--------------------------------------------------------------------------KIMPANA PIETER MOGOAI (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, the applicant's supplemented application ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Place yourself and the applicant on record.

MR LAMEY: As it pleases you, Mr Chairman. Lamey on behalf of the applicant Kimpana Pieter Mogoai whose supplemented application is in Volume 2 page 198 up to and including page 209. May I proceed Mr Chairman?

Mr Mogoai, you are an applicant for amnesty regarding your participation in the Cosatu House bomb explosion which occurred in May 1987, is that correct?

MR MOGOAI: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR LAMEY: Could you please have a look at page 198 up to including 209 of Volume 2 of the bundle. Is that your supplemented application which you signed before a Commissioner of Oaths on - during July 1997 and this particular - and that this portion in the bundle is actually the relevant portions relating to the Cosatu House incident, is that correct?

MR MOGOAI: That is correct, Mr Chairman.

MR LAMEY: Mr Mogoai, is it correct that you were a member -you became a member of the Security Branch specifically stationed at Vlakplaas since approximately 1980?

MR MOGOAI: That is correct, Mr Chairman.

MR LAMEY: Prior to your joining the Security Branch you were a member of the military wing of the African National Congress, uMkhonto weSizwe and that you were stationed at the regional headquarters of the ANC in Botswana. Specifically you were an infiltration officer tasked with the establishment of infiltration routes of MK members from Botswana to the Republic of South Africa, is that correct?

MR MOGOAI: That is correct, Mr Chairman.

MR LAMEY: Eventually you became a full member of the security police and you obtained a force number 170488K as stated in paragraph 8(b) on page 199, is that correct?

MR MOGOAI: That is correct, Mr Chairman.

MR LAMEY: Could you please page to page 203 being the annexure to your supplemented amnesty application you set out the background as to how you became a member of the security police, is that correct?

MR MOGOAI: That is correct, Mr Chairman.

MR LAMEY: And you confirm the contents of that?

MR MOGOAI: I do.

MR LAMEY: That is on page 203 of the bundle, Mr Chairman, the background up to page 205.

Mr Mogoai, you were one of the first Askaris of Vlakplaas, is that correct?

MR MOGOAI: That is correct, Mr Chairman.

MR LAMEY: You also state in paragraph 2.7 of annexure A on page 206 of the bundle sorry, 204 of the bundle that one of the reasons that made you to decide to join the ranks of the Security Police that you became disillusioned with the ANC in that respect that more prominent leaders in the ANC also were members of the South African Communist Party and that they played a prominent role in uMkhonto weSizwe, is that correct?

MR MOGOAI: That is correct, Mr Chairman.

MR LAMEY: Mr Chairman, that is paragraph 2.7 on page 204 of the bundle.

You also say that because of that your decision to join the Security Police was also partly motivated because the ANC regarded you as a traitor and that an instruction was issued to eliminate you, is that correct?

MR MOGOAI: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: Paragraph 2.8. Now, with regard to the Cosatu House incident you applied for amnesty for malicious damage to property and any other offence which can be deduced from the facts regarding this incident, is that correct?

MR MOGOAI: That is correct, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Can I interrupt at this stage and address a general remark. What has just been said by this applicant has been said I think by most of the other applicants. Let me however warn their legal advisors that we will require them when they come to the stage of addresses to notify us in detail what they want amnesty for, not any other matters arising or matters of that nature. We would want them to specify in exact terms as they can. So if you could all just bear that in mind in case I forget to say it again later.

MR LAMEY: Thank you Mr Chairman.

Now regarding the specific event, Mr Mogoai, you state that on the particular evening before the - before you departed for Johannesburg, you were called together, among other members, as you state here in paragraph 1 on page 206, by Colonel de Kock. Is that correct?

MR MOGOAI: That is correct, Mr Chairman.

MR LAMEY: One of the members that you mentioned here is Mr Brood Andries van Heerden. Is it correct that you have subsequently, subsequent to making your statement here that you realised that that is an error, the reference to him. Is that correct?

MR MOGOAI: That is correct, Mr Chairman.

MR LAMEY: Is it also correct that you recall that Mr Willie Nortjè was involved in the operation but you're not certain whether he was as such present at that meeting?

MR MOGOAI: That is correct, Mr Chairman.

MR LAMEY: Now you further state that at that meeting, is it correct that according to your recollection it was the early evening of the same night when the operation got carried out that this meeting, that you were called together by Colonel de Kock or that you received the first knowledge about what was going to take place, if I can put it that way?

MR MOGOAI: That is so, Mr Chairman.

MR LAMEY: And that you were in fact informed that an explosion is going to take place at Cosatu House?

MR MOGOAI: That is so, Mr Chairman.

MR LAMEY: After that you mentioned in your statement, when you made your statement that you went to a certain place at Midrand where you all met again with members of the Security Branch at John Vorster Square but you have drawn my attention also that your reference here to Midrand is not correct and you accept that this was Honeydew?

MR MOGOAI: That is correct, Mr Chairman.

MR LAMEY: At this place further instructions were carried out and you and Chris Magopa were tasked - you received six packs of Black Label beer - and you were specifically tasked should you encounter guards at Cosatu House to give these beers to them and as far as you know those beers, as you put it, were doctored in the sense that it would make them dizzy or activate intoxication?

MR MOGOAI: That is so, Mr Chairman.

MR LAMEY: After this ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, wait a moment. Have we received certain supplementary pages?

MR LAMEY: Mr Chairman, I'm referring to paragraph 2 on page 207.

CHAIRPERSON: Well I have no page 207 - my copy goes to 206, 209. ...[inaudible] I have got 7 and the next page is 10, I am not ...[inaudible] 8 or 9.

MR LAMEY: I apologise Mr Chairman, I wasn't aware of that.

CHAIRPERSON: None of the other Committee Members have them either. Well we take a very short adjournment and hurriedly have these pages copied? I think the persons who haven't got an interest aren't here today.

MR LAMEY: Perhaps it would be a suitable adjournment just ..[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: A very short adjournment to merely photocopy the pages 207 and 208. We have got 209 so it's only the two pages that have to be copied. We'll adjourn for a few minutes.

KIMPANA PIETER MOGOAI: (s.u.o.)

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Lamey I heard you saying they received six packs, I thought that's a bit much?

EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: (Continues) Mr Chairman, yes let me just clarify that, they each received a six pack of Black Label beers. May I proceed further Mr Chairman?

Now your specific task with Chris Magopa as stated here on page 207 was to give this to the guards should you encounter any guards at the premises, is that correct?

MR MOGOAI: That is correct, Mr Chairman.

MR LAMEY: Now on your arrival at Cosatu House you found that the front door was open but you did not see any guards, is that correct?

MR MOGOAI: That is correct, Mr Chairman.

MR LAMEY: You were aware that other members who were tasked were there were busy with their tasks and you also know that explosives were placed somewhere in the building, is that correct?

MR MOGOAI: That is correct, Mr Chairman.

MR LAMEY: And after you and Chris Magopa could not see any of the guards, you went back to your vehicle, is that correct?

MR MOGOAI: That is so, Mr Chairman.

MR LAMEY: And you further state that the operation was quickly completed and that you thereafter went back to Vlakplaas?

MR MOGOAI: That is correct, Mr Chairman.

MR LAMEY: And that you subsequently heard from the commander, Colonel de Kock, that the operation was carried out successfully?

MR MOGOAI: That is correct, Mr Chairman.

MR LAMEY: You also - was aware of a news report the following day that there was an explosion and that you also have knowledge of the fact that the building was damaged.

MR MOGOAI: That is correct, Mr Chairman.

MR LAMEY: Now on page 208 you state with regards to your political objective that you also knew that COSATU was a movement which was active of the labour front which organised strikes and that they worked hand in hand with the ANC and that you also knew that they supported the Freedom Charter, is that correct?

MR MOGOAI: That is correct, Mr Chairman.

MR LAMEY: You yourself thought that the task was perhaps futile because that they merely could use another building afterwards, is that correct?

MR MOGOAI: That is correct, Mr Chairman.

MR LAMEY: But you had to follow an instruction in this regard, which you received from the officer commanding in regard to your participation?

MR MOGOAI: That is correct, Mr Chairman.

MR LAMEY: You also state further in paragraph 11 that you recall also that De Kock mentioned that a General gave approval for this operation?

MR MOGOAI: That is correct, Mr Chairman.

MR LAMEY: You also say that as a Vlakplaas Askari member you were not in a position to verify, to question the instruction in this instance?

MR MOGOAI: That is correct, Mr Chairman.

MR LAMEY: You also had to rely on the - De Kock's motivation as to why the explosion at Cosatu House had to take place?

MR MOGOAI: That is correct, Mr Chairman.

MR LAMEY: You also recall that De Kock said that if they can plant bombs we can do it also?

MR MOGOAI: That is so, Mr Chairman.

MR LAMEY: Thank you Mr Chairman, I've got no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, we start with you again.

MR VISSER: No questions from me, thank you Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Booyens. No questions Mr Chairman.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HUGO: Hugo, just a couple of questions, Mr Chairman.

Mr Mogoai, if we just could go back to page 206 of your amnesty application, let me just put it to you that I act here on behalf of Mr de Kock, Captain Letsatsi, Simon Radebe and then Pegi Radebe or more correctly put, his correct name is Jacob Radebe and then Chris Magopa.

Now first of all in respect of Mr de Kock he says that he has no recollection whatsoever on the meeting that was attended by all these names mentioned here at Vlakplaas. What is your comment as far as that is concerned?

MR MOGOAI: My comment on that issue is that as far as I remember we were called in to prepare ourselves.

MR HUGO: Well, let me just put it to you further that Mr Simon Radebe on behalf I'm also acting says that he was called in and he was then given an instruction on a one on one basis by Mr de Kock and he most probably called you in to give you the instruction as to what your participation would be during this operation. What would you say to that?

MR MOGOAI: My former participation in the whole operation, I was briefed by Colonel de Kock.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but what is being put to you as I understand it is that you were probably briefed only yourself and Colonel de Kock being present?

MR MOGOAI: We were all present with the Stratcom members when Colonel de Kock gave us the instruction, especially me and Chris Magopa.

MR HUGO: Good, I'm not going to take this any further, safe to say that both Mr Simon Radebe and Jacob Radebe and Mr Magopa and for that matter also Captain Letsatsi would say that they never attended this meeting, that they were given these instructions by Mr de Kock on different occasions. Can you recall that?

MR MOGOAI: If that happened, it might have happened at some stage without my knowledge but what I recall is that we were all present.

MR HUGO: And then Mr Mogoai, will you just turn over to page 207, paragraph 4 thereof. There you say:

Now Mr Chris Magopa's version is that they, he did in fact come across a guard but he wasn't interested in making conversation with him or taking some of the beer that was offered to him. Can you recall that?

MR MOGOAI: We confronted nobody, the door was sort of a double door, the other part was open, the other one was closed and there were two chairs on the stairs but there was nobody and then we moved on.

MR HUGO: Good and then just on page 208 paragraph 10 (c) can you just tell us again, where did you, from whom did you receive the amount of R200.

MR MOGOAI: From Simon Radebe.

MR HUGO: Now let me just put it to you that Mr Radebe said he has no recollection of this whatsoever and he doesn't know where the money came from and he can't remember as to whether he had in fact given you the money. Are you sure about this that you received it from him?

MR MOGOAI: He gave me an envelope. In the envelope I found R200.

MR HUGO: And did he say what the reason was and from whom it came?

MR MOGOAI: He said from Colonel de Kock and I didn't ask why.

MR HUGO: I have no further questions, thank you Mr Chairman.

ADV GCABASHE: Could I just ask, Mr Mogoai, could you possibly be mixing this particular incident up with another one which is why your facts might not be the same as your colleagues, is that possible?

MR MOGOAI: No, there isn't any other time that I was given any money or an envelope which contained money.

ADV GCABASHE: And the same relates to the meeting where all those members were present, the questions Mr Hugo was asking you, where the group met and were given instructions. Again you couldn't be mixing that aspect up with something else?

MR MOGOAI: I wouldn't say, I mean this was a totally different operation. I wouldn't say that I mixed them up.

ADV GCABASHE: Thank you.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Mogoai, this meeting was it on the evening, the same evening as the explosion took place?

MR MOGOAI: Yes, Mr Chairman.

ADV DE JAGER: So you gathered all together before leaving to Honeydew and were you told at the stage when you gathered before leaving?

MR MOGOAI: Yes we gathered before we left.

ADV DE JAGER: And then you received the instruction, you can't remember any previous instruction prior to that meeting?

MR MOGOAI: No, no, no, Mr Chairman.

ADV DE JAGER: Thank you.

ADV GCABASHE: And you wouldn't be mixing up a meeting at Honeydew with this meeting at Vlakplaas? You wouldn't be switching incidents either?

MR MOGOAI: No, in Honeydew actually what happened, it was not a meeting as such, it was a reassurance of what happened, of the previous briefing at Vlakplaas so it was a reassurance.

MR LAMEY: Mr Chairman, may I just ask just one follow up question in re-examination if there are no further questions?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ADV MPSHE: I do have questions.

MR LAMEY: Sorry.

ADV MPSHE: Thank you Mr Chairman.

Mr Mogoai, if you have a look at page 204 of your application. 204 attached to the original numbering and more specifically to 2.7. You see 2.7?

MR MOGOAI: Yes, sir.

ADV MPSHE: Will I be correct, Mr Mogoai, to state that you'd do anything for the Security Force so as to keep yourself and your family alive?

MR MOGOAI: Quite correct, sir.

ADV MPSHE: So whatever your involvement in this operation you were looking forward to receiving something, some money for your family and yourself?

MR MOGOAI: I wouldn't put it that way. I would say I was doing it so as to go on surviving as I ...[indistinct] in the past.

ADV MPSHE: So you expected some gain to the benefit of your family and yourself?

CHAIRPERSON: Well were you paid a salary for what you were doing? Was it your job?

MR MOGOAI: I was getting my salary every month.

ADV GCABASHE: But just to clarify this, you joined the Security Branch to survive to earn a living. You didn't go on this specific mission so as to get something out of it personally in terms of money? I making that distinction between taking the job and this specific mission, am I right?

Or have I confused you?

MR MOGOAI: There are many operations in which I was involved in, in which I did not get money for.

ADV DE JAGER: But even you didn't know that you would receive R200 before you went on the mission?

MR MOGOAI: I did not know that I was going to get it.

ADV DE JAGER: So that was not the reason why you went on the mission, the fact that you'd received the R200, you went because of an order given?

MR MOGOAI: Yes, sir.

CHAIRPERSON: As I understand you, you had never received money before as a reward?

MR MOGOAI: Before?

CHAIRPERSON: You had never received money for a mission before?

MR MOGOAI: Yes.

ADV MPSHE: The question was asked you did not know that you would receive money, did you expect to receive money?

MR MOGOAI: No.

ADV MPSHE: Now you made mention of communism here on page, from 2.7, did you have any problem with communism yourself?

MR MOGOAI: Myself?

ADV MPSHE: Yes.

MR MOGOAI: Yes, sir.

ADV MPSHE: Why?

MR MOGOAI: Sorry?

ADV MPSHE: Why, what was wrong with it?

MR MOGOAI: No, I don't believe in communism.

ADV MPSHE: Because other people don't believe in communism?

MR MOGOAI: I don't believe in communism.

ADV MPSHE: Why?

MR MOGOAI: Because it is anti-Christ, or anti, it doesn't believe in religion.

ADV MPSHE: Good. Turn now to page 3 page 2.5. I'm sorry, paginated 2.5 Mr Chairman. Paragraph 2.8. It reads:

Would I be correct to say that your joining the security force was more of seeking for an asylum than commitment to the Security Force operations?

MR MOGOAI: I wouldn't - partly I would agree with you but not wholly. In my situation and in the situation in the country itself, I mean if I did not join the Security Forces obviously I was going to be an easy target.

ADV MPSHE: So it was, the Security Force was an asylum for you, a safe place for you, let's put it that way?

MR MOGOAI: It was a secure place for me.

ADV MPSHE: Ja. Thank you Mr Chairman.

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: Mr Chairman, just one or two questions in re-examination.

Mr Mogoai, we have not in your verbal evidence dealt, for sake of brevity, with the total, repeated the total background, but you can confirm the total perspective as it is stated in paragraph 2 of page 203 and 205 is that correct?

MR MOGOAI: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And your whole decision to join the Security Police if we can put it was put together by several factors but the first thing that made you also, one of the important aspects why you decided to come back to South Africa was you wanted to get back to your family but also that you became disillusioned so it must all be seen together, is that correct?

MR MOGOAI: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And that prior to your - before you came back via a previous of employer of you, you made contact with the Security Police in order to inform them that you're coming back to South Africa so that they know that you are here in the Republic for bona fide reasons and not further to participate in the aims or the acts of the ANC, is that correct?

MR MOGOAI: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And just to confirm this, this was the first operation that you received afterwards some additional remuneration apart from your general salary that you received, is that correct?

MR MOGOAI: Which operation?

MR LAMEY: The Cosatu House one.

MR MOGOAI: That is correct, sir.

MR LAMEY: And prior to that you were not promised that you would receive some additional benefit or so you did not expect it at all?

MR MOGOAI: No sir.

MR LAMEY: Thank you Mr Chairman, I've got no further questions.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR RADITAPOLE: Just a few, Mr Chairperson.

Mr Mogoai, if I understand you correctly, will I be correct to say your political objective was almost the same as some of the applicants here to try and stop a takeover by a communistic or marxist orientated government?

MR MOGOAI: Partly so, partly so, sir.

MR RADITAPOLE: And partly - and the other part, what would be the other part?

MR MOGOAI: The other part is that I was also actually following orders and I had at that stage already regarded myself as an enemy of the ANC and it's alliances that is called COSATU.

MR RADITAPOLE: Right, your opinion or your perception of regarding yourself as an enemy started after they suspected you of having been a traitor, am I correct?

MR MOGOAI: It developed from there, sir.

MR RADITAPOLE: As a former member of the ANC you might have read the Freedom Charter am I correct?

MR MOGOAI: Yes, sir.

MR RADITAPOLE: And at one stage the Freedom Charter was regarded as a communistic document, some people were charged for that, are you aware of that?

MR MOGOAI: I am.

MR RADITAPOLE: What would you say if I say to you most of the process of the Freedom Charter are found in the Bill of Rights which is part of the new constitution of South Africa, social rights etc., etc? Would you still maintain it was a communistic document?

MR MOGOAI: I agree. I agree, sir.

MR RADITAPOLE: Let me come to the ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Is that relevant, politics of the country isn't it which ...[indistinct] at the time?

MR RADITAPOLE: Let me come to the, to your coming back home. Just one or two questions in so far as that is concerned. You arranged for a meeting in Botswana between you and the security forces. You came back home, you stayed for six months

at Sebokeng. Thereafter you joined the Security Forces. It would create an impression that you had contact with the Security Forces or to put it otherwise, it would appear that the suspicion was justified to say that maybe you were a double agent. What would you say about that?

MR MOGOAI: At that time, I mean, anybody could have had that perception but during that particular time I was always having regular contact and communication with the Security Forces.

MR RADITAPOLE: During the time you were at the infiltration of the ANC in Botswana?

MR MOGOAI: No. When I was in Sebokeng. When I was in Botswana I had no contact with them altogether.

MR RADITAPOLE: Thank you, no further questions, Mr Chairperson.

MR MOGOAI: Thank you.

MR LAMEY: Mr Chairman, my colleague Mr Rossouw will now proceed with his applicants, we're just going to move chairs.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, Visser on record, I'm sorry to interpose. I see Mr Raditapole has arrived, no doubt in the expectation of a hearing what the witness or the applicant Greyling will have to say. Mr Chairman, I will have to Committee and my learned friend that I am unable to call the witness Greyling and I'm very sorry that my learned friend has had to come here for nothing. I do apologise for that but it's something which arose last night, Mr Chairman, and it's something completely out of my control.

CHAIRPERSON: Well Mr Visser, I sympathise with you in that but if we put my feelings on record, is if you are not able to call him I do not, if we finish the rest of this hearing, propose to adjourn the whole of this hearing for his convenience. It seems to me it would be a more proper course if he can't be called at this hearing to remove his application from the role of this hearing.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, you are quite correct and I would ask you to do that because he will not be able to be called during this hearing in any event.

CHAIRPERSON: I don't want everybody else to have to be inconvenienced by that and it seems to me that if he is not available to be called here, he must be removed, his name, his application must be removed from this hearing. His application remains a valid application but it is no longer part of this bundle, it is removed from it.

MR VISSER: Well we would appreciate it if you would so order, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well.

MR RADITAPOLE: Mr Chairman, just to express my indebtedness to Advocate Visser for having advised me through the Commission that Mr Greyling was coming to testify and ....[indistinct] interest but I do understand the position and I understand where we are. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: I'm sorry we've had to waste your time this morning but in the light of the interest you had shown in other applicants we felt yesterday that when our attention yesterday was drawn to this application that your attention should perhaps be drawn to it.

MR RADITAPOLE: I'm indebted to the Commissioner, it's good to see you all again. Thank you.

MR ROSSOUW: My first witness that I call is Mr Isak Daniel Bosch. You will find ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: I wish members when they're referring to applicants would refer to them as applicants and not witnesses. I tend to get confused when they say witness and think it is somebody who is a witness and not an applicant.

MR ROSSOUW: Sorry, Mr Chairman, indeed applicant Bosch, you will find his application in Volume 1, page 180 to 186. Can the applicant be sworn in Mr Chairman?

ISAK DANIEL BOSCH (sworn states)

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Chairman, at the outset may I just indicate to the Committee that the form 1, the form for the application was not bound into the bundle that is Volume 1, only the affidavit by Mr Bosch appears which is annexed to his application form appears as from page 180. Mr Chairman, then I've also handed to you another annexure to his Amnesty Application which I've also handed to all my learned colleagues and this annexure deals with the bombing of Cosatu House which you will note is not included in the bundle Volume 1 from page 180 which is only for Khotso House.

Mr Chairman, this is not a new application, a fresh application for the incident at Cosatu House and the evidence leader Advocate Mpshe will confirm that the application for Cosatu House was included in the applicant's initial application and the affidavit that he made in support thereof at the Attorney General.

MR MPSHE: Mr Chairman, I wish to set the record straight first and say that the applicant in his initial application made mention only of Cosatu House, no detailed affidavit was submitted but in his official application he makes mention of Cosatu so the detailed application Cosatu was drawn I think sometime during the course of this hearing but mention was only made of it in the initial application that is why it is not included in the bundle by myself but I do confirm he did mention it in his application.

CHAIRPERSON: Well without seeing it are we able to determine whether it is an application that was properly lodged within the time limits?

MR MPSHE: Mr Chairman, I have an insight in all the applications, I read all the applications, it was submitted timeously.

CHAIRPERSON: But did it comply with the Act? Did it set out the necessary details? Was it set out in the form required by the act, you've told us that it was just a mention of Cosatu House?

MR MPSHE: Yes, Mr Chairman, the required application form in terms of the Act was filed by them ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: The application form was but what about the details as regard Cosatu House, how much detail was in that?

MR MPSHE: Mr Chairman, in so far as the details are concerned on Cosatu House there were no details it was just mention thereof.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that compliance with provisions of the Act merely to mention something?

MR MPSHE: It is not, Mr Chairman.

MR ROSSOUW: Sorry, Mr Chairman, as far as I recollect the affidavit that was made in support of that application, it also refers to the incidents which was referred in the affidavit was under command and it was also with a political objective, that was stated. What I've now submitted to you in fact supplementing and setting out the detail of that application.

CHAIRPERSON: The point I am raising is how can this Committee without seeing those application decide whether it is a legitimate application? We haven't got it before us, have we?

MR ROSSOUW: No, Mr Chairman. In that event then we, I will endeavour to obtain the affidavit which was filed.

ADV DE JAGER: Haven't you got a copy of the application?

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Chairman, I've only got a copy of the handwritten application. The affidavit to that I haven't got.

ADV DE JAGER: Was there an affidavit next to the application at that stage?

MR ROSSOUW: That is indeed so Mr Chairman.

ADV DE JAGER: Isn't it the procedure if offence have been mentioned and insufficient details have been supplied that the evidence leaders would request further information about it in order to enable the Committee to come to a conclusion?

MR MPSHE: That is so, Mr Chairman, but in regard of this hearing Mr Chairman, due to time constraints that I had in my hands I was not able to write letters to everybody but to some members I did write letters and with some members I communicated by telephone.

CHAIRPERSON: The question was not what you did in preparation for this hearing but when applications are received before they are filed they are read are they not and it's not the practice that if there is insufficient information before the application is filed the applicant or his attorney are notified that they have not complied with this or that provision and that they are given an opportunity to do so.

MR MPSHE: That is correct, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Was that done in this case?

MR MPSHE: Mr Chairman, I wouldn't know whether it was done when it was received because it is not done by myself.

CHAIRPERSON: I think we hear the application subject to us obtaining the papers and then deciding. It seems to me the most sensible proposal would be for us to hear the evidence now subject to the constraint that we are not by doing that indicating that we consider it a legitimate application. We will then obtain the necessary documents, ascertain what the position is and we can then communicate with you if there are any further problems.

MR ROSSOUW: Thank you Mr Chairman. Can I just also place on record that I have received no indication from the TRC to supplement the initial application and I can just mention that a copy of that handwritten application, I will make available to the Committee during the course of the day.

CHAIRPERSON: We will get - after the hearing we will get the other, we'll get the whole file and see precisely what was done but rather than waste time, we go on and hear his evidence now and as I say subject to the restraint that if we decide that there is no valid application we will not consider the value of it.

EXAMINATION BY MR ROSSOUW: Thank you Mr Chairman.

Mr Bosch, I refer you to page 180 of Volume 1, just briefly for the purposes of background ...[intervention]

ADV DE JAGER: Have you been sworn in?

MR BOSCH: Yes.

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Bosch, on page 180 you state that you are applying for amnesty for your involvement in bomb explosion at Khotso House as well as Cosatu House and any other offence arising from that which you are going to testify about?

MR BOSCH: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: Just to begin, your background, you say on page 180 that you went to school in Pretoria and after you completed your schooling you joined the South African Police?

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Rossouw, that information has been made available under oath, he could just confirm that this is evidence which has been submitted to us under oath, I really don't think that it matters where he went to school.

MR ROSSOUW: As it pleases the Committee.

Mr Bosch, at the bottom of page 180 to the top of page 181 for background, do you confirm that?

MR BOOYENS: Yes I do.

MR ROSSOUW: In 1993 or least in 1990 you resigned from the Police?

MR BOSCH: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: Regarding the annexure which was submitted to the Committee with relation to Cosatu House, do you have that before you?

MR BOSCH: Yes.

MR ROSSOUW: You are also applying for amnesty for your involvement in the bomb explosion and damage to property in the Cosatu House incident?

MR BOSCH: Yes, that is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: Do you confirm the date and place where this took place?

MR BOSCH: Yes.

MR ROSSOUW: And regarding your involvement you state that your recollection is that observation was undertaken before the time by yourself and Colonel de Kock on Cosatu House?

MR BOSCH: Yes that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: That is 180(a).

MR ROSSOUW: Thank you Mr Chairman.

Mr Bosch, you state further that you can recall that you flew in a Police helicopter over Cosatu House with Colonel de Kock and made a video recording of the premises?

MR BOSCH: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: You also recall that Mr de Kock testified that a video recording was made of the premises from the street with a camera in a bag?

MR BOSCH: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: Where did the camera come from, can you inform the Committee regarding this?

MR BOSCH: The camera was purchased by the Police, we used it at Vlakplaas. It wasn't specifically purchased for this particular operation, we had it beforehand.

MR ROSSOUW: Is it correct that you inserted the camera into the bag?

MR BOSCH: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: You were connected to the technical division at Vlakplaas?

MR BOSCH: Amongst others.

MR ROSSOUW: You said that during preparation you also had knowledge that there was a printing press in the building and that the operation amongst others would be directed at destroying the printing press?

MR BOSCH: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: You also knew that COSATU was an alliance or an ally of the ANC?

MR BOSCH: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: Do you confirm the rest of the contents of your statement?

MR BOSCH: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: And regarding paragraph three thereof you say that on the evening of the operation your task was to observe?

MR BOSCH: Yes that is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: And you were in a vehicle with Mr Dave Baker?

MR BOSCH: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: Did you ever leave the vehicle?

MR BOSCH: No.

MR ROSSOUW: Were you armed?

MR BOSCH: Yes, I was armed.

MR ROSSOUW: At any point did you find yourself in a situation where you had to confront people or possibly use your weapon?

MR BOSCH: No.

MR ROSSOUW: After the explosion you state that you returned back to Vlakplaas with Mr Baker?

MR BOSCH: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: You then state that damage was done to Cosatu House but as far as you know nobody was seriously injured or killed?

MR BOSCH: Yes that is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: Did you draw any financial benefit from your involvement in this action?

MR BOSCH: No.

MR ROSSOUW: Regarding the political objective of this operation did you listen to the evidence of Colonel de Kock, Minister Vlok and General van der Merwe?

MR BOSCH: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: Do you reconcile yourself with the political objective which would have been obtained through the action on Cosatu House?

MR BOSCH: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: You also knew that COSATU was an ally of the ANC and that it acted as a front organisation on the labour front for the ANC?

MR BOSCH: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: You also heard the evidence about the daily, weekly and monthly security reports which were also circulated at Vlakplaas. Did you also have insight into those documents?

MR BOSCH: From time to time.

MR ROSSOUW: Your knowledge regarding the involvement of COSATU in the ANC, would that have emanated from reading those reports?

MR BOSCH: Yes that is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: You state that your involvement in this operation was due to an order and that you received this order from Colonel de Kock?

MR BOSCH: Yes that is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: Were you in a position to question his orders?

MR BOSCH: No.

MR ROSSOUW: Were you in a position in any way to doubt his orders with regard to the authorisation which he possibly may have received from head office?

MR BOSCH: No.

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Bosch, with regard to your involvement in Cosatu House, I refer you to page 182 in Volume A. You are also applying for your involvement in the bomb explosion at Khotso House, I beg your pardon, this is Khotso House and any other offences arising from the incident? It is a common fact that the explosion occurred in August 1988?

MR BOSCH: Yes that is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: Just to begin with, in your statement you said that you are referring to the application of Andries van Heerden?

MR BOSCH: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: You request extends as far as your involvement and your personal knowledge of the incident goes?

MR BOSCH: Yes that is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Chairman, you will find the application by Mr van Heerden in Volume 1 at page 159 and further.

In so far as Khotso House is involved is it also your evidence that you were not involved or knew about the first unsuccessful attempt?

MR BOSCH: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: At that stage you were stationed at Vlakplaas and you were solely involved in the second successful attempt which was led by Colonel de Kock?

MR BOSCH: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: Then, Mr Bosch, you state in your statement that on the evening of the operation you were with Dave Baker in his vehicle. Is it correct that you are confusing this with your involvement in the Cosatu House incident?

MR BOSCH: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: On that particular evening am I correct in saying that you were in Colonel de Kock's BMW vehicle, you drove in that vehicle to Honeydew and after that to Khotso House?

MR BOSCH: Yes that is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: Can you recall in any way that you were involved in monitoring Khotso House before your involvement with Vlakplaas?

MR BOSCH: I can't recall that we flew in a helicopter but as far as I can recall I know that we took a number of photos and also made a video recording from street level.

MR ROSSOUW: Your task on that particular evening of the operation on Khotso House was similar to the Cosatu House incident because you also undertook observation from the vehicle in which you travelled?

MR BOSCH: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: At that stage did you leave the vehicle?

MR BOSCH: No.

MR ROSSOUW: And you were not involved in the placing of the explosives and you did not enter the premises?

MR BOSCH: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: You also state that after the explosion took place you went back or you can't recall whether you went to Honeydew or directly to Vlakplaas?

MR BOSCH: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Bosch, in the application of Mr van Heerden he states that he saw General Piet du Toit at the safe house in Honeydew before the operation at Khotso House. Can you recall that?

MR BOSCH: Not at all.

MR ROSSOUW: Regarding your involvement with the Khotso House incident you state that damage was done to Khotso House but you don't know anything about anybody being injured or killed?

MR BOSCH: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: You did not draw any financial benefit or any other remuneration from this incident?

MR BOSCH: No.

MR ROSSOUW: Regarding the political objective for this incident, you listened to the evidence of General van der Merwe, ex-Minister Vlok as well as Colonel de Kock. Do you reconcile yourself with this and do you agree with it?

MR BOSCH: Yes that is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: Did you know that the South African Council of Churches offices were seated in Khotso House and that financial assistance was being given to ANC members by the South African Council of Churches?

MR BOSCH: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: Then you regarded this action against Khotso House as necessary in the struggle by the security forces to maintain the government of the day?

MR BOSCH: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: Your involvement in this operation emanates from an order which was given by Colonel de Kock?

MR BOSCH: Yes that is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: And in this case you were in no position to question his orders?

MR BOSCH: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: And you were also not in a position to verify

the origin of these orders?

MR BOSCH: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Chairman, that is the evidence. I might just mention that I have supplied to all my learned colleagues as well as the Committee an affidavit by Mr Bosch prior to the starting of the hearing in which he explains the confusion as far as his involvement in the two incidents are concerned. You will note that his role that he played was exactly the same in both instances and that led to the confusion. I don't think that it will be necessary, it's just ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Well we've got it, shall we call it 180(b) and put it in with the application?

MR ROSSOUW: Thank you Mr Chairman, 180 (b).

Mr Chairman, the affidavit that I referred to is just headed "Affidavit" and it's dated the 14th July.

CHAIRPERSON: Have you finished?

MR ROSSOUW: That's my evidence.

MR VISSER: No questions thank you, Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Booyens, no questions Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Mpshe?

ADV MPSHE: Sorry, Mr Chairman, no questions thank you.

ADV GCABASHE: Can you just clarify one small point for me, page 184: You have knowledge, and it's the second sentence really, that the South African Council of Churches financed the ANC leaders. Is this personal knowledge or were you so informed.

MR BOSCH: We were so informed, Mr Chairman.

ADV GCABASHE: By whom?

MR BOSCH: During my career as a security policeman.

ADV GCABASHE: Documentary evidence or you were told this in meetings?

MR BOSCH: As far as I can remember it was told in meetings.

ADV GCABASHE: Was this told to you just before the operation as well?

MR BOSCH: No, ma'm.

ADV GCABASHE: This was the information you had in your background information?

MR BOSCH: That's right yes. That is correct, Mr Chairman.

ADV GCABASHE: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Chairman, I will then call my next applicant, Mr Dawid Brits. You will find his application in Volume 2, page 220.

DAWID JACOBUS BRITS: (sworn states)

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Chairman, at the outset - I've also handed to the Committee and everybody present an annexure to the Amnesty Application which you will find on page 220. This is just setting out in detail supplementing the application, the handwritten application that you will find on page 220 and further.

CHAIRPERSON: 220(a).

EXAMINATION BY MR ROSSOUW: Thank you Mr Chairman.

Mr Brits, I refer you to page 220 of Volume 2, do you have that before you?

MR BRITS: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Brits, do you confirm the content thereof in as far as paragraph 1 - 6 is concerned?

MR BRITS: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: Paragraph 7(a) were you an official or a supporter of any political organisation?

MR BRITS: I served the Government of the day.

MR ROSSOUW: Is it correct when I say that you also supported the National Party?

MR BRITS: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: So you were a supporter of the National Party. Do you confirm the contents of paragraph 8?

MR BRITS: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Is it quite correct that if a policeman says I support the government of the day say he supports the party or is he saying I support the government of my country?

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Chairman, that's why I asked whether he also supported the Nationalist Party, but there is a distinction.

Mr Brits, then with regard to your involvement in the Cosatu House bomb explosion you are requesting amnesty as set out in the annexure page 220(a) you request amnesty for your involvement in the bomb explosion and any damage to property and damage to Cosatu House as well as any offences arising from the evidence which you will give?

MR BRITS: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: It is common cause that the explosion took place in 1987 in Johannesburg?

MR BRITS: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: With reference to page 3 of annexure 220(a) there is the application of Willie Nortjè and you request that this be incorporated in your application in as far as the facts there fall within your personal knowledge, is that correct?

MR BRITS: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: Regarding your own involvement in the operation you state that your order was received from Colonel de Kock. You also state that after the operation Brigadier Schoon was present at Vlakplaas and you inferred from that that the operation had enjoyed his approval?

MR BRITS: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: You yourself was not tasked with any observation or gathering of information tasks before the operation but you do know about the observation that was carried out by means of helicopter as well as the photos that were taken?

MR BRITS: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: You also state that Colonel de Kock expressly stated it to you that there should be no loss of life during this operation

MR BRITS: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: And during the intelligence sessions you also became aware of the existence of the printing press in the building?

MR BRITS: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: And that the printing press should be rendered unusable and that the activities of COSATU should be halted?

MR BRITS: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: You say that your specific task with regard to the operation would be to keep the area surrounding the building clean along with other members from Vlakplaas so that anybody who could possibly be on the street could be removed and not be injured as a result of the explosion?

MR BRITS: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: You also mention on page 5 of the affidavit that you can remember the names of the person who were involved?

MR BRITS: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: You state that on the particular evening you travelled in a mini bus from Vlakplaas to Johannesburg, can you remember that a gathering was held in Honeydew?

MR BRITS: No.

MR ROSSOUW: You say that you arrived at Cosatu House and that you climbed out of the vehicle and patrolled the area surrounding the building on foot?

MR BRITS: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: Were you armed?

MR BRITS: Yes.

MR ROSSOUW: You've already testified that Colonel de Kock had stated that no person should be injured during the operation, did you have an instruction that anybody should be shot should they arrive on the scene?

MR BRITS: No.

MR ROSSOUW: You also state that you did not see how the other members penetrated the Cosatu House building but that you withdrew after a while and waited a short distance away for the explosion

MR BRITS: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: The other members who were involved in the operation are mentioned in paragraph 1.1, you say that after the explosion you saw Captain Zeelie on television and that is also where you recollection springs from that he could be involved in the COSATU House incident?

MR BRITS: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: Page 6 paragraph 1.3 you also state that in your handwritten application that Lionel Snyman and Dries van Heerden's involvement, are you certain about the involvement?

MR BRITS: No.

MR ROSSOUW: It is a mistake that you made to mention them in your handwritten application?

MR BRITS: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: You also mention the braai that was held at Vlakplaas after the incident and that ex-Minister Vlok paid a visit during which he expressed his congratulations?

MR BRITS: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: You also state that no persons as far as you know were seriously injured or killed and that the building was injured and that the operation had been a success?

MR BRITS: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: You did not draw any financial benefit or remuneration from the incident except for the fact that a braai was held at Vlakplaas after the operation?

MR BRITS: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Brits, during the trial here you heard the evidence which was given by General van der Merwe, ex-Minister Vlok about the political objective of this operation?

MR BRITS: Yes, I did hear the evidence.

MR ROSSOUW: Do you reconcile yourself with that and are you in agreement with this?

MR BRITS: Yes that is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: You also refer on page 6 of your application paragraph 10 (a) that the political objective as incorporated in the application of Nortjè should be incorporated in your application?

MR BRITS: Yes that is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: You also say that your involvement emanated from an order which was given by Colonel de Kock?

MR BRITS: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: You believed that this action against Cosatu House was aimed at the ANC which was the enemy so that their operational activities could be halted and more specifically so that the revolutionary material which was distributed as a result of the printing press which was used could be halted?

MR BRITS: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: The operation was also aimed at creating confusion between Cosatu and the ANC?

MR BRITS: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: You have already confirmed that your involvement was a result of an order from Colonel de Kock and that you participated directly under his command?

MR BRITS: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Brits, finally on page 8 of the annexure in the final paragraph, you confirm the content thereof and request that the Committee take note of this?

MR BRITS: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: More specifically that since you have resigned from the Police you have had numerous medical problems, that you have a weak medical condition that you have been diagnosed with cancer and that in January last year you underwent an operation and that you are currently still receiving treatment for your condition?

MR BRITS: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Chairman, that's the evidence for the applicant.

MR VISSER: Visser on record Mr Chairman, I have no questions.

CHAIRPERSON: No questions from any applicants.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Brits do you know Mr Willemse?

MR BRITS: That is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: Did he participate with you in that operation or one of the operations or both operations?

MR BRITS: He participated with me in one of the operations.

ADV DE JAGER: Do you know exactly what he did?

MR BRITS: No, I don't know.

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Chairman just relating to that question, Mr Brits is only applying for one incident, Cosatu House, whereas Mr Willemse is applying for both, Cosatu and Khotso House.

CHAIRPERSON: No questions, thank you.

AMNESTY HEARING

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Chairman, I believe that there is still other members of Vlakplaas who must proceed.

MR DU PLESSIS: Sorry Mr Chairman, may I perhaps just ask if my client Mr Bellinghan may be excused?

CHAIRPERSON: On the same basis as the other.

MR DU PLESSIS: As it pleases you Mr Chairman, he's going nowhere.

Mr Chairman, may I call my client Mr Beeslaar?

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Rossouw, please keep in mind that if some of your other clients or applicants could perhaps help with Mr Willemse's application that you would submit that to us, anything that can tell us what his role was. We accept that he can't be here as a result of the attack on him but we would like some corroboration of what he's saying in his statement.

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Chairman, yes, I have as far as my clients are concerned, there's no real evidence as far as the direct role of Mr Willemse is concerned that I can place through them on the record apart from to confirm what I've done yesterday is that he was with Mr Snor Vermeulen and that that was accepted, the evidence by us.

MR MPSHE: Mr Chairman, I don't know which one is fastest or the swiftest between changing their mikes now and then or the members coming over to the mikes because there's going to be that interruption now and then.

GERHARDUS CORNELIUS BEESLAAR (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, may I just remind you that his application was an extra document because his application was not contained in the bundle which I handed to you at the beginning of the hearing?

CHAIRPERSON: The search now starts.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes Mr Chairman, it's numbered page 32 and it says "Beeslaar, Schedule 2, Cosatu House." He's only applying for Cosatu House.

CHAIRPERSON: I take it the rest of his application has been lodged, it is in the file somewhere but it hasn't been connected here.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes Mr Chairman, he has also given extensive evidence in the PEBCO 3 Matter for instance.

CHAIRPERSON: Should we call him applicant number 36?

MR DU PLESSIS: As it pleases you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Have we got another 36?

MR DU PLESSIS: I think it will be 37, Mr Chairman, yes.

Mr Chairman, before I start with the evidence may I perhaps just refer you to page 32, the first page, the date there should be 1987 and not 1988, it's just a formality and then in respect of the acts for which amnesty is sought, I will endeavour to include quite a few other offences in the heads of argument when I hand the heads of argument to you, so I just want to point that out that that is not the only offence applied for. May I proceed, Mr Chairman? Thank you.

Mr Beeslaar, do you have your application in front of you?

MR BEESLAAR: Yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: Now do you confirm the correctness of typed page 34 to page 37 as far as the political motivation was concerned with which you acted?

MR BEESLAAR: Yes, I confirm that.

MR DU PLESSIS: You've also heard the evidence from Mr Vlok down all the other applicants who were involved in this action, Colonel de Kock for instance, under whose instructions you acted. Do you confirm their political motivation which they gave?

MR BEESLAAR: Yes, I do.

MR DU PLESSIS: And you acted on the direct orders of Colonel de Kock, is that correct?

MR BEESLAAR: Yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: Did you derive any financial benefit from this operation?

MR BEESLAAR: No.

MR DU PLESSIS: Did you support the National Party and it's policy?

MR BEESLAAR: Yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: Did you believe that your actions were aimed at combating of the revolutionary onslaught of the liberation movements against South Africa?

MR BEESLAAR: Yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: You also believed that you were part of the struggle against Communism?

MR BEESLAAR: Yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: And your version of the events are set out on page 34, do you confirm the correctness in that?

MR BEESLAAR: Yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: You also hear the evidence of Major Baker and Mr Bosch?

MR BEESLAAR: Yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: They were in the vehicle with you?

MR BEESLAAR: Yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: Do you confirm their evidence as correct?

MR BEESLAAR: Yes I do.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you Mr Chairman, I've no further questions.

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Chairman, maybe I can just ask him?

CHAIRPERSON: Put yourself on record.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR ROSSOUW: Rossouw on record Mr Chairman, sorry.

Mr Beeslaar, do you have any recollection of what Mr Dow Willemse's involvement was in this operation?

MR BEESLAAR: No I have no recollection of that.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, I beg your pardon. Mr Beeslaar asked me for an opportunity to read something to the Committee if he could just have the opportunity to do that? Would you please continue Mr Beeslaar?

MR BEESLAAR: I believe that be revealing the truth and by confessing our sins of the past, sins on both sides to confess this and repent before God. He will give forgiveness and reconciliation. Who are we as weak human beings not to forgive each others sins. Thank you.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, Visser on record. No questions but if I may make a suggestion, for purposes of reference perhaps in written argument, could this affidavit perhaps be numbered 272 in Volume 2, Mr Chairman, because then it will be easy to refer to

it. The last page now is 271 in Volume 2. That one's marked as an Exhibit M, Exhibit L and Exhibit M is his schedule so perhaps this should just be an exhibit number.

CHAIRPERSON: The other ones where we have called them a,b and c we have been adding to existing file documents but I think if this comes in now I agree that it would, and where have we got to U, is it?

MR VISSER: Yes, Mr Chairman, U. So it would be Exhibit V.

Thank you Mr Chairman, may the witness be excused? Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, I believe the next witness will be Mr Zeelie on behalf, as part of the Johannesburg Branch.

CHARLES ALFRED ZEELIE: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR ROSSOUW: Thank you Mr Chairman, Rossouw on behalf of the applicant Mr Zeelie. Mr Chairman, you will find the application by Mr Zeelie in Volume 1, page 92 and further. Page 92 to 114. Mr Chairman, I've also handed to the Committee and my learned colleagues a document which I propose we name Exhibit X which just sets out the background.

CHAIRPERSON: I think it should be 92(a), this should be kept with his application.

MR ROSSOUW: 92(a) then, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: That is the one that sets out his background, his Police career, the stuff that all the other people have got in their applications.

MR ROSSOUW: Indeed, Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, I note that it's five minutes to go before tea time, maybe I can just quickly deal with the background and then after tea we can start with the application itself.

I then refer you to 92(a), the background of Mr Zeelie.

Mr Zeelie do you have that in front of you?

MR ZEELIE: Yes.

MR ROSSOUW: As far as your background is concerned you confirm the contents of the first page thereof?

MR ZEELIE: Yes.

MR ROSSOUW: Page 2 as far as your career ...[intervention]

ADV GCABASHE: I'm sorry, Mr Rossouw, could you just tell me "hierdie aansoek" right at the bottom should be read along with what? Can you just finish that off for me? The bottom of page 92.

MR ROSSOUW: Sorry, Mr Chairman, sorry yes, I forgot to deal with that aspect. The form that is in the bundle you will note mentions that it should be read with the application which will be submitted by way of the office of the Attorney General. This form, Mr Chairman, was submitted together with an application for another matter. You will see at paragraph 9(a) it deals with the Stanza Bopape incident so there is another form which was submitted to the office of the Attorney General which is, to which the application you will find from page 95, that part from 95 and further, that was part of the other form that was submitted by way of the Attorney General’s office.

ADV GCABASHE: Are you saying apart from the Stanza Bopape matter the A.G. is dealing with some other matter that we need to take cognisance of? Just clear that up for me?

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Chairman, I hope that you will take cognisance of this matter which was submitted, these three incidents for which Mr Zeelie is now applying which is in the bundle, that is apart from the Bopape matter for which there was already a hearing. Mr Chairman, maybe I can explain it like this, it would appear that there was two form 1's submitted, this one in respect of Stanza Bopape and it then specifies that the rest of his amnesty application will be dealt with by way of the Attorney General's office and it was in that form to which the incidents for which we are now applying for amnesty, was included.

CHAIRPERSON: I think the time has now come that we can take the adjournment now and be back at 11 o'clock to continue, we hope uninterrupted then.

CHARLES ALFRED ZEELIE: (s.u.o.)

EXAMINATION BY MR ROSSOUW: (cont)

Mr Zeelie to refer to 92(a) part by the general background, do you confirm the contents of this entire portion and you ask that that be also incorporated into your Amnesty Application?

MR ZEELIE: Yes.

MR ROSSOUW: Then just a couple of incidents I would like to focus on. On page 3 during your period in which you were attached to the Security Police in Johannesburg at the bomb disposal unit you were involved in about 160 bomb explosion scenes, is that correct?

MR ZEELIE: Yes. I may just clarify that I investigated these.

MR ROSSOUW: And that included the Magistrates Court Johannesburg, Ellis Park, Wits Commando and Krugersdorp bomb explosions?

MR ZEELIE: Yes, those were motor bomb explosions.

MR ROSSOUW: And then specifically on pages 5 or 4 to 6 you give more information about specific incidents and you specifically included it here to indicate what the revolutionary climate was in Johannesburg from 1987, 1988 onwards during which time the incidents took place for which you applied for amnesty?

MR ZEELIE: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Chairman, if I can just refer you to page 4 on that document, paragraph 4, the first incident refers to the date 5 September 1994 - Mr Chairman that should be 1984.

Mr Zeelie, you are also requesting the Committee to read that to be able to understand the background situation in Johannesburg at the time?

MR ZEELIE: Yes.

MR ROSSOUW: Then on page 8 and follows, you give an indication of the arms caches which you found and weapons that you found there?

MR ZEELIE: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: Page 8 and 9, Mr Zeelie you're also requesting that this be seen in the context of the threat and onslaught which existed at the time against the existing Government order and also the Security Forces?

MR ZEELIE: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: And then as far as you personally are concerned, on page 10 and follows, you mention that you took the initiative in regard to precautionary measures relating to bomb explosions you took the initiative for the development of a bomb disposal vehicle and you got sponsorships from private bodies to sponsor that?

MR ZEELIE: That's correct.

MR ROSSOUW: You said you contributed to the development of the STS Blast Bag, that is then a water bag which would be placed over limpet mines to prevent the explosion or to minimise the possible damage?

MR ZEELIE: That's correct.

MR ROSSOUW: You also heard, there was evidence here about a device which was used at one of the Cry Freedom incidents and it had been removed from an identification board?

MR ZEELIE: Yes that is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: You also mention that you had developed this notice board which was erected at various public places to focus the public's attention on this threat?

MR ZEELIE: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: On page 12 you've set out your progress in the South African Police, is it correct that during these incidents of '87 and '88 you had the rank of a lieutenant?

MR ZEELIE: Yes.

MR ROSSOUW: And in 1994 you left the South African Police and at that stage you held the rank of a major?

MR ZEELIE: Yes.

MR ROSSOUW: Then from pages 92 and follows of your application, Volume 1, bundle 1, do you confirm the contents of paragraphs 1 to 6 thereof?

MR ZEELIE: Yes, that's correct.

MR ROSSOUW: Then paragraph 7(a), were you a supporter of the National Party?

MR ZEELIE: That is correct. May I just point out a small difference in the background? I said I was born at Waterval under and in the application it says Springs. Springs is where my birth is actually registered.

MR ROSSOUW: Then on page 194 is that your signature at the bottom of the statement, do you confirm that?

MR ZEELIE: Yes.

MR ROSSOUW: Then, Mr Zeelie, page 195 bundle 1, you applied for amnesty for your involvement in the preparation of an explosive device which was placed in the Alexandra Theatre. You heard that this was the King's Theatre in Alexandra?

MR ZEELIE: Yes, that's correct.

MR ROSSOUW: And then you also asked for amnesty for your involvement there and any other offences or ...[indistinct] which might have arisen from that?

MR ZEELIE: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: You said that this incident took place in 1988 and you say that you were requested by Colonel Niels van Wyk to prepare an explosive device to be placed in the theatre to prevent the screening of the film Cry Freedom, is that correct?

MR ZEELIE: That is correct, yes. It was not to be placed within the theatre but just that the building had to be damaged.

MR ROSSOUW: You say you prepared this explosive device with a Mr Dries van Heerden and it consisted of plastic explosives and a mini ignition device. Where did you get these explosives from?

MR ZEELIE: It was in my possession, it formed part of explosives which related to DLB's.

MR ROSSOUW: You said that your unit regularly made available such explosives to yourself?

MR ZEELIE: Yes.

MR ROSSOUW: You then said that you prepared the explosive device and you handed it to Colonel Niels van Wyk. Could you perhaps then explain a little more about that?

MR ZEELIE: I didn't physically hand it to him, I took the device to him and just showed him what it consisted of.

MR ROSSOUW: You also mention that he in turn gave it to Joe Mamasela, is that correct?

MR ZEELIE: No, that's not correct. It's not Joe Mamasela but Joe Matsamela.

MR ROSSOUW: Am I right in saying that he was a black member of the Security Police at John Vorster Square?

MR ZEELIE: Yes.

MR ROSSOUW: And you also say that as far as your knowledge goes this explosive device was placed by one Sam, an informer, in this theatre complex?

MR ZEELIE: Yes. Just once again, I want to point out it wasn't placed in the theatre but at the back of the theatre. It was to be placed behind the screen, behind the wall which formed the screen. There was a little alleyway where there were pieces of corrugated iron and the explosive device was then attached to the wall outside.

MR ROSSOUW: Is it also correct that you travelled to Alexandra when the device was handed to Mr Matsamela and from there onwards to the informer?

MR ZEELIE: Yes.

MR ROSSOUW: After the explosion you visited the scene?

MR ZEELIE: Yes.

MR ROSSOUW: And you say it was clear that screening of Cry Freedom would not be able to continue at this theatre?

MR ZEELIE: Correct.

MR ROSSOUW: As far as you know, nobody was killed or injured but the theatre was damaged?

MR ZEELIE: Yes. Nobody was injured or killed.

MR ROSSOUW: Then Mr Zeelie, you listened to the evidence of General van der Merwe and Mr Vlok relating to this incident and especially the political objective which was sought to be achieved, do you agree with that?

MR ZEELIE: Yes.

MR ROSSOUW: You also mention that it was a Stratcom operation to prevent the screening of the Cry Freedom film?

MR ZEELIE: Yes, that's correct.

ADV GCABASHE: Can I just stop you right there on that point? Just explain that Stratcom operation in light of what Mr Bellinghan has said and our current understanding of how Stratcom worked? What was your understanding of the operation?

MR ZEELIE: What I understood by that was that we had to make sure that the film Cry Freedom would not be screened in the theatre because it was a countrywide Stratcom action to prevent the broader public from seeing the film which would have led to, then perhaps becoming involved in incidents of unrest.

ADV GCABASHE: Who told you it was a Stratcom operation specifically?

MR ZEELIE: If I remember correctly, Colonel Niels van Wyk told me that but there might be a misunderstanding in that the Stratcom Operation was conveyed to me by Du Toit and I was told to go and see Captain Louis van Huyssteen regarding this matter.

ADV GCABASHE: Thank you.

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Zeelie you also heard that General Piet du Toit testified that he channelled this order to you, in other words you concede that you also spoke to him about this matter?

MR ZEELIE: Yes that is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: On page 197, paragraph 10(b) there you state the following that it was part of the countrywide Stratcom actions to try and prevent the screenings of that film, do you confirm the rest of the contents there?

MR ZEELIE: Yes.

MR ROSSOUW: You did not derive any benefit financial or otherwise from your involvement in the preparation of this device?

MR ZEELIE: No.

MR ROSSOUW: And you also received an order, that's what you say on page 98, that you received an instruction from Colonel Niels van Wyk?

MR ZEELIE: Yes and I may add that it also came from Colonel Piet du Toit.

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Chairman, I will then deal with page 99. It's not in the chronological order of how the incidents took place but just for convenience as far as the bundle is concerned, deal first with the Khotso House incident.

Mr Zeelie, on page 99 of bundle 1 you there say that you're also for amnesty for your involvement in the bomb explosion at Khotso House and any other offences which the evidence might reveal?

MR ZEELIE: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: This incident took place on the 31st August 1988, is that correct?

MR ZEELIE: Yes.

MR ROSSOUW: You then on page 99 at 9(a)iv you refer to a statement which you made to the Attorney General on the 10th April 1995. That is an annexure to this Amnesty Application and it appears on page 107, is that correct?

MR ZEELIE: Yes.

MR ROSSOUW: Before I deal with the contents of that you, on page 100 you state that you just want to correct something in paragraph 1.6 and 1.8 of annexure C.A.Z. on page 107?

MR ZEELIE: That is correct.

ADV GCABASHE: I've lost you, which page are you referring to?

MR ROSSOUW: Sorry, Mr Chairman, I'm referring to page 100.

CHAIRPERSON: We haven't got it, we go from 99 to page 102.

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Chairman, can we perhaps just adjourn for two minutes?

ADV DE JAGER: No you must continue, we'll follow the evidence as you read it and then you must just hand in the pages.

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Chairman, I can just mention that the relevant pages are included in my bundle. I am referring to page 100 in that first paragraph there it mentions that the affidavit made to the Attorney General and more specifically paragraphs 1.6 and 1.8 thereof which you will find on page 107. Mr Zeelie would just like to make a correction as far as that's concerned.

MR ZEELIE: That is correct. Yes Chairperson, the name of Mr Eugene de Kock I mentioned it there in both cases instead of the name of Mr Kotze.

MR ROSSOUW: In other words what you're trying to say is that Mr de Kock and the Vlakplaas contingent were not involved in the first unsuccessful attempt to blow up Khotso House?

MR ZEELIE: That is correct. It wasn't an attempt in any event, it would have taken place so it wasn't as if it was an attempt.

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Zeelie, as far as the annexure on page 107 is concerned, there you state that you and Mr Beyers had a conversation with General Erasmus, how did that come about?

MR ZEELIE: Mr Beyers approached me on several occasions and complained to me about the activities which took place at Khotso House, the SACC Headquarters in respect of terrorists that were given shelter there and also financial assistance given to terrorists as well as potential terrorists and I then told him that I would take up the matter with General Erasmus; and then on a particular day we went to see General Erasmus and we put the problem to him. He was also aware of the problem. He then told me that he would take up the matter with head office and that he had to go to head office in any event on that day.

Upon his return that afternoon he called me in and told me that he had spoken to head office. He didn't mention any specific name and said that we were given permission to continue to blow up the building. I suggested to him that Jannie and I would take the explosives in small quantities into the building and then at a later stage we would cause an explosion in the building.

General Erasmus then told me that we couldn't do it in that way and that we had to act in cooperation with head office.

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Zeelie, is it correct that on the next day you went with General Erasmus and Mr Beyers to the Pretoria Security Branch head office?

MR ZEELIE: Yes.

MR ROSSOUW: What happened there and thereafter?

MR ZEELIE: General Erasmus went into the building and Beyers and I were with him. I think we went to the seventh floor and we waited there for General Erasmus. He entered General van der Merwe's office, that is Erasmus. After a while he reappeared and he asked me to go through to the explosives head office, the office of Mr Paul Hattingh. We drove through to that place, when we arrived there, myself and Jannie Beyers and General Erasmus and we spoke to Colonel Paul Hattingh and told him what the situation was. He then called in Mr Hammond and Mr Kotze and the matter was then further discussed.

During that discussion these two members undertook to prepare the explosive device. Hammond also undertook to obtain canvass rucksacks in which the explosives would be packed and carried. We then went back to Johannesburg.

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Zeelie, who was to be in command of this first attempt if we can call it that?

MR ZEELIE: Hennie Kotze was our senior and he would have taken direct command.

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Zeelie, what happened during this first attempt?

MR ZEELIE: During that incident, I picked up Mr van Heerden at his house. We then went to a safe house in Honeydew. Various other members were there including myself, Nonnie Beyers, Mr van Heerden, General Erasmus, Mr Hammond and Mr Kotze. We then departed for Khotso House or the area where Khotso House was.

We drove around the building and at the insistence of Mr Kotze who said that there was too much movement around the building at that stage and that we could not carry out the operation then. We then aborted the operation and went back to Honeydew.

Mr Kotze then suggested that he would possibly call in the help of Mr Eugene de Kock.

MR ROSSOUW: And it was during the meeting at Honeydew, it was not decided during the meeting at Honeydew that you would approach Mr de Kock?

MR ZEELIE: No.

MR ROSSOUW: Colonel de Kock testified that you'd made such a request to him and that you met each other in a hotel in Johannesburg. What is your recollection about that?

MR ZEELIE: As far as I can remember I didn't contact Mr de Kock personally. Exactly how it came about that the two of us got together in Johannesburg is something that I can't recall, however, we met each other at the Johannesburg Sun where the matter was discussed. I also can't remember whether I told or asked him about Mr Hammond or Mr Kotze at that stage and that I took him to the building to show him where it was. There were certain discussions, I cannot recall them exactly, discussions about this operation to be carried out.

MR ROSSOUW: Then, Mr Zeelie, that particular evening, the evening of the operation, what was your function then?

MR ZEELIE: Because I was the head of the explosives unit in Johannesburg at the time and would automatically have been involved wherever an explosion took place, I took part in the operation itself but I would have had to go back home so that they could contact me after the explosion to then attend the explosion scene. I took part in the explosion by carrying some of the bags containing the explosives into the building and by placing these bags at the places where the explosion took place.

I can just mention briefly that the original plan was that the explosion was planned to be a car bomb explosion and the explosives where to be packed in a car and that would have made it look like a car bomb or it would have made it look as if explosives had been carried into the building and that an explosion had taken place for unaccountable reasons.

On the insistence of Colonel de Kock and once we saw what was going on in the building, we then decided to place the explosives at the lifts so that the explosion would cause as few injuries as possible. The facts are already on record that explosives would find the route of least resistance and the explosion of energy would actually have travelled up into the lift shaft and not necessarily move outwards where people could then be killed or injured.

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Zeelie, on this point could you just tell us what the role of Mr Douw Willemse was during this operation?

MR ZEELIE: As far as I can recall Mr Douw Willemse and one other member of Vlakplaas had to assist the members carrying the explosives, to scale the wall and then on their return to once again assist these members to be able to escape from the building quickly.

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Zeelie, you then withdrew from the building and in paragraph 1.13 on page 108, you say the following that Mr Hammond then took over command of the scene and Mr Kotze was also with him?

MR ZEELIE: Yes when I say that he took over the scene I mean that they prepared the explosive devices, it was in fact one device which consisted of several bags of explosives but the two switches were used and they connected these two switches. After I placed my explosive charge I immediately departed again and I left the building, I went to my car. Before we went to Honeydew I had parked my car about a block or so away from the building so that I could make a quick getaway and go back home.

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Zeelie, you also wore camouflage at the time?

MR ZEELIE: Yes.

MR ROSSOUW: Why?

MR ZEELIE: I'm an easy target, everybody knows what P.W. and F.W. looks like and I actually look just like them so I'm an easily identifiable target and that's why I always wore a disguise during an operation. I wore a wig and glasses etc and disguised myself in that way.

MR ROSSOUW: Is it also correct that you had to return to the scene afterwards and you didn't want to be identified as being one of the people who was on the scene before the explosion?

MR ZEELIE: That's correct.

MR ROSSOUW: You then received a call that the explosion had in fact taken place and you then went to the scene again in your car?

MR ZEELIE: Yes.

MR ROSSOUW: When you arrived at the scene you also met the Reverend Storey and the evidence which he gave at the trial of Mr P.W. Botha - Mr Chairman, I'm not certain what bundle that is, I think it's bundle 3, I'm not certain. Mr Chairman, my colleagues confirm that it's bundle three and you will find it on page 430, typed page 430 in that bundle.

Mr Zeelie, Mr Storey testified there that the scene was quiet and that they found you there. He says:

Sorry, Mr Chairman, I've been misinformed by my colleague, Mr van der Merwe. Mr Chairman, you will find it on page 430 of typed page in bundle 4. I think it's line 22 and further.

Mr Zeelie can you comment of the evidence of Reverend Storey?

MR ZEELIE: That is correct. Firstly I would like to explain that during any explosive scene, regardless of who had caused it or in which way the explosion had occurred it was our training and we also performed it as such that the first priority during or at such an explosive scene would be to attend to those who were injured which indeed was performed at this scene and that is why I would like to deny the allegations made by Reverend Storey and furthermore I would like to place it on record that I am in possession here of a newspaper cut out from The Citizen of the 1st September 1988 and here is a photo of Reverend Pieter Storey and Reverend Frank Chikane as well as myself and if one looks at this photo you'll see that it was already light when I communicated with them and I did refuse entry upon the insistence of Reverend Storey and I'd like to read the section below the photo:

"The Reverend Peter Storey, the Superintendent of the Central Methodist Church, leaving the site of the blast with Reverend Frank Chikane, General Secretary of the South African Council of Churches, after they had been refused entry to Khotso House" take note, Khotso House. I refused them entry into the building because the building was in a dangerous situation at that point. It says "Lieutenant Charles Zeelie of Police Explosives walks behind them." and that is why I would like to take exception to the allegation made by Reverend Storey that I was aggressive and that he wanted entrance to another building on another premises and that there were people who were bleeding. At that stage, attention would already have been paid to all injured persons on the scene.

MR ROSSOUW: Thank you Mr Zeelie. Mr Zeelie, furthermore, as the head of the bomb disposal unit you visited the scene and you compiled a statement with regard to your investigation there and this statement which would have been in the Police Investigation Docket has been mislaid and you have not been able to trace it?

MR ZEELIE: That is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: And you disguised the fact that a coverup was attempted and admitted that it might have been somebody else who was responsible for the bomb and that you were not involved?

MR ZEELIE: That is correct. In actuality I investigated the scene of the explosion as I would have done with any other explosion scene and I provided the facts in that statement, the facts regarding what I found upon the scene.

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Chairman, in that light since Mr Zeelie is unable to trace the said affidavit, I'm not certain what the content thereof would be but I would presume that it would be similar to the affidavit that Mr Zeelie made after he investigated the bomb blast at Cosatu House which you will find which you did have a copy of in his possession and you will find on page 111 of the bundle.

It would appear to me that it is merely a physical description of the scene as Mr Zeelie found it and I would submit that the affidavit he made after the bomb blast at Khotso House would be similar to that and that it would not necessarily indicate who would be responsible for the incident.

ADV DE JAGER: Is there anything that you wish to add regarding Khotso House?

MR ZEELIE: That's correct. I would just like to put it on record that I'm in possession of a cut out from the New Nation also dated on 1st September 1988 and I would like to read a paragraph of the article to you, just to indicate that Cosatu was indeed using that particular building.

ADV DE JAGER: Yes but we are now busy with Khotso House.

MR ZEELIE: Yes, that's correct but I would just like to state that Khotso House was also used by Cosatu for their activities.

ADV DE JAGER: If you say that under oath then we believe it.

MR ZEELIE: That's correct. It says here that members of Cosatu Johannesburg Branch had a meeting in the building four hours before the explosion.

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Chairman, that would be hearsay evidence.

Mr Zeelie, regarding your investigation, do you know whether anybody was seriously injured or killed during the explosion?

MR ZEELIE: Chairperson, as far as I know approximately thirteen persons were slightly injured but there were no serious injuries and definitely no casualties. I would just like to state this for the record with regard to the guard who was in the building, the perception which originated that the guard was injured during the explosion is incorrect, Chairperson. He was injured after the explosion that is as a result of the explosion but after the explosion he ran down the steps and as a result of the investigation on the scene we found his footprints in the dust as he had run down the stairs and when he reached the ground floor he fell because there was no floor.

MR ROSSOUW: Thank you. Mr Zeelie, regarding the political objective of this action did you listen to the evidence given by ex-Minister Vlok and General van der Merwe? Do you reconcile yourself with this and are you in agreement that this was the political objective of the explosion at Khotso House?

MR ZEELIE: That's correct.

MR ROSSOUW: On page 100 you mention that the South African Council of Churches were assisting ANC members and that the building was made available for offering residence to ANC members and refugees?

MR ZEELIE: That is correct. As already stated I was a member of the investigative unit at John Vorster Square and at times it was brought to our attention by terrorists who made statements that they did indeed obtain financial assistance from the S.A. Council of Churches and that they also received residence there.

MR ROSSOUW: Did you have any financial benefit or remuneration from your participation in this action?

MR ZEELIE: No.

MR ROSSOUW: And you also carried this out under the order of General Erasmus?

MR ZEELIE: That is correct, it was a direct order from him.

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Zeelie, can I refer you then to page 102 of bundle 1 which is in connection with Cosatu House. You are applying for amnesty as an accessory after the fact and any offence arising from the incident?

MR ZEELIE: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: It is common cause that this explosion occurred on the evening of 6-7 May 1988 and you mention on page 103 of the bundle that you were not involved in the planning or execution of the bomb planting. In you capacity as head of the bomb disposal unit you visited the scene and compiled a report regarding the incident. This has been attached from page 111 to page 114 in the bundle and this explains the observations which you made as the head of the bomb disposal unit when you visited the scene at Cosatu House?

MR ZEELIE: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: And you request that this be incorporated into the document. You are applying as an accessory. Can you tell the Committee what was told to you before the bomb explosion and by whom?

MR ZEELIE: As already known on the day of an election, that evening we patrolled and the person who was in the vehicle with me, who was more senior than I was, conveyed to me that on that particular evening a large explosion would take place and that I would be visiting the scene and that I would visit the scene with the knowledge that this was a Stratcom action.

MR ROSSOUW: It was not conveyed to you which premises it would be?

MR ZEELIE: It was not specifically said to me which scene it would be.

MR ROSSOUW: And after the investigation you compiled the report and you indicated that it would be the South African Police who were involved?

MR ZEELIE: I would like to mention something regarding the facts about which questions were asked earlier with regard to movements in the street and whether or not there were nightclubs in that area. Indeed there was a nightclub approximately four blocks from the building but because of the fact that it was an election day all licensed premises were automatically closed for business and that nightclub would definitely not have operated, all nightclubs would have been closed for business.

ADV DE JAGER: So the person who had been sleeping in the car must have had his own alcohol?

MR ZEELIE: It was someone who had visited a shebeen.

MR ROSSOUW: You also state that nobody was injured or killed during the explosion?

MR ZEELIE: That is correct. Not a single person was injured, not to mention killed.

MR ROSSOUW: You have heard the evidence given by General van der Merwe and Mr Vlok with regard to this action as well as the evidence of Colonel de Kock with regard to the political objective thereof. Do you confirm this and do you reconcile yourself with this?

MR ZEELIE: Yes that is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: You also state on page 104 that you were under the impression that this was a Stratcom operation which was to be lodged on the referendum day with the aim at discrediting the ANC/SACP Alliance?

MR ZEELIE: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Chairman, that is the applicant's application.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Visser on record Mr Chairman. A few questions with your leave?

Mr Zeelie you evidence with regard to the Cry Freedom incident in Alexandra as well as Khotso House is not entirely in line with the evidence given by other applicants, could we ascribe this to the fact that your recollection as the other applicants have complained has also been letting you down with regard to the time which has elapsed since the incidents?

MR ZEELIE: Chairperson, it may be the recollection of the

other applicants which is letting them down however, that which I have testified is according to my belief what happened and what I can recall.

MR VISSER: So therefore you're saying that you are right and the others are wrong on the points of difference?

MR ZEELIE: No, I am just standing by the facts which I have given here and I cannot make any changes regarding that at this point.

MR VISSER: Are you saying that where you differ you are the one who's right and they are wrong?

MR ZEELIE: No, I stand by my statement which I made.

MR VISSER: Please go to page 96 of Volume 2. You say that you received an order from Colonel Niels van Wyk. Do you see that? I beg your pardon, it's Volume 1 not Volume 2.

MR ZEELIE: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Did you hear what General du Toit said? Colonel

Niels van Wyk was on leave at that point.

MR ZEELIE: I can't comment on that, Chairperson, as I remember I did receive the order from him and I will stand by that.

MR VISSER: I see but you've also stated here today that it was conveyed to you that this was a Stratcom action?

MR ZEELIE: Yes that's correct.

MR VISSER: And you said that you received it either from Colonel Niels van Wyk or General du Toit?

MR ZEELIE: If I recall correctly I said that.

MR VISSER: So then indeed you did hear something from Du Toit?

MR ZEELIE: I have stated that.

MR VISSER: And General Du Toit has stated that he gave the order to you and Van Huyssteen, do you remember that evidence?

MR ZEELIE: I remember that General Du Toit testified to that effect.

MR VISSER: And this morning you said that when you heard about the Stratcom action, Du Toit said that you were to speak to Van Huyssteen?

MR ZEELIE: Chairperson, I said that I would have spoken to both of them.

MR VISSER: Van Huyssteen?

MR ZEELIE: Colonel van Wyk and Van Huyssteen.

MR VISSER: Yes but you said that your recollection is very clear. I just want to put it to you that when you differ from the evidence given by the other persons who I am appearing on behalf of that they are correct in their recollection that you are incorrect and I will not take it any further.

MR ZEELIE: Mr Chairperson, I also believe that I am correct and that is why I delivered the evidence.

MR VISSER: Very well, let's refer to the Khotso House incident. I beg your pardon, yes it was Khotso House then. I'm not certain and I might just ask Mr Mpshe by means of the Chair whether these persons received notification because it would appear that he is implicated in these applications but that is something which Mr Beyers can see to.

MR MPSHE: He has been served.

MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson. Just one further aspect, there is something which I neglected to ask Mr Zeelie. You have amended Joe Mamasela to Joe Matsemela and Joe Matsemela would have been the one who gave the explosive device to Sam Mdaba, is that correct?

MR ZEELIE: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: According to the evidence as we understand it, Du Toit gave you and Van Huyssteen the order and Van Huyssteen gave Sam Mdaba the order to plant the bomb. Did you understand it like that as well, that's his evidence?

MR ZEELIE: Whose evidence? General du Toit?

MR VISSER: Yes.

MR ZEELIE: Yes that is how I understood it.

MR VISSER: And all that I want to put to you is those two persons have applied for amnesty as we have heard. Well, Colonel Niels van Wyk and Joe Matsemela according to our knowledge have not applied for amnesty. I'm just putting that to you on record if you wish to comment about that.

MR ZEELIE: Chairperson, as I have already stated, that is my recollection of the events. If there is a possibility that they are not involved I will concede that but I would just like to tell you that that is my recollection.

MR VISSER: I'm not going to discuss the Khotso House incident from page 107 to page 108 with you now but I'm just going to put it to you as follows: do you deny that with regard to Khotso House, the orders were issued as testified here by Mr Vlok, General van der Merwe and Brigadier Schoon and may I add Colonel de Kock. Do you deny that that is how it happened?

MR ZEELIE: Chairperson, I cannot comment on where from above the order came, I was not present during negotiations on the higher level. If there is a possibility that it is a convergence of circumstances, I will not argue that.

MR VISSER: And I will not put any further questions to you at this opportunity. Thank you.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you Mr Chairman.

Mr Zeelie, how good is your recollection regarding the incidents at Cosatu House and Khotso House?

MR ZEELIE: Chairperson, it happened a long time ago and there are certain facts which I would be able to recall much easier than others.

MR DU PLESSIS: Well one can make mistakes.

MR ZEELIE: Well we are only human Chairperson.

MR DU PLESSIS: And the mistakes which appeared on page 107 and 108 of the affidavit, you have conceded that you have corrected these errors?

MR ZEELIE: Yes that is correct and furthermore I would like to explain that when I made these affidavits, once again I would like to place it on record I was under tremendous pressure. There was a lot of disinformation that was being distributed about me and I must add at that stage I did not trust the staff at the offices of the Attorney General and I conveyed the sentiments to the Attorney General himself and once again the affidavits were made under tremendous pressure and I wanted to move away from these people as swiftly as possible and I was playing for time until I could achieve certainty regarding the true circumstances regarding the Truth Commission and whether or not we would be able to trust the Commission.

MR DU PLESSIS: If there are small differences between what you say and what my client's say, that's Mr Hammond and the others, we are not going to argue about this.

MR ZEELIE: No, Chairperson, I would just like to indicate that there are words which were used such as, amongst others, Mr Kotze was afraid, that's incorrect.

MR DU PLESSIS: That would have been one of my questions.

MR ZEELIE: I know that certain people were unhappy about that choice of words but those were the circumstances under which the affidavit was compiled and we were just satisfied that the facts were the basic rendition of the facts and I signed the affidavit and completed it.

MR DU PLESSIS: So paragraph 11 where you say that Mr Hammond and members of Vlakplaas were panicking, you don't know him as somebody who panics rather easily?

MR ZEELIE: No, I have known him for quite some time, I have a photo of him and myself together in 1976.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Zeelie, please, I don't know what the relevance of that is, as far as we know, Mr Hammond planted the explosives and he was responsible for the actual explosion whether or not he was nervous or afraid, he committed the deed and he admitted it and you said that as well.

MR ZEELIE: Yes, that's correct, the only reason why I incorporated that was because it was part of my career where I was involved with the reality of unrest where the first doctor who was killed ...[intervention]

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Zeelie, we're dealing only with Khotso House at this occasion so answer the questions about that. We don't want to hear about any other incidents or any other casualties at any other places.

MR DU PLESSIS: Chairperson, I would just like to state that I asked the previous question as a basis for my following questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Before you go on, paragraph 1.12, the next paragraph, it appears to indicate that it was Mr Zeelie who decided the explosives should be put next to the lift shaft to avoid damage. I understood it was Colonel de Kock?

MR ZEELIE: Chairperson, yes I can comment on that. I was also an officer at that stage and the explosion took place in my region. As I have already mentioned, originally it would have been placed in a car and it could have been stated incorrectly here that I took the direct decision. However it was a joint decision. Mr de Kock was there and I agreed with him regarding this.

MR DU PLESSIS: But Mr Zeelie, in that respect I want to put something to you and that is that Mr Kotze and Mr Hammond said that it was a joint decision?

MR ZEELIE: That is correct, that is what I'm trying to convey.

MR DU PLESSIS: And they agree that it was decided that quicker action had to be taken that it couldn't be placed in a car, that it had to be placed in a lift shaft?

MR ZEELIE: That is correct and automatically then that would have led to fewer injuries.

MR DU PLESSIS: Very well, Mr Zeelie, then you would agree with me then that what you say in paragraph 1.9 that it took place on the following evening, that this was not in fact the following evening, my instructions are that this took place a week after the first incident?

MR ZEELIE: That correct, Chairperson, I think under cross-examination I have already conceded that it might have occurred an evening or much later according to my recollection which was refreshed with regard to the gathering with Mr de Kock at the hotel.

MR DU PLESSIS: On page 10 you state that Mr Hammond asked you where his ladder was and you would agree that it wasn't his ladder, the ladder which was used?

MR ZEELIE: No, that was also put incorrectly, to a certain degree I'm referring to the ladder which had been left on the scene and I assumed that he knew that I was to investigate the matter as a Stratcom matter.

MR DU PLESSIS: I don't know whether or not you have read Mr Hammond's Amnesty Application but mention was made of persons who were injured and he retrieved that information from official sources?

MR ZEELIE: Is that with regard to Khotso House?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes that's correct and I think you have just testified and I don't know if you realised what you were saying. You testified that there were no injuries and I want to put it to you that there were indeed injuries?

MR ZEELIE: No, I said that with regard to Cosatu House there were no injuries.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ADV MPSHE: Mr Zeelie, page 113 paragraph 12:

Was that a mistake or were they in actuality in the building?

MR ZEELIE: Chairperson, as Mr Eugene de Kock has already testified he also observed that there were in fact people in the building and those were the facts which I obtained as a result of my investigation at the scene.

ADV MPSHE: Yes but were they there during the explosion or when you visited the scene?

MR ZEELIE: That is my information which I obtained from the person at the building that they were in the building.

ADV MPSHE: Do you know what happened to these people?

MR ZEELIE: No I don't know what happened to them. As far as I knew they had to evacuate the building automatically, it would have been impossible for them to continue living there. I don't know what became of them.

ADV MPSHE: Where exactly where they in the building?

MR ZEELIE: At this point I can't tell you where exactly in the building they were but I think that Mr de Kock testified that, and I can't remember exactly which floor it was, but they were on one of the floors.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr de Kock said that there were people in the building, they had a laundry there, but he didn't say that they were there at the actual moment of the explosion that they observed people there at that time. He said that people were in the building during the week and that they might have been living there.

MR ZEELIE: That's correct Chairperson, I don't believe he testified that there was nobody in the building at the time of the explosion.

ADV DE JAGER: Now this information, can you just tell us, of these 28 people, did you find them there when you were investigating the scene and was it their direct testimony that they were there in the building when the explosion took place?

MR ZEELIE: I think that they were asleep but it was very clear that people were definitely living there.

ADV DE JAGER: Were any of them injured?

MR ZEELIE: None of them were injured.

ADV GCABASHE: I was just going to ask for a minute. Oh, thanks that's much better, thank you, there was just a bit of an interference.

MR SIBANYONI: Mr Zeelie, I was looking at your political objective for the Khotso House and what I noticed is that page 100 of Volume 1 that you only speak about the financial support which the SACC or Dr Beyers Naudè was giving to the ANC. What is missing there is the allegation that there were some explosives kept in Khotso House. What do you say about that?

MR ZEELIE: I did not testify during my evidence in chief that there were explosives in the building, what I said was that from the statements of other terrorists we got information that they were receiving financial assistance from the SACC and also were given shelter but I didn't mention explosives.

MR SIBANYONI: Yes, exactly, that is my question to say according to you or according to what you have said, you didn't have any knowledge whether there were any explosives kept at Khotso House.

MR ZEELIE: No, at this stage I have no recollection of whether there were explosives in the building specifically.

MR SIBANYONI: Because Khotso House was in your area in Johannesburg shouldn't one presume that you were the first person to hear or to know about such allegations?

MR ZEELIE: No, Chairperson, that would have been dealt with by the Church Affairs Desk and it would have been investigated by them and if they obtained any facts and if there was an action then I would have become involved.

MR SIBANYONI: No further questions, Mr Chairperson.

ADV GCABASHE: I've just got a couple, Chair.

Who was responsible for surveiling the area, reconnoitring the area before let's call it the first attempt, the aborted attempt?

MR ZEELIE: Nonnie Beyers did the observation of the place before he also joined Honeydew.

ADV GCABASHE: And what made you also decide to go on that particular day, what information did you rely on in deciding to go to Khotso House on that first day, the aborted day?

MR ZEELIE: I can't give you a specific reason why that specific day was decided upon, just as I also can't tell you why we went on the particular day when the explosion did take place?

ADV GCABASHE: Are you saying that that reconnoitring was not one of your areas of competency, other people made that decision?

MR ZEELIE: That is correct. I didn't specifically say that we should act on that particular day.

ADV GCABASHE: So it would not have been your duty either to decide on the effect or the impact of the bomb on surrounding buildings, you would not have had any input at all on that?

MR ZEELIE: I assumed and I knew that there would automatically be an impact on the surrounding buildings. As I have already said, I have experience, I have been involved in about 160 bomb scenes, so there is a release of energy which would then automatically impact on the buildings, the surrounding buildings and it wouldn't necessarily cause structural damage but it would break windows.

ADV GCABASHE: The question was did you have a specific input into the discussions around the impact on the surrounding buildings and the people in those buildings, just you personally?

MR ZEELIE: No.

ADV GCABASHE: Then just to take you back a little to your discussion with Nonnie Beyers about what was happening at Khotso House. You didn't verify any of that information?

MR ZEELIE: To whom? I accepted what he told me or I accepted his integrity and he knew what was what regarding church affairs.

ADV GCABASHE: So the short answer is you did not verify the information?

MR ZEELIE: No, Chairperson.

ADV GCABASHE: Then you say that you mentioned Khotso House to General Erasmus. Was that on the same day that you and Nonnie Beyers had discussed Khotso House?

MR ZEELIE: No, Nonnie Beyers told me on several occasions that we should take action against Khotso House and that is why I said that I would go with him to General Erasmus to discuss the matter.

ADV GCABASHE: Do you remember when you went to see General Erasmus specifically, do you remember the date at all?

MR ZEELIE: I can't remember a date.

ADV GCABASHE: In relation to the 31st August which is the day that the Vlakplaas team successfully completed this operation, in relation to that when did you see General Erasmus, one week, one month, two months before?

MR ZEELIE: It could have been a week, even two weeks beforehand but I would have to speculate if I wanted to give you an exact date.

ADV GCABASHE: You see, in that speculation what would assist you is the aborted attempt, you know, what we've come to call the aborted attempt, which you had placed at about a week before, very roughly. Again, you're just trying to remember, I recognise that.

MR ZEELIE: That is correct.

ADV GCABASHE: Now if you work backwards would you then say another week, working backwards?

MR ZEELIE: It's possible, it's very difficult at this stage to give you an answer to this.

ADV GCABASHE: What makes it so difficult, Mr Zeelie?

MR ZEELIE: It happened a long time ago and it's really difficult for me to give an answer to that.

ADV GCABASHE: So it's more recollection, it's the recalling that's difficult?

MR ZEELIE: That is correct.

ADV GCABASHE: Now on the day that you mentioned this to General Erasmus, he said to you he would like to talk to head office about this, that's what you said?

MR ZEELIE: That's correct.

ADV GCABASHE: He then reverted to you. Now when he came back to you on this was it on the day that you had mentioned it to him or at a later stage?

MR ZEELIE: No, it was the same day.

ADV GCABASHE: Right, now in relation to that day when did you go to Pretoria, the very next day?

MR ZEELIE: The following day, yes.

ADV GCABASHE: So as far as you were concerned, this was a plan of action that was authorised by General van der Merwe downwards, you knew nothing beyond the General van der Merwe level, just you personally?

MR ZEELIE: It's very difficult to say. When General Erasmus came back and said that authorisation was already given, I accepted that so the perception might have arisen that there was already an authorisation for that from higher up.

ADV GCABASHE: I'm trying to determine that "van bo af", how high, your perception. I know you were at General van der Merwe's office, you were standing outside his office anyway, how high your perception, you were an officer who was involved, you were there. How high up?

MR ZEELIE: It could have meant for me from General van der Merwe upwards, it might even have gone as far as the State President. I didn't ask any questions about it, it would have been wrong for me to question any of my senior officers about it.

ADV GCABASHE: Then in relation to this being a decision by Mr Vlok and Mr van der Merwe as opposed to a Stratcom decision, can you give any input on that at all, would you have any sense at all of a decision by two rather than as a policy decision? Can you give us any help with that?

MR ZEELIE: Do you mean at Khotso House, that it was a Stratcom action?

ADV GCABASHE: Both essentially, I'm just trying to understand. You've heard all the evidence and we have heard evidence that, this is Cosatu House, was P.W. downwards. Khotso House it was inferred that it was P.W. downwards and I'm trying to understand that instruction from the officers as against to a policy decision by Stratcom and we've been told that Stratcom did not authorise illegal activities. Now I'm looking at Stratcom as a separate entity, as a government policy decision making body authorising this as opposed to individuals authorising these types of actions, illegal actions.

MR ZEELIE: If I understand the question correctly then this action was an action against the building from which these organisations operated. I personally can't really give an answer as to what the true reasons of General van der Merwe or even Minister Vlok or Mr P.W. Botha might have been. I went to General Erasmus, he said there had already been given an order for that and I just carried out.

ADV GCABASHE: Thank you Mr Zeelie.

CHAIRPERSON: One point I would like to clarify with you and you've told us that after the explosion the caretaker of the building ran down the stairs?

MR ZEELIE: That's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Now he gave evidence at the hearing at George where as I understand his evidence he said he was sitting at the reception which I take it would have been at the entrance?

MR ZEELIE: The inference which I made as I already said is after the explosion one could clearly see his footsteps from up above.

CHAIRPERSON: How can you say they were his footprints, you

may have seen footprints on the stairs?

MR ZEELIE: That's what I was going to explain now, that was the only conclusion that I could draw that those were his footsteps because there was nobody else who came forward in respect of being on a higher floor and Mr Weyers's information was that only the night watchman was right there.

CHAIRPERSON: I thought you told us there were 28 people or something in the building?

MR ZEELIE: That's Cosatu House.

CHAIRPERSON: Cosatu House was it, not Khotso?

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, I may just point out in respect of that guard as far as my information goes, a witness or a statement was taken from the guard at the stage of the inspection afterwards and I don't know if that statement was at all utilised during his evidence.

CHAIRPERSON: He talks in his evidence of someone else having come down from the third floor.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, Mr Chairman, I haven't had sight of that statement but I think as far as I know that statement possibly contradicts the evidence that he gave in that trial but that's as far as I can take it.

CHAIRPERSON: You haven't seen it so how can you say that?

MR DU PLESSIS: I have instructions in that.

MR ROSSOUW: I've got no re-examination Mr Chairman, can

the witness then be excused?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes certainly.

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Chairman, I will then call Mr Dries also known as Brood van Heerden. You will also find his application at Volume 1, page 159 to 179.

ANDRIES JOHANNES VAN HEERDEN: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR ROSSOUW: Thank you Mr Chairman.

Mr van Heerden, I refer you to page 159 of your Amnesty Application in Volume 1. Do you confirm the contents of the paragraphs on that first page up to 7(b)?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Yes.

MR ROSSOUW: Do you confirm that you were a member of the IFP?

MR VAN HEERDEN: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: And during 1987 and 1988?

MR VAN HEERDEN: At that stage I was still a supporter of the National Party.

MR ROSSOUW: On the following page 160, do you confirm the contents of that page as far as your role as a Police Officer is concerned and also for the periods which you were in the Police 1972 to 1987 and then from 1988 onwards?

MR VAN HEERDEN: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: Is it correct that during 1987 you were a member or an employee of a bank group in South Africa, not a member of the Police and that any reference to your involvement in the Cosatu House is entirely incorrect?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Yes that's true.

MR ROSSOUW: Then on the next page up to page 163, end of that page is that your signature which appears on the application, do you confirm it?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Yes.

MR ROSSOUW: Then on page 164, annexure to your Amnesty Application, do you confirm the contents of paragraphs 1, 2 thereof?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Yes.

MR ROSSOUW: And specifically on page 165 in the second paragraph you there state that during your period of service in the Police you were indoctrinated specifically to the extent that you had to struggle against this communism, the onslaught of communism and that was also strengthened by the statements made by senior members of the Police and politicians, pointed out the ANC as enemies of the Republic?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Correct.

MR ROSSOUW: And it's in this background that you served in the South African Police?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Correct.

MR ROSSOUW: Mr van Heerden, on page 167 you apply for amnesty for the Cry Freedom incident and the explosion at the Alexandra Theatre. You've heard that it was also called the King's Theatre?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Yes that is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: And you ask for amnesty for any offence, omission or delict which may have arisen from that action, is that correct?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Yes.

MR ROSSOUW: You mention that you were only aware of the explosion, you weren't involved in the planning or execution thereof, is that correct?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Yes.

MR ROSSOUW: You say that you knew that Colonel Niels van Wyk instructed Mr Zeelie to prepare a limpet mine which was given to Joe Matsemela?

MR VAN HEERDEN: That is what Mr Zeelie told me.

MR ROSSOUW: So that was what was told to you?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Yes, indeed.

MR ROSSOUW: You were in Mr Zeelie's office when the limpet mine was prepared by him?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Yes.

MR ROSSOUW: And thereafter you went with him, where?

MR VAN HEERDEN: I went with him to Colonel van Wyk's office. He went into Van Wyk's office, I went past to the filing office.

MR ROSSOUW: You say the limpet mine was to be placed in the theatre to prevent the screening of the Cry Freedom film which related to the life of Steve Biko?

MR VAN HEERDEN: What I mentioned there is what I was told after the explosion had taken place that the thing had been placed at a theatre and the reasons therefore.

MR ROSSOUW: You say that after the explosion you went to the scene?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Yes that's correct.

MR ROSSOUW: Mr van Heerden, you also made a statement to the Attorney General regarding this incident and this appears on page 173 to 175 of Volume A?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Yes, that's correct.

MR ROSSOUW: There you mention all the things that you now confirmed. I'd like to just refer you to paragraph 12.1.2. There you state in the fourth line from the bottom that Boet Engelbrecht, the investigating officer, was told or he was told that he would be the investigating officer and he was told this after the incident?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Correct.

MR ROSSOUW: You then mention a number of people, Colonel Victor, Nic Deetlefs, Fleischman, Brits and At van Niekerk. Is it correct that they were members of the investigation team and you don't mean that they actually knew of the operation beforehand?

MR VAN HEERDEN: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: Mr van Heerden, then you say that no one was injured or killed during the explosion or no one was killed. Do you know whether anybody was injured?

MR VAN HEERDEN: No one was injured.

MR ROSSOUW: But the theatre was damaged?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Yes that is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: As far as the political objective was concerned you listened to the evidence of General van der Merwe and Minister Vlok and also General du Toit, do you associate yourself with that, do you agree that that was the political objective with this action?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Yes.

MR ROSSOUW: And you request that it be seen as part of your application?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Yes.

MR ROSSOUW: 169, you say there you saw the planting of a limpet mine as an action associated with a political objective, seeing as it was a politically inspired film dealing with the life of a political activist and your action would prevent the screening of it?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Yes.

MR ROSSOUW: You also say that according to your opinion, the preventing of the screening of the film would prevent any further emphasis which was placed by the liberation movements on the struggle against the government and that the screening could actually place a lot of emphasis on the liberation movement's struggle amongst the members of the broader public and help them?

MR VAN HEERDEN: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: Did you derive any benefit financial or otherwise from your actions?

MR VAN HEERDEN: No.

MR ROSSOUW: You also say that you were not involved but as far as you are aware you're asking for amnesty for any involvement and this was also told to you by Mr Zeelie?

MR VAN HEERDEN: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: Mr van Heerden, on page 169 you also ask for amnesty for your involvement in the bomb explosion, arson or damage to property or any other unlawful act which may appear or arise from the bomb explosion at Khotso House and your involvement in that?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Correct.

MR ROSSOUW: As far as that's concerned you also made a statement to the Attorney General and was attached to your application and it's contained in the bundle page 176 to 179 in Volume 2, is that correct?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Yes.

MR ROSSOUW: On page 170 you state that there was information at the disposal of the Security Police which proved that or said that the ANC received financial support from the SACC, do you have personal knowledge of that?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Yes.

MR ROSSOUW: How is that so?

MR VAN HEERDEN: I was the handler of a person who on two occasions pretended to be a member of the ANC MK and he received financial support from Khotso House.

MR ROSSOUW: Page 170, as far as the first incident is concerned, the first unsuccessful attempt, you say that you were at home and that Mr Zeelie who was the explosives expert at John Vorster came to pick you up?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Yes.

MR ROSSOUW: You then went to a house in Honeydew and Generals Erasmus and Du Toit were there, is that correct?

MR VAN HEERDEN: As I have already said, General Erasmus and General Du Toit were there but I've already said that General Du Toit on the second occasion, after the successful completion was at the house in Honeydew.

MR ROSSOUW: Okay so this previous incident, before the unsuccessful attempt, that is not correct?

MR VAN HEERDEN: That is not correct, yes.

MR ROSSOUW: You then say that the members of the explosives unit, Kotze and Hammond were also present?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Yes.

MR ROSSOUW: You heard the evidence that there was a first attempt and that it was abandoned because there were too many people in the street outside the building, is that correct?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Yes.

MR ROSSOUW: As far as the second attempt is concerned you say it took place about a week later and once again you were picked up by Mr Zeelie at your home?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Yes.

MR ROSSOUW: Page 177, ... [intervention]

ADV GCABASHE: Could I just very quickly, if you finish off 171 because that's where you are. I see mention is made of, it must be Warrant Officer Mostert and then there's General Bassie Smit and Krappies Engelbrecht. They were involved in the cover up, is that correct to your knowledge?

MR ROSSOUW: According to the evidence, yes. Mr Chairman, why I'm skipping to 177 is because it follows chronologically at this point in the evidence but ...[intervention]

ADV GCABASHE: Are you coming back to this?

MR ROSSOUW: Yes.

ADV GCABASHE: My apologies.

MR ROSSOUW: Mr van Heerden, on page 177 - sorry Mr Chairman, if you could just give us a minute, it seems that the pages were not bound into the bundle of the applicant?

At the end of that page, paragraph 12.2.5 you refer the second attempt which took place a couple of days later. You say that Mr Zeelie picked you up at your home and you once again went to Honeydew and that is where Colonel de Kock was involved. You also said that that was the first time that you met him?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Correct.

MR ROSSOUW: You say that there were certain people involved and present there. You once again mention Du Toit, is that General du Toit?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Yes.

MR ROSSOUW: Is that correct?

MR VAN HEERDEN: No that's not correct, I saw him later that evening.

MR ROSSOUW: Then on page 178, just the following page, you say that there was a briefing session which Kotze and De Kock led and afterwards you went to the building. What was your role to be?

MR VAN HEERDEN: I was standing in front of the building in De Villiers Street. I had to notify the members entering the building of any movements in the street.

MR ROSSOUW: So you acted as a stop group?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Yes, it simply means that I was standing outside of the building, I wasn't really part of a stop group in any true sense of the word.

MR ROSSOUW: 12.2.8, there you refer to the penetration group in a kombi. De Kock, Kotze, Hammond, Zeelie, Beyers and Douw Willemse.

MR VAN HEERDEN: Yes, that's what I remember.

MR ROSSOUW: Can you elaborate on the role of Mr Willemse in this group?

MR VAN HEERDEN: I can't say for sure, no I can't remember exactly what his role was after they entered the building.

MR ROSSOUW: And then in paragraph 12.2.9 you say that afterwards or a couple of minutes later the penetration could have come out of the building and you then left, you drove to a parking area behind a Braamfontein Hotel, that's where you heard the explosion?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Correct.

MR ROSSOUW: And 12.2.11 on page 179 you say that you once again drove to Honeydew?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Yes.

MR ROSSOUW: You say that your recollection is that General du Toit was present at Honeydew at that stage?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Yes.

MR ROSSOUW: Do you confirm the rest of the contents in that statement on 179 and more specifically the function at Vlakplaas where Mr Vlok attended and which you also attended?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Yes.

MR ROSSOUW: And then Mr van Heerden if I can take you back to page 171 in the second paragraph, there you say that an investigation was done after the explosion and as far as you are aware it was under the leadership of Lieutenant Mostert?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Yes but Mostert never heard the true facts from me.

MR ROSSOUW: So you didn't make any false statement to anybody in this connection about the operation?

MR VAN HEERDEN: No, I never made a statement about the operation.

MR ROSSOUW: You say that Warrant Officer Mostert reported to General Bassie Smit and Krappies Engelbrecht?

MR VAN HEERDEN: That's what he told me.

MR ROSSOUW: You also say that nobody was injured or killed during the explosion?

MR VAN HEERDEN: That is correct.

MR ROSSOUW: And also that Khotso House was however damaged?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Yes.

MR ROSSOUW: Mr van Heerden you also listened to the evidence given here by General van der Merwe and Mr Vlok relating to the political objectives concerned. Do you agree with those objectives, do you associate yourself with that and do you also ask that it be incorporated in your application for amnesty?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Yes, indeed.

MR ROSSOUW: And then as already mentioned on page 172, you were personally aware of the fact that Khotso House gave financial assistance to liberation fighters?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Yes.

MR ROSSOUW: And this financial assistance would support the freedom fighters and enable them to continue their armed struggle against the Government of the day?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Yes.

MR ROSSOUW: You did not derive any benefit from your involvement in this operation, financial or otherwise?

MR VAN HEERDEN: No.

MR ROSSOUW: And you also acted on orders which you received and you say that your involvement arose out of the orders which you received from your superiors from John Vorster Square, General Erasmus?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Yes.

MR ROSSOUW: And that Eugene de Kock was personally responsible for the successful operation?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Yes.

MR ROSSOUW: And you say that Generals Erasmus and Du Toit were present at both operations, you have now corrected that?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Yes. Chairperson, if I may just add in respect of Khotso House, Mr Frank Chikane, the Reverend Frank Chikane's son was involved in an explosion at Northcliff shopping centre. A colleague of his had blown himself up and according to identikits and statements obtained he was with this person at the time of the explosion. There was information that he was actually hiding in Khotso House and after the explosion possessions belonging to Mr Chikane's son were found in one of the vehicles.

MR ROSSOUW: Thank you Mr Chairman, that's the evidence for the applicant.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: But a few brief questions. Visser on record with your leave Mr Chairman.

Mr van Heerden page 171 where you make reference to Warrant Officer Mostert and reference to General Bassie Smit and Krappies Engelbrecht, it was put to you by Commissioner Gcabashe that they were part of the cover up, but am I correct in saying that this is not what you say here?

MR VAN HEERDEN: No, I have never said to any one that I was involved and neither did Warrant Officer Mostert know, I just know that he reported to him about the matter.

MR VISSER: And that's all you are trying to say?

MR VAN HEERDEN: That's all I am trying to say there.

MR VISSER: With regard to Colonel du Toit, he tells me that he had nothing on earth to do with Khotso House. Now you say that you made an error and you admit that you make an error that he was previously at a planning meeting but you keep on saying that you saw him later. Now he says that he was never at any meeting which had any connection with Khotso House. Can he be correct regarding your recollection or are you so dead certain that you can say Piet du Toit is not telling the truth?

MR VAN HEERDEN: My recollection is that he was there, Mr Chairperson, but if General du Toit says he was not there, I know of many people who took part in the operation who I have not mentioned. I'll concede that General du Toit can be correct in saying he was not there.

MR VISSER: And it was a long time ago?

MR VAN HEERDEN: It was a long time back.

MR VISSER: If I can refer you to page 186 to be read together with page 174, if you can just keep your fingers on both pages, the impression is already made on page 186 that what you know about the orders that were given with regard to the theatre in Alexandra is something which was told to you.

MR VAN HEERDEN: The order was conveyed to me, Chairperson.

MR ROSSOUW: And you specifically state that on page 174 in paragraph 12.1.2, Lieutenant Zeelie told you?

MR VAN HEERDEN: I have just testified to that Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Okay, then we don't have an argument about that because you see General du Toit testified that he was the acting commander at that time and that Niels van Wyk was on leave at the time of this incident so that is your recollection?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Chairperson, Mr van Wyk was in his office when Mr Zeelie went to see him.

MR VISSER: So you say Mr van Wyk was there.

MR VAN HEERDEN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: No further questions, thank you Mr Chairman.

MR SIBANYONI: Mr van Heerden on page 168 you refer to Joe Mamasela but Mr Zeelie said that is should be Joe Matsemela, is that also your recollection?

MR VAN HEERDEN: Chairperson, the name Joe Mamasela, Mr Zeelie told me that Joe Mamasela was going to do it and that is why I mentioned the name Joe Mamasela there.

CHAIRPERSON: He corrects it now, Zeelie originally says he used Mamasela?

MR SIBANYONI: He didn't correct it.

CHAIRPERSON: He was told by Zeelie.

MR SIBANYONI: And on page 177 you refer to Khotso House as the head office of the World Council of Churches. I take it that you want to say ...[intervention]

MR VAN HEERDEN: It's the Council of Churches, correct.

MR SIBANYONI: You say there were many names that you did not mention of people who were involved in the operation at the time. Why did you not mention these names?

MR VAN HEERDEN: It's people that I cannot remember who took part in the operation because I did not know many of the people at that stage.

MR SIBANYONI: No further questions Mr Chairperson.

ADV DE JAGER: And you also mentioned peoples names that had nothing to do with the incident such as Joe Mamasela and Smit and those people?

MR VAN HEERDEN: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Chairman, I've been requested by the applicant that he just wants to use a minute to say something.

ADV GCABASHE: Can I just ask a very short question before he does that? Page 179, that last paragraph, 12.2.13. You comment about Minister Vlok, the last seven or so lines, that you talked about a "hoop robbel bakstene". This is your affidavit here?

MR VAN HEERDEN: That is correct.

ADV GCABASHE: Tell us a little bit about that?

MR VAN HEERDEN: It was on the occasion at Vlakplaas where Minister Vlok congratulated us where he just said "it was a house and then just a pile a bricks" and then Mr Vlok was silenced.

ADV GCABASHE: So he made some - he tried to make reference to the bombing and he was ...[intervention]

MR VAN HEERDEN: That is correct.

ADV GCABASHE: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: And was it on this occasion that somebody said, one of the officers said: "shhh" when the Minister said that in an attempt to prevent him from saying too much in front of other people who were unaware of the true situation?

MR VAN HEERDEN: That is correct, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Please proceed.

MR VAN HEERDEN: Mr Chairman, I just want to make a statement in Zulu and I would like you have it interpreted so that the other members can understand it:

"Mr de Kock is the King of Kings. Go well."

MR ROSSOUW: Thank you Mr Chairman, may the applicant be excused?

ADV GCABASHE: A quick question, you're not saying that in respect of any of the other people who are your seniors?

MR VAN HEERDEN: I'm saying this to Colonel de Kock in person due to the testimony that he has given about his men.

ADV GCABASHE: Thank you.

MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, I am due to start with the next three applicants, that will be applicant number 21 that I intend calling first. Mr Kok, then Mr Du Toit, number 13 and in the last place Mr Hattingh who is applicant number 11 in Volume 1 but it is inconvenient to use one of these conventional microphones, may I perhaps just ask that the applicant microphone that stays on just be moved here?

You would find Mr Kok at page 89 of Volume 2.

JAKOB FRANCOIS KOK: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, there would have been handed to the Committee four pages, five pages which are marked 95(a) to (e) which I just asked to be included in Mr Kok's application but I should perhaps mention at the outset that for purposes here, the Committee can ignore page 95(a) and it only becomes relevant at the very last paragraph on 95(b) that small (b). 95(a) actually deals with another operation.

Mr Kok you have your application before you?

MR KOK: Yes I do, Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: And you are applying for amnesty for the Khotso House incident, is that correct?

MR KOK: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Do you confirm on page 92 of your application that you ask for amnesty for any offence, omission or delict which relates directly to the incident?

MR KOK: Yes Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Please return to page 89, paragraphs 7(a) and (b) it must read National Party and supporter and not applicable, is that correct?

MR KOK: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Do you confirm page 90 as correct?

MR KOK: I confirm it as correct.

MR BOOYENS: And page 91?

MR KOK: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: We are now on page 92, you earlier stated ...[intervention]

ADV GCABASHE: I'm sorry, Mr Booyens, just one minute. The translation is not coming through, it's just not coming through at all unless there's something wrong with what I have here? Thank you.

MR BOOYENS: Maybe it's not coming through because I'm speaking too quickly Commissioner?

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Booyens couldn't you perhaps - would you have objection if you asked the questions in English?

MR KOK: No, I won't have any objection.

MR BOOYENS: Very well. Perhaps we should just enquire, Mr Chairman, is it a just a problem with the translation or is it with the transcription as well?

CHAIRPERSON: Transmission.

MR BOOYENS: Just the transmission. Very well.

Mr Kok, just one further aspect, at page 92, paragraph ...[inaudible]. Very briefly, you have heard the evidence of the erstwhile Minister of Law and Order, you have heard the evidence of the erstwhile Commission of Police and the senior officers in charge of this operation. Do you confirm the correctness thereof?

MR KOK: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: In so far as you personal knowledge thereof.

MR KOK: Yes Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: And do you also confirm the political motivation as set out by those senior officials as to the reason that it was decided that Khotso House should be sabotaged?

MR KOK: I agree with that Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Is it further correct that - did you yourself in your capacity as a security policeman, although you were attached to a technical section, have some knowledge of the activities of the South African Council of Churches and the allegations that were being made about their activities?

MR KOK: Yes we would get some information on a regular basis through minutes that came to the office.

MR BOOYENS: I think you're referring to security reports?

MR KOK: Security reports.

MR BOOYENS: Right. You although you were not in a field section and you had no way of verifying or checking the veracity of these statements, is that correct?

MR KOK: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Would it further be correct to say that you ...[intervention]

ADV DE JAGER: Apparently the fault with the translation has been fixed now and you can go ahead.

MR BOOYENS: Is it further correct that you were on occasion given instruction by your commanding officer Mr Waal du Toit to take your lock picking equipment, specifically those dealing with those dealing with the opening of motor cars and to accompany Colonel de Kock on an operation?

MR KOK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: To your recollection at that stage were you told by Mr du Toit what the nature of the operation would be or the purpose or not?

MR KOK: No Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: On a subsequently later, or after you had reported to Colonel de Kock and accompanied him you learnt that the purpose was that Khotso House should be sabotaged and you would open motor cars to enable explosives to be placed in them to create certain impressions?

MR KOK: That's correct.

MR BOOYENS: Is it furthermore correct that you did accompany the members there, it was decided to abandon the idea of placing the explosives inside the motor cars and you then did nothing but you did accompany them, is that correct?

MR KOK: Yes that's correct.

MR BOOYENS: Subsequent to that, after the operation did you report back to your commanding officer, Mr du Toit, and informed him in fact that the destination was Khotso House and that's how you were involved?

MR KOK: Yes I gave him a full report.

MR BOOYENS: So far as - do you confirm the balance of your application as set out in the papers before the Committee?

MR KOK: Yes I confirm it.

MR BOOYENS: In so far as your personal political convictions were concerned were you prepared once you knew that the destination was Khotso House and once you were given a background as to the reason for the operation to associate yourself with this operation?

MR KOK: Yes I was prepared.

MR BOOYENS: You were prepared.

MR KOK: I was prepared.

MR BOOYENS: And as far as you were concerned against your own political belief apart from such reasons as were given against the background of your own political beliefs and on the information you had available which you already stated you were unable to check, were you satisfied that you could take part in this operation, it was part of the struggle against the liberation movements?

MR KOK: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Thank you Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Thank you Chairperson, I call Mr Waal du Toit. You will find his application on page 1 of Volume 2.

WYBRAND ANDREAS LODEWICKUS DU TOIT: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS: Thank you Chair.

Mr du Toit, you are applying for amnesty in connection with the explosion at Khotso House?

MR DU TOIT: Yes that is correct.

MR BOOYENS: And just to get back to what you called it here, you describe your involvement on page 6 as that of being an accessory after the fact to malicious injury to property and you are asking for amnesty for any other offences or delicts which are directly connected to your involvement in this regard?

MR DU TOIT: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: And then if you will go to page 1, paragraph 7(a) and (b) would it be correct to say that you are the supporter of the National Party?

MR DU TOIT: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Page 2, do you confirm the correctness of that page?

MR DU TOIT: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Page 3?

MR DU TOIT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: As far as page 6 at the top, paragraph 9(a)?

MR DU TOIT: Yes that is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Can you recall - you've heard the evidence of Mr Kok who worked under your command that there was an instruction to assist Colonel de Kock?

MR DU TOIT: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Do you accept that that's how it happened?

MR DU TOIT: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Can you recall the request of Mr Kok?

MR DU TOIT: No I can't specifically recall it.

MR BOOYENS: But you will accept that Mr - by the way Mr de Kock also can't remember it, he said that he would have phoned you and it would have been a normal routine request and perhaps he might have told you what it was about but you can't recall that?

MR DU TOIT: No.

MR BOOYENS: But you accept that you gave Mr Kok an order?

MR DU TOIT: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Was this a routine type of request?

MR DU TOIT: Yes, it was a routine request.

MR BOOYENS: And you first heard that he was involved in the blowing up of Khotso House when he reported back to you at a later stage?

MR DU TOIT: Yes, he reported back to me on the next day.

MR BOOYENS: Were you also aware of the allegations without commenting on the correctness thereof, allegations regarding Khotso House and the SACC, in other words allegations that they were giving support to liberation movements etc?

MR DU TOIT: Yes I was aware of that.

MR BOOYENS: And you as a technical man had no way in which to verify that information?

MR DU TOIT: No.

MR BOOYENS: You just accepted that these allegations or information was correct?

MR DU TOIT: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: As far as your personal political convictions were concerned at that stage after you heard this you reconciled yourself with the fact that this was done in the struggle against the liberation movements?

MR DU TOIT: Yes, I associated myself with it.

MR BOOYENS: You also heard the evidence given here by Minister Vlok the former Commissioner of Police and the other person who was in charge of this operation as far as the political motivation of this operation was concerned, do you associate yourself with that?

MR DU TOIT: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Do you confirm the total content of your application as it has been submitted to the Committee?

MR DU TOIT: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: And you request amnesty as it is set out in the documents?

MR DU TOIT: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

PAUL JACOBUS HATTINGH: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS: The applicant's application appears on page 235 of bundle 1.

Mr Hattingh, during consultations you pointed out to me that there were a number of aspects which need to be raised and that is on page 2 where you give the background of your career it has to be said that you were a member of the Detective Branch at Brakpan between 1973 and 1977 - yes the rest I just think relates to a typing error which I can correct. Do you confirm the contents of page 235 up to page 238?

MR HATTINGH: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: You also heard the evidence of the former Minister of Law and Order and the Commissioner of Police and the other officers involved in this operation, is that correct?

MR HATTINGH: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: And as far as you can recall and are personally aware, you can confirm that is correct and you associate yourself with the political objectives as set out by the Minister and the Commissioner?

MR HATTINGH: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: At the time of these two incidents because you apply for amnesty for both Khotso and Cosatu Houses, you were the Lieutenant Colonel in charge of the explosives training unit and the bomb disposal unit?

MR HATTINGH: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: And on page 239 you state what you can recall about Khotso House namely that, and that's been confirmed by Brigadier Schoon, that you received an order from him to help General Erasmus and his men and that Colonel de Kock was also involved and that you ordered some of your members also to assist?

MR HATTINGH: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Is that as far as you can recall?

MR HATTINGH: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Now as far as Cosatu House is concerned, the applications on page 243 and once again you say that you received an order from Brigadier Schoon and you told certain members to assist in the operation?

MR HATTINGH: Correct.

MR BOOYENS: You were aware that it was contemplated that the building should be damaged by means of explosives and by virtue of the fact that you were a security policeman you were aware of the allegations made regarding the activities of the organisations attached to both Khotso House and Cosatu House?

MR HATTINGH: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: And in both cases you personally associated yourself with this as a result of your own personal convictions, you saw it as an action in the struggle against the liberation movements?

MR HATTINGH: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: And you also associated yourself with the statements made by the other members as far as the political motivation is concerned?

MR HATTINGH: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: You heard the evidence of General Erasmus and Mr Zeelie that they visited you at some point, do you remember that?

MR HATTINGH: I don't specifically remember it but it's very possible.

MR BOOYENS: So you won't deny that?

MR HATTINGH: No.

MR BOOYENS: Do you confirm the contents of your application as being correct?

MR HATTINGH: Yes, chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: That's all Chair.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, I have just one question.

Mr Hattingh you have heard what I've said that Mr Kotze will testify that you gave the orders with Khotso House and that there was an abortive attempt and then a second attempt. Would there be any reason why you could dispute that?

MR HATTINGH: No. I don't recall it specifically but it's possible.

ADV GCABASHE: Thank you Chair. Just a couple of brief questions. When General Erasmus and Mr Zeelie visited you were they with Hammond and Coetzee or Kotze rather, or on their own?

MR HATTINGH: No, I don't remember that visit.

ADV GCABASHE: So as far you are concerned, you got an order from Brigadier Schoon and flowing from that you instructed your junior officer?

MR HATTINGH: That is correct.

ADV GCABASHE: Thank you.

AMNESTY HEARING

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, I think my witnesses are next, my applicants, I beg your pardon, if I can just request a microphone over here please.

ADV DE JAGER: Would you kindly switch seats Mr du Plessis?

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman we'll use Mr Cornelius's place. I beg leave to call Hennie Kotze. Mr Chairman, I beg leave to call Hennie also known by certain Russian people as Ginger Kotze, Mr Chairman.

HENNIE KOTZE: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman you'll find his application on page 97 of Volume 2.

Mr Kotze you have given your background and your training from page 98 up to and including page 116, do you confirm this?

MR KOTZE: Yes I do.

ADV GCABASHE: But you do want to make a correction on page 98 don't you? Paragraph one, two, three, four:

You want to change that? Page 98?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, Mr Chairman, that is correct, that just skipped my attention but that should be 1st December 1975. I am indebted to you, I didn't pick that up.

Mr Kotze during the time that you were involved with the Security Branch with regard to this specific operation did you act for and behalf of the National Party and did you believe in their ideology?

MR KOTZE: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And were you a supporter of the National Party?

MR KOTZE: Yes I was a supporter.

MR DU PLESSIS: And did you believe that you were fighting against the liberation movements and communism.

MR KOTZE: Absolutely, Chairperson.

MR DU PLESSIS: And you have heard the evidence of Minister Vlok and General van der Merwe and the other witnesses with regard to the political reasons and motivation for their action in this operation. Do you confirm that evidence?

MR KOTZE: Yes, I confirm that.

MR DU PLESSIS: Will you please turn ...[inaudible]. Under whose command did you act?

MR KOTZE: At the time of the incident I was under the command or the direct command of Colonel Hattingh.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Kotze, you've given the details of this deed from page 117 and that is with regard to Khotso House, that's page 117 to page 119.

MR KOTZE: That is correct, I confirm that.

MR DU PLESSIS: Could you please explain to the Committee the order which you received with regard to this action, was this issued by your commander, Mr Hattingh?

MR KOTZE: That is correct. Colonel Hattingh gave the order to me and my colleague Mr George Hammond to execute this operation.

MR DU PLESSIS: And was this order given before the first operation took place?

MR KOTZE: Yes that is correct.

INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone is not on.

MR DU PLESSIS: That he also told you that the Municipal Elections were to be disrupted?

MR KOTZE: That's correct.

INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone.

MR DU PLESSIS: And during the abortive attempt it was stopped because a more senior officer was not there, what was the reason for that?

MR KOTZE: The prominent reasons were of a dual nature. Firstly because in the street where the target building and that is Khotso House was situated, there were too many people, even in the early morning hours there were too many people and I was afraid that people would be injured and it would also be easier for us to be noticed and that would of course place the entire operation at risk. I decided that we should withdraw and try again at a later occasion instead of picking up too many problems.

MR DU PLESSIS: Lets return to the order given by Colonel Hattingh. When you received the order did you believe that it was a lawful order?

MR KOTZE: Yes. Colonel Hattingh's managerial style was that we as a unit would not execute anything unless a lawful or legal order had been issued from above and then the order would also flow to us by means of the commander of our unit who at that stage was Colonel Hattingh. Therefore when the order was conveyed to me I had no doubt that in terms of the structure of the Police and it was a legal and legitimate order and he also said that the order came from much higher above. According to my recollection he made such a remark that it was an order which came from a very high level.

MR DU PLESSIS: But he didn't tell me from who the order came?

MR KOTZE: No, he didn't say.

MR DU PLESSIS: And then with the second operation that was approximately a week before the first abortive attempt?

MR KOTZE: Yes, it could be a week or it could be a few days less or more but it was approximately a time period such as that which followed according to my recollection.

MR DU PLESSIS: Could you explain the preparation which you undertook? The charges which were used, the switches and such?

INTERPRETER: The speakers microphone is not on.

MR KOTZE: After we received the order we had the meeting and discussed how we would compile the charge, what type of switch we would use and in order to explain the characteristics of this operation we decided to use Eastern Bloc weaponry so that if pieces of debris were left or if a partial detonation were to take place and leave pieces of debris it could not be traced to South African origin and that the finger could not be pointed at us. We decided to use mechanic switches, if I remember correctly, they were of Russian origin, mechanical time switches and along with that an MD5M switch of Russian origin.

With our first attempt we used landmines mostly, if I remember correctly they were Russian landmines and a number of sticks of TNT. There was also a block of plastic explosives which was also of Eastern Bloc origin. That is more or less what we used during the first attempt.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you Mr Kotze, we neglected to discuss the end of the first aborted attempt. When you came back from that attempt you went to talk to your Commander Colonel Hattingh?

MR KOTZE: That's correct. That evening we decided between myself and Mr Hammond we discussed it, we told each other that it may be possible to involve Colonel de Kock and his staff because he was a very well experienced an capable operative and we'll be able to enjoy the protection of his staff when we acted and the following day we discussed this with Colonel Hattingh and he agreed that this was a good idea and according to my best recollection, Mr Hammond and I drove out to Vlakplaas where we presented our problem to Mr de Kock. His immediate reaction was that he didn't have a problem with assisting us but that he didn't want to do something like that out of his own and that he requested that his commander at that state, Brigadier Schoon, also be involved in the matter and that he needed the green light from that side.

Then from Vlakplaas I phoned Colonel Hattingh and by means of a cryptical discussion I conveyed the facts to him and if I remember correctly, Colonel Hattingh then phoned Brigadier Schoon and discussed the matter with him and approximately ten to fifteen minutes later a telephone call came from head office, from Brigadier Schoon to Colonel de Kock to inform him that there would be no problems in his assisting us and then we began to plan the operation with him.

MR DU PLESSIS: Regarding the operation, entering the building, who was involved in entering the building.

MR KOTZE: I can remember that it was Colonel de Kock, myself, Mr Hammond, Mr Kok was also with us, Charles Zeelie was present, I remember Willemse, Nonnie Beyers of course who walked ahead to point out the route and I think Mr Snor Vermeulen as well. That would be the group that moved in to the back part of Khotso House.

MR DU PLESSIS: You've heard the evidence that people were spotted from inside who could look through into the parking area and it was decided not to plant the explosives in a car, do you agree?

MR KOTZE: Yes I do.

MR DU PLESSIS: And then it was decided to plant the explosives near the lift shaft?

MR KOTZE: Yes, we then decided to plant the charge against the lift shaft.

MR DU PLESSIS: And you followed the same route out of the building?

MR KOTZE: Yes, after the charges had been placed Colonel de Kock gave the order that all who were not directly involved should withdraw and if I remember correctly, myself and Mr Hammond and Mr de Kock remained with the charges.

MR DU PLESSIS: And after it had been activated you left the building by the same route?

MR KOTZE: Yes, climbed back into the vehicle that was driven by Mr Snyders and then we left.

MR DU PLESSIS: Where did you go then?

MR KOTZE: A distance away we stopped and I heard from the versions of the other applicants that it was near the Braamfontein Hotel. We waited until we heard the explosion taking place. When this happened and was confirmed by radio from other vehicles among others Colonel de Kock was in a different vehicle and we received confirmation that the charge had indeed gone off and that the explosion had taken place. We went back to the safe house in Honeydew.

MR DU PLESSIS: And did you receive any financial gain from this operation?

MR KOTZE: None whatsoever.

ADV GCABASHE: Just one question. Page 117, bottom paragraph line 2, 10 to 14 days before the operation you received this order from your superior. Was this the first or the second, the first order you're talking about before the aborted attempt?

MR KOTZE: Yes the section of my application on page 117 was written in very short detail but the initial order from Colonel Hattingh definitely came before the first attempt. It could have been more or less days but a number of days lapsed before Mr Zeelie phoned regarding the planning of the operation.

ADV GCABASHE: If we assume that you got this order 14 days before your attempt, that would have meant in relation to the 31st August? Sometime in the first or second week of August, would I be right? I'm just trying to put this together.

MR KOTZE: Yes, Mr Chairman, that could be very well well be the fact. Sometime earlier in August, yes, for the first attempt.

ADV GCABASHE: Thank you.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR ROSSOUW: Sorry, Mr Chairman. Sorry Mr Chairman, I was skipped, I didn't have time to pose my question. Can I just ask a couple of questions to the applicant?

Mr Kotze, can you recall that Mr Willemse went along with you into the building?

MR KOTZE: I can remember that very clearly Chairperson.

MR ROSSOUW: Can you remember that he also carried a bag in which there were explosives?

MR KOTZE: I can't remember specifically who the persons were carrying that, I think Mr Hammond and I as well as other members of staff. I could have been so but I remember that his specific task was, moved through an adjacent apartment building which would give us access to the back part of Khotso house and we then had to climb over a wall and above or on top of this wall. There was wire fencing and that was the access or that was what presented access to Khotso House from this back part in the parking area and Mr Willemse had a side cutter and one of his tasks was to cut a hole in the fence for us so that we could climb through. I remember specifically because at that stage every time he cut a piece of wire it sounded like a cannon shot.

I can't remember that he went along with us into the building, he remained there in order to prevent that we be trapped by people from behind, people that we didn't expect.

MR ROSSOUW: Were you also involved in the Cosatu House incident?

MR KOTZE: No, not at all.

MR ROSSOUW: No further questions.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you Mr Chairman. May I call Mr George Hammond.

CHAIRPERSON: ...[inaudible]

MR DU PLESSIS: Two, Mr Chairman, I'm nearly finished.

CHAIRPERSON: We normally adjourn at 1 o'clock and I don't know if anybody feels they must take an adjournment now or we continue?

MR DU PLESSIS: As it pleases you.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well, let us continue and conclude the evidence.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, I'm not sure whether this person is here in Volume 2 page 15 you have another applicant, Mr Paul Francis Erasmus. He's apparently not represented by anybody . At this stage I'm not sure whether he's here or not.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Mpshe, is he a participant?

ADV MPSHE: He has applied Mr Chairman. I'm informed that he is not here as well.

CHAIRPERSON: But has he been given notice?

ADV MPSHE: Yes Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: And has he given any indication of attending the hearing?

ADV MPSHE: No, Mr Chairman, not to my knowledge.

GEORGE FRANCOIS HAMMOND: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS: His application on page 28 of Volume 2.

Mr Hammond do you confirm the general background which appears from page 28 until page 42?

MR HAMMOND: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And during that period of time is it correct to say that you supported the ideology of the National Party?

MR HAMMOND: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And you were a supporter of apartheid?

MR HAMMOND: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR DU PLESSIS: Furthermore you believed that you should fight for the maintenance of the existing ideology and for apartheid.

MR HAMMOND: Yes that is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: You also believed that you were fighting against liberation movements and the dangers of communism?

MR HAMMOND: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And was it also your belief when you participated in this specific operation?

MR HAMMOND: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Who was your commander with regard to the Cosatu House and Khotso House incidents?

MR HAMMOND: Mr Paul Hattingh.

MR DU PLESSIS: And did you believe that the orders which you received from him came from a higher level?

MR HAMMOND: Yes I believed that.

MR DU PLESSIS: Would he have given you an order if he had not received further orders from above?

MR HAMMOND: No.

MR DU PLESSIS: Would you please look at page 47 and page 59. In paragraph 10 (a) you say with regard to Khotso and Cosatu House you say in this sentence:

"The political motivation and reason for the damaging of this building is unknown to me."

Is this the case during the operation itself?

MR HAMMOND: Chairperson, I understand that the political motivation of this operation much better after having heard the evidence of ex-Minister Vlok as well as General van der Merwe.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, but when you participated in the operation did you know that this was aimed at the liberation movements and the ANC specifically?

MR HAMMOND: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And you were aware that you were acting as part of the counter-revolutionary struggle against the liberation movements and communism?

MR HAMMOND: Yes that is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Did you receive any kind of financial gain?

MR HAMMOND: No.

MR DU PLESSIS: Not from either of the operations?

MR HAMMOND: No.

MR DU PLESSIS: You've heard the evidence regarding the political objective and motivation given by ex-Minister Vlok and General van der Merwe and other applicants?

MR HAMMOND: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And do you confirm this?

MR HAMMOND: Yes, I do confirm this.

MR DU PLESSIS: And do you agree with it?

MR HAMMOND: Yes, I do.

MR DU PLESSIS: You've heard the evidence of Mr Kotze with regard to the Khotso House incident. Do you confirm his evidence as correct?

MR HAMMOND: I confirm this as correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Is there anything you wish to add?

MR HAMMOND: No.

MR DU PLESSIS: Would you then please turn to page 43, that is where you give the particulars regarding the Cosatu House incident. Do you confirm the correctness thereof?

MR HAMMOND: Yes it is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Might I put it to you in the following way: could you give the Committee a slight indication of the type of charges which were used regarding the explosive devices which were used during this operation?

MR HAMMOND: We were told that there was a printing press in the building which was to be destroyed in the process of damaging the building. Pierre le Roux and I prepared two charges. The one consisted of a SZ6 demolition charge as well as some blocks of TNT. This SZ6 charge was in a metal container in which there were six kilograms of explosives.

The second consisted of two SZ6 demolition charges as well as a number of blocks of TNT. The first charge was approximately ten kilograms and the next was 15 kilograms.

When we penetrated the building, Mr Le Roux placed the first charge next to the printing press. When we entered the building, the printing press was immediately to our right. We passed the printing press and placed the larger charge near the lift shaft. When we prepared the charges at the office we had automatic time switches which we would use in the explosion. We tested them repeatedly for approximately a week in order to ensure that they would work and so that we could synchronise the explosions.

When we placed the charges I counted from five to zero upon which we connected the batteries to the switches and then placed the cartridges. We then withdrew.

MR DU PLESSIS: The ladder which was used, whose ladder was it?

MR HAMMOND: Chairperson, while we were busy with discussions regarding how we would penetrate the building mention was made of a rope which we were to use. I climbed many ropes in my life but there are a number of people who don't know how to do that and it was quite high to the basement going down the wall. I suggested that we use a ladder and an ex-member of the Police brought the ladder there, I don't remember his name.

MR DU PLESSIS: And the persons in the building along with you and Mr le Roux was Snor Vermeulen and Willie Nortjè?

MR HAMMOND: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: The charge which you placed was not aimed at making the building collapse completely?

MR HAMMOND: No.

MR DU PLESSIS: And that was the same with Khotso House?

MR HAMMOND: Yes that is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And for the purposes of the record the damage which was done at Cosatu House has been explained by you from page 45 until 46?

MR HAMMOND: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And then regarding Khotso House just for the purposes of the record do you confirm the correctness of page 53 to 54 which pertains to the content of the building?

MR HAMMOND: Just in the first paragraph I refer to a farm somewhere in the region of Muldersdrift. It was Honeydew not Muldersdrift.

MR DU PLESSIS: That is on page 53, just below the middle of the page?

MR HAMMOND: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR DU PLESSIS: And then on page 54 up to and including page 58 you give an explanation of the damage done to the buildings and those persons who were injured?

MR HAMMOND: That's correct, that was with Khotso House.

MR DU PLESSIS: With Khotso house and you received that information from official documentation?

MR HAMMOND: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Is there anything which you would like to add?

MR HAMMOND: No, Chairperson.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you Mr Chairman I have no further questions.

ADV GCABASHE: ...[inaudible] I have a very good idea it's quite far out. Where is that?

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, perhaps I can enlighten you, if you drive on the road to Krugersdorp, it is closer to Krugersdorp on that road in the vicinity of Honeydew.

ADV GCABASHE: Thank you.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you Mr Chairman, may I lastly call Mr Pierre le Roux please?

PIERRE LE ROUX: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you Mr Chairman, you'll find his application on page 137 of Volume 2.

Mr Le Roux your background is given from page 1 to 9, do you confirm that this is correct?

MR LE ROUX: Yes, I do confirm this.

MR DU PLESSIS: And your political motivation is given on page 159 until 162, do you confirm that as correct?

MR LE ROUX: Yes I do.

MR DU PLESSIS: You were involved only in the Cosatu House incident?

MR LE ROUX: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And you commander was Colonel Hattingh?

MR LE ROUX: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And you heard the evidence of Minister Vlok, General van der Merwe and the other witnesses here with regard to the political motivation for this incident, do you confirm that as correct?

MR LE ROUX: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Do you agree with it?

MR LE ROUX: Yes I agree with it.

MR DU PLESSIS: And in that time did you support the National Party and it's ideologies?

MR LE ROUX: Yes, that's correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And did you believe that you were fighting to maintain apartheid?

MR LE ROUX: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And that your action was aimed against the liberation movements, their ideologies and specifically communism?

MR LE ROUX: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And where you say on page 159, you say the same as Mr Hammond, you also mean that during the operation you were not entirely aware of what the political motivation was?

MR LE ROUX: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: But you were aware that your action was aimed against the liberation movements and the proponents of communism?

MR LE ROUX: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr le Roux did you receive any advantages, financial or other, from this operation?

MR LE ROUX: I did not receive anything.

MR DU PLESSIS: And regarding the events you heard the evidence of Mr Hammond regarding this matter, do you confirm that as correct?

MR LE ROUX: Yes I do.

MR DU PLESSIS: And do you confirm your own version from page 157 to 158?

MR LE ROUX: Yes, except paragraph 3, the second sentence in the middle of the page.

MR DU PLESSIS: The word "and" should be omitted?

MR LE ROUX: Yes that was incorrectly typed in.

MR DU PLESSIS: It should read the order was given by my commander Colonel Hattingh to me, Pierre le Roux?

MR LE ROUX: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Anything you wish to add?

MR LE ROUX: No there is nothing I wish to add.

MR DU PLESSIS: I've got no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: I should perhaps warn you, it seems to be your last chance, gentlemen.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you Mr Chairman, may the witness be excused?

ADV DE JAGER: Do any of the applicants know what has become of Mr Paul Francis Erasmus?

MR VISSER: Chairperson my information is that he is somewhere in Central Africa or that he was recently in Central Africa with Mrs Winnie Madikizela Mandela, I don't know in what capacity.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Mpshe you didn't hear whether he in fact received the notice?

ADV MPSHE: Mr Chairman, the notice went out, unfortunately my file of all returns is upstairs but I can check that and verify for the Committee but notices went out.

CHAIRPERSON: If he's got notice and didn't bother ...[inaudible]

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Chairman, I don't know if this will be a convenient moment to enquire from the Committee, my client Mr Willemse is not so far away but he is in the Southern Cape, whether I can perhaps have an indication as to how you intend to deal with his application?

CHAIRPERSON: We have considered the applications and arrived at a decision on the other applications. I may well be then thought necessary to hear him on certain aspects or not to hear him.

MR ROSSOUW: Mr Chairman ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: You of course would be informed and given the opportunity of making any representations that you might wish to do in that regard but I do not think, I certainly do not think it would be necessary to reconvene this hearing to hear Mr Willemse's evidence. We have heard a number of witnesses in the last day or so and he seems to fit into that category. There is no suggestion, nobody, none of the applicants or any other person has suggested that he had any different motive or that he received large sums of money for his services or anything of that nature and it may well be possible that an affidavit could meet any requirements that we may have for further information but that will just have to stand over for the moment.

MR ROSSOUW: Thank you Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: We would assume, Mr Chairman, that the same by and large made out to ...[indistinct] would apply to Greyling?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, may I just make an enquiry about heads of argument?

CHAIRPERSON: I don't want enquiries, I want suggestions please. I take it you do not propose to start arguing now?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, Mr Chairman, my proposal would be written heads of argument and then we just need an indication of a time period and a time frame. Obviously we know from previous experience that typing of the record takes a while, probably about a month to six weeks, was my previous experience.

CHAIRPERSON: There have been various hearings recently so I think it would be safer to say six weeks than a month.

ADV DE JAGER: I think that the representatives should seriously consider that one should be prepared to argue without the record which is what is normally expected of you. There might be exceptional cases during which the evidence was of such a nature that it requires finer analysis but we could have asked you today to argue orally and then you would have had to argue without the record.

MR DU PLESSIS: You are aware of the heads which I have submitted in the past at very short notice and I would probably have been able to work through the evidence in a mornings time and I would have been able to argue orally.

CHAIRPERSON: This has not been a hearing where there's been a great deal of conflicting evidence where one has to weigh up the evidence. There have been differences between various people as to who was at what meeting, who did precisely what but the picture of what happened is reasonably clear, isn't it and it's really the object, the intent of the parties and couldn't that, as my colleague has said, couldn't we dispense with reference to the record and merely have your submissions on your clients' contentions and of course any comments you wish to make about other evidence which may appear to conflict with that of your clients and what weight to attach to that and I think, speaking for myself, I think it would be preferable if we all endeavour to dispose of this matter on that basis that if we give you, what, two weeks, three weeks?

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, however - may I just come in here? I would really want to request you to give us the opportunity to at least have some reference to the record. There may be certain instances where one would want to deal with some of the evidence in a broader context that was given here and it may be, just be relevant. Unless you're in a hurry to have argument but at the end of the day, I would, I know myself, I would prefer if I don't have to argue without the record, to do it with the record.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, what are your views?

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, our attitude has always been to try to put a full argument on paper before you. We've always tried and you will bear testimony to that, that we've tried to give you the references to the record.

CHAIRPERSON: So you want the record?

MR VISSER: Certainly we would prefer it and in this particular case, Mr Chairman, we have the evidence of Vlok and Van der Merwe which do seem to be the first time that the Amnesty Committee has really received a full explanation right from as high as we're going to go in this whole process from a politician's point of view and it just occurred to us, Mr Chairman, that it might be relevant to incorporate some of that in our argument or at least to address it.

CHAIRPERSON: Well I can understand it if you are confining the record to the record of certain applicants not the record of the entire proceedings because we already have a fairly substantial part of General van der Merwe's evidence and if we were to restrict to the record, to the evidence of certain of the applicants, I think we could then get the record in considerably less than six weeks. Now what are your views on that, Mr du Plessis?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes that may be so Mr Chairman but I must state Mr Chairman that in respect of my clients I know the evidence was very quickly but it is important for purposes of my clients that the evidence of Mr Vlok, for instance on his credibility, should stand and therefore I would want to address you, not in conjunction with Mr Visser but probably in support of Mr Visser on his evidence because it is important for ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: No, I'm saying, but do you agree we do not need the evidence of all the applicants? If we need the evidence of Mr Vlok, General van der Merwe then that would be sufficient to enable you gentlemen to prepare your argument?

MR DU PLESSIS: And Bellinghan, Mr Chairman, yes.

ADV DE JAGER: If there are 35 transcripts of this record to be made, it has major cost implications. The second is that after a period of two months our memories regarding this matter will have faded and we will have to consider the entire content of this matter from the beginning to the end once more while we are proceeding with other matters. That's why it's important that the heads of argument be submitted as soon as possible while it is still fresh in everybody's memory and you can also expect a quicker judgement.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, may I make a suggestion? Give us a month and we'll simply see how quickly. We might very well be able to do it within that month. If we run into a problem, well then we'll discuss that problem at that time but my learned friend said three weeks, you were referring to, somebody else referred to six weeks. Make it a month and within that time I'm sure Commissioner de Jager wouldn't have forgotten all about this hearing and by which time I'm sure we could have our written argument in.

CHAIRPERSON: And it will be your responsibility to obtain what portions of the record you want.

MR VISSER: Yes, Mr Chairman, if we can just state that it would be on the basis that if we have problems in obtaining the record in time from the Truth Commission that we can approach you for an extension of time.

CHAIRPERSON: ...[inaudible] dramatic happens you always can but otherwise I think I agree that we say that we want argument submitted within, to be lodged at the office in Cape Town by the 31st August. It is still July.

ADV MPSHE: Mr Chairman, if the question of heads is round up I want to come up with something else.

CHAIRPERSON: Certainly.

ADV MPSHE: Mr Chairman, I don't know whether it can be done here but I want to make that application in compliance with Section 22 of the Act, insofar as the opinion of the Committee is concerned for victims, that I request that it be on record that the victim, Welcome Ntumba ...[intervention]

CHAIRPERSON: Is a victim.

ADV MPSHE: Is a victim and there is another one Mr Chairman but it came by way of a letter. I don't know whether I can also place that also on record? This is the response to the media request we are making and the name is Felicia van der Hoven, only those two.

CHAIRPERSON: Well on what basis?

ADV MPSHE: That she was one of those who were occupying the flat that was attached to Khotso House and she's still alive but she is mentally retarded, she gets some seizures and the like.

CHAIRPERSON: Can I see that letter please? There are still persons concerned with the reparations who have been transferred to the Amnesty Department. I would suggest that we ask one of them to make enquiries in this regard to get more details as to precisely when the onset of these diseases and illnesses took place, matters of that nature and then we will certainly consider it.

ADV MPSHE: Thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: I'm returning the letter to you now.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, I must perhaps just respond in that regard. That is one of the persons I think that was mentioned on page 58 of Volume 2. I'm not sure if it's the right one or it looks like it, Van der Hoover, ja, Felicia van der Hoover. It is mentioned there an according to the records she had no injuries, she just suffered from shock. I have the record that we obtained the information from with me, I don't know if you would be interested to have that?

CHAIRPERSON: That is why I suggest that we should make further information, because the letter Mr Mpshe has got refers not only to her mental state due to shock but to an actual illness that may have been present before and I think that it should be enquired into. It is of course one of the things that I think are accepted that post-traumatic shock happens to victims not to perpetrators and also sometimes emerges sometime later.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, we don't have any problem with that Mr Chairman.