ADV PRIOR: It is the 16th of November. We proceed with the amnesty applications of last week and Mr Botha was still being cross-examined. I have a few questions for Mr Botha, with the leave of the Committee.

CHAIRPERSON: I have a request before we start, is it possible to twist those lights away a little?

HENDRIK JOHANNES PETRUS BOTHA: (still under oath)

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ADV PRIOR: Mr Botha, I just have seven aspects that I want to canvass with you. The first being my understanding of your evidence as well as the evidence of Mr Wasserman et al, regarding Operation Butterfly.

Was it paramount with the Security Branch, that is your division or your office, to either dismantle those structures or destroy those structures by either prosecuting the members in those various structures or by eliminating those members? Sorry, the third possibility also, by turning those members?

MR BOTHA: Mr Chairperson, in 1985 with Operation Butterfly, exposure - the prosecution of the members of this movement, and this was the first option.

ADV PRIOR: And it would appear from the evidence and from the documents we have seen, there was great success with the investigation and prosecution of many of those MK members? Is that correct?

MR BOTHA: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

ADV PRIOR: Is my sense of what happened thereafter correct, that your Branch experienced a sense of frustration at the fact that the court process wasn't one hundred percent effective? In other words, due to problems that you either did foresee or did not foresee, certain of the accused, the MK cadres were in fact acquitted which gave rise to a sense of frustration within your unit?

MR BOTHA: Yes, there was a build up of frustration Mr Chairperson.

ADV PRIOR: As you testified last week, you, as well as possibly Colonel Taylor at some stage, came to the realisation that the only effective way to destroy those structures that you had been working on since 1985, Operation Butterfly, the Natal machinery, would be to eliminate those persons in key positions within that machinery?

MR BOTHA: No Mr Chairperson, it was not that the people who were left, had to be eliminated.

ADV PRIOR: Maybe let me qualify that, the personnel in key positions, for examples Ndwandwe, Portia Ndwandwe, to name an example?

MR BOTHA: Yes Mr Chairperson. After the arrest and the conviction, or successful conviction of these people, there was from those who were left over from Butterfly, who was not charged at all, they were used as witnesses. Some of them were not charged at all.

The monitoring of them was in the nature of the case, it was our responsibility and we would continue and we would then, or we decided then that people would continue. When she left the country to go to Swaziland, she became a primary target.

ADV PRIOR: Just to move on briefly on the preparation for the trial. Would it be correct to suggest that some, if not many of the State witnesses, were in fact coerced into making statements and into giving evidence against their colleagues?

MR BOTHA: All those who were detained according to the Act, made Article 29 statements. In the interviews of these people it was decided who would be willing to act as State witnesses.

ADV PRIOR: Would assaults have occasioned the making of those Section 29 statements or not? I am not suggesting that it was across the board, but what I am driving at is that a lot of those statements that those people made, were they made as a result of coercion or force being applied to them?

MR BOTHA: In terms of the Act, they had to make a statement, yes. There was pressure on the detainees to make a statement.

ADV PRIOR: But you say pressure because of the nature of the provision of the Act?

MR BOTHA: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: But you have told us as I understand your evidence, that practically everybody you questioned, was assaulted?

MR BOTHA: That is negative Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Didn't you tell us you punched people, you slapped them?

MR BOTHA: Not all of them Mr Chairperson, it was a few incidents?

CHAIRPERSON: The majority?

MR BOTHA: No Mr Chairperson. I would say the majority of the people were not attacked or assaulted.

CHAIRPERSON: That wasn't the impression I got from your evidence last week. Ndwandwe I think, was about the only one you said, wasn't.

ADV PRIOR: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Botha, given your position within the Security Force structure in Durban, Port Natal at that stage, were you - let me put it this way, we heard evidence last week that Mr Bhila was eliminated, it would appear on the instructions of Mr Taylor.

MR BOTHA: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

ADV PRIOR: Am I correct in understanding that you had nothing to do with that episode?

MR BOTHA: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

ADV PRIOR: It never came to your attention that a decision to eliminate Bhila had been taken?

MR BOTHA: Negative.

ADV PRIOR: Had it come to your attention?

MR BOTHA: With the amnesty application process in 1996, I did take notice, yes.

ADV PRIOR: I am actually talking about at the time, 1987?

MR BOTHA: Negative, no, I did not have any knowledge of this.

ADV PRIOR: In retrospect, should that information have come to your attention, being the Head of Information gathering, or Intelligence as you were?

MR BOTHA: Negative. The fact that a decision was made by Taylor, did not have to be shared with me.

ADV PRIOR: Did that not lead to any friction between you and Mr Taylor?

MR BOTHA: Negative.

ADV PRIOR: You described your relationship with Mr Taylor as a good one?

MR BOTHA: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

ADV PRIOR: I just want to develop just briefly on that. Bhila was described to us last week as being a dangerous terrorist. He had been acquitted and that seems to have been the underlying motive or reason for killing him? Would you go along with that?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

ADV PRIOR: On the same basis, Mr Nxiweni must have been equally dangerous?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

ADV PRIOR: Yet, we have a situation that Mr Bhila is murdered three days after his acquittal and Mr Nxiweni is almost a year, if not longer after that acquittal, he is eliminated. Are you able to assist us in just understanding what went wrong, if anything?

MR BOTHA: Mr Chairperson, I do not know what Colonel Taylor's idea was at that stage and as I understood in his evidence, it was his decision. He did not share this decision with me and it was according to the Act that inspired him to do that.

ADV PRIOR: Is the name Pindele Mfeti known to you?

MR BOTHA: Could you please repeat the name and surname?

ADV PRIOR: Pindele Mfeti?

MR BOTHA: Negative Mr Chairperson, I cannot say that I remember this name.

ADV PRIOR: Our information is that Pindele Mfeti was also a medical student, I beg your pardon, a law student and was the cousin of Pumeso Nxiweni, and apparently was also a similar age, in his 40's.

MR BOTHA: I do not know him Mr Chairperson.

ADV PRIOR: He disappeared plus minus, more or less around the 25th of April of 1987 and has never been seen since? I am just asking whether you know or not. This is a request that has come from the family.

It would seem at least in the victims' minds, that if Bhila was assassinated for the reasons that have been given here, it would seem also logical that your unit would have been looking for Nxiweni at the same time and that possibly, quite possibly he was mistaken for Pindele Mfeti, who also went missing from the campus, from Allan Taylor.

MR BOTHA: Negative Mr Chairperson.

ADV PRIOR: We heard evidence from Mr Ramatala that bonuses were paid to askaris. I should imagine bonuses were also paid or rewards paid to informers?

MR BOTHA: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

ADV PRIOR: In the case of the Ndwandwe matter, and I am not asking you to at this stage to reveal the identity of your informers, are you able to tell the Committee whether in any of these operations, Ndwandwe or Nxiweni or the other kwaMashu 3, whether informers were paid?

MR BOTHA: Negative Mr Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Does that mean that you do not know?

MR BOTHA: No, I say in the case of these people, bonuses were not paid.

MR MALAN: And you are sure about this?

MR BOTHA: Yes, I am.

ADV PRIOR: Were rewards paid as opposed to bonuses?

MR BOTHA: The general term in the case of rewards for those who were trained outside of the country, as in the police, it was used as rewards.

ADV PRIOR: But in this case where Ndwandwe, the operation to obtain Ndwandwe, Portia Ndwandwe, are you able to say out of your own recollection whether rewards were paid?

MR BOTHA: No, no bonuses were paid, or another form of reward for her.

ADV PRIOR: So in other words no money was paid over?

MR BOTHA: Yes, in her case specifically for the abductions, no.

ADV PRIOR: And if we can just clarify with the other two incidents, Nxiweni and with the kwaMashu 3?

MR BOTHA: Yes, no money was paid for those specific incidents.

ADV PRIOR: Was there any reason for that? It seemed to be a departure from the usual practice?

MR BOTHA: Negative Mr Chairperson. I would just like to explain that Mr Ramatala's explanation concerning rewards for the askaris of Vlakplaas, is not as it was the normal practice.

If I can just get an opportunity to explain this. Informants or any person who gave information that led to the arrest or the elimination of a terrorist ...(recording stopped) ... became R2 500-00 per person. A certain amount was connected to for example a land mine or a Makarov and these information that we received, were rewarded. The askaris, if they were to operate here by the identification of a person, led to the arrest of a terrorist and these rewards were then paid to them in Pretoria, at the unit at Head Office.

In the activity that occurred in Natal, where one of our informants, information led to the arrest of a person, we then paid the person here. It was sent to Head Office and we then paid that person directly. We never paid out rewards as we thought fit, and that is concerning the physical identification of such a person and then the arrest of that person.

ADV PRIOR: In the case of Portia Ndwandwe, you knew where she was residing in Swaziland before the operation, is that correct?

MR BOTHA: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

ADV PRIOR: Did that information filter through via your information network, intelligence network that was already in place in Swaziland?

MR BOTHA: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

ADV PRIOR: If I may ask you this question, the two informers that assisted you in Swaziland on the day in question to bring Ms Ndwandwe out of Swaziland, they were not part, or they had not given you the information relating to her whereabouts?

MR BOTHA: Negative Mr Chairperson.

MR MALAN: I am sorry the use of your word negative, you say no, they were not part of the information structure or are you saying that the statement is wrong?

MR BOTHA: No, I agree with your first interpretation of the word negative.

MR VISSER: Perhaps I should just direct my learned friend's attention in case he wants to ask questions about it, on this issue, on page 86, the last paragraph of volume 2 Mr Chairman.

ADV PRIOR: Thank you Mr Chairman. I just want to ask about the actual, physical detention of Portia Ndwandwe in Swaziland. When you had put her into the kombi, did she acquiesced, did she struggle, did she put up a fight? Can you explain the position?

MR BOTHA: Yes Mr Chairman, she did resist.

ADV PRIOR: Was she subdued?

MR BOTHA: Yes, I would say that most of us, we could easily hold her, and we then tied her hands with a rope.

ADV PRIOR: It seems that she obviously, when she realised what was going on, she didn't want to go with you voluntarily and had to be physically restrained and subdued as you have indicated, she was held down and she was cuffed, is that correct?

MR BOTHA: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

ADV PRIOR: You indicated in your evidence that at some stage, she was at the back of a bakkie and you climbed in with her, and you were under a tarpaulin or a cover.

MR BOTHA: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

ADV PRIOR: Is that when you drove to the Onverwacht border post?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

ADV PRIOR: Why was that?

MR BOTHA: It was the only place where we could sit and that was at the back of the bakkie. Laurie and Sam was in the front and because of the tarpaulin at the back of the bakkie that was to protect us from the weather, it was raining at that stage.

ADV PRIOR: The interrogation at the Onverwacht safe house, are you able just to give us an idea of how long that endured? Was it three or four hours, was it longer?

MR BOTHA: If I had to put together the uninterrupted times, I would say that it would have been a maximum of four hours.

ADV PRIOR: At Onverwacht, did it appear clear to you that she wasn't going to cooperate with the Security Branch?

MR BOTHA: Mr Chairperson, in terms of her cooperation and answering questions regarding information, there was cooperation, but in terms of her willingness as an informer, there was no cooperation.

ADV PRIOR: So she was prepared to give you crucial information regarding her unit and the Natal machinery, which you have said, she indicated who Nxiweni was and the operation that he had been involved in, but she wasn't prepared to give her full cooperation as an informer or as an askari, is that correct?

MR BOTHA: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

ADV PRIOR: That information just came out of a question and answer exercise?

MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct Chairperson.

ADV PRIOR: No assaults with no torture whatsoever?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

ADV PRIOR: Would you agree with me that even at that stage, your branch had virtually all the information that they required regarding the Natal machinery?

MR BOTHA: No Mr Chairperson, I wouldn't say that we had all the information, one would have wanted all the information.

ADV PRIOR: Were you interested in tying up who was responsible for what operation?

MR BOTHA: The structure in Swaziland, was one thing, and the structure within the RSA was another, and then we came to the individuals, and there were certain aspects of information in which we would have been interested.

ADV PRIOR: After Onverwacht, when you travelled to Pietermaritzburg, was there any, in your mind, was there any more information that you required from her, given what you knew already?

MR BOTHA: There was always the possibility of new information coming forth. She served as the acting Commander of Natal.

ADV PRIOR: But was there anything concrete or something specifically that you wanted to go for, that you needed to interrogate her about, or was it just that vague possibility that she may come up with something, you giving another interrogation session?

MR BOTHA: No, there was no specific information which I had, which I wanted her to share with me.

ADV PRIOR: Now, in the Pietermaritzburg safe house, that was on the farm Elandskop, is that correct?

MR BOTHA: That is correct Chairperson.

ADV PRIOR: How long would you say she was interrogated there?

MR BOTHA: Mr Chairperson, I worked with her for approximately two hours. If it was indeed that long.

ADV PRIOR: Are you the only person who interrogated her at Pietermaritzburg?

MR BOTHA: That is correct yes.

ADV PRIOR: No other person interrogated her whilst she was on the farm Elandskop?

MR BOTHA: As far as I worked with her, from Onverwacht on the farm, I worked with her.

ADV PRIOR: Did Taylor interrogate her?

MR BOTHA: Negative Mr Chairperson. He questioned her at Onverwacht, but not while I was working with her at Elandskop.

ADV PRIOR: There is some indication that a Mr Labuschagne from the Eastern Transvaal Branch, had questioned her. Are you aware of that?

MR BOTHA: Yes, I am aware of that.

ADV PRIOR: Where did that occur?

MR BOTHA: That occurred after I had already left with the informers. One of the other applicants will testify regarding that.

ADV PRIOR: Was that usual practice?

MR BOTHA: Yes Chairperson, there was nothing strange about that at all.

ADV PRIOR: The decision to eliminate her, had already been taken at the time, or just before you left Pietermaritzburg, is that correct?

MR BOTHA: Mr Chairperson, when I left the farm, I knew that she was going to be eliminated.

ADV PRIOR: But had you discussed that with Mr Taylor?

MR BOTHA: In the final phase, no I didn't.

ADV PRIOR: In principle?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

ADV PRIOR: And you had indicated to him, I think my understanding of your evidence is by the time that you left the farm, you were convinced that she wasn't going to be turned?

MR BOTHA: That is correct Chairperson.

ADV PRIOR: The two informers, the two persons that assisted you in Swaziland, they left with you from Pietermaritzburg to Durban I understand?

MR BOTHA: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

ADV PRIOR: Would they have been aware of the decision to eliminate Ms Ndwandwe?

MR BOTHA: Negative Mr Chairperson, they wouldn't have been aware of that.

ADV PRIOR: The longer she was out of circulation from Swaziland, wasn't the risk increasingly higher that the MK/ANC structures would be aware that something was wrong?

MR BOTHA: Absolutely. The longer the person remained out of circulation, the greater the risk.

ADV PRIOR: I need to ask you this question, is there any specific reason why you did not, having made the decision as you have told us about killing Ndwandwe, that you left just before she was to be executed? That you were not part of that execution?

MR BOTHA: Mr Chairperson, the informers were returned by me to Durban, that was the only reason.

ADV PRIOR: But you could have been there when she was executed, and then leave the farm?

MR BOTHA: Yes, but unfortunately I left before the time.

ADV PRIOR: So that wasn't part of a discussion or an agreement with Taylor, that they would do the execution, you would get away with the informers, or move away with the informers?

MR BOTHA: Negative. The informers were on the adjacent farm, they weren't on that farm.

ADV PRIOR: So if I understand your evidence, it just happened that way, there was no plan or there was no design?

MR BOTHA: No, there was nothing strange about that.

ADV PRIOR: You were taking the informers away and you knew that Taylor would then do the killing or oversee the killing?

MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct Chairperson.

ADV PRIOR: I know you weren't there, but you obviously must have discussed the killing of Ndwandwe afterwards? We know from the exhumation that there was no clothing found in the grave. Would that have been usual to strip the body either after the killing or before the killing? I just need to know from you whether that would have been usual or common place or are you unable to comment?

MR BOTHA: I would not be able to comment regarding that.

ADV PRIOR: Because it would seem from the objective facts that when she was buried at that grave, or in that grave, she was naked, except for a plastic, it seems like a refuge bag that was placed around her pelvic area.

MR BOTHA: Yes, I was not present when they exhumed the body.

ADV PRIOR: Was there any discussion afterwards of how she was executed?

MR BOTHA: No, Mr Chairperson, it was not discussed.

ADV PRIOR: You never asked any questions of how they did it, or who pulled the trigger or whatever?

MR BOTHA: Negative, one never asked questions regarding that.

ADV PRIOR: The information you say you obtained, sorry before we move on, I have been requested to put certain things to you regarding Ms Ndwandwe. There will be evidence if necessary from various persons, to say that Ndwandwe, Portia Ndwandwe, did not leave the Durban area after her release and that she remained in attendance throughout the Ramlakan trial as part of the audience.

Are you able to comment on that?

MR BOTHA: Yes, the case was completed and she was released in January 1986, after the completion of the Section 29 hearing. She remained in Durban until the end of 1986/1987 when she left the country for military training.

ADV PRIOR: Can you deny that she was attending the proceedings of the Ramlakan trial? I should imagine right up until the end of the case in 1987?

MR BOTHA: I cannot comment regarding that, because I did not attend the hearing every day.

ADV PRIOR: Would it be likely that if she had attended, the Security Branch, were they not monitoring the audience or the supporters of the accused?

MR BOTHA: Once again Mr Chairperson, I wouldn't know what the conduct or decision of that hearing was.

ADV PRIOR: Just to get clarity on that last aspect, was it the policy of the Security Branch to monitor who the supporters of the accused were in such a trial? Would you have known who came to attend the trial or not?

MR BOTHA: Yes, one would know who was there and who wasn't.

ADV PRIOR: The APMC of the structure, is it correct that that did not include any internally trained cadres, but was formed by externally trained cadres?

MR BOTHA: The APMC consisted of internally and externally trained terrorists Mr Chairperson.

ADV PRIOR: Is it correct that in 1986, she could not have been in charge of any combat unit because it would seem on what I have heard thus far, she had not yet been trained?

MR BOTHA: She had already been trained internally during the Ramlakan period. If I am referring to that specific period, the APMC, the functioning of Butterfly, before the arrest on the 23rd of December 1985.

ADV PRIOR: Is it not close to the truth that she was arrested simply for being at the house where Ramlakan and others were arrested, that she had been assisted by Ramlakan in her studies and that he had also provided her with accommodation because of problems she had with her in-laws or family?

MR BOTHA: She was more than simply that. She lived there, that is correct.

ADV PRIOR: And that she may possibly have done secretarial functions, but she certainly wasn't a trained combatant.

MR BOTHA: She was Mr Chairperson. She along with another person by the name of Ricky Naidoo fulfilled a number of functions in the command of Ramlakan and the other people from the place where they worked.

ADV PRIOR: You indicated in your evidence that one Braso had made phone call to the Ramlakan home just before the arrest?

MR BOTHA: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

ADV PRIOR: Is it not, well, I have been requested to put this to you, that it wasn't Braso, but one Ralph Lawrence who had made that call, and he had spoken to Sibusiso Sithle Mbongwa also known as George Fukudi and that that conversation was recorded on tape?

MR BOTHA: That is correct, the conversation was recorded by us with monitoring.

ADV PRIOR: But with Ralph Lawrence made the call?

MR BOTHA: Negative, it was Braso, Raymond Lala. He made a number of calls to that address, his voice was familiar to us. His voice was that of an Indian.

ADV PRIOR: There is just one other aspect, it would appear from bundle 3 that there was a report that Portia Ndwandwe's home was burgled on the very day or the evening of the day she was kidnapped out of Swaziland. There was an allegation that an amount of about R20 000 or R25 000 was missing.

Do you know anything about that?

MR BOTHA: I am aware of the report which appeared in the newspaper.

ADV PRIOR: Well, were any of your operatives in the area, you had abducted her. Was any of the instructions to go and see what could be found at the home?

MR BOTHA: Negative Mr Chairperson, there was no order, I don't think that they were responsible.

ADV PRIOR: Do you agree that it certainly raises a suspicion?

MR BOTHA: Yes Mr Chairperson, but the circumstances could have been manipulated by someone within the ANC in order to steal that money.

ADV PRIOR: Du Preez and Wasserman?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

ADV PRIOR: You say couldn't get through the border post because of the lateness of the hour?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

ADV PRIOR: Do you know where they slept before they came through the border post the next day?

MR BOTHA: Negative Mr Chairperson.

ADV PRIOR: Did they know where Ndwandwe lived in Manzini?

MR BOTHA: They knew.

ADV PRIOR: Just finally on this aspect, your Intelligence network, was there any information regarding the burglary or the breaking in? I mean your Intelligence network was in place in Swaziland, was there any information forthcoming from that source?

MR BOTHA: The only report which there was about the burglary appeared coincidentally in a Swazi newspaper and through the South African media. That was the only reference made to that incident.

MR MALAN: I think Mr Botha, that the question is whether you from your information network, heard anything about the burglary?

MR BOTHA: I understood the question correctly. The only knowledge which we had regarding this burglary, was not by means of our information network, but by means of the media.

ADV PRIOR: I don't want to belabour this too much, but on what your answer is, no one within the ANC knew that she had been abducted or kidnapped on that day, they only came to realise that later. They would have no reason to have exploited that fact, not having known about it at that specific time?

MR BOTHA: That is correct Chairperson, we were not even aware of an amount of R25 000.

ADV PRIOR: Let's forget the amount, just the fact of the burglary at that time, the day that she was kidnapped by your unit, the ANC would not have known about it and therefore I am suggesting to you that it seems improbable that they would have exploited that fact.

MR BOTHA: No comment Mr Chairperson.

ADV PRIOR: I want to move on to Pumeso Nxiweni. You have had sight of Exhibit H?

MR BOTHA: That is correct Chairperson.

ADV PRIOR: That was the sort of consultation notes of the Investigative Unit of the Amnesty Committee. I don't intend going through the ...(indistinct) verba of everything here, but if you look at the fourth page, where under the title possible assistants Sithle Mbongwa, is there anything there that you wish to disagree with? I think you may have answered that a short while ago.

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

ADV PRIOR: Do you wish to add anything, that is regarding Ndwandwe being at Ramlakan's house and the reason why she was there? Do you want to add anything to what you have already answered?

MR BOTHA: All that I confirm here is that the facts are not correct, that she was at Ramlakan's house.

ADV PRIOR: If you can go to the next page, that is the fifth page, Naya Ngema, do you wish to comment on the notes there or the information there? Let me maybe ask you correctly, Naya Ngema who survived, he was the member that went to Swazi, he never turned up in the kwaMashu 3 at the meeting that was arranged with your informers?

MR BOTHA: That is correct Chairperson.

ADV PRIOR: Can you dispute or do you deny that it was his unit that carried out six of the bombings that you attributed to Nxiweni's unit, the Allan Taylor unit?

MR BOTHA: That is correct Chairperson.

ADV PRIOR: Sorry, do you challenge that?

MR BOTHA: No, I say that this unit was under the command of Nxiweni as Commander.

ADV PRIOR: He will give evidence and say that that wasn't the case.

MR BOTHA: That may be his evidence, but that was our knowledge.

ADV PRIOR: Further down the page, he says that his unit was responsible for the six attacks, Pinetown post office, Glenashley shopping centre, Westville post office and a blast in kwaMashu, the Bree railway station and the Red Hill post office. In other words, that was the swimmers' unit?

MR BOTHA: That is correct Chairperson.

ADV PRIOR: Is that correct, are you saying, did you know about the swimmers' unit?

MR BOTHA: They were all known to us as the kwaMashu unit.

ADV PRIOR: And you say Nxiweni was part of the Allan Taylor unit?

MR BOTHA: He had a unit with Allan Taylor which was known as the Allan Taylor unit.

ADV PRIOR: Were those two distinct units or did they fall under the umbrella of the kwaMashu unit, I don't quite understand?

MR BOTHA: Perhaps just to explain. If a person was a Commander in a determined area such as Durban, he could have up to five units under his command, and in this case Nxiweni was identified to us as Commander of a number of units.

ADV PRIOR: Is it correct that at the time of his kidnapping, if I may call it that, that is Nxiweni, that he was busy preparing for the year end party at the residence?

MR BOTHA: No, I am not aware of what he was busy with at the Allan Taylor.

ADV PRIOR: Your evidence was that weapons and ammunition were found at the Allan Taylor residence after Nxiweni had been detained, is that correct?

MR BOTHA: That is correct Chairperson.

ADV PRIOR: And they had been, well, it would not have been difficult to link him with those weapons and explosives, is that correct?

MR BOTHA: Well, he gave us the directions to the place.

ADV PRIOR: And if you had charged him for those weapons, he would in all likelihood have received a fairly substantial term of imprisonment?

MR BOTHA: If his fingerprints were to be found on those exhibits.

ADV PRIOR: Or other evidence, there could have been other evidence, that he pointed out the spot, that he knew where it was?

MR BOTHA: That is correct Chairperson.

ADV PRIOR: The fingerprints would have just been some additional evidence?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

ADV PRIOR: But if he had been convicted for those articles, he would have received a substantial term of imprisonment?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

ADV PRIOR: At least what, five, six years?

MR BOTHA: Minimum of five years.

ADV PRIOR: Minimum? And you could have effectively taken him out of circulation on that basis?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

ADV PRIOR: Did you contemplate that?

MR BOTHA: Negative Mr Chairperson.

ADV PRIOR: Had the decision already been made at a different time that he was to be eliminated?

MR BOTHA: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: So you weren't interested, I think you have told us already, in getting him before a Court and convicting him?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

ADV PRIOR: On the fifth page at the bottom, one Siphiso Kunene, was he known to you?

MR BOTHA: Yes Mr Chairperson.

ADV PRIOR: Do you have any comment to make on his information that he will give?

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, with respect, we all know that this is not a permissible way of asking questions of a witness. If my learned friend wants to ask a question, let him put the question.

We know that in procedure, one doesn't just place a document before a witness and say is there something that you disagree with and then take your cross-examination from there.

With respect, it doesn't lead anywhere Mr Chairman, and it is unfair to the witness because he doesn't know what the question is.

ADV PRIOR: Thank you Mr Chairman, I take note of that. I was trying to save some time, but I see that it is not going to assist. Siphiso Kunene states and that will be his evidence that his unit, which was the Chesterville unit, was reporting to Mapumulo in Swaziland and that they had no link to Nxiweni. Could you confirm that?

MR BOTHA: That is possible.

ADV PRIOR: And that it was his unit that were responsible for the two CNA bombs that went off and not Nxiweni's unit.

MR BOTHA: Once again, Chairperson, as I said units in Durban fell under the command of Nxiweni, whether or not they had direct command contact with him, is unknown to me.

But I would just like to indicate in paragraph 3 of Ngema's evidence on the same page, the question that you asked me about whether there was a liaison, I told you that Pila once instructed them to make contact with Nxiweni to obtain weapons in an emergency. He sent one of the unit members who did not know Nxiweni to the meeting. He does not know who this person met with.

That simply confirms what I said that there was contact between them.

ADV PRIOR: Yes, there was contact, but we will leave it at that. The suggestion that was put to you, is that after his acquittal Nxiweni played no active role in the combatant situation, the combat situation in Natal because of the very fact that he was known to you, that he had been acquitted, that he was obviously being observed or watched or whatever?

MR BOTHA: For a period of time after that, he became active again.

ADV PRIOR: I think you have agreed, during the interrogation of him, that you slapped him on a number of occasions?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

ADV PRIOR: Did anybody else interrogate him from your own knowledge, any of the other applicants?

MR BOTHA: Yes Mr Chairman.

ADV PRIOR: Just mention them to us?

MR BOTHA: The only people present was Du Preez and Van der Westhuizen.

ADV PRIOR: Did Mr Du Preez assault him in your presence?

MR BOTHA: Yes Mr Chairman. Du Preez slapped him in my presence.

ADV PRIOR: With a fist? Also with a fist?

MR BOTHA: And he hit him as well.

ADV PRIOR: And Van der Westhuizen as well?

MR BOTHA: Yes.

ADV PRIOR: It never escalated to anything more than a slapping or a punching, there was no instruments used?

MR BOTHA: No, no instruments were used.

ADV PRIOR: Sorry, you were also not present at Nxiweni's execution?

MR BOTHA: That is correct. If Colonel Taylor had not arrived that afternoon, he and Wasserman, Du Preez and I would have eliminated Nxiweni.

ADV PRIOR: Is there any reason why Taylor who was the Head of the unit, hadn't been informed about Nxiweni?

MR BOTHA: He was not in Durban at the time of the decision.

ADV PRIOR: He just slotted in, he came suddenly at the farm or the safe house and he just took over?

MR BOTHA: That is correct, if my memory serves me correctly, he had arrived back from Swaziland that afternoon.

ADV PRIOR: The kwaMashu 3, I think you explained in quite a lot of detail how you got them to the meeting place and what happened. In this case there was no need to interrogate them, is that right, because the decision to execute them, had been made before their detention or their arrest?

MR BOTHA: That is correct Chairperson.

ADV PRIOR: The positioning of the bodies after they were shot, was that to destroy any evidence that they had been shot, in other words, they were placed with their heads onto the explosives, so that there would be no come back at any later stage?

MR BOTHA: That is correct Chairperson.

ADV PRIOR: Thank you, I have no further questions. Sorry, I have been asked to put this question, did your branch or did your unit clear the DLB in the kwaMashu area under the control of the kwaMashu unit?

MR BOTHA: There were only three limpet mines in their presence. The DLB's clearing was done by the Investigative Officer and if I remember correctly, a carrier bag and other forms of proof were found at a house which were tested positively for explosives.

There were such exhibits.

ADV PRIOR: Are you able to tell us which house it was that this bag was found?

MR BOTHA: Mr Chairperson, I can't remember, but I think that that information was given to the Investigative Team. There was a dossier with that information contained in it.

ADV PRIOR: Can you just tell us who maybe the Investigating Officer is so that we can follow this up?

MR BOTHA: It was Warrant Officer Petser.

ADV PRIOR: Thank you Mr Chairman.

MR NOLTE: Mr Chairman, no questions.

MR VISSER: No re-examination, thank you Mr Chairman.

ADV SIGODI: There is just one aspect that I want to clarify with you. You mentioned that the reason why you eliminated these people was because there was pressure on you to solve the problem, that is the problem of terrorism in the region.

I want to find out who exerted this pressure on you?

MR BOTHA: Mr Chairperson, daily we had morning conferences under the Chairpersonship of Gen Steyn, his rank was then Colonel and then later Brigadier.

Apart from those morning conferences, there were special meetings held with the Officers' Corps whereby at various opportunities it was said that we must get this country out of this mess. We cannot allow terrorism to take over and Colonel Steyn was a very fiery person when it is about the activities. He places pressure on you to such an extent that it didn't matter for us how long we worked in a day.

That, and then certain statements by politicians, activity requests for cross border operations, if there would be acts of terror the SADF would then react in a counter attack. We had to react on all of this.

ADV SIGODI: Did this mean to you, that the only way was to kill people the only way that you could alleviate this pressure, was to kill people?

MR BOTHA: In some instances yes, Mr Chairperson. In my opinion it was the only solution for the problem.

ADV SIGODI: The fact that there was this cross border raids by the SADF, did that, how did that put pressure on you as members of the Security Branch? Was there some form of competition between the Security Branch and the SADF?

MR BOTHA: Negative, there was no competition who could succeed the most, but what I am trying to say there is that as with the politician statement, that we would follow them to wherever they go, and then there were certain cross border raids where we followed certain terrorists and I thought it right that when there were certain operations internally, in terms of elimination of people who were involved, or was in control of certain acts of terror.

ADV SIGODI: Did you feel that you were safe with your acts? In other words did you feel that you were safe with your acts of eliminating people with your illegal acts?

MR BOTHA: Yes Mr Chairperson, I knew that if it was executed in such a way that no one could point a finger, it would be safe.

ADV SIGODI: And what if somebody could point a finger at you?

MR BOTHA: Then we would have to carry the consequences. I then believed that I would receive assistance.

ADV SIGODI: From where?

MR BOTHA: From within the structures of the South African Police.

ADV SIGODI: In other words, there was a culture of covering up illegal acts, is that what you are saying?

MR BOTHA: No, that is not what I am saying. Chairperson what I am saying is that I believed that I would be assisted. I have never been in a position where there was a cover up and where people in our own department was misled concerning certain acts.

ADV SIGODI: What was the basis of your belief that you would be assisted?

MR BOTHA: I believed that if we were so manipulated, we would not be directly implicated in a matter.

ADV SIGODI: Thank you Chairperson.

MR MALAN: The investigation that followed after the kwaMashu 3, that you said Warrant Officer Petser led?

MR BOTHA: Yes, Mr Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Did he ever make contact with the Security Branch or firstly, was he in the Uniform Branch or which branch?

MR BOTHA: No, he was from the Investigative Personnel from the Security Branch.

MR MALAN: Did he ever ask you if the operatives under your control, had any involvement in it?

MR BOTHA: No, negative Mr Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Did he never consider that?

MR BOTHA: No, it was never considered. It was only dealt with as a purely terrorist investigation.

MR MALAN: And then just your answers on questions that Mr Prior put to you, specifically concerning Bhila.

You testified that the first time that you heard about Bhila's elimination and how it occurred, was with the amnesty application?

MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.

MR MALAN: The evidence that we heard earlier on, concerning the applications of Bosch and others and McCarter as well as Wasserman, and that is that he then continued with his activities and that Taylor put it to them?

MR BOTHA: Yes, I heard that evidence.

MR MALAN: In other words, he was an active member of one of the structures, otherwise he wouldn't have been charged in the first place?

MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.

MR MALAN: And you picked him up with your involvement in investigations in Amanzimtoti and as well as the Ramlakan case?

MR BOTHA: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR MALAN: Did you have knowledge of the fact that he suddenly appeared out of circulation in the structures?

MR BOTHA: Yes Mr Chairperson. The information at that stage was that he left the country for further military training.

MR MALAN: Who gave you this information?

MR BOTHA: It came through the normal information structures. He was a prominent person. He was not the only person who at that stage, disappeared for training outside of the country.

MR MALAN: The people who went for training outside of the country, did you also try to follow them with the information structure, to find out what they were doing and where they were?

MR BOTHA: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Did you try to follow Bhila?

MR BOTHA: I believe so Mr Chairperson, there would be a dossier for him, concerning him leaving the country.

MR MALAN: You never asked Wasserman if he would know anything about Bhila?

MR BOTHA: No, it was not necessary for me to ask this.

MR MALAN: Why not?

MR BOTHA: There was nothing that made me suspicious that there was something else, that he just left the country for military training.

MR MALAN: Did you think that the elimination actions, that you were involved in, were the only ones that took place within your unit?

MR BOTHA: Yes, I believed it.

MR MALAN: You did not think that any of the other members were involved in acts like these except where you were in command and coordinated it?

MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct Mr Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Thank you.

MR VISSER: May the witness be excused Mr Chairman?

CHAIRPERSON: No, I have a few questions.

MR VISSER: I am sorry.

CHAIRPERSON: You have just told us that the information you got from the normal channels was that Bhila had left the country for military training?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And we know that information is totally inaccurate and unreliable?

MR BOTHA: I agree with you there.

CHAIRPERSON: So your other similar information, may have been equally unreliable?

MR BOTHA: No Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Why should just Bhila be inaccurate? Why should you be able that other information was accurate? You told us that the Bhila information came through your normal channels?

MR BOTHA: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And we know that it was totally inaccurate, don't we? You have just agreed?

MR BOTHA: Mr Chairperson, I also heard from the evidence of Wasserman that it was created that this person just left the country.

CHAIRPERSON: And we know don't we, that he couldn't have gone back to any activities, because he was murdered three days after he was released?

MR BOTHA: I heard that in the evidence, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: I think in fact the instructions, the evidence was that the instructions were given a day or so after his release.

MR BOTHA: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: It would seem again false information was given?

MR BOTHA: Yes, if the legend was created, that had to be carried out, that was the information that we received.

CHAIRPERSON: Going back to Nxiweni. Do you know who I am talking about?

MR BOTHA: Yes, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: You had the opportunity as I understand it, to have charged him with the unlawful possession of firearms and explosives?

MR BOTHA: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: But you didn't bother to do anything further about that, because you had already decided to kill him?

MR BOTHA: That is correct, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: So, your interest wasn't seeing if you could lawfully take him out of circulation?

MR BOTHA: Mr Chairperson, the decision to eliminate Nxiweni, was taken already when we took him. The information concerning the ammunition or the trunk of ammunition, was only made that evening after I took the decision.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, why couldn't you have changed your mind? Why insist on going on with the murder of a man, when it was no longer necessary?

MR BOTHA: In my opinion it was still necessary. I just confirmed that he is involved, that he did receive ammunition and I just cleaned up around him.

CHAIRPERSON: So you weren't interested, you were more interested in killing people than in securing evidence and prosecuting them in the lawful manner?

MR BOTHA: In the instances where the activity of a person was of such prominence, that would be my decision, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Does that make your job easier, is that why you were doing that?

MR BOTHA: In the case of where a person, Mr Chairperson, was responsible for acts of terror, in the execution and planning of it, yes it did make our task easier when we eliminated them, because we could then stop the process.

MR VISSER: May the witness be excused Mr Chairman?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VISSER: Thank you.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I call Mr Steyn. Mr Chairman, the application of Johannes Albertus Steyn is to be found in the newly marked bundle 2, from page 35 onwards.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR VISSER: The applications of Mr Steyn are for Ndwandwe, Nxiweni and the kwaMashu 3 Mr Chairman, not for the Bhila incident.

JOHANNES ALBERTUS STEYN: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Steyn, you applied for amnesty concerning the incident of Fila Portia Ndwandwe, M.K. Zandile as well as Pumeso Nxiweni and the kwaMashu 3, Sibusiso Ndlovu, Manzi Vilakazi and Elias Gift Mtshali, is that correct?

MR STEYN: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Have you got your application for amnesty in front of you?

MR STEYN: Yes.

MR VISSER: Except for certain aspects that we will indicate or highlight to the Committee, do you confirm the correctness of this written application and the supplements when we refer to it, and do you ask that this will be incorporated in your evidence?

MR STEYN: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Could you just tell the Committee where you were born?

MR STEYN: Mr Chairperson, I was born in Viljoenskroon, on the 30th of September 1939.

MR VISSER: Where did you grow up?

MR STEYN: In the Free State. At a very young age, I left the Free State and went to the Western Transvaal where I later attended high school in Lichtenburg.

There after the completion of my school, I then directly joined the South African Police.

MR VISSER: You gave a short summary of your career with the South African Police on page 36, paragraph 8(b) of your application, is that correct?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And the highlights of it is that you then joined on the 22nd of February 1956 and you were then placed in the Uniform Branch in the Vaal Triangle until the end of 1968? From the 1st of January 1969 you were then Lieutenant and served in the Security Branch within the Vaal Triangle?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Are you still in the South African Police?

MR STEYN: No, I retired.

MR VISSER: When did you retire?

MR STEYN: On the 31st of December 1994.

MR VISSER: With the rank of General Major?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: At that stage you were then the District Commissioner of the Transvaal, just before you retired?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: At one stage, you landed in Natal, but before we get there, in the Western Transvaal, did you there have any experience of terrorist acts or activities and of the deploying of the struggle of the past?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct Mr Chairperson. While I was in the Western Transvaal we were aware of the onslaught from out of Botswana into the Republic. There was a consistent infiltration of terrorists from Botswana, the coming in of weapons into the country, and certain acts occurred where people were killed.

MR VISSER: How did it happen that you came to Durban?

MR STEYN: Mr Chairperson, on request of Gen Van der Merwe, I was sent to Durban after the late Colonel Welman died in an act of terror in Durban.

MR VISSER: Do you spell it Welman?

MR STEYN: Yes, I presume so.

MR VISSER: He then died and you are saying that you were then requested by Van der Merwe to come down to Durban. What was your position when you landed in Durban?

MR STEYN: For the first six months I was second in charge of the Security Branch under the command of at that stage, Brigadier Van Niekerk.

MR VISSER: In those first six months, what did you mostly do here?

MR STEYN: Mr Chairperson, apart from my normal duties as second in charge of the Security Branch, I got information about the history of Natal, the political history, the struggle.

MR VISSER: And the dimensions of the political struggle here.

MR STEYN: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: In that position as assistant, as you referred to it earlier on, did you change or did that position change?

MR STEYN: Yes. At the beginning of 1987 Mr Chairperson, with the transfer of Brigadier Van Niekerk, I took over the command of the Security Branch in Durban.

MR VISSER: And what was your rank then?

MR STEYN: I was then the Section Commander of Port Natl.

MR VISSER: With what rank?

MR STEYN: I presume that I was a Colonel, but afterwards I was then promoted to Brigadier.

MR VISSER: On page 38 of bundle 2, you refer to the applications or the incidents then and you refer in paragraph 1, that Ndwandwe admitted that during the period of 1986 to 1988, she was in charge of various local and external trained ANC terrorists who amongst others, were responsible for attacks on Lieutenant Radjo and Zukela and Warrant Officer Zukela, is that correct?

MR STEYN: That is correct, yes.

MR VISSER: And you then put dates in brackets that we know is wrong. The first you said was during October 1988 concerning Radjo, instead of 31 of July or June of 1986. And the other was during August 1988 concerning Zukela, while it was the 17th of September 1986. How did you make this mistake?

MR STEYN: Mr Chairperson, it was in a period when we had to submit our applications and we worked under pressure, there wasn't enough time and I think it was a mistake, typing error or an error on our side, and that is how I see it.

MR VISSER: Did you discuss it with each other, the incidents and the facts, and tried to remember what happened?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And Mr Forster, was he also part of these discussions?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: You have listened to the evidence of Mr Botha?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: He testified about the dimensions of the political struggle of the past here in Port Natal and he also referred to various points concerning the policy of the ANC/SACP as well as the policy and strategy of the South African government to face the attacks with political power on the side of the National Party or the government then?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Do you agree with what he told the Committee?

MR STEYN: Yes, I do.

MR VISSER: You applied as we know, for the abduction and the death of Ndwandwe. On page 38 you referred to the presentation where Mr Botha mentioned that was submitted to you by Taylor and Botha, is that correct?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And then you continue to say in very short in your application, that the members that you mentioned there, then left and what the purpose was of this operation?

MR STEYN: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You already said that it was done under pressure or the writing of this document. Can you just maybe discuss this in more detail. When Botha and Taylor confronted you or discussed Ndwandwe's case with you, what was the idea there, what had to be done?

MR STEYN: Mr Chairperson, the idea was that she must be abducted from Swaziland with the purpose to recruit her, to get information from her.

MR VISSER: This information, would that then be for what purpose?

MR STEYN: The information would be in terms of the structures of the ANC in Port Natal and in the greater Republic.

MR VISSER: Yes, as well as weapon, ammunition, etc, training, is that the structures that you are referring to?

MR STEYN: Yes.

MR VISSER: You also mentioned that the purpose would be to recruit her as an informant. Why would that be necessary?

MR STEYN: Mr Chairperson, if we succeeded in recruiting her as an informant, she would be very valuable in the sense that in her position as the Commander, she had knowledge of various MK/ANC activities, not just in Swaziland, but also here internally in Port Natal.

MR VISSER: On page 40 of bundle 2, the third paragraph, you say that before I authorised the elimination of Zandile, I considered all possible options and then you mentioned the recruiting her as an informant or detaining, letting her go or then the last one, elimination.

What I would like to ask you is when did the question about the elimination come to you and begin to play a role?

MR STEYN: Mr Chairperson, the idea of elimination already came to me on the first day when Taylor and Botha spoke to me. It was already for me an option then.

MR VISSER: Did you know that if you abducted her, let me put the question like this, if you abducted her from Swaziland and you used informants for that purpose, and you took her out of Swaziland, brought her into South Africa, and you could not recruit her as an informant, did you then realise that there could be a problem?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: What would that problem be?

MR STEYN: Her recruitment or placing her back, would then lead that those informants would be placed in danger, the structures within Swaziland as well as in the Republic or in the Durban area had to be changed, or we had to adapt certain things.

MR VISSER: Why would that be so, why would there be changes, what structures are you talking about, police structures?

MR STEYN: No, within the MK structures.

MR VISSER: You said that there would be changes there then, if she was then freed and placed back to Swaziland?

MR STEYN: She had to change her own modus operandi, any Commander would change the structures to make different plans, so that the Security Branch could not get hold of her or her structures.

MR VISSER: So you then realised that there is a possibility that eventually she will have to be eliminated?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Even so, you wanted or attempted to recruit her as an informant?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: If that was not the purpose, what could you have done then? If it was not necessary or if it was not your purpose to recruit her as an informant, what would you have done then, if you did not decide to eliminate her?

MR STEYN: Then we would possibly have to find it easier to eliminate her in Swaziland.

MR VISSER: Botha testified here about how they went there, travelled there from Durban and how you arrived at the Onverwacht border post and what then happened in Swaziland and on the way back. Do you agree with the evidence of Botha where he refers to your part and role and that is in short that you were dropped off at the Onverwacht border post, where you waited for them to return after all the planning and arrangements were made between you?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Is it correct that on the same day, late that evening, people came to you?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And you were then picked up and taken to the border fence between the Republic and Swaziland to a certain point?

MR STEYN: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Where you met Zandile and Botha, helped them through the border fence and then transported them to the police station at the Onverwacht border post?

MR STEYN: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Why did you go along personally with this occasion Mr Steyn?

MR STEYN: At various occasions Mr Chairperson, I went along with operations with recruitment attempts, with various other investigations, because circumstances dictated that I go along.

I know it was quite risky to send people into another country, and should something happen, I could at least be in the environment in order to attempt to control the situation from my point.

MR VISSER: Could you say when you were picked up and taken to the border post and returned to the house, who was the person who was present? With the exception of yourself, who else was there?

MR STEYN: It was Ndwandwe, Henti Botha, Mr Forster and I think Mr Taylor.

MR VISSER: What happened to Ndwandwe that evening at the border post?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, at the safe house, she was interrogated.

MR VISSER: You are referring to a safe house?

MR STEYN: Or at least the house that was connected to the border post.

MR VISSER: Yes, there she was interrogated by whom?

MR STEYN: Primarily by Mr Botha.

MR VISSER: Did any of the other members also interrogate her from time to time?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Did you yourself interrogate her from time to time?

MR STEYN: Yes, I attended quite a lot, although I did not ask her many questions. Mr Botha was the one who asked the most questions.

MR VISSER: The person who worked with her as you put it, was Mr Botha?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: How long did this interrogation take?

MR STEYN: If I remember correctly, it was until approximately midnight, perhaps a little while after that.

MR VISSER: At what time did you pick up the people at the border post?

MR STEYN: The following morning, I think it was after seven.

MR VISSER: No, at what time did you fetch Botha and Ndwandwe at the border post?

CHAIRPERSON: It wasn't the border post, it was the fence.

MR VISSER: It was the border fence.

MR STEYN: I think it was approximately half past eight or 9 o'clock.

MR VISSER: So from approximately 9 o'clock to midnight, would you say?

MR STEYN: Yes, more or less.

MR VISSER: The following morning, you have just referred to the following morning, who arrived there?

MR STEYN: Mr Wasserman and Du Preez arrived there.

MR VISSER: Why didn't they come out the previous evening?

MR STEYN: It was too late for them to cross the border.

MR VISSER: I think that Botha said that the Onverwacht border post would close at six o'clock or I think closed at six o'clock at that stage?

MR STEYN: Yes, I am not entirely certain, but I know that it was late.

MR VISSER: Yes, they were too late. Is it also your knowledge and recollection that Ndwandwe provided certain information with regard to MK activities in the Durban area?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: I don't expect of you to remember or repeat everything, but did you look at or are you aware of the application of Mr Botha?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And the cases which he has mentioned on pages 6 and 7, actually it is 6 to 9 or 6 to 8 at least, of bundle 2?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: By the following morning, what was the position with regard to the recruitment of Ndwandwe?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, at that stage, there was no clarity with regard to whether or not she could be recruited as an informer.

MR VISSER: You have also heard Mr Botha's evidence concerning the measures which were applied in order to determine whether or not an informer would indeed be recruited, do you agree with what he said in broad principle?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Very well, if you could have recruited her, what would then have happened, there at the Onverwacht border post, what would have happened there?

MR STEYN: If we had been one hundred percent certain that recruitment would be one hundred percent successful, then the normal procedure would be to replace such a person as soon as possible.

MR VISSER: Why as soon as possible?

MR STEYN: Because it would prevent that other members of the structure in Swaziland become aware of the absence of such a person and that would make the situation rather suspect for such a person.

MR VISSER: Did you or anybody in your presence or anybody that you are aware of, assault Ms Ndwandwe or physically mistreat her?

MR STEYN: No, she was not assaulted, definitely not.

MR VISSER: By the following morning, I don't know whether I have asked you this already, but just answer it once more if I have, what was the position regarding her recruitment?

MR STEYN: We did not have clarity whether or not she could be recruited as an informant.

MR VISSER: And what happened then?

MR STEYN: We departed for a farm near Pietermaritzburg.

CHAIRPERSON: I seem to recall that at the end of last week, I was asked that we should adjourn at shorter intervals, that the intervals we had last week, were a little tiring for some people, particularly in view of the climatic conditions here. Should we take the adjournment now before we get to ...

MR VISSER: Certainly Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: We will take a short adjournment of 15 minutes now.

CHAIRPERSON: One matter before we continue, unless anybody can advance any very persuasive argument, I propose to adjourn tomorrow at half past three in the afternoon. I've got to go and see a dentist.

JOHANNES ALBERTUS STEYN: (still under oath)

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: (continued) Mr Steyn, we have reached the point where on the morning at Onverwacht border post, it was realised that you were not certain whether Ndwandwe would cooperate as an informer and that you then departed for a farm in the vicinity of Pietermaritzburg with her, is that correct?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Did you travel in the same vehicle as Ms Ndwandwe?

MR STEYN: No Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Who accompanied her?

MR STEYN: Mr Botha drove with her.

MR VISSER: Yes, and when you arrived in Pietermaritzburg, did Botha report any further to you regarding any further conversations which he had with her?

MR STEYN: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And was there then reason to believe that she was recruitable as an informer?

MR STEYN: Mr Chairperson, at the farm, Mr Botha if I remember correctly, spent another while with her. He spoke to her for a while longer, after which he told me that he was of the opinion that she was not recruitable.

MR VISSER: Yes, before we get to that, did Mr Botha report to you regarding the content of discussions which he had with Ms Ndwandwe on the way from the Swaziland border post to Pietermaritzburg?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And that she had told him certain things?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Can you recall what that involved?

MR STEYN: Mr Chairperson, Mr Botha among others informed me that during the drive to the farm, Ndwandwe admitted that some of her units had been responsible for the death of Lieutenant Radjo and that Warrant Officer Zukela had also died as a result of the actions.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, that is Exhibit A page 22 as regards Radjo, the fourth item, and page - A Mr Chairman, it is the list of politically related incidents in Port Natal. Page 22, the fourth item Mr Chairman, and as regards Zukela it is page 25, the third item.

Page 22 is the first one Mr Chairman, the fourth item from the top and page 25, the third item from the top refers to Warrant Officer Zukela.

Mr Steyn, you have already stated that Botha proceeded with his interrogation of Ms Ndwandwe. Did he gradually on the farm, report to you?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And that report, indicated his belief that she was not recruitable?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: What did you do then?

MR STEYN: Mr Chairperson, I entered into a discussion with her and I made myself aware of the fact that she had admitted to certain acts of terrorism and that she was not prepared to cooperate with us any further in the form of an informer.

MR VISSER: Yes. You have stated in your application, in the middle of page 40, that she pertinently stated this?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: What did she state?

MR STEYN: She stated that she would continue with her activities should she be released. And that she was not prepared to cooperate with us.

MR VISSER: Yes, and at that stage the deed was practically done, if I understand you correctly?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: To charge her in South Africa, would that have been a viable option at that stage?

MR STEYN: No Mr Chairperson, it would not have been because we abducted her illegally from Swaziland. It would have created problems if it came to light that we had abducted her.

MR VISSER: Did you apart from her admittance, have any kind of evidence which could be used in court against her?

MR STEYN: No Chairperson.

MR VISSER: What about her release?

MR STEYN: Her release would have led to her continuing her activities.

MR VISSER: Yes, and you have also said that as an informer she was not recruitable, what did you do then?

MR STEYN: Mr Chairperson, at that stage I decided that her elimination was necessary.

MR VISSER: Did you issue any orders in this regard?

MR STEYN: Yes, I did.

MR VISSER: To whom?

MR STEYN: I gave orders to Mr Taylor and Mr Forster. I told them that they were to see to it that she would be eliminated.

MR VISSER: Did you remain there or did you depart?

MR STEYN: After that, I departed.

MR VISSER: And you don't know anything else about what happened there after that?

MR STEYN: No, I didn't know that evening, but at a later stage I was informed that she had been eliminated and buried. That she had been eliminated and buried on the farm.

MR VISSER: Mr Steyn, while you were interrogating Ms Ndwandwe on that day and we know now who the people were who were present, you have referred us to who they were, you have referred to Mr Botha, were there also any other people who during the course of that day, arrived there on the farm at Elandskop?

MR STEYN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Who were they?

MR STEYN: I remember Mr Labuschagne and for the moment I have forgot the following name.

MR VISSER: That was Mr Verwey?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Did they arrive there?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Do you know how it came to pass that they arrived there?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, I later heard that if I can remember correctly, they had been informed by Mr Taylor earlier that day.

MR VISSER: That Ndwandwe was in your custody?

MR STEYN: Yes, that Ndwandwe was on the farm.

MR VISSER: Where did they come from?

MR STEYN: They came from the Eastern Transvaal, Middelburg if I remember correctly.

MR VISSER: The Eastern Transvaal, would that be the Uniform Branch of the Eastern Transvaal?

MR STEYN: It was the Security Branch of the Eastern Transvaal.

MR VISSER: Okay, and did the Eastern Transvaal Security Branch also have an interest in ANC/SACP activities in Swaziland?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Did Mr Labuschagne and or Mr Verwey also interrogate Ms Ndwandwe?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And as far as you are aware, did they know that she had been abducted?

MR STEYN: No Mr chairperson.

MR VISSER: Would they have known about the decision or the intention that she be eliminated?

MR STEYN: No.

MR VISSER: Could you approximately remember how long they stayed there on the farm?

MR STEYN: I am not sure, but it could have been an hour or two.

MR VISSER: An hour or two? And that is as far as your knowledge goes regarding the matter of Ms Ndwandwe?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Yes. And you have stated that you departed from the farm before she was eliminated?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And Labuschagne and Verwey, what were their positions?

MR STEYN: I can' recall exactly, they may have departed before me, but I am not entirely certain.

MR VISSER: With regard to the incident of Mr Pumeso Nxiweni, were you physically involved before his elimination with anything which had to do with it?

MR STEYN: No, not at all.

MR VISSER: Were you aware of his activities or his alleged activities?

MR STEYN: Yes, I was aware.

MR VISSER: Were you also aware or just to save time, were you aware of the activities of the kwaMashu 3?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: In the sense that the kwaMashu unit and other units operated in the Durban area?

MR STEYN: Yes, in that sense, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Did you have any access to information, security community information which indicated that these people were indeed involved in terrorist attacks?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: With regard to Mr Nxiweni, what was the first piece of information which you became aware of regarding his elimination?

MR STEYN: Mr Chairperson, on a certain day Mr Taylor and if I remember correctly, Mr Botha came to tell me that they had eliminated them.

MR VISSER: Yes. You did not submit that information for investigations against the involved persons?

MR STEYN: No, I did not.

MR VISSER: And in that stage, you identified yourself with the elimination?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And you also cooperated in the cover up of the incidents?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And the same goes for the kwaMashu 3 incident for which you are applying for amnesty?

MR STEYN: That is entirely correct.

MR VISSER: Who informed you regarding their elimination?

MR STEYN: If I recall correctly, it was Mr Taylor.

MR VISSER: Mr Taylor? And once again, you didn't take any steps to have the incident investigated as an offence or institute any prosecutions?

MR STEYN: No, I did not.

MR VISSER: And you also associated yourself with that deed and the conduct of your staff members?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: On page 41, or at least before we get to that, you are the Commander here in Durban. Could you tell the Committee how you experienced your position, and which influences were of application to you so that the Committee can develop a better comprehension of the reasons why you participated in the actions regarding which you have given evidence this morning?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, at that stage before my arrival and after my arrival in Durban, with my period of service there, there was a continuous series of acts of terrorism which were committed in Natal.

MR VISSER: Botha described it as Bombay.

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And someone put it here to Mr Botha that it was a hotspot in South Africa?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct. At a certain stage things were quite serious. One drove from one bomb explosion to another. Incidents would take place within minutes from each other.

One would be sitting in one's office after having arrived back from a scene of an incident, and then hear about another. There would be up to three incidents per day.

MR VISSER: Did that result in you having to work long hours?

MR STEYN: We never looked at our watches.

MR VISSER: You and your colleagues?

MR STEYN: Yes, me and the people who worked below me. Especially when the day broke that three bombs exploded on one day, I realised that we would have to do something in order to normalise the situation.

MR VISSER: Were you filled with feelings of powerlessness regarding what was happening?

MR STEYN: That is true. To such an extent that I created special opportunities to speak to some of my fellow officers and to illustrate the situation to them, and to emphasise that we could not allow the situation to continue as such.

One weapon stockpiling point after another, was discovered, where great amounts of weaponry, ammunition and explosives were found and they were meant for use in the country.

MR VISSER: Mr Botha referred in cross-examination by Mr Prior to these conferences which you had with your soldiers during which you encouraged them to be more effective and he described you as fiery. What would your commentary be regarding that?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, he is correct in saying that. I was under a lot of pressure as the Commander of the Security Branch of Natal. The Security Branch was responsible for terrorism, we had to prevent it. We were under a lot of pressure from Head Office.

We heard the politicians saying that we would hunt them, we would sniff them out no matter where they went, we would not allow the ANC to destroy this country. We would not allow a South African Communist Party government.

In the process, and I will state this directly, I must have done more than just motivate the people that worked for me, I motivated them to a great extent to ensure that we combat this onslaught.

MR VISSER: Did you place pressure on them?

MR STEYN: Yes, I pressurised them tremendously. I told them that if one could consider the statements of the ANC, the documentation, the notion of a People's War, those were the phrases which I used, to encourage my colleagues to put everything into the struggle, to prevent a new dispensation from coming into power.

CHAIRPERSON: You say you did this, but as I recollect at the same time, pressure was coming onto you from above, there were political speeches made, saying very much the same sort of thing?

MR STEYN: Precisely so Mr Chairperson. These things were said on platforms by the politicians. All of us know this and I can see this in my mind's eye, how the politicians said that we will not allow this sort of thing, we will never allow that a communist government be established here.

These were all things which impressed me and placed a great deal of pressure on me, and I transferred this to the colleagues who worked with me.

MR VISSER: Mr Steyn it is one thing to say that politicians were talking about it, but in practice, isn't it simply so that that which the politicians say, becomes part of one's duties to observe and execute?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And is that how you saw it?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is how I understood it.

MR VISSER: You also referred indirectly a few moments ago that you visited scenes where bomb explosions had taken place and so forth. Did these scenes leave any impressions on you?

MR STEYN: Yes, they left impressions and it made one more determined to give one's best in combatting the struggle.

MR MALAN: I beg your pardon Mr Steyn, could I just ask you this, once again with regard to what we said earlier, there is no doubt that there was a tremendous level of pressure, you have referred to the politicians' statements. Did you understand the political statements of that time, as the expectations of politicians that they had of you, to eliminate people?

MR STEYN: It was the answer to the pressure. I understood that we had to combat the struggle at all costs.

MR MALAN: You see, it is quite a comprehensive term this term at all cost, because in the first place, that would be in the framework of your capacity and your mandate?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR MALAN: So then, what else would this at all costs phrase include within this context? I think that we should just have understanding of this.

MR STEYN: It may be the incorrect choice of words, but ultimately we had to do everything. To put it briefly, we could not allow that another dispensation be established here by a revolutionary takeover. And we Mr Chairperson, and myself, were indoctrinated in the sense that we felt and I heard Mr Vlok testify earlier where he said the following. We created a climate, we created a situation in which the Security Forces and especially the Security Branch of the police, did these things.

And Mr Vlok said a terrorist in the hands of a Security Branch, was not far from an action that fell within the parameters of the normal police activities.

MR VISSER: And he also said, is it not true, that in these circumstances, members of the police acted and believed that they were even authorised or that it was expected of them to act illegally?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is true.

MR MALAN: I am sorry, you are asking a general question. It is true that he said it, but I would just like to come back to you. Did you expect that it was expected from you to act illegally?

MR STEYN: In certain instances, I believe it was the case, yes.

MR MALAN: And you believed that it was expected from you to eliminate people by killing them?

MR STEYN: Yes, by implication.

MR MALAN: Or with abductions and murders?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is true.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, Visser on record, I have received an indication from the Committee for which we are thankful Mr Chairman, that we can go a lot quicker and that we need not repeat the evidence already given.

We will therefore confine ourselves to a larger extent Mr Chairman, to that which is new.

CHAIRPERSON: I think in that regard too Mr Visser, it would be sufficient if the applicants merely confirm the contents of their application, they need not repeat it.

MR VISSER: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Unless there are specific points that you want them to enlarge on.

MR VISSER: We are indebted to you Mr Chairman, and it certainly will contribute to us going a lot quicker. Mr Steyn, we were at the point concerning the pressure. You talked about the politicians.

Is it not true that there was pressure from the police structures and security structures that existed during the struggle, that they also put pressure on you?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct Mr Chairperson. We received, continually received instructions from Head Office to face this onslaught and together with the management structures and security structures, where the main theme was these acts of terror or the terrorism.

MR VISSER: On page 41 you referred to the evidence of Gen Johan van der Merwe, whose evidence you asked to be incorporated in your evidence.

It is from page 127 of volume 2. You refer there to attacks on police, on page 41 and you confirm the contents of page 41, 42, statements made by the ANC that connects with what Mr Botha gave you on page 43, 44, 45, 46 up until page 47, the second last paragraph, is that correct?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, the reference at page 45 to the Exhibit which is referred to as JAS3 in the second paragraph, refers to page 412 of volume 2. My Attorney tells me it is volume 3 now with the renumbering. I am sorry, it is then volume 3, page 412. The next paragraph refers to a JAS4, which is page 413 - page 418 of volume 3 and in the next paragraph MK in Combat, JAS5 refers to volume 3, page 405, Mr Chairman.

According to yourself, I have just checked Mr Chairman, it is volume 3, my Attorney is correct, Attorneys are always correct it seems. With the elimination of Ndwandwe, in your opinion, was there any effect with regards to the Durban area?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct Mr Chairperson, there was acts of terror, it lessened.

MR VISSER: In other words it worked?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: On page 47 of volume 2, you also go to Pumeso. You already dealt with that and you also dealt with the kwaMashu 3.

Mr Steyn, you told me that you would like to say something or get it off your chest about your situation and the Security Branch members and what the situation was in this political struggle. Would you like to tell us about this? You said that you were sorry.

MR STEYN: Mr Chairperson, I would like to say that a person is sorry that these things happened, but what I would like to say is I am sorry that the government of the day, of that time, the National Party did not have the vision to solve the problems in the country by political means.

I am furthermore sorry that because of this, the revolutionary onslaught was increased, continued, during which time a lot of people were injured and killed and property was damaged. The emphasis of what I would like to say, I am sorry about these two aspects that I have just mentioned, that the South African Police and then especially the Security Branch was caught between these two poles.

We indeed stood between the government on the one side, and the revolutionary onslaught on the other side. While we were caught up in this, this problem situation, we committed certain acts that I believe under normal circumstances, would not have realised.

I think we were placed in a position where we ultimately broke the law.

MR VISSER: You confirm then in conclusion paragraph 19(a) and (b) of form 1 of your application, where it has something to do with you?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman.

MR NEL: Thank you Mr Chairman, Christo Nel, I have no questions.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ADV PRIOR: Thank you Mr Chairperson, Prior, Evidence Leader. General Steyn, if you could look at Exhibit H, the first page, do you accept that with the additions of what Botha told us that Raymond Lala was involved as the link between the internal and external and there was a fellow, a chap, Chappies Morabe, do you agree in broad outline that the structure of Operation Butterfly was as is depicted on the first page?

MR STEYN: Mr Chairperson, I would say as far as it was explained by Mr Botha, because he knew the finer details of this. I was not well informed about the finer details.

ADV PRIOR: Now, but you were the Officer Commanding of Port Natal, the Security Branch, is that correct?

MR STEYN: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

ADV PRIOR: And would you not by virtue of that position have been up to speed with the events taking place within the area of your jurisdiction or are you saying that men under your command like Botha, were able to keep information away from your ears?

MR STEYN: No, he would not withhold any information.

ADV PRIOR: All right, you knew then when Operation Butterfly had been penetrated that the Commanders were Thami Zulu and Ralph Lawrence, also known as Fear, you knew that?

MR STEYN: Yes, Mr Chairperson, maybe I should just explain that Operation Butterfly was already on before I came to Natal. I was not there from the first day.

MR VISSER: I didn't want to interrupt Mr Chairman, but Exhibit H is quite clear that it refers to 1985, and this witness only arrived here in May 1986.

ADV PRIOR: Yes sorry, but you said that you familiarised yourself with the political situation in Natal?

MR STEYN: That is correct yes. In the broader terms I did get information about what this onslaught was about.

ADV PRIOR: Were you in Durban or in Port Natal at the time that the Piet Retief 9 were killed or were you still in the Eastern Transvaal?

MR STEYN: I was in the Western Transvaal.

ADV PRIOR: Western Transvaal.

MR STEYN: No, I cannot remember.

ADV PRIOR: Were you aware of such an event that nine MK combatants were in an operation, were killed in an operation?

MR STEYN: That is correct, yes, I became aware of this.

ADV PRIOR: Were you aware that shortly after that, Thami Zulu and Ralph Lawrence were then withdrawn by the ANC out of Swaziland and were taken I think into Zambia or Angola, I am not too sure.

MR STEYN: At the stage when I tried to become aware of all the activities, I was aware that both of these people, or persons that you have just mentioned, was withdrawn but I cannot remember the correct dates.

ADV PRIOR: You were also obviously up to date with the developments in the Ramlakan trial, although it is referred to Buthelezi and others, we refer to it in these hearings as the Ramlakan trial, is that correct?

MR STEYN: Yes, to an extent I was informed about this because I think the arrests took place at the end of 1985 and once again, it was about six months before I arrived here.

ADV PRIOR: You see, what I am driving at is that at some stage in your evidence you said that your information was that Pila Portia Ndwandwe was during 1986 to 1988 in control of various local and external trained ANC terrorists?

MR STEYN: That is correct Mr Chairperson, the members who worked in the Intelligence section, informed me about this.

ADV PRIOR: What I am trying to indicate to you or demonstrate to you is that it seems unlikely that she would have been the Commander at that stage, given the nature of her, the circumstances surrounding her arrest.

On Exhibit H the first page, the externally trained members were Sibusiso Sithle Mbongwa, also known as George Fukudi, he was one of the accused in the Ramlakan trial, do you agree?

MR STEYN: I can remember that, yes.

ADV PRIOR: And his title was given on our information that he was the Commander. Then there was Linda Mone, also known as Stan Mone, he was an askari and he was a State witness.

MR STEYN: I cannot remember the facts concerning the case.

ADV PRIOR: There was one Masters, there was another M. Tulo, who was an askari and also a State witness.

MR STEYN: I cannot remember that.

ADV PRIOR: There was a fellow, Mduduzi Sithole, apparently he died and there was Andrew Zondo, he was accused in the Toti bomb trial and he was executed.

MR STEYN: I knew about that, it was in the media.

ADV PRIOR: Are you able to assist this Committee from your own knowledge, when Ms Ndwandwe was supposedly the Commander, when she took over the command of the Natal machinery?

MR STEYN: Mr Chairperson, if I can remember correctly, as it was told to me or the way in which I received this information through the Intelligence section, it was probably if you are now talking about Swaziland in 1987, 1988.

ADV PRIOR: Were you aware that she was a witness or listed as a State witness in the Ramlakan trial?

MR STEYN: Mr Chairperson, I heard about that later.

ADV PRIOR: And are you aware whether she left the Republic during that trial or whether she was still in the Republic? Are you able to assist us?

MR STEYN: I cannot say with certainty, but the information that I received, I received this from the Intelligence section and as I heard from different sections, the same information.

MR MALAN: Can I just ask this, so the information that you received about these activities, was the information that you received from Botha and his section?

MR STEYN: That is correct yes.

MR MALAN: You did not have any other sources, or received any other information?

MR STEYN: No, I did not myself gather this information, but mainly this unit who was responsible for the gathering of this information, kept me up to date.

MR MALAN: That is actually the question, because the question was if there was other sources that you knew about, but you said that all the information that you received about these security matters, Operation Butterfly and everything around this, came from Mr Botha?

MR STEYN: Not necessarily, no. Not necessarily from Mr Botha's unit only, there were general knowledge concerning this operation that I had as the case evolved.

MR MALAN: No, but general knowledge is not particular knowledge about this, your own knowledge that you had, not what everybody else knew?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct, the knowledge that I had, or the information that I had, was from the Intelligence component.

MR MALAN: Can you just tell us what components?

MR STEYN: It was Botha, Taylor, mainly them.

MR MALAN: Thank you.

ADV PRIOR: There was no other way that you could be rest assured that that information was correct? What I am driving at is you accepted the veracity of the information given to you by Taylor and Botha without reservation?

MR STEYN: That is correct. I accepted the information that they gave me. Over the years, I have received information from them about other incidents, etc.

ADV PRIOR: Now, were you aware that Stanley Bhila had been eliminated by your unit or by the members under your command?

MR STEYN: No Mr Chairperson.

ADV PRIOR: When did you hear for the first time that Bhila had been murdered by your, members of your unit?

MR STEYN: Mr Chairperson, if I can remember correctly, it was when the amnesty process or applications were discussed?

ADV PRIOR: Did it take you by surprise?

MR STEYN: Well, I was surprised to hear about this, but I did not know a lot about Bhila.

ADV PRIOR: He was killed in 1987, you were already almost a year in Durban, is that correct, or in Port Natal?

MR STEYN: That is correct yes.

ADV PRIOR: I am just trying to understand how the command structure worked, if your men under you were prepared to kill people or murder people without informing you, then I want to understand how it was possible? Was that par for the cause or what was the position, was it on a need to know basis?

MR STEYN: Mr Chairperson, in many of these instances, as amongst others, I can refer to Bhila, it was on a need to know basis. They did not inform me, that is the truth. I was not informed about this and I added this in my amnesty application.

ADV PRIOR: So we can accept that they must have decided amongst themselves that Bhila was to be eliminated and that no one above Taylor, who was a Major at that stage, needed to know about that?

MR STEYN: That is probably how they decided on it, yes.

ADV PRIOR: We know Bhila was murdered in 1987. Had the question of eliminating terrorists come to your attention before that, before that time?

MR STEYN: I am not sure if there was any other instances, or cases.

ADV PRIOR: Was the first one when Ms Portia Ndwandwe was eliminated, was that the first elimination that you were aware of?

MR STEYN: I am not sure, it could be, but I am saying that I am not sure.

ADV PRIOR: Does the name Deon Cele ring a bell?

MR STEYN: That is correct yes.

ADV PRIOR: Our information is that he was killed in July or August of 1988.

MR STEYN: It could be the right date yes.

ADV PRIOR: And his body was exhumed at Elandskop?

MR STEYN: I found out about that at a later stage.

ADV PRIOR: Try and assist us. If you think back, were you aware of that elimination or are you saying that in your recollection, that occurred, Deon Cele occurred after Ndwandwe, as far as you can remember?

MR STEYN: No, I really can't remember Chairperson.

MR MALAN: May I just ask you, did you apply for the Cele murder?

MR STEYN: No.

MR MALAN: So why would you then have known before Ndwandwe, wouldn't you have applied if you had known?

MR STEYN: I don't follow the question.

MR MALAN: It was put to you whether or not you know the name Cele and you said yes. And then it was put to you that he was murdered in July 1988, most probably, and that his body had been uncovered at Elandskop.

MR STEYN: Yes.

MR MALAN: And then it was put to you whether you had knowledge of it. If one looks at your application, then it appears that with Natal, Ndwandwe was the first person in time with whom you were involved?

MR STEYN: That may be so. I was not involved in the Cele incident and the Bhila incident.

MR MALAN: Mr Steyn, let me attempt to put it to you as follows, why do you doubt whether you would have known before Ndwandwe about any elimination of individuals? Are there others of which you knew and for which you are not applying for amnesty, is that a possible inference that we must draw?

MR STEYN: No, everything that I knew about, I have applied for.

MR MALAN: Thank you.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, perhaps we must refer to one incident. Perhaps my learned friend has not referred to it because it wasn't in similar vein as the present applications, but that is the so-called Quarry Road incident in 1986.

This witness also applies for amnesty in that regard Mr Chairman, that was a shootout. I believe that is the reason why my learned friend is not referring, just for the sake of clarity.

ADV PRIOR: I am indebted to my learned friend, and thank you Mr Chairman, for clarifying that.

General, apart from the 1986 Quarry Road matter which was a shootout, we are talking about eliminations, assassinations, murders. Is it your evidence, your positive evidence that the Ndwandwe matter was the first matter that you were aware of, of the Durban Branch of the Security Police, that were involved in an assassination?

MR STEYN: If I recall correctly Mr Chairperson, that would be so. I cannot place the incidents in chronological order so quickly.

ADV PRIOR: Do I understand your evidence correctly, the reason why you became involved in the Ndwandwe matter, was because in case it leaked out or people found out about it, that you were able then to be on the spot to suppress information or to cover up as it were?

CHAIRPERSON: Didn't he say he was to be on the spot at the border, if problems arose with them across the border?

MR STEYN: That is correct Chairperson.

ADV PRIOR: Just explain that, let's for example argue that something went wrong. You were sitting at Onverwacht, how were you going to assist?

Let's say for example the unit got shot in Manzini, through Swazi Security Forces for example, and that news got back to you, how were you going to then act?

MR STEYN: Mr Chairperson, I was of the opinion and it was our idea that should anything go wrong, some of our members would be able to contact me in whatever way, whether it be illegally by climbing back over the border fence.

I believed that there would be a manner in which it would come to my knowledge.

ADV PRIOR: What was the plan, was there any plan?

MR STEYN: Should anything happen that would lead to some of the members being arrested or shot, I would have to analyze the situation and make a decision as to what to do next.

In extreme circumstances, such as the arrest of some of our members, I would in all probability have discussed the matter with more senior people and said, look, we have a problem, we have acted in a cross border operation, and I would have to discuss this with senior members.

ADV PRIOR: Would that not have been discussed before your trip into Swaziland, the liaison with higher people, in case something should go wrong?

MR STEYN: As Commander of this operation, I had all those possibilities in mind.

ADV PRIOR: You see General, you would also have been implicated if it came out that something went wrong in Swaziland and you were there at Onverwacht border post, the mere fact that your presence was there, would have implicated you, or compromised your position, would you agree?

MR STEYN: Do you mean that should something go wrong in Swaziland?

ADV PRIOR: Exactly.

MR STEYN: Well, it wouldn't have been a problem for me, because I would have to handle it from that point.

ADV PRIOR: It wouldn't have become a problem because people higher up than yourself, were aware of that situation?

MR STEYN: I don't understand this question, which situation are you referring to?

ADV PRIOR: Well the fact that you would have gone into Swaziland to execute an operation?

MR STEYN: Nobody above me knew about this operation.

ADV PRIOR: Well, when Taylor and Botha gave you the presentation, as you have indicated to abduct Ms Ndwandwe out of Swaziland, this was the first time that you were involved in a cross border operation, is that correct?

MR STEYN: In Natal Mr Chairperson.

ADV PRIOR: All right, I beg your pardon, you were involved in Botswana. Did you consider the fall out, the political fall out of your actions in Swaziland? I mean the embarrassment to the government, to the police?

MR STEYN: It was a consideration Mr Chairperson, but for us it was about committing this deed.

ADV PRIOR: How seriously did you consider that aspect of the operation?

MR STEYN: One would always bear something like that in mind, but what was the greatest factor of consideration for me, was the successful execution of this operation and should any problems arise, we would handle them in accordance with the circumstances.

ADV PRIOR: Would it not have been necessary to discuss this serious type of operation, which had international implications and ramifications, with someone more senior than yourself?

MR STEYN: No Mr Chairperson, I did not do that, I would not do that because then I would involve or implicate people in a higher position than myself in an illegal act.

ADV PRIOR: Were you confident General, that you had the backing of your seniors should anything have gone wrong at that stage?

MR STEYN: I believed that I would enjoy support should anything go wrong, regardless of whether we were in a problematic situation or not, however, I did not inform anybody above me about it, because it would have involved more people, it would have involved innocent people in a wrongful act with which we were busy.

MR MALAN: I beg your pardon, Mr Steyn, isn't it correct that you would not have received permission?

MR STEYN: No, I would not have received permission.

MR MALAN: No, you wouldn't have?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR MALAN: And the reason why you didn't tell anybody was not to prevent the implication of others, but because you knew that they would not permit you to do this?

MR STEYN: Exactly, they would not permit me to perform an illegal act.

ADV PRIOR: But at the same time, you believed that this was what the politicians, this is what your seniors wanted? This was your response to the pressure that they were putting on you to solve the problem?

MR STEYN: That is correct Chairperson.

ADV PRIOR: You see, General, something bothers me. We have heard evidence for the last year or so, concerning hit squads and death squads, the operations that were carried out by the Security Police across the borders, and we have heard evidence that for example Vlakplaas was responsible for a lot of assassinations outside and inside the country.

We also heard, we have heard evidence that normally Vlakplaas was utilised by the various regions to carry out political assassinations. But we have also seen that members of the Eastern Transvaal Security Branch, also carried out murders, that Port Natal also carried out murders of their own, without the intervention of for example Vlakplaas and they all seem to be, or seem to have surfaced more or less at the same time, from 1986, 1987, 1988. Do you agree with that assessment, in its broadest or generalist terms?

That there were murders committed by the Eastern Transvaal, by Port Natal Branches of the Security Police?

MR STEYN: Mr Chairperson, is the question about the fact that these deeds were committed in various provinces at the same time or not?

ADV PRIOR: Let me come closer to the question. It seems that in various regions, the various Security Branches employed the same tactics that you as applicants now employed, and there seems to be no indication from above, that this was going to be a tactic or a policy, it just seems to have been decided amongst the Branches themselves, and that is what troubles me. There seems to be no coordination yet, over the period that I have mentioned, these methods were employed by various offices of the Security Branch?

MR MALAN: Mr Prior, I think that statement is clear, the reaction is what is your question relating to the statement.

ADV PRIOR: Well, are you able to comment whether there was no coordination at a high level, in other words was this not the implementation of a policy?

MR STEYN: No Mr Chairperson.

ADV PRIOR: Would you just ascribe it to something that just happened, everyone seemed to be thinking the same thing at the time?

MR STEYN: No Mr Chairperson, there was no official policy.

MR MALAN: May I follow on this. Mr Steyn, we have heard evidence here about Vlakplaas who was asked by Taylor to take certain action regarding Bhila, you heard the evidence?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR MALAN: Why would the request have been directed at Vlakplaas if there wasn't any knowledge that Vlakplaas performed such actions? Would the reasonable inference not be that Mr Taylor at least had to have been aware of murders which were committed by the Vlakplaas unit?

MR STEYN: That is an inference which he could have drawn.

MR MALAN: Did he at any stage tell you about it?

MR STEYN: I don't know if he personally told me about it.

MR MALAN: Did you hear at any other place that Vlakplaas had been involved in such murders during the time that you were the Commander of the Security Branch in Natal?

MR STEYN: I was aware that Vlakplaas had been involved, but I cannot put my finger on exactly what and when it happened.

MR MALAN: So in a certain fashion you became aware that Vlakplaas was committing murders?

MR STEYN: There were other cases in other divisions of which I knew there were investigations.

MR MALAN: Were any of those investigations brought before Court where certain individuals were charged?

MR STEYN: If I remember correctly, I could refer to the incidents in the Eastern Transvaal where a number of people were shot and where there was indeed an investigation in the Eastern Transvaal division, if I could just think quickly.

MR MALAN: Did you know that those were full blown murders?

MR STEYN: No.

MR MALAN: Please Mr Steyn, the question has got to do with murders, because you will remember the evidence that we had here regarding Bhila was that Vlakplaas came down to do the routine work, and that they were approached by Taylor with regard to the execution of a certain murder.

I am just summarising it very briefly. Why would Taylor have mentioned it if he did not know about it and you have just testified that he must have known, otherwise he would never have asked? So similarly, did you have any similar knowledge at your disposal which would have led to you issuing a similar request?

MR STEYN: I probably would have been able to lodge such a request, but I never would have.

MR MALAN: I don't know if you understand me correctly. I am asking whether or not you could have made such a request because you had knowledge that Vlakplaas was involved with murders.

I am not accusing Vlakplaas here, but this is actually the framework within which we can view this situation.

MR STEYN: I don't think I would have been able to direct such a request.

MR MALAN: And then you said that you relied on Taylor and Botha and the people below them for information regarding these incidents? I think it is common cause if we accept your evidence that you did not know about Bhila, but that Taylor at least did know about that?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR MALAN: And now, just as Mr Prior is attempting, I am also attempting why you went to Swaziland. My question is if this was the first time that you had contact with this sort of abduction of which the expectation was the murder if we look at Taylor's evidence, was the attempt not to implicate you in these actions or activities?

MR STEYN: If I remember correctly, and I am speaking under correction with regard to dates, I was already if I recall correctly, before that incident, the Ndwandwe incident, I had been with some of my members on scenes where shooting incidents had taken place, where we were aware of the presence of trained terrorists and if I remember correctly, I was present at at least three where full scale fights broke out and people were shot.

MR MALAN: You can tell me if you are actually aiming at something here, but this question is not about contact situations or combat, the question is about planned killing of individuals who were not armed when they were killed.

I think that you led us to understand that you could not have been involved in something like that previously, that your first incident in Natal had to have been Ndwandwe.

MR STEYN: If I remember correctly, then that is the case.

MR MALAN: My question is, were you not involved in the Ndwandwe matter on the basis that it was said to you that the primary objective was the abduction and that they wanted you along for the information?

MR STEYN: I don't think that there were any other intentions to implicate me in the incident. It was my own desire to go along.

MR MALAN: I beg your pardon Mr Prior, I would just like to follow up on this. The evidence of Mr Botha initially indicated that the actual test and this is also in his application and in your application, the test to see whether or not Ndwandwe could be an informer, was applied during interrogation and that the process followed through that, in other words, if it was a consequence, I am talking about your written application, a consequence of abduction and cooperation, but Mr Botha made it very clear to us that these documents are actually incorrect, that the intention was actually to kill her unless there was absolute certainty that she would cooperate as an informer?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR MALAN: Now Mr Steyn, you have told us that it was in your mind that her death was a possibility before this operation was executed, when you gave permission for this operation to be executed?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR MALAN: Was the possibility or probability ever discussed that the death would most probably be a consequence before this operation was executed?

MR STEYN: I think that was the idea.

MR MALAN: You are saying that you believe that that was the idea, that you think it was discussed as such and I would like you to go back please, because you have said that the actual discussion took place at the safe house in Pietermaritzburg, the final test.

You said that you also made yourself aware of it then and in your application you create the impression that it occurred there, but Mr Botha has indicated to us that the test had already been applied previously. If she had not cooperated, the other questions would never have been asked, the replacement and so forth.

She would either cooperate or she would die. That was the case?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR MALAN: Was it your clear comprehension when you went in to this operation?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR MALAN: You knew that you were going to kill her and that there would be a remote chance that she would not die?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR MALAN: Can you tell us why you went along so easily with that if that was the first time. Wasn't it a moral issue with you and that is exactly the thing that I am driving at?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, the information was there. The information was already known to us with regard to what she was responsible for.

A lot of acts of terrorism had been committed by her unit, by her people who were controlled by her. I believed that those actions or that action would have been the correct action to neutralise her activities.

MR MALAN: Yes, I hear you Mr Steyn, but just try and put yourself back as we have heard the evidence here with specific reference to you.

You are acting as the Head of the Branch, you are combatting and fighting terrorism. You are experiencing this as a revolution, it is something terrible, but you operated within the framework of the law. You did not go beyond your capacity, specifically with regard to the death of other people.

Then a suggestion comes to you and it is said we are going to kill this girl. Wouldn't that have been something that you would have remembered intensely? Isn't that an absolute jump or a change in style for you, how did this happen?

MR STEYN: I would just like to say that before I had come to Durban, I had already been involved in incidents in the Western Transvaal for which I am applying for amnesty and in those cases - and I am saying this so that I can indicate to you that this is not the first incident.

Although I was not physically involved with those deeds, I was instrumental. Me and or my people were instrumental in conveying information so as to eliminate people so that targets could be attacked.

MR MALAN: That actually makes the situation very difficult, working piece by piece with amnesty applications. I don't think we should take it much further at this stage, we can let it stand over until later.

But these aspects are going to impact on one another, but we can discuss that later. As I have read your application, there isn't a comparable incident in the Western Transvaal which can be identified with your current application, however, we can take this further at a later stage.

ADV PRIOR: Gen Steyn, are you able just to recall at what time of the day Ms Ndwandwe came through the border fence with Taylor and Botha? Are you able to just assist us?

MR VISSER: She came through only with Botha Mr Chairman.

ADV PRIOR: Well, I am referring to that event, when she was handed over to you?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, if I remember correctly, it would have been approximately half past eight that evening.

ADV PRIOR: Did you have any information at what stage or what time of the day she was abducted at Manzini?

MR STEYN: I accept that she was abducted during the preceding hour or two.

ADV PRIOR: General, the Allan Taylor unit as it was described by Mr Botha, were you familiar with that description?

MR STEYN: I am aware of that unit.

ADV PRIOR: Are you able to assist us, I omitted to ask Mr Botha about that, but are you able to assist us by possibly even looking at any of the documents before you, who was part or who formed part of that unit during 1987/1988 period?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, are you referring to the Allan Taylor unit?

ADV PRIOR: Yes.

MR STEYN: No, I am not certain. I don't have the finer details of the fellow unit members.

ADV PRIOR: Possibly that can be checked upon and one of the other applicants maybe later on in the week, can give us that information?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

ADV PRIOR: Who was your immediate superior at that time, the time of the Portia Ndwandwe event in 1988? In other words who was your superior in Head Office, Pretoria?

MR STEYN: It was the Security Chief of South Africa.

ADV PRIOR: Who was that?

MR STEYN: I suspect that it could have been Gen Van der Merwe.

ADV PRIOR: I am just asking these questions, just for background. Gen Engelbrecht, Krappies Engelbrecht, where did he, did he fit in at that stage or not?

MR STEYN: No Mr Chairperson, I think that he only arrived on the scene later.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairperson, I want to know with respect, why my learned friend is asking these questions? This is not an inquisition, this is also not a fishing expedition.

The names of people are bandied about as if there is some evidence somewhere, lurking in the wings, that would connect them with this, where there is absolutely nothing on the evidence before you, to link them. Unless my learned friend has very good reason for asking these questions, Mr Chairman, I am going to object to this political assassination as it were, of people by bandying their names around just for the sake of ...

CHAIRPERSON: How is that political assassination to ask if he was a senior officer in the Security Branch, as I understand the question. He was asking who was he superior?

MR VISSER: But he answered that question Mr Chairman, now the question is what about Krappies Engelbrecht. Well, what about Krappies Engelbrecht, he's got nothing to do with nothing with respect, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: I don't know, Mr Prior apparently thinks that he was somewhere in the chain of command.

ADV PRIOR: I am happy with the answer that he wasn't, he came later, and that was the pitch at which I asked that question. It has been answered. I certainly never intended to politically assassinate Krappies Engelbrecht or any of Mr Visser's clients.

Thank you Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Before we go on, you say you think she was picked up an hour or two before she was taken through the border fence?

MR STEYN: I assume so Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: That is what you would have expected?

MR STEYN: That is correct yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Because in this Exhibit H that we have been handed, and I don't know what reliance can be placed on it, there is reference to her being dropped at the rendezvous point in the morning. You don't know anything about that?

MR STEYN: No Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: What time of the morning did they leave you?

MR STEYN: Mr Chairperson, I do not understand your question, from where is this?

CHAIRPERSON: I understood you were left at the border, at Onverwacht?

MR STEYN: Yes, I remained behind.

CHAIRPERSON: What time, when did they leave?

MR STEYN: I assume it was early in the evening, dusk and when I remained behind and they went on.

CHAIRPERSON: Did they leave you at dusk at Onverwacht when they were going to fetch this young lady?

MR STEYN: That is how I remember it, yes, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: What time would that be? We are talking now about October, dusk would have been when?

MR STEYN: I estimate probably six o'clock, half past five. It could even have been half past six.

CHAIRPERSON: After the border post had closed? You have told us the border post closed there at six o'clock as I understood your evidence?

MR STEYN: Mr Chairperson, that was the evidence of Mr Botha. I answered that I was not sure when the border post closed.

If it was earlier, I would agree with that. If it was an hour or half an hour before that, I do not have a problem with that.

CHAIRPERSON: Any questions? Re-examination?

MR VISSER: None, thank you Mr Chairman.

MR MALAN: Mr Steyn, I would like to ask you a question that I asked about Mr Vlok and at previous opportunities. This pressure that was interpreted as an expectation, in that you must act illegally, I think you also came to that conclusion, if you really interpreted it in that way, why would you not then at that stage, where these things were brought under your attention, then inform those above you?

If you thought that that is what they expected of you, why didn't you then report back on successes because then the killing would then be a success?

MR STEYN: Mr Chairperson, no, I would never have thought that I could deal with it in that way. The responsibility was mine in Natal. I still had the responsibility and I still had to keep the peace here in this area.

MR MALAN: Let us look at the Bhila case. If Mr Taylor thought that it was expected of him to execute certain acts or acts like these, because the pressure is now from you onto him, why wouldn't he then report back to you and say I would just like to report back a success Colonel. We took out Bhila, we will have no more problems?

MR STEYN: Mr Chairman, I do not know why he did not do that. But I would like to be honest and say that if he did that, and the circumstances was of such a nature that it fell within our framework, then I would have identified with it. I would not have taken it any further.

MR MALAN: You would not have addressed him, this is now before Ndwandwe, a year before that, wouldn't you at that stage have said that we have got a certain framework and a structure and we have got certain capacities and abilities, would you not have scolded him?

MR STEYN: Like I said earlier on, at that stage I already went through the school in the Western Transvaal where I had to deal with similar situations.

MR MALAN: Thank you Mr Steyn.

CHAIRPERSON: One purely geographical question, this farm house that you came back to, was it a farm called Elandskop or was it at the place Elandskop?

MR STEYN: Mr Chairperson, as I understood it it was on the farm Elandskop.

CHAIRPERSON: In Maritzburg, the Maritzburg district?

MR STEYN: Yes, in the Maritzburg area or district.

MR VISSER: At the risk of being blamed to give evidence Mr Chairman, the witness is wrong, we will give the right evidence to you later. May the witness be excused Mr Chairman?

I don't know whether you want to take a five minute break for change over Mr Chairman or whether we should go directly on with the next witness?

CHAIRPERSON: What do you feel, do you want to break?

MR VISSER: The shorter breaks, I am not quite sure how you have in your mind? They seem to be eager to continue Mr Chairman.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------MR VISSER: The next witness Mr Chairman, will be the witness Forster, who will give evidence. I must say that I was toying with the idea of calling Mr Wasserman back at this stage, but perhaps it may be better to call Mr Forster and thereafter we will call Wasserman back Mr Chairman.

He is Jakobus Adriaan Forster. His application appears in bundle 2 at page 94 and following, up to page 110. He is ready to take the oath Mr Chairman.

JAKOBUS ADRIAAN FORSTER: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Forster, you are an applicant for amnesty in these cases and you are applying for amnesty in the case of Fila Portia Ndwandwe, is that correct?

MR FORSTER: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Where were you born and where did you grow up?

MR FORSTER: I was born in Roodepoort in the Transvaal in 1948, in February. I attended primary school there up to standard 1 and I then went to Pietersburg where I did my primary and high school training, up to standard 7.

From standard 8 and matriculated in the Queenstown in the Eastern Cape, where I then immediately joined the police.

MR VISSER: During your childhood, was there certain influences on you as in the case of Mr Botha?

MR FORSTER: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Just to save time, you grew up in a conservative environment?

MR FORSTER: That is true Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Where you did not or were not exposed to strong influences concerning the policy of separate development and then later apartheid, in that it was wrong?

MR FORSTER: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Was it not apartheid first and then separate development? It is not important though?

MR VISSER: I think one could argue about that, but I would not like to do that. Mr Forster, you joined in July 1976, is that correct?

MR FORSTER: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And you gave a short summary of your police career, in bundle 2?

MR FORSTER: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You are now currently not a member of the police any more?

MR FORSTER: That is correct yes.

MR VISSER: When did you retire?

MR FORSTER: At the end of September last year, I retired.

MR VISSER: Because?

MR FORSTER: Because of medical reasons.

MR VISSER: Being?

MR FORSTER: They call it major stress.

MR VISSER: Stress Major?

MR FORSTER: Stress Major and post traumatic stress.

MR VISSER: Yes. Are you currently receiving treatment for your condition?

MR FORSTER: Yes, I was hospitalised twice, I was in a clinic, Vista Clinic in Pretoria, from March up to May 1996 and there I received treatment specifically for this disorder.

MR VISSER: From January 1985 up to December 1991, you served in the Security Branch in Pietermaritzburg, is that correct?

MR FORSTER: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And during that time, you went through the ranks of Major, Lieutenant and Lieutenant Colonel?

MR FORSTER: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Maybe firstly the position that you were in in 1988 in Pietermaritzburg in the Security Branch, what was your rank then?

MR FORSTER: At that stage Mr Chairperson, I was in charge of the ANC desk, concerning research of ANC/MK terrorists. It was a very small unit at that stage and it had far less members than the other sections in Natal.

MR VISSER: We heard that there were three sections, Port Natal, Natal and Northern Natal?

MR FORSTER: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: If you could compare your position with that of Colonel Taylor here in Durban, what would the comparison be?

MR FORSTER: There was a lot of overlapping, not as much as in Port Natal, but concerning weapon stockpiling and especially acts of violence, grenade attacks, etc.

MR VISSER: In your career, did you have any contact or exposure to acts of terror where people were killed and or injured and property was damaged?

MR FORSTER: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And did you have the same experiences as the other witnesses, that it left an impression on you and that this incited you to do everything in your ability to oppose this political struggle against the government of the day?

MR FORSTER: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Do you confirm the contents of your statement that you submitted, and that is now in front of the Committee, is that correct?

MR FORSTER: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And you are also asking for the Annexure, the statement of Van der Merwe and the Generals, as well as the evidence of Mr Vlok and Johan van der Merwe to be included?

MR FORSTER: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Can we get directly to the question of the abduction and the elimination of Ms Ndwandwe. The first question that I would like to ask you is why you became involved in this matter?

MR FORSTER: Mr Chairperson, at that stage the three sub-sections, Port Natal, Midlands and Northern Natal, they were busy combining or becoming one, and we worked closely together, and that is how I became involved or became more involved in the Port Natal Unit, as well as investigations that was led, because I regularly went to Port Natal concerning investigations of terrorism.

MR VISSER: How did you hear about this operation?

MR FORSTER: I was called to Port Natal by at that stage Andy Taylor, and I then went there.

MR VISSER: And you then received certain information from him?

MR FORSTER: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And then the decision was made that you must go with?

MR FORSTER: That is correct.

MR VISSER: How did you go to Swaziland?

MR FORSTER: It was myself, at that stage Brigadier Steyn and Taylor, they went in their own vehicle, with the N2 in the direction of the border post.

MR VISSER: You can refer to the surnames, we will not add any extra value to that, Steyn and Taylor, you can refer to them like that.

MR FORSTER: Thank you.

MR VISSER: You then went in the direction of the border post, ...(indistinct).

MR FORSTER: We then drove to the border post, Onverwacht to a house there.

MR VISSER: It was a police house?

MR FORSTER: That is correct.

MR VISSER: At the border post? There you left Steyn?

MR FORSTER: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Did you then, yourself, go into Swaziland, what vehicle and with whom?

MR FORSTER: It was with Botha and Taylor in Taylor's vehicle, we left the Onverwacht border post and then entered Swaziland.

MR VISSER: What happened there at Manzini?

MR FORSTER: At Manzini, when we arrived there, there were two other vehicles involved in this operation.

MR VISSER: It was a kombi and a bakkie?

MR FORSTER: Yes, that is correct. We took our positions in close to the George's Hotel in Manzini, the bakkie already in place in front of the hotel. We were behind the bakkie, but in full view.

At the front of the bakkie was the kombi.

MR VISSER: Who was in the kombi?

MR FORSTER: It was Wasserman and Du Preez.

MR VISSER: Who was in the bakkie?

MR FORSTER: There were two informants in the bakkie.

MR VISSER: What time of the day was this?

MR FORSTER: Mr Chairperson, if I can remember correctly, it was approximately five o'clock, half past five, six o'clock.

MR VISSER: It was late in the afternoon.

MR FORSTER: Yes, if I remember correctly, we went through the border post at about two o'clock.

MR VISSER: What did you see there?

MR FORSTER: I saw that Ndwandwe got into the bakkie with the two informers. She sat in between them and the bakkie moved on in the direction of Big Bend.

MR VISSER: What did you do then?

MR FORSTER: We followed this bakkie and we made radio contact with the kombi, Wasserman and Du Preez to inform them that the vehicle was moving. They drove in front and I am guessing, approximately 15 kilometres out of Manzini, we stopped.

Actually we forced the bakkie in between the kombi and the vehicle that we were in, and the bakkie then came to a standstill so that the kombi could stop at the driver's side of the bakkie. We stopped on the other side.

Botha got out, the driver got out, the kombi's doors were opened.

MR VISSER: The lady was the transferred into the kombi?

MR FORSTER: Yes.

MR VISSER: Did this coincide with force?

MR FORSTER: Not with unnecessary violence, we just took her, grabbed her and moved her from one vehicle to another. MR VISSER: Her hands were tied?

MR FORSTER: Mr Chairperson, I was not there when her hands were tied, I remained in the vehicle with Taylor in the back, the vehicle that was at the back.

MR VISSER: What happened then?

MR FORSTER: The three vehicles then went on to Big Bend, in the direction of Onverwacht border post, at the Hluti road.

MR VISSER: What happened then?

MR FORSTER: On this road Botha and Ndwandwe got on the back of the bakkie and the drivers of the bakkie was Wasserman and Du Preez. Yes, they drove in front.

MR VISSER: What was the weather like?

MR FORSTER: It was rainy, wet, muddy.

MR VISSER: What happened then?

MR FORSTER: Taylor then took our vehicle and moved back.

MR VISSER: Where were you then?

MR FORSTER: I took over the kombi with the two informants. Close to the Culel border post, I personally stopped and dropped off the two informants. It was still in Swaziland.

MR VISSER: What was the idea behind this?

MR FORSTER: In that they would cross the border on foot, and not go through the border post.

Taylor moved onwards with his vehicle and I came behind him with the kombi.

MR VISSER: Did you leave Culel?

MR FORSTER: Yes, we left Culel and left to the Onverwacht border post.

MR VISSER: Did you pick up the informants again?

MR FORSTER: No, they had to find their own way back to the house where we were.

MR VISSER: That is at the Onverwacht border post?

MR FORSTER: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: You and Taylor, what did you do then?

MR FORSTER: We drove through Culel and we informed Steyn at Onverwacht at the house, that the operation was a success.

MR VISSER: Did you pick up Steyn?

MR FORSTER: Yes, we picked up Steyn in the kombi.

MR VISSER: Where did you go then?

MR FORSTER: We went to the planned place, near the border post, where we met Botha and Ndwandwe.

MR VISSER: Is that you, Steyn and Taylor?

MR FORSTER: Yes.

MR VISSER: What happened there then, did Botha and Ndwandwe arrive there?

MR FORSTER: Yes, they arrived there, we put her in the kombi and we went back home or to this house.

MR VISSER: What happened from there?

MR FORSTER: Wasserman and Du Preez stayed behind in Swaziland, it was too late for them to go through the border post, as it is general knowledge.

I later heard that they stayed over in Manzini. I was now in the house.

MR VISSER: With Ms Ndwandwe, what happened to her?

MR FORSTER: She was interrogated by Botha.

MR VISSER: Did you interrogate with him?

MR FORSTER: Yes, from time to time I did ask questions.

MR VISSER: Were you present there the whole time?

MR FORSTER: No, I wasn't present there the whole time.

MR VISSER: What was your knowledge with regards to Ms Ndwandwe's position before you went in and crossed the border?

MR FORSTER: I was aware of the fact that the was acting Commander of the Natal machinery in Swaziland.

MR VISSER: Were you aware of the plan concerning her?

MR FORSTER: The plan was to recruit her as an informant, to get information from her, and to then apply her in that capacity or regard.

MR VISSER: And if that did not happen?

MR FORSTER: Well, then the only other option or alternative would be to place her back which would have been problematic or to eliminate her.

MR VISSER: What did you think would happen when you came to Swaziland with Ndwandwe, or when you went to Swaziland and met Ndwandwe, what did you think will happen? I do not want to ask leading questions now, maybe we can just continue.

What was the purpose of the interrogation?

MR FORSTER: The interrogation was to recruit her as an informant for the Security Branch.

MR VISSER: Did it appear to you as if she was recruitable as an informant?

MR FORSTER: No Mr Chairperson, not at the times when I was present with the interrogation.

MR VISSER: You then spent the night there at the house?

MR FORSTER: Yes.

MR VISSER: At the Onverwacht border post?

MR FORSTER: That is correct.

MR VISSER: The next morning, I understood Wasserman and Du Preez arrived from Swaziland?

MR FORSTER: Yes, that is correct Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: What did you do then?

MR FORSTER: We once again agreed that she was not willing to work for the Security Branch and not to, or to prevent any people from seeing us in the house, we decided to drive to a farm in Pietermaritzburg, close to Elandskop.

MR VISSER: What was this farm called?

MR FORSTER: No, I do not know what this farm's name was. I just knew it was close to Elandskop station.

MR VISSER: Was the farm called Elandskop?

MR FORSTER: No, not as far as I know.

MR VISSER: You are now at this house, that we refer to as the farm at Elandskop to easy refer to it, what happened there then?

MR FORSTER: Chairperson, Botha still continued with the interrogation in the house.

MR VISSER: Were you present?

MR FORSTER: Yes, from time to time I was present. She was not cuffed or tied or anything like that, she sat there freely and he was busy interrogating her.

MR VISSER: According to yourself, during this whole episode was she attacked?

MR FORSTER: No, not at all.

MR VISSER: What was your summary concerning the possibility to recruit her as an informant, out of your own observation on that day on the farm?

MR FORSTER: It became more and more clear to me that she would not be willing to work or cooperate as an informant.

MR VISSER: Why do you say that?

MR FORSTER: After it became known to me that she admitted to acts like for example the death of Lieutenant Radjo and Zukela, she was proud of that and she boasted about this.

MR VISSER: You say this on page 99 in your application?

MR FORSTER: Yes, that is correct Mr Chairperson, that was the impression that I got. That is how she conveyed this to me.

MR VISSER: We know from Botha and Steyn that at one stage it became clear as you have testified, that she was not recruitable and that Steyn then gave the instruction that she must be eliminated?

MR FORSTER: Yes, that is correct Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Before this happened, can I just ask the following, can you remember when Botha left? Was it before or after the elimination of Ndwandwe?

MR FORSTER: Mr Chairperson, as far as I know, it was before the elimination.

MR VISSER: Did anybody accompany him?

MR FORSTER: At that stage Mr Chairperson, if I can just explain, there were two other people who interrogated Ndwandwe, Labuschagne and Verwey of Middelburg Security Branch, I met them at a certain place because they didn't know where the farm was, and I accompanied them to the farm.

MR VISSER: When we arrived there, was Botha still there?

MR FORSTER: No, according to my knowledge Botha left.

MR VISSER: So you cannot say who was there?

MR FORSTER: No.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairperson, I see that it is one o'clock. I don't think I will be able to finish before, within the next half a minute, perhaps we should take the adjournment now.

CHAIRPERSON: We will adjourn until two o'clock.

JAKOBUS ADRIAAN FORSTER: (still under oath)

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: (continued) If I may just interrupt, while it has been brought to my attention, there are two references which I neglected to give you Mr Chairman.

May I refer you back to volume 2, page 41, that is the application of Steyn, who has completed his evidence. At the end of the first paragraph from the top Mr Chairman, there is also a reference to JAS2, which I neglected to give you. That is volume 3, page 424.

CHAIRPERSON: 424?

MR VISSER: Yes Mr Chairman, and the last one is at page 47 of bundle 2, just before the second last paragraph starts Mr Chairman, there is a reference to JAS6, which is in volume 3, page 419 - 423. I apologise for the oversight.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR VISSER: Mr Forster, we are now still on the farm there at Elandskop near Pietermaritzburg, and you are saying that it was very clear to you that Ndwandwe could not be turned to become an informer for the Security Branch. I think that is where we stopped, is that correct?

MR FORSTER: Yes, that is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: What happened then? Or, if I could just bring you up to date with what was going on, you went to fetch Labuschagne and Verwey and you went back to the farm, and when you arrived there, I think you said that Botha had already left?

MR FORSTER: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Very well. For how long were Labuschagne and Verwey there?

MR FORSTER: As far as I can recall, it was approximately an hour and a half, to two hours.

MR VISSER: Did they interrogate Ms Ndwandwe?

MR FORSTER: Yes.

MR VISSER: And they then left?

MR FORSTER: That is correct, yes, they departed.

MR VISSER: Was there any further orders which were issued?

MR FORSTER: Issued were given by Steyn to me and to Taylor.

MR VISSER: What were the orders?

MR FORSTER: The order was that if it was in any way not possible to get her to work as an informer for the Security Branch, we were to eliminate her.

MR VISSER: What was the idea, did you have to attempt again to recruit her or what?

MR FORSTER: On the contrary, he gave the order for her to be eliminated.

MR VISSER: Did you and Taylor then go ahead and do this?

MR FORSTER: No.

MR VISSER: What happened?

MR FORSTER: Taylor gave the order to Wasserman to carry out the elimination.

MR VISSER: I see in your affidavit, at the bottom of page 98, you say that Du Preez and Wasserman dug a grave outside the house? Approximately how far from the house?

MR FORSTER: Chairperson, it was probably if I had to estimate, between 50 - 80 metres away.

MR VISSER: Could this activity be spotted from the house?

MR FORSTER: No, it was in a grove of high trees.

MR VISSER: What did you and Taylor do in the meantime while they were away?

MR FORSTER: Taylor continued to question Ndwandwe in Zulu however, in which I am not proficient. And I was simply present there.

MR VISSER: Very well, was Ndwandwe assaulted during her detention by you?

MR FORSTER: No, not at all.

MR VISSER: And during a certain stage, Wasserman and Du Preez removed her from the house?

MR FORSTER: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Did you accompany them?

MR FORSTER: no.

MR VISSER: Where were you?

MR FORSTER: I remained in the house with Taylor.

MR VISSER: Did Wasserman and Du Preez return later?

MR FORSTER: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And then you departed?

MR FORSTER: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Mr Forster, this case of Ndwandwe, was this the first case of an abduction out of Swaziland and elimination in which you participated?

MR FORSTER: No.

MR VISSER: How many incidents of similar nature, did you participate in previously?

MR FORSTER: One.

MR VISSER: Which one was that?

MR FORSTER: That was the case of Deon Cele.

MR VISSER: Cele Mr Chairman. When did this take place?

MR FORSTER: In July 1988 according to my recollection.

MR VISSER: Among others, you have referred in your application with regard to the political background, to an extract in volume 3, page 424 of Heads of argument which were prepared, I trust that this was prepared by my learned friend, Mr Hattingh, is that correct?

MR FORSTER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Yes. You have attached this document mostly as I understand it, as a summary of relevant quotes which were taken from ANC/SACP literature for the information of the Committee?

MR FORSTER: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman, we have nothing further to present. Mr Forster yes, the evidence of Mr Steyn about the pressure which was experienced "from above", in Pietermaritzburg where you were, was it in any way different?

MR FORSTER: Pietermaritzburg was also an area which experienced a great deal of hand grenade attacks and as I have testified earlier, there weren't as many explosions, but yes, I would agree with Steyn.

MR VISSER: That you also experienced pressure from the politicians and from within the structures of the security structure?

MR FORSTER: Yes, and at that stage I also worked much closer with Steyn's division.

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairperson.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ADV PRIOR: Thank you Mr Chairman. Colonel Forster, from the evidence that we have heard, it seems up until a certain stage, the Security Branch operated within the framework of the law and the rules and regulations relating to your type of work, in combatting terrorism, is that correct?

MR FORSTER: That is correct Chairperson.

ADV PRIOR: And then there seems to have been a shift away from that as a policy and I am not suggesting that occurred in each and every case, but there was a change that instead of prosecuting terrorists, one would simply eliminate them?

MR FORSTER: That is not correct Chairperson, it was another method which was applied, in order to obtain information and so doing, to recruit MK members or terrorists, because an information network could only function with information.

It was an attempt - you referred to a policy, it wasn't a policy to eliminate, it was another strategy.

ADV PRIOR: All right, let's call it a strategy. How did that strategy arise, did it arise or maybe you can answer that, how did it come about that this was considered an option or accepted as an option, given the fact that you had the machinery of the law if I can put it that way, on your side, you could operate, I mean you had draconian powers in terms of the Internal Security Act and other forms of legislation.

When did you decide, or when was it decided to adopt this strategy?

MR FORSTER: I don't believe that there was any specific date which I can recall upon which an amendment came about regarding the method in which we would continue our work.

It did however arise from the high tempo of terrorist attacks on the RSA, that we began to realise that we had to act more pro-active fashion. By pro-active I mean obtaining the information beforehand, and not waiting for an explosion to take place, and only then dealing with it.

We had to combat the violence and the onslaught.

ADV PRIOR: I am talking specifically about killing as a strategy.

MR FORSTER: No, the killing did not develop as a strategy in order to purely eliminate somebody. The idea was to recruit the person as an informer and I am sure you will see and it has been argued here, that the cases which are presented here, are cases of persons who we had identified in the hierarchical structure of the ANC, and that this was not an everyday occurrence.

ADV PRIOR: There were specific persons, given their functions within the MK structures, they were identified as key personnel for want of a better word, and if they could not be turned, they would then be eliminated, is that my understanding of your evidence, is that correct?

MR FORSTER: It was not like that with every case, it depended upon circumstances.

ADV PRIOR: I still have difficulty with the concept because it seems that various branches of the Security Police, throughout the country adopted the same sort of strategy if they couldn't turn them, they would then in all probability be killed.

I need to know if you can assist us, whether that strategy if I can, for want of a better word, whether it was a strategy or giving effect later to a strategy that went wrong, or you couldn't give effect to the strategy of turning, was that discussed at a national level or at a time when all the interested parties were together, or did it just develop in the regions, on its own, without any coordination?

MR FORSTER: I have no recollection, or let me put it clearer, I don't know that something like that occurred.

ADV PRIOR: I put it to you because we know from the various applications and the evidence that has come out, that Port Natal wasn't the only Security Branch office that eliminated people and I was just curious to know whether the fact that other branches or other offices were also doing the same sort of thing, whether that had been coordinated at a certain level or not?

MR FORSTER: Not according to my knowledge.

ADV PRIOR: Colonel, the farm Elandskop, sorry, it has been loosely referred to as Elandskop, in fact the correct description is Graig Head Sub A, in the district Elandskop/Qwadi. Is that correct?

MR FORSTER: If you say so, yes. That could be correct.

ADV PRIOR: And that was a Natal Trust Farm?

MR FORSTER: That is correct.

ADV PRIOR: And who leased that farm?

MR FORSTER: I don't know. I don't know who it was.

ADV PRIOR: Did you have anything to do with the arrangements regarding the lease of the farm to the police or not?

MR FORSTER: There was no agreement for the usage of the farm.

MR MALAN: I beg your pardon, can I just make sure, you said that there was no agreement?

MR FORSTER: There was no contract for the use of the farm.

MR MALAN: Who owned the farm?

MR FORSTER: Natal Trust Farms. As far as I can remember, there were 13 to 16 farms which were run by Natal Trust Farms at a certain stage, and at that point, there were a number of people on some of the farms.

MR MALAN: Who was Natal Trust Farms?

MR FORSTER: That is a very difficult question.

MR MALAN: Was it a private or public section concern, you don't know?

MR FORSTER: I don't know, no.

MR MALAN: If you don't know, how could you just go ahead and use somebody else's farm on a permanent basis?

MR FORSTER: I can explain it to you.

MR MALAN: Please do.

MR FORSTER: Chairperson, that farm was used as a safe house, according to the terminology. I had permission to use the farm from the manager of those farms, at that stage.

MR MALAN: As a safe house?

MR FORSTER: No, not necessarily, he didn't know what it was going to be used for.

MR MALAN: You never informed him?

MR FORSTER: No, I never informed him. I simply asked him for a premises from which, or at which I could stay the night. He didn't even make any enquiries regarding what type. He knew that I was in the police, I am sure he could have drawn his own inferences, but I didn't discuss the activities which may or may not take place there.

MR MALAN: Did you ask him for the use of the farm for personal or police reasons?

MR FORSTER: I asked for the farm for police use.

ADV PRIOR: This farm at Elandskop, are you able to tell us when that was acquired for police purposes?

MR FORSTER: Chairperson, if my memory serves me correctly, it would be approximately in 1986.

ADV PRIOR: You had offices within Maritzburg?

MR FORSTER: That is correct.

ADV PRIOR: Why did you need safe houses, or houses away from the eye of the public?

MR FORSTER: Because we worked with informers, and you couldn't bring informers to your offices, one would have to keep them in a safe place.

ADV PRIOR: Not to operate clandestinely?

MR FORSTER: No, I did not operate any clandestine activities from there, in the sense that Vlakplaas would have with askaris and so forth.

ADV PRIOR: But eventually the farm was used for that very purpose?

MR FORSTER: Later it became that, but initially it was not intended for that.

ADV PRIOR: I think you have answered my question, you never set up these farms or these safe houses in order to implement this new strategy?

MR VISSER: Sorry, Mr Chairman, the fact that I sit idly by and don't object every time, does not mean that we agree that there was ever a strategy that my learned friend is angling for, but I don't want to object every time he uses the word strategy or grand strategy or whatever.

ADV PRIOR: Thank you Mr Chairman. Who was your immediate superior at the time, that is 1987? 1986, 1987, 1988?

MR FORSTER: At that stage, in 1987 if I remember correctly, it was Brigadier Beukes who later became General Beukes.

In 1988 if I remember correctly, it was General Jack Buchner and in 1989, I think it was Corrie McDuling. I am not certain from when Gen Buchner was transferred from there.

But as I have already mentioned in my evidence in chief, the three divisions had already started working together much closer in the regard of that which we are discussing.

In Port Natal, I would have received my direct instructions as part of that division, from Steyn or from the senior officer above me.

ADV PRIOR: I don't know if you gave evidence about this specific aspect I am going to ask you about, but in your area of jurisdiction, in Pietermaritzburg, had there been any activities ascribed to Portia Ndwandwe's unit or not?

MR FORSTER: Not as far as I am aware of.

ADV PRIOR: Why was it necessary for you to go along to Swaziland?

MR FORSTER: Because I also handled informers in Swaziland and because terrorists and MK activities in the Midlands fell within my jurisdiction, as well as weapon stockpiling points.

It was necessary for me to obtain the necessary information as soon as possible, in order to deal with the terrorists.

ADV PRIOR: Did you interrogate Portia Ndwandwe in Onverwacht?

MR FORSTER: I may have asked her a few questions, but at that stage I left it to Botha. I think the only time when I actually did speak to her, was at Elandskop on the farm, that was when I communicated more with her.

ADV PRIOR: At that stage, the decision, had it not been taken that she was to be eliminated? She wasn't going to be turned, that was clear from the Onverwacht experience?

MR FORSTER: Yes, that is true Mr Chairman, but the hope was there that she could be turned.

ADV PRIOR: Notwithstanding that, I understand on your evidence Labuschagne and Verwey also came to interrogate her?

MR FORSTER: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

ADV PRIOR: And they came from Middelburg?

MR FORSTER: That is correct, yes.

ADV PRIOR: Well, what made you so confident that she was going to divulge information, that could assist the Middelburg Security Branch and assist the Pietermaritzburg Security Branch when your information was that she was not interested in turning, and she was in fact defiant and she was proud of the events that she had described?

MR FORSTER: Mr Chairperson, you asked me a question just before that, why did I go with and I answered you, and I think that you are using that point, to jump to another one, which is a bit far from the initial one. Could you just indicate what you are really asking.

ADV PRIOR: All right, let me repeat that. You said you went along, because you also had informers in Swaziland and you wanted to find out about weapon storage places and so forth?

MR FORSTER: That is correct.

ADV PRIOR: You hardly spoke to her in Onverwacht and you questioned her in Pietermaritzburg, the next day?

MR FORSTER: That is correct.

ADV PRIOR: And at that stage, a decision had already been taken to eliminate her, but you questioned her in the hope that she may have given you some information?

MR FORSTER: It was still my opinion to recruit her.

ADV PRIOR: Tell us what information did she give you that was of assistance to your branch or your office?

MR FORSTER: In my operational area, she did not divulge any information that had specifically to do with the Midlands.

ADV PRIOR: Did she give you any information that impacted on the Eastern Transvaal Security Branch?

MR FORSTER: I was not present at that interrogation.

ADV PRIOR: Did you find out later whether she maybe, just before she was murdered, divulged something of importance to Eastern Transvaal?

MR FORSTER: Chairperson, no. I do not know.

ADV PRIOR: But you would have shared that information amongst your colleagues?

MR FORSTER: It would be shared at the end, but at that stage, no. I wasn't there, or I wasn't constantly present on the farm.

ADV PRIOR: Colonel we understood that evidence was shared, or information was shared between the offices and the various branches.

MR FORSTER: That is correct yes.

ADV PRIOR: Can we accept that nothing stays in your mind, that Eastern Transvaal mentioned to you that she had divulged?

MR FORSTER: I cannot remember.

ADV PRIOR: And did Botha say at Pietermaritzburg, whether she had now given any new information?

MR FORSTER: Not as far as I know. He discussed with Steyn more so than with me.

ADV PRIOR: Colonel Forster, were you ever present when Mr Botha interrogated Portia Ndwandwe?

MR FORSTER: Yes, at times I was present.

ADV PRIOR: And when Wasserman was with her, and or Du Preez, were you present at any of those stages?

MR FORSTER: I cannot remember, no.

ADV PRIOR: You say she wasn't assaulted at any stage in your presence?

MR FORSTER: That I can say with certainty.

ADV PRIOR: Was that because she was a woman or for any other reason?

MR FORSTER: Chairperson, we were in the process to recruit an informant, to recruit a person and we try to act in the most humane manner and I can say with certainty that she was not assaulted.

ADV PRIOR: We heard from Mr Botha if I remember correctly, and I obviously speak under correction, that part of the recruitment process was to put pressure, and possibly to intimidate through threats of assault or whatever?

MR FORSTER: Yes, one can apply pressure, but she was never assaulted.

ADV PRIOR: I am asking you again, was it because she was a woman?

MR FORSTER: It could possibly be the case but according to myself, it was not necessary to assault her. There was enough pressure on her, according to myself, that if she wanted to cooperate as an informant, she would have, and it was not necessary to assault her.

CHAIRPERSON: As I understand you don't know what information was got from her?

MR FORSTER: Mr Chairperson, the information that was received from her, was conveyed to me by Botha. From her directly, I did not receive information that applied for my in my area or district.

CHAIRPERSON: When did Botha tell you?

MR FORSTER: At times, I cannot exactly remember when. If it was at Onverwacht or after we arrived at the farm, but at times, he did convey certain information to me.

ADV PRIOR: Mr Forster, was there any understanding between yourself and Colonel Taylor, that what you were doing on that farm, was to be kept amongst yourselves? In other words, you have told us that Deon Cele was a similar incident and he was exhumed on the very same farm, is that correct?

MR FORSTER: That is correct yes.

ADV PRIOR: I don't want to go into that, because that is the subject of another application.

MR FORSTER: Yes, that is another application.

ADV PRIOR: But we have that event and Ndwandwe's execution and disposal on the same farm.

MR FORSTER: That is correct yes.

ADV PRIOR: Was there any understanding among you and Colonel Taylor, given the fact that he was in charge of the Durban office and you of the Maritzburg office, that things would remain amongst yourselves, and not go any further?

MR FORSTER: That is correct Chairperson.

ADV PRIOR: Or did you report for example to a higher authority?

MR FORSTER: No.

ADV PRIOR: And why was that agreement necessary?

MR FORSTER: It was an illegal act and to report back at a higher level, you would incriminate someone if they would agree or if they did not agree with it, then you had to sort out your own problems.

ADV PRIOR: I should imagine that by that stage, and by all accounts, you had a long career with the police?

MR FORSTER: That is correct yes.

ADV PRIOR: Were you not concerned what may happen if you were discovered, and in fact if you were compromised in the Swaziland operation to abduct Portia Ndwandwe?

MR FORSTER: Yes, it was in the back of my mind.

ADV PRIOR: Did you discuss that with General Steyn or with any of the other people, were there any guarantees or any assurances of what could happen or what would happen if you were discovered?

MR FORSTER: Various things could have gone wrong. It was as far as I can remember, before we left, this matter was brought to our attention. You can call it a contingency plan if you want to put it that way, but we were of the opinion that the chances would be good that this operation would be a success.

Depending on what would happen or could have happened, or depending on what would happen, would then indicate what our reaction would be.

ADV PRIOR: I gain the impression from what I have heard from the other applicants and yourself, that you moved fairly freely and unrestrictedly in Swaziland, or did you fear interference from the Swazi police?

MR FORSTER: You are never safe in another country.

ADV PRIOR: Yes, I do understand that, but at that stage you went in, or did you liaise with them, or what was the position?

MR FORSTER: No, I did not personally liaise with them, or that any of the group that are applying for this, did.

ADV PRIOR: So there were possibilities, contingency plans were discussed in the event of those possibilities, but the group was confident that it would be a success?

MR FORSTER: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

ADV PRIOR: Thank you Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.

MR NGUBANE: No questions, thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Re-examination?

MR VISSER: None, thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, before anybody else, let me get in with one question. You told us a moment ago, that you were involved in the Deon Cele matter.

MR FORSTER: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Is it correct that those who were involved in that with you, were Colonel Taylor?

MR FORSTER: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Colonel Botha?

MR FORSTER: Correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Wasserman?

MR FORSTER: Correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Verwey?

MR FORSTER: Correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Labuschagne?

MR FORSTER: Correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And Brooks?

MR FORSTER: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Several of the same people as in this one?

MR FORSTER: That is correct yes.

CHAIRPERSON: And in that one also the reason advanced was that you were trying to recruit him?

MR FORSTER: That is correct yes.

MR MALAN: I would just like to come back Mr Forster, to the reasons that was considered why the elimination must continue.

You heard the evidence of Steyn and Botha in that the decision was taken beforehand and that there was a small chance that she could have been recruited?

MR FORSTER: Yes, I think it would have been the first prize, that was the words used.

MR MALAN: Was this discussed with you beforehand?

MR FORSTER: Yes, it was discussed beforehand.

MR MALAN: So you also went into this knowing that the possibility was that she would be eliminated, and that there is a small chance that she will be recruited?

MR FORSTER: As you say, yes.

MR MALAN: These formal options that was considered, was it considered case by case? You mentioned now the Cele incident, there the same options come to the front?

MR FORSTER: That is correct.

MR MALAN: So would you say that this was a once off orientation or decision in that a person who do not cooperate, we eliminate him?

MR FORSTER: No Mr Chairperson. It depended on the person and what the incident was. There was no recipe if I can put it this way.

MR MALAN: But in this case, there was a recipe?

MR FORSTER: Yes.

MR MALAN: And in the Cele case there was a recipe?

MR FORSTER: Yes.

MR MALAN: Can you give us an example where you did not apply this recipe? You do not have to mention a name, but I would prefer that you do not mention a name, but I would like to understand the circumstances where putting the person back, was a possibility?

MR FORSTER: If there was another incident, I would have applied for it, if there was such a recipe.

Let me try and explain to you.

MR MALAN: Let me make it easier for you. Can you remember any incident, and just name this person A. You know the circumstances and you can describe where placing the person back, actually occurred?

MR FORSTER: I am now really trying to help the Committee here. You can return a person by testing him or her, you can provide that person with disinformation and see what happens at the other end through the network of your own informants.

In other words, there were cases where people were returned without eliminating them, and then continue with the process.

MR MALAN: With respect Mr Forster, I asked you to remember an incident. That is now an incident where you are going to Swaziland, you abduct a person, bring that person back across the border, interrogate the person, see if you can recruit the person, and then return this person. The person is now abducted, the person knows what is going on, can identify the people who was involved, how can you return this people? Would the informants be in danger?

MR FORSTER: Yes, well in that instances, informants would not have been used because we were known to them.

MR MALAN: The person that you wanted to recruit, would that person then continue with activities?

MR FORSTER: It depends on the type of pressure or hold that we had on this person, in that the person would then rather go back.

MR MALAN: It seems as if we will not succeed in this line of questions, it seems as if it remains in the abstract.

I would just like to ask you a few questions about your background. You said that you grew up in a conservative background?

MR FORSTER: That is correct, yes.

MR MALAN: Are your parents still alive?

MR FORSTER: No.

MR MALAN: When did they die?

MR FORSTER: My father died in 1992 and my mother in 1976.

MR MALAN: Your father, was he a supporter of the National Party?

MR FORSTER: He was a supporter of the National Party.

MR MALAN: Where did he live?

MR FORSTER: At that stage he lived in Pretoria, in a clinic, but he actually lived in Pietersburg.

MR MALAN: I see in your application that your wife joined the ANC women's league, when was this?

MR FORSTER: That was in 1987, 1986.

MR MALAN: That was in this time of these incidents occurred?

MR FORSTER: Yes, it was just after I was transferred back to Pietersburg, I think it was in 1987.

MR MALAN: Then you already experienced problems in your marriage, so the problems did not occur or started because she changed her political alliance and moved over to the ANC?

MR FORSTER: Well, it was part of it, yes.

MR MALAN: Thank you Mr Chairperson.

ADV SIGODI: I just want to ask this question, in the safe house, do you know if there were any instruments of torture?

MR FORSTER: No, there were none.

ADV SIGODI: Was that because you did not see them?

MR FORSTER: No, there were none.

ADV SIGODI: Even in the other previous incident of Deon Cele,

were there none?

MR FORSTER: No, there wasn't any.

ADV SIGODI: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: In the other incident of Cele, after it had been decided that he should be killed, he was taken out of the house, and Wasserman hit him on the head with a heavy wooden instrument?

MR FORSTER: That is correct yes.

CHAIRPERSON: He was taken to the grave where he was stripped, except of his underpants?

MR FORSTER: That is correct yes.

CHAIRPERSON: And then shot?

MR FORSTER: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Why was it decided to take his clothing off?

MR FORSTER: Mr Chairperson, because afterwards we would burn it and in order to cover up the identity of the person.

CHAIRPERSON: Whose idea was it?

MR FORSTER: At that stage it was Wasserman's idea.

CHAIRPERSON: Was it Wasserman's idea to hit this unfortunate man over the head?

MR FORSTER: Yes, it happened like that.

CHAIRPERSON: Why?

MR FORSTER: Chairperson, in order to incapacitate him, render

him unconscious. I am talking now as I saw it.

CHAIRPERSON: Then you had to carry him to the grave?

MR FORSTER: That is correct yes.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, perhaps it might be convenient to recall Mr Wasserman at this stage. His application, you will recall is in bundle 2, from page 112 onwards Mr Chairman.

LAURIE WASSERMAN: (still under oath)

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: (continued) Mr Wasserman, you gave evidence previously in these hearings, is that correct?

MR WASSERMAN: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: And you took the oath to speak the truth previously, do you consider yourself still bound to speak the truth in terms of the previous oath that you took?

MR WASSERMAN: I do Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Mr Wasserman we are not going to rehash or revisit the evidence which you already gave in regard to the political situation and political objectives.

Can we go straight to the incident regarding Ndwandwe?

MR WASSERMAN: We can Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Now, you have heard the evidence of the previous witnesses. Will you briefly tell the Committee where you came into it, and what your part was first in the abduction and through to the end of the incident where Ms Ndwandwe was eliminated and buried?

MR WASSERMAN: Well Mr Chairman, I accompanied all the names that had been mentioned so far to the house.

MR VISSER: Mr Wasserman, can you just speak up a little bit please.

MR WASSERMAN: I accompanied the persons and personalities that had been mentioned by the previous applicants to this house at Onverwacht.

Later, we all had our responsibilities from there, we knew what they were. I then proceeded with the bakkie through Lavumisa border post.

MR VISSER: Which border post is that, we have heard of ...

MR WASSERMAN: Oh, on the South African side it is called Culel, the Swazi side it is Lavumisa, it is the same post.

MR VISSER: I am sorry, I don't know whether I am the only one that is confused, but I have heard of a border post Culel and the other one is Onverwacht. Which of the two did you enter?

MR WASSERMAN: It is Culel, but it is also Lavumisa, it is the same place.

MR VISSER: Well, let's just stick to what we know, Culel.

CHAIRPERSON: (Microphone not on)

MR VISSER: Yes Mr Chairman, but it becomes very confusing on the record, when suddenly one refers to different names of people and places where we know which ones we have been referring to so far.

MR WASSERMAN: I will refer to Culel.

MR VISSER: If you could just stick to the names that we have been using so far. Please continue.

MR WASSERMAN: All right Mr Chairman, so from there, I proceeded up towards Manzini where I waited on Culel/Manzini road. Later on I met up with Du Preez. At that point where we met, is where the two informers were handed their bakkie.

CHAIRPERSON: What were the two of you travelling in at that stage?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, at that stage I was alone in the bakkie.

CHAIRPERSON: Du Preez?

MR VISSER: Du Preez?

MR WASSERMAN: Du Preez was in the minibus.

MR VISSER: In the minibus?

MR WASSERMAN: In the minibus, yes.

MR VISSER: Kombi?

CHAIRPERSON: Kombi?

MR VISSER: It was actually a panel van Mr Chairman, but we will call it a kombi. All right, and you say there you handed the bakkie to the two informers, and what did you do, get into the kombi with Du Preez?

MR WASSERMAN: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: And what happened then?

MR WASSERMAN: We then proceeded into Manzini and took up a surveillance position.

MR VISSER: Behind or in front of the bakkie?

MR WASSERMAN: In front of the bakkie, which was in the vicinity of the entrance to the George Hotel.

MR VISSER: What time of the day was this approximately?

MR WASSERMAN: I would estimate it now between 17H00 and 18H00 Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Between five o'clock and six o'clock in the afternoon, all right?

MR WASSERMAN: Correct sir.

MR VISSER: Continue.

MR WASSERMAN: We were informed by radio that the subject, Ms Ndwandwe had arrived and had entered the bakkie.

MR VISSER: Who informed you by radio?

MR WASSERMAN: It was Mr Botha sir.

MR VISSER: And he was where?

MR WASSERMAN: They were in a position behind the bakkie.

MR VISSER: In Taylor's vehicle?

MR WASSERMAN: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: All right.

MR MALAN: Sorry to interrupt the course of things Mr Visser, but you said that you wouldn't want to lead all the evidence once again, in order to expedite matters, is there any reason why you are coming back to this?

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, yes, I certainly am not doing this because I think that I have nothing else to do. I am just wondering whether this witness shouldn't at least tell you what his participation was.

Perhaps I can go a little quicker, thank you for the indication Mr Chairman. Perhaps if I may then just lead you, is it true that at some stage, Ms Ndwandwe got into the bakkie with the two informers?

MR WASSERMAN: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: That the bakkie then left Manzini and travelled towards the Big Bend?

MR WASSERMAN: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Did you follow them or did you go ahead of them?

MR WASSERMAN: We were ahead Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Ahead, and Taylor with his vehicle and occupants followed from behind the bakkie?

MR WASSERMAN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Is it also correct that some distance away as Mr Forster had testified, the vehicles came to a standstill and Ndwandwe was transferred from the bakkie into the kombi?

MR WASSERMAN: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: From there, with which vehicle did you travel?

MR WASSERMAN: I was in the bakkie Mr Chairman, no, I was in the kombi, the kombi bus Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: In the kombi? Mr Botha and Mr Forster said that it was raining that day, is that your recollection?

MR WASSERMAN: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: And that on the way to Hluti, the vehicles came to a standstill and Botha and Ndwandwe got onto the back of the bakkie, covered with a tarpaulin and where did you then, which vehicle did you then alight?

MR WASSERMAN: I then took charge and drove the 4 x 4, the bakkie.

MR VISSER: You drove the bakkie and who was with you?

MR WASSERMAN: Du Preez in the front.

MR VISSER: Du Preez. The other two vehicles left and exited at Culel?

MR WASSERMAN: Correct Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Where did you then go, did you go passed Hluti and where?

MR WASSERMAN: I proceeded to a point on the fence line, on the border fence line where Mr Botha and Ms Ndwandwe were handed over.

MR VISSER: Did they climb through the fence?

MR WASSERMAN: Correct Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: And who was on the other side?

MR WASSERMAN: There was Mr Taylor and Mr Steyn, and Mr Forster.

MR VISSER: All right, what did you then do, you and Du Preez I should ask?

MR WASSERMAN: The Culel border post was closed, so we continued along the southern road of Swaziland.

MR VISSER: Did you go back to Manzini?

MR WASSERMAN: And headed into Manzini, yes.

MR VISSER: Did you stay over in Manzini that evening, that night?

MR WASSERMAN: We only got there in the early hours of the next morning, but we did stay over in Manzini, yes.

MR VISSER: There seems to be a suggestion that there was a burglary in a house where Ms Ndwandwe was living and that money was taken. If it is suggested that either you or Du Preez or you and Du Preez did that, what would you say about that?

MR WASSERMAN: I deny that emphatically Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Did you know where she lived?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, she had various houses, she was very difficult to find at any set stage. I wouldn't have known exactly where she would have even kept that.

MR VISSER: If you wanted to go and find her at her house, you say you wouldn't have known where to go?

MR WASSERMAN: Not instantly Mr Chairman, one would have to mount a little bit of an operation around it, but not instantly, she had various addresses.

MR VISSER: Yes. You exited the next day, is that correct from Swaziland?

MR WASSERMAN: Correct Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: I want to ask you, did you enter and exit Swaziland, you, yourself on valid passports and travel documents?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, I had a false South African passport.

MR VISSER: And Du Preez?

MR WASSERMAN: A false South African passport as well Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: And you entered and exited both ways, on the false passports?

MR WASSERMAN: Correct Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: What did you do after you had exited at Culel the next, I am sorry, where did you exit the next morning?

MR WASSERMAN: We exited at Culel.

MR VISSER: At Culel, and where did you then go?

MR WASSERMAN: We proceeded to the house at Onverwacht border post.

MR VISSER: Yes, where you found Steyn and Botha and Forster and Ms Ndwandwe, is that correct?

MR WASSERMAN: That is correct, sir.

MR VISSER: Did you participate in her interrogation at all?

MR WASSERMAN: No, not Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: And thereafter, you left for a farm in the Elandskop area in Pietermaritzburg, is that correct?

MR WASSERMAN: That is correct sir.

MR VISSER: With which vehicle did you travel?

MR WASSERMAN: In the minibus.

MR VISSER: The kombi?

MR WASSERMAN: The kombi bus.

MR VISSER: And was Botha and Ndwandwe also in the kombi?

MR WASSERMAN: Correct Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Was anybody talking to her, interrogating her during the trip from Swaziland to Pietermaritzburg?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Botha was having discussions with her in the kombi.

MR VISSER: Yes. Did you listen to the contents of those discussions?

MR WASSERMAN: I was unable to listen due to the aboarding between the front and the back, I couldn't hear the conversation.

MR VISSER: After arriving at the farm, at Pietermaritzburg, did you there participate in any interrogation of Ndwandwe?

MR WASSERMAN: I took part in some questioning of Ms Ndwandwe Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Was she assaulted at any time during her interrogations where you were present?

MR WASSERMAN: No, she was not Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: All right. Did you know what the decision was in her regard, what was going to happen to her?

MR WASSERMAN: I was aware of the situation in that regard Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: When did you become aware?

MR WASSERMAN: From the outset Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: From the outset? And eventually it transpired that she would not, she was not willing to cooperate with the police and certain orders were given?

MR WASSERMAN: That is correct sir.

MR VISSER: As far as you are concerned, what were those orders?

MR WASSERMAN: I was asked by Mr Taylor, to eliminate Ms Ndwandwe.

MR VISSER: Yes, would you just tell us what happened?

MR WASSERMAN: He told me that it was really now, Du Preez and I took her outside of the house, to where the grave had been dug previously.

MR VISSER: By whom?

MR WASSERMAN: By Du Preez and myself sir.

MR VISSER: All right.

MR WASSERMAN: We took her outside, the grave was about 60 metres from the house's verandah. Once she was outside, just beyond the verandah, I rendered her unconscious with a heavy blow.

MR VISSER: Using?

MR WASSERMAN: Using a wooden riot baton, police riot baton.

MR VISSER: Police baton, all right. Did you then carry her?

MR WASSERMAN: She was immediately unconscious and Du Preez and I then carried her to the grave that was dug in amongst the trees.

MR VISSER: Did you take her clothes off?

MR WASSERMAN: We then placed Ms Ndwandwe in the grave, half way, sort of half way in. I then fired a single shot into her head.

MR VISSER: Yes.

MR WASSERMAN: From here, she was dead. We then undressed her.

MR VISSER: Why was that done?

MR WASSERMAN: For clothing and identification purposes. Clothing could be identified at a later stage.

MR VISSER: Did you then place her in the bottom of the grave?

MR WASSERMAN: We then placed her in the bottom of the grave and began to fill it in.

MR VISSER: What with Mr Wasserman?

MR WASSERMAN: First put in a layer of some white lime, some building type lime.

MR VISSER: Why was that done?

MR WASSERMAN: That takes away any smell through the soil for wild animals or for smelling purposes.

MR VISSER: Before you placed that over the body, did you also place some plastic bags or agricultural bags over the body?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, that was done slightly at a later stage.

MR VISSER: All right, please continue. You then started filling in, is that what you are saying?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, there was first the lime and then filled up and then some rubbish bags were placed in on top.

MR VISSER: Refuse bags?

MR WASSERMAN: Refuse bags, yes.

MR VISSER: All right. Anything else?

MR WASSERMAN: The bags were there should anybody have a look or see anything indentations in that area, one would presume it was a little bit of a dump there Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Yes, and would then hopefully stop digging?

MR WASSERMAN: And hopefully avoid it.

MR VISSER: You were also involved in the matter of Cele?

MR WASSERMAN: Correct sir.

MR VISSER: Which was very, as the Honourable Chairman has pointed out, a very similar situation to the present one, the one of Ndwandwe?

MR WASSERMAN: Correct sir.

MR VISSER: When you say refuse bags, does it include also refuse that was placed somewhere as a layer over the grave?

MR WASSERMAN: I can't recall that explicitly, but there would have been some refuse in the bag, I would imagine sir.

MR VISSER: When the - after the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act was passed, you decided to apply for amnesty and is it correct that you did afford your cooperation to the Investigation Unit of the TRC in order to assist them inter alia in pointing out the place, the spot, where she was buried? I am referring to bundle 4 Mr Chairman?

MR WASSERMAN: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: And there is in bundle 4, at page 452, there is a diagram indicating the direction of the travel of the projectile which killed Ms Ndwandwe in the right hand top corner and the right hand bottom corner?

MR WASSERMAN: I see that Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Would that accord with your recollection of how you fired the shot into her head?

MR WASSERMAN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: After you had completed that, and the grave had been filled in, what did you then do?

MR WASSERMAN: Myself and Du Preez returned to the house sir.

MR VISSER: And you then left?

MR WASSERMAN: Correct Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Am I correct in assuming then that you did not, you were not part of the decision makers in regard to this incident?

MR WASSERMAN: Correct Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: You followed orders, but you agreed with the contents of the orders?

MR WASSERMAN: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: For reasons which you already told the Committee?

MR WASSERMAN: Correct sir.

MR VISSER: Did you know Mr Labuschagne and Mr Verwey?

MR WASSERMAN: I do know them sir.

MR VISSER: And you noticed them there that day, questioning Ms Ndwandwe?

MR WASSERMAN: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Were they present at the time when she was murdered?

MR WASSERMAN: Not at all Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Mr Wasserman, you were also involved in the elimination of Mr Pumeso Nxiweni, is that correct?

MR WASSERMAN: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: And if I understand correctly, you arrived on the afternoon of the 5th of November 1988, with Taylor at the safe house at Verulam?

MR WASSERMAN: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Where you discovered Nxiweni being held by Botha, Van der Westhuizen and Du Preez?

MR WASSERMAN: Correct sir.

MR VISSER: Will you please tell the Committee what transpired after you had arrived?

MR WASSERMAN: At a later stage, I didn't have any questions to ask Mr Nxiweni. Later on myself, Mr Botha and Mr Du Preez left for the Allan Taylor residence.

MR VISSER: Did Du Preez tell you to come along?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes sir.

MR VISSER: And what did, is it correct that you lifted a DLB at the Allan Taylor residence?

MR WASSERMAN: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Was this DLB, let me rather approach this differently, did you know Nxiweni before that day?

MR WASSERMAN: Correct Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Did you know of activities allegedly participated by him in, in which he participated?

MR WASSERMAN: Correct sir.

MR VISSER: Yes. We heard of an Allan Taylor unit. Can you tell the Committee as far as you know, what names you can connect to what you referred to as the Allan Taylor unit?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, there is some confusion here about the Allan Taylor unit. An awful lot of MK, military MK activity was emanating from Allan Taylor unit. I am unable to always specifically state who was in which unit and where, but Pumeso Nxiweni was a prevalent Commander of Allan Taylor.

MR VISSER: Yes. And is it your experience also that some of the members of units, were active in more than one unit at any one time?

MR WASSERMAN: Correct Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: What is Allan Taylor?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, it is the medical residential quarters for the University of Natal. It is like a hostel.

CHAIRPERSON: And I presume it would change from year to year, the people staying there?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, that would be correct sir.

CHAIRPERSON: So you would have a constant turn over of people there?

MR WASSERMAN: Very much so sir.

MR VISSER: You were about to tell us that you went with Botha to the Allan Taylor residence, and who else?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Du Preez.

MR VISSER: Du Preez, all right, and we know that you lifted, well, what did you find there, perhaps you should tell us in your own words?

MR WASSERMAN: We went into a store room and found a metal trunk, which we were familiar with, it was the kind of trunk that we were familiar with when it came to DLB's and we opened it and found some explosives inside that trunk.

MR VISSER: All right. Do you know what happened to those explosives which, to the contents of that DLB later?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, they were in the control of Mr Botha, I don't know what happened with them after that.

MR VISSER: Yes. When you went back, or did you go back to the safe house at Verulam?

MR WASSERMAN: Correct Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: What did you find when you arrived there?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Taylor had already commenced to dig a grave outside.

MR VISSER: Did he commence to dig the grave, or had he dug the grave?

MR WASSERMAN: It was almost dug Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Yes, and where was Pumeso?

MR WASSERMAN: He was still, he was at the safe house Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: At the safe house, or in the safe house?

MR WASSERMAN: In the safe house Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Was there anyone with him?

MR WASSERMAN: If I recall correctly, Mr Van der Westhuizen was still there Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: All right, so what happened thereafter?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Taylor sent Van der Westhuizen and Botha away.

MR VISSER: Away where?

MR WASSERMAN: I don't know Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Did they leave the premises?

MR WASSERMAN: They left the premises.

MR VISSER: All right, and you, Du Preez and Taylor remained behind?

MR WASSERMAN: Correct Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: What happened then?

MR WASSERMAN: Du Preez and I then led Mr Nxiweni out.

MR VISSER: Didn't Taylor tell you anything?

MR WASSERMAN: Taylor said yes, we must eliminate Mr Nxiweni.

MR VISSER: All right, he gave you the order?

MR WASSERMAN: Correct sir.

MR VISSER: And you say you and Du Preez then led Mr Nxiweni out,yes?

MR WASSERMAN: To a point close to the grave.

MR VISSER: Yes.

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Du Preez then shot him a single shot in the head.

MR VISSER: Was Pumeso not rendered unconscious as had been the case with Ndwandwe?

MR WASSERMAN: Not on this occasion at all, no, he was not.

MR VISSER: Was Pumeso standing, sitting or laying when Du Preez shot him?

MR WASSERMAN: He was standing Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: And where on his body, was he shot?

MR WASSERMAN: He was shot on the side of his head Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Which side? If you can't remember,just say so.

MR WASSERMAN: I can't remember automatically.

MR VISSER: Pardon?

MR WASSERMAN: But I can see on the papers, if you show me the paper, I can remember it. I don't know if it was on the left temple or the right temple.

MR VISSER: But he was shot in the temple?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes.

MR VISSER: Did he fall down?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Did you take his clothes off?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, we did, we took off his clothes.

MR VISSER: Did you also put lime over the body there?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Refuse bags?

MR WASSERMAN: I don't recall refuse bags Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Was this during the day or the night?

MR WASSERMAN: This was night time.

MR VISSER: Night time, could you see what was transpiring?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes Mr Chairman, it was with night vision, night eyes, it was fine.

MR VISSER: Yes. Was Mr Pumeso blindfolded when he was led out of the house?

MR WASSERMAN: He was Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Was the weapon silenced or not?

MR WASSERMAN: It was a silenced weapon Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: What happened to the clothes both of Ndwandwe as well as that of Pumeso?

MR WASSERMAN: We burnt the clothes on both occasions Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Both occasions? Mr Wasserman, you heard the evidence as to why Mr Pumeso was killed, why it was thought necessary to eliminate him. Do you agree with that evidence?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, I concur with the evidence given to the Committee thus far.

MR VISSER: Were you also aware of the information regarding Mr Nxiweni, which was received from Ms Ndwandwe?

MR WASSERMAN: I was aware Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: And were you convinced of the truth of what it was alleged that he was involved with as far as MK operations were concerned, in Natal?

MR WASSERMAN: Correct Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Now, going over to the incident of the kwaMashu unit, were you involved in that incident as well?

MR WASSERMAN: I was Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Can you please inform the Committee what your participation and role was?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, my activities concur with that, with the evidence given by Mr Botha. The use of informer there, the capture of the members of the unit on the Avoca Bridge and the transporting thereof, to the safe house.

MR VISSER: Were you involved with those informers who penetrated and gained their confidence?

MR WASSERMAN: I was not Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Who was the one who was involved, whose informers were they?

MR WASSERMAN: I think Mr Botha was the handler, I think.

MR VISSER: I see. All right, the fact is that there was an arrest made for want of a better word, at the Avoca Bridge?

MR WASSERMAN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Did you have knowledge of a report that they were under way to blow up the railway line at Phoenix?

MR WASSERMAN: Correct Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Railway station, all right, and what happened with them, after they were arrested?

MR WASSERMAN: They were taken through to the safe house at Verulam Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: At Verulam?

MR WASSERMAN: Correct Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: What transpired there Mr Wasserman? First of all, were they found in possession of anything?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, on their arrest they had limpet mines with them.

MR VISSER: Limpet mines. Can you remember how many?

MR WASSERMAN: I recall three Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: How many people did you arrest there?

MR WASSERMAN: Three Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Were they Mr Ndlovu, Mr Vilakazi and Mr Mtshali?

MR WASSERMAN: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Did you know them before?

MR WASSERMAN: I didn't know them personally, I knew of them Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Did you know of their activities?

MR WASSERMAN: Correct Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: And that it was alleged that they played a significant role in MK terror operations in Port Natal?

MR WASSERMAN: Correct sir.

MR VISSER: So, at the safe house at Verulam, anything that happened there?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, we spoke to them, separated them and spoke to them.

MR VISSER: Were they assaulted?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Did you assault anyone?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, I did Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Whom did you assault?

MR WASSERMAN: I don't recall which of the three I assaulted Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: One of the tree?

MR WASSERMAN: I spoke to all three on occasions Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Could you have assaulted all three of them?

MR WASSERMAN: It is possible Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: What was the purpose of assaulting them?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, we had information they were on their way to go and do a military operation and I wanted a little bit more facts, very quickly, so I beat them just to make sure that I was going to get what I needed, in time, Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: How did you assault them?

MR WASSERMAN: I would have slapped and punched Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Slapped with the open hand?

MR WASSERMAN: And with my fists Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Where on the body of these persons?

MR WASSERMAN: It would have been to the face, the ears, the chest Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And were they punched in the face as well?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Did they give an explanation about the limpet mines which you found in their possession?

MR WASSERMAN: Well, I was informed that they were to be used on that evening's military operation Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Yes, but in your interrogation, did the kwaMashu 3 give an explanation of their possession of the three limpet mines, that you can remember?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, not specifically to me was it made, however, I recall being informed that the military weaponry had come from Nxiweni.

MR VISSER: All right.

CHAIRPERSON: Did anybody say that they had been left with them, and they were going to throw them away?

MR WASSERMAN: Not to me Mr Chairman, I did hear that later though sir.

MR VISSER: All right, so what transpired thereafter?

MR WASSERMAN: After that, Mr Taylor arrived at the safe house Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Could you just speak up a little bit Mr Wasserman, I find it extremely difficult to hear you.

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Taylor arrived at the safe house Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Did he take over?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes.

MR VISSER: Did he give instructions?

MR WASSERMAN: Instructions were then given.

MR VISSER: What did he say?

MR WASSERMAN: These persons, this unit, was to be taken out to the scene where they were going to do their military activity.

MR VISSER: And eliminated?

MR WASSERMAN: And eliminated at the scene and it was to look as though they had had a mishap in the handling of their own explosives.

MR VISSER: Yes, and is that what happened?

MR WASSERMAN: That is what happened Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Did you go out to the scene?

MR WASSERMAN: I did Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Accompanied by?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Taylor.

MR VISSER: Botha?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Botha, myself and Mr Du Preez.

MR VISSER: All right, Mr Botha gave evidence to say that Taylor remained in the car with these three persons. I am sorry, just bear a moment with me Mr Chairman.

I repeat, is it correct that when you arrived there, Mr Taylor remained in the car with the three persons?

MR WASSERMAN: It is correct Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And you went somewhere?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: What did you go and do and where did you go?

MR WASSERMAN: Went to a point on the railway line not too far from Phoenix railway station Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Yes?

MR WASSERMAN: Du Preez, myself and Botha each had a member of this unit under our control.

MR VISSER: You escorted them to this point?

MR WASSERMAN: We escorted them to the point on the railway line Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: And what happened there?

MR WASSERMAN: Well, at this point, each one of us had control of a member of the unit.

MR VISSER: Which one did you have control of or don't you remember?

MR WASSERMAN: I don't remember Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Yes, and?

MR WASSERMAN: At a sign from Mr Botha, we each shot the one that we were responsible for, once in the head Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Just how did this happen? First of all, was it during the day or at night?

MR WASSERMAN: No, it was dark, it was night time Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Dark? Were they standing up when they were shot?

MR WASSERMAN: No, they were on haunches Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Did someone or all of you, instruct them to sit down?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: And to do what?

MR WASSERMAN: I just said merely, you know, sit down Mr Chairman, I didn't tell them to do anything.

MR VISSER: Was it light enough so that you could see around you?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, it was Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: And you say there was a sign by Botha?

MR WASSERMAN: There was a nodding of the head Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Yes, and you then said that they were all shot, all three of them, with a single shot?

MR WASSERMAN: Initially all shot with a single shot, with I had a Scorpion with a silencer on Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: And the others, did they use firearms with or without silencers?

MR WASSERMAN: All silenced weapons Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: And after you had shot, the three of you had shot one shot into the heads of the victims, what happened then?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, then they were placed upon...

MR VISSER: First of all, did you fire only one shot into the heads?

MR WASSERMAN: Oh no, Mr Chairman, I fired a second shot into my victim.

MR VISSER: And the others?

MR WASSERMAN: They also did, to my recollection.

MR VISSER: To your recollection? All right, they were then placed you said, just continue?

MR WASSERMAN: They were then placed on top of an explosive device, their explosive devices that they had when we arrested them that evening.

MR VISSER: What part of their bodies were placed on the explosive device, on the limpet mines?

MR WASSERMAN: The hands and head sir.

MR VISSER: And what was the purpose of that?

MR WASSERMAN: The explosion would render their identities, make them unidentifiable Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Yes, and the fact that they were shot in the head?

MR WASSERMAN: Correct.

MR VISSER: Are you an explosives expert?

MR WASSERMAN: No.

MR VISSER: Who prepared the limpet mines for the explosion?

MR WASSERMAN: It was done by Mr Du Preez sir.

MR VISSER: All right, and did you then leave?

MR WASSERMAN: Correct Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: And did you hear the report of the limpet mines detonating?

MR WASSERMAN: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Did you take part at all in their interrogation or should I rather ask this, was your interrogation of these three directed at attempting to persuade them to become informers on this occasion?

MR WASSERMAN: No Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Why was that?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, I had no, I never ever thought that they would even think about it.

MR VISSER: Becoming informers?

MR WASSERMAN: About working with the State,yes.

MR MALAN: Sorry, just before you proceed, did you not say that you didn't know any one of them personally?

MR WASSERMAN: I didn't know any one of them personally, no.

MR MALAN: You simply knew of activities in which they were involved?

MR WASSERMAN: Correct.

MR MALAN: So why did you think that they would not be prepared to become informers?

MR WASSERMAN: I wasn't going to try and turn them Mr Chairman, it wasn't my area of responsibility in the first place.

MR MALAN: If I heard you correctly, you were saying that you never, ever thought that they would become informers?

MR WASSERMAN: In my brief association with the parties involved, there was no time Mr Chairman, to make an assessment on that.

MR MALAN: Was there no time, or was it not the objective?

MR WASSERMAN: It certainly wasn't my objective Mr Chairman, I don't know about other members.

MR MALAN: You never considered that, that is really what it comes to?

MR WASSERMAN: No sir.

MR VISSER: Yes.

MR MALAN: So you cannot say that you never, ever thought that they would become informers?

MR WASSERMAN: No.

MR VISSER: Well, on that point, what was your experience about more than one person being together and being able to be convinced to become informers? Was that easier or more difficult?

MR WASSERMAN: No, that is exactly the difficult starting point Mr Chairman. Should three persons be captured together, one will find that it is most difficult to try and turn or make informers of persons in that situation.

ADV SIGODI: Sorry, why didn't you charge them? Why were they not charged if they were found with the limpet mines?

MR WASSERMAN: I am unable to, the decision wouldn't have been mine, and I am unable to pass comment on that Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: You followed orders?

MR WASSERMAN: Correct Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Yes. Apart from the evidence which you gave regarding political situation and the political objectives relating to this incident, did you also hear the evidence of Mr Botha?

MR WASSERMAN: I did Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: And that of Mr Steyn?

MR WASSERMAN: I did Mr Steyn.

MR VISSER: And do you also make common cause with what they stated in that regard?

MR WASSERMAN: I do sir.

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman.

MR NOLTE: Thank you Mr Chairman, I have no questions.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ADV PRIOR: Thank you, Prior on behalf of the Amnesty Committee, Evidence Leader, and also standing in for Mr Ngubane, on behalf of the victims.

Mr Chairman, with your leave I will start with the kwaMashu 3 and then work backwards, those are freshest, if it will not inconvenience anyone.

Mr Wasserman, what would have happened to you if you had said to Mr Botha, look, I don't want part of this, I don't want to follow this order?

MR WASSERMAN: I would imagine my days on the Intelligence gathering unit, might have been numbered.

ADV PRIOR: Do you think he would have sidelined you or had you transferred?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes Mr Chairman.

ADV PRIOR: In order to keep your employment with that unit, you decided to carry out this unlawful command?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, once the command was evident to me, I also accepted it.

ADV PRIOR: So it wasn't just a question of following orders, you made common cause or made common purpose with what was going down there, what was happening?

MR WASSERMAN: That is correct sir.

ADV PRIOR: It wasn't so much the order that moved you, as the activity of your unit? You were killing operatives at that stage, that was the strategy, is that not so?

MR WASSERMAN: It was one finger on the fist Mr Chairman.

ADV PRIOR: Well, you had these people dead to sites, you had them with mini limpet mines, you could have charged them, they would have got at least six, seven, eight years possibly, taken out of circulation.

MR WASSERMAN: That is correct Mr Chairman.

ADV PRIOR: Would that have been quite a thing to put together, an investigation in the light of the acquittals of Bhila and Nxiweni in Ramlakan?

MR WASSERMAN: No, I don't think so Mr Chairman.

ADV PRIOR: It was simply expedient for your purposes or your unit's purposes, to eliminate them as you did?

MR WASSERMAN: No Mr Chairman, it was part of the fight against the military fight that was waging at the time, some could be handled by Courts, other actions just didn't seem so.

ADV PRIOR: And as decided by the Durban branch of the Security Police?

MR WASSERMAN: As decided by my command structure, at least I know that.

MR VISSER: Taylor at Botha?

MR WASSERMAN: At least I know of my command structure, yes sir.

MR VISSER: The evidence of Mr Forster and of Mr Botha, was that primarily the task or the object was always information gathering. Is that correct?

MR WASSERMAN: That is correct Mr Chairman.

ADV PRIOR: You have been asked this by a member of the panel. Can you think of any reason given your experience, background, in the field, why even an attempt was not made to try and turn these, the kwaMashu 3?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, I don't know if the other parties did try to turn any of these personalities. In my presence it didn't occur.

I don't know amongst themselves, if they tried. But also it gets to the point of when there are three picked up, if one agreed, the other two would be in the way, so that is the difficulty in this particular instance.

ADV PRIOR: Do you know how they were arrested or picked up, in other words what plan or what legend was created?

MR WASSERMAN: No, I was briefed to meet my unit, and we were to effect the capture on the Avoca Bridge Mr Chairman.

ADV PRIOR: Did it appear to you as if they were waiting for people that they knew? In other words a rendezvous?

MR WASSERMAN: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

ADV PRIOR: So they expected to meet comrades, was that part of the plan?

MR WASSERMAN: I don't know what they were told, whether it was to be comrades or finances or somebody, but they were to meet somebody.

ADV PRIOR: And those informers, were they present on that occasion, or not?

MR WASSERMAN: No Mr Chairman.

ADV PRIOR: And you said those informers were handled by Mr Botha?

MR WASSERMAN: I think that is correct Mr Chairman.

ADV PRIOR: You don't know if they are the same people in the Ndwandwe matter?

MR WASSERMAN: I don't know that Mr Chairman.

ADV PRIOR: You say you had a Scorpion pistol, who issued you that weapon?

MR WASSERMAN: It was the ANC's weapon Mr Chairman.

ADV PRIOR: Where did you, where did you obtain it from?

MR WASSERMAN: I obtained it from an ANC DLB that was lifted.

ADV PRIOR: Was that the one at Allan Taylor as you say?

MR WASSERMAN: No Mr Chairman. We lifted hundreds of DLB's, I can't recall which one this one came from.

ADV PRIOR: Did you simply keep those weapons under your control, that is the Security Branch, Durban, to use whenever you felt like it?

MR WASSERMAN: Correct Mr Chairman.

ADV PRIOR: So those weapons would not necessarily have been handed in through the official channels?

MR WASSERMAN: No sir.

ADV PRIOR: And the other persons, Botha and Du Preez, what were they armed with, similar weapons?

MR WASSERMAN: It was also Scorpions yes.

ADV PRIOR: Also silenced?

MR WASSERMAN: Also silenced, yes.

ADV PRIOR: If we can just go now to Pumeso Nxiweni. This Allan Taylor unit, you say all you can recall is that Nxiweni was the Overall Commander?

MR WASSERMAN: Round about this stage, yes Mr Chairman.

ADV PRIOR: You can't remember anybody else that possibly was a member?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, I would be wrong to just add up names, I can't recall names right now.

ADV PRIOR: If it was suggested to you that the Allan Taylor unit broke up at the time of the trial or the arrest of the accused in the Ramlakan matter and was never regrouped, what would your comment be?

MR WASSERMAN: I would doubt that very much Mr Chairman.

ADV PRIOR: Although you don't have any information about specific persons who were actually members during 1987 and 1989?

MR WASSERMAN: No Mr Chairman, I can't recall that portion.

ADV PRIOR: And you worked closely with Mr Botha, did you not?

MR WASSERMAN: I did Mr Chairman.

ADV PRIOR: So it was virtually, it would have come to your attention had there been active members, other than Nxiweni involved at Allan Taylor?

MR WASSERMAN: No Mr Chairman, there definitely were active members, there definitely were, I just can't recall the names.

ADV PRIOR: During the arrests of the accused involved in the Ramlakan trial, was a DLB also discovered at Allan Taylor?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, I actually can't recall specifically but there were weapons recovered, yes.

ADV PRIOR: And I understand standard procedure for example a container, that would be dusted for prints?

MR WASSERMAN: Correct.

ADV PRIOR: I mean that is written in the book?

MR WASSERMAN: Correct.

ADV PRIOR: On this occasion, after the arrest of Nxiweni, you discovered a DLB at the Allan Taylor residence, in a storage room?

MR WASSERMAN: That is correct.

ADV PRIOR: Was that dusted for prints?

MR WASSERMAN: No, not at all Mr Chairman.

ADV PRIOR: Against procedure?

MR WASSERMAN: Against procedure Mr Chairman.

ADV PRIOR: And we have gone through this with the other applicants, there was a golden opportunity to prosecute Nxiweni and have him removed out of circulation for a number of years, on the strength of the ammunition and explosives and that DLB?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, I heard that evidence given.

ADV PRIOR: Can you maybe advance a reason why there was this departure from the normal practice?

MR WASSERMAN: No Mr Chairman, I have to concur with the evidence given previously by the other applicants.

ADV PRIOR: Unless the decision was already to eliminate Nxiweni, and not to bother about investigating any charges against him? That would seem to fit the scenario, would it not?

MR WASSERMAN: I am unaware of that particular setup as you are outlining it now Mr Chairman.

ADV PRIOR: It seems to my mind that Nxiweni was unlikely to be a person to be turned, I am talking about 1988? Would you agree?

MR WASSERMAN: I agree Mr Chairman.

ADV PRIOR: Can we then accept that the only reason why Nxiweni was then detained or arrested, was for purposes of his elimination?

MR WASSERMAN: I am unable to answer that Mr Chairman, my Commanders would have to answer that.

ADV PRIOR: Well, what was your sense, you worked very close to Botha? I mean surely he would have discussed with you what the strategy would be, would have been?

MR WASSERMAN: Sorry, there is too much noise from down here, I couldn't hear anything.

ADV PRIOR: I will repeat it. I just get a sense from replies that I have heard today and over the last couple of days, that everyone seemed to just have their own agenda. Surely Botha would have discussed with you what was to happen with Nxiweni, that there was a plan to have him arrested and once he was arrested or detained or abducted, whatever the position was, whether to prosecute him, to turn him or whatever?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, when this gentleman was arrested, I wasn't even in this country.

ADV PRIOR: Where were you?

MR WASSERMAN: I was away, I was in Swaziland. So, I wasn't aware of this.

ADV PRIOR: All right. The weapon you used to kill Mr Nxiweni, what was that? Was it also a Scorpion?

MR WASSERMAN: I never shot Mr Nxiweni.

ADV PRIOR: Mr Du Preez shot him, you were together, acting together?

MR WASSERMAN: Scorpion.

ADV PRIOR: It was a Scorpion, and he was only shot once?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes Mr Chairman.

ADV PRIOR: It seems from the post mortem report at page 510, in bundle 4 Mr Chairman, one sees the entry wound on the left side of the skull, probably just behind the left ear and exiting on the right hand side.

MR WASSERMAN: I see that and concur with that Mr Chairman.

ADV PRIOR: Was he shot from very close range?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes Mr Chairman.

ADV PRIOR: Was it almost a contact shot or can't you say?

MR WASSERMAN: It was very, very close indeed Mr Chairman.

ADV PRIOR: What, a few inches or a few millimetres or a few centimetres?

MR WASSERMAN: Like that.

ADV PRIOR: He was laying, standing, seated?

MR WASSERMAN: He was standing Mr Chairman.

ADV PRIOR: Was lime also, I think you said that, all right, just one other aspect, you said Taylor had begun or had started to dig the grave for Nxiweni?

MR WASSERMAN: Correct.

ADV PRIOR: Himself?

MR WASSERMAN: Himself, yes Mr Chairman.

ADV PRIOR: That is what he said in his amnesty application.

MR WASSERMAN: I don't know what he said in his amnesty application.

ADV PRIOR: Was it unusual that he should have dug the grave?

MR WASSERMAN: No, not when you knew Mr Taylor, Mr Chairman, no.

ADV PRIOR: I want to deal with Fila Ndwandwe's incident. This was a, the foray into Swaziland was a well planned operation, was it not?

MR WASSERMAN: Correct Mr Chairman.

ADV PRIOR: Given the evidence we have heard today, General Steyn, et al Mr Botha over the last few days, would I be correct in understanding that the planning was such that the risk of things going wrong, was reduced to a very, very bare minimum?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes Mr Chairman, that is right.

ADV PRIOR: And obviously you people didn't want to spend any more time than you had to, in Swaziland, after the abduction of Ms Ndwandwe?

MR WASSERMAN: Correct Mr Chairman.

ADV PRIOR: And I would also like to believe that you would have planned the whole operation that you would have been able to return before the border post closed at ten o'clock on the same day?

MR WASSERMAN: We had planned that Mr Chairman.

ADV PRIOR: In other words, you left yourself sufficient time to get back to the border post, to exit Swaziland?

MR WASSERMAN: Correct sir.

ADV PRIOR: It would be dangerous to remain back in Swaziland, particularly if word had got out that she had been abducted by the Security Branch?

MR WASSERMAN: Well, it wouldn't have been ideal to be there.

ADV PRIOR: Precisely. Now, what time did you get to the border fence, that was where obviously you had got through a hole in the fence or whatever, the fence was cut or whatever it was, near Onverwacht. What time was that approximately?

MR WASSERMAN: Half past eight, 9 o'clock Mr Chairman.

ADV PRIOR: That seems to be Colonel Forster's recollection as well. Now from there to Culel, or to Lavumisa, which is on the Swazi side, how far is that approximately by vehicle? Less than 50 kilometres?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes Mr Chairman.

ADV PRIOR: About 30?

MR WASSERMAN: About 30 Mr Chairman.

ADV PRIOR: Would it have taken you more than an hour and a half to leave Onverwacht where you had dropped off Botha and Ndwandwe to get back to Lavumisa, to travel that distance to the border post?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, it was very, very wet, the road was very muddy, that is why only the vehicle, the 4 x 4 could continue. To go back on that same broken road, the road was pretty mushed up from merely getting there.

ADV PRIOR: All right, just look at page 443 of bundle 4. You were in the vicinity where the road that looks like a dirt road, crosses the border, is that correct, the international line?

MR WASSERMAN: Correct.

ADV PRIOR: So would you have driven back to the crossroad with Hluti?

MR WASSERMAN: Correct.

ADV PRIOR: And then you would have turned to the south towards Lavumisa?

MR WASSERMAN: Well, that is the road that you are discussing now.

ADV PRIOR: You said you couldn't go along the dirt road, because it was too mushy?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, that is right.

ADV PRIOR: Because of the weather? So which road did you go, which road did you follow?

MR WASSERMAN: We went the other way, heading to Hlangano.

ADV PRIOR: So you went further away from Onverwacht?

MR WASSERMAN: yes.

ADV PRIOR: Right, you went to Hlangano and then where, did you turn up towards where?

MR WASSERMAN: Then up to Hlatikulu, that is all tarred road now sir. Hlatikulu, and then up towards Manzini and then back the other way.

ADV PRIOR: So even though you had a 4 x 4 vehicle, you didn't want to travel the 30 kilometres to Culel, but went via a ...(indistinct) route?

MR WASSERMAN: It is not a ...(indistinct) route Mr Chairman,it is the right way to go. I did know the area, I was from there.

ADV PRIOR: Did you tell Mr Botha that you were going to take this route back and you wouldn't be able to get back before the border post closed?

MR WASSERMAN: We knew once we had done the handover, we were not going to get back in time for the border.

ADV PRIOR: Did you tell him, that is the question?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, I told him.

ADV PRIOR: So he was aware that he wouldn't see you that evening?

MR WASSERMAN: He was aware.

ADV PRIOR: You say it was difficult, it would have been difficult to find out where Ms Ndwandwe lived. Mr Botha's evidence was that you had her address?

MR WASSERMAN: We had a couple of her addresses, but you couldn't tell where she would be on Monday night, or which one on Tuesday.

ADV PRIOR: At Onverwacht, did you take part in any interrogation of her?

MR WASSERMAN: No, I didn't Mr Chairman.

ADV PRIOR: What was her condition when you saw her at Onverwacht the next morning?

MR WASSERMAN: She was relaxed, she was fine Mr Chairman.

ADV PRIOR: Was she handcuffed?

MR WASSERMAN: I can't recall that, no, no.

ADV PRIOR: Would she have been, surely she would have been restrained in case she tried to escape?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, at Onverwacht, at the border post?

ADV PRIOR: At the safe house, where she spent the evening with the others?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, I can't recall if she was handcuffed.

ADV PRIOR: Was she shackled?

MR WASSERMAN: No Mr Chairman.

ADV PRIOR: With foot shackles?

MR WASSERMAN: No Mr Chairman.

ADV PRIOR: She never complained to you about anything?

MR WASSERMAN: No.

ADV PRIOR: She seemed calm?

MR WASSERMAN: She was calm Mr Chairman.

ADV PRIOR: She wasn't complaining about her predicament?

MR WASSERMAN: She didn't complain to me about her predicament at all Mr Chairman.

ADV PRIOR: Did you travel with her back to Pietermaritzburg, in the same vehicle that is?

MR WASSERMAN: I was in the same vehicle, but in the front with Mr Du Preez.

ADV PRIOR: And was she being interrogated in that vehicle or was not much said?

MR WASSERMAN: No, they were talking in the back of the vehicle Mr Chairman.

ADV PRIOR: Having a discussion?

MR WASSERMAN: Questions and answers, the vehicle is blocked off. The driver cannot see, the front crew cannot see into the back Mr Chairman.

ADV PRIOR: So you don't know what occurred in the back there, apart from that you heard a discussion of sorts?

MR WASSERMAN: That is correct Mr Chairman.

ADV PRIOR: And you can't tell us whether she gave any important information up or not, over that period?

MR WASSERMAN: I was briefed on that when we got to the Maritzburg farm.

ADV PRIOR: At Pietermaritzburg, how long did she spend at that safe house, sorry, on the farm?

MR WASSERMAN: She was there all the time Mr Chairman.

ADV PRIOR: Until what time, what time was she taken out, was it in the early evening to be killed?

MR WASSERMAN: It was already dark Mr Chairman, I would say 19H00, 20H00.

ADV PRIOR: And at that safe house, were you there most of the day?

MR WASSERMAN: I was, most of the day, yes.

ADV PRIOR: Did you interrogate her?

MR WASSERMAN: No Mr Chairman.

ADV PRIOR: Did Du Preez interrogate her?

MR WASSERMAN: No Mr Chairman.

ADV PRIOR: Well, who interrogated her? Do you know?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Botha Mr Chairman, and Mr Steyn, Mr Chairman.

ADV PRIOR: Did you see that?

MR WASSERMAN: I looked in the room, Mr Chairman, yes, I saw them talking with her.

ADV PRIOR: From time to time, you would pop in?

MR WASSERMAN: That is exactly right Mr Chairman.

ADV PRIOR: For what purpose?

MR WASSERMAN: To hear how things were going, and to listen.

ADV PRIOR: Did you also pop in from time to time when Mr Labuschagne and Mr Verwey were interrogating her?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, I did Mr Chairman.

ADV PRIOR: This must have been an intense interrogation? I mean you had a dangerous terrorist in your custody?

MR WASSERMAN: What are you trying to say Mr Chairman?

ADV PRIOR: Just answer the question, was it an intense interrogation?

MR WASSERMAN: No Mr Chairman.

ADV PRIOR: Was it a casual interrogation?

MR WASSERMAN: By the evening stage, I think it was casual to my mind, Mr Chairman.

ADV PRIOR: She had been interrogated virtually the whole of that day?

MR WASSERMAN: Well Mr Chairman, if that is an intensive interrogation to your mind, then that is how it is.

ADV PRIOR: And the decision had already been made at Onverwacht to eliminate her? You have heard that evidence?

MR WASSERMAN: I have heard the evidence.

ADV PRIOR: So what were you trying to, what were you trying to get out of her? Information I would imagine?

MR WASSERMAN: Well, I would imagine information Mr Chairman.

ADV PRIOR: And she wasn't giving the information, is that correct, because it took so long. You said the interrogation lasted until the virtually the evening?

MR WASSERMAN: I never had any interrogation to do with her Mr Chairman.

ADV PRIOR: Wasn't the case that she was a very hard nut to crack?

MR WASSERMAN: That is so Mr Chairman.

ADV PRIOR: And she remained defiant to the bitter end?

MR WASSERMAN: That is correct.

ADV PRIOR: And she refused to cooperate with the Security Branch?

MR WASSERMAN: In my presence, that is correct, yes.

ADV PRIOR: And I should imagine there was no difference, her being a female and being treated in a certain way, as Nxiweni was treated being a male person, he was punched and slapped on his body?

MR WASSERMAN: She wasn't punched or slapped on her body.

ADV PRIOR: Why not, what was the difference?

MR WASSERMAN: She just wasn't.

ADV PRIOR: Because she was a female, are you saying that there was some sense of chivalry shown to her?

MR WASSERMAN: You are saying that.

ADV PRIOR: No, I am trying to find out Mr Wasserman, because we can't, you are not prepared to volunteer anything.

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, she was not assaulted at all.

ADV PRIOR: She must have known at some stage, she was going to be executed, would you agree?

MR WASSERMAN: I am unable to say so Mr Chairman.

ADV PRIOR: Well, when you led her out of the house, was she blindfolded?

MR WASSERMAN: She was blindfolded and believed she was going to be collected and moved to another safe house.

ADV PRIOR: Is that what you told her?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes Mr Chairman.

ADV PRIOR: And what did she say?

MR WASSERMAN: She accepted that, she had no choice.

ADV PRIOR: And then you clubbed her on the head from behind?

MR WASSERMAN: That is correct.

ADV PRIOR: Did you strike her on the, can you maybe just tell us, because the post mortem showed a fracture and I just want to clarify that. Did you hit her on the back of the head, on the jaw or can't you remember?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, no, it was on the right hand side of her head.

MR VISSER: Could my learned friend point the fracture out to us Mr Chairman.

ADV PRIOR: If my learned friend looks at page 452 on the right hand side, the diagram of the skull, there is reference to fracture lines, arrows. But in any event, I am not going to proceed with that, you indicated that the blow was of sufficient force to render her unconscious?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes sir.

ADV PRIOR: And it was just the one blow that you administered?

MR WASSERMAN: A single blow sir.

ADV PRIOR: And was she standing up when you administered that blow?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes, correct sir.

ADV PRIOR: And obviously she didn't know that you were going to strike her at the time that you administered that blow?

MR WASSERMAN: That is correct Mr Chairman.

ADV PRIOR: You then placed her in the grave, is that right?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes sir.

ADV PRIOR: And well, did you lay her down? In what position did you place her before you shot her?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, she was virtually lying down in the grave, but in a slightly seated up position.

ADV PRIOR: I am coming to that, and you know why, you have seen the diagram of the bullet wound.

MR WASSERMAN: Correct.

ADV PRIOR: She was shot from the top of her head with the exit coming out at the roof of her mouth? That has been shown to you?

MR WASSERMAN: That is correct.

ADV PRIOR: Would you agree with that being the position?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes sir.

ADV PRIOR: And after you shot her, you then stripped the body, is that correct?

MR WASSERMAN: Correct sir.

ADV PRIOR: Thank you Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.

MR NOLTE: No questions Mr Chairman.

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, two matters which I have neglected to put very briefly with your, it is not really re-examination, but if you will allow me just to put them very briefly.

The firearms you used in these incidents, in each occasion, were firearms of which the possession was not lawful in the hands of whoever the policemen was that used them?

MR WASSERMAN: That is so sir.

MR VISSER: And when you entered the Allan Taylor residence on the campus of the University of Natal, was that a legal entry or an illegal entry?

MR WASSERMAN: It was illegally done, sir.

MR VISSER: Illegally.

CHAIRPERSON: Why, what was illegal about it?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, the entry to the premises was illegally gained.

CHAIRPERSON: You were going to get some explosives that you thought might be used for acts of terrorism?

MR WASSERMAN: That is correct Mr Chairman, but we didn't want anybody else to see us gathering or collecting, making a collection of these weapons.

CHAIRPERSON: What was illegal about it though, I can understand that you didn't have time to get a search warrant, so you proceeded to go and search, how was it illegal?

MR WASSERMAN: I am not too sure about that point Mr Chairman, we made entry into I suppose the storeroom without permission of anybody.

MR MALAN: Do you need the permission of the owner when you want to seize illegal weapons?

MR WASSERMAN: No sir.

FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ADV PRIOR: Mr Chairman, I apologise, may I just raise the matter of Pindele Mfeti, I didn't, I forgot to ask that question, but possibly through the Committee may I just ask around that.

It is of importance to the victims, he was a relative of Nxiweni's family, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: How long will you be do you think Mr Prior?

ADV PRIOR: It is virtually one question, possibly two Mr Chairman. Mr Wasserman if you may be able to assist, and I pitch this question at the level of helping the victims, come to terms with what happened to their loved ones.

You have obviously followed the questioning of Mr Botha closely, and we know that one Pindele Mfeti who was also a student, he was a fairly elderly student, he was bout 40, he had a child in matric at the time, he was studying I believe law, and he was the cousin of Pumeso Nxiweni. He disappeared on the 25th of April 1987.

The family are concerned that possibly in their endeavours to find Nxiweni, shortly after the acquittal in the Ramlakan case, that possibly Mfeti was mistaken for Nxiweni, and he was abducted and dealt with. Are you able in any way, to give up any information that may assist the families?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, I don't even know that name. I have never even heard that name.

ADV PRIOR: Thank you Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Thank you, yes, Mr Chairman.

ADV SIGODI: You say that after you shot Portia Ndwandwe as well as Pumeso Nxiweni, you covered the body with lime. Where did you get this lime?

MR WASSERMAN: It would have been bought at one or so, hardware store. I can't recall where it was bought Mr Chairman.

ADV SIGODI: When was it bought?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, no, I don't know why was it bought.

ADV SIGODI: Why was it bought?

MR WASSERMAN: It would have been purchased to cover the body, to stop an odour coming through the soil.

ADV SIGODI: But from your evidence it seems that the lime was already there when you shot and killed these people? Did you have lime stocked in that safe house for these kinds of actions?

MR WASSERMAN: No Mr Chairman, I was given the lime Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Why by?

MR WASSERMAN: I was given the lime Mr Chairman, by Mr Taylor.

ADV SIGODI: When did he get this lime?

MR WASSERMAN: I don't know when he got the lime Mr Chairman.

ADV SIGODI: So in other words, you don't know where this lime came from?

MR WASSERMAN: I don't know when he got it or where he got it from Mr Chairman.

ADV SIGODI: Another thing which I want to clarify in my mind, is how many people in the Durban Security Branch belonged to the, I will call it the inner circle, the few people who were responsible for these killings as far as you know?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, as far as I know, it would only be the applicants that are before the Committee.

ADV SIGODI: Why were you particularly chosen for this type of work, what is it that you had done, were you given any training for killing or what by the Security Branch?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, no, I am as military trained as anybody else and I was just in the Umkhonto weSizwe section.

ADV SIGODI: The reason I am asking you is because you say that you were not in the country when Mr Nxiweni was arrested.

MR WASSERMAN: On that occasion I was debriefing informers in Swaziland Mr Chairman.

ADV SIGODI: But why would you be the one to be chosen to kill him, to be given the orders that you must kill him?

MR WASSERMAN: I have no idea on how to even answer that Mr Chairman.

ADV SIGODI: Thank you Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Before my colleague asks questions, did Mr Taylor give you this lime when he told you to eliminate, did he say well, take them outside, eliminate them and sprinkle lime on them?

MR WASSERMAN: He knew of the lime, these occasions here, he actually handed me the packet of lime.

CHAIRPERSON: Did he tell you what to do with it?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes Mr Chairman, he told me to spread it.

CHAIRPERSON: On top of the bodies, after you undressed them?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes sir.

MR MALAN: I wanted to ask this same question, but just from a different angle, clearly the lime wasn't purchased specifically for these events, because the lime was there, it was evening, decisions were made at night. You have no knowledge of anyone going out to buy it specifically for the burying of specific victims that your applications relate to?

MR WASSERMAN: No Mr Chairman, I am not aware of that.

MR MALAN: And the lime was not only available in Pietermaritzburg near Elandskop, it was also available on other farms?

MR WASSERMAN: It was used on the other farm as well Mr Chairman.

MR MALAN: You were involved on more than one occasion, with spreading lime?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes Mr Chairman, they are in the application.

MR MALAN: Yes. And did you form any opinion as to the availability of the lime?

MR WASSERMAN: Personally no, Mr Chairman.

MR MALAN: You can't tell us whether you think even at this stage, whether lime was kept for such occasions or whether it was specifically bought?

MR WASSERMAN: No Mr Chairman, I never ever saw lime laying around, I was just handed it on the occasion. I never saw packets of lime.

MR MALAN: And you have no idea where Taylor got the lime from?

MR WASSERMAN: No sir.

CHAIRPERSON: How big were the packets that you were given? You weren't given a bag of lime, you were given a small packet, not a 50 kg pocket?

MR WASSERMAN: No Mr Chairman, a small packet which you would tear the top off and sprinkle.

MR MALAN: Pre-packed pack?

MR WASSERMAN: No, a small packet sir.

MR MALAN: Yes, but was it pre-packed by the distributor, the manufacturer or whoever would have distributed it?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes Mr Chairman. It was in, it looked like the commercial packaging.

MR MALAN: Commercial packaging?

MR WASSERMAN: Yes sir.

MR MALAN: The other issue that I just want to further pursue is, you gave evidence last week about the elimination of Bhila and your simply being present at the time, that at some later stage you became aware that he was to be eliminated? Is that correct?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Taylor told me at a later stage, yes.

MR MALAN: In this, it really relates to the same question, a group of people involved, I find it extremely difficult to look at the applicants as you have referred to them, as the only people within the so-called inner circle for want of a better word, that you never discussed these incidents with each other, that you wouldn't ask questions, even as to where was the person killed, how was he killed, was he buried or not, where was he buried. You heard the evidence, and this is the line of evidence, that you never spoke of it?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, that is correct. In this kind of job, nobody ever would speak out, it would stay where it was, that is where it was. There was a code of ethics that one wouldn't ask and one wouldn't say.

MR MALAN: Not even amongst co-perpetrators, people planning together, deciding together to kill a person? You wouldn't ask questions of each other?

MR WASSERMAN: No Mr Chairman, if that portion was yours to do, then that was done, and it was left at that Mr Chairman. It was left at that.

MR MALAN: Was there ever such an instruction not to ask questions, not to talk? Did that code of ethic if one could call it such, simply develop out of the blue, did it just dawn upon you or was it agreed, did Taylor or someone tell you listen, no one asks questions, no one speaks?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, I am unable if there was a person specifically there, but it was very evident amongst us all that such a code was there, but nobody specifically ever told me that is how it is.

It just comes in the Special Branch type of activity.

MR MALAN: So, as far as Port Natal is concerned, your involvement with Bhila, was that an induction in a sense, an initiation with the group or not so?

MR WASSERMAN: No, not so Mr Chairman.

MR MALAN: When did you become aware of this code of ethics of not speaking and not asking and not reporting?

MR WASSERMAN: I already knew of that in my previous service Mr Chairman.

MR MALAN: Which was where?

MR WASSERMAN: In the Rhodesian setup Mr Chairman.

MR MALAN: So you had similar experiences there, is that what you are telling us?

MR WASSERMAN: No, not at all Mr Chairman, but in war and in operations, one learns that this ethic is there.

MR MALAN: Not even to discuss with people who went out on the same mission with you?

MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, the details weren't discussed, the result would have been.

MR MALAN: Thank you.

MR VISSER: May I add something Mr Chairman. May I add on the question of the lime.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, I think we were going to talk about the same thing, page 444?

MR VISSER: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: You haven't been told yet, when the body was exhumed, a yellow plastic bag, dolomite agricultural lime, 10 kg was around both feet. Would that be about the size of the bags that you were given?

MR WASSERMAN: That is the size Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. We will adjourn now until 9 o'clock tomorrow morning.

MR VISSER: Can this witness be excused Mr Chairman? As it pleases you Mr Chairman.