CHAIRPERSON: I apologise to counsel and applicants for any inconvenience that may have been caused by our starting a little late. It was unfortunate. It is something that we could not avoid.

We were interviewed by people who were interested in one of the applications that is before us, the victims or rather the relatives of victims in the matter, in an application which unfortunately will not be proceeding because the applicant has passed away and these victims wanted certain clarification as to their rights and we had to explain the position to them. That is what took up the time. I'm sorry about the delay. Can we begin?

MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, we'll begin with the Nietverdient incident, we'll commence with that and we'll commence with the evidence of Charl Naude.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

CHARL NAUDE: (sworn states)

MR WESSELS: Mr Chairman, the application for amnesty appears in bundle 3, on page 2. Mr Chairman, may I just state for the record that my client is a bit hard of hearing and he tells me that he cannot hear Judge Khampepe when she speaks. Perhaps if he have a difficulty he will draw my attention to it and I will ask them to speak louder.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well.

EXAMINATION BY MR WESSELS: Mr Naude, is it correct that you have applied for amnesty and that your amnesty application appears on page and further of the bundle?

MR NAUDE: That's correct.

MR WESSELS: Do you confirm the correctness thereof?

MR NAUDE: Yes.

MR WESSELS: Mr Naude, could you briefly describe your career in the South African Army?

MR NAUDE: I joined the Army Gymnasium. I spent two years there, after which I was transferred to the Infantry School where I was an instructor for standing forces. After that I went to the military academy where I became an officer and after that I went to the Parachute Battalion for a while. From the Parachute Battalion I went to Special Forces where I spent the rest of my career for 15 years.

MR WESSELS: Is it correct that you left the Army as a Colonel?

MR NAUDE: Yes, that's correct.

MR WESSELS: Is it also correct that during your career in the Defence Force, and specifically when you were with Special Forces, you participated in 141 contacts?

MR NAUDE: That's correct.

MR WESSELS: And during these contacts there was fire?

MR NAUDE: That's correct.

MR WESSELS: In other words, where there was shooting upon each other?

MR NAUDE: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: Is it true that you were discharged with honourable service for performance in operational areas?

MR NAUDE: Yes, that's correct.

MR WESSELS: In 1986 you were still a member of Special Forces and you served under General Joubert, is that correct?

MR NAUDE: That's correct.

MR WESSELS: At a stage in 1986, General Joubert called you and Colonel Verster in and made certain statements to you.

MR NAUDE: That's correct.

MR WESSELS: What were those statements?

MR NAUDE: He told us that because of the political situation in South Africa, the necessity had arisen that we be divided to SAP units and we had to act in support of the Northern Transvaal Commando and the Wits Commando. I was devolved to the Wits Commando.

MR WESSELS: What would your duties have involved?

MR NAUDE: I was devolved in support, and I should elaborate regarding the command situation at that point. In support of denotes that it was not under the command of the police but that it was in support, which meant that me and the police would make joint decisions about operations and that we would identify targets jointly, although this would take place based upon their information.

MR WESSELS: And with who in the police were you supposed to cooperate?

MR NAUDE: With Brigadier Jack Cronje.

MR WESSELS: And what was the purpose of this co-operation?

MR NAUDE: The point of the co-operation was to combat the onslaught of the enemies of the State. I had certain limitations according to which I was to act. Among others, the General told me that we could only carry out operations which would have a great impact on the enemies onslaught in the State. We had to use minimal violence and we had to maintain absolute secrecy. Furthermore, all operations were to take place in co-operation with the SAP.

MR WESSELS: Is it correct that during June 1986, Cronje approached you with certain bits of information and certain proposals were made for action?

ADV DE JAGER: I beg your pardon, could you please repeat the limitations which you have just given or Mr Wessels could repeat it? I couldn't follow all of them unfortunately. I couldn't write them all down.

MR NAUDE: The first one was that it was to be operations which would make an impact on the enemy's situation at that point, minimal violence was to be applied.

MR WESSELS: What is meant by the application of minimal violence?

ADV DE JAGER: If we could just deal with the previous question. Impact on enemies?

MR NAUDE: Okay. Then the application of minimal violence, absolute secrecy and all operations would be carried out in co-operation with the SAP.

MR WESSELS: What does the concept of minimal violence involve?

MR NAUDE: Minimal violence in my mind was that we should rather take out one leader instead of eliminating hundreds of soldiers.

MR WESSELS: Very well. What was the proposal and information which Cronje provided to you during June 1986?

MR NAUDE: Chairperson, the first meeting that we held I asked the question what are we going to do next and we tabled a number of proposals. Among others, it was put to me that streams of people were going out for instant training and re-training and permanent training.

ADV DE JAGER: Thank you, Mr Naude. Could you please give assistance to us, approximately when did this meeting take place, and who attended it?

MR NAUDE: It was a meeting between myself and Brigadier Jack Cronje. This was approximately a month before - I can't recall the exact date, but it was a brief period of time before the Nietverdient incident.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: When you say it was a month before the Nietverdient incident, we know that the incident occurred in June and according to the evidence of General Joubert the co-operation or the implementation of his plan also occurred in June.

MR NAUDE: Very well, I could put it like this. It took place shortly after the General had given me the order. It was the very first meeting which I had held with Cronje. I can't recall the exact date, but it was definitely still in June.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: I just needed to have that corrected because it would have actually thrown your approximation completely out of sync with the evidence of General Joubert.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, do carry on.

MR WESSELS: Mr Naude, what else happened during that meeting?

MR NAUDE: We decided what the sequence of events would be from that day forward. It was the first planning that took place and Brigadier Cronje said that streams of people were leaving the country for instant training, and to tell the truth, he told me that there were people who were wanting to leave at that time for instant training. He told me that he also had a very well placed source who knew exactly which people wanted to go and so forth.

The Ribeiro couple were also involved in this meeting. Many other operations and possible targets were proposed, of which I decided not to execute because it did not fall within the limitations given to me by the General, namely that minimal violence was to applied. It wouldn't have helped to eliminate very low enemy status soldiers.

Furthermore, we decided that the best target at that stage would be the people who were going for instant training. During the meeting which was held with General Joubert, he also pointed out to us that this was one of the problem areas within the RSA. I would like to tell the Committee that we did not act internally, so we were not aware of precisely what the Intelligence situation was in South Africa, all we knew was what we read in the newspapers. The fact of the matter is that we regarded the departure of people as a target.

We then planned an operation. I reported back to the General. I think that we should also make a distinction here between what the General's evidence was and the fact that he said that they decided on a high level that instant training or the cessation of instant training would have a certain influence on the security situation in the Mamelodi, Northern Transvaal area.

They also said that this would serve as a deterring mechanism. But that was on a very high level and this was on a specific operation which we were planning. We didn't necessarily envisage the same impact of this operation as they had seen it from their high level.

We proceeded and planned the operation. I reported back to the General and said that the operation would take place more-or-less as follows; that the people who were led by the police source who had been approached by the local population to go out for instant training, would then be taken to a certain point. At that point we would take them out of the vehicle, we would drug them after which we would make it appear as if an accident had taken place. The General agreed with that.

We went ahead with the planning of the operation. The General also gave me the authorisation to use drugs. Seeing as these drugs would have a scheduling status, I had to get authorisation from the General in order to obtain these substances from the physician.

There were approximately 15 doctors in Special Forces at that stage and I gave my medical ordinance the order to withdraw the medicine, seeing as he was trained to know exactly how the dosages were to be applied and how much was to be injected and where it was supposed to be injected.

Later I asked him ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: Could you please go a little bit slow, we are struggling to keep up with you.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Will you kindly repeat what you said about what you stated to the medical ordinand? I couldn't take all that down, you were too fast.

CHAIRPERSON: And while you are about it, if you can we would like you to give us the name of this medical ordinand.

MR NAUDE: The name of medical ordinand was Dave Tippet and he was to go to the physicians and fetch the medicine.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: You may proceed, Mr Naude.

MR NAUDE: Very well. We went to a predetermined place in the Western Transvaal, and there I met Cronje and Rudi Crause of the SAP. We reconnoitred a place where this operation could take place, the first meeting with the kombi full of activists. And then we also ...(intervention)

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: When you say "we", you are talking about yourself and who else?

CHAIRPERSON: Cronje.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Cronje?

MR NAUDE: We're talking about Cronje, Crause and myself.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Thank you.

ADV DE JAGER: I beg your pardon, I think there is a measure of confusion. You said that you drove to Western Transvaal where you met Cronje and Rudi Crause there. Did you with them or did you meet them there?

MR NAUDE: No, I met them there. I actually meant that I drove to Zeerust and met them there.

We did a reconnaissance of the exact place where we wanted this meeting to take place, and we also reconnoitred a place where we would stage the so-called accident.

After that we spent quite some time waiting. The operation would take place on that specific evening. Eventually the vehicle approached and we surrounded it, we took the passengers out of the vehicle and injected them with the drugs.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Naude, you must please give us the details, then we don't have to ask you for the details. When you say that you surrounded it, it denotes more than one person, more than yourself.

MR NAUDE: Yes, I wanted to say that the layout of the operation there was as follows: It was Major Derek Vorster, who was part of the early warning group at the entrance of the farm, who would give us early warning if there was any kind of external influence coming in such as a farmer passing by he would give us prior warning. Then it was me and Tippet and another person who I cannot remember at this point, I can't remember his name. It was either somebody from the Security Branch who assisted us, but I do know that there was a third person, however we could not make out who this third person was. We removed the passengers from the vehicle and injected them with this drug.

MR WESSELS: Was every person injected individually?

MR NAUDE: Yes, every person was injected individually.

MR WESSELS: And what was done with them after that?

MR NAUDE: From there on ...(intervention)

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Who administered the injection?

MR NAUDE: I administered the injection.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Without the assistance of Mr Tippet?

MR NAUDE: He also assisted, but he filled up the syringes and I administered the injection.

MR LAX: You are free to respond to my questions in Afrikaans.

MR NAUDE: The people were reloaded into the vehicle, and after that phase 2 of the operation followed, which involved the departure to the place where the accident was to take place.

ADV DE JAGER: Can you please provide some more particulars regarding that? You have injected the people, they have been reloaded, were they already in a coma so to speak or had they reacted to the injections, how did they react, what were the results?

MR NAUDE: The people didn't react immediately, they were able to re-embark onto the vehicle themselves. After 12 years I can't remember exactly how long it took, but they were already in the vehicle and a short while after that they had fallen asleep and they appeared to be unconscious to me.

CHAIRPERSON: Let's just understand this. Were they fully conscious when you commenced to inject them or were they already partly unconscious?

MR NAUDE: No, they were completely conscious when we injected them. After they had come back into the vehicle, after they had been reloaded into the vehicle, they became unconscious.

CHAIRPERSON: So did they volunteer, did they come out of the vehicle and voluntarily submit themselves to the injection?

MR NAUDE: They were detained with firearms, they didn't have a choice.

CHAIRPERSON: So they were forced out of the vehicle?

MR NAUDE: Yes, they were told to climb out, but under duress or in detention.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Before we lose this point, how long would you estimate that it took for you to administer those injections?

MR NAUDE: It probably took approximately 15 minutes, perhaps even shorter.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: And immediately after injecting each of these young persons, were they then instructed to go back to the vehicle?

MR NAUDE: It occurred right next to the vehicle. Before we injected - as we were injecting every person they were told to climb back into the vehicle.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: So you would be unable to say whether the drug had taken any effect by the time they were told to go back to the vehicle?

MR NAUDE: I think it had already had an effect on them at that stage, but they were still able to move independently, they could climb back into the vehicle themselves and sit down themselves, but shortly after that one by one they all became unconscious.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: You may proceed, Mr Naude.

MR NAUDE: From there on phase 2 of the operation began, where Rudi Crause of the Security Police led us to the point which we had reconnoitred beforehand, because he knew the road to the place where we were going to make the so-called accident happen.

MR WESSELS: How did he lead you?

MR NAUDE: He drover in a separate vehicle which drove ahead in the procession. Major Derek Vorster climbed into the vehicle which contained the 10 activists. He drove that vehicle and followed us on the road to that specific point.

MR WESSELS: Were you in the front vehicle?

MR NAUDE: Yes, I was in the front vehicle.

ADV DE JAGER: At that stage the vehicle had arrived driven by a member of the Security Police, is that correct?

MR NAUDE: Yes, that's correct.

ADV DE JAGER: Do you know who the driver was?

MR NAUDE: Later I heard that it was Mamasela, but I didn't know that at that stage.

ADV DE JAGER: Was he the only member of the Security Police who was present when the injections were administered?

MR NAUDE: As far as I know. As I've said, apart from the one person of whom we weren't sure who he was, I would say that the Security Police were sheltering in the bushes approximately 50 to 100 metres away from there and that was all of the Security Police. There was Mr Cronje and Loots and Crause who were the people from the Security Police whom I know that were present there.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: I think you may proceed, Mr Wessels.

MR WESSELS: Thank you. Mr Naude, we have a vehicle in which the police and yourself were, followed by the kombi which was being driven by Vorster, were you in radio contact with one another?

MR NAUDE: I can't remember whether or not we had radios at that stage. I think they maintained a following distance of about 500 metres from us. I can't remember whether or not we had radio contact.

MR WESSELS: What happened next?

MR NAUDE: When we arrived at the given place, Vorster drove the vehicle into a ditch and into a tree, he threw petrol in the vehicle. I omitted to say that in order to make the whole situation look realistic, we also had a limpet mine and an AK47 which we placed in the vehicle. He then set the vehicle alight.

MR WESSELS: Is it correct that the purpose was to make it appear as if this mini-bus had left the road, been involved in an accident and then burnt out?

MR NAUDE: Yes, that's correct.

MR WESSELS: What happened next?

MR NAUDE: After Vorster had completed this he walked along the side of the road so as not to leave any tracks and he climbed into the vehicle with us, we drove back to the place where we had administered the drugs and everyone climbed into his own vehicle and drove back to their respective units.

ADV DE JAGER: Let's just achieve some clarity of this. There's petrol in the vehicle, it was set alight and a limpet mine was placed in the vehicle. Did this explode or what happened?

MR NAUDE: It did explode later on as a result of the heat. Everyone refers to the vehicle as exploding but in actuality it didn't really explode, it was set on fire.

MR WESSELS: The drug which was applied, what was the purpose behind that?

MR NAUDE: The purpose behind the drug was firstly to calm the people down as quickly as possible and secondly, we would be able to keep the people in the vehicle while the accident was being staged. We also debated at length and felt that it would be the most humanitarian way in which to execute this operation seeing as any other method was not acceptable to us.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Mr Naude, let me understand you. The purpose of administering this drug was to calm the young persons down, and you say as quickly as possible, had you been advised by whoever provided you with the drug how long it would take for them to be calmed down, on administration of that drug?

MR NAUDE: As far as I can remember they just said quickly, they didn't tell me specifically how long it would take but they did tell me that they would be drugged very speedily.

ADV DE JAGER: You're speaking of calming people, was the idea to calm them down or to render them unconscious?

MR NAUDE: No, the purpose was to render them unconscious.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: But that what you've just stated just now, was that an error? That's how it was translated to me:

MR NAUDE: By nature of the situation the drug had a calming effect which would take place very quickly. After that however, it went over into unconsciousness.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: But what was the read purpose of administering the drug, to calm or to render the young activists unconscious?

MR NAUDE: It was to render the unconscious.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: The second reason you gave was that the intention was to keep them in the vehicle whilst you were staging the accident, what do you mean by that?

ADV DE JAGER: ...(indistinct)

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Yes. The second reason you have given was that the drug was administered to the young persons in order to keep them inside the vehicle whilst you were staging the accident, what do you mean by that?

MR NAUDE: The objective behind the administering of the drug was dual, firstly we felt that the most humanitarian way in which to carry out the operation and secondly, it was also to ensure the passengers would remain seated in the vehicle and not resist and so forth, while the accident was being staged.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Did you expect them to be able to run out of the vehicle, to be able to open the doors? Is that what you are saying?

MR NAUDE: Sorry, I couldn't hear that one.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, may I be of assistance? Some of the people don't know how these things work and nobody ever thinks of explaining to the witnesses how they work. Perhaps if Piet could just tell him, channel 2 or whatever, Mr Chairman, there will be no problem.

MR WESSELS: Well it's just that the witness is hard of hearing and he has a difficulty hearing you.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Yes, you have actually apprised me thereof. I'm trying to be as loud as I can.

You stated that the reason why you administered the drug was also to keep them inside the vehicle, to prevent them from leaving the vehicle whilst you were staging the accident. Did you envisage a situation wherein they would be able to come out of the vehicle?

MR NAUDE: You know, obviously if we want to stage an accident they could have jumped out the vehicle or attacked the driver, then we would have had to shoot them or something, so that was the secondary reason why we wanted to calm them down.

CHAIRPERSON: To make them unconscious in fact.

MR NAUDE: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: You were satisfied that once they were unconscious they wouldn't be able to get out of the vehicle.

MR NAUDE: That's right, Chairman.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Yes, you may proceed.

MR NAUDE: From there I drove back to Pretoria and the following morning I reported back to General Joubert and informed him that the operation had taken place and that there should not be any problems if everything had gone according to plan.

At this stage I would like to explain exactly where the misunderstanding occurred with General Joubert having the idea that we would have spike the beer with the drugs beforehand. It is obvious that some of these people might not have wanted to drink beer, and that is the reason why we decided against the beer plan and moved over to the idea with the injections.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Had that idea ever been canvassed with General Joubert? - the idea of spiking their beer?

MR NAUDE: I heard whether or not I was supposed to clear it with him?

MR WESSELS: I think the witness didn't quite hear your question. May I just repeat it to the witness?

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Yes, yes. Are you explaining, Mr Wessels, or do you want me to repeat myself?

MR WESSELS: Perhaps if you could repeat the question.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: When you spoke to General Joubert and advised him of the plan that you jointly devised with Brigadier Cronje of the Security Police, did you canvass the idea that you would spike their drinks with a drug that you wanted him to authorise you to give?

MR NAUDE: I'm very sorry, but once again I could not hear the question.

ADV DE JAGER: I think there may be a confusion about him speaking to Cronje and what he reported to Naude.

Did you and Cronje devise the plan together with regard to the administering of a drug?

MR NAUDE: Yes, we devised the plan together.

ADV DE JAGER: So what was your plan before you went to General Joubert?

MR NAUDE: The plan was that Mamasela was their guide and that he would place a crate of beer which was spiked with drugs in the kombi, which he would give to them at a certain time and then they would fall asleep and they would be asleep upon their arrival at us, but we realised that some people might not want to drink beer and that is why we left that plan and decided to inject the activists on the spot.

ADV DE JAGER: Is it true that you told Joubert that the beer would be spiked with drugs, when you explained the plan to him?

MR NAUDE: Yes, that's why we have this misunderstanding.

ADV DE JAGER: Only after you had discussed the plan with him did you amend the plan?

MR NAUDE: Yes, that's correct. After we did that we amended the plan.

ADV DE JAGER: Thank you.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Can I understand you properly on that aspect, it's been worrying me. You never discussed with Joubert your intention of administering the drug to the activists.

CHAIRPERSON: You mean injecting.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Injecting.

MR NAUDE: No, I never discussed it with him.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: So Joubert was under the impression that only the beer would be spiked with the drug that you authorised him to give, that you requested him to authorise?

MR NAUDE: As a matter of fact the doctor pointed out that the drug administered in beer won't work so well, so he said that the injection would work better. And that is the point where the change in the plan came.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Now you requested General Joubert to give you permission to obtain a drug, is that not so?

MR NAUDE: That is right.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: What kind of a drug was it?

MR NAUDE: I did not know what type of drug it was at that stage, we would find out from the doctor which was the best drug to be administered.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: And his understanding was that that was the drug that would be used and to be put inside the beer, was that Joubert's understanding at that stage when you were having that discussion?

MR NAUDE: I think we had a wider request than that. We said that we were looking for a drug whereby we could drug the people before the time, before they reached the place. And when we spoke to the doctor he told us that the beer would not work, we should rather use an injection and he gave us some syringes. Excuse me, I might be wrong, I did not personally speak to the doctor, the medical ordinand spoke to the doctor and that is the feedback that he gave to me, that we could not use the beer because some people might drink more or less and so we would have no control over the intake of the drug, it would be better to administer it by injection and then we would know how much everyone would get and we would have control over how everyone would get.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: So that information was never relayed to General Joubert?

MR NAUDE: No, I did not discuss it again with General Joubert because, as he said in his evidence, he was busy and I already had the authorisation to use these drugs. I did not think of going back to him and telling him that we would not be using beer but injections.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Thank you, Mr Wessels, you may proceed.

MR NAUDE: I returned to General Joubert and reported to him that the operation had been successful.

MR WESSELS: I have no further questions, thank you Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, are you involved in this?

MR VISSER: Yes, indeed, Mr Chairman. Do you want me to start?

CHAIRPERSON: Well you might as well start.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: You have never shown much hesitation in the past.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Commandant, I appear for Brigadier ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: I think he retired as Colonel.

MR NAUDE: Some people have called me General so I don't mind.

MR VISSER: May I call you Mr Naude to avoid confusion?

Mr Naude, I appear for Brigadier Wikus Loots and Colonel Rudi Crause. I know it was a long time ago and one's memory is not so good, just by means of a few questions could we get as close to the truth as possible because Crause and Loots' memories are just not as good. It was a long time ago and one tries to forget these things.

MR NAUDE: That is so for sure, Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: By the way that was the first thing that I wanted to ask you. During this action, Mr Naude, what was your emotional state while you were injecting these 10 persons who had to be killed later?

MR NAUDE: Chairperson, I would just like to say that this was outside the nature of our actions. We were soldiers where the enemy was some distance from you and we shot at each other and once we've done the shooting we would treat each other's wounds and the war would be over for that moment. In this instance it was a difficult operation.

What I omitted to say was that afterwards I went to the General and said that I do not want to continue with this type of operation because I felt that I had placed a great responsibility on my men and it was not in our nature to execute such operations. And the secrecy which he gave to me or which he placed as a limitation I could not maintain because there were so many people involved in this operation.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Naude. Mr Crause says, or he will give evidence - and you can say if this is correct according to your memory, that Brigadier Cronje and yourself arrived at his office in Zeerust the day before the incident or the day of the incident and that you informed him there that you were looking for a place where this incident could take place. Is that correct or do you recall it differently?

MR NAUDE: It's probably correct. I cannot recall exactly whether we met at his office, but the fact of the matter is we arranged a meeting but whether it was in a hotel or in his office I cannot recall.

MR VISSER: That is in order. The evidence of Mr Crause will be the same as yours, that he was asked because of his knowledge of the area, to identity a place that he went and indeed he identified such a place. The evidence of the two gentlemen would concur with your evidence as to what happened that evening where the injections were administered. The evidence looks the same. There is just one aspect which you might have forgotten or which you do not agree with. The Honourable Chairperson asked you if these persons, when you injected them, were fully conscious, do you remember the question?

MR NAUDE: That is true.

MR VISSER: But there is evidence, I'm not entirely sure, I have not found it, but I think it was Brigadier Cronje that had said that by the time the people arrived at the farm they were under the influence of alcohol, somebody said it, can you comment on that? In other words, that their consciousness or their minds had been touched by alcohol by the time when these injections were administered.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, perhaps I can be of assistance to my learned friend. You will find that evidence on page 5. And I'm interrupting here because I wanted to ask that question, and if I can deal with it through Mr Visser's questions then I won't waste your time. The evidence there of Brigadier Cronje, was ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: Page?

MR DU PLESSIS: Page 5.

ADV DE JAGER: Bundle?

MR DU PLESSIS: Of bundle 2(c). Page 5, bundle 2(c). The evidence there, perhaps I can just read it to you. He testified, that's the fourth line from the top:

The rest is irrelevant. And then further on he testifies:

MR VISSER: I'm indebted to my learned friend. That is where I remember it from. Do you have any comment? Do you recall this, because it seems that this is connected with the question that the Chairperson asked you.

MR NAUDE: The persons smelt of drink, but I cannot confirm here that these people were under the influence of alcohol. This was 12 years back and I do not know if they were strongly under the influence of alcohol.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.

MR GROBLER: Mr Chairman, it seems that I should then be the next person to ask questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Please do.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR GROBLER: Maybe I should follow the position of Mr Visser and address you as Mr Naude.

I would put a few statements to you and I will put an abridged to you which I will argue. Your position was that of a soldier, you were trained as a soldier, you executed orders, you do not question these orders, you just follow them. Would that be a correct statement?

MR NAUDE: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR GROBLER: When you were devolved to the Northern Transvaal area, was this according to a plan where you would be in support of the South African Police?

MR NAUDE: That is correct.

MR GROBLER: And at the stage when you had been devolved, at that stage did you realise that this plan would entail individual persons would identified as targets and eliminated? And I mean elimination in the form of killing. Did you realise that then?

MR NAUDE: Yes, I did.

MR GROBLER: I'd just like to go a bit further with regards to information. If one works with the totality of the evidence there is information that has to be gathered before any operation can be executed. You touched on it and I think you said that Special Forces at that stage had no internal activity or did not execute activities within the country, is that correct?

MR NAUDE: That is correct.

MR GROBLER: Would it also be correct to say that Special Forces did not really have an internal intelligence wing, if I could put it that way?

MR NAUDE: That is correct.

MR GROBLER: If you had had any internal intelligence, it would be because the so-called pipeline of intelligence was followed from outside the country into the country and where Special Forces gathered information as to where what happened internally and they gave it to the police, actually the Security Police, whose task it was to hand the internal problems.

MR NAUDE: The information was followed through our military intelligence channels to the police centre.

MR GROBLER: We've called it the Joubert Plan so far, did you hear Joubert's evidence?

MR NAUDE: That is correct.

MR GROBLER: When the Joubert Plan was implemented and you had been deployed, at the level where you were working would there be discussions about the identification of targets?

MR NAUDE: That is correct.

MR GROBLER: And if a statement would be made that you specifically identified a target, would that statement be correct or would you not agree with it?

MR NAUDE: As I have said in my evidence, we did not know individuals within South Africa, so if I had to identify a target it would be an action for example, people who go out for instant training but not a specific person.

MR GROBLER: Let me put it this way, this relationship between Special Forces and the Commandment and the Security Police - I am visualising this but correct me if I'm wrong, that one primarily has intelligence on the basis of which a target is identified and that information comes from the SAP. Would that ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I thought your question specifically was whether he was in a position to identify targets. That was your question originally, wasn't it?

MR GROBLER: Yes, Mr Chairman, but I thought he had ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: And he said:

MR GROBLER: ... but I thought he had answered that.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR GROBLER: And now I'm dealing with another aspect. I'm sorry if it didn't come across clearly.

CHAIRPERSON: Alright.

MR GROBLER: May I just explain, I just see it from another angle. In the whole set-up as you were working there, one had the intelligence that was used to identify a target. That intelligence was the statement that I put to you as primarily based on South African Police information.

MR NAUDE: That is correct.

MR GROBLER: And then one gets to the following phase where an action has to take place and one needs information to execute that action. I think the correct word to say that it would the tactical intelligence, is that correct?

MR NAUDE: That is correct.

MR GROBLER: The tactical information, how was this gathered?

MR NAUDE: Chairperson, tactical information was gathered by ourselves and the police. Certain things we had to get from them and certain things we would get ourselves. What I could do myself I did myself, what I could not do myself I left to the police.

MR GROBLER: I cannot recall whether you have said it specifically, but you would recall that General Joubert said that a question was put as to whether the police authorised or approved the operation.

MR NAUDE: That is positive, he did ask me.

MR GROBLER: As far as you know, was there a reason why General Joubert would ask that question?

MR NAUDE: It was one of the four limitations he put to us, and he wanted to ensure that we operated within those limitations.

MR GROBLER: Mr Naude, as to the external ...(indistinct), would a person who arrived at the scene have seen 10 people, he would seen a limpet mine, he would have seen an AK47, he would have seen people who had died, I don't if he would have seen any drink, but from the outside he would held the image of an amount of people who (a) could not control themselves, (b) were incompetent and had destroyed themselves, would you agree?

ADV DE JAGER: Why would it not have been an image of a driver who had made an accident, why would this reflect on the passenger that he would be a person who could not control himself or whatever?

MR NAUDE: I would say, Chairperson, that he would have thought that it was someone who had made an accident and at closer inspection he would have come to the conclusion that these people had something to do with the liberation struggle.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes?

MR GROBLER: If you could bear with me, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: May I suggest that you don't have to get him to agree with the evidence of Joubert where that evidence has not been challenged by anybody. Where Joubert gave evidence on matters which were accepted and nobody has challenged it, there is no real need for you to put all of that evidence to him just to get his opinion on it.

MR GROBLER: I accept that, thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: It hasn't been challenged.

MR GROBLER: General, - sorry, there I make the mistake - Mr Naude, yesterday the need-to-know basis was discussed, do you recall that?

MR NAUDE: Yes, I do.

MR GROBLER: When you reported back to General Joubert, did you tell him anything more, other than the fact that the operation was successful?

MR NAUDE: It's difficult to recall exactly what I told him. I think I told him what had happened, but I cannot say under oath that I explained in detail what had happened.

MR GROBLER: But for purposes of the record this was not the type of operation where there would be any written record?

MR NAUDE: No, the less we communicated the better, there had to be absolute secrecy.

MR GROBLER: Thank you, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Is there anybody else who is involved in this evidence who wishes to put questions to this witness, to this applicant?

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, I act on behalf of Brigadier Cronje and Captain Hechter who have already received amnesty for this incident.

CHAIRPERSON: Quite right.

MR DU PLESSIS: I therefore do not want to become embroiled in any of the applications, however I have a duty to put the evidence of my client which has already been led before this Committee, insofar as it may be necessary.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Naude, may I just ask you, on page 5 of bundle 2(c), Brigadier Cronje says that the four Special Forces operatives wore balaclavas, can you recall this or not?

MR NAUDE: That's correct, Chairperson, all were wearing balaclavas.

MR DU PLESSIS: Very well. And Brigadier Cronje, on page 4 of the same bundle, says that there was a meeting between yourself and him with regards to the Nietverdiendt incident. Is this the meeting that you referred to in your evidence, that you had with Brigadier Cronje with regards to certain objectives?

MR NAUDE: Chairperson, I'd like to state clearly that there were many meetings and it is impossible at this stage specifically to say which meeting was which meeting. At the first meeting it was decided on the Nietverdiendt 10, but there were repeated meetings after that, sometimes on a daily basis.

MR DU PLESSIS: I have no further questions, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Ms Lockhat, are there any questions you wish to put to this witness?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS LOCKHAT: Mr Naude, on page of Jack Cronje's evidence in bundle 2(c), it was said that the kombi with the trainee was pushed down an incline and the kombi was filled with explosives that had blown up, nowhere did they say it was pushed into a tree or whatever. What is your submission on that?

MR NAUDE: The evidence is also right there because it was an incline but on the other side of the river there was a tree, and it went through the river into the tree.

MS LOCKHAT: Can you just tell us, basically how many meetings would you normally have in Special Forces? Would it be once a month, would it be once a day, basically what, how would you communicate with one another?

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Before he can answer, do you mean ...(intervention)

MS LOCKHAT: Just generally, relating to Special Forces incidents.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Do you mean a meeting between him and his General, General Joubert?

MS LOCKHAT: General Joubert, yes that would be one.

MR NAUDE: We had meetings, Mr Chairperson, as and when required. Sometimes the frequency of meetings was high and sometimes it was very low. Sometimes in two or three months I never spoke to the General, but sometimes we virtually saw each other every day and sometimes twice or three times a day.

MS LOCKHAT: Tell me, is it correct that Special Forces had a kind of a bible in a sense, where all the matters were set down, all the incidents, and people that you were going to eliminate or targets were actually included in that, is that correct?

MR NAUDE: Not as far as I know. I know nothing about that.

MS LOCKHAT: Tell me, what were the functions of Special Forces?

MR NAUDE: The function of Special Forces is to carry out special operations which not any of the other units are capable of doing, due to their special training and parachute jumping, deep-sea diving etc.

MS LOCKHAT: Would you also say that Special Forces functions were actually to eliminate and kill?

MR NAUDE: Yes, for sure, Mr Chairperson.

MS LOCKHAT: Excuse me, I didn't hear that?

MR NAUDE: That is definitely so, that was the purpose of Special Forces, to kill people.

MS LOCKHAT: So when you talk about this minimal force that you'd actually used regarding these 10 soldiers, would you say that it was just another way of just getting rid of people and that this minimal strategy of yours was really not of essence?

MR NAUDE: When one is in a fight or a normal war situation, the minimal force is not applicable but the General told us that minimal force was to be used because this was an urban operation where one could not just walk in and use a mortar attack in Mamelodi, that is not minimal force. But where one has to kill as little people as possible to have maximum effect, that is the purpose of minimal force.

MS LOCKHAT: Tell me, what was the role of Loots in this incident?

MR NAUDE: Chairperson, I'm not sure. I think Mr Loots was involved because he was the commander of Crause and Crause did not work on his own without his commander's knowledge, but he did not play a key function in this operation.

MR VISSER: I will confirm, Mr Chairman, that will basically be the evidence of Loots and Crause.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MS LOCKHAT: Thank you, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much. Oh, I'm sorry.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VAN DEN BERG: Thank you, Chairperson, I'm indebted.

What information did you have in respect of the identities of the individual persons who were killed? Did you know names, ages?

MR NAUDE: I had no intelligence with regards to these people. The first time that - right up until today, I think I saw the people's names in the paper for the first a week ago. I saw them for the first time when they arrived at the scene. I had no idea what they would look like or how old they were.

MR VAN DEN BERG: The evidence at the previous hearings, and that's contained on page 13 of bundle 3(c), gives their names as well as their ages. Can you recollect, when you took them out of the vehicle, as to how old some of these people were?

MR NAUDE: Some of the persons were young, I can recall but I cannot specifically remember. I would have judged it was - it's difficult for me to judge black people's age, but I would have said between 17 and 25.

MR VAN DEN BERG: The evidence is that for example, Abraham Makualani was 17 years old at the time and Samuel Masilela was 16 years old and Sipho Philip Sibanyoni was 15 years old.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, may I perhaps just come in here. You will recall that there was quite a dispute at the hearing of this matter, about the ages of these victims. You will also recall that there wasn't evidence led, the information was provided by my learned friend and Mr Currin, and there was a question of birth certificates which would have been provided and which weren't eventually all available. But at the end of the day there was some confusion about the ages and some of the post-mortems indicated some of the persons as having been up to 40 years old. I just want to make that point. If my learned ask a question and says there was evidence, that is not the case.

CHAIRPERSON: Well now I think that, is it really material because this witness tells you that he can only guess that some of them may have been 17 years old and some older. How much clearer can he get?

MR VAN DEN BERG: I'll leave it at that point, thank you, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VAN DEN BERG: The message that was to be sent back to the townships to other prospective soldiers was that this was a dangerous thing to embark upon, if I understood your evidence correctly.

MR NAUDE: I don't ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: When you say that this was a message, I don't think it was intended that somebody was going to carry a message to the people. As I understand the evidence it wasn't that way. What he really means is that news of this event would reach the township and that in itself would convey to the young people in the township that it is not safe to do what they were planning to do.

MR VAN DEN BERG: You've phrased it far better than I have, thank you, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Do you want to react to the question as reformulated for me by the Chairperson?

MR NAUDE: I don't think there was - due to the fact that we wanted it to look like an accident, we didn't want a direct message, we couldn't send a direct message back to the township. But the point it, eventually these people will go missing and eventually the news would get through that, and it will have an effect later on, but it wasn't a direct purpose.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Would that explain why the vehicle was set alight? Because for many of the victims, up until the stage when the Cronje applications were launched, it was unclear to them what had become of their next of kin. The bodies apparently were very badly burnt and in many cases, if not all, the identification was impossible.

MR NAUDE: That was the reason, yes, Mr Chairperson.

MR VAN DEN BERG: What was the role of Captain Hechter in this operation?

MR NAUDE: Mr Chairperson, Captain Hechter, as I saw him, was second in command of this operation on the SAP's side and in this operation I cannot think that he would have played such a tremendous role. I remember that he attended some of the meetings but he certainly didn't play such a big role.

MR VAN DEN BERG: The information that you received was that these people were fighters, "vegters", soos dit in joy aansoek staan, that were going for further training. If I can refer you to your application, page 3 of the bundle and the response under paragraph - it's headed;

and then paragraph (a)(iv):

MR NAUDE: Yes, I see that.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Was that the information that was conveyed to you by the police?

MR NAUDE: Chairperson, that was the information which we had.

MR VAN DEN BERG: And you conveyed that information to General Joubert, that they were fighters who were going for further training in a sort of an instant training ...(intervention)

MR NAUDE: Might I just interrupt at this point? The word is "activist", not "fighter".

MR VAN DEN BERG: The word "vegters" is used in General Joubert's application and I'm just checking whether his source of information was this particular witness, Mr Chairperson.

MR NAUDE: Yes, I did inform General Joubert accordingly.

MR VAN DEN BERG: And that was for some form of instant training, if I understand his evidence correctly?

MR NAUDE: Yes, at that stage people would leave on a Friday and return on a Sunday and complete certain phases of training on that weekend. They would then complete the rest of the training on a following weekend, so that they would not have to defect, that they could carry on with their work on a Monday, they wouldn't go missing. This meant that they would be able to undergo training under cover and not create any suspicion with the police.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Is this type of training something, according to the information that you were given, which occurred regularly?

MR NAUDE: According to my information this took place every weekend, sometimes during the week, but mostly on the weekends they would depart for such training.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Now this evidence in terms of a "kits opleiding", was never led by Brigadier Cronje or by Captain Hechter. Their evidence as I recollect it was that these were people that were going out of the country for military training. Do you want to comment on that difference?

MR NAUDE: It may be that he thought so, but the fact of the matter remains that I was under the impression that they were going for retraining, that they had already received training on an earlier stage. Perhaps he omitted to say that they had already been trained. But the fact of the matter remains that that is what I knew.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Based on the information that you had been told by Brigadier Cronje?

MR NAUDE: Chairperson, yes, that is the information which emerged at this joint meeting. I can't say with certainty at the moment that it was Brigadier Cronje who had said it or whether it was Hechter or one of his other people, but the fact remains that during this meeting this information became available to me.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Was Brigadier Cronje present at that meeting?

MR NAUDE: I suspect that he was present. We held a great number of meetings and I think that he was present. If I can remember this after 12 years I would say that he was present.

MR VAN DEN BERG: When the kombi was stopped at the point at which you surrounded it and removed the occupants and injected them, was there any resistance offered?

MR NAUDE: No, none whatsoever.

MR VAN DEN BERG: It must have been obvious to those persons that they were now in some serious difficulty, surrounded by a group of heavily armed men wearing balaclavas, you say that there was no resistance offered whatsoever, none of them made a run for it?

MR NAUDE: There was no resistance whatsoever. Chairperson, with a kombi you can only exit from one door and we were standing there, there was no resistance whatsoever.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Now the injections were given for purposes of reducing the level of resistance and to make, if I understood you correctly, to make the killing more humane. Did I understand you correctly?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, he said that, to make them unconscious.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Mr Chairman, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: ... those who were doing the killing.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Thank you, Mr Chairperson. Finally Mr Naude, some of the mothers of the people who died in that incident have been to the scene of where the "accident" took place, and they say that it doesn't resemble that which you've described, they say that there is no incline or anything like that, that it's a flat area. Can you comment on that?

MR NAUDE: Chairperson, the first thing that I would like to say is that I was in the front vehicle which was driving approximately 300 metres ahead and there was definitely a stream that crossed the road and we drove the mini-bus down the embankment of the stream into a tree on the other side. I can't say exactly what happened because I was driving in the front vehicle which was 300 metres ahead. I'm almost certain that this question can be answered by Mr Derek Vorster who was on the scene.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Thank you, Mr Chairperson, I have no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Before I adjourn, is there likely to be any re-examination of this witness?

MR WESSELS: No, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much, you may stand down. We will taken an adjournment and resume in 15 minutes.

CHAIRPERSON: ... applicant come back again, a member of the Committee wishes to clear up on or two points with him.

MR WESSELS: He is present, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, you're still under your former oath.

CHARL NAUDE: Mr Naude, I just wanted to get clarity on one issue and that relates to the plan with regard to the manner in which the elimination of the young activist was to be carried out. Brigadier Cronje has already in his evidence alluded to the meeting that you and him had, wherein you were advised that Mr Mamasela had infiltrated the young activists who intended to undergo military training in Botswana. What I want to find out from you is whether the manner in which the elimination was to be executed was planned at that meeting?

MR NAUDE: Chairperson, no, I don't think that the detailed plan had already been devised by then because that was the first meeting. I think we then went back

and somewhat later, approximately a day or two later, we decided to devise a plan.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: When you refer to the "we", are you referring to yourself and Brigadier Cronje?

MR NAUDE: That's correct, I'm referring to the Security Branch by name, Brigadier Cronje and myself.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: And are you saying therefore that the notion of blowing up the kombi as part of the execution of the operation was known to Brigadier Cronje?

MR NAUDE: I'm very sorry, could you just repeat that please, Chairperson?

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Was the notion of blowing up the kombi as part of the execution of the operation known to Brigadier Cronje?

MR NAUDE: I think he - you know I don't think he was informed in too much detail as to exactly what is going to happen on site, I think what happened there is that he thought that the kombi was blown up but it was in fact set alight and it exploded later due to the fact that the limpet mine was put in the vehicle.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: But was he aware of how the operation was going to be executed?

MR NAUDE: I would assume that, yes.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: And if he says that he was not aware of the details of how the operation was to be executed, what would be your response to that?

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Could you just repeat that again?

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: In his evidence it would seem that he did not know of how the operation was to be executed, that's his evidence.

MR NAUDE: I really don't know whether he knew about it or not. I assume he knew that because he was there that night, so you know it's very difficult for me to understand that.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: I'm not talking about him being present at the scene of the accident, I am talking about knowing the plan and the manner in which the operation was to be executed.

MR NAUDE: Yes, I must say that he must have known. You know the police came, the vehicle came to a pre-arranged "AW", then he knew about the plan. He must have known otherwise the kombi wouldn't have arrived at the prearranged place.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Yes. In your earlier evidence you stated that you jointly devised the plan of eliminating the activists.

MR NAUDE: Yes.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: And that plan would have entailed the manner in which the elimination would be carried out.

MR NAUDE: Yes.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Which would then include the putting of an AK47 inside the vehicle.

MR NAUDE: Yes. I must say that I'm not exactly sure that we've decided that on the meeting, I think I decided that on the last moment, and I can't exactly remember who was present when we decided that, but it is a fact that Brigadier Cronje was aware of how the operation would be executed.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Thank you. Thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thanks very much.

MR NAUDE: Chairperson, I would just like to make a final remark. I would like to tell General Joubert, in times when Generals don't wish to know us, I would like to thank him for standing by us. The other Generals gave orders but forgot very quickly that they were involved, and I would like to thank him in front of this Committee.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible) that is recorded.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes? Where do we proceed from there?

MS LOCKHAT: We will proceed with the applicant D J Vorster.

MR WESSELS: Mr Chairman, the application of Mr Vorster appears on page 33 of bundle 3.

DEREK J VORSTER: (sworn states)

MR WESSELS: Mr Chairman, the witness will give his evidence in English.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well. Did I hear you say page 33?

MR WESSELS: 33, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

EXAMINATION BY MR WESSELS: Mr Vorster, is it correct that you retired from the South African Defence Force as a Major?

MR VORSTER: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: Can you just briefly sketch your history as a soldier?

MR VORSTER: Yes. I joined the - I was called up for National Service in 1976, the beginning of 1977 I joined the Permanent Force, in the same year I underwent selection training for Special Forces, and I was with Special Forces until I left the forces in 1988.

MR WESSELS: Is it correct that during 1986, you were working under the command of at that stage, Commandant Naude?

MR VORSTER: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: Is it further correct that at some stage during the course of that year he called you in and told you that your group had to work with the police in combating the onslaught against the country, is that correct?

MR VORSTER: That's correct.

MR WESSELS: And at some stage he came to you and he said that there was certain plan wherein certain activists were going to be executed?

MR VORSTER: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: Can you tell us in more detail what was told to you and what happened thereafter?

MR VORSTER: Okay. Firstly, Commandant Naude came to me and said that - I was part of the group that was allocated to the Northern Province Command, and he said an operation had been identified and he briefly explained to me that there was a number of activists that were going out to Botswana to receive retraining, specifically training in limpet mines, and that we were to intercept this group and eliminate them.

MR WESSELS: Yes, what were your duties?

MR VORSTER: Firstly my duty was, at the initial farm which was the rendezvous point where the police informer would have brought the activists, at that stage I was to be an early warning group to make sure that no civilians or unauthorised people entered a specific road while the activists were being injected. Thereafter, my task would have been to take the kombi to a spot which would be pointed out to me and to stage an accident and burn the vehicle, including the occupants.

MR WESSELS: Right, on this particular day, what did you do?

MR VORSTER: On this specific day, if I recall correctly, I left Pretoria some time after dark. I was told of a specific point on a farm where the rendezvous would take place. I arrived there and at this specific rendezvous point I met Commandant Naude as well as Sergeant-Major Tippet and various members of the Security Police.

MR WESSELS: Yes, and then? Proceed.

MR VORSTER: Okay. At that time, if I recall correctly, it was early evening, in the region of 9 o'clock or half past nine. Between Commandant Naude and myself we just discussed exactly where I'd put the - I'd be the early warning group. We stood around waiting for this mini-bus. The bus was late. I think the driver was told to be there by a specific time and he arrived about an hour or an hour and a half later than what we expected him.

MR WESSELS: Yes, what did you observe happened there and what did you do?

MR VORSTER: When the vehicle approached I was in position in a early warning group, the vehicle moved past me and stopped plus-minus 50 metres or 70 metres away from me. The vehicle was surrounded by Commandant Naude and the other people who were present. They all had weapons. Well we all had weapons, including myself. And I saw them order the people to get out of the vehicle.

I was not present right there at the vehicle, but I knew how the plan would go, it's that the activists would be told to get out of the vehicle, they would be searched for any weapons and they would be given an injection and put back into the vehicle. ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Did you actually see that from where you were?

MR VORSTER: Mr Chairman, I could see activity around the vehicle, I did see people get out of the vehicle and because all the occupants were first taken out and then there was a large group of people around the vehicle and then were starting to get back into the vehicle.

MR WESSELS: Yes, and then?

MR VORSTER: Okay, once the vehicle, the activists were back in the vehicle I was called by radio - I had radio communication with Commandant Naude at the time, and I was told to get back into the vehicle. I got into the vehicle.

There were two activists that were in the front seat next to me. When I got into the vehicle most of them were already unconscious and some of them were still conscious but very, on the verge of being unconscious.

An escort vehicle which was also a mini-bus, with Commandant Naude, Brigadier Cronje and I think Captain Crause or Colonel Crause - at that time I think he was a Captain, was also in that vehicle and they drove ahead. I was in radio communication with them ...(intervention)

MR WESSELS: Who drove this vehicle in which the activists were?

MR VORSTER: I drove it.

MR WESSELS: Yes?

MR VORSTER: I drove behind the escort vehicle because I did know the place we were going to. We drove for plus-minus 45 minutes, an hour, I can't remember exactly. And when we reached - at one point the lead vehicle went through a dip in the road and I was told from the escort vehicle that they think that this would be a suitable spot to stage the accident. I stopped the vehicle and I inspected the place. I saw that it was a dry river bed and there was a very prominent tree on the other side of the river bed.

I got back into the vehicle ...(intervention)

MR WESSELS: What was the condition of the activists at this stage?

MR VORSTER: Okay, at this time they'd all been sleeping or were unconscious, none of them were coherent or conscious at all.

MR WESSELS: Yes?

MR VORSTER: I got into the vehicle, I put on my safety belt and I drove at a reasonable speed into this dry river bed, straight into the tree. I then got out. I had 25 litres of petrol in the vehicle with me. At this stage the lead vehicle was plus-minus 250/300 metres up the road. I could just see the back lights of the vehicle, although I was in constant radio contact with them. I then proceeded to pour petrol over the occupants of the vehicle, the full 25 litres. I then set the vehicle alight and I proceeded to the escort vehicle.

MR WESSELS: Is it correct that there was a limpet mine placed in this vehicle?

MR VORSTER: Okay, I did not know about the limpet mine, it could have been inserted in the plan. Nothing was originally discussed about a limpet mine or any weapons. Only at a later stage did I understand that a limpet mine and an AK had been hidden in the vehicle.

MR WESSELS: And then you got in the vehicle and you left the scene?

MR VORSTER: That's correct.

MR WESSELS: Is it correct that on the following day you went to Colonel Verster about this operation and you complained to him?

MR VORSTER: That is correct. That same evening I had a discussion with Commandant Naude, expressing my feelings that I did not think that we should be involved in operations of this nature for various reason, firstly being the security aspect of too many people of which we did not know the people were present and also that I felt that it was not our operation, our type of operation.

The next morning I phone Colonel Verster and I requested an interview with him. The reason I asked him for an interview is because at that stage I think he held the position of SSO Operations within Special Forces as well as we were in the process of the establishment of the CCB, of which the unit I was in would be incorporated.

I went to the meeting with him, I said that I was very unhappy with the way that the operation had been conducted and the people that had been present and also that I didn't feel that it was the type of operation that a highly trained Special Forces member should be involved in. And I requested that in future I not be considered for any operation of this nature.

MR WESSELS: And what was his attitude?

MR VORSTER: He agreed with me that it wasn't an operation for a Special Forces soldier and also that the security aspects of an operation, a mixed operation like this, was doubtful and that he would convey my feelings to higher authority.

MR WESSELS: Were you ever thereafter involved in similar types of operations?

MR VORSTER: No, I was not.

MR WESSELS: I have no further questions, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, who wishes to commence?

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, Visser on record. I have no questions for this witness, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR GROBLER: I also have no questions, thank you Mr Chairman.

MR DU PLESSIS: I have no questions, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Ms Lockhat, have you any questions?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS LOCKHAT: Just give me one minute, Chairperson.

Mr Vorster, how long were you in Special Forces?

MR VORSTER: I was in Special Forces from 1977 until 1988.

MS LOCKHAT: Is it correct to say that Special Forces were basically trained to eliminate and kill?

MR VORSTER: That is ...(incorrect)

MS LOCKHAT: So why would you say that you had problems after this incident that you discusses with Colonel Verster, that this was not the type of operation for Special Forces? I don't understand that.

MR VORSTER: Okay. A Special Forces soldier was trained to do reconnaissance and to eliminate the enemy behind enemy lines, and I felt that this was not an operation that anybody needed special training for and it was not an operation that a soldier should be involved in.

MS LOCKHAT: Thank you, Chairperson, no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Mr van den Berg?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VAN DEN BERG: Thank you, Mr Chairperson.

You'll forgive my absence of military knowledge. You referred to an SSO Ops, what is that?

MR VORSTER: It was a staff officer who was in charge of Special Operations.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Was he a type of complaints officer or somebody that you would take personal or other types of problems to?

MR VORSTER: No, it's not, he is in charge of Special Operations. The reason I went to Colonel Verster is that I'd served under him since 1977 and I had a lot of confidence and respect for him.

MR VAN DEN BERG: I understand. Now if I understand what happened correctly that evening, is that you were part of an early warning unit at the scene where they were injected, is that correct?

MR VORSTER: That's correct.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Who else was part of that early warning unit?

MR VORSTER: There was a - one of my team members was a person called Jose de Souza.

MR VAN DEN BERG: It was yourself and de Souza?

MR VORSTER: That's correct.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Where were the policemen at the time, that's Crause, Loots, Cronje, Hechter?

MR VORSTER: Can you just tell me at what time?

MR VAN DEN BERG: At the time that - once the vehicle had passed you and the activists were being off-loaded, where were the policemen at that time?

MR VORSTER: I wouldn't be able to tell you because they were 60 or 70 metres away from me and all I could see was the mini-bus with a number of people around it.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Is it your evidence that they were assisting Mr Naude in the off-loading of the activists?

MR VORSTER: No, I couldn't say that because I wasn't present there and I wasn't in a position to identify exactly who was doing what.

MR VAN DEN BERG: No subsequently you drove the vehicle with the semi-conscious and later unconscious activists to the scene at which an accident was staged, is that correct?

MR VORSTER: That's correct.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Were you the only Special Forces person in the vehicle?

MR VORSTER: That's correct.

MR VAN DEN BERG: You say that you didn't see the AK47 or the limpet mine being placed in the vehicle?

MR VORSTER: No, I did not.

MR VAN DEN BERG: This is perhaps something I should have asked Naude, but do you have any idea when these were placed in the vehicle?

MR VORSTER: Say again?

MR VAN DEN BERG: I said it's perhaps something I should have asked Naude, but when do you think these things were placed in the vehicle?

MR VORSTER: I would assume that it was placed in the vehicle after, either while the activists were being injected or directly after they had been put back into the vehicle - but I can only assume that.

MR VAN DEN BERG: I understand. By the time that you took control of that vehicle, what was the situation in respect of the activists?

MR VORSTER: As I said, most of them were unconscious and the others were on the border of unconsciousness.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Do you special training in staging of accidents?

MR VORSTER: No, I do not.

MR VAN DEN BERG: So you took your own life into your hands by driving across a dry river bed and into a tree if I understand you correctly?

MR VORSTER: No, I'm a trained reconnaissance commander soldier. I did a reconnaissance first and then I drove into the river bed. I selected the tree and the exact point where I was going to enter the river bed.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Was there anybody else from Special Forces present at the time that you poured the petrol over the bodies of the activists?

MR VORSTER: I was the only person present. The nearest person to me was in the escort vehicle which was plus-minus 250 to 300 metres away from me. I was the only person at the scene.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Do you have any recollection of the age of the people involved, a guesstimate?

MR VORSTER: I've got no idea. It was dark and when I got into the vehicle the activists were already in a state of semi-unconsciousness and I did not put on any lights in the vehicle. So at no stage did I physically get a good look at the activists.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: But could you determine that they were in a state of semi-consciousness?

MR VORSTER: Because they ...(intervention)

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: In the dark.

MR VORSTER: Sorry, say again?

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: How could you be able to ascertain that they were in that state because it was completely dark according to your evidence?

MR VORSTER: That is correct, but they were all asleep and a number of them were snoring and there was no talking in the vehicle and they were all slumped backwards or to the side.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Proceed Mr van den Berg.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Thank you. The reconnaissance which was done for the accident, when was that done?

MR VORSTER: When the escort vehicle radioed me and said that the dry river bed which I was a approaching should be a suitable place for the accident, I then stopped the vehicle plus-minus 50 or 100 metres from this dry river bed, I got out of the vehicle and I walked towards the dry river bed, I saw that the embankment was high and I saw that there was a tree and I then looked which would be the most appropriate way for me to approach this so that it looks as if the vehicle skidded of the road, went into the dry river bed and into the tree.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Presumably it was dark when all of this took place.

MR VORSTER: I did have a very powerful flashlight with me and the vehicle's lights were on.

CHAIRPERSON: May I just remind counsel that this is an application for amnesty and not a trial and the questions ought to really relate to whether the applicant ought to get amnesty or not. Questions relating to details of this kind, when one knows it is common cause that there was a crash, the vehicle collided and people died, when those facts are common cause how much further is it taken by putting the kinds of questions that you are putting to him?

MR VAN DEN BERG: Can I summarise it, Mr Chairperson?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, please, unless you are going to throw in, you say no, you're not going to rely on his evidence because he's not telling the truth on material points.

MR VAN DEN BERG: I accept that, Mr Chairperson.

Some of the mothers of the victims concerned have been out to the scene of the accident and they say to me that it doesn't resemble what you have described, can you comment on that?

CHAIRPERSON: That's it. You see you put that to them, it's the kind of question I understand you should be putting to him. Please answer that.

MR VORSTER: Mr Chairperson, I do not know where the families were taken. My recollection is of what happened 12 years ago and a place and the geography of the place where I staged the accident and set the vehicle alight. So I cannot comment as to where the families were taken.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Finally, the information that you had in respect of the activists, that was the information that was conveyed to you by Naude, is that correct?

MR VORSTER: That is correct.

MR VAN DEN BERG: No further questions, Mr Chairperson, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR WESSELS: There's no re-examination, Mr Chairman.

ADV DE JAGER: You've just told us it's 12 years ago, do you know whether the road was rebuilt, whether there's a bridge now or what the position may be?

MR VORSTER: Mr Chairman, I've not visited the scene since that night and my recollection was that it was a small farm road and I doubt very seriously that a major highway or road would have been built there.

CHAIRPERSON: Sici?

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: No questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Any re-examination of this witness?

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Wessels?

MR WESSELS: No re-examination, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

Yes, you may stand down, thank you very much.

MR VORSTER: Mr Chairman, I would also just like to take this opportunity to thank General Joubert for his presence here, I appreciate it a lot, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Ms Lockhat, who do we proceed to now?

MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, we could proceed to Mr Crause.

MR VISSER: That is in order, Mr Chairman. I call Colonel Crause to give evidence. His evidence will be given in Afrikaans.

PHILIP RUDOLPH CRAUSE: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Please proceed.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Visser, the spelling is it C or K?

MR VISSER: C-R-A-U-S-E, Mr Chairman. I beg leave to hand up an affidavit that was drawn up by Mr Crause. It is an elaboration with regards to certain aspects of his amnesty application as it serves before you and which will also form part of his evidence. May I hand this up to you as well as to my colleagues?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VISSER: Could this be marked Exhibit A, Mr Chairman?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, this will go in as Exhibit A.

MR VISSER: As it pleases you, Mr Chairman. If I may proceed, Mr Chairman?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, please do.

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Crause, is it correct that you are an applicant for amnesty?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: With regards to three incidents that are to be heard before this Committee, the Nietverdiendt incident and the second incident which we refer to as the Silent Valley incident and the McKenzie incident, and we are presently only dealing with the Nietverdiendt one?

On page 2, Mr Chairman, at the bottom of the page you will find a reference to the bundles in which the applicant's evidence appears. You would have noticed that paragraph 10(a) and 10(b) of the applicant's application was not bound in this bundle before you. This problem is chronic and it seems as if this problem will not go away and we'd like to correct it but we cannot seem to. Mr Chairman, if I may explain?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VISSER: Earlier on in the amnesty applications there were certain amendments brought in the applicants, on the forms of the applications of some of the applicants and we have attempted, Mr Chairman, - those amendments had been granted, I think all of them were by Justice Wilson, we've been attempting to get that done, Mr Chairman, and there seems to be a problem as far as the administration is concerned. We make no point of it, Mr Chairman, other than saying that in all instances for the clients for whom we act, paragraphs 10(a) and 10(b) are identical. So if you have one you have them all, they've simply been copied, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Right you are, thank you.

MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, if I can just come in here. I've made copies of the Annexures 10(a) and 10(b) relating to the political objective of Advocate Visser's clients. I have discussed it with him previously and he said I should just keep it available, which I have, and then once we commence with Crause's application I can just submit it. I have it with me, so if the Chairperson would allow me I will just present it to you.

CHAIRPERSON: Well if the need arises.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, the Evidence Leader is quite correct, I confirm what she says, Mr Chairman, but frankly I don't believe that you need it before you right now. Perhaps one set could be handed to you, Mr Chairman, it will be applicable to all the applicants, which you can place somewhere in your record. But you will find in the applications which are all over the bundles of the Amnesty Committee, you will have copies of the 10(a) and (b)'s, Mr Chairman, so I am not insisting on you having them.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well.

MR VISSER: Mr Crause, if can just continue. You are up to date with certain documentation which serves before the Amnesty Committee ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: In order to avoid any confusion because of a multiplicity of documents, the affidavit you've just handed in was described as Annexure A and this document which now is presented by Ms Lockhat will be referred to as Exhibit B, should the need arise.

MR VISSER: As it please you, Mr Chairman. Yes, with the rider that it will be applicable to all the applicants for whom we appear.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

You are up to date written information which has been handed up before the Amnesty Committee, amongst others on page 3 of Exhibit A you refer to the Foundation of Equality Before the Law, Exhibit P45 before the Amnesty Committee, General Johan van der Merwe's submission, Exhibit P46 and a statement by ex-Generals.

This documents, Mr Chairman, you will find in bundle 2(a), pages 55 to 117. That is the evidence which we are now going to refer to of the 21st of October of General van der Merwe. And in bundle 2(i) under (a), pages 1 to 29 there is a submission of General van der Merwe. This is the one that is referred to as Exhibit P46 and on page 136 to 147 of bundle 2(i) you will find the submission by the Generals, of the previous Commissioners.

Chairperson, we will just refer to this, we will not waste time by referring to it in the light of the evidence that will be led here, because we will refer that the original Amnesty Committee has taken note of this already in the Jan Hattingh/Cronje matter and has already summarised that evidence and we can save time by not reading it word for word.

We have referred Mr Crause to the evidence of General van der Merwe's submission which is indicated on (d) and then you would request that the Amnesty Judgments in the incidents which you mention at the bottom of page 3 be taken into consideration with the decision as to your amnesty application, is that correct?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: You were born in the Free State in Bethlehem on the 26th of May 1945 - I'm on page 4, Mr Chairman - and you are now 53 years old.

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: The Amnesty Committee - page 5 - has made a summary in the amnesty decision of Brigadier Jack Cronje, on page 2 where he says, and you quote on page 5:

That passage has been put to you, do you find that that passage is applicable to your situation?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You joined the police in 1962, you went to the college and you retired because of medical reasons on the 21/12/1993, with the rank of Colonel.

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And thereafter you acted - page 6, Mr Chairman - from January to August 1994, as the advisor to the then Boputhatswana Special Branch, is that correct?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: What is of import in your career, on page 5 of Exhibit A, is that from 1971 you were stationed at Zeerust. You started as a detective and in 1972 you went to the Security Branch, and from 1985 to 1986 you were the Branch Commander of the Security Branch at Zeerust, do I have that correct?

MR CRAUSE: Yes, you do.

MR VISSER: On page 6 you referred to the struggle of the past, which you have summarised. You refer in paragraph 9 to bundle 2(a) of the Cronje Five's evidence, pages 58 to 117, and bundle 2(e), pages 300 to 344, once again incorporating the evidence of General Johan van der Merwe. Do you concur with the policies as he put there in the struggle of the past and the actions and convictions of the Security Branch's members?

MR CRAUSE: Yes, I do.

MR VISSER: On page 7 you have a quotation from Judgment of Brigadier J Cronje on page 2 to 4, I am not going to read it, but in those paragraphs, Mr Chairperson, the evidence of General van der Merwe is summarised. And the only thing that I would like to do is ask Mr Crause if he concurs with that summary there, as a correct summary of the struggle of the past in the country.

MR CRAUSE: Yes, I do, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And then you continue in paragraphs 11 and 12 and mention key points with regards to the struggle with the ANC/SACP, the four pillars of their struggle and the violent attempt to usurp the previous government.

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And it was an undeclared war in the past - as found in the amnesty judgment of Brigadier Cronje, page 2 to 3, which you quote at the bottom of page 9 and over to page 10, is that correct?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Now you yourself, Mr Crause, anything that you have done, was it done out of malice or to your own advantage, or why did you act in the manner in which you did act during the incidents for which you are applying for amnesty?

MR CRAUSE: I did this in my service and I did not receive any remuneration.

MR VISSER: And not from any personal malice?

MR CRAUSE: No.

MR VISSER: And then you said that the struggle that reigned, which was marked by assassination attempts of members of the Security Forces, did you take note of this and did this have an influence on your work environment?

MR CRAUSE: Yes.

MR VISSER: And that the ANC/SACP alliance focused itself on soft targets. And then I would like to take you to paragraph 20 on page 11, and I would like to ask you to please read this to the Committee.

MR CRAUSE:

MR VISSER: Mr Crause, if we could, with the permission of the Members of the Committee, go directly to the role that Botswana played in the incidents which will be heard by the Amnesty Committee during this session. Could you please inform us as to how you experienced this?

MR CRAUSE:

MR VISSER: Yes, you refer in paragraph 24 that this was on the assumption that General van der Merwe would give evidence before you, which has not happened, you refer to Mr Marius Schoon. Mr Chairman, the purpose of that is to draw your attention to some evidence, documentary evidence which was handed in, Commissioner de Jager was present in that hearing and he would know about it, in the Marius Schoon application. We don't want to belabour any points in this regard, Mr Chairman, and what we have done, and we hope it will carry away your approval, is not to hand in all the exhibits which served in that application, but to allow me just to refer you to three passages in one of the exhibits, which was Exhibit RR.

Mr Chairman, what this issue concerns is that since 1979, Mr Marius Louis Schoon went to Botswana and he established infiltration routes, as he himself testified before the Committee under the Chairmanship of your brother, Justice Wilson, and where - perhaps I should just make it clear that the other Commissioners were Commissioner de Jager and Commissioner Sibanyoni - from which it appeared Mr Chairman, that - I'm talking about the, I'm referring to the evidence of Mr Marius Schoon -that his role in Botswana became a very important role for the ANC. He took it as far as saying, Mr Chairman, and the record will speak for itself, I'm trying just to shortcut the issue ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Visser, I'm speaking for myself and not on behalf of the Committee, but I think for purposes of these applications it could be accepted that Botswana was a country sympathetic to the cause of the liberation forces and they have received assistance from Botswana in certain respects.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, we are very indebted, particularly if we were assured that that would be the position taken by all the members of the Committee, that that is so ...

CHAIRPERSON: I think you should have no difficulty in that regard.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: How does it affect the present application, Mr Visser?

MR VISSER: Well Mr Chairman, the way in which it affects it is from a point of view of proportionality the question may well be asked, why do you simply take three people and shoot them, in the Silent Valley matter, why do you take 10 people who are going out to be trained and simply shoot them or simply eliminate them, why don't you follow other venues? The state of emergency had just been declared countrywide on the 16th of June. This is 10 days after that date, when the Nietverdiendt matter takes place.

And what we are saying, Mr Chairman, and the message which the applicants for whom we appear wish to convey to you is that the problems from Botswana were so great and their capacity to deal with them was so limited that it led to drastic action having been taken. And that in short, Mr Chairman, is hopefully the answer to Commissioner Khampepe's questions.

CHAIRPERSON: I think it can be accepted that Botswana played a particular role in the struggle of the liberation organisations, in the sense that it rendered assistance to them in several respects. And I don't think you should labour that point.

MR VISSER: May I just for clarity's sake make one point. Whatever we say about Botswana is no reflection on the Botswana Government, please.

CHAIRPERSON: We understand.

MR VISSER: As long as that is understood. You will references, Mr Chairman, in Exhibit 2IL. Now 2IL is a bundle which was compiled in 1988. Now immediately let me say this comes after all the incidents which you are going to hear, but it starts with reference to 1984 and it runs through. And you will find a number of references that the Security Police of the Western Transvaal complained and reported to the Botswana Police, certain incidents, the whereabouts of certain people whom the Security Branch thought were enemies of the State, and that it had very little effect. Apart from that criticism, Mr Chairman, - I just want to make it clear as I've done before, that we are not referring to the Botswana situation with a view of discrediting the Botswana Government.

CHAIRPERSON: Understood.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, we are not going to go through - while we're on the point, perhaps I should just deal with it, bundle 2IL was placed before you ...(no microphone)

MS LOCKHAT: It's bundle 2J, so it's incorrect to say bundle 2IL.

MR VISSER: Alright, if it's undergone a metamorphosis then 2J.

MS LOCKHAT: That's correct.

MR VISSER: It is now 2J, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well.

MR VISSER: We are not going to deal with it, Mr Chairman, but in argument we will draw your attention to the fact of the amount of weapons, explosives etc., which were smuggled in through Botswana, and the number of cadres who went out, left the country through Botswana and re-entered the country from Botswana, in order to show, Mr Chairman, the mental makeup and the motivation of the applicants when dealing with the applications which are not before you. Other than that, Mr Chairman, I'm going to step off that if I may.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, well when the time comes for you to address us, you will specifically draw our attention to it.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Mr Chairperson, if I could assist in that regard, bundle 2J has reference to a large number of MK cadres, and evidence was led in the amnesty application of Aboobaker Ismail relating specifically to infiltration routes from Botswana into South Africa, particularly reference to the bomb blast at Wits Command, where Grosskopf and Lester Dumakude were involved.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I'm indebted to my learned friend. In fact we do make a reference to Rashid, to Mr Aboobaker Ismail, to Mr Maloi and others in the application. We'll run through this paragraph, Mr Chairman, very briefly without wasting time and we'll draw your attention to those paragraphs. But I thank my learned friend for his contribution.

CHAIRPERSON: Right you are.

MR VISSER: Mr Crause, if we have to move to page 11 then, your evidence is that Botswana played a very important role in the revolutionary struggle in the country, with special significance for the network of infiltration routes and logistical support which was established between Botswana and the Republic of South Africa, is that correct?

MR CRAUSE: Yes, that's correct.

MR VISSER: Indeed it changed to such an extent that by 1989 it was, according to statements made by the ANC, regarded as the most important entry and exit route from the RSA.

MR CRAUSE: Yes, that's correct.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, then at page 14, paragraph 32, the reference there should now be amended to be 2J. At page 14, paragraph 32.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well.

MR VISSER: And then I deal, Mr Chairman, I promised that I will draw your attention to them, we deal in paragraph 33 with the complaints to the Botswana authorities in regard to the problems which the police had in the Western Transvaal. We take it no further than we've already done, Mr Chairman. And we also refer to the fact of that, and it is relevant we submit, Mr Chairman, that in 1986, on the 12th of June, a countrywide state of emergency was declared by the then State President. That's paragraph 34, Mr Chairman.

Then you say in paragraph 35:

Can you tell us whether or not it was possible for you to simply arrest all those individuals who were creating problems for you and lock them up?

MR CRAUSE: No, it was impossible at that stage.

MR VISSER: Well why would it have been impossible at that stage?

MR CRAUSE: There were a great number of people, these people went out for military training, we didn't know who or what they were, then they would come, they would commit sabotage.

MR VISSER: And you maintain in paragraph 36, that it happened more and more that the police, as you put it, began to act beyond the parameters of the law, in order to combat the freedom activities effectively?

MR CRAUSE: That's correct.

MR VISSER: In paragraph 37 you provide a summary of the activities of the ANC/SACP alliance within and outside Botswana. And at 37.1 on page 15, Mr Chairperson, you refer to certain well-known names who were indeed operating in Botswana, is that correct?

MR CRAUSE: Yes.

MR VISSER: Among others you refer to Mr Aboobaker Ismail, MK name Rashid, Lambert Maloi, Johannes Mnisi, Lester Dumakude, Lekhoto Pule, who were all the most important individuals, and you say that there were also others who were involved in these activities.

MR CRAUSE: Yes, that's correct.

MR VISSER: We will not read the rest of paragraph 37 point for point, but you are simply making the point about how busy your life as a security officer was with regard to the Botswana situation, correct?

MR CRAUSE: Yes, that's correct.

MR VISSER: Then with regard to what is now referred to as bundle 2J, you also refer in summary on page 16, paragraph 38, to the activities, which was intended to be of assistance to the Committee in order not to have to read the entire bundle should there not be enough time, you have provided a summary of why you regarded the entry route from Botswana as important.

MR CRAUSE: That's correct.

MR VISSER: And in paragraph 39 on page 17, you have then attempted to sketch your position as well as those of your comrades in the Security Branch. And you ask the Committee to pay attention to that when considering your application.

MR CRAUSE: Yes, that's correct.

MR VISSER: Then finally, with regard to, or second last, with regard to the introduction, the Committee has repeatedly heard how important it is that information had to be gathered and exchanged. The Committee has also made a decision regarding the Cronje judgment, do you agree firstly, with regard to the significance of important and the fact that information was exchanged between members of the security community as far as your memory goes?

MR CRAUSE: Yes, that's correct.

MR VISSER: You have provided your political reasons in Exhibit B before the Committee, you are familiar with that?

MR CRAUSE: Yes.

MR VISSER: Once again you confirm this in your evidence?

MR CRAUSE: Yes, that's correct.

MR VISSER: And you refer to paragraph 52 and following by means of summary to your political movement reasons, or motivation, is that correct?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And just for summary, you maintain that you made an oath towards the State when you became a policeman and that you regarded it as your duty in order to combat the struggle, and especially because this was part of your struggle in terms of the Police Act, that you had to ensure internal security?

MR CRAUSE: Yes, that's correct.

MR VISSER: And in paragraph 55 you refer to an extract of the evidence of the former Minister of Law and Order, Adriaan Vlok, which speaks for itself, and you request that the Committee consider this when considering your application, is that correct?

MR CRAUSE: Yes.

MR VISSER: If we proceed to page 24, and before we get to the Nietverdiendt incident on page 30, you wanted to inform the Committee that you have a problem with your memory. Also when I questions Colonel Naude I made a point thereof that this took place quite a while ago and he said that this took place 12 years ago, I think it may actually have been 13 years already, and you say that you are no longer entirely certain of all the incidents or events in precise detail.

MR CRAUSE: That's correct.

MR VISSER: However, you have listened to the others who are involved and as far as it is possible for you, you have attempted to search your own memory and you believe that the evidence which you will place before the Committee today will be the truth and the whole truth, according to the best of your memory regarding what took place there.

MR CRAUSE: That's correct.

MR VISSER: And this is of application to all your applications?

MR CRAUSE: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: If we could proceed to page 30, I would like for you to tell the Committee in a relaxed fashion about your recollection about the Nietverdiendt incident.

MR CRAUSE: Chairperson, on the 26th of June 1986, I was visited by Brigadier Jack Cronje and Commandant Charl Naude at my office in Zeerust. At that stage I was the Commander of the Zeerust Security Branch. Brigadier Cronje informed me that there were 10 ANC activists who were on their way from Mamelodi to Botswana for military training. His request to me was that he was looking for a suitable place where these people could be intercepted and killed. I told him that I would not be able to be of assistance to him without the authorisation of the appropriate officer.

After that I contacted Brigadier Loots from Potchefstroom by telephone and he informed me that I could go ahead and be of assistance to them and that he was on his way.

MR VISSER: If I might interrupt you, what was his description of command at Potchefstroom?

MR CRAUSE: He was the commander of the ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Crause, I think it may be of assistance to you - I see that you are referring to the document, if you could just tell us which points you are dealing with, specifically which paragraphs, it will be of assistance to us.

MR CRAUSE: Just to return - I'm dealing with paragraph 91 at this stage. We are going to page 31, paragraph 92. I then took Brigadier Cronje and Naude on various routes and we identified two places. One I do not name here but my memory has subsequently been refreshed when Naude mentioned it. The one was the place where the vehicle would be stopped, the second was an appropriate place where an accident could be staged.

From there I returned to my office and there Brigadier Loots joined us.

MR VISSER: On that very same day?

MR CRAUSE: Yes, on that day. I must mention that the plan was submitted to me and the intention thereof was to eliminate the people, and I accepted at that stage that the vehicle would simply be exploded with the people inside.

Later that evening I returned to the scene where the vehicle would be intercepted. I would just like to tell the Committee exactly where I am now.

MR VISSER: Perhaps you could return to that later. I would just like to ask you this first. You've heard from Brigadier Cronje and from Commandant Naude that these people were involved or on their way to receive extra training and that they were to be eliminated, what was your feeling about that?

MR CRAUSE: I personally agreed with the order that the person were to be eliminated. Once they had been allowed to leave the country and received their training there could be no guarantee that the Security Branch would be able to trace them or prevent them from committing acts of terror. I was convinced that these persons should be prevented at all costs of leaving the country and receiving military training.

MR VISSER: Paragraph 94 is about a piece of evidence from bundle 2(c), page 29 regarding which the current witness is making a few remarks. We are not going to give any further evidence regarding that.

MR CRAUSE: I'm now moving ahead to paragraph 95,

Chairperson. My knowledge of the events stretches from my arrival on the abandoned farm in the Nietverdiendt environment. I would just like to re-emphasise that this the place where the vehicle was to be pulled off the road. Brigadier Cronje, Commandant Cronje and Colonel Loots were also present on the farm and there were also other unknown persons who were present. I later heard that these persons were Captain Hechter and members of Special Forces.

I was a distance away from there but I saw that the black men were being taken out of the vehicle and injected with a substance and then helped back into the vehicle. Colonel Loots and I did not participate in that.

MR VISSER: And do you know what the substance was and what its affect would be?

MR CRAUSE: I did not know what the substance was that they were injected with, but I do recall that very soon after the injection they fell asleep or became unconscious or dead.

We drove ahead to the point upon which we had decided that morning. I drove the vehicle while the kombi with the sleeping men followed us. It was being driven by a member of Special Forces. I would just like to mention that at that stage I did not know that it was Mr Vorster that was driving the vehicle. I also cannot recall that Mamasela drove with us.

MR VISSER: Your memory or your recollection is that after you left the farm he went back to Pretoria?

MR CRAUSE: Yes. We drove ahead - and I cannot recall because I only heard about the radio contact a few moments ago. After we had driven through the ditch we allowed the vehicle to be driven into the ditch. I was not personally present but the person who drove the vehicle into the ditch came to us and we saw the vehicle explode.

MR VISSER: You are prepared to accept the evidence of Mr Naude as correct?

MR CRAUSE: Yes. From there we drove back to the place where we had parked our vehicles and from there we separated. And that is what I know about the incident.

MR VISSER: Did you have anything to do with any aspect of this incident after the incident, after the 26th of June?

MR CRAUSE: No, none.

MR VISSER: Do you know whether an inquest of a post-mortem was held after the incident?

MR CRAUSE: I must mention that the incident took place in Boputhatswana and as far as I was aware they held a post-mortem inquest.

MR VISSER: Did you make any enquiries regarding that?

MR CRAUSE: No, I did not discuss the incident with anybody else.

MR VISSER: You refer - well, Mr Chairman, perhaps I should refer you to bundle 2(i) just to draw your attention to the fact that you might remember in 1997, we handed in affidavits on behalf of Mr Crause and Mr Loots to the original Amnesty Committee. They are bound in, Mr Chairman. We asked for them to be bound in. They are to be found in bundle 2(i), page 127 to 129. For Mr Crause and Mr Loots is at 130 to 133 - lest I forget when I lead his evidence.

Mr Chairman, that's the evidence which we wish to present. Oh sorry, Mr Chairman.

MR CRAUSE: I would just like to clear up one matter which has become a problem and that is the road there. Once again I have driven that road in Boputhatswana, it has been rebuilt, it is now a broad tarred road whereas previously it was a narrow dirt road. I might just mention that the indentation in the road has been filled up and levelled.

MR VISSER: That's the evidence-in-chief, Mr Chairman, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Yes, any cross-examination?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR WESSELS: May I go first, Mr Chairman?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR WESSELS: Mr Crause you have accepted Mr Naude's evidence, do you also accept the correctness of Mr Vorster's evidence as it has been delivered here?

MR CRAUSE: Yes.

MR WESSELS: No further questions, thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thanks. Any other questions by anybody else?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS LOCKHAT: Mr Crause, what did Jack - when Jack Cronje and Mr Naude came to you about the plan, what exactly did they inform you of?

MR CRAUSE: Brigadier Cronje told me that 10 activists were on their way from Mamelodi to Botswana for extra training and that they were to be eliminated.

MS LOCKHAT: Did he tell what his plans were as to how they were going to eliminate the 10 victims?

MR CRAUSE: Not at that stage.

MS LOCKHAT: Didn't you ask them?

MR CRAUSE: No, I didn't ask him at that stage because I told him that I wanted to inform my commanding officer about the matter.

MS LOCKHAT: And I assume you asked them thereafter, or did you just direct them as to the place?

MR CRAUSE: Later on the way I was informed that they wanted to stage an accident, but I didn't know that the passengers of the vehicle were to be injected or that the vehicle was going to be blown up. I was only informed about this later.

MS LOCKHAT: So you knew that they were going to be eliminated but you didn't know how and you didn't bother to ask either.

MR CRAUSE: No, I didn't.

MS LOCKHAT: So you were party to this although you didn't know how the people were going to be eliminated?

MR CRAUSE: I was satisfied that they were going to be eliminated. It didn't matter what the method of elimination would be.

MS LOCKHAT: Tell me, were you the only person from your branch that participated in this incident?

MR CRAUSE: That's correct.

MS LOCKHAT: You didn't include other people in this mission?

MR CRAUSE: No, not at all, it was only me and my commander, Brigadier Loots.

MS LOCKHAT: Thank you, Chairperson, no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Chairperson, I don't have any questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much.

CHAIRPERSON: Has this evidence cleared up the difficulty that you were putting for the previous witnesses about the fact that the dependants of the deceased not being able to find the area being described as it was, because of the levelling and the development of the road in that area?

MR VAN DEN BERG: Mr Chairperson, I'm instructed that a policeman was on the scene some time after the incident took place, a policeman who is stationed at Madikwe. I've been given a contact telephone number and I will attempt to contact him to take the matter further as far as that's concerned.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, doesn't know just now how long after the incident this road or this area was looked at or examined by these dependants.

MR VAN DEN BERG: That's correct. Certainly when they went out there it was after the applications of Brigadier Cronje.

CHAIRPERSON: Oh well.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Which is quite some time after the incident.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, some years. Thank you very much.

There's no point in asking you whether you want to re-examine the man, Mr Visser.

MR VISSER: No re-examination thank you. May he be excused, Mr Chairman?

CHAIRPERSON: Certainly he's excused.

MS LOCKHAT: Mr Chairman, it is now 1 o'clock or no, one minute past one. I don't think I'll be able to finish Mr Loots before 1 o'clock.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Gentlemen, can we - ladies and gentlemen, can we resume at a quarter to two? We will adjourn

now and resume at a quarter to two. Thank you very much.

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MR VISSER: ... Members of the Committee. Chairperson, we have taken the liberty of placing before you a document which is an affidavit signed by Brigadier Wikus Johannes Loots. Have you found it?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, we have.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, may I say immediately that you will find, perhaps not surprisingly, that the affidavit of Brigadier Loots is virtually a carbon copy of what you've heard in the evidence of Rudi Crause, particularly as far as this incident is concerned and particularly with a view of their slight role in the whole of the incident. We don't therefore propose to deal with Brigadier Loots in any detail.

CHAIRPERSON: Well it's all before us in any case.

MR VISSER: It is all before you now in any case Mr Chairman, and I will go very swiftly, with your permission.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much. ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: Your full names?

CHAIRPERSON: ... Exhibit C.

MR VISSER: Exhibit C.

ADV DE JAGER: Your full names?

WIKUS JOHANNES LOOTS: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Brigadier, you apply before this Amnesty Committee for three incidents for which we will deal with the Nietverdiendt incident only, is that correct?

MR LOOTS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Your application you attach at page 2, in the middle of the page. And it is indeed so that in bundle 2(i) you have an affidavit from pages 130 to 133. Mr Chairperson, I have noted that before you entered that it is pages 130 to 132. It's just a little technical fault with the numbering of the pages there. Mr Loots, like Mr Crause you have referred to Exhibits P45, 45 and 47, the evidence of General van der Merwe which was heard on the 21st of October, as well as his evidence on the 9th of February and the references as given in Exhibit C and you are up to date with his evidence in the Stanza Bopape and Khotso and Cosatu House and Cry Freedom instances, is that correct?

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You confirm that the evidence as given by General van der Merwe and as the original Amnesty Committee in the judgment of Brigadier JH Cronje according to your insights and judgement would be the correct facts and as far as you are concerned this is applicable to your position?

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And as far as you are concerned this is applicable to your position?

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And you request on page 3 that those amnesty judgments as far as it concerns you it has to be kept in mind with the consideration of your amnesty application?

MR LOOTS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: You born at Prieska on the 9th of January 1940, you are 59 years old. You have heard when I read an extract, which is on page 4 at the bottom of the page, of the typical situation of the members of the Security Forces vis à vis the National Party and the government, do you confirm that this is applicable to you as well?

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: On page 5 you have a short summary Brigadier, on pages 5 and 6, of your career in the Police Force highlighting that you started your career as far back as 1959. And you were in the Northern Eastern Cape - excuse me, the North Western Cape and that from 1963 you were transferred to the Security Branch, is that correct?

MR LOOTS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And then when this incident took place you were a Divisional Commander of Western Transvaal Security Branch in Potchefstroom?

MR LOOTS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And later you were transferred to Northern Transvaal, as Divisional Commander in Pretoria and you were Regional Commander of Crime Prevention of the Northern Transvaal, is that correct? ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Visser, I do not want to interrupt you, but this is all under oath, this is background and I don't think there is anybody who will argue this. If you could get to page 35 as quickly as possible and if there's any argument as to the information, then it should be put later.

MR VISSER: It was my intention to refer you to page 7, how the struggle seemed and so forth. As it was said by Mr Crause this morning and as it is in Exhibit C, you affidavit, do you confirm that?

MR LOOTS: Yes, I do.

MR VISSER: With regard to your own political motives as well as other aspects, do you confirm the correctness and truth thereof as far as it is concerned with your application?

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: If we could move to page - and Commissioner de Jager will forgive me this one aspect, but I have to refer to it before I get to page 35. If I could move on to where you addressed the matter of Botswana and the importance of Botswana. I would like to refer you to the bundle which is bundle 2(j) and I would refer you to page 2 thereof - or excuse me, I mean page 5 up to page, I think it's 39 Chairperson, up to page 39. This is a statement if I have it correct, that was drawn up by you.

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And the contents of this statement deals basically with Botswana, is that correct?

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: It deals with weapons and infiltrations from and to Botswana between South Africa and Botswana, is that correct?

MR LOOTS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: The information contained herein, did you receive this from existing information from reliable sources?

MR LOOTS: My own sources as well as sources from Western Cape, Durban, Eastern Cape, who had sources in Botswana.

MR VISSER: It is also stipulated here and it also refers to your personal knowledge and the gathering of information and your experiences?

MR LOOTS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: I would just like to draw your attention to this, Chairperson, and there is a statement from Brigadier Loots in there.

Can we move to page 35. We know Brigadier, that we deal with the killing of 10 unknown persons who were on their way from Mamelodi in Pretoria to Botswana, and this included the burning of their bodies and the burning of a kombi and you apply for any other offences in conjunction with this.

On page or paragraph 99, on page 35, would you address the document there and explain to the Committee what your role and part in this incident was.

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, according to the best of my recollection, Colonel Rudi Crause called me on the 25th of June 1986, at ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: Could I interrupt you there. The 25th of June, might that be wrong?

MR LOOTS: It may have been the 26th, I'm not sure.

MR VISSER: You're not sure?

MR LOOTS: No, I'm not sure, it could be.

He informed me about this action. He informed me that Brigadier Jack Cronje and Commandant Charl Naude from Special Forces were involved with the planning of the elimination of a number of black activists from Mamelodi - this was Brigadier's area of command, who were on their way to leave the RSA to Botswana with the objective of gaining military training.

After this discussion the two of us, this is Brigadier Crause, Brigadier Cronje and Commandant Naude, on the 26th of June we met them at Zeerust. Brigadier Cronje informed us that he was looking for a safe place where Special Forces operators could meet the kombi with ANC recruits who were on their way from Pretoria, under the control of Joe Mamasela.

Brigadier Cronje also informed us that he and Commandant Naude decided to eliminate the group and it would happen in such a manner that it would seem that it was armed persons who infiltrated the country with weapons and explosives.

MR VISSER: To interrupt you there, do you have any knowledge of any - we have heard of an AK47 and a limpet mine which was planted in the kombi, do you have any personal knowledge thereof?

MR LOOTS: No.

MR VISSER: But in the light thereof it does not surprise you?

MR LOOTS: No, it does not.

MR VISSER: Very well.

MR LOOTS: Point 1: I was convinced that the persons had to be stopped before they left the country to receive military training because experience has taught that if an activist decided to receive military training there was not possibility to change his mind. And since such persons after they've received their training would return back to the Republic where they endangered lives and property and the Security Branch would not be able to stop them when they return, I gave them my co-operation.

MR VISSER: The question might be asked why you were involved in this, what is your comment thereof, why were you asked?

MR LOOTS: Because the usual practise was that in Western Transvaal - and this is applicable to the previous commanders who were responsible for the control of MK activities in Botswana and it was a gentleman's agreement that the we would know the persons before they acted in our area.

MR VISSER: Very well. And in paragraph 103 you said a kombi with black men as occupants that stopped at a cafe. Joe Mamasela was the driver. Brigadier Cronje, Commandant Naude, Crause and yourself drove with the kombi to a place close to Nietverdiendt, where the persons would be intercepted and that Mamasela then followed behind you.

MR LOOTS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And with your arrival at the farm, what did you do there?

MR LOOTS: There was a team of Special Forces operators. consisting of persons unknown to me

MR VISSER: We know who this was. You don't have to worry about that, we know who these persons were. What did you see happening there?

MR LOOTS: The black passengers were fetched from Joe Mamasela's kombi. Some of them were made to lay on the ground and Commandant Naude injected them. It might be that other persons also administered injections, but I cannot clearly recall that now. I was not aware what the substance was with which they were injected. I was about 50 metres away from them, but I know that after the injection, very soon after the injection they seemed unstable on their feet and some of them became unconscious.

MR VISSER: Or you say "dead" there, but you don't know what the effect of the substance was?

MR LOOTS: No, I don't. They were loaded into another kombi one by one and members of Special Forces left with the activists kombi thereafter.

MR VISSER: Colonel Naude told us that what had happened is that you drove on drove on because you knew the road, they followed. The kombi with the activists was drive by Mr Vorster and the kombi was driven right up against a tree. Do you have a problem with accepting that evidence?

MR LOOTS: No, that is a correct version as I recall it.

MR VISSER: And in your application you mention that you heard several explosions and you also say that you don't know what the kombi was lit with, whether petrol or explosives were used, but today you have heard that it was lit with gasoline and later on the limpet mine might have exploded. Would this concur with your recollection of what had happened?

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And where you say in your application that the explosion would probably be handgrenades, but you would accept that it is as Naude and Vorster had said here?

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, that's the evidence which we wish to present, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: You mention that the kombi in which they came was Joe Mamasela's kombi, was Joe Mamasela known to you at that time?

MR LOOTS: I knew him, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: You knew him?

MR LOOTS: Yes, I knew him.

CHAIRPERSON: And was he there at the scene at the time?

MR LOOTS: If I recall correctly, after they arrived and after they were injected, he left immediately.

CHAIRPERSON: Did he leave alone or in the company of somebody?

MR LOOTS: As far as I can recall he was alone. Paragraph 112 on page 38 is where I mention it.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you very much. Yes, cross-examination?

MR VAN DEN BERG: Chairperson, possibly just one aspect.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VAN DEN BERG: You appear reasonably certain about the dates, you said the 25th of the 26th of June, how did you arrive at that date?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, it was after the application for amnesty. This was a long time ago. That is the only explanation that I can give at this stage.

MR VAN DEN BERG: You didn't make a note of it somewhere, at the time?

MR LOOTS: Many things happened and I cannot recall everything.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS LOCKHAT: Mr Loots, when Mr Crause contacted you per telephone, what did he brief you, what did he inform you of?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, if I recall correctly Colonel Crause reported to me that Brigadier Cronje and Commandant Charl Naude wanted to speak to us at Zeerust and because of incidents that happened over the years, that when the names Cronje and Naude was heard you would accept this had something to do with infiltrators or people who part of the struggle.

MS LOCKHAT: And indeed also inform you as in paragraph 99 of your statement, that they were planning to eliminate a number of black activists? - as per your statement.

MR LOOTS: ...(no audible reply)

MS LOCKHAT: And when you met with Cronje and Naude, what did they inform you of, what was the operation about?

INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone is not on.

MR LOOTS: They mentioned the 10 persons who were on their way out, but the manner in which it would be acted was not discussed with us at that stage.

MS LOCKHAT: Did you not ask them?

MR LOOTS: We operated with Special Forces quite often in the past and I had never questioned their capability. I also did not ask what would happen and how it would take place.

MS LOCKHAT: So you knew you were going to eliminate people, but the details of that were not important to you at the stage?

MR LOOTS: Not at that stage.

MS LOCKHAT: You just previously stated that you operated with Jack Cronje previously and that you knew that if he contacted you that the task would obviously be eliminating, what other ...(intervention)

MR LOOTS: ...(inaudible). Chairperson, the name Charl Naude - when I heard the name Charl Naude, I accepted that it had something to do with the training of people or it had to do with people who went from training.

MS LOCKHAT: But surely a person in your position, isn't there an onus just to ask exactly what you're going to get involved in?

MR LOOTS: At that stage this was done telephonically. It was difficult, and that is why I drove all the way to Zeerust.

MS LOCKHAT: Thank you, Chairperson, no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

ADV DE JAGER: You mention - and I cannot say that I was not listening, that somebody else mentioned that the persons after they received the injections were transferred to another kombi.

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, if I recall correctly they arrived in a kombi that was driven by Joe Mamasela. In paragraph 112 I say that Joe Mamasela from that point departed, so I am almost convinced that they were transferred to another kombi that was driven by Mr Vorster and where the accident would then take place. That is how I recall it.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Can you advise us what other operations you were involved in, in which Mr Charl Naude as a member of Special Forces was also involved in?

MR LOOTS: ...(no audible reply)

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Was that the only matter?

MR LOOTS: The McKenzie incident is one, the Gaberone attack in '85. I'm depending on my memory now, but there was more than that but I cannot recall.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: And these happened obviously prior to this Nietverdiendt incident? All these incidents happened prior to the Nietverdient incident?

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Now when you met with Brigadier Cronje after you had been telephoned by Mr Crause, did Brigadier Cronje advise you of the method he intended to use in carrying out the elimination of these young activists?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, I cannot recall the details of what Cronje discussed with me. I accepted that Special Forces would do the work. As I have said previously I trusted the manner in which they acted as professionals.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: But was there no mention why Brigadier Cronje that Special Forces would do the elimination?

MR LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson, but the manner in which it would be done was not mentioned to us, or it was not discussed with us.

CHAIRPERSON: Precisely what was required of you to do?

MR LOOTS: Chairperson, I think as I have explained, at that stage I was in command of the Western Transvaal and it was practice that when persons from elsewhere like Northern Transvaal, would act in the Northern Transvaal, that they inform you ...

CHAIRPERSON: I understand that but was there anything that you were required personally to do?

MR LOOTS: The only request from their side was to find a secluded spot where these persons could be intercepted.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: But that had been done by your underling, Mr Crause. The spot had already been identified by Mr Crause, is it not so?

MR LOOTS: ...(no audible reply)

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Yes. Now why was your presence required?

INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone is not activated.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Your microphone is off.

MR LOOTS: The only answer that I can give was that it indicates to the manner that I had to be, had knowledge of what happened there as a commander of the area.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: You could have approved of Mr Crause proceeding with the request that had been relayed to him by Brigadier Cronje telephonically, couldn't you have done that?

MR LOOTS: As I have explained, telephonically it was difficult to discuss such sensitive matters on the telephone and that is why I drove to Zeerust.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: But I was under the impression that Mr Crause had discussed the matter with you telephonically and it was as a result of that telephonic discussion that you came down to Zeerust.

MR LOOTS: If I recall correctly, Crause told me that Cronje had contacted him and that he and Naude needed some assistance to help with people who were on their way out and therefore because detail could not be discussed over the telephone, I decided to drive through.

CHAIRPERSON: What was the limit of your participation in this whole thing actually, what actually did you do?

MR LOOTS: I will agree with Major Vorster, that God does not make this happen to me again, to be involved. I was just here as an observer. I had no part in the catching of people or whatever.

CHAIRPERSON: Were you there right up to the time that this vehicle burnt down or exploded?

MR LOOTS: That's correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And after that, did you have to report to anybody?

MR LOOTS: Brigadier was my superior and I assumed that he would do the necessary.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thanks. Mr Visser, any questions in re-examination?

MR VISSER: No re-examination thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VISSER: May the witness be excused?

CHAIRPERSON: You are excused.

MR VISSER: I only have the two applicants in this incident, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: I understand.

MS LOCKHAT: We call the next applicant, Mr P J Verster.

MR WESSELS: Mr Chairman, the application of Mr Verster appears on page 25 of bundle 3. I will also make reference to a document that he handed in with his application, which forms part of bundle 4. That document starts on page 27 of bundle 4.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Mr Wessels, before you proceed, is Mr Verster applying for amnesty in respect of the Nietverdiendt incident?

MR WESSELS: Yes, he does indeed.

CHAIRPERSON: What did he do?

MR VERSTER: He did not take actively part in anything and therefore he's not guilty of a gross human rights violation in terms of the Act although he became aware of what had happened and therefore in common law he would be technically guilty as an accomplice, and on that basis he had to apply also for amnesty because he could be held liable on that basis.

I did suggest to my learned friend, the prosecutor leader, that this is actually a matter that does not need to be heard in a hearing and that it can be dealt with by way of administrative decisions in chambers, but I was told that ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Well, I think all the documentation had been prepared and a great deal of trouble had been gone through and perhaps it was thought that it would be convenient to dispose of the matter.

MR WESSELS: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: But before you call him, I just thought I wanted some clarity from you as to precisely what he did to associate himself with this offence.

MR WESSELS: Well the evidence was already that Vorster came to him and reported to him that he didn't want to be involved again. He thereafter knew about the incident and he did not disclose this information to any person outside the Defence Force and to that extent it can be possibly said on a technical basis, that he did associate himself with the action.

CHAIRPERSON: Well's let's dispose of his evidence as quickly as we can.

MR WESSELS: We will, I will do so.

CHAIRPERSON: We have other matters that are of a far weightier nature.

MR WESSELS: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: So will you call him please.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: That being so, do you still want to traverse the bundle that you have referred to?

MR WESSELS: I'm just going to refer to it, I'm not going to read it out or anything like.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: ...(inaudible)

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Verster, your full names please?

PIETER JOHAN VERSTER: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, please proceed.

EXAMINATION BY MR WESSELS: Mr Verster, is it correct that you have applied for amnesty, and your application appears in the papers as I've read it out, and do you confirm the correctness thereof?

MR VERSTER: Yes.

MR WESSELS: Is it also correct that your personal profile appears from page 28 to page 31 in bundle B, do you confirm that?

MR VERSTER: Yes, that's correct.

MR WESSELS: Is it correct that during 1986, you were deployed to the Wits Command under the instructions of General Joubert to assist the police?

MR VERSTER: Yes, that's correct.

MR WESSELS: At this stage you still occupied certain other posts, is that correct?

MR VERSTER: Yes.

MR WESSELS: What were those positions?

MR VERSTER: Chairperson, I was the senior staff officer for covert operations. That was the staff officer of General Joubert. We were also in a transition period during which we were busy establishing the CCB.

MR WESSELS: Mr Verster, you were not involved in the planning or execution of the Nietverdiendt operation, is that correct?

MR VERSTER: No, except for the initial negotiations with General Joubert and Commandant Naude I was not involved at all.

MR WESSELS: Were you aware that these operations were to take place before they actually took place?

MR VERSTER: I can't say with certainty, however from my position as staff officer, it may have been that there were negotiations or telephone conversations regarding co-ordination, however I was not aware of the specific planning.

MR WESSELS: After the operation had been executed, is it correct that Mr Vorster approached you?

MR VERSTER: Yes, that's correct. Mr Vorster came to me the following day and told me that he didn't believe that this was the sort of work which soldiers were to be part of and that he did not want to be involved at all in the future.

MR WESSELS: Were you then made aware of what happened there?

MR VERSTER: Yes, I was then made aware of the circumstance.

MR WESSELS: Did you convey this to anybody else?

MR VERSTER: At a later stage I discussed this with the chairperson, General Joubert.

MR WESSELS: I have no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, there can't be any cross-examination surely?

MR VISSER: I have no questions, thank you Mr Chairman.

ADV DE JAGER: I beg your pardon. You were made aware of it the following day, you knew that people had died and you did not report this or convey it to anybody else except to General Joubert?

MR VERSTER: Yes, that's correct, Chairperson. By nature of my appointment I was not at liberty to discuss it, I kept it within the military system.

ADV DE JAGER: So that was your reconciliation or knowledge of the deed?

MR VERSTER: Yes, that's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: So all you knew is what you were told?

MR VERSTER: Yes, that's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Thanks very much, you are excused.

MR VERSTER: Thank you, Chairperson. I'd just like to say a few words if you would grant me a moment or two.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, certainly.

MR VERSTER: Yesterday when we began Chairperson, we saw that from the police's side General van der Merwe was present and he supported his people. I would just like to put it a bit stronger than previous members of the forces.

We were part of a system. General Joubert explained what the channels were. I was also very well aware of what the channels were and I feel that it is very poor that our direct head of whom I have direct knowledge, that General Geldenhuys was not present here.

I would also like to say that we have come over a period of 10 years where we have had these problems. It began in 1989, and from the very first day the attempt has been to make it appear as if people acted independently according to their role. And if I look at General Joubert, I would like to put it very strongly that he is the only General who had the will and the perseverance to stand by the decisions which he made, and perhaps this is part of the problems that the General is experiencing today with his health. I would just like to emphasise that we support him loyally. I thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Right, that will be recorded. Thank you very much.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, we move onto another incident altogether now, do we?

MR VAN DEN BERG: Mr Chairperson, I've been requested to call one of the mothers. I know that one of them testified previously at Cronje's hearing. There's been really an amplification of the evidence that was given at Cronje's application and one of the mothers would like to respond to that. May I do so?

CHAIRPERSON: Certainly.

MR VAN DEN BERG: We call Mrs Phiri please.

CHAIRPERSON: Can you spell that name?

MR VAN DEN BERG: P-H-I-R-I.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Mr van den Berg, what language does shoe speak?

MR VAN DEN BERG: Sesotho.

MS PHIRI: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Yes, please proceed.

EXAMINATION BY MR VAN DEN BERG: Previously Mrs Makualane testified at the Cronje hearings, and that's at page 55 and following, bundle 2(c).

Today, Mrs Phiri, you've heard evidence of what happened with your son. Who was your son?

MS PHIRI: Thomas Phiri was my son. He is the last born in our family.

MR VAN DEN BERG: When was he born?

MS PHIRI: He was born on the 25th of December 1964.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Today you heard evidence that they were injected with a narcotic substance which rendered them unconscious, do you want to respond on your behalf and on behalf of the families to that evidence?

MS PHIRI: Yes. We have heard the evidence regarding the injection, but it differs from what Cronje told us. And the policeman from Daggarsberg told us that it was not Nietverdient. This incident did not happen at Nietverdiendt. We asked then where Nietverdiendt was. They told us it was 65 kilometres from where we were. They are not telling us the truth here. They don't tell us what they did to them.

CHAIRPERSON: In what way are they not telling the truth? What is the truth?

MS PHIRI: The truth is that they should tell the Committee the truth. They have sworn that they will tell the truth. Cronje said there were handgrenades in the kombi, more than 25. They say there was a limpet mine. Now the policeman who found the children in the kombi said the kombi had bullet holes all round and the sliding door was open and one child was at the driver's seat. Let them tell us the full story so that we can - we are deeply hurt. If they tell the story we will be okay.

MR VAN DEN BERG: You've then also heard evidence that the bodies were burnt at the scene of the sham accident, for want of a better word, do you want to comment on that?

MS PHIRI: Yes, we were told that the bodies were burnt and the door was open and the there were footsteps, those of the soldier's boots and they disappeared into the veld. Only the intestines of the children were left behind, the bodes were burnt.

We want to know where these children were buried because we were never told the truth of where they were buried.

MR VAN DEN BERG: Chairperson, those are the aspects that we wish to canvass. I have no further questions.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Mr van den Berg, Mrs Phiri has made certain allegations. She has received some information from a policeman. Is she aware of who that policeman is? And from your side, have you done anything as her legal representative, to take these issues up and investigate them further with a view assisting this Committee to come to an equitable decision?

MR VAN DEN BERG: Judge Khampepe, I've been given details of a policeman at the Madikwe Police Station, an Inspector Modisane. I was given this information during the course of yesterday afternoon. I've made various attempts to contact him. He's apparently off duty at present. I will continue to try and get hold of him to ascertain what the position is, because there does seem to be quite a large discrepancy between what Mrs Phiri has described and what the applicants have testified to. I will continue to follow that up. I'm afraid, as I said, this information was only given to me during the course of yesterday afternoon by one of the, a Mr Moyeme, who I understand is linked to the TRC and one of the Investigators, but I'm not 100% certain of that, what his status is and whether he is in fact linked to the TRC, but he is the person who gave me the information.

CHAIRPERSON: To your knowledge, is there any evidence as to where the remains of these people were buried?

MR VAN DEN BERG: No, Mr Chairperson. We've been given portions of what appears to be an inquest record or post-mortem reports, but we've not been able to ascertain, despite enquiries both at Madikwe and at the magistrates court. We made those enquiries during the Cronje hearing and we've not been able to determine whether you tie the post-mortems to specific burial places. It would appear that you can't.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Now if I can recall well, whether you can even rely on the post-mortems which are in your possession. Is it that not where the problem is?

MR VAN DEN BERG: That's also indeed a problem because from those post-mortems they appear to be considerably older than the children that we're talking about here.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but those were merely estimates, isn't it?

MR VAN DEN BERG: That is so, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. It seems that this matter is not capable of being cleared, either due to a passage of time or a failure on the part of anybody to record where the remains of these people were buried and that will remain one of these unanswered questions.

If during the course of these proceedings tomorrow or the day after, you are in a position to get any further information, will you please come and see me in chambers so we can decide how to deal further with this matter?

MR VAN DEN BERG: I will do so, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Visser, I know that the police did not solve or pursue the matter further at that time, but Mr Crause was later involved in Boputhatswana, can there not be any assistance from their side, so that the parents can be determine where their children have been buried?

MR VISSER: Mr Chair, yes we will attempt, I will make a few enquiries. I have thought that perhaps we should enquire as to who the person is that led the post-mortem inquiry. And even though the record may not be available, we could contact him in order to determine what he may remember thereof. However, I will consult Brigadier Loots and Mr Crause to see if they could not consult their old contacts and make certain arrangements.

This is of course subject to the fact that those who appear before you nowadays, who are no longer in the police force, don't really have much access to information and there are certain problems and resistance with regard to such enquiries. However, we will attempt to do so by assuring whoever we contact, that we are doing so with the authorisation of the Commission.

ADV DE JAGER: I cannot think that in this case it could not be possible to determine what happened to the bodies. There was no secrecy in the sense that it appeared to be an accident or was supposed to look like an accident and there was no reason to cover up the whole story in terms of the burial and so forth.

MR VISSER: More than that we know that a case was made with the Boputhatswana authorities and an investigation was conducted, so there should be no reason why there should be secrecy surrounding what happened to the bodies.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr van den Berg, I'm rather surprised that it's almost, well maybe longer than a year since the Cronje hearing, that this information only comes to hand yesterday. Was there any consultation previously, or didn't they know about it and you only heard that from Mr Moyeme? Is he present here?

MR VAN DEN BERG: No, he's not, Mr Chairperson. I do have a contact number for him. After the Cronje applications arrangements were made for the mothers to go out to what was believed to be the scene. And I didn't keep track of it post to that I'm afraid. We made enquiries during the Cronje application, in an attempt to ascertain the, or to get better information, but I'm afraid that we didn't in my office follow it up thereafter.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Do you say Mr Moyeme might be attached to our Investigative Unit?

MR VAN DEN BERG: Judge Khampepe, that was the impression that I was brought under. I may be completely incorrect.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Are you able to clear that with ...(indistinct).

MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, this is the first time this has been brought to my knowledge. I can take up the matter further if he does work for the Commission and if it is clarified I can that upon myself to get that information, but this is the first time that I've heard of it.

CHAIRPERSON: Mrs Phiri, you have heard all that is being said now by counsel in this matter. Attempts will be made to try and find out if it is at all possible to do so, where these people were buried, the remains of these 10 people were buried and if any reliable information comes forward it will be communicated to you and to the parents of the other deceased. Do you understand?

MS PHIRI: I do understand.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MS PHIRI: Can I have two more words to say?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MS PHIRI: I want to enquire from the killers, yes they told us that they killed them, they told us that they injected them with drugs and they are buried, but I want them to know that their graves are open and even in heaven they will not get forgiveness at all because they killed minor children. Had these children killed people before we would have understood that yes, it was their turn to be killed, but I want to tell them today that they will never get forgiveness from God at all, their graves are waiting for them, waiting open.

CHAIRPERSON: Right you are. If this matter can be taken further we should do so.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, something that has just occurred to me that might be a fruitful enquiry into is, it surprises one to know that there was an inquest and that none of, where apparently there was some identification of some of these people with their addresses, it surprises one to learn that the next-of-kin were not told of an inquest and one wonders whether my learned friend couldn't just discover from these clients or from the relations whether they ever attended, because that might shed light on the situation.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, only the inquest occurred in the form of Boputhatswana and whether one would be able to trace the necessary documentation in that part of the world at this stage is another problem.

MR VISSER: One would just have expected the next-of-kin to have been informed of an inquest.

CHAIRPERSON: Right, thanks very much.

CHAIRPERSON: Where do we proceed to now?

MS LOCKHAT: We can proceed with argument now, Chairperson.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Which other matter is on the roll after the Nietverdiendt matter?

MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, the Ribeiro matter is on the roll.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Are we ready to proceed?

MS LOCKHAT: The only problem that I can foresee is that there are legal representatives that are not here and it is ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Legal representatives of?

MS LOCKHAT: Of implicated persons. That seems to be a problem I can foresee, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: They are aware of the hearing?

MS LOCKHAT: Yes, they are aware of the hearing, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And they made no excuse or explanation as to why they are not here?

MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, they were relying on the Commission to inform them as to when they are going to, when they are needed for the hearing, but they are aware that we commenced yesterday and they were here this morning as well and then they'd left, so they're not here now, Chairperson.

ADV DE JAGER: Aren't they Pretoria advocates?

MS LOCKHAT: That is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: They're about two blocks away.

MS LOCKHAT: I can contact them and inform them that they have to be here in the next five minutes.

ADV DE JAGER: It seems as though attorneys or representatives are already doing that because I see cellphones there being spoken on.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: On what basis could they have relied on the Commission to inform them, when I think that was arranged in chambers, that we would try and approximate when the first incident is likely to come to an end and people would then make themselves available for the next incident?

MS LOCKHAT: That is correct, Chairperson, and I did inform them that I can't give them specifically a time as to today, when we're going to finish today regarding Nietverdiendt. And that seems to be the problem.

CHAIRPERSON: Well I think that we should make a beginning in the next matter and whilst we are making a beginning in the next matter, perhaps telephonic communications should be established with counsel representing implicated people and told that this matter has now commenced.

MS LOCKHAT: That's in order, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Will you call the parties concerned?

MR WESSELS: ... Wessels, I appear for Robey, Naude and Verster as well as Vlietstra.

MR GROBLER: Mr Chairman, I unfortunately missed your opening words, but if we're dealing with the application in respect of the Ribeiro's, I'm appearing on behalf of General Joubert.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, Visser - I'm sorry. ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: General Joubert is not an applicant in this matter?

MR GROBLER: In the Ribeiro matter yes, he is Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

MR WESSELS: For Robey, Verster, Naude and Vlietstra.

MR MEINTJIES: Mr Chairman, I'm Roelf Meintjies from the firm, Meintjies Waugh Inc., I appear on behalf of Mr JJH van Jaarsveld in this matter.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, Visser on record. I appear for two people who might be implicated, General PJ Coetzee, a previous Commissioner of Police and Brigadier Willem Schoon.

CHAIRPERSON: How do you spell that?

MR VISSER: S-C-H-O-O-N.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman lastly, I appear on behalf of Brigadier Cronje and Captain Hechter insofar as it may be necessary to represent them at this hearing.

ADV DE JAGER: ... not represented here?

MR YOUNG: Mr Chairman, my names is Young, Ruth and Wessels, Pretoria, on behalf of General Geldenhuys. Counsel will be here presently, Advocate Etienne Coetzee of the Pretoria Bar. May it please you.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

MR YOUNG: Etienne Coetzee yes, Mr Chairman. General Geldenhuys, I beg your pardon. He's not an applicant, but he may be implicated.

CHAIRPERSON: Are the applicants represented? I trust they are.

MR GROBLER: Mr Chairman, I believe Advocate Tokkie van Zyl is not present. He's instructing attorney is Adolf Malan. I'm not sure who their clients are, but I have left a message on their cellphone just now.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Well, can we make a beginning. Will Mr Robey be the first witness?

MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, we call on Mr Naude.

MR WESSELS: Mr Chairman, the application of Mr Naude appears on page 18, bundle 4. If it's in order with you, Mr Chairman, I will not deal with the profile of the applicant, but will immediately start with the facts of the matter.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Naude, you have to take the oath again.

CHARL NAUDE: (s.u.o.)

EXAMINATION BY MR WESSELS: Mr Naude, is it correct that you were also involved with the Ribeiro matter?

MR NAUDE: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR WESSELS: When were you aware for the first time of the activities of Doctor and Mrs Ribeiro?

MR NAUDE: At the meeting where General told myself and Colonel Verster, that was the first time that I heard these names.

MR WESSELS: And what were you informed about the Ribeiro's?

MR NAUDE: It was a summary and the only thing that I knew at that stage was that they were responsible for the transport of person to Swaziland for instant training and that they were trained themselves and that they handled training in their house at a later stage, and they handled money matters of the ANC.

MR WESSELS: What did you ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: Excuse me. This meeting, was it just the three of you?

MR NAUDE: It was just the three of us.

ADV DE JAGER: Nobody of the police was present?

MR NAUDE: This was the meeting where the General gave us instructions to support the police.

CHAIRPERSON: So let's just get his straight. The information you got that they were responsible for sending people to Swaziland for training and their house was used as well for training, is that it? Is that what you said?

MR NAUDE: That's correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And then something about financial assistance they gave, is that right?

MR NAUDE: It appeared as if the Ribeiro family had some of the finances of the ANC with them and as soon as ANC activists needed money, then they would provide them with that.

CHAIRPERSON: Now you got that information from General Joubert?

MR NAUDE: That's right, I got that from General Joubert, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Carry on.

MR WESSELS: What did you do after that with regard to the Ribeiro's?

MR NAUDE: For a while this project was abandoned. We discussed other operations during our meetings with Brigadier Cronje and his staff, of which not a single one materialised into a specific operation that was executed.

Later on I had a meeting. Mr Robey and myself were at a meeting in Northern Transvaal with the Security Branch at their offices, where I requested a file of the Ribeiro family.

If I recall correctly, the file was not handed to me immediately, a few days after that they handed the file to me. I gave the file to Mr Robey to study, with specific reference to residence of Doctor Ribeiro and his wife.

MR WESSELS: And why did you do this?

MR NAUDE: This was done in order to plan an operation against them.

MR WESSELS: Did you study the file yourself?

MR NAUDE: I read through the file but I did not make an in-depth study of this file, I left it to Mr Robey. I think at that stage we, in the many meetings and with the names being mentioned, we already had much knowledge of the Ribeiro family.

MR WESSELS: Did you discuss the Ribeiro family with members of the Security Branch?

MR NAUDE: Chairperson, I did discuss it with Brigadier Cronje as well as Captain Hechter.

MR WESSELS: And what was the conclusion that was drawn after this discussion, was a decision taken to take action against them?

MR NAUDE: A decision was taken that we would act against them.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, who took that decision and when?

MR NAUDE: Chairperson, I cannot recall specifically who said yes, let's do it, it was probably a collective decision that was taken at one of these meetings.

MR WESSELS: Yourself and who else?

MR NAUDE: As far as I recall it was Brigadier Cronje and Captain Jacques Hechter.

MR WESSELS: Yes, and what happened after that?

MR NAUDE: We eventually knew enough of the Ribeiro family to plan an operation and amongst others Robey and myself decided that we were to use people who have never been in Mamelodi and will probably never return to Mamelodi.

I then requested from headquarters that I would want to Portuguese Special Forces operatives from the operational area. This request was conceded to and I told Mr Robey that the person would arrive with a normal scheduled flight from the operational area and I would meet them at headquarters.

MR WESSELS: Before we get to that point, did you discuss this plan with General Joubert?

MR NAUDE: That is correct, I did discuss it with General Joubert.

MR WESSELS: Did you get his approval for this action?

MR NAUDE: Yes, I did.

CHAIRPERSON: When you say that you requested headquarters to send you two specially trained Portuguese, who are you talking about, who did you deal with?

MR NAUDE: The people whom I referred to are Portuguese soldiers in Special Forces. There was a group of Portuguese soldiers. They were the remain of 32 Battalion whom we recruited and they were in the operational area.

ADV DE JAGER: I think the question was ...

CHAIRPERSON: The question was, when you said that you requested headquarters, who in fact did you approach at headquarters?

MR NAUDE: Chairperson, I cannot clearly recall if I asked the General or whether I asked Colonel Verster, but it would probably be one of those two members.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: I want to suppose this was not the first request you had made to headquarters, was there no standard procedure for such requests?

MR NAUDE: Sorry, I couldn't follow that question.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Didn't you have a procedure in which you would speak to a particular person at headquarters when you made such a request?

MR NAUDE: Sorry, is the question whether there was a procedure?

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Yes.

MR NAUDE: Yes, there was a procedure, the commanders discussed it with each others. I either spoke to the General or I spoke to one of his staff officers and that staff officer had to give me what I wanted if it met with the General's approval.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Yes. And in this case you can't remember who you spoke to?

MR NAUDE: I could have spoken to any of them, but I cannot recall with one of the two I had discussions.

CHAIRPERSON: Now which part of the world are you now dealing with, Angola or Mozambique?

MR NAUDE: We speak about the operational area, Ovamboland in the north of Namibia.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: You may proceed, Mr Wessels.

MR WESSELS: Thank you, Mr Chairman. Continue, Mr Naude, what had happened then?

MR NAUDE: On a given day I then told Mr Robey that the people had arrived at Special Forces headquarters and that he had to collect them and house them in a hotel. He then left. He found the people and he reported back to me that he did indeed book them into an hotel and he told the Portuguese how to get to the place and return to the hotel.

MR WESSELS: Mr Naude, was it the plan that Doctor and Mrs Ribeiro would be shot?

MR NAUDE: That was the plan, that they would be shot, yes.

MR WESSELS: Yes, continue please.

MR NAUDE: When Mr Robey reported to me that he was certain that these two people knew the route into and out of the city properly and would be certain that they would find it again, I then said that we must continue with the operation.

CHAIRPERSON: Where were they to go to? When you talk about the route, the route to where?

MR NAUDE: There was a point if one travels with the Silverton Road out, that's Pretoria Road, there was a crossing and that was the point where they had to find their own way. They were to be met there because these Portuguese did not know Pretoria or the CBD. We had to show them the shortest route and they had to drive this route by themselves.

MR WESSELS: Where would this operation have been executed?

MR NAUDE: It would have been executed in Mamelodi.

MR WESSELS: At the surgery of Doctor Ribeiro?

MR NAUDE: That's positive, yes Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: So was it Robey who showed them the route?

MR NAUDE: Robey took them to a final rendezvous and they took the map and from there it was only about four blocks away, so to get the route from there was very easy.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but Robey took them and showed them the route to Mamelodi.

MR NAUDE: That's right, he showed them the route.

MR WESSELS: So what happened on this specific day when the operation was launched?

MR NAUDE: I can recall that at that stage the preparation of the vehicles was done by Robey, namely false number plates so that the car could not be traced. The engine and chassis numbers had been removed and this vehicle was prepared with false number plates and it was taken to the operatives, the black Portuguese operatives ...(end of side A of tape)

MR NAUDE: ... from Robey. He followed them to the point where the rendezvous point was and from there they had to continue on their own and come back to the rendezvous.

MR WESSELS: Where were you the day of this incident?

MR NAUDE: We drove and we stopped at the Palms Hotel, which was in Pretoria Road just outside, or it was the last building outside Silverton. We waited there. We co-ordinated that everybody was together and everybody knew what was going on and that everybody was at the right place at the right time.

From there Robey and Koen Vlietstra drove to the rendezvous point to wait for the people if they should return, so as to collect them from there.

MR WESSELS: Who was with you?

MR NAUDE: Captain Hechter, or I drove with Captain Hechter in his police vehicle.

ADV DE JAGER: Excuse me. You now used a term:

MR NAUDE: To the rendezvous point, to the meeting point.

ADV DE JAGER: No, I follow now. I think the people who don't know the terms will not follow what the term is.

MR NAUDE: Please excuse me, Chairperson.

MR WESSELS: Where did you and Hechter go to?

MR NAUDE: We drove to an open field. As one enters Mamelodi on the south eastern side of Mamelodi there was an open field and we waited there.

MR WESSELS: Why did you go there?

MR NAUDE: We waited there in case there was a problem where South African Police would stop the vehicle and then Hechter could step in and let our operatives go.

MR WESSELS: Very well. The operation was executed and you waited there, what would happen after that?

MR NAUDE: To pistols were used in the operation and although they had silences, Captain Hechter told me that he was certain that he heard two shots.

From there we drove past the Ribeiro's house. He stopped, he went inside, he came back and from there we drove back to the Palms Inn Hotel and I got to my vehicle and we drove from there, each to our separate units. When he came out of the house he said that both the Ribeiro's had been shot dead.

CHAIRPERSON: Who was it that said so?

MR NAUDE: Excuse me, Chairperson?

CHAIRPERSON: Who was it that went into the house?

MR NAUDE: Captain Hechter went into the house.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes?

MR WESSELS: Continue.

MR NAUDE: Robey had instructions to book the operatives back into the hotel, make sure that he was not being followed. To book the operatives back into the hotel and to come out to our headquarters. He did indeed do so.

ADV DE JAGER: Were they also in the Palms Inn Hotel?

MR NAUDE: No, they were in entirely another hotel in the city. I'm not sure what the hotel's name was.

MR WESSELS: What happened to these operatives?

MR NAUDE: I gave instructions to Robey to leave them in the foyer at Special Forces headquarters with their equipment and their clothes. They had to book out of the hotel and they had to be left there. He did indeed do so. I don't know what happened to them after that. I accept that they took the following scheduled flight out to Ovamboland to the operational area in Ovamboland in the north of Namibia.

MR WESSELS: Did you report to General Joubert?

MR NAUDE: Yes, I reported to General Joubert. And the vehicle that was used was destroyed in its entirely and was discarded of on different rubbish dumps.

CHAIRPERSON: This might be an unnecessary question, but do you know what the names are of the people that did the killing?

MR NAUDE: Chairperson, we tried to find out, but we could not find the names of the two operatives.

CHAIRPERSON: Where could you not find them?

MR NAUDE: Excuse me, Chairperson, I could not hear that.

CHAIRPERSON: When you say you couldn't find their names, where did you look?

MR NAUDE: I contacted everybody who was involved and I tried to find what their names were, but - the thing is Mr Chairperson, the people were here for two days, two or three days and we had very little to do with them. And after all these years I cannot recall what the operatives names were.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: After you had requested head office to provide you with these two people, were you not informed who would be coming to assist you? Were you just given faceless persons?

MR NAUDE: I'm very sorry, I couldn't hear that.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: When you made the request to your head office to provide you with the two operatives from Namibia, didn't they tell you who would be given to you to render the assistance that you wanted from headquarters?

MR NAUDE: Chairperson, at troop level it was not important what the people's names were, we did not focus on the names. They told me that the two operatives were here. I wonder if the staff officer knew what their names were. Probably the persons who put them on the aeroplane would have booked them in on their names, but I don't think anybody else would have known what these people's names were.

CHAIRPERSON: So Robey must know their names because he booked them into an hotel.

MR NAUDE: Chairperson, he would probably be able to tell you, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: You never found out from him?

MR NAUDE: No, I asked him but he cannot recall.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, please proceed.

MR WESSELS: I have no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: So apart from what you were told, you knew nothing about the activities of Doctor and Mrs Ribeiro, is that correct?

MR NAUDE: Except for what I knew, or what was told to me by the Security Branch, I did not know anything of these two persons.

CHAIRPERSON: Are far as you are concerned, whose decision was it that they should be killed?

MR NAUDE: Chairperson, I think the decision came a long way and I think in the meeting already, where the General spoke to the commanding officer and had a meeting with the Security Branch, already there these two people were pointed out as potential targets. At the meeting that myself, General Joubert and Mr Verster had, already they were pointed out as potential targets. And that is the reason why I decided that we continue with the operation. But the decision was taken at a meeting where the Security Police were present.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but I want to know the names of the people who took that decision.

MR NAUDE: Chairperson, I cannot say. I can tell you under oath that it could have been me, it could have been anybody, but I accept responsibility.

CHAIRPERSON: No, it's not a question of you accepting responsibility. That's very noble of you to accept responsibility. We would like to know who the individuals are who in fact took that decision.

MR NAUDE: Chairperson, while we had the meeting it probably came to the fore that we have to continue with the operation, but I cannot specifically remember who said those words: "Let's continue with the operation." I cannot recall.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Haven't you in your evidence-in-chief stated that you had a meeting, a discussion of some kind with Brigadier Cronje, after which a decision was taken to act against the Ribeiro's? Wasn't that your evidence-in-chief?

MR NAUDE: Sorry, could you just repeat that again?

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Wasn't your evidence-in-chief that you had a meeting with Brigadier Cronje, you had a discussion with Brigadier Cronje after which a decision was taken to act against the Ribeiro's? I think I'm quoting you verbatim.

MR NAUDE: That's 100%, I agree with that, but what I can't remember is that day when we were sitting discussing that, who was the individual, me or him or Hechter, that actually said a decision was taken ...(intervention)

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Yes, the thrust of the your evidence was that it was a collective decision amongst the three of you.

MR NAUDE: Yes, I ...(intervention)

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: And this is the question that is being put to you by the Chair. He is trying to clear in his mind whether you still stand by that evidence, that the decision to execute this operation was taken jointly by you, Brigadier Cronje and Mr Hechter.

MR NAUDE: I think that's the closest to the truth, yes. I will go along with that.

CHAIRPERSON: Is it not strange that you who knew nothing about these people should take part in the decision that they should be killed?

MR NAUDE: The reason why I did not have a problem with this was because my commander told me that these people had to be a target and Brigadier Cronje, he was a Brigadier of whom I accepted that what he told me would be the absolute truth.

CHAIRPERSON: So your commander was who?

MR NAUDE: Sorry, could you repeat that please?

CHAIRPERSON: Who was your commander at the time?

MR NAUDE: It was General Joubert.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: May I clear something with you, Mr Naude. This is how I understand your evidence. You were advised by your commander, General Joubert, that he Ribeiro's had been identified as a target. You subsequently had a meeting with Brigadier Cronje at which again it was decided that now action must be taken against the Ribeiro's. What is it that needed to be done by Robey in file that you gave him to study?

MR NAUDE: We needed information, detailed information of exactly where the Ribeiro's stayed, and that is about all that we needed in the file. That was virtually all that the file consisted of. It consisted of an air photograph of Mamelodi and a street map indicating the houses of the two people.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: I would have been under the impression that there was more in the file because in your evidence-in-chief you say that you did not read the file in-depth, you left that to Mr Robey to do because you didn't have time. What there to be studied in-depth if all that you required was the street address and probably the map which you could have obtained, not necessarily from the file.

MR NAUDE: I must agree that I went through the file and to this day I can't remember what exactly what was on the file. What I know that was of interest at that stage was the fact that we wanted the exact position of the house.

The rest of the stuff I can't remember whether I heard it in the conference or read it in the file, but the fact remains they gave us a folder. It wasn't the docket, it was just a folder with documents in it and I can't exactly remember, Mr Chairman, what exactly was in the file. I can just remember one thing and that was that there was an air photograph and there was a street map of Mamelodi in it.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Naude, if one wants to find out where the Ribeiro's lived, one could find out and tell Hechter; let's drive and show me where he lives.

MR NAUDE: We did not want to show our white faces in the area and that is why our people did not show them where the place was. I gave Robey the instruction "take them to a place close to where they live and from there they had to go themselves and they have to find the place themselves because it was not difficult to find the place. I had no problem with the Portuguese who have never been in Pretoria, that they would get lost in that area.

ADV DE JAGER: But Hechter drove up and down in Mamelodi, he very often drove up and down in Mamelodi.

MR NAUDE: Hechter did but not I. I have never been there and I did not want to show my face there. He had a good reason for being there, I had no reason for driving around there. If anybody saw me there and asked who I was, it would have been a problem.

ADV DE JAGER: You see my problem is that you say you wanted to find the exact address because at that stage you had the Portuguese in mind and so that you know where to take them.

MR NAUDE: We had the Portuguese in mind and specifically we asked for this file with the air photograph and the map so that we could show the Portuguese where precisely the had to go.

ADV DE JAGER: But Hechter could have driven out with the Portuguese and showed them where they lived.

MR NAUDE: I would agree with you, that would have been an option, but we decided that these guys have to find their own way, they were not to be seen with Security Police, nothing like that.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Are you aware that Captain Hechter had been to the Ribeiro's? Had he told you that?

MR NAUDE: That he's been to the ...(intervention)

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: That he'd been to the Ribeiro's, to the house of the Ribeiro's.

MR NAUDE: After the incident?

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Before.

MR NAUDE: No, he didn't tell me that.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Did you ask him whether he was aware of where the house was of the Ribeiro's? I mean they had been the ones who had been doing the groundwork.

MR NAUDE: Did I ask him if he ...?

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: If he knew where the Ribeiro's were staying?

MR NAUDE: Yes, but he gave us a street address, he gave us photographs of the house and he gave us an air photograph of the area and a street map.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Yet you still asked for the file to give to Robey in order to gain that information.

MR NAUDE: But that was the file that they gave us. It was a photograph of the, the air photograph of Mamelodi and the street map of Mamelodi with the addresses in it.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: But if Mr Hechter had already given you the street address, what then was the purpose of studying the file?

MR NAUDE: Because there were air photographs on the - I was worried that the Portuguese speaking people from Northern Namibia wouldn't be able to get the street file, the street address. That is why I gave them a photo, I wanted to give them photograph where they could look at and see that house looks like this one, this house looks like this one, this is the right house. Because we couldn't afford to make a mistake.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: You had operatives like Mr Mamasela, didn't you - who were black ...(intervention)

MR NAUDE: Sorry?

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: You had people within the Security Force, who were black and who could have assisted with the pointing out.

MR NAUDE: Sorry, could you just say that again?

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: You had black operatives, black operatives within the Security Force, who could have assisted you and your operatives in locating the house of the Ribeiro's.

MR NAUDE: Okay. Due to the fact that I had a limitation from the General, that it must be absolute secrecy, we had to keep that to as narrow amount of people that we could. And we assumed that the people from Northern Namibia would never come here again and would never be able to talk to somebody here and would never refer to this operation again.

If we had taken people that stayed here and something comes into the papers, they might decide to talk about it. That's why we didn't use a South African person to assist us in the operation.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Mr Wessels, were you through with his evidence-in-chief?

MR WESSELS: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Did that file contain not one scrap of paper to record the kind of activities that the Ribeiro's were engaged in?

MR NAUDE: Chairperson, I cannot answer that question. I think Mr Robey, who had the file would be able to answer that question much better.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: But you have in your evidence, Mr Naude, also referred to the file. You briefly went through the file, wouldn't you be able to know whether there was something far much more than the aerial map and the address in the file?

MR NAUDE: I wen through the file with the purposes to see that the material that I wanted for the operation was there, I didn't go through it to try and determine whether Mr Ribeiro was innocent or not. That decision was made, that he is a target.

So I didn't want to study the file to try and prove that, I wanted to know whether the information that I need to conduct my operation was there and I paged through it and I found the information that I needed and I gave the file to Robey and I said, "carry on with the operation".

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: To your knowledge, how thick was that file?

MR NAUDE: Is it possible to ask the question for - no, no, no, it was definitely not the docket that was opened on Mr Ribeiro and his wife. It wasn't a thick file like this, it was a folder, a carton folder with papers inside. So it wasn't the big docket like this, it was just - I think, my personal feeling is that they took some stuff from the docket and gave that to me, but they didn't give me the whole docket.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: To your knowledge, who of your colleague would have firsthand information, firsthand information of the activities of Doctor Ribeiro?

MR NAUDE: It was only the Security Police that had firsthand. None of us had firsthand information about the Ribeiro family.

CHAIRPERSON: Who in the Security Police?

MR NAUDE: To my knowledge it was Colonel, Brigadier Cronje and Captain Hechter.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, cross-examination of this witness?

MR VISSER: Visser on record, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Mr Visser?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: One question just from a sake of interest.

This vehicle which was used and which was totally destroyed and disposed of on various rubbish dumps, Mr Naude, was this the Landrover of which was written in the newspapers and which was discussed?

MR NAUDE: No, it was another vehicle. It think it was an Opel vehicle, it was reddish in colour. I think it was an Opel.

MR VISSER: And where did the Landrover fit into the picture, or was there ever a Landrover in question?

MR NAUDE: The Landrover was the vehicle which Mr Robey had waited in, in the rendezvous point in Fleet Street.

MR VISSER: Thank you.

MR GROBLER: May I proceed, Mr Chairman?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, please do.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR GROBLER: Mr Naude, if I understand your evidence correctly, and I think that Judge Khampepe summarised it correctly, you were deployed to the Northern Transvaal Commandment in terms of the broader Joubert plan, of which we heard the evidence yesterday, did you already know that one or both of the Ribeiro's had been identified as targets?

MR NAUDE: Yes, Chairperson, both had already been identified as targets.

MR GROBLER: I would like to present something to you, an extract from Brigadier Cronje's evidence. I don't think it will be necessary for you to consult the specific bundle itself because I'm going to put it to you in broader terms. My colleague which has appeared on behalf of Brigadier Cronje will be able to substantiate this. Brigadier Cronje makes the statement that:

His evidence was consistently, if I've summarised it correctly, that with regard to him Mrs Ribeiro was not a target but that Doctor Ribeiro was indeed a target. Now I'd like to know whether or not you ever gained that impression from your discussions, that Mrs Ribeiro was not a target?

MR NAUDE: Chairperson, never. From the very beginning both Doctor Ribeiro and his wife were presented to me as targets, both of them.

MR GROBLER: Then I would also like to make it very clear that you not only discussed them with General Joubert, but also with Cronje and Hechter.

MR NAUDE: That is correct.

MR GROBLER: And I would like to ask you the following. If you say that both of them were presented as targets, are you speaking with regard to your discussion with General Joubert or with regard to discussions with Hechter and Cronje?

MR NAUDE: I'm speaking of discussions with the General and with Cronje.

MR GROBLER: I will return to this somewhat later, but I would like to put something to you.

MR NAUDE: Chairperson, at this point I would like to say that it is incredibly difficult to remember at this point exactly who said what to you, whether it was Hechter or Cronje who said something. It's very difficult and these bits of information make it even more difficult to say who said what.

I accept that it came from that office because that would be the only place from which we gained information and that was the only place where I heard about Ribeiro, so it had to have come from there.

ADV DE JAGER: I don't think that that's the intention with the question. I don't think that it's intended that you are supposed to say whether or not it's Hechter or Cronje who said these things, but Cronje gave evidence and said that what is about to be put to you is what Hechter himself said. So listen to what Hechter himself said and then tell us whether or not you agree with it and whether it's the truth or not.

MR GROBLER: It is simply about your recollection and I don't expect of you to remember verbatim who said what.

If you will just give me a chance to consult the bundle please.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Do you want pages, Mr Grobler, maybe I can assist you.

MR GROBLER: I beg your pardon?

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: I said if you wanted pages of what you wanted to put to him of what was said by Brigadier Cronje, I can assist you with the relevant pages.

MR GROBLER: Thank you, Judge, I made extracts and I was looking for the extracts.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: Yes.

INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone is not on.

MR GROBLER: On page 457 to page 458 is a paragraph which moves over and Captain Hechter said in his evidence:

The only question that I would like to put to you - I have put the contrasts to you in terms of what Brigadier Cronje said and Captain Hechter has said. If I were to understand you correctly, that which Captain has said would be more in line with your recollection that it was both of them?

MR NAUDE: Yes, that's correct.

MR GROBLER: Then I would like to return to Brigadier Cronje's evidence in bundle 2(b), and he puts this statement on page 499 at the beginning of his application. My learned friend, Mr du Plessis referred him to his own application and asked him the question:

And then he says:

Let me just finish ready and then I will ask for you comment.

There are two statements in that, firstly that you approached him and that you explained to him that you needed the file or that you needed a memorandum regarding Doctor Ribeiro and his activities, what is your comment regarding that?

MR NAUDE: If I wanted to be certain of the correctness of the target that we were going to be attacking, I would have to consult the General about that, and I needed to get my facts in order regarding exactly what the situation was.

Here we are jumping from a time period just after the order was given by the General back to that specific memorandum which was requested practically at the first meeting which I had with Cronje. So we're jumping around somewhat and none of these are being put in chronological order.

MR GROBLER: Well then you will have to be of assistance to us. I wasn't aware of this and it didn't emanate from the record, in terms of the chronological occurrence of these things. But if I understand you correctly, it is correct that you did request the memorandum from him at a certain point in time?

MR NAUDE: Yes, that's correct.

MR GROBLER: And that memorandum was required because for one or other reason you had to convince Joubert of something.

MR NAUDE: I wanted to be certain that General Joubert could be confirmed. If we had information it had to be confirmed through two channels, and that is why I wanted to include the memorandum so that when I had my discussion with the General, I would have my facts together. He would definitely have asked me; "In your eyes, is it correct that these people be shot?", and then I would have to have my facts ready. That memorandum was probably requested before the Nietverdiendt 10 operation took place.

MR GROBLER: Because the evidence led according to my interpretation to the following idea, and this is contained in the next sentence:

You see, he was linking those two to each other, the request for the memorandum and he maintained that Special Forces had targeted the Ribeiro's.

MR NAUDE: Chairperson, that was precisely correct because my General told me that the Ribeiro's had already been targeted. But that's not to say the we didn't make a joint decision later that it should be done. The General did tell me that the Ribeiro's had been targeted and he also informed me that I was to look at the Ribeiro's, and I conveyed this exactly to Cronje.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Naude, you gave evidence about the fact that it was not the task of Special Forces to target people, the Security Police who knew the people were responsible for targeting them and they would have then informed you; these people have been targeted, do the job. Brigadier Cronje has stated this. Let us not be mistaken here. He said that the police had not targeted those people, that Special Forces had targeted them.

MR GROBLER: With respect, Chairperson, I don't think he goes as far as to say that the police did not target them., that is not part of this evidence. Perhaps you have knowledge of something which I don't have any knowledge of.

ADV DE JAGER: Well this has been found in his evidence. His legal representative is here, he can correct me if he wishes to. He said that they had information but that these people had been targeted by Special Forces.

MR DU PLESSIS: Chairperson, perhaps we should place this all into context in terms of the evidence of Hechter that there had been two prior operations undertaken by the police against the Ribeiro's. So although this had not been testified exactly by Brigadier Cronje that the police had decided about the Ribeiro's, it was clear that the Ribeiro's were indeed a target because two prior operations had been aimed at the Ribeiro's.

I wanted to interrupt a few minutes ago regarding my learned friend's questions because it is incredibly confusing to take pieces of evidence and ask questions about that while it is not being viewed in context.

I don't know if he is aware of the evidence of Colonel Loots with regard to the Ribeiro matter which was given, during which Loots specifically explained by way of example how information Cronje would have had from the file, what he knew about the file. I would just like to emphasise that point. To remove certain aspects and to ask questions about that is very confusing and it is my duty to interrupt and set these facts straight.

I think one can accept that the Ribeiro's were definitely a target at an earlier phase, and this is supported by Hechter's evidence.

MR NAUDE: I would just like to point out that Joubert gave evidence yesterday that upon the very first meeting, when he was meeting with Cronje and the commander of the commandment, they had already been targeted. That was not Special Forces, that was a meeting of three big-shots. And from that meeting the General told me these people up here think that is a target. But that's not to say that it was Special Forces.

Mr Cronje could have thought that it was Special Forces because I said so, but in actual fact it emanated from his meeting and it was simply the General that was giving that information to me again.

ADV DE JAGER: Let's just have some clarity here. Did you ever investigate the Ribeiro's or name them as a target, based upon any knowledge which you had?

MR NAUDE: I knew absolutely nothing about the Ribeiro's until the moment that the General told me: "Work with these people, this is your task, these are your responsibilities, these are the three things which had been identified at a meeting which had absolutely nothing to do with you." That was the very first time that I heard of Ribeiro.

MR GROBLER: Thank you, Chairperson. I also thank my learned friend here, who has put the context completely right. It is so that Captain Hechter gave evidence and perhaps I shouldn't confuse you any further with page references, I will give you the extent of that evidence.

He testified that before this operation was executed by you, and by that I mean those people that worked alongside and under you, there had been two other attempts to eliminate the Ribeiro's. Were you ever aware of that?

MR NAUDE: No.

MR GROBLER: He didn't take you into his confidence and tell you about that?

MR NAUDE: No, I didn't know anything about it.

MR GROBLER: My apologies, Chairperson, for a moment I lost my notes.

The other question, Mr Naude which - and perhaps I should just put it pertinently to you regarding General Joubert's version, and that is that if you had come to him and said we were going ahead with the action against he Ribeiro's, he would have asked you: "Have the police approved this?" In other words, is this enjoying their approval? Would you have gone along with that?

MR NAUDE: Yes.

MR GROBLER: If I might then put the following question. I think there might be an element of confusion regarding how you managed to get the two operatives from Namibia in the north over here. Would you first have sought the approval from General Joubert to continue with the elimination operation before you discussed the operatives?

MR NAUDE: Yes, that's correct.

MR GROBLER: So then you have achieved the approval and you would have to put the administration in place in order to get those operatives here?

MR NAUDE: Yes.

MR GROBLER: Would you have required to go back to General Joubert for any of those administrative details?

MR NAUDE: As soon as the framework of an operation had been determined and as soon as the guidelines had been established for an operation, then the General I think trusted us to operate within those parameters judging by the amount of time he had worked with us. If I had gone back to the General it would have been if an operation had changed in essence to such an degree that it had moved beyond the parameters of the original plan, then I would have requested his approval for amendments to the plan.

MR GROBLER: You see because he will be questioned later on regarding his recollection of his specific involvement in that and I am simply trying to determine whether or not with the rest of this operation you would have been able to carry out all the operational planning and the administrational planning without the General being aware of what you were doing, such as the operatives for example.

MR NAUDE: It is impossible for the General to become involved in the detailed planning and administration of a plan because that is the work that we are supposed to do. And if we had any problems which we could not solve we would go to the staff officer or the General himself, should he be available. If it was sensitive we would go to him, if it was not that sensitive we would go to the staff officer. And we would request for certain personnel or vehicles and we didn't always go back to the General with every aspect.

MR GROBLER: Can you recall today whether or not the physical obtaining of the two operatives was delegated to someone else or whether you carried this out yourself?

MR NAUDE: I cannot remember. I didn't do it myself, it was carried out through headquarters because it was an autonomous unit and the operational area and its unit there was an autonomous unit over which I had no jurisdiction and we required the approval of headquarters in order to give effect to such a transfer. I can't recall whether or not I asked the General or one of the staff officers regarding this request. I can't recall.

MR GROBLER: And after the operation you would then by nature of the situation, or perhaps I'm assuming too much, after the operation you reported back to General Joubert regarding how the operation went?

MR NAUDE: Yes, that's correct, I reported back to the General.

MR GROBLER: And what would be the extent of the report-back have been?

MR NAUDE: Simply the success or the details. I provided no details, I simply said that the operation had been a success according to the way it had been planned. All troops had returned safely and that was the end of the matter, I didn't tell him anything else.

MR GROBLER: Just a moment please, Chairperson.

ADV DE JAGER: I'd like to ask you something in the meantime. It has come to light that there was also a memorandum which was handed over to the General, and you requested this from the Security Police. Is that the way I have put it to you, was there a memorandum?

MR NAUDE: Chairperson, I must tell you that after it having been mentioned I can remember that I requested this document, but the fact is that we handled so many documents that to remember what was given to me and what was not given to me 12 years ago is very difficult, but I can remember that I requested a memorandum.

ADV DE JAGER: One understand these reasons and so forth, but your recollection has been refreshed and you requested a memorandum and you agree that you did put in this request. And once your memory has been refreshed I'm sure you'd be able to tell us why you requested the memorandum and what in broad terms was contained in the memorandum.

MR NAUDE: I can't recall the detail of the memorandum, however I can recall that we discussed a very brief summary of what was happening with the Ribeiro's. The fact that they were involved in the funding and the training and transfer of people and so forth were particulars which I requested in a memorandum form.

MR GROBLER: Chairperson, perhaps we are at the moment not entirely on track. My recollection of Brigadier Cronje's evidence is that he did indeed - and my learned friend will help me, not provide that memorandum but that he provided or made certain information available, on the grounds of which they would be able to compile their own memorandum. I may be recalling incorrectly.

ADV DE JAGER: I should be pleased if we don't make any statements to the witness which are not correct, seeing as we are aware of the information now. We are trying to get the facts together correctly so that we can put questions to the witness.

MR GROBLER: Yes, you are entirely correct, Chairperson, but the question was what the content was, and that is what I based my interjection upon.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: And that appears on page 500.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

JUDGE KHAMPEPE: I think you are correct, a memorandum was not handed to Mr Naude, but a file was made available and Cronje insisted that they had to prepare their own memorandum.

MR GROBLER: I thank you, Judge, that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: We've reached a stage where we have to adjourn for the day and we will resume at nine thirty tomorrow morning.