMUS: Chairperson, to answer it in this manner: I would have expected him to help me in a total fashion. In other words if the mock escape had to take place; and I don't know if it would have been necessary, if the mock escape would have taken place there to call on their assistance. But I'm not sure it would have been necessary, because there could have been someone else from a police station who had to become involved. And then you would have stressed this chain. I would have expected him to help me; I did not ask him with regards to something specific.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr De Jager?

ADV DE JAGER: General, you say that members of the police force who made themselves guilty of assaults knew that it was wrong, and if it became known, they had to bear the consequences themselves. Is that correct?

GEN ERASMUS: That is correct Chairperson.

ADV DE JAGER: You made yourself guilty of these offences. Was it also your attitude that there you had to bear the consequences yourself?

GEN ERASMUS: That is correct Chairperson.

ADV DE JAGER: Did you not expect that the politicians or your seniors would assist you in that regard?

GEN ERASMUS: Chairperson, I do not know if they would have been able to help me. I expected that because of the utterances they made and that which they said that they should assist us; but if they would have done it, I was not sure.

ADV DE JAGER: Then just one other aspect. You testified that the members were shocked because they did not mean to kill the person. I wouldn't say that he died by accident, but almost by accident according to them.

GEN ERASMUS: Chairperson, I did testify to that and I'm convinced that these members did not at all have the intention to kill the person, but only to obtain the information from him.

ADV DE JAGER: Were you because of that more sympathetic towards them than you would have been if they had tortured a person to death by using violence?

GEN ERASMUS: Chairperson, yes definitely. I was more sympathetic and I think it was an unfortunate incident.

ADV DE JAGER: Were other incidents, the ones that you were involved in, deliberate? For example the case of Kondile and other people, Mtimkhulu. There was a decision taken to kill these people. The intent was to kill them. It did not happen by accident.

GEN ERASMUS: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Adv Gcabashe?

ADV GCABASHE: (Inaudible).

JUDGE NGCOBO: Just one aspect to clear your evidence Gen Erasmus. You testified that if Mr Bopape had been tortured severely, and if there had been evidence of serious assault having taken place prior to his death, that would have influenced your decision. Probably you would not have - you would have made another decision. Is that right?

GEN ERASMUS: Chairperson, what I meant was if it was the case, I would have given the full details to Gen Van der Merwe and it's quite possible that we could have made another judgment then. But Gen Van der Merwe would then have decided that, although he was confronted with a factual situation, that we should proceed in the normal fashion and to follow the investigation and have an inquest. Because I also made sure these people understood that I undertake to have discussions with Gen Van der Merwe, but I do now know what his reaction would be.

JUDGE NGCOBO: Would you have recommended that in those circumstances, the normal procedure - that is the inquest and the prosecution if necessary - should follow, is that what you would have recommended personally?

GEN ERASMUS: Chairperson, I cannot say what I would have said. It would have depended on what we discussed.

JUDGE NGCOBO: I don't want to know what other persons would have said. I want to know what you would......you were the head of the Security Branch at John Vorster Square. What I want to know, why would the fact that a person had been tortured and assaulted before death have made a difference to you.

GEN ERASMUS: The only reason why I made that judgment Chairperson was because here we had a case where it's reported to me that this man unfortunately after the application of electrical shocks in a short span of time, died. If this man was attacked deliberately and because of that died, then I would have made a different judgment.

JUDGE NGCOBO: What judgment would you have made? That's all I want to know from you.

GEN ERASMUS: Chairperson, taking into consideration these circumstances, I possibly would have continued, because I knew these members, I would have gone along with....

JUDGE NGCOBO: It would not have made a difference, right?

GEN ERASMUS: Chairperson, we can accept that. But I never, ever expected that such an assault would have taken place.

JUDGE NGCOBO: I have no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Visser, do you have any questions arising out of questions that have been put by the panel?

MR VISSER: No, thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Gen Erasmus, you may stand down.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, I see that it's just short of one o'clock.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I doubt whether Mr Rautenbach is going to complete his cross-examination before lunch-time.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. We will then have to as I've indicated earlier in the week that we'd be adjourning at lunch-time today. We in our discussion with legal representatives earlier in the week also mentioned that we'll be trying to start earlier next week. What would be a convenient time on Monday? Because Monday might be different - I don't know, from a technical point of view is it all right? It makes no difference. What time would be convenient for Monday? Nine o'clock?

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, may I speak on behalf of myself?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VISSER: I would rather go later than start earlier. The problem which you can well imagine is that one has a lot of administration and other issues which one has to take care of in the mornings. Frankly I will fall in with whatever suits the majority. I would certainly prefer to go a half and hour later in the afternoon rather than start a half an hour earlier but that's only my own ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: I think at this stage - we can perhaps discuss it but I think at this stage let us adjourn until half past nine on Monday morning. If necessary we can sit for half an hour longer on Monday, if the people don't like it we can change it to nine o'clock for Tuesday.

MR RAUTENBACH: Mr Chairman, Mr Visser just mentioned -from my side I just want to put the following on record. As far as I am concerned, we would like to, if we can start earlier the better, if we can finish later, we'll even go for that. I know there are personal interests involved and that is because of my situation that I explained to you in your rooms the other day, especially with regard to the 10th and that is why as far as we are concerned, we will sit longer hours whenever you want us to sit even if it's, if we start earlier and finish later, that will also be in order.

CHAIRPERSON: Right, we'll then adjourn till Monday.

ADV DE JAGER: Could I just mention something? I don't know - I know the next witness to be cross-examined, but we're not sure who would be the witness thereafter. It may be that you may be calling other witnesses. If they decide not to do so, I wouldn't like Mr Rautenbach to be surprised, or Mr Prinsloo, and no witness would be available later in the week. So could you kindly sort out that witnesses will be available to continue on Monday and appear for the whole day?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I think we don't want a situation where somebody is caught by surprise and haven't got a witness because of that, and then we'll just lose time. So I'd appreciate it as Mr De Jager says if the legal representatives could liaise amongst themselves and with regard to the calling of future witnesses, so we don't land up with a wasted period of time because of that reason.

MR VISSER: I'm not entirely certain what is expected now of us Mr Chairman. Must we say today whether we're going to call... [intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: I think you see Mr Rautenbach should and Mr Prinsloo and Ms Van der Walt should know, and you should know whether, after Gen Du Toit has been cross-examined who's going to call the next witness so that that witness can be available, et cetera. Because we don't know exactly who's going to be called and when and in which order, who's going to call next.

MR VISSER: May I attempt to be of assistance in that regard? As presently advised Mr Chairman, we don't know whether we will call further witnesses and I would want to suggest through the chair to Mr Rautenbach that he be ready to proceed after General du Toit and maybe he must set his sails to that wind ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: ...[indistinct] it depends on ...[intervention]

MR PRINSLOO: Mr Chairman, we were told by Mr Rautenbach, there's a likelihood of a particular policeman or police officers they intend calling, but should those people be called then we will also be calling a witness. It depends on that ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: What I was going to say, I would prefer it if the cases of the applicants could be concluded before we commence with the case of the victims but obviously if you will only call a witness in response to a witness that my be called but you don't intend at this stage calling that witness, then that can also be done. It would seem then that Mr Rautenbach, you well be advised to have any witnesses you wish to call ready to call in case nobody is called after General du Toit, thank you.

Thank you, we will then adjourn until half past nine on Monday, the 8th of June 1998 in this hall, thank you.