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ON RESUMPTION:

CHAIRPERSON: 21st of April and we are today starting with the McKenzie bombing incident which involves the following applicants, E. Goosen, W.J. Momberg, P.R. Crause, W.J. Loots, J.V. van der Merwe and K.C. McKenzie. Ms Lockhat, are we still proceeding with the application of Mr McKenzie?

MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, we have duly served a Section 19(4) on Mr McKenzie, we have informed him of the hearing. He has informed me that he is not interested in appearing before the Commission, he duly is withdrawing his amnesty application in connection with this incident and that is the position regarding Mr McKenzie, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: So the application of Mr K.C. McKenzie is withdrawn?

MS LOCKHAT: That is correct Chairperson.

ADV DE JAGER: Could you perhaps ask him to confirm that in writing?

MS LOCKHAT: I will do that Adv De Jager, he has informed me that he has Counsel in the matter, so he's got legal representation in this matter, so we will advise them.

ADV DE JAGER: Yes please.

MS LOCKHAT: He has informed me that he has taken advice from Counsel in relation to this matter, and therefore he has decided to withdraw the application, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Were you requested by him to make a formal withdrawal on his behalf, is that the situation?

MS LOCKHAT: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. The application of Mr K.C. McKenzie is therefore withdrawn as a result of instructions given by Mr McKenzie to Ms Lockhat in this regard.

MS LOCKHAT: Thank you Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Lockhat, are you in a position to give an indication whether any person who is implicated in these applications, has been served with the necessary Section 19(4) notices in particular, are you in a position to give an indication whether Mr Charl Naude has been served with such a notice?

MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, it is correct that the relevant implicated parties have been notified in connection with this matter.

CHAIRPERSON: Can you just for the record, give us an indication who has been served and if you do have such notices, if you can give us the returns of service.

MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, when you say returns of service, the acknowledgements of receipts?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MS LOCKHAT: Well, we basically have a general problem that when we serve the notices on the relevant Attorneys or Counsel, we didn't really receive acknowledgements of receipts, but just the mere fact that there is an Attorney that corresponded to us in relation to the Section 19(4), that we regard it as proof that they have all received the relevant notices.

CHAIRPERSON: We shall accept that proof and we would request you to hand that up to the Committee.

MS LOCKHAT: I will do so Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Who is going to start Mr Visser?

MR VISSER: Chairperson, I act for Van der Merwe, Crause and Loots. The arrangement is that Mr Momberg and Goosen will start.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Maybe it will be an appropriate time for all legal representatives who are going to be involved in this incident, to kindly state their names for the record, starting with you Mr Visser.

MR VISSER: Yes, Louis Visser on record Chairperson, I appear for Gen van der Merwe, Brigadier Loots and Colonel Crause in the McKenzie matter.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you.

MR ALBERTS: Good morning Chairperson, my name is George Alberts. I appear for Messrs Momberg and Goosen in this application, instructed by Attorneys Weavind & Weavind.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR DU PLESSIS: Chairperson, Roelof du Plessis of the Pretoria Bar and instructed by Strydom Britz Attorneys. I act on behalf of Brigadier Jack Cronje insofar as he is mentioned and to safeguard his rights, and on behalf of Captain Jacques Hechter in so far as he is mentioned in one of the applications.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MS LOCKHAT: My name is Lynn Lockhat and I appear on behalf of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Alberts, are you ready to commence with one of your applicants?

MR ALBERTS: I am indeed Chairperson. The first applicant that will be heard, will be Willem Johannes Momberg.

WILLEM JOHANNES MOMBERG: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Alberts, you may proceed.

EXAMINATION BY MR ALBERTS: Thank you Chairperson. Before I formally lead evidence, I would move for an amendment of the application of Mr Momberg, I beg leave to hand up to you pages incorporating the amendment. It is an amendment to the document entitled "Bylaag 5", and it deals with the crimes and delicts for which amnesty is sought. In my submission, it is merely a formal amendment and I beg leave to hand up to you the amended page.

CHAIRPERSON: Before you proceed Mr Alberts, I note that Mr Fanie Molapo who is the Investigator charged with the investigation of this matter, is here. You will recall that the matter was made to stand down until today to enable the relevant victims in this incident, to be duly notified in terms of Section 19(4) and Mr Molapo was requested to urgently travel to Botswana with a view of ensuring that the Section 19(4) notices have been served on the victims and if they had not been served, to attend to the service thereof. Maybe we should hear from Ms Lockhat what the position is before we commence with your applicant.

MR ALBERTS: As you please Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MS LOCKHAT: Thank you Chairperson, Mr Fanie Molapo was instructed to go to Botswana in order to trace the relevant victims Chairperson. He went to, he corresponded with the senior Assistant Commissioner of Police, Mr Kenneth Mapani and he deposed to an affidavit as well Chairperson, setting out the names, the date of the incident which occurred on the 9th of April 1987 and then he included the names of the deceased, the three victims. I've got an affidavit which I will hand up Chairperson, as well as the names of the injured persons, as well as the relevant plots that were damaged as a result of the bomb blast Chairperson. Mr Fanie Molapo can just briefly inform us as to exactly what he did when going to Botswana Chairperson. If you would allow me just to then ask Mr Fanie Molapo just to brief us basically.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, you may proceed to do so.

MS LOCKHAT: Thank you Chairperson. Mr Fanie Molapo, can you just inform us as to who you had spoken to in Botswana and what steps you took to actually trace and inform the victims?

MR MOLAPO: On Monday I arrived in Botswana. I met with High Commissioner from South Africa, in Botswana. We went to Police offices, that is the Headquarters, where I met the Commissioner of the Police and his assistant together with those who were involved with the investigation of this incident. I informed them who I am and what I want. They told me that they are going to request the government for permission so that they would be able to allow us to get the docket. After that they looked for a docket, then they told us that they cannot photostat the docket and that we will not be able to photostat the album. They told us that what would be possible is that Mr Mapani should give me an affidavit which I am going to hand over today. Those people who were deceased on that day, were Botswana citizens. They were not members of the ANC or where the kombi was, it was not an ANC camp or a place where ANC people used to reside. It was a kombi which was put there. The person who died there together with her children, was a social worker. They wanted to know as to whether who were responsible for this incident, and that we informed them that these people applied for amnesty. They told us they would not allow their people to come to South Africa. What they would do, they would notify the victims about what happened and what is going to happen today. They took me to the scene of the incident, I found that it was a township. They asked me why do these people who committed this incident, did not investigate first the identity of the residents of that place before they do the operation.

MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, Mr Molapo said to me that the three persons mentioned as the deceased, he met with the next of kin in relation to these three people, and that the other injured persons, that the Police actually also informed them and that we will duly also notify them as well Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: So is it correct that Mr Molapo, you met with the relatives of Madibize Pitolo, Gomotso Pitolo, Sehofatso Mabyo and advised them of their right to be present at these hearings in terms of Section 19(4) and that they elected not to be present and you are satisfied that their names be handed up to the Committee?

MR MOLAPO: What I would say is that they were not satisfied because they told me that they did not know this in time, and they did not have passports, and there was nothing they could do. They requested me to inform you that they are opposing amnesty.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, were you given an indication on what basis the opposition would be?

MR MOLAPO: I went to the scene of this incident ...

CHAIRPERSON: No, I am not talking about your personal observation, I am asking if the relatives, did they give you any indication on what basis they would oppose this application for amnesty?

MR MOLAPO: They were talking to the Policeman whom I was with. They were saying they were Botswana citizens and they were not members of the ANC.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. With regard to the persons who were injured, did you have an occasion to have a meeting with them, to advise them of these proceedings?

MR MOLAPO: I was not able to meet those who were injured. The Botswana Police told me that they would go and notify those people who were injured.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Ms Lockhat, I think for purposes of proper compliance with Section 19(4), we are aware that these people were given late notification, Mr Visser, Mr Alberts, Mr Du Plessis, we will proceed with this matter and what we will do is, if we do get an indication, a very firm indication that the relatives of the victims of the three persons identified under 4 on page 1, in this affidavit, they intend to oppose these applications, and the opposition is substantive, we will allow them to do so, they will get a copy of the record of these proceedings and we will take the matter from there. Otherwise we will not delay these proceedings, we will commence with the applicants as arranged last week.

MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, on the part of the Commission, we will see that the relatives, the next of kin and the injured persons, actually do get a copy of the record in order, if they do still want to pursue opposing the application, that they be granted that opportunity Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Will you try and make contact through Mr Molapo's assistance of course, with the relevant authorities with a view of getting firm instructions or indications from the victims, meaning those who were injured, as a result of this incident, as well as the relatives of those who are deceased, whether they intend to oppose, so that we can make the necessary arrangements to send the record and will you get back to us probably by tomorrow with an indication of whether indeed they want to pursue this matter?

MS LOCKHAT: In order Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Shall we give the number to the affidavit that has just been handed up, will that be Exhibit A?

MS LOCKHAT: That will be Exhibit M Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: M?

MS LOCKHAT: That is, Chairperson, Exhibit M.

CHAIRPERSON: So the affidavit of Mr Kenneth Mapani will be reflected as Exhibit M in our records. Thank you very much, Mr Alberts, you may now commence, presenting of evidence on behalf of Mr Momberg.

MR ALBERTS: Thank you Chairperson. Might I just mention that Mr Momberg prefers to testify in Afrikaans, and I will proceed in that language. Mr Momberg, do you have your application in front of you?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

MR ALBERTS: As it had been bound in the Bundle, it is from 77 and further?

ADV DE JAGER: It is Bundle 10, page 77 and further.

MR ALBERTS: Did you read through the application before you attended these hearings today?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, I know what the contents of the Bundle is.

MR ALBERTS: Do you confirm in general the correctness of the contents thereof?

MR MOMBERG: I do.

MR ALBERTS: Can we specifically look at page 77 to page 106, it is the general introductory part of your application?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

MR ALBERTS: In that your general background appears of the role which you played in the South African Police during the relevant period of time?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

MR ALBERTS: In particular, do you confirm the correctness of the contents thereof?

MR MOMBERG: I do.

MR ALBERTS: We now know that this incident took place during April 1987?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

MR ALBERTS: What was your position in the South African Police during that period?

MR MOMBERG: I at that period, I was a Lieutenant in the Security Branch Northern Transvaal of the Security Police.

MR ALBERTS: Which Unit of that Security Branch were you stationed at?

MR MOMBERG: I was a member of Unit A.

MR ALBERTS: What work was that Unit involved in?

MR MOMBERG: Unit A was mainly involved in White, Coloured and Indian matters as well as tertiary educational institutions and religious matters.

MR ALBERTS: Will you please go to page 108 of the application, that is where you deal with the factual events concerning this motor bomb, car bomb, and will you please look at paragraph 4 on that page. Will you please inform the Committee as to what the course of events were which were relevant here?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, during the period relevant to this incident, Sergeant Goosen and I acted as handlers of an informer, a certain Keith Charles McKenzie. This informer was already in our service since 1983 and was initially used on a local basis.

MR ALBERTS: What does local use mean?

MR MOMBERG: We used him locally in order to get information regarding coloured school matters as well as local unrest in the coloured areas, Eersterust in Pretoria.

MR ALBERTS: Where did he live?

MR MOMBERG: McKenzie lived in Eersterust.

MR ALBERTS: Will you continue please?

MR MOMBERG: During 1985 we succeeded in making contact between him and a certain Freddie Legoka, an MK member in Gaberone, which led to the fact that McKenzie was recruited as an MK member, as a courier. As such, McKenzie regularly smuggled weapons and explosives into the RSA.

MR ALBERTS: McKenzie also made an affidavit regarding this matter, you will find it on page 136 and further of this Bundle. Have you seen this yet?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, yes, I have seen this.

MR ALBERTS: According to this affidavit implies that for the first time, during 1986, he made contact with amongst others, you, is that correct?

MR MOMBERG: That is wrong, he already made contact with me in 1983.

MR ALBERTS: And at that stage, had he already been recruited as an informer?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

MR ALBERTS: Was any force placed on McKenzie in order to get his co-operation in this regard?

MR MOMBERG: No force was used whatsoever.

MR ALBERTS: Do you not then agree with his affidavit to the extent that this is implied?

MR MOMBERG: I definitely do not agree.

MR ALBERTS: How did it occur that in this specific incident, that you became involved in this?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, during the end of March 1987 I was approached by Brigadier Cronje and he mentioned to Sergeant Goosen and I that there would be a meeting between us, Brigadier Cronje, myself and Goosen and Brigadier Wikus Loots, the Commander of the Security Branch Western Transvaal, as well as members of the South African Defence Force's Special Forces in order to do planning regarding an operation in Botswana. This operation dealt with the elimination of MK Victor Hannes Mnisi, Ernest Pule, a member of MK Special Operations group, who also acted as Co-ordinator for MK in Botswana and a certain Lester Dumakode, a member of MK Special Operations group in Lusaka and responsible for the smuggling in of the weaponry via Botswana to the Republic of South Africa. According to information at our disposal, Mnisi was one of the chief planners of the Church Street bomb during 1983 and was also very closely involved in the planning and execution of many other serious acts of terror and on a continual basis, was involved in the continued planning of terrorist acts in the Republic of South Africa. The meeting as mentioned above, took place on a secure - the South African Defence Force, Special Forces, in the vicinity of Broederstroom. The people who were present and who I can remember were Brigadier Cronje and Loots, Commander Charl Naude of Special Forces, Lieutenant Hechter, myself and Sergeant Goosen.

MR ALBERTS: Was a certain Rudi Crause present there as far as you can remember?

MR MOMBERG: At the time of my application for amnesty I was not aware of these facts, later I was made aware of the fact that Captain Rudi Crause was present.

MR ALBERTS: Continue please.

MR MOMBERG: During this meeting, it was proposed that McKenzie's vehicle which was a Hi-Ace bus would be equipped with a bomb and that thereafter he would depart for Botswana for a meeting with MK members in Gaberone, but specifically in the Wade Adams industrial area. The planning was furthermore that the bomb with which his vehicle would be equipped, would explode in Gaberone, during the meeting as a result of detonation by means of a remote controlled equipment, which would be controlled by an operator of Special Forces. This plan also held that McKenzie would die in this explosion. Lieutenant Hechter, Sergeant Goosen and I did find this unacceptable and we left this meeting.

MR ALBERTS: What happened thereafter?

MR MOMBERG: Further discussions took place between ourselves, that was Hechter, Goosen and myself in which we were informed that we had to look at alternatives and that in all cases, we had to keep the informer, McKenzie ready for a follow up meeting the next day.

MR ALBERTS: Did this take place?

MR MOMBERG: The second meeting did take place the next day at Hennops' Pride, a picnic place in the same vicinity and the same people were once again present.

MR ALBERTS: Is that also the case with Lieutenant Jacques Hechter, was he present at the second meeting?

MR MOMBERG: No, Hechter was not present at this meeting. At this occasion we agreed that the plan should be amended so that McKenzie would not be a victim of the explosion.

MR ALBERTS: Can I just refer you to page 111 of your application, with regards to the newly amended plan which you agreed upon.

MR MOMBERG: The way in which it was going to work, was based on that followed by MK in the past regarding the infiltration of weapons to the RSA. MK's method of working was such that weapons which were smuggled into the country, would be placed in McKenzie's vehicle in the following manner, namely that the vehicle would be taken from McKenzie on his arrival in Gaberone, that the weapons would then be loaded from the secret hiding place, put in his vehicle and then the vehicle would be given back to McKenzie.

ADV DE JAGER: I see that you are reading, is this somewhere on a page, because I cannot follow where you are reading from in your application? Thank you, if you could just indicate to us, then we do not have to write everything down, we can just write down the page numbers.

MR ALBERTS: Will you then continue on the end of 111 where you have just started?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, as I have already mentioned, the way in which MK worked, was that the vehicle would be taken away from McKenzie on his arrival in Gaberone and that the weapons would then be taken from the secret hiding place which was unknown to McKenzie, be loaded and the vehicle would be given back to McKenzie for his trip back to the RSA. Taking into consideration this way of doing things, it was expected that McKenzie's meeting with the MK members would take place, and the weapons would be loaded into this vehicle which he had to smuggle back. If the secret compartment would then be opened, the bomb would be detonated by a light sensitive switch, which would be built into this bomb, and the targeted MK members would be killed in the process, without McKenzie being endangered at all. It is however also so that McKenzie did not necessarily smuggle weapons into the RSA on every visit to Botswana. Sometimes he only conveyed messages or brought messages back to the RSA. In this way for example, during the period in our service, he visited Botswana 23 times, and only on seven occasions, brought weapons back to the RSA. If it therefore happened that there was no opportunity for detonation by way of light sensitive switch, we would fall back on the alternative method of detonation by means of remote control, so if that occasion had arisen, in order to eliminate the above-mentioned targets.

ADV DE JAGER: After you had agreed upon this plan, can you just explain to me, at the top of the page you say, taking into consideration the way in which things were done, it was expected that McKenzie's meeting with targeted MK members would take place, and that the vehicle would then be taken for purposes of loading it with weapons. You have now told us that only on seven occasions were weapons loaded, this is out of 25 or 23 occasions. The remaining 16 occasions, was the bus then never taken by MK, did it remain in McKenzie's possession?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, it differed from incident to incident or visit to visit. Sometimes the bus was taken by MK, then for example if they came back to him, they would have told him that there were too many roadblocks in Botswana, that they did not want to load the weapons, it would be dangerous. On other occasions, the bus was not taken and it remained in McKenzie's possession.

ADV DE JAGER: Now if this would not be detonated by this light sensitive control, by somebody who opened that secret chest, then the person would have pressed the switch or the detonator?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, on the condition that the targeted MK members were in the bus or the immediate vicinity of the bus.

ADV DE JAGER: Now, if this happened on 16 occasions that those people did not take the bus, then it was not very certain on this occasion as to whether they would take the bus and how long the bus would move around and whether that person would be able to follow that bus the whole time?

MR MOMBERG: On this specific occasion I can just mention that we monitored this informer by means of his post and tapping his telephone, because he was sensitively placed and from the mouth of the informer, we were aware of the fact that he had been requested to come to Botswana urgently and this made us believe that MK wanted to get weapons through to South Africa very urgently and that is why we could accept with reasonable safety that weapons would be loaded.

CHAIRPERSON: Without putting words into your mouth, I can't recall whose application does deal with the matter pertinently, that McKenzie had actually divulged the information that he was going to Botswana at the request of one Mnisi on a particular date and that they were going to meet at a particular destination. That was the information that you were fully aware of and your planning was in accordance with that information, so you were not planning in the dark?

MR MOMBERG: I can confirm that Chairperson, that is true.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, you haven't however, dealt with that aspect of evidence in your, you haven't dealt with that aspect in your evidence. I don't know whether it is something that you will soon be dealing with or it is something that you have already left out. If I follow the sequence of your evidence, it would appear that you have omitted to state how you knew that there would be this meeting, you have not dealt with that at all. Mr Alberts?

MR ALBERTS: That is so Chairperson, but I think the applicant has just given an explanation based on the Intelligence which was available to him as to constitute a reasonable degree of certainty that in this particular instance, in all probability McKenzie would be involved with the transportation of explosives or weapons. Be that as it may, might I then continue with the applicant?

CHAIRPERSON: You may do so sir, and will he also make mention because I don't think he has also dealt with the aspect involving the detonation of the bomb by remote control. So far only reference to the light sensor.

MR ALBERTS: Chairperson, we will get to that in due course.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you.

MR ALBERTS: You have testified as to the planning, will you please give the Committee an indication as to how this plan was put into operation?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, after we had agreed on this plan, the following steps were taken, namely that McKenzie would be identified by the operator of Special Forces and therefore where he was hidden in our vehicle, we made him get out at a reasonable distance from where the meeting was to be held, and let him stand up straight under the pretext that we wanted to give him something to drink, and at that stage Special Forces had to identify him physically, so that he could be identified by the operator who would be involved in Botswana.

MR ALBERTS: You find this evidence on page 110 of your application?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

MR ALBERTS: Was McKenzie ever aware of the contents of this plan?

MR MOMBERG: At no stage was McKenzie aware of the fact that his vehicle would be equipped with a bomb. Sergeant Goosen and I told him that the vehicle would have a tracking device and this was responsible for the manufacture and placing of the bomb, there was a false component which already existed in his vehicle. This was used in the past to smuggle weapons into the RSA in the past. The day after that, his vehicle was given back to him with the bomb in it.

MR ALBERTS: You have already mentioned one method of detonation of the bomb, being the light sensitive switch which was built in. What was the alternative?

MR MOMBERG: The alternative would be that if the targets were near the vehicle and the opportunity arose, that the bomb could be detonated by means of remote controlled device. This device would be controlled by the operator from Special Forces and his instructions were to have this detonation take place in a case where the targets Mnisi, Pule and Dumakode were either in the bus or in the vicinity of the bus.

MR ALBERTS: Is it correct that the light sensitive switch would only detonate the bomb if the hidden compartment was to be opened?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct. The light sensitive switch was hidden behind the lid of the false compartment.

MR ALBERTS: So that method could only succeed if the compartment were to be opened physically, is that correct?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

MR ALBERTS: How was the plan executed further?

MR MOMBERG: I continue on page 113, after the vehicle was handed back to McKenzie, Goosen and I in April of 1987 accompanied McKenzie to the Kopfontein border post where Goosen activated the light sensitive switch without McKenzie's knowledge. He then crossed the border on the way to Gaberone for his meeting with the targeted MK members. At that stage, Special Forces operator was already in Botswana and in Gaberone, and his instructions were to observe this vehicle at all times.

MR ALBERTS: What did you do then after McKenzie had crossed the border?

MR MOMBERG: After McKenzie crossed the border, we, that is Goosen and I, in the vicinity of Zeerust in a safe area, we awaited news as to what had happened in Botswana. We waited on this farm for approximately four or five days and then on a certain day, received a report that a bomb had exploded in Botswana. Thereafter we waited for a further day in the hope that McKenzie would return to the RSA.

MR ALBERTS: McKenzie did not know about the intended explosion. Did you give him any instructions with regard to his return to the RSA?

MR MOMBERG: We could not tell McKenzie that there was a bomb in his vehicle, and neither did we. Before he left, we did mention to him that if on a specific visit or any future visits, he felt threatened in any way or if anything newsworthy were to happen in Botswana, he had to flee immediately and attempt to cross the border back to the RSA, be it by foot or per vehicle, be it at the border post of in an illegal manner.

MR ALBERTS: Did you ever find out afterwards what really happened to McKenzie in Botswana?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, after McKenzie, this is his period of incarceration with the ANC, after he returned to the RSA, we debriefed him. During this debriefing, McKenzie informed us that before he got to Gaberone, he was stopped by unknown MK members. They gave him instructions to go to Francistown where he was kidnapped by Dumakode, Pule and other MK members and after a period in Zambia, he was taken to Quattro Camp in Angola. McKenzie was then also later moved to Uganda where he was detained for a long period. It was therefore clear that MK had already found out before the time, that McKenzie was an informer of the Security Police. This fact was confirmed where we were told about the ANC's Operation Vula, the documentation clearly indicated that information was given from the Security Branch or leaked to the Security Branch to the ANC. This kidnapping of McKenzie was a blow for the whole operation. The operator of Special Forces, could at no stage observe the vehicle and launched an intensive search for that vehicle. After the operator searched for the vehicle for approximately five days, it seems that he saw the vehicle in a residential area in Gaberone and that he immediately detonated the bomb by means of his remote controlled device. Information received thereafter indicated that civilians which were killed in this explosion, or injured, and serious damage was incurred to property. This also led to an official complaint from the Botswana government to the South African Department of Foreign Affairs.

MR ALBERTS: According to the evidence which you have just given, it seems as if the explosion can be ascribed to the detonation of the bomb, by means of the remote controlled device. Are you certain about this?

MR MOMBERG: No, this is a deduction which we made due to the information which we received in bits and pieces and I am not going to stand by this statement, it is quite possible that MK members could have fiddled with this vehicle and the secret compartment.

CHAIRPERSON: May I interpose Mr Alberts? How could you have - there is some disturbance in the hall - if I may proceed, Mr Momberg, you say that you deduced that the detonation was caused by the activation of the bomb by means of the remote control that would have been operated by the operative from Special Forces, did you not discuss this matter with the relevant members of Special Forces with a view of wanting to find out what had happened, once you became aware that the detonation resulted in people other than your targets, being injured and killed?

ADV DE JAGER: It seems as if there is remote control in action.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, are you in a position to respond to my question Mr Momberg, we hope we will not be interrupted any further, it must be some interruption coming from Reception, I suspect.

MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, I think it is a conference meeting that is taking place.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, yes, I can give you an answer. I can answer by saying no, I never concerning this specific incident, contacted people from Special Forces, and that was for the reason that at the level at which I was acting on that stage as Lieutenant, that I really wasn't in a situation where I did any planning or evaluation with Special Forces, this was done at a higher level as one can see from the fact that Brigadier Cronje, Brigadier Loots were also involved in the project.

CHAIRPERSON: Maybe we will canvass the matter with you later on, you may proceed to give your evidence in chief.

MR ALBERTS: As you please Chairperson. Were there any elements in the planning that would imply that certain innocent people would be affected by means of this bomb?

MR MOMBERG: No Chairperson, the planning was aimed purely at MK members and the elimination of MK members, either at the weapons cache where the weapons would be loaded, or perhaps at a place where the targets would be at the bus, but where innocent civilians would not be put in danger. That was the planning Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Was the planning aimed at specific targets, the interpretation came through as aimed at MK members. You intended, your intended targets were Mnisi, Pule and Dumakode?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that not so? Yes. And at all material times, your intention was to eliminate them and the two methods of detonation of the bomb was intended to ultimately result in the death of the three mentioned MK members?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR ALBERTS: If I may interpose Chair, surely Mr Momberg, the issue of other people besides those three, must have crossed your mind? Other MK members may have actually been tasked with the loading or unloading of that vehicle?

MR LAX: Chairperson, that is correct. In the situation in which we acted, although our primary target was Mnisi, Pule and Dumakode, it would be correct to say that should the bomb have exploded at the cache at Botswana, other MK members could also have died. With that part of the plan, we reconciled ourselves because they would have been members of MK.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I am getting a little confused if your response to Mr Lax's question is in that fashion. The plan was devised on the information that was at your disposal, which information one would like to presume, was furnished to you by Mr McKenzie that he would be having a meeting with certain members of MK on a particular day and particular time. What I would like to clear with you, maybe at this stage and not later, is whether in giving information to you as your informant, did Mr McKenzie advise you of how the weaponry into the false compartment was done? To be precise, did he give any indication as to who would do the loading of such weaponry, whether it would be Mr Mnisi, Mr Dumakode or Mr Pule? I think you understand where I am getting to?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, as I have already said, the method was that the vehicle would have been taken from McKenzie by one of these three people, that would be Mnisi, Pule or Dumakode and that the vehicle would then be given back to him after the weapons had been loaded. On the basis thereof, we assumed that the weapons, because it would mostly happen at night, that it would be loaded by Pule, Dumakode or Mnisi.

ADV DE JAGER: You refer to the course of action, the method, that is what usually happened. The Chairperson asked you did you have specific information that in this specific incident, there would have been a meeting where these three people would have met McKenzie?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, yes, we had such information.

ADV DE JAGER: For this specific incident, did you work with the general way of doing things or did you have a specific pattern or specific method for this specific case?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, perhaps I could just clarify by saying that the meeting that McKenzie had with Mnisi, Pule and Dumakode, was something that occurred with basically every visit, with every visit, he would have seen Mnisi, Pule and Dumakode, with exceptions for example of Mnisi or one of the others, would have been busy with another assignment in Lusaka or somewhere else, and then he would only have seen two of the three. But with each visit of McKenzie to Botswana, he saw Mnisi, Pule and Dumakode.

CHAIRPERSON: Did he know who in the normal course of running of things, would do the loading of the weaponry into the false or secret compartment? Was that information known by Mr McKenzie?

MR MOMBERG: No Chairperson, he did not know.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, you may proceed Mr Alberts.

MR LAX: Sorry, before you do, Chair, you have just interrupted my questioning, there was just one aspect I just wanted to follow up on.

CHAIRPERSON: You may proceed Mr Lax.

MR LAX: I just want to recap before I get to my question, just for the sake of ensuring that we are still on the same page. The reason I put this suggestion to you that I did, was precisely because McKenzie didn't know who actually loaded the vehicle, but that was your backup plan as I understood it, am I correct in that understanding? In other words, the light sensitive detonator was the backup and in the best of all possible worlds, the Special Forces operator would see all three targets together with the vehicle and detonate it, thereby getting the first prize, so to speak? Have I understood you correctly?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, no, it was the other way around. The light sensitive switch was the primary switch. In other words, it meant that when this compartment was opened to load, and you could accept that it would be MK members and probably Pule, Dumakode and Mnisi who would load it, and then the bomb would be detonated. The remote controlled switch or equipment was the backup.

MR ALBERTS: That would be the case should, against everything that would happen, that weaponry was not the main aim for getting McKenzie to Botswana?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, that is correct, if it would seem that weaponry would not be loaded during this visit, but that there would be a meeting between McKenzie and these three people in the bus or in the vicinity of the bus, then this bomb would have been detonated by means of remote control.

ADV DE JAGER: But then McKenzie would have died in any case, not so?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, yes, I would have to concede, but the planning, the primary planning was that McKenzie would not be hurt in this action.

MR ALBERTS: And was that also the instruction that was given to the Special Forces operative in Botswana, that was given to him?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, that is correct.

MR ALBERTS: Then to continue with your application Mr Momberg, from page 116 of the paginated bundle you deal with the aim and the motivation of this act. Are you aware of the content?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, I am aware of the content.

MR ALBERTS: Do you confirm the correctness thereof?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, I do.

MR ALBERTS: And specifically what concerns your motivation, have you seen the application of Brigadier Cronje who was also involved?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, yes, I have seen his application.

MR ALBERTS: With regard to his application it is in Bundle 1, that is the second cluster of documentation that was provided, did you read the application appearing there?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, I have read the application.

MR ALBERTS: And specifically in that Bundle, from page 246 and on, Brigadier Cronje deals with the motivation obviously from his perspective for this particular operation, is that correct?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct Chairperson.

MR ALBERTS: And do you know the motivation that he gave?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, I have knowledge of that.

MR ALBERTS: Do you identify yourself with that, do you agree?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, I do.

MR VISSER: Might my learned friend perhaps tell us about that, because we don't have it in front of us. We would like to know what that motivation is with which the witness agrees.

CHAIRPERSON: Could you assist Mr Visser, Mr Alberts?

MR ALBERTS: Chairperson, it is a matter which is canvassed in several pages, about eight pages of Brigadier Cronje's application. Might I be permitted ...

ADV DE JAGER: Which Bundle is it or don't we have it in a Bundle before us?

MR ALBERTS: Unfortunately it is in a cluster 2 Bundle, and that is the only document that gave us access to what Brigadier had said. That cluster is unfortunately not in front of you, but that is the only source for that, and that is why we specifically referred to that. May I perhaps have the opportunity to hand this extract to my learned friend.

ADV DE JAGER: Can't you perhaps just read that part of the motivation, is it very long?

MR ALBERTS: I will read it.

CHAIRPERSON: Before you do so Mr Alberts, I think Ms Lockhat might be in a position to give us some kind of assistance. Which Bundle, is it Bundle 2(A) or (B)?

MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, the relevant pages that Adv Alberts are referring to, is not contained in our Bundles, but it is information that he received in another hearing that is to come. He used that information, I have informed him this morning that he has to make it available to us if he is going to present it, but it is not in our Bundles Chairperson, and Cronje - his application, is also not contained in this Bundle Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Mr Alberts, I thought you were making reference to the evidence that has been given before this Amnesty Committee during the Cronje hearings.

MR ALBERTS: What I was referring to here Chairperson, was merely the application itself of Brigadier Cronje. Of course we know now that he has testified concerning this incident, and we also have a record of that evidence but the reference I am making to you now, is to his application itself and not to any evidence.

CHAIRPERSON: In relation to this incident?

MR ALBERTS: In respect of this particular incident.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, that would be the application that we have already heard as a Committee, is that not so, that is contained in one of the Bundles?

MR ALBERTS: Indeed.

MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, what Adv Visser is saying is the amnesty application form of Cronje is not contained in the Bundle, but the transcripts relating to that hearing is. He refers to the amnesty application of Cronje which we don't have, and then he also refers to the transcripts which we do have in 2(H), that is Bundle 2(H). But at this stage, we don't have Cronje's original amnesty application, not original, but a copy thereof contained in the Bundle, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, his motivation was dealt with when he gave evidence, and it is contained in one of the Bundles. I am saying this because I was a member of the panel that heard that application, so if you could assist Mr Visser by providing the necessary details with regard to the motivation as contained in the transcript that is forming part of this hearing, we have quite a number of Bundles, 2(A) up to 2(I). One of those Bundles should be able to assist both this panel as well as all the representatives appearing in relation to this incident.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, Visser on record, what I am really only interested in is ascertaining whether there is any conflict between the evidence which he gave before the original Amnesty Committee, that is Jack Cronje, and what is stated in his written application. If my learned friend assures me that there is no conflict, then we can let the matter rest and deal with the evidence as it was being presented and as it is contained in Bundle 2(H).

CHAIRPERSON: So now that we understand Mr Visser's bone of contention, Mr Alberts, are you in a position to assure him that the motivation as contained in his written application and supplemented by his affidavit, attached to that written application form, is the same as that one contained in our record, which is Bundle 2(A) up to (H)?

MR ALBERTS: It is the same motivation, it was just given possibly in greater detail in the application itself than in his actual evidence, which is contained in the Bundle.

ADV DE JAGER: But the application he confirmed under oath, so that is part of his testimony. If he incorporated it, he didn't read each and every word, but he said that I confirm what is contained.

MR ALBERTS: Yes, that is indeed the case.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, it would appear that according to Mr Alberts who has read both the application of Brigadier Cronje as well as the motivation as appearing in our records which would be Bundle 2(A) up to (H), in as far as he is concerned, there appears to be no contradictions. That should satisfy you.

MR VISSER: Yes, indeed it does. I would just like to explain Chairperson, that I don't want to be criticised later that I should have been aware of something what I am not aware of, which appears ex facie the written application, because that is not part of the papers, and I am only ready to deal with that which is before us, which is the evidence, that is the only point.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, we understand your point and it is only fair for you to make it.

MR ALBERTS: Chairperson, might I finally put my learned friend's fears to bed. I will read directly from the record of his evidence, the transcript, it reads as follows, he was asked from page 162 onwards.

ADV DE JAGER: Yes, which Bundle? We have to have it on record, we have to go and read it, and if we have to search for it, it makes it difficult, so please refer to the Bundles and the pages?

MR ALBERTS: It is Bundle 2(H) and the evidence is from page 1 to 11 of the Bundle and I am going to read from page 8.

ADV DE JAGER: Thank you.

MR ALBERTS: What stands there is the following -

Brigadier Cronje answered yes, so he has under oath confirmed the contents of what Mr Momberg has associated himself with and adopted in his evidence.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Thank you Mr Alberts, that should assist Mr Visser.

MR VISSER: With respect, that doesn't assist me at all. I know that he confirmed his application form, but I don't know what it stated.

ADV DE JAGER: Then it reads, if you continue, and page 167, the last paragraph, please read the last paragraph on that page -

and then he continues to read on page 168 and then he is returning to page 156, so he is actually reading from the application, so it is incorporated in the evidence.

CHAIRPERSON: Maybe to come to Mr Visser's plight, we have Mr Du Plessis here, who is representing the interests of Brigadier Cronje. I am sure with the precision that I know Mr Du Plessis to be capable of applying when it comes to his applications, he would be in a position to give us Brigadier Cronje's application, in relation to his general motivation, which is referred to in this paragraph as read out by my colleague, Adv De Jager. That should come to the immediate assistance of Mr Visser. He would be in a position to see whether indeed what is said by him, and what was confirmed by him, does accord with what was in writing in his application.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, I have just been handed certain documents which appear, I take it to be an extract from the written application form, Form 1, of Brigadier Cronje, and if that is so, then I will just need a few moments at an appropriate time, just to read through it and I will know what my learned friend is talking about. I won't waste any more of your time.

CHAIRPERSON: I am sure Mr Du Plessis will also not charge your client a fee, if you were to ask him to confirm if what you have been handed up, is indeed what was Brigadier Cronje's written application.

MR VISSER: I might be disappointed Chairperson, he wants his money.

MR DU PLESSIS: I am not so sure about that Chairperson. Chairperson, may I just mention that in so far as there might be doubt about what Brigadier Cronje testified in respect of the political background and so on, he never testified anything pertaining to this incident. His only evidence about this incident is contained in Bundle 2(H).

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but you also refer to his general motivation?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, in his application.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but then if you could assist Mr Visser by giving him, show him, you must have one of his applications, written applications with you.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, I don't have Brigadier Cronje's applications with me, I just have the evidence unfortunately, but during lunch time I can obtain it and bring it with.

CHAIRPERSON: I see your Instructing Attorney is sitting next to you, I do trust that he still operates the same as he did when we were hearing the Cronje applications, so with that kind of operation, we should be able to at least allow this matter to proceed knowing that during lunch time, you will organise the necessary papers and assist Mr Visser with his problem.

MR DU PLESSIS: Chairperson, I have the application in my office, I will go and get it.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, I have just read through the pages, I have scanned through it and the problem solved itself. What I didn't understand is this does not refer, what my learned friend is referring to now, does not refer to this particular incident. It is part of the general background.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, general motivation.

MR VISSER: That I have no problem with.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, it is a general motivation that became applicable in relation to all the incidents that Brigadier Cronje applied for amnesty.

MR VISSER: If that is so, I have absolutely no problem.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VISSER: I was brought under the impression, quite incorrectly so apparently, that he was talking about the motivation for this particular incident.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, will Counsel try to go on the same page next time, so that we can fast track these proceedings? Mr Alberts, you may proceed now that we have sorted this problem out.

MR ALBERTS: As you please Chairperson. With specific reference to page 116 of this application, can you just repeat the motivation which you mentioned there?

MR MOMBERG: My motive with the committing of the above-mentioned deed or deeds, was to protect the safety of the country and offer relief for the political opposition against the government. The context in which this deed or deeds took place, seems more complete out of the facts which were explained here. This took place in the continuation of the continuing political unrest and was a counter reaction to that.

MR ALBERTS: With reference to sub-paragraph 4, what was the objective of this deed?

MR MOMBERG: The objective of this deed seems out of the above-mentioned, it seems to be aimed at the political opponents of the government and or the property of such opponents.

MR ALBERTS: And further it seems as if it was committed in the execution of an order which you received?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct. It was done in the execution of an order which I received as a member of the Security Forces.

ADV DE JAGER: Who gave you this instruction or order?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, it came from Brigadier Cronje.

MR ALBERTS: Finally, can I refer you to the concluding remarks which appear in your application, it is from page 118 point 1 and further and with regard to paragraph 7 which appears on 118.1, do you confirm the correctness thereof?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, I do.

MR ALBERTS: As we are sitting here now Mr Momberg, we know what the result was of this bomb explosion, innocent civilians apparently were killed and injured and property was damaged. If you now sit back, what is your feeling presently as regards the consequences of this event?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, at that stage of my career, I was involved in a struggle against MK and in no way did I have any gripe with any citizen or inhabitant of Botswana as such, and therefore it is disappointing and saddening for me that innocent people and especially children were killed in this explosion. They were not the targets at all, not at any stage, and at no stage were we apathetic towards the interests of the people of Botswana or their lives.

MR ALBERTS: Thank you Chairperson, I have no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Alberts. Mr Visser, are we going to start with you sir, do you have any questions to put to Mr Momberg?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Yes please Chairperson. Mr Momberg, just what regards the meeting, in your statement and in evidence, you refer to two meetings where people were present and you also referred to other discussions, is that correct?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, if I understood the question correctly, there were two meetings. The one at the secure place of the Security Forces at Broederstroom and the next day at Hennops' Pride picnic terrain.

MR VISSER: Is it possible that there could have been a further meeting which you could have forgotten about, I know it is 12 years ago. Let me just say why I am asking you this, Brigadier Loots for whom I am appearing, in the first place only remembered one meeting when he completed his amnesty application. Later he was reminded of the fact that there were two meetings, and I agree with you that there were two meetings, but the incident where he was present at a meeting where discussions were held about killing McKenzie together with the bomb explosion, now is this something which you, Hechter and Goosen perhaps discussed on another occasion?

MR MOMBERG: No Chairperson, this incident or the meeting where the first plan was discussed, which dealt with the fact that McKenzie stood a very good chance of being blown up together with the vehicle which he was to take to Botswana, it was the meeting which took place at Broederstroom.

MR VISSER: At that first meeting, Colonel Crause tells me that he was not present there. You testified today that you heard later that he was present there, but he says that he was not there, would you agree with that?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, as I have said quite rightly and as Mr Visser says quite rightly, I only found out later that Captain Crause was present.

MR VISSER: You yourself cannot remember that?

MR MOMBERG: No.

MR VISSER: He was present at the second meeting?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

MR VISSER: I think you also testified to that.

MR MOMBERG: Yes.

MR VISSER: The run up to this thing, McKenzie was your and Goosen's informer, is that correct?

MR MOMBERG: Yes.

MR VISSER: Would it be correct to say that it would not be general knowledge in the Security community as to the identity of McKenzie, only the two of you would have known his name and his identity?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, that is the ideal with any informer, that his identity be protected as far as possible.

MR VISSER: Yes, but you also gave informers numbers, not so?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

MR VISSER: So that if you reported regarding information which you received from an informer, that you should report it to Head Office under that number?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

MR VISSER: For example MT395 reports that, or whatever the case may be?

MR MOMBERG: I confirm that.

MR VISSER: And by the way, the informer number of McKenzie, was it 3195?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, it was.

MR VISSER: Now can we accept that reporting would have been done on a regular basis to Head Office as regards information received from McKenzie?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, to Head Office as well as to other Security Branches which had an interest in the matter.

MR VISSER: Yes of course, such as the Western Transvaal?

MR MOMBERG: Most certainly, yes.

MR VISSER: Where Brigadier Loots was the Sectional Commander?

MR MOMBERG: Yes.

MR VISSER: I wonder if you can remember perhaps I must just ask you this, Loots tells me that he can recall that at one stage you contacted him and asked him to attend the meeting, whatever meeting that might have been, but he remembers that you contacted him telephonically, can you remember such a discussion?

MR MOMBERG: No.

MR VISSER: I do not want to blame you for that, it is a long time ago, but can I try to refresh your memory with this question. He says that you also told him that this source 395, MT395, would go to Botswana during the Easter weekend to receive weapons from Dumakode, is it possible that you could have said this?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, in that context it could have been possible. We liaised with Brigadier Loots and his personnel from the Western Transvaal on a regular basis because McKenzie was placed in Botswana and because Botswana apart from the national threat which MK was regarded as a part of, MK in Botswana was the primary responsibility of the Western Transvaal, so yes, we did liaise regularly and we would have informed him that the informer was on his way.

MR VISSER: Yes, but it now deals more specifically with what he was to have done there, and that is as a result of the question which Commissioner Lax asked you and I think the Chairperson. Brigadier Loots remembers that you told him that during the Easter weekend your source was to go to Botswana to get weapons from Dumakode and he says that there was a tape recording made of a telephone discussion between Dumakode and McKenzie, which was available. Can you recall something like that?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, I confirm the existence of the tape recording with that discussion between Dumakode and McKenzie.

MR VISSER: Yes, that Dumakode in that discussion which was taped, asked McKenzie to come specifically to fetch weapons?

MR MOMBERG: Can I reply in this way, he did not say it openly on the telephone that the man had to come and load weapons.

MR VISSER: Was it a deduction which you all made?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, in the sense that Dumakode told McKenzie that they needed him urgently in Botswana.

MR VISSER: I see that Brigadier Loots is agreeing, he is nodding his head, so maybe I put it wrongly, I apologise. But the deduction which you all made, quite reasonably from the telephone discussion between Dumakode and McKenzie was that this was a case of weapons being loaded?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

MR VISSER: This information would naturally have first come to you as you are the handlers, you and Goosen, of McKenzie, not so?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Did you go to Brigadier Cronje with that information?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Was the idea at that stage already, was there a plan or would it only have come later, that this occasion was to be used to see whether you could not deal a blow? Was it your plan or did it only come later?

MR MOMBERG: No, it only came later.

MR VISSER: You reported this to Brigadier Cronje. Do you know from your personal knowledge what he did?

MR MOMBERG: I have no personal knowledge as to what Brigadier Cronje did with the information at that stage.

MR VISSER: We do however know that Commander Charl Naude, from Special Forces, was supporting the Security Branch, Northern Transvaal, are you aware of that?

MR MOMBERG: No, at the time of this incident, I was not aware of the fact that Charl Naude was assisting the Northern Transvaal.

MR VISSER: We heard evidence from a master plan which Joubert had, and this was the sending of members of Special Forces to Northern Transvaal and Gauteng, but if you don't have any knowledge of that, we will leave it at that. When you gathered at the first meeting, Brigadier Loots was present, is that correct?

MR MOMBERG: Yes.

MR VISSER: Please assist me to see whether he has this correct, he says during that meeting, he was informed by Cronje about a plan, he was informed that the information which he already had because you had discussed the tape recording with him, that he was informed that McKenzie would go out, he would probably bring weapons in and that it was envisaged that there would be a chance to build a bomb into the kombi, with which especially Dumakode, Pule and Johannes Mnisi could possibly be blown up. Would that be correct that at that meeting, at Broederstroom, that it was said as being the facts or can you not recall that?

MR MOMBERG: If you would allow me to just answer, this meeting took place, this Goosen and I, we were informed by Brigadier Cronje that that evening we had to attend a meeting where he and Brigadier Loots and people from Special Forces would be present. At the time of this meeting, this plan was discussed and in all honesty, today I cannot tell you who said what at that specific meeting, and who made which proposals.

MR VISSER: That is good enough. The spirit of the thing is that a plan was discussed during this meeting - would it be correct to say that without Special Forces, this plan would have had no chance of succeeding?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, in a certain sense it is true as Special Forces had the abilities to place an operator in Botswana which the Security Branch did not have at that stage.

MR VISSER: And to build and design this specific bomb?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, I do not want to say anything about the design of the bomb or the form it took, I never saw it. After we received the vehicle, if we opened it the light sensitive switch would have gone.

MR VISSER: While you are referring to the light sensitive switch, and to join in the question from Commissioner Lax, Brigadier Loots as we know, on the day after the meeting at Broederstroom, spoke to Gen Van der Merwe as Security Head Office and asked him permission to continue with the plan. If you did not know that, I am telling you so that you know, Van der Merwe and Loots will testify to this. The question which it is about now, is that Brigadier Loots says that he cannot recall at that first meeting, that there was, that anything was said about a light sensitive switch as a detonator, the only thing that he can remember is that they spoke about an operator of Special Forces who was in Botswana and was placed in such a way that with a remote controlled device, he could detonate the bomb. My question to you is simply, is it possible that it was decided later on a further detonator, namely the light sensitive switch or are you convinced that this was already discussed at the first meeting?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, no, it is one of the reasons why the plan was not acceptable to myself, Goosen and Hechter, namely the fact that there was only one method of detonation and that was by remote control. It is so that the light sensitive switch was raised at the second meeting.

MR VISSER: Thank you, because this is in agreement with what Loots will tell the Committee. I am nearly finished, Mr Momberg. If you will just give me a little while longer. You said that it was not part of the planning at all that innocent civilians or people would become victims, is that correct?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

MR VISSER: You also added something and I want to question you about that, with an operation which involves a bomb which explodes, which cannot be aimed, does the possibility not always exist that the bomb could hit a target which it was not intended for?

MR MOMBERG: With a bomb it is possible, I agree, but in this specific case, it would have worked in such a way that if the bomb exploded by means of the light sensitive switch, it would have been at an arms cache of MK, and secondly, according to my knowledge, the operator of Special Forces, had specific instructions regarding the detonation of this bomb, by remote control if this was deemed necessary.

MR VISSER: Not that it matters greatly, but is Commissioner Lax not then correct? The sure way of having the bomb explode that the targeted people would be involved, was with the pressing of a button, was when somebody saw them and somebody then pressed the button? I don't think you understood the question correctly, that is why I am asking you again.

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, no. I say no in the sense that if the vehicle was taken away by Dumakode, Pule and Mnisi to an arms cache where the weapons were to be loaded, then this would mean that our targets would have - seen in the fact that McKenzie was never taken with and the time that lapsed between the time that the bus was taken and returned, that this arms cache was outside of Gaberone, outside the built up area, therefore our planning and our whole manner was intended at eliminating these three at the arms cache with the light sensitive detonator.

MR VISSER: But I think what Commissioner Lax was on about, if one wants to speculate is the fact that the kombi could have been stopped at a roadblock and Police from Botswana could have discovered that place, surely that is a possibility?

MR MOMBERG: It would have been pure by chance that it would have been discovered.

MR VISSER: Mr Crause will testify that one of this tasks which he forgot about and which he only remembered a short while ago, was that - it was to ensure that the Kopfontein border post, where the kombi entered Botswana, that there were no members of the staff of the border post who could open that compartment, it was part of what he would do to ensure that there would be no mistake.

MR MOMBERG: This could be so. If you will allow me, I can explain exactly how this compartment was equipped. In the inside of the Hi-Ace bus, behind the driver's seat was a flap which opened where the battery of the vehicle was. The compartment is an extension of that compartment which usually housed the battery. In other words, in order to get to the false compartment, a person first had to lift the carpet, remove the flap, take out the battery, take out another flap and only then would the secret compartment be open.

MR VISSER: So you say that there was no probability that this would be opened?

MR MOMBERG: The probability that this would be opened, this person went through the border post 23 times, and this compartment was never detected.

ADV DE JAGER: I think that the planning was not to hit civilians, but if you think about this very calmly and you use a bomb which explodes, then it injures whoever is close to it, is that not true?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: You cannot aim it like a gun at a specific target?

MR MOMBERG: Correct.

ADV DE JAGER: And had somebody been walking by, he could have been hit?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, yes, that is true and that is precisely why we attempted by means of the way of doing things, the way in which the bomb would detonate, the light sensitive detonator and the deduction that the arms cache was outside the built up area.

ADV DE JAGER: You would have expected that the loading of the weapons would take place in secret, but even there, you could not say that nobody would walk past at that specific moment? You would have taken precautions that a civilian would not be injured, but you cannot say that this would definitely not happen?

MR MOMBERG: No, we couldn't.

MR VISSER: And the next question is did you make peace with that fact?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, to the extent that one took all the precautions possible in such an operation, but once again seen in the light of a war situation, one made peace with the fact that innocent people could be hurt. Not had to but could.

MR VISSER: And that is why you apply for amnesty?

MR MOMBERG: Yes.

MR VISSER: Now finally, you referred to discussions after the first meeting with Brigadier Cronje, and that he said that they would look at alternatives, just to bring things together, the light sensitive detonator, was this the alternative?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, that would be correct.

CHAIRPERSON: I didn't understand your evidence in chief to have meant that the light sensor switch was the alternative. I think that was - your evidence in chief when you were being led by your Counsel, Mr Alberts, led you on that aspect, and your evidence in chief was that the light sensor detonation was the first choice of detonating the bomb, and that the remote control, was the alternative. Further, when Mr Lax posed a question to you, you again corrected him, because that is how he put it, he said the light sensor detonation was an alternative method and not the first method, you corrected him and you said no, it was the reverse, again confirming your evidence in chief, that the light sensor was the first choice of detonation of the bomb, and the remote control was the alternative method. So you cannot agree to what has been put to you by Mr Visser, because it would be contrary to what you have already stated in your evidence in chief?

MR VISSER: Chairperson, would you allow me, because I caused confusion, and I believe I should put it straight. I am not talking about that part of the evidence. What I am now referring to was the evidence of this witness where he said that they were dissatisfied with the plan which was planned at the first meeting which would have involved also the killing of Mr McKenzie. They then walked out and they discussed that with their Commander, Brigadier Cronje, and he said don't worry, we will look for an alternative. Alternative in the sense of how can we preserve Mr McKenzie from now being killed, and the question now that I put is what were those alternatives, and the alternative was it was then agreed on a light sensitive switch, which is not in conflict with what he has said before.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson. The last aspect, we know that mention was made about Johannes Mnisi, you already testified that he was involved in the Church Street bomb in one way or the other, is that correct?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, he was one of the main planners.

MR VISSER: Evidence was given by Johannes Mnisi before a hearing of the Amnesty Committee in this same hall, that he was a member of Special Operations. Do you have any knowledge of that?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

MR VISSER: He was MK Chief of Staff, Special Operations in Lusaka and his actions were channelled through Botswana as well as through Mozambique and Swaziland, would you agree with that?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

MR VISSER: The Church Street bomb for example came from Swaziland?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Are you also aware of the fact that he was involved in the attack on Voortrekkerhoogte?

MR MOMBERG: Correct.

MR VISSER: And the Magistrate's court bomb in Krugersdorp and many more?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, that would be correct to say that he was involved in numerous acts of terrorism.

MR VISSER: So he was a very important MK Commander?

MR MOMBERG: Extremely important.

MR VISSER: Yes, and if I may say his Lieutenants were Lekgote Pule and Lester Dumakode?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Since the Church Street bomb exploded in May 1993, what was the priority or how high would you have described the priority of the members of the Security Force to try to get hold of these three people?

MR MOMBERG: This would have been an extremely high priority to get these three people out of the system. Firstly, arrest and to bring them before Court for the acts of terrorism, amongst others the Church Street bomb, which we all know had a tremendous impact and secondly, if this was not possible, we would try and get them out of the MK channels to ...

MR VISSER: By eliminating them?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: By killing them? Was it in the four years after the Church Street bomb up to and including the McKenzie incident, was it possible to arrest any of them that you were aware of?

MR MOMBERG: No.

MR VISSER: And that left you with the only other alternative, namely to eliminate them?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

MR VISSER: One last aspect in this regard, and this is that Brigadier Loots tells me, and I think that you mentioned this somewhere, I am not sure where, that the planning was that the big fish were Johannes Mnisi, Dumakode and Pule, but he also said or other MK members and or ANC supporters, this was the target of this bomb, would you agree with that?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, our primary target I will agree, was Pule, Dumakode and Mnisi, but other MK members could also have been killed in the process. And it would mean that if this was the case, it would also have been a win-win situation for us in the sense that it would have given MK the message that we can act against them in their own area.

MR VISSER: Yes. Thank you Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Before I proceed to Mr Du Plessis, you have answered positive to what was put to you by Mr Visser, that prior to this incident, prior to the McKenzie bombing incident it had not been possible for the Police to arrest these people who were in the list of your Unit to get them arrested, and if failing to arrest them, to then eliminate them. Are you personally aware of how many attempts were made to arrest them?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, no I am not personally aware of any attempts made to arrest these people, all that I can say is that Pule, Dumakode and Mnisi as far as my knowledge went, never entered the RSA themselves, apart from Mnisi a while before this.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, now would it therefore have been feasible at all to attempt to arrest them?

MR MOMBERG: No Chairperson, at that stage from the information which we had at our disposal, it would not have been possible to arrest them.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, so that never, that idea of attempting to arrest them, never entered your mind, did it? It wasn't a possibility?

MR MOMBERG: Yes Chairperson, to say that it never came up in my mind, would not be correct. Had those people put their feet in South Africa, not only I, but many other members of the Security Branch, would have descended upon them in order to arrest them, but seen in the light of the fact that they did not come into the RSA, there was no possible way of arresting them, and therefore we decided on elimination.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, from the information that was at your disposal, they had not made any attempt to enter the RSA?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And therefore it was not possible for you to have even considered an arrest under those circumstances, with the information at your disposal?

MR MOMBERG: Under the specific circumstances it is correct to say that we did not consider an arrest at that stage.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you. Mr Du Plessis?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you Chairperson, I will be very short. Mr Momberg, the first meeting you testified that Captain Hechter was present?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: He was Lieutenant then, but let's call him Captain, that is how he is known these days. And thereafter he wasn't in any way involved in this operation?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, no, at no later stage he was involved in any aspect of the operation, and he was also not informed about this.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, I have no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Lockhat?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS LOCKHAT: Tell me Mr Momberg, who did you report to, who was your senior?

MR MOMBERG: My direct superior Chairperson, was Brigadier Cronje.

MS LOCKHAT: Tell me, did you report to Cronje regarding McKenzie and the three targets?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, yes, regarding McKenzie I reported on a daily basis as the information became available, to Cronje.

MS LOCKHAT: So tell me, how did Loots actually get involved in the situation?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, I will have to make the inference that Brigadier Cronje talked to Brigadier Loots. Besides conversations among individual members at the Security Branches, the Commanders also on a regular basis, contacted one another and then co-ordinated.

CHAIRPERSON: But you have no personal knowledge thereof?

MR MOMBERG: No, I have no personal knowledge of that.

MS LOCKHAT: Why I am asking you this is just because on page 2 of Bundle 2(H), Cronje says that -

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Lockhat, he has no personal knowledge, I think the right person to ask is Mr Loots and not Mr Momberg.

MS LOCKHAT: Point taken Chairperson. You said there were two meetings, is that correct?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

MS LOCKHAT: I note in your amnesty application form, you said that the same people that were at the first meeting, also attended the second meeting, and you included Hechter in the second meeting. Can you comment on that?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, yes, I can perhaps just ascribe that to an error, Hechter was definitely not at the second meeting.

MS LOCKHAT: I just want to point out Chairperson, that that would be at page 108 of Bundle 10 where he mentions the names of the persons present at the meeting, and then page 110 where he says the same people, the second paragraph -

And then he goes on further and he mentions that the same people were present.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that all Ms Lockhat?

MS LOCKHAT: No Chairperson, I've got more questions. Tell me, you said Charl Naude was also present at these meetings of Special Forces, is that correct?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, that is correct.

MS LOCKHAT: So was he instructed to approach Special Forces to organise the bomb?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson yes, he was a full part of the meeting, so he had the opportunity to make input. Whether he then offered to build the bomb or to let the bomb be built by Special Forces, I can't comment on that. That was an open meeting, everybody had the ability or the opportunity to make input.

MS LOCKHAT: Tell me, the plan to detonate this bomb, was there ever a plan as to abort, was it possible to actually abort this bomb?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, yes, there was an alternative plan or a Plan B if I can call it that. As you can remember in my evidence in chief, I mentioned that Sergeant Goosen activated the light sensitive switch, without McKenzie's knowing of it. This activation included what we call an armed switch, this is a pin so that if for example, if you have headphones, something that you had to remove and the bomb was then removed, then the plan to abort, would then comprise that should, there would be no opportunity for the Special Forces operative to get the targets at the bus and then to detonate the bomb, and before that, if the bus was not taken to be loaded with weapons and the light switch sensitive would not then detonate the bomb, and it would then perhaps happen that McKenzie returned to the country, then the same procedure would have followed as with arming the bomb. In other words, at the border post, McKenzie would once again, whilst he was busy with his documentation to enter, the bomb would have been de-activated, by placing this instrument back and the bomb would then be useless.

CHAIRPERSON: If that would require some instrument to be placed back, that would have been placed back by whom?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, it would have been done by Goosen or myself.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR MOMBERG: That is one of the reasons why we waited at the border post.

CHAIRPERSON: You would then have gone into the other side of the border, that is the Botswana side, to do that?

MR MOMBERG: No Chairperson, we would have done that on the RSA side.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Yes Ms Lockhat?

MS LOCKHAT: I just want to refer you back to your amnesty application form. You state - page 114 Chairperson, Bundle 10 -

Can you please comment on that?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, as I said in my evidence in chief, that is an inference that we made at that stage, and I also said in my evidence that it was quite possible that it could not have been the case, that someone could have tampered with the compartment in the vehicle, so that was purely an inference that was made with the information at our disposal.

MS LOCKHAT: Do you think that the person at Special Forces, was he instructed to just be there at all times until the bomb detonated in whichever way?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, if I understand the question correctly, I am going to answer in such a way - the operative had a specific instruction to always observe the vehicle in Gaberone. If I refer to the bus, I refer to the Hi-Ace. And then to determine in such a way, what was happening in the first instance, and then secondly, should it be necessary, that the detonation then be done.

MS LOCKHAT: So basically it took five days for this bomb to go off?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

MS LOCKHAT: Could it be possible that this person that was following or looking for the vehicle, contact you and tell you that the bomb did not detonate and that you should come, or Goosen should come to Botswana and then use the instrument, was this a possibility?

MR MOMBERG: No Chairperson, the operative was not known to us. We did not know him, the operative was a member of the South African Defence Force, Special Forces and not the South African Police.

CHAIRPERSON: You in fact had no control of this operation whilst the car was in Botswana?

MR MOMBERG: The moment that the vehicle moved across the border into Botswana, yes, the vehicle was under the control of the South African Defence Force operative.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MS LOCKHAT: One last question, you said that McKenzie and Mnisi had to be identified and that Special Forces had to identify them. Do you know who the person was that was supposed to identify them, do you know the name of the person?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson no, I did not say McKenzie and Mnisi, only McKenzie had to be identified in order for identification in Botswana by Special Forces. I do not know who identified him of Special Forces, it could have been anyone of the people, it could have been Charl Naude himself or it could have been some of his people who were hiding in the bushes.

MS LOCKHAT: Thank you Chairperson, no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

ADV DE JAGER: But they must have known who had to be killed, Mnisi and Pule they must have been able to identify them, otherwise this man could pushed the button if John or Paul or anyone could have been there?

MR MOMBERG: Mnisi, Pule and Dumakode were well known in Botswana, especially with regard to people in the Intelligence, their faces were well known. So the operative of Special Forces, I don't want to comment on his competence, but if he was in Botswana for some time, then he would have exactly known who Dumakode, Mnisi and Pule were.

CHAIRPERSON: But that would be pure speculation on your part, is it not? This is not the information that resides within you? You don't even know whether they used an operator who was in Botswana for a day, precisely to be able to attend to this matter, or he had been in Botswana for some few months or years, you don't know? That information does not reside within you?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, no, I don't have first hand knowledge, but the fact of the matter is that the operatives were focused on MK. If he was a Botswana operative, he would have been aware of who were members of MK or MK group in Botswana and he would have known what they looked like.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Alberts, before the Committee gets an opportunity to put questions of clarity on Mr Momberg, do you have any re-examination to do?

MR ALBERTS: Thank you Chairperson, I have no re-examination at this stage.

MR DU PLESSIS: Chairperson, I am sorry to interrupt, may I just mention that I have Brigadier Cronje's amnesty application here, if anybody is interested.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Lax, do you have any questions to put to Mr Momberg?

MR LAX: Thank you Chairperson. Mr Momberg, you had quite specific information that you have referred us to with regard to your planning, is that correct?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

MR LAX: And that information was that McKenzie met either or all of Dumakode, Pule or Mnisi, every time he went to Botswana?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

MR LAX: Your information was further that if he was going to load firearms, or ammunition or other weapons to be brought into the country, the vehicle could be taken away from him for some period of time, and then returned to him at a later stage, and he had no knowledge how or where that vehicle disappeared to?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

MR LAX: Now, I would like to suggest to you that you had no foresight whatsoever that innocent people might be hurt in this operation, because your planning in your own mind, was so careful that only your targets were the people who you might get and that is what you answered earlier in your evidence in chief, as opposed to when you were being questioned by Mr Visser.

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson yes, Mnisi, Pule and Dumakode, they were the targets and the whole operation was aimed at them.

CHAIRPERSON: What Mr Lax is putting to you is that you had no foresight, you couldn't have foreseen that innocent people would be hurt in this operation, it is not something that you would have foreseen. Are you saying that that is correct?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAX: You see, that is how I understood your evidence in chief, you actually did not foresee that at all. In your subsequent answers, that is mere speculation after the fact, but at the time you were planning this thing and at the time you were involved in this operation, you did not contemplate in any way whatsoever that innocent people might get hurt?

MR MOMBERG: No Chairperson.

MR LAX: Now, the only other aspect that I am slightly puzzled about is this, again in terms of your planning, this was an operation to pick up firearms, to pick up ammunition that would be loaded in that compartment, that is what you foresaw would happen, correct?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

MR LAX: What possible purpose then did the Special Forces operator serve?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, in any such operation, you make provision for the unforeseen and the unforeseen in this regard was that should weapons not be loaded, should it happen that Pule, Dumakode and Mnisi came back and say they could not load the weapons, and at any stage there was an opportunity to still eliminate them, then the Special Forces operative would have come into the picture and he would then have detonated them by means of the remote controlled device.

MR LAX: You see, if any three of them or all three of them came back, not having loaded the vehicle, in other words, the Special Forces operator would have seen them come back to McKenzie, the vehicle would not have been exploded and therefore there would have been an assumption that nothing had been loaded into it, alternatively that the light sensitive switch didn't work for one reason or another, wasn't there an enormous risk that McKenzie would then be blown up in that next anticipated possible move?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, yes, there was a risk for McKenzie, but within our capacity, our limited capacity to operate in Botswana, we did what was possible to protect McKenzie.

CHAIRPERSON: But wasn't your evidence in chief that special instructions would have been given to the Special Forces operator, not to harm Mr McKenzie, which would then entail that he was not to detonate the bomb by means of a remote control if McKenzie was next to the intended targets?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct. At any stage where it appeared to the operative that he could eliminate the target and there was a chance that McKenzie would not be injured or killed, then he would have detonated the bomb, otherwise he would not have done it.

CHAIRPERSON: So indeed, you did at least apply your mind with regard to the possible risk of McKenzie being hurt in the event of the bomb being detonated by means of the remote control, something that you applied your minds to?

MR MOMBERG: Yes Chairperson, we definitely tried to protect McKenzie.

MR LAX: Now my last question deals with this section that you have been referred to by Ms Lockhat, on page 114 of the papers. Frankly I am having some difficulty with your answer in this regard. Why didn't you tell the truth which is that you don't know how the bomb got detonated in your application? Why didn't you write that here because that is the truth, or that is what you would like us to believe is the truth in any event?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, what I wrote in my application was what I thought at that stage and how I could remember what had happened at that stage, inferences that I made reasonably at that stage, it was 1987. That was that the operative detonated the bomb. That was based on information that I got in bits and pieces and the part where McKenzie said that he was re-routed and that the bomb or the vehicle with the bomb then went back to Gaberone. And the reason why I made the inference was the fact that the operative detonated the bomb, is that it became clear that McKenzie was re-routed to Francistown and afterwards the vehicle was taken back to Gaberone and the operative's instruction was observe the bus in Gaberone. That is why I made the inference that he couldn't keep this bus under surveillance the whole time, so when he saw it, he could have panicked and pressed the button. I just want to emphasise it, it was an inference at that stage and that was at the stage when I made the application for amnesty. At no stage did I try to cover anything.

MR LAX: My question remains, why didn't you tell us in your amnesty application that this is speculation on your part, but this is what you think happened. You see the way it is worded here, is as if you had personal knowledge of these facts, it is as if you know exactly what happened. You say the man saw the vehicle in a residential area, you don't say I assume he saw the vehicle, or I am speculating or I am inferring, you are telling it like a fact. It gives absolutely the wrong impression. Why did you not state it as if this was something that you were speculating about or you were assuming about or inferring about?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, the point is taken to heart and it is my mistake, I surely should have said that those were inferences.

CHAIRPERSON: What really is troubling, Mr Momberg, with how this information is contained in your affidavit, to which you have deposed, is that you are saying things as though they reside within you. You state that the car was spotted in a residential area in Botswana and you say that as a matter of fact, not speculation. You state that it was so spotted, approximately five days after it had somehow disappeared and then you proceed to give a factual information that the operator then decided to detonate the bomb without due regard to the consequences of his action. All these are facts which are stated positively and there is no indication that these are facts stated or deduced from inferences, there is no indication to me that you drawn any inference.

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, once again, my apology. I should surely have put it more clearly, I should have stated that those were inferences that we have made. With regard to the residential area, the bomb exploded in a residential area.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. My other difficulty with regard to that is the secret compartment was installed in such a way that it was to be known to only those who would load the weapons in the vehicle, it was not something that would be easily detected by any person who did not have information about its location or existence.

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Now in your deduction you said you deduced that somebody could have tampered with the false compartment, if it was not so easily detectable to any person, is it feasible, is it probable that a person other than those who knew of its existence, who would be MK activists, would have been tampered with it?

MR MOMBERG: No Chairperson. One has to accept that the vehicle was taken from Francistown to Gaberone by MK members and as you then say, it is so that only myself, Goosen and very few this people this side of the border, knew where the compartment was, and MK members on the other side knew where it was. If it had been tampered with, it would have been MK members in Botswana.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, making it highly improbable for any person other than the people who would have known of its existence, to have been able to tamper with it?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: You may continue Mr Lax.

MR LAX: I am finished Chairperson.

ADV DE JAGER: The fact is however, based on the information that you now have, that McKenzie was kidnapped by probably Mnisi and the people that he had to meet there, MK members?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: Then he was taken to Quattro Camp?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: So his vehicle would have been under their control?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct Chairperson.

ADV DE JAGER: They would have brought it back or drove it to wherever it was afterwards, and then they would have given it over to someone under their control, if they did not keep it under their control or command?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: Now if the vehicle had been under their control, then they had known where the hidden compartment was?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: And it could be that they wanted to put something in there, or look at it or whatever, at any stage?

MR MOMBERG: It is possible Chairperson.

ADV DE JAGER: But something that I can't explain is that you did not think of that possibility, but you speculate if it is indeed speculation, is based on the fact, only the fact that it exploded because it was detonated with remote controlled device?

MR MOMBERG: The reason why I made that specific inference at that specific stage, was our information was of such a nature as already mentioned, that the vehicle was taken from McKenzie, that the vehicle was away and then it was taken back to him, then it was loaded with weapons. From that we could have inferred that this loading process did not take place in Gaberone, but in the outskirts of Gaberone. At that stage, I then made the deduction that it was the operative, purely because it would have been illogical for me to expect that anyone in a residential area in Gaberone, would want to load weapons. Therefore, I did not think of the light sensitive switch and that is why I said it was the operative.

ADV DE JAGER: I just want to put it to you that as it is put and stated here, you made a factual statement and not an inference. You could have the opportunity to answer that, but after the operative had looked for the vehicle for approximately five days, that is not speculation, you say to us that you knew that he looked for the vehicle for five days, so someone or he should have told it to you.

MR MOMBERG: There was a five day period between the time when McKenzie went over the border, crossed the border and the bomb exploded, so it is still part of an inference that he was still looking for the vehicle, because he had to execute his instruction.

CHAIRPERSON: That is not stated as an inference Mr Momberg, that is our problem, it is a fact. You know the period it took for him to locate the vehicle as a fact, it is not something that you are inferring, there is no deduction there. It is a fact and it is also a fact that the car is then located in Gaberone, in a residential area in Gaberone.

MR LAX: Can I just add something, you know that whole paragraph - you go further than just mere speculation. You say here that -

I mean that is going beyond just mere speculation, that is saying the guy had an intensive search to find the vehicle, he must have looked high and low. You don't know that that happened at all?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, if I had been the operative, that was what I would have done. I would have started with an intensive search for the vehicle, I would have done everything to execute my instruction properly and that is why I make these kinds of statements here. I am just inferring that this operative was in a situation where he had the instruction to keep the vehicle under observation and then he looses it on the first day.

MR LAX: You see, the other thing that really concerns me is that in the next sentence, after you have then spoken about the explosion of the bomb and so on, then you differentiate between information that is in your personal knowledge and information that you have received. You then say -

etc, etc. You go so far in the way this thing is drafted and in the way you are expressing yourself here, to differentiate between information which is obviously in your personal knowledge from the face of the document, and information which you have received from some other source. Do you see our problem?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, yes, I take note of the problem with this specific paragraph and please believe me, I regret that I put it in this way. That was not the intention, the intention is that I should have said that these are the inferences that we had made at that stage and perhaps I should have divided it into different paragraphs, such as the last few sentences that this incident also led to an official complaint. Perhaps this should not even be added to this paragraph, so this is an error on my side in the way in which I have written it. Please I want to make an apology for this once again.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Momberg, after this incident had occurred, did you have an occasion to speak to your superior, Brigadier Cronje, to find out how everything was scuttled through this kind of detonation, did you make such a follow up with Brigadier Cronje?

MR MOMBERG: I am sorry Chairperson, I lost a few words there now with the rain. Can I just put these things up, if you would allow me.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you have them on now, are you switched to the right channel?

MR MOMBERG: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Subsequent to this incident, did you have an occasion to speak to Brigadier Cronje about it, to find out how everything went awry, what happened to make the operation not to be successful? Did you make such follow ups with Brigadier Cronje?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, yes, we spoke to Brigadier Cronje and the whole set up regarding the things that went wrong about the operation, were discussed. But at that stage, Brigadier Cronje knew just as much as we did. The knowledge that we got afterwards, we only received after McKenzie's return. Brigadier Cronje would have been just as speculative as I would have been, had he wanted to give me any answers as to why the operation had gone wrong.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, because he also I think, had something to say about the operative having been responsible for the detonation of the bomb, I am just trying to go through Bundle 2(H) to get the right reference to the evidence that was deposed to, that was tendered to this Committee by Brigadier Cronje, in relation to the explosion that occurred in Botswana. That is something that we will pursue after ...

MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, he does say on page 6 something contrary to that -

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Thank you Ms Lockhat. Mr Alberts, flowing from the questions put to Mr Momberg, by the Committee, do you have anything to re-examine him on?

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR ALBERTS: Thank you Chairperson, I have a few questions, yes. Mr Momberg, if you page to page 114, that is the page in which the paragraph appears with which they have a few problems, let's start with that. If I understood your evidence correctly, you were on a nearby terrain ... (tape ends) ...

MR MOMBERG: Correct.

MR ALBERTS: Was there any communication from the side of the RSA with the operative in Botswana after McKenzie had crossed the border?

MR MOMBERG: I do not have any first hand knowledge, but there were communication channels between operative and handler in such operations.

MR ALBERTS: This specific place where you were, were there any means of communication available there?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, on the farm where we waited, there was a mobile communication centre which was established by the South African Defence Force, which monitored all the airwaves of Botswana, that is the public broadcaster, the Police channel as well as the Defence Force channel of Botswana. In other words discussions by the Botswana Defence Force, Botswana Police as well as the Botswana radio station and the public broadcaster, was monitored in order to remain abreast of what was going on in Botswana and to know exactly when the bomb would explode.

MR ALBERTS: And before the expiry of these five days, did it in any way come the knowledge of any Security Forces within the RSA that the plan had gone array?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, at one stage we did receive a report that the operative in Gaberone could not observe the vehicle.

MR ALBERTS: Do you know whether any instructions were then given to the operative as to what had to happen as a result of this fact?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, he gave a very definite instruction to search for the minibus.

MR ALBERTS: And do you know this to be a fact?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, yes. This is a fact.

MR ALBERTS: And now we know that after five days, the bomb was detonated. Do you know that to be a fact, and did you know it then to be a fact?

MR MOMBERG: Yes Chairperson, we received a report that a bomb had exploded in Botswana.

MR ALBERTS: Did you at that stage know that it was this specific car bomb?

MR MOMBERG: We did not know that it was this specific car bomb, but once again it was an inference which we made that it should be, or a deduction that we made that it should be this specific bomb.

MR ALBERTS: Did you at any stage thereafter, were there any specific facts which came to your knowledge which without any doubt could have made the manner of detonation, known?

MR MOMBERG: No.

MR ALBERTS: Your reference here to information which you received afterwards, is this only to do in the paragraph as it stands here, is it only about the consequences thereof or not?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct. The information which I refer you to here, is which was available to the media as well, newspapers, etc.

MR ALBERTS: And this was about death, injury and damage?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

MR ALBERTS: And it was also as a result of this that the official complaint followed by the Botswana government?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct. If I understand your question correctly, the complaint followed on the bomb explosion and Botswana complained officially that it was due to the RSA.

MR ALBERTS: Can you indicate as to how much time it took of your time and that of your legal advisor, to compile this application of yours and when this was done?

MR MOMBERG: I do not have any specific times, but this application ...

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Alberts, that would be his own fault, there were two years in which he had time to do his application. I cannot see the relevance of that. Long periods of time were given to people. If somebody decided to do it at the last minute, it is his own fault.

MR ALBERTS: That may be so, but nevertheless it is still a factual question as to how much time was spent on compiling this application.

CHAIRPERSON: Where is this leading us to Mr Alberts?

MR ALBERTS: It is simply leading us to this point Chairperson, that - and it might purely be a question of argument in any event, nevertheless, if there is to be argument about this, then with respect, I am entitled to canvass facts which might be relevant to such an argument.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, so you want him to testify how an error was made in relation to that paragraph?

MR ALBERTS: Indeed.

CHAIRPERSON: You may proceed sir, but if you could just get to the point as fast as you can.

MR ALBERTS: Thank you Chairperson. Do you still remember the question?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, I do. Although this amnesty application was handed in just before the cut off date, a tremendous amount of hours were spent on this application, long hours and we worked under great pressure, Mr Goosen, myself and our legal representatives, in order to get these applications completed in time. Therefore we often worked until well after midnight on these applications and that is the only reason that I can think of that it seems to you as if I am placing facts in front of you, which are actually deductions or inferences.

MR ALBERTS: Can you just indicate to the Committee as to the period of time, how many days it took for you to compile this application, your specific application?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, it was a matter of a week and a half if I remember correctly.

MR ALBERTS: Thank you. Lastly, was it a possibility or was it not, even on a reasonably theoretically basis, that this bomb could have exploded in another manner, other than detonation or one of the two manners that you sketched for us, in other words, if the vehicle had caught fire or had been involved in an accident? Was it a possibility?

MR MOMBERG: Yes, it was a vague possibility, but it was a possibility nevertheless.

MR ALBERTS: And did you envisage this?

MR MOMBERG: Yes we did.

MR ALBERTS: Did you think it was probable that something like this would happen?

MR MOMBERG: No, we did not. As a matter of fact, we hoped that something like that would not happen. One would like to exercise as much control as possible over any explosion.

MR ALBERTS: Thank you Chairperson, I have no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Lax, would like to put a question flowing from your re-examination.

MR LAX: Thank you Chairperson. Mr Momberg, you will recall that I asked you some questions about this very paragraph on page 114. I specifically asked you how did you know for example that this person searched for five days and so on, and all that stuff, and your answer was very specific. Your answer wasn't in line with the evidence that you have just given. Your answer was if I had been in that position, I would have done that, that is what I would have expected him to do and therefore I drew the deduction that that is what would have been, that was your answer. Why didn't you tell us what you have just told us now after questioning by your Counsel, which is a re-examination by your Counsel that you had specific knowledge that he got instructions to do that. You didn't tell us that at that stage.

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, it is very difficult to sit here and to tell everything exactly as it happened. I am sitting here and trying to explain my part in this operation to the Committee, and it may be that at one stage I leave things out and other times, I add things, but it is not being done with any malicious intent.

CHAIRPERSON: Fortunately we are able to correct this situation before we broke, and you were able to restate the facts as you remembered them better when you were questioned by Mr Alberts. I didn't get the name of the person who was instructed or who gave instruction to the operative to search for the vehicle, do you know?

MR MOMBERG: No Chairperson, I have no personal knowledge of that. I do know that the message came from the South African Defence Force that he had to look for the vehicle, but I do not know who gave the instruction.

CHAIRPERSON: When did that knowledge, when did you become aware of the fact that the operative was told to search for the vehicle in the event of it being lost? Did you become aware of this fact after the explosion or were you aware before the explosion, that this was part of the plan that in the event of the car disappearing, he were to search for it?

MR MOMBERG: Chairperson, no, it was not part of the plan, but during the period of time that we waited on the farm for something to happen, information came back to us that the vehicle was missing in Gaberone and that the man had been instructed or the operative, had been instructed to look for the vehicle. At that stage we were isolated on a farm, there was no free access to the farm. On that farm it was myself, Goosen and then that mobile communication centre of the Defence Force. We did not have access to our Security Branch, Zeerust, on a regular basis to know what was going on.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, to your knowledge Charl Naude was the guy who had taken up the planning of the operation in Botswana, is it not so?

MR MOMBERG: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And you would then infer that he is the one who might have communicated with the operator in Botswana with regard to searching for the vehicle and such other related matters?

MR MOMBERG: That is possible.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. And the Security Police as a whole, were not involved with anything that impinged on the execution of this operation in Botswana?

MR MOMBERG: No Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Momberg, you are excused.

CHAIRPERSON: I know that Mr Visser is quickly looking at his time, to give an indication to us that it is almost time to take a lunch adjournment. We will take a 30 minute lunch adjournment.

MS LOCKHAT: All rise.

ON RESUMPTION:

MS LOCKHAT: (Microphone not on)

CHAIRPERSON: Is he late?

MS LOCKHAT: That is correct Chairperson. We will proceed in Mr Du Plessis' absence. Mr Alberts, we are in your hands, who do we call next?

MR ALBERTS: The following applicant Chairperson, is Eric Goosen.

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ON RESUMPTION:

ERIC GOOSEN: (sworn states)

MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, if I can just come in here, I just want to mark the document "Gewysigde Bladsy 62", that is Mr Momberg's amendments, can we just mark that Exhibit N for the record. Is it not necessary Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: We don't think it is necessary to accept it as an Exhibit, it is an amendment of an already document.

MS LOCKHAT: Fine Chairperson, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

EXAMINATION BY MR ALBERTS: Chairperson, may I at the outset move for a similar amendment in respect of Mr Goosen. I beg leave to hand up the page concerning his application in this regard.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, we will accept that amendment Mr Alberts.

MR ALBERTS: Thank you Chairperson.

MR DU PLESSIS: Chairperson, may I just apologise that Mr Britz and I weren't here when you came in. We had lots of problems with the people with the food and the availability thereof, and I have had a few fights with the people in there, so - but we apologise.

ADV DE JAGER: Are you apologising for having the fight or being late?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I was quite justified in the fight we set up, because they do not seem to be in quite a rush to provide us with food, but we apologise that we were late.

CHAIRPERSON: Your apology is accepted Mr Du Plessis. Next time make sure that you have the fight ten minutes before we are to commence.

ADV DE JAGER: What is the paginated page of this - 45?

CHAIRPERSON: It is 45 Mr Alberts, is it not so?

MR ALBERTS: Indeed Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. You may proceed.

MR ALBERTS: Page 45. Chairperson, in this instance, Mr Goosen also prefers to testify in Afrikaans, so I will lead him in that language.

Mr Goosen, you applied for amnesty and your application is in the Bundle on page 1 and on, in fact up to page 62.27, is that correct?

MR GOOSEN: That is correct.

MR ALBERTS: Are you aware of the content of this application?

MR GOOSEN: Yes, that is correct.

MR ALBERTS: Do you confirm in general the correctness of the content?

MR GOOSEN: I confirm the correctness, yes.

MR ALBERTS: Once again your application consists of three components, the first is an introductory part, that gives an indication of your personal circumstances at the time within the South African Police, that is in general terms?

MR GOOSEN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR ALBERTS: And then for current purposes, the second part contains this specific incident for which you are applying, that is the bomb explosion in Botswana and then at the end you have a few comments in closing?

MR GOOSEN: That is correct.

MR ALBERTS: What was your rank in the Police at the time of the incident?

MR GOOSEN: I was a Sergeant.

MR ALBERTS: And where were you stationed?

MR GOOSEN: I was in the Security Branch, Northern Transvaal, Unit A.

MR ALBERTS: And that is the same Unit where Mr Momberg was, is that correct?

MR GOOSEN: Yes.

MR ALBERTS: Who was the Commander of that Unit?

MR GOOSEN: Brigadier Jack Cronje was the Commander of the Security Branch, Northern Transvaal.

MR ALBERTS: And who was the Commander of Unit A?

MR GOOSEN: If I remember correctly, it was Captain Fred Blauw at that stage.

MR ALBERTS: Was Mr Momberg also a member of Unit A?

MR GOOSEN: Yes, that is correct.

MR ALBERTS: Would you please have a look at page 45 of your application, that has now been amended, please turn to 46. Do you confirm that this incident occurred during March and April 1987?

MR GOOSEN: Yes, that is correct.

MR ALBERTS: Would you please just read to the Committee how it occurred that you became involved in this incident.

MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, yes. Lieutenant Momberg and myself at all relevant times, handled a certain informer, McKenzie and this informer was recruited in 1983 and initially he was used locally. During 1985, we succeeded in getting contact between him and Freddie Legoka, MK member, Gaberone and that led to the fact that he was recruited as a courier by MK and McKenzie then brought weapons and explosives into the Republic from Botswana. During March 1987 Momberg and myself were approached by Brigadier Cronje and we were informed that a meeting between us, Brigadier Wikus Loots, the Commander of the Security Branch, Western Transvaal and members of the South African Defence Force, Special Forces were organised to discuss a specific operation for the elimination of Victor Mnisi, Ernest Pule a member of MK Special Operations Group, Lusaka who was also the MK Co-ordinator for Botswana and one Lester Dumakode, a member of MK Special Operations Group at Lusaka and the responsible member for MK for smuggling weaponry via Botswana to the Republic.

MR ALBERTS: Could I just interject here, you mention Victor Mnisi, is that his correct name, full name?

MR GOOSEN: Victor Mnisi as reflected here in my application, is Johannes Mnisi and his MK name was Victor, MK Victor.

MR ALBERTS: You may continue on page 47.

MR GOOSEN: According to our information, the above-mentioned Mnisi was one of the chief planners of the Church Street bomb by the Poyntons Building during 1983, and he was also involved with many other serious acts of terror and on a continual basis, was involved with the continuing planning of acts of terror in the Republic. The aforementioned meeting took place at a site at Broederstroom Road, and Brigadier Cronje, Loots, Commandant Charl Naude of Special Forces, Lieutenants Hechter, Momberg and myself were present during this meeting. It was suggested that McKenzie's kombi had to be equipped with a motor bomb and that he should then have a meeting with these MK members in Gaberone at the Wade Adams industrial area. The planning was also that the bomb with which his vehicle would have been equipped, would explode in Gaberone during the meeting, as a result of detonation by means of a remote control device, which would be controlled by an operative from Special Forces. Part of this plan was the fact that this explosion would also mean the end of McKenzie. This aspect of the proposal was unacceptable for myself, Lieutenant Momberg and Hechter, and as a result thereof, we left the meeting and then also distanced ourselves from this plan in its totality.

MR ALBERTS: May I just interrupt here. According to the information at your disposal, it does seem that McKenzie was called to Botswana for a meeting with specific MK members, is that correct?

MR GOOSEN: Yes, that is correct. Telephone tapping was done at McKenzie's home, he received a call if I remember correctly, from Lester Dumakode, who gave him instructions to go to Botswana for serious discussions with him and the inference we made was that that had to do with more weaponry to be taken to the country.

MR ALBERTS: We now know that you had the first meeting where the planning was done, and you left it. What happened after that?

MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, after we left the meeting, we didn't return to the meeting. Myself, Momberg and Hechter stood on the stoep and had an informal discussion and the meeting then had to adjourn because the other people present, came from the room and with Brigadier Cronje, we then went back to Pretoria.

MR ALBERTS: What happened after that?

MR GOOSEN: The discussion in the vehicle of Brigadier Cronje was that we don't have to worry about McKenzie's well-being, other alternative plans would be put in place to ensure that he would not be hurt in this operation.

MR ALBERTS: We now know that there was a second meeting. Were you present?

MR GOOSEN: Yes, that is correct.

MR ALBERTS: Who else was present?

MR GOOSEN: At the second meeting it was - everyone was present with the exception of Hechter, everyone that I had already mentioned, and afterwards I couldn't remember it, but I heard afterwards that Major Crause was also present at the second meeting.

MR ALBERTS: Could you then continue on page 48.

MR GOOSEN: The meeting took - a second meeting was held at Hennops' Pride, the same people were once again present at this stage. We then agreed on a changed plan and this changed plan then held that McKenzie would not be a victim of the explosion, where the aim was to eliminate the MK members. After this plan had been finalised, McKenzie was introduced to the Special Forces member for identification purposes, to ensure that the plan then proceeds without problems.

MR ALBERTS: Could I interrupt you once again. It is quite clear that certain MK members were targeted, is that correct?

MR GOOSEN: Yes.

MR ALBERTS: How would those people be identified?

MR GOOSEN: They were well known to the operatives of the Special Forces or Security Forces in the Police. There was a terrorist photo album where the photo's of these specific MK members who had to be eliminated, appeared. At the time of the second meeting, if I remember correctly, some of these photo's of these MK members, were then handed to the Special Forces.

MR ALBERTS: So Special Forces would then be responsible for the identification of these people in Botswana?

MR GOOSEN: The MK people, yes.

MR ALBERTS: You may continue.

MR GOOSEN: McKenzie was never made aware of the fact that his vehicle would be equipped with a bomb. Lieutenant Momberg and myself told him that the vehicle would, or had to be equipped with a tapping device and we then under this pretext, got hold of his vehicle. It was handed over to the Special Forces and they then built the bomb into a false compartment which was already in the vehicle for the smuggling of weapons. A day or two later, we gave the vehicle back to McKenzie. The built in bomb could be detonated in one of two ways. The compartment in which it was housed, was equipped with a light sensitive switch and that would immediately detonate the bomb, the moment the compartment was opened, or the detonation could be done by means of the remote controlled device. MK's modus operandi with regard to the loading of weapons which had to be smuggled into the country, consisted of the fact that a vehicle would usually be taken from McKenzie in Gaberone and that the weapons would then be loaded at a secret place, that McKenzie didn't know and that the vehicle would then once again be given to McKenzie for his journey back to the Republic. Because of these arrangements that existed ...

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Goosen, you are reading your affidavit just too quickly for even the Translators to translate without seriously gasping for air. If you could just slower your pace with which you are reading your affidavit.

MR GOOSEN: I have taken note, Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: And also enable other people to hear in other languages, because they are also translating into various languages. You are also too quick even for my eyes, I can't keep pace with your reading.

MR GOOSEN: MK's modus operandi with regard to the loading of weapons, which had to be smuggled into the country, consisted thereof that the vehicle usually would be taken from McKenzie in Gaberone and that the weapons would then be loaded at a secret place, which was not known to McKenzie and that the vehicle would then be given back to McKenzie for his trip back to the Republic. Based on the arrangement that existed with regard to McKenzie's meeting of the mentioned targeted MK members, it was expected that those members would take McKenzie's vehicle for the purpose of loading the weapons that he had to smuggle back. Consequently the explosion would occur in the presence of these members when they would have tried to load the weapons. It was a fact that McKenzie did not necessarily bring weapons after every visit to Botswana, sometimes he only had to take messages. Should it then happen, there would not have been the opportunity for detonation of the bomb by means of the light sensitive switch and in that instance, it would have fallen back onto the alternative method of detonation that would then be by means of the remote control device, as soon as the opportunity arose.

MR ALBERTS: What would have been the opportune moment?

MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, we are aware of the fact that the Botswana Police quite often had roadblocks and should they then have taken McKenzie's vehicle for taking the weapons, and that they would have then come across a roadblock and that they would then have returned to the hotel where McKenzie was, there then would have been a situation where the targets then could have been involved in this explosion.

MR ALBERTS: Would an opportune moment then imply that the targets be present?

MR GOOSEN: Yes, that is correct.

MR ALBERTS: Could you then continue?

MR GOOSEN: Momberg and myself followed McKenzie at the beginning of April 1987, up to the Kopfontein border post. We accompanied him, and I activated the light sensitive switch and the transmitter unit without McKenzie knowing. He then crossed the border on the road to Gaberone for his meeting with the three targeted MK members. At that stage, Special Forces operative was already in Gaberone and his instruction was to always observe this vehicle.

CHAIRPERSON: May I interpose Mr Alberts, when you say at that stage the operative of Special Forces were already in Botswana, was that information given to you by Mr Charl Naude?

MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, I can't say - Charl Naude didn't say this to me in person, but in the execution of the operation and McKenzie going to Gaberone, we were informed by Brigadier Cronje that Special Forces operative was in Gaberone.

CHAIRPERSON: You may continue.

MR GOOSEN: Before McKenzie could meet with the targeted MK members, he was stopped on the outskirts of Gaberone by MK members whom I did not know. They re-routed McKenzie to Francistown where he was abducted by the Dumakode, Pule and others.

CHAIRPERSON: May we interpose again. Are you talking about something that you personally witnessed?

MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, I didn't see it personally. These facts given here in my application, came to the fore when McKenzie in 1992 was repatriated from the Quattro Camp and we then debriefed him.

ADV DE JAGER: So that is four, five years after the incident?

MR GOOSEN: Yes, it was only then that these facts came to light, and that was that he was re-routed. That was what he said.

MR ALBERTS: Were you personally involved with the debriefing of McKenzie when he returned approximately 1992?

MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, yes, that is correct. I was responsible to meet him at Jan Smuts airport with the repatriation and thereafter I met him at the Springbok hotel and from there, we made arrangements to debrief him in Pretoria for approximately a week.

ADV DE JAGER: So if one looks at the chronological order, you would have said that McKenzie disappeared, you don't know where he was?

MR GOOSEN: That is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: And when did you find out that McKenzie was somewhere, and that he was alive?

MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, there was a lot of speculation, it could perhaps be that he did not return, that he turned around, that he started working with the ANC, in other words that he became a double agent, it could have been that - there are a variety of factors which led to the fact that we didn't precisely know where McKenzie was.

ADV DE JAGER: When did you for the first time, not you personally, when did you get to know that he was abducted?

MR GOOSEN: That was during the debriefing in 1992 after he had been repatriated from Quattro.

CHAIRPERSON: You may proceed Mr Alberts.

MR ALBERTS: Thank you Mr Goosen, will you proceed.

MR GOOSEN: It became clear that MK had already found out before the time that McKenzie was an informer of the Security Police. This state of affairs threw the whole operation into chaos. The Special Forces operative never saw the vehicle when it arrived at Gaberone and as a result, he launched an intensive search for it.

MR ALBERTS: May I just interrupt you here. How did these facts which you have just testified to, come to your knowledge?

MR GOOSEN: As Momberg has also said in his evidence, on the safe terrain of the Western Transvaal, there was a mobile radio vehicle of Special Forces. There was also an operative on a hill with a sender, which as I understood it, received the messages from the operative's line to that person. That person would re-route it to the vehicle, the mobile vehicle and after McKenzie had gone across the border and the explosion did not take place within a day or two, this message reached the mobile unit that the vehicle had never been seen by the ...

ADV DE JAGER: You know what hearsay evidence is. Did you hear this with your own ears or did you hear it from one of the operatives?

MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, these were things that were told to me by the Special Forces operatives.

ADV DE JAGER: To you?

MR GOOSEN: No, I did not hear the message personally.

MR ALBERTS: So what you are saying, rests on hearsay is that correct?

MR GOOSEN: Yes.

MR ALBERTS: Will you just continue with your evidence?

MR GOOSEN: Approximately five days later, he saw McKenzie's vehicle by chance in a residential area of Gaberone and he immediately detonated the bomb by means of the remote controlled device.

ADV DE JAGER: Why do you say in his silliness, stupidity?

MR GOOSEN: At that moment the message was re-launched or resent to Special Forces. It was sent to the operative that that vehicle had to be searched for and found under all circumstances in Botswana and on plus minus the fourth or fifth day, once again, based on hearsay did not hear the radio message, but we were still on the safe terrain of the Western Transvaal. It was mentioned that the vehicle had been found by the operative.

ADV DE JAGER: But you haven't answered my question, why do you say that in his thoughtlessness, that he pressed this button?

MR GOOSEN: It was my deduction at the time of the compilation of this amnesty application as far as I knew, and the deduction that I had made at that time, that the car bomb was exploded as a result of detonation by this operative.

ADV DE JAGER: But why do you say that he did it thoughtlessly, why didn't he do it on purpose, who says he didn't see the people there?

MR GOOSEN: I cannot give an answer to this, but we knew that the arms cache was on the outskirts of Gaberone and this explosion apparently took place in a residential area.

MR LAX: Sorry, with the greatest of respect, you didn't know where the place was, McKenzie didn't know where the place was. You were guessing that it might be in the outskirts, some area beyond Gaberone, but it could just as easily have been right in the middle of a township, right in Gaberone, it could have been in a built up area, that they may have waited a suitable period, this is all total speculation? You don't know where or when or how or anything that this might have happened? All you know is what he told you?

MR GOOSEN: That is correct, and the deduction that we made about the time that they took as regards when they took the bus until when they handed it back, gave us the indication that it was not in the immediate vicinity of Gaberone, but we could have been wrong in that regard.

MR ALBERTS: And the deductions, if I understand you correctly, can we accept that this was also based on hearsay evidence?

MR GOOSEN: That is correct.

MR ALBERTS: Did you also hear what the consequences of the explosion was?

MR GOOSEN: The initial was that an explosion had taken place in Gaberone, at that stage we were not one hundred percent sure as to whether it was the car bomb, and later from the media reports, in the newspaper and on the news, we heard that it was the car bomb which had exploded.

MR ALBERTS: Was this at the stage when the explosion took place when the operative of the Special Forces found the vehicle?

MR GOOSEN: That is correct.

MR ALBERTS: And afterwards, did you find out, we all know today, that there were lives involved, personal injuries were done and property was damaged and that it could be that all these people who suffered, were innocent?

MR GOOSEN: That is correct.

MR ALBERTS: Was it part of your planning that they were to be involved?

MR GOOSEN: No, the initial planning was aimed at the three identified MK members, Pule, Dumakode and Mnisi. But I could have envisaged that something could have gone wrong if one sent in a car bomb, and that innocent people could also have been injured or killed in such an explosion. But this was not part of the planning or the reaching of our objective.

CHAIRPERSON: May I interpose Mr Alberts? This really is what concerns me Mr Goosen, when a question is put to you by your Counsel to find out if the injury to other people, other than the three targeted MK operatives, was ever foreseen by you and you respond by saying no, you intended that the targets should be contained in that only Mnisi, Pule and Dumakode should be the victims of the explosion and no one else, when in fact from the evidence you have given before this Committee, you did not know who would load the weapons in the vehicle, you did not know whether it would be Mnisi, Dumakode or Pule who would do the loading of the weapons, how could you say that you never foresaw that people other than Mnisi would end up being the object of your attack?

MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, if I can react to this in this way and reply to your statement, to some extent we did envisage that at the arms cache, that other MK members could also have been killed or injured in the explosion, others than the three targeted MK members, and with the building of a car bomb and the extent to which McKenzie's kombi was changed, one can also in all reasonableness envisage that there is no safeguard with any such switch and such an explosive device, that it would affect any other targets, other than the three targeted persons.

CHAIRPERSON: Proceed Mr Alberts.

MR ALBERTS: As it pleases you. But if I understand you correctly, despite the fact that you envisaged that others could also have been injured, this was not part of your planning and your planning only aimed at the three targets?

MR GOOSEN: That is correct, the primary objective was to eliminate the three identified MK members in the explosion.

MR ALBERTS: But nevertheless one could have envisaged that others could have been hurt as well, and that is the type of risk of such a bomb, is that not so?

MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, with the extent of such an explosive device, one has no guarantee which exempts you from the fact that anybody else could also be hurt or killed in the process.

MR ALBERTS: No guarantee that it would not happen?

MR GOOSEN: One cannot foresee or envisage that it will not happen.

MR ALBERTS: ... it's the rest of your application. On page 52 and further you mention the fact that according to your information Botswana citizens were injured and that damage was incurred to property. These people were unknown to you I accept?

MR GOOSEN: Yes, that's correct.

MR ALBERTS: Did you at any stage after the conclusion of this operation, speak to anyone of Special Forces who was involved with this or who could have had any knowledge of this? Did you have anything to do with them?

MR GOOSEN: No, Chairperson.

MR ALBERTS: In your unit or in Security Branch Northern Transvaal, according to your knowledge, was any attempt made to determine exactly why the operation failed or went wrong and what the final consequences or results were?

MR GOOSEN: I have no personal knowledge that any steps were taken after the operation and what the nature of the discussions would have been, so I can only speculate on that.

MR ALBERTS: Would those kinds of attempts - in any case they have been handled with on the level that you were at that stage, namely that of Sergeant?

MR GOOSEN: No.

MR ALBERTS: Would it have been dealt with on the level of Lieutenant Momberg?

MR GOOSEN: No.

MR ALBERTS: Since then and specifically at the time of the compilation of your application which now serves before the Committee, to the present time have you had any discussions or anything to do with members of the Special Forces?

MR GOOSEN: No, Chairperson, simply because I did not have any knowledge of who the members of the Special Forces were at that stage. I had no way of making contact with them. I have no knowledge of particulars, telephone numbers, addresses or any way in which I can correspond with them.

MR ALBERTS: Why I'm specifically asking you this is as a result of the problems which Lieutenant Momberg had with regard to deductions that he made as to what happened then, that there could possibly be the perception that you and he, or at least he can co-operate here to possibly try to protect somebody who has not been incriminated by name here?

MR GOOSEN: No Chairperson, there is no possibility of that option.

MR ALBERTS: Because we know that Commander Charl Naude, who is the one member who you mention here expressly and who has also been mentioned by Mr Momberg, that he was involved. Are you aware of the identity of anyone else of the Special Forces?

MR GOOSEN: No.

MR ALBERTS: ... who was involved here?

MR GOOSEN: No.

MR ALBERTS: In any way whatsoever?

MR GOOSEN: Not at all.

ADV DE JAGER: Was Charl Naude introduced to you by name?

MR GOOSEN: That's correct. During the meeting he was introduced to me as Commander Charl Naude.

ADV DE JAGER: So there was no secrecy about who he was?

MR GOOSEN: No, because everyone's true identities were revealed there, mine, Goosen's and Charl Naude.

MR ALBERTS: Just to step down from this subject, would you please page to page 53 of your application. There you mention in paragraph 10(a), the political objective which was the purpose of this operation, do you confirm that?

MR GOOSEN: I do.

MR ALBERTS: It was the general objective, namely this one which is mentioned in 10 as I have it, which was the same with all the operations in which you were involved in the Security Branch Northern Transvaal.

MR GOOSEN: That is correct.

MR ALBERTS: In paragraph 10(b) you give your motivation for the political objective, which deals with this application and this incident, in particular do you confirm the correctness thereof?

MR GOOSEN: I do.

MR ALBERTS: You also have knowledge of Brigadier Cronje's application for amnesty which has served before this Committee?

MR GOOSEN: That's correct.

MR ALBERTS: And do you know what his motivation in general was?

MR GOOSEN: I did read through his pieces and I agree with the contents thereof.

MR ALBERTS: This motivation of yours continues to page 54 of your application, will you just for purposes of the record confirm this?

MR GOOSEN: I confirm this.

MR ALBERTS: And lastly, from the contents of page 55 it seems that you were in the direct instruction of a senior officer.

MR GOOSEN: That is correct.

MR ALBERTS: And who was that?

MR GOOSEN: I was acting in direct instruction of Brigadier Jack Cronje.

MR ALBERTS: And lastly, for purposes of the record I just want to refer you to the remaining parts of your application which have been included here. Not everything has direct relation to this incident, but specifically the contents of pages 197, 198, that would paginated pages 55 and further, is that correct?

MR GOOSEN: That's correct.

MR ALBERTS: Lastly, we now know that innocent people were involved and injured as a result of this operation, what are your sentiments in this regard?

MR GOOSEN: Chairperson, I regard the incident as a pitiful event, it was not part of the operation that innocent civilians of Botswana were to be injured or killed in this operation. I want to express my sympathy to those families and to justify my part in this, that is was not part of the planning.

MR ALBERTS: Thank you, Chairperson, I have no further questions at this stage.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Alberts. Mr Visser, do you have any questions to put to Mr Goosen.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Thank you, yes Chairperson.

As we now understand the informer, McKenzie, gave you information and you made a recording of a telephone call between him and Dumakude, is that correct?

MR GOOSEN: Yes.

MR VISSER: Just for the record it's D-U-M-A-K-U-D-E, Chairperson.

You say that thereafter a meeting took place.

MR GOOSEN: That's correct.

MR VISSER: At the end of the testimony you also said that you acted on instruction of Brigadier Cronje.

MR GOOSEN: That's correct.

MR VISSER: What was this instruction that you are referring to specifically, what did he tell you to do?

MR GOOSEN: The instruction or the order was to keep ourselves prepared and to attend a meeting later that evening.

MR VISSER: Yes, and at the meeting were any further instructions given?

MR GOOSEN: No definite instructions were given to me, Momberg or Hechter. The meeting was mainly led by Brigadiers Cronje, Loots and Commander Charl Naude.

MR VISSER: And at the next meeting the next evening when they decided that McKenzie was not to be killed or injured in the explosion, was your duty merely to make the information and the source itself as a vehicle in which to execute this operation?

MR GOOSEN: That is correct that McKenzie was the means to the whole objective. - and the second meeting took place during the day, just for record purposes.

MR VISSER: Am I correct if I say the Security Branch's involvement here was very slight, it actually went about the fact that you had a source who went to Botswana.

MR GOOSEN: The latter is correct. As regards the real context of the stated question, I cannot react to that because at that stage my rank would not have justified me having any such information.

MR VISSER: Yes, but what we are talking about is that Special Forces would have made the bomb, built it in the car and detonated it and monitor the situation in Botswana. You had no control over this?

MR GOOSEN: That's correct.

MR VISSER: The other aspect is, when during the planning there was spoken about who the targets were to be, Brigadier Loots told me that a first prize would have been Johannes Mnisi, Dumakude or Pule, but it was also aimed at any MK members.

MR GOOSEN: That's correct.

MR VISSER: Crause, as you have already said, was not present at the first meeting but at the second meeting. Would you agree if I put it to you that his duty was to ensure that things go smoothly at the border post and to ensure that the kombi goes through.

MR GOOSEN: Those facts, I could not recall that, but I wouldn't argue with them.

MR VISSER: The people who were to load the weapons, if we now speak about the light sensitive switch of yours, would you accept, as the Chairperson has also put it, that it would not necessarily be Mnisi, Dumakude or Pule, but also any other MK operatives?

MR GOOSEN: That's correct.

MR VISSER: Who did you report back to after you returned?

MR GOOSEN: To Brigadier Jack Cronje. We reported that an explosion had taken place. Further aspects which were taken by Brigadier Cronje on that, I cannot comment on.

MR VISSER: I did not ask you about that either. I have no further questions, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Visser.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr du Plessis?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Chairperson.

Captain Hechter was only present in the first meeting.

MR GOOSEN: That's correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And thereafter, did he have anything to do with the operation?

MR GOOSEN: Nothing whatsoever.

MR DU PLESSIS: And he knew nothing about the operation?

MR GOOSEN: No.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, I have no further questions.

ADV DE JAGER: And at the first meeting the operation was not agreed to?

MR GOOSEN: Yes, no finality was reached during the first meeting, regarding the continued planning and execution of a plan of action.

ADV DE JAGER: But as I understood it, you and Hechter left, you disassociated yourself with the plan.

MR GOOSEN: That's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Lockhat?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS LOCKHAT: Mr Goosen, did you activate the bomb the first time in the vehicle, McKenzie's car?

MR GOOSEN: That is true. At the border post on the RSA's side when McKenzie handed in his travel documents for purposes of leaving the country I walked to his minibus and activated the bomb.

MS LOCKHAT: You also knew how to deactivate the bomb, is that correct?

MR GOOSEN: That is correct.

MS LOCKHAT: You also had an instrument to deactivate the bomb, is that correct?

MR GOOSEN: That's correct, it is known as a sock, which goes in and out of a hole just like those used in earphones.

MS LOCKHAT: So how did you know how to activate the bomb, to deactivate the bomb, who showed you this, wasn't this bomb made by Special Forces? How did you know to do all of this? Please comment on that.

MR GOOSEN: Special Forces did build the bomb. Lieutenant Momberg and I personally took receipt of the kombi at Special Forces from Charl Naude, who then showed us where the arming device had been placed on the steering column.

MS LOCKHAT: You say there was radio contact between yourselves and then the operative in Botswana, is that correct?

MR GOOSEN: No, that's not correct. Ourselves will mean that this includes me or the police, that would not be correct, the communication which is being referred to here is communication between the Special Force operative in Botswana and Special Force member who were placed in the control area of the RSA.

MS LOCKHAT: But you could get information to wherever you were, is that correct?

MR GOOSEN: If one requested information I accept that one would be able to obtain that information from members of the Special Forces.

ADV DE JAGER: But you could also send information out, you could make contact with people outside?

MR GOOSEN: Not in our personal capacities, Chairperson.

MS LOCKHAT: It did come to your knowledge that the operative in Botswana, that there was a problem, McKenzie wasn't there, they couldn't track down the vehicle, they informed that they were, you were informed that they instructed the operative to them go and look for this vehicle, is that correct?

MR GOOSEN: That's correct, based on hearsay and things that were told to us on the farm just outside Kopfontein.

MS LOCKHAT: Was it possible, seen in that five days, that it was five days since the kombi went into Botswana, was it possible to actually deactivate this bomb? Was it possible for them to contact you or you to contact them to instruct them not to proceed if these operatives were not found, the MK operatives, was that possible?

MR GOOSEN: I can just react by saying that in this instance no, because I had the specific sock with which I activated the vehicle. The one reason for us staying there was that if the bomb for one or other reason were not to detonate and the minibus were to come back, that Lieutenant Momberg and I would be in a position to render it harmless.

MS LOCKHAT: So you could actually only deactivate once that bus comes in, back into the RSA?

MR GOOSEN: That's correct, and at that stage we did not have passports to enter Botswana in any case.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that a plausible reason to give, Mr Goosen? I'm sure if you would have wanted to obtain a passport as a member of the Security Branch, you would have been able to do so in a jiffy. Isn't the crux of the matter the fact that you had no control over the operation whilst the car was in Botswana?

MR GOOSEN: That's correct, Chair.

MS LOCKHAT: I have no further questions, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Alberts, do you have any re-exam to do?

MR ALBERTS: I have no further questions at this stage, Chairperson. In other words, questions following upon the questions by my colleagues or Ms Lockhat. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: So Alberts has no re-examination. Mr Lax do you have any questions to put to Mr Goosen? Mr Lax has no questions to put to you, Mr Goosen. Advocate de Jager?

Mr Goosen, you are excused.

MR GOOSEN: Thank you, Chairperson.

MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, we call on the next amnesty applicant, Mr W J Loots.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, thank you. I believe it's my turn now. We're going to call Brigadier Loots. He's ready to take the oath.

ADV DE JAGER: Your full names please?

WIKUS JOHANNES LOOTS: (sworn states)

MR VISSER: Chairperson, relevant documentation to the evidence of the three witnesses which will follow are contained in the amnesty decisions in bundle 1. You will find the relevant incident dealt with in the Cronje amnesty decision at page 19. We will refer briefly also to volume 2(h). We will also refer you to bundle 10, page 122 and following, where the application itself, the original application is bound into your bundles. And we will lastly and most importantly refer you to Exhibit C, which was the affidavit handed up by Brigadier Loots at the inception of the hearings. The McKenzie incident you will find at page 38, Chairperson, and I intend to go straight to page 38, with your leave.

CHAIRPERSON: Will you just allow us a few seconds to locate our Exhibit C?

MR VISSER: Yes, certainly. Exhibit C is the one. I will not refer at this stage to bundle 1, so that one you may as well ignore for the moment. So bundle 10, bundle 2(h) and Exhibit C are the ones that we will refer to.

CHAIRPERSON: We have no problem with bundle 1, we seem to know it by heart by now.

MR VISSER: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: We would like to have bundle 3, I'm sorry, Exhibit C.

MR VISSER: Exhibit C, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Whilst we are still locating Exhibit C, you've made reference to bundle 2(h), can you give us an indication which pages you will be referring to?

MR VISSER: The page numbers are as marked in hand manuscript from page 1 to page 11 and page 161 to page 169. Those are the ones that are relevant. I'm not necessarily going to refer to all of them.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Whilst attempts are being made to locate our exhibits you may proceed.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Chairperson.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Visser, I don't think I will be able to find mine, I think it's at home. I see that there's a new person next to you, won't he be able to give us a copy?

CHAIRPERSON: You may proceed, Mr Visser.

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Thank you, Chairperson.

Brigadier Loots, you have already appeared in these hearings cycles, if I may refer to hearings, this amnesty application cycles, and you handed in Exhibit C, and you incorporate that into your evidence, is that correct?

BRIG LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Could you directly go to the McKenzie incident on page 38 of that specific bundle.

BRIG LOOTS: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: That is an incident where there was an explosion on the 9th of April 1987 in Gaberone, Botswana, and you in paragraph 115 you then give an indication of your knowledge and your involvement in this incident, could you just read that?

BRIG LOOTS: Chairperson, I remember that at approximately the end of March, beginning of April '87, received information from Lieutenant Momberg, he was a Lieutenant at that stage, that Lester Dumakude or Lekote Pule - it wasn't quite clear which one of the two, made an appointment with a source to meet him during the Easter weekend in Botswana.

MR VISSER: You refer here to the source as the person that you referred to in the previous paragraph, that is the source from the Northern Transvaal.

BRIG LOOTS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: So he was only known to you by means of what?

BRIG LOOTS: That was MT395, the registered number.

MR VISSER: You didn't know him, you also didn't know his identity?

BRIG LOOTS: No, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: I remember that I was in telephonic contact with Brigadier Cronje, a meeting was then held in the Broederstroom area. The people present were Brigadier Cronje, myself, Commandant Charl Naude of Special Forces and as far as I can remember ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: Well we know that Mr Goosen and Mr Momberg were present and we also know that Mr Hechter was present. So we are now aware of what the Committee has heard, that that was the situation.

BRIG LOOTS: Thank you, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Now you say that you can't remember whether Crause was present. Now if his evidence is that he was not present, then would you contest that?

BRIG LOOTS: No, I would accept that as correct.

MR VISSER: Perhaps we should just get a bit of background information before we get to what happened at the meeting. Now you heard when I asked questions during cross-examination to Mr Momberg concerning the status and position and the activities of Johannes Mnisi, is it correct?

BRIG LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Do you agree with the statements that I put to Mr Momberg with regard to the importance of Mr Mnisi?

BRIG LOOTS: Yes.

MR VISSER: Now after the Church Street bomb, what was the situation if one refers to target priorities regarding Johannes Mnisi?

BRIG LOOTS: Chairperson, I can explain it in this way. I personally had to attend the Church Street bomb and I can give you the assurance that every member of the Security Branch at that stage was involved with investigations, that it was our aim to get the people who were responsible for this act by either arresting them or to eliminate them.

MR VISSER: Would it then be correct to say that there was then out of necessity discussions between you and Cronje before March '87, concerning actions against Mnisi?

BRIG LOOTS: That is correct. As Lieutenant Momberg informed the Committee, the source visited Botswana 23 times and that there also there are registers of his entering and exiting, so he visited Botswana on 23 occasions.

MR VISSER: Now if we get to the meeting, what happened at the meeting? - that's in paragraph 116, page 39.

BRIG LOOTS: At the meeting I was informed by Brigadier Cronje that weapons, ammunition, explosives, limpet mines, would be hidden in a false compartment which would then be, that was in McKenzie's vehicle.

MR VISSER: Was that the first time that you heard of this hidden compartment?

BRIG LOOTS: No, I was aware of it before that. As Colonel Momberg had testified, on six, seven occasions he brought in weapons with this vehicle.

MR VISSER: Continue to page 117.

BRIG LOOTS: The issue of the telephone call from Dumakude or Pule and the meeting with McKenzie in Botswana was discussed at the meeting and McKenzie would then book into a hotel of his own choice and then his vehicle would then, as in the past, be taken by MK members from him and they would then load the weapons and the vehicle would then be given back to McKenzie.

MR VISSER: Is that what was said to you, that is the modus operandi, that is the way in which the source gets the weapons or loads the weapons?

BRIG LOOTS: Yes.

MR VISSER: Now whilst we're at the telephone conversation, was there also anything mentioned of the tape recording?

BRIG LOOTS: Yes.

MR VISSER: Could you perhaps just tell the Committee.

BRIG LOOTS: I arranged with Brigadier Cronje to get us a copy of that specific part. During my discussions with Botswana, we at a later stage also offered them this tape. I can just mention that this tape was after amnesty was under discussion. The file with the tape was handed to Brigadier Jack Cronje. I discussed this with his legal representatives and for some reason this ...(end of side A of tape)

... where they were to meet was at Wade Adams in the industrial area.

MR VISSER: Now what was the inference that you had made from the discussion on the tape, what would McKenzie do in Botswana?

BRIG LOOTS: It was quite clear that his visit was seen a very serious light by MK, or let me put it in this way, they requested him to go there that weekend because they urgently wanted to see him.

MR VISSER: What did you infer?

BRIG LOOTS: I accepted that once again as in the past it would be a case that weapons would be taken into the country.

MR VISSER: Please continue with paragraph 119.

BRIG LOOTS:

MR VISSER: So the idea was or the targets as I understand it, they were the mentioned by Momberg and Goosen, but as Mr Goosen also said that where they load the weapons if other people who also had something to do with the smuggling of the weapons, that that would not have deterred you to also eliminate them?

BRIG LOOTS: No, definitely not.

MR VISSER: And what was the planning as explain to you on how it would take place? - paragraph 120.

BRIG LOOTS: The planning was that Commandant Charl Naude would arrange that a bomb would be built into the false compartment that had already been built into the ANC Special Forces.

MR VISSER: How do you know that?

BRIG LOOTS: I got to know that by means of discussions with Brigadier Cronje and also Momberg and the ...(indistinct) that was after the source came back and after they had taken the weapons from the compartment. I just want to put it quite clearly here, Chairperson, I also referred to a light sensitive switch.

Now I just want to put it quite clearly that after the vehicle left on that day for Botswana and the vehicle did not arrive at Wade Adams, the vehicle just went missing, I asked Charl Naude, he was on the scene, what had happened and he then enquired from the person who prepared the bomb, that was Colonel Hekkie van Heerden, the late Hekkie van Heerden, I learnt that he passed away a year ago in an aeroplane crash in Angola, and he then ascertained that besides the light sensitive switch, the remote control also had a light sensitive switch.

MR VISSER: In any case at the first meeting it was conceded by the other witnesses, that the light sensitive switch was not discussed. We'll return to that. But in your application you refer to a light sensitive switch.

BRIG LOOTS: Yes.

MR VISSER: And where it does not tally with the evidence that you have just given, that would not then be a correct version?

BRIG LOOTS: That is correct. I just want to put it into perspective. When I discussed this with van der Merwe, a light sensitive switch was not the case.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, if you will allow me on a personal note, I gave you warning earlier last week that there was a more serious mistake that I made with the papers, with Exhibit C, and we've now come to it. It's paragraph 121, it appears to have slipped in into a place where it shouldn't be. It should follow paragraph 99 in the Nietverdiendt matter. And I do apologise, I accept full responsibility. If you read it you will immediately see that it's out of place here and that it follows perfectly after paragraph 99. So if you would perhaps just strike it out here and read it in after paragraph 99.

CHAIRPERSON: So paragraph 121 is struck out.

MR VISSER: And it becomes 99(a).

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, for purposes of these proceedings we simply strike out.

MR VISSER: Thank you, thank you, Chairperson, but you will remember when you read the Nietverdiendt, when you consider the Nietverdiendt application. Thank you, Chairperson.

Then we turn the page, it should then start with:

And that is contained in the document that I handed in. I don't know what the exhibit number is.

MR VISSER: That was bundle 2(j). We have already dealt with that.

BRIG LOOTS: And there was documentary evidence of explosives provided to people in Durban where it had been used.

MR VISSER: And then you also refer, as the other witnesses, to the activities of Johannes Mnisi and the second part of 122, you also confirm that?

BRIG LOOTS: Yes, I do. He was responsible for many acts of terror in the RSA.

MR VISSER: Yes, you have confirmed. Brigadier, you agree that the planning was that an operative of Special Forces would activate the bomb in Botswana after the ANC had taken the kombi from McKenzie. That is how you understood it?

BRIG LOOTS: Yes, absolutely, I want to emphasis it was after the kombi as in the past.

MR VISSER: Now at that point - well let's refer to the first meeting, did you realise that there was a possibility that things could go awry and that innocent people could be injured or be killed as a result of the operation?

BRIG LOOTS: Yes, unfortunately that is the case, it's one of those incidents where you really don't have full control.

MR VISSER: But you still then reconciled yourself with it to get to the target and your main objective and that is to eliminate these people?

BRIG LOOTS: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: In paragraph 124, if you can just continue. Perhaps I just have to ask you this, there was evidence of the other witnesses that at a meeting that they describe as the first meeting, that the planning was that McKenzie had to be blown up with the kombi and that they weren't satisfied with it. Can you recollect such a discussion that they left the meeting?

BRIG LOOTS: Chairperson, I really tried to search my memory, I can't remember but what I want to say to the Committee is that it is correct as Lieutenant Momberg and Goosen had testified that they and Brigadier Cronje had left. Personally I stayed over with Charl Naude the next morning before I went to the safe place which I referred to where we stayed that was at Lanseria, not far from Pretoria.

And the next morning I went to Brigadier Cronje to his office that was in Pretorius Street. I enjoyed a cup of coffee with him and I ceded to his request to get the necessary permission from General van der Merwe.

MR VISSER: Yes, that is where we are at 124?

BRIG LOOTS: Yes, that is 124.

BRIG LOOTS: What I want to assure the Commission of is, I cannot remember that McKenzie, he did very good work for us in this country, that he would have part of a plan where he would have become a victim.

MR VISSER: Now that is also the evidence of the other witnesses. Nevertheless, how did it occur that you talked to General van der Merwe?

BRIG LOOTS: Western Transvaal, because of its geographic position was responsible for the co-ordinating of MK and APLA activities in Botswana and also infiltrations from Botswana and for that reason Brigadier Cronje, perhaps I had better knowledge of the geographic area of Wade Adams and so forth, we visited Botswana regularly, he then asked me to represent him and to present it to General van der Merwe, which I did.

MR VISSER: And paragraph 125, you continue where you say that you had an appointment with General van der Merwe, you saw him in his office and you informed him of the project. Paragraph 126, could you continue.

BRIG LOOTS:

MR VISSER: We also just have to add that a part of your contribution was monitoring of the vehicle from Pretoria up to Botswana, that is McKenzie's vehicle.

BRIG LOOTS: That is correct. Lieutenant Momberg and Sergeant Goosen assisted in that regard up to Kopfontein gate.

MR VISSER: But besides that you had no direct involvement in this operation, or contribution, is that correct?

BRIG LOOTS: I was there with Commandant Crause because at that stage because of infiltration of weapons on large scale we had quite a number of dogs, explosives dogs and we then saw the unit whose function it was to search those vehicles. We then saw to it that that vehicle would not be searched.

MR VISSER: Now that was the sum total of your activity.

BRIG LOOTS: Yes, that is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: What is the reason, why didn't you act in a foreign country for example, Botswana?

BRIG LOOTS: Now the Police Force did not have the jurisdiction to at across the border.

ADV DE JAGER: Whose task was that?

BRIG LOOTS: That was the Defence Force.

MR VISSER: And that would obviously include Special Forces?

BRIG LOOTS: Special Forces, specifically Special Forces.

MR VISSER: We are now still with the discussions between you and General van der Merwe, did he enquire about the possibility regarding danger for civilians?

BRIG LOOTS: Yes, he did. I told him that we foresee a slight possibility because as I understood it, Dumakude's instruction was very specific: meet me at Wade Adams - that's according to the tape, there I take you to a hotel of your choice, the vehicle is then removed. It was not discussed in detail, but the modus operandi was of such a nature that we accepted or assumed that the vehicle would removed for the loading of weapons.

MR VISSER: General van der Merwe then gave the approval within the limitations of what you had told him what your involvement would be in the operation.

BRIG LOOTS: I could perhaps just put it that General van der Merwe gave approval that we could continue with the operation understanding that the Defence Force would handle things in Botswana and that all possible preparations should be made that people lives would not lost.

MR VISSER: That is people other than MK members.

BRIG LOOTS: Yes, people other than MK members. I also informed Brigadier Cronje about this.

MR VISSER: After that there was a second meeting.

BRIG LOOTS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: In your application you only refer to one, that's on page 122, that's only one meeting. Now this is the second meeting that you refer to, why didn't you initially when you completed the application, why didn't you refer to this first meeting?

BRIG LOOTS: Chairperson, as I've said in my application that was some time ago and after these amnesty applications, when the whole process got started we once again talked to other people, our memories were refreshed and in a such a way I then remembered that a person such as Colonel Crause was definitely not present at the safe place. Crause was in Rustenburg and I then called him from there for the second meeting.

MR VISSER: You also refreshed your memory by using the evidence of Momberg and Goosen and you also agree that their exposition regarding the meetings are correct.

BRIG LOOTS: Yes, I agree.

MR VISSER: With the exception of course as we have said, that you can't remember the issue of McKenzie in the explosion.

In paragraph 130 you get to the point where the second meeting took place, you say who were present. It's in your statement. And what you also say on page 43 is that McKenzie was later brought in and introduced to Colonel Crause and myself. Now the evidence of Mr Momberg was that he stood at a distance under the pretext that he would get some cold drink, how do you remember it?

BRIG LOOTS: We personally met Mr McKenzie there and we had a general discussion with him.

MR VISSER: Paragraph 131, please continue.

BRIG LOOTS:

MR VISSER: We know that McKenzie was not informed that there was a bomb in his vehicle, you have no reason to contest that?

BRIG LOOTS: No.

MR VISSER: And in paragraph 133 you then say what you observed.

BRIG LOOTS:

MR VISSER: That is the Saturday of the Easter weekend of '87?

BRIG LOOTS: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And you also told us about the dogs and that you made sure that the vehicle was not searched for explosives. And that was all that you had to do with this project?

BRIG LOOTS: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: In bundle 2(h), Brigadier Jack Cronje testified, on page 3 - page 3 of bundle 2(h), Chairperson. I have it approximately two thirds down the page. Brigadier Cronje said:

If I can just stop there. If that then means that you had known McKenzie before the Easter weekend of '87, what would you reaction be?

BRIG LOOTS: This statement is not correct. I met McKenzie there for the first and the last time.

MR VISSER: And the sentence continues, and I add:

Would that be correct?

BRIG LOOTS: No, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: The idea was, as your evidence is, that everything there was discussed at the meeting?

BRIG LOOTS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: On page 4, once again two thirds down the page, Brigadier Cronje then gave an exposition, very short, of what had happened and although the order isn't perhaps as it should be, do you in principle agree with what has been said there? You have already read the paragraph, is that correct?

BRIG LOOTS: Is it at the top?

MR VISSER:

That's correct, not so?

CHAIRPERSON: That's line 20?

BRIG LOOTS: Chairperson, that is correct.

MR VISSER:

BRIG LOOTS: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER:

Well that should probably be: "inserted the weapons or whatever and handed it back to McKenzie." Do you agree in principle?

BRIG LOOTS: Yes, I agree.

MR VISSER: If we can then go to page 7, second paragraph. Brigadier Cronje on a question of my learned friend, Mr du Plessis:

What is your comment?

BRIG LOOTS: I would interpret it as if that would have been a combined operation, joint operation between Western Transvaal and Northern Transvaal.

MR VISSER: As it is stated there in the evidence you don't agree?

BRIG LOOTS: No.

MR VISSER: And then on page 165, that's 2(h) ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Before you proceed to that, Mr Visser, if I may interpose. What does he say to what is contained also in relation to what you've just put to him about paragraph 7, which appears on page 3, line 10, from 10 until about line 17?

MR VISSER: Yes, Wikus Loots, the Head of the Security - that passage?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VISSER: Perhaps I should read that as well.

CHAIRPERSON: Won't you just put it to him because I think it's tied to what you've just put to him.

MR VISSER: Yes, thank you for reminding me, Chairperson. Let me do that.

On page 3, bundle 2(h), it is indicated here that that is the evidence of Brigadier Cronje:

Now what happened here, Chairperson, and my learned friend can stop me, but apparently the word "neutralising" was used in the, apparently, in the original application form and he was interjection by saying it should read "elimination".

The only point here is the first sentence:

You have already testified this afternoon that discussions between you and Brigadier Cronje did take place.

BRIG LOOTS: That's correct.

MR VISSER: In light of that, what Brigadier Cronje says here, is that possible?

BRIG LOOTS: That's possible, but not with regard to this specific operation, neither with regard to what he is saying about General van der Merwe here. I only spoke to him at a later stage.

MR VISSER: So are you saying now that if this is a general statement you agree with this?

BRIG LOOTS: That's correct.

MR VISSER: Bear with me a moment, Chairperson. It's just been pointed out to me that the same statement is made also at page 2, line 24 and 25, Chairperson. That is all I wish to refer you to in bundle 2(h).

In your evidence, and I think you have already said this, that you regard this as a joint operation?

BRIG LOOTS: That's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: So it would be incorrect then if a suggestion was to made that this was your personal matter, that you were in operation of this matter and not Brigadier Cronje, would you agree with that? If a suggestion was to be made that you were the one who initiated this operation, that suggestion would be incorrect.

MR VISSER: May I rephrase your question?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, about initiating the operation.

MR VISSER: If the intention of the evidence of Brigadier Cronje is to allege that this whole operation was thought out by you and planned and executed by you, what do you have to say about that?

BRIG LOOTS: I would say that that is not correct, it was a joint operation.

ADV DE JAGER: But as regards this operation the spark which set things going was information that on that Easter weekend Mr McKenzie was to go to Botswana?

BRIG LOOTS: That's correct.

ADV DE JAGER: That information reached you and who gave you that information?

BRIG LOOTS: As I can remember it was telephonically given through Lieutenant Momberg and Cronje.

ADV DE JAGER: Did Lieutenant Momberg or Gouws ever report directly to you?

BRIG LOOTS: From time to time Lieutenant Momberg and I did speak telephonically about aspects regarding McKenzie.

ADV DE JAGER: And the information that they received from their informers, was this conveyed to Brigadier Cronje?

BRIG LOOTS: Oh yes, it was.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Commissioner. And what is more, the informer was not one of your informers, if I may say it like that, it was an informer from the Northern Transvaal Security Branch?

BRIG LOOTS: Yes. I could perhaps just add this for clarity. Those of use who struggled to get informers inside, out of the ranks of the ANC's special operations group, Western Transvaal could not succeed in this. Northern Transvaal, MT395 was one of the few in Mnisi's group who succeeded in penetrating this and for that reason because Botswana played such an important role and because they used Botswana in such a large extent for infiltration, it was an opportunity for us which we wanted to utilise.

MR VISSER: We know now that you said that you and Crause monitored the kombi and that Loots and Goosen were there, they now passed the border and thereafter you said you had nothing to do with it. Did you a few days later hear anything about this kombi?

BRIG LOOTS: The Security Branch at Zeerust reported or informed me telephonically that over the Botswana general radio they heard about a car bomb which had exploded in Gaberone. I also read in the newspapers that three citizens or civilians of Botswana were killed and that houses in Gaberone west were damaged.

MR VISSER: Due to the action of the investigating unit we know that three people were killed and injured and a number of buildings were damaged and this seems as if it concurs with the information that you received from the newspaper reports.

BRIG LOOTS: That's correct.

MR VISSER: You speculated if it could be asked as to whether you had any information about this and in paragraph 138 you say that it's not clear to you what the citizens of Botswana would have done with the kombi and how it reached them.

BRIG LOOTS: I can only give my opinion and that is that only people who knew about that secret compartment would possibly have tampered with it.

MR VISSER: It is not to say that those people who were killed were in the kombi, they could possibly have been next to the kombi?

BRIG LOOTS: That's possible, yes.

MR VISSER: Did you receive a request from the Botswana Government, the Botswana Police?

BRIG LOOTS: It is part of this document as well. I dealt with them over a period of five years, with Mogale and ...(end of side B of tape)

... JGT375T, which seemed to be that of a motorbike. And today I am honest, I waited until they gave me the right one.

MR VISSER: And that was JGT375T?

BRIG LOOTS: That was JGT375T, which was registered in McKenzie's name.

MR VISSER: Something which is not in your statement is that - and later you were also reminded of this, is that later, after the incident, you were with General van der Merwe again, was somebody there with you?

BRIG LOOTS: Brigadier Cronje.

MR VISSER: And what did you do there?

BRIG LOOTS: This was a result of the sensation raised or caused in the newspaper after it was established that the kombi which had exploded in Gaberone west and which had caused so much death and damage, that it was a vehicle from Pretoria and on instructions from General van der Merwe we visited head office and Brigadier Noppe and all those people who worked with Botswana compiled these notes.

MR VISSER: What did you go and do when you visited General van der Merwe?

BRIG LOOTS: As far as I can remember it was to assist with the compilation of a note.

MR VISSER: A note addressed to whom?

BRIG LOOTS: I do not know, I was never stationed at head office myself.

MR VISSER: Who was there with you?

BRIG LOOTS: Brigadier Jack Cronje as far as I can remember.

MR VISSER: In bundle 2(h) on page 164, it was placed on record, and this is also in Brigadier Cronje's evidence, that reference is made to this incident and it is said:

And Chairperson, you will recall that Minister Botha sent a letter because he couldn't appear personally before the Committee at the time ...

CHAIRPERSON: A memorandum.

MR VISSER: ... a memorandum yes, in which he stated that he was given false information and it was with regard to that memorandum that Cronje was asked these questions.

In any case you reported what you knew, was part of your report the fact that Special Forces and the police were involved in the explosion or did you just merely report that it was a source which transported weapons and ammunition for the ANC, which had been blown up?

BRIG LOOTS: General van der Merwe was completely informed and I just reaffirmed this.

MR VISSER: We now know about evidence which was given by Mr Momberg and Goosen and from the affidavit of Mr McKenzie that when he landed up in Botswana at that period, that he was taken by people, Mr McKenzie does not say who they were, but that he finally ended up being detained in Quatro Camp where he received rough treatment.

BRIG LOOTS: I can just mention that at that stage I was in command of Security Branch Northern Transvaal. I can confirm that Mr McKenzie was part of this group which during 1991 arrived at Jan Smuts airport. I did not see him personally, but the people who dealt with him said that both of his wrists showed signs of being broken and he gave a rendition of being treated very badly.

MR VISSER: As far as you can remember, did you say anything about a light sensitive detonator to General van der Merwe?

BRIG LOOTS: No. At a later stage, but not when I informed him about the project.

MR VISSER: Is there anything else that you can recall regarding this incident?

BRIG LOOTS: No, nothing specific.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Chairperson, that's the evidence-in-chief.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Visser. Mr Alberts, do you have any questions to put to Mr Loots?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR ALBERTS: As it pleases, Chairlady.

Brigadier, initially it seems as if you were totally unaware, or that you could not remember about this first meeting, is that correct?

BRIG LOOTS: That's correct.

MR ALBERTS: And you say that you cannot recall any plans which would have resulted in McKenzie being killed as part of the operation?

BRIG LOOTS: If I now think back today then I just would like to add that, and I'm saying this with great respect, someone who did know Brigadier Jack Cronje personally will find it difficult to understand when I say to you that something like that could possibly have happened.

Brigadier Jack Cronje is a hard man in the sense that, and I say again I'm not criticising him, we fought a hard struggle. On the one side it was the National Party who placed laws on the statute book, which we had to apply, on the other side it was Oliver Tambo and his freedom fighters who really made life difficult for us. Today I say this with hesitation, ...(indistinct) really made life hell for us. And for that reason if something went wrong or something slipped through I will not deny it although I cannot recall it.

MR ALBERTS: Is it not because eventually it had nothing to do with the operation, that you could possibly have forgotten it?

BRIG LOOTS: I accept that the next morning when I got to him, because Lieutenant Momberg testified to this, that he said to them; if it's a problem then we'll think of an alternative. And I believe in all honesty that before I went to General van der Merwe such a thing was not in dispute.

MR ALBERTS: So that possibility could have been off the table already and it would not have been possible or necessary for this to be mentioned to Brigadier Cronje.

BRIG LOOTS: Yes, Chairperson.

MR ALBERTS: In other words at that stage it would have been accepted that as long as it was possible that it could be contemplated, that they would walk away from this and that it was not a realistic possibility?

BRIG LOOTS: That's how I accepted it. I made my submission to General van der Merwe with a clear conscience.

MR ALBERTS: Seen in that light, Brigadier, are you then prepared to accept that Momberg and Goosen's evidence is factually correct?

BRIG LOOTS: Perhaps I can just add this, that the day next to the Hennops River, where Colonel Crause and I had the privilege to speak to Mr McKenzie, during the discussion it was mentioned or it became known that there was a specific or a particular relationship between these men and Mr McKenzie.

For that reason I say that I have an understanding that if such a thing would be understood that they were to blow up McKenzie as well, that I can understand their sadness. That's the only explanation I can give. Although, I say again that my memory proves to be a problem for me and I cannot without further ado say today that Momberg and Goosen are not speaking the truth when they say that.

MR ALBERTS: One more question, Brigadier, your recollection regarding the planning with regard to the activation of the bomb, is it that it would take place in Botswana?

BRIG LOOTS: That's correct.

MR ALBERTS: By Special Forces?

BRIG LOOTS: That's correct, in control ...(inaudible) the forces.

MR ALBERTS: And you heard the evidence today of both Momberg and Goosen, that it was in reality done here ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Alberts, I myself have a problem with the activation of a bomb. I think there is a possibility for a misunderstanding and you must just make sure that it's not understood as I initially understood it, because I thought that if you activate a bomb it just explodes.

MR VISSER: Perhaps the correct word is to arm instead of activate or as opposed to activate.

BRIG LOOTS: There is definitely a difference between a bomb which is armed and a bomb which is activated, a bomb which is armed is as I've explained with the handgrenades, where the safety pin is bent open to keep it safe and when you want to throw it you just pull it out and you through it. That is an armed handgrenade. But the moment you pull out the pin you are activating it. I mention this as an example of how that bomb was built. And about the light sensitive switch I have no knowledge about that.

ADV DE JAGER: According to what you have explained now, their evidence is that the bomb was armed on the border.

BRIG LOOTS: That's correct.

MR ALBERTS: And then it would be logical that the activation of the bomb would be the explosion and there can be no doubt that the planning was that this was to take place in Botswana?

BRIG LOOTS: Would you just repeat that please.

MR ALBERTS: It is then a logical conclusion as regards the previous answer, that the bomb was to be activated in the sense that it would explode within the area of Botswana?

BRIG LOOTS: That's correct.

MR ALBERTS: And that was the planning at all times?

BRIG LOOTS: At all times, yes.

MR ALBERTS: The matter of your meeting with McKenzie -and I also took this up with Momberg and Goosen because your testimony could possibly have been interpreted as contradictory to theirs in that case. They tell me that when McKenzie was taken out of the vehicle with the primary objective at least of being identified they agree with you, Brigadier Cronje amongst others, that he spoke to him as well as you, but that was after you had agreed about what the plan was to be.

BRIG LOOTS: That's correct.

MR ALBERTS: That is when the meeting between you and McKenzie amongst others took place?

BRIG LOOTS: That's correct.

MR ALBERTS: Do you agree with that?

BRIG LOOTS: Yes.

MR ALBERTS: Would you just give me a moment please? Brigadier, you regarded or described this operation technically as a joint operation and quite rightly so, between Security Branch Northern Transvaal, Western Transvaal and Special Forces.

BRIG LOOTS: That's correct.

MR ALBERTS: And you were one of the senior members who were involved in the planning thereof?

BRIG LOOTS: That's correct.

MR ALBERTS: You will surely agree with the fact that the input from, amongst others, Goosen and Momberg as handlers of the source, was necessary for you and that is was useful?

BRIG LOOTS: Absolutely, yes.

MR ALBERTS: But there cannot really be any possibility that these two men can quite rightly be regarded as part of the final planning of this operation and that they should accept responsibility for the planning thereof?

BRIG LOOTS: No, I think that was in the hands of Brigadier Jack Cronje. I was second in command according to rank, and Colonel Charl Naude in his own good right represented the Defence Force.

MR ALBERTS: So as regards Goosen and Momberg, they were ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: I don't think that can be contested, that they were subject to Cronje and to his instructions.

MR ALBERTS: Then just finally, Brigadier, it seems that you were in the unenviable position as Goosen and Momberg with regard to the feedback as to what really happened in Botswana with the explosion of the bomb, is that correct?

BRIG LOOTS: Yes, absolutely. As I say, I was in control here in Pretoria after he landed at Jan Smuts and from some of the younger men entered into discussions with him and we gave him a reasonable amount of money for all his pain and suffering and for the salary which he normally would have received.

MR ALBERTS: That was years later.

BRIG LOOTS: Yes, it was in '97.

MR ALBERTS: What I want to determine is the situation directly after this incident. Their evidence was that there was information which was lacking that was given to the Security Police.

BRIG LOOTS: I agree, that was true.

MR ALBERTS: So it would be difficult for anyone directly thereafter to say exactly what had happened, is that correct?

BRIG LOOTS: I can just mention to you that the woman who was with him was at our disposal and men from Cape Town and Paarl were of the first men who reported that she was in Lusaka. Luckily she was not harmed, but later after he had returned, we heard what trauma McKenzie had experienced.

MR ALBERTS: I would like to ask the final question, was there any liaison between you, Brigadier Cronje and Commander Charl Naude immediately after completion of this operation, which would have enabled you to know exactly what had happened there?

BRIG LOOTS: We did have discussions. Immediately after it had become known that a bomb had exploded in Gaberone west, Brigadier Cronje visited me and we discussed it, but the big question mark was what had happened to McKenzie. It was a cause of great concern for us until in the end he came back with the groups.

MR ALBERTS: Thank you, I have no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Though Mr Alberts, your question had not been answered fully. Your question which had been posed by you was if there had been any communication between Mr Loots, Mr Cronje and Mr Naude. He's only partially answered the question in that he said there were communications between himself and Brigadier Cronje and as a result of those communications they still remained with the big question as to what had happened to McKenzie.

But did you proceed to have any communication whatsoever with Mr Naude from the Special Forces side?

BRIG LOOTS: No, I'm sorry, I did not have any further contact with him. As was testified here the BSB was established, the CCB was established and it was devolved to Northern Transvaal, it was firstly devolved to Western Transvaal.

In previous hearings I mentioned to you that we were involved in the Gaberone operation in '85 and the Nietverdiendt 10. At that stage Charl Naude was still part of the Western Transvaal, but at this stage he was in Northern Transvaal and I had no further discussions with him.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Alberts.

MR ALBERTS: Thank you, I have no further questions, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr du Plessis?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Chairperson.

Brigadier, did you ever at any stage hear that Brigadier Cronje said that McKenzie had to die in the operation?

BRIG LOOTS: No, never, never. And that is why I really do not want to mislead this Committee,

MR DU PLESSIS: But why do you then testify that such a thing would not be strange for you, as if you wanted to create the implication that Brigadier Cronje did say that.

BRIG LOOTS: I tried to the best of my ability to give people who did not know Brigadier Jack Cronje very well, to make them understand this and that he could possibly have let something like this slip.

MR DU PLESSIS: No, Brigadier, what you are telling the Committee and everybody here and what is being televised on television now is that you say that Brigadier Cronje is the type of man who would easily say that these people could be killed in an operation. Is that what you are trying to say?

BRIG LOOTS: No, I conveyed that incorrectly.

MR DU PLESSIS: And if I put it to you that in all the operations in which Brigadier Cronje applied for amnesty, which are numerous, there is not one case where there was any talk of anybody being on the side of the Security Forces who were sacrificed in such an operation, will you agree with me?

BRIG LOOTS: Yes, I was not involved in everyone in which he was involved, so I cannot reply meaningfully to that.

MR DU PLESSIS: Well I put it to you, do you want to comment on that?

BRIG LOOTS: Not as far as I'm aware of.

MR DU PLESSIS: And if I put it to you that Brigadier Cronje testified that he did not get a cent extra remuneration for anything that he did personally, can you comment on that?

BRIG LOOTS: I'm not aware of anything. The same goes for me.

MR DU PLESSIS: Brigadier, you testified that you were contacted by Momberg with information that Dumakude or Pule had made an appointment with the source to meet him in Botswana over the Easter weekend. That is what your application says.

BRIG LOOTS: Yes, that's correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: So Momberg contacted you, and what did you do after that?

BRIG LOOTS: I also testified that Brigadier Cronje, that we had contact on that same day.

MR DU PLESSIS: Your application says, and that's how I understood your evidence, that you remember that you were telephonically in contact with him thereafter and you said to Brigadier Cronje; here is a possibility that we can do something, we can use this information, we can plan an operation.

BRIG LOOTS: I will not deny that.

MR DU PLESSIS: And in all probability you said that this is an opportunity to eliminate Dumakude or Pule, is that correct?

BRIG LOOTS: That's correct, yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: So in all probability you would have said to him; here is a possible of a plan?

BRIG LOOTS: Yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: And thereafter the person who went to see General van der Merwe was you and not Brigadier Cronje?

BRIG LOOTS: That's correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And the officers in command who were present with the execution of this operation in the Western Transvaal were you and Mr Crause?

BRIG LOOTS: That's correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Brigadier Cronje was not involved, he was no physically present?

BRIG LOOTS: The day at Hennops River?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I am referring to the fact when the vehicle was taken out of the Western Transvaal.

BRIG LOOTS: No, he was not there.

MR DU PLESSIS: You were present there as commanding officer as well as Mr Crause?

BRIG LOOTS: That's correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And after the operation had been completed, can you remember who reported to General van der Merwe about the operation?

BRIG LOOTS: If I remember correctly this bomb exploded five days after he had departed and there was a reasonable period of time that passed before I got these registration numbers, so the question how long afterward I cannot say with certainty, but it could be a month or even longer.

MR DU PLESSIS: But it was you who reported to General van der Merwe?

CHAIRPERSON: I think Mr Loots has not understood your question.

MR DU PLESSIS: I'll rephrase it, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: It is not about the duration, it is about who actually reported to van der Merwe after the operation had taken place. Won't you just repeat your question so that he can understand it clearly.

MR DU PLESSIS: I understand that there was a period of time in which you did not know what had happened in Botswana. Who was in contact with General van der Merwe during that period as well as after, when you became aware of what had happened? It was you, was it not?

BRIG LOOTS: That's correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: If we take this together we see that when you got the information you contacted Brigadier Cronje with a suggestion in order to launch an operation. Furthermore we see that ...(intervention)

BRIG LOOTS: Chairperson please, when I got the information ...(intervention)

MR DU PLESSIS: Let me just go through this slowly with you. Right at the beginning when you got the information from Momberg, was it you who phoned Brigadier Cronje and made a suggestion regarding a operation? It was you who went to see General van der Merwe ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: May he just reply please?

MR DU PLESSIS: I'm making one ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: Many questions are being put as if it is assumed that the witness agrees. He might agree, I don't know, but I think he ought to be given an opportunity to reply to each question.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: But Chairperson, I've gone through each of these, there are four points and I've already gone through each one. Unless Mr Visser tells me that his client who has just given an affirmative answer to each and every one of them, that his client is now going to disagree, I want to put all of them conjunctively in one statement.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, this witness never agreed that he telephoned General van der Merwe.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: No, I said ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: ...(indistinct)

MR DU PLESSIS: Brigadier Cronje.

CHAIRPERSON: Cronje, Mr Visser.

MR VISSER: Cronje. He didn't say he phoned him. It might be that he did, but that's not something that he said so far.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr du Plessis, what should stop you from putting each and every question to Mr Loots and waiting for him to respond to each and every question?

MR DU PLESSIS: Chairperson, I'll go through the exercise again.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, please do so.

MR DU PLESSIS: Brigadier Loots, there are four important points that I just asked you about, let's do it again. You received information from Mr Momberg concerning the possible meeting or the meeting with Dumakude and Pule, that's between the source and Dumakude and Pule?

BRIG LOOTS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR DU PLESSIS: You phoned Brigadier Cronje, and you testified that there was a possibility that you talked to Brigadier Cronje afterwards, you phoned him and that you talked to him about a possible operation. That is what you testified just now, do you agree or do you want to change your testimony?

BRIG LOOTS: Chairperson, it ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: Chairperson, I'm going to object to my learned friend's cross-examination and - just give me a chance, I'm going to object, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, yes. You will be given an opportunity to object, Mr Visser. Can we just try to proceed ...(indistinct)?

MR VISSER: Well would you just listen for a short moment to my objection, Chairperson? My objection goes far further than just objecting to the way in which my learned friend is cross-examining.

My objection Chairperson, starts with the original Amnesty Committee when we appeared to go and protect the interests of these people, and when my learned friend, Mr du Plessis objected to us cross-examining and a ruling was made and if you look - and I'll refer you to the passages, bundle 2(e) at page 395 and it runs through and at page 496 the rulings were made which effectively stopped me from cross-examining. And I would have cross-examined Brigadier Cronje on this very issue. It effectively stopped me from doing that and I still asked at that stage; what happens one day if my witnesses come and apply for amnesty and they give evidence contrary to that of Brigadier Cronje, what is going to happen? And the Committee through Judge Mall, said; then obviously you will have the right to cross-examine Brigadier Cronje.

So if my learned friend wishes to cross-examine this witness, fine, but then he must present Cronje so that I can cross-examine him and if he doesn't do that, Chairperson, then none of what Cronje said can be taken into account against this witness. And that also accords with the ordinary rules of evidence.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: Well Chairperson, may I respond to that?

CHAIRPERSON: You may respond Mr du Plessis.

MR DU PLESSIS: The position is that we have now direct contradictory statements. The question - and let me get to the question I wanted to ask, I simply wanted to ask Brigadier Loots - perhaps my learned friend should have waited for the question, if it was possible that Brigadier Cronje could have been under the impression when he testified, that this was more Brigadier Loots' operation than his operation.

MR VISSER: I have no problem with that question in the world.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Chairperson. And I wanted to base that on the fact that Brigadier Loots initiated the operation, that he was at the scene of the operation ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: Mr du Plessis, I ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: May I?

What do you mean when you say it would be based on the assumption that Brigadier Loots initiated the operation?

MR DU PLESSIS: Not the assumption, the fact.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, based on what?

MR DU PLESSIS: The fact that he initiated the operation, that he spoke to General van der Merwe, that he reported back to General van der Merwe and that he was present at the operation. That could have induced in Brigadier Cronje the thought, and that is why he testified it, that this was really Brigadier Loots' operation, Brigadier Loots says he thought it was a combined operation.

So at the end of the day all I want to point out is that if that is the case, there is no real contradiction between Brigadier Cronje and Brigadier Loots. That is what I'm trying to do, Chairperson, and my learned friend wants to stop me.

MR VISSER: I'm happy with that, Chairperson, but my learned put to this witness that he telephoned Cronje, and still say there was no such evidence, that is why I objected the line of cross-examination.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: Well Chairperson, on page 39 of this witness' document, which my learned friend handed in, it says:

CHAIRPERSON: I'm aware of that.

ADV DE JAGER: I think the question is, who talked to who, who picked up the phone and phoned the other one? He said that it was possible that he could have phoned Cronje. That is how he put it at that stage. Put the question that you wanted, I think we all have the other questions, and let's see what the answer is there.

MR DU PLESSIS: I don't want to do more than just clearing up the contradictions. That's all I'm trying to do, is to deal with the contradictions.

Brigadier, can I put it to you in this way, is it possible that in the light of the facts - and you have heard what I put to the Committee, now in the light of those facts and that you actually had greater involvement with this operation, that Brigadier Cronje could have been under the impression or that he considered it to be your operation and from your side that you had thought that it was a joint operation?

BRIG LOOTS: Chairperson, the only answer that I can give is that the source was Northern Transvaal, there's no doubt about that. And for that reason from time to time there was interaction by means of telephone, personal visits. Therefore I then say that I viewed this operation as joint.

MR DU PLESSIS: I understand that, but what I want to know from you is, do you concede that Brigadier Cronje possibly could have had the impression that it was in fact your operation and that you were in control of the operation?

BRIG LOOTS: Chairperson, I don't make it a secret that I did everything in my power and ability to persuade Botswana to work with us, and therefore I would concede that I am one person who did everything in my ability to get people brought to justice who were responsible for the killing and maiming of innocent people in this country.

MR DU PLESSIS: Now what I want to know from you Brigadier, do you concede that Brigadier Cronje ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: Mr du Plessis, isn't this something that you have to use in argument? How can he concede what Cronje had thought?

MR DU PLESSIS: He testified that he knew Cronje. But I will leave it there.

ADV DE JAGER: But I really don't know what you want to do.

MR DU PLESSIS: I'm not quite sure. I will leave it at that.

Brigadier Loots, when you reported back to General van der Merwe what did you tell him, did you tell him everything about the operation as you have conveyed it to us?

BRIG LOOTS: At what stage was that?

MR DU PLESSIS: That was at the end of the operation when you reported back, right at the end when you had a conversation with him.

BRIG LOOTS: Was that after the vehicle had left and the vehicle went missing?

MR DU PLESSIS: That was the vehicle went missing, after the bomb had exploded, after Botswana had said that there was a bomb, there were problems and political problems. What did General van der Merwe know?

BRIG LOOTS: Everything that I knew, Chairperson, I conveyed to General van der Merwe because if I remember correctly, Botswana officially gave a note of protest to the RSA. Now how it was handled, at head office, the compilation of all the memos for information of the cabinet, I can't say anything about that.

MR DU PLESSIS: He knew that Special Forces were involved?

BRIG LOOTS: Yes, absolutely.

MR DU PLESSIS: And then lastly, Brigadier, you were aware that there was a source of the Security Branch who on many occasions brought weapons from Botswana to the RSA?

BRIG LOOTS: Yes, that is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And as I understand your evidence, and tell me if I'm correct, you testified that you did not know who this source was, you knew of the existence of such source?

BRIG LOOTS: Yes, that was by means of his registered number, MT395, and he was introduced to us personally as Mr McKenzie.

MR DU PLESSIS: That was during the first meeting before this operation?

BRIG LOOTS: Yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: But before that you only were aware of the fact that he was a source?

BRIG LOOTS: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR DU PLESSIS: I have no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr du Plessis. Ms Lockhat?

MS LOCKHAT: No questions, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser?

MR VISSER: No re-examination thank you, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Loots, you are excused.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Chairperson.

ADV DE JAGER: Your full names please?

PHILIP RUDOLPH CRAUSE: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Chairperson, Exhibit A will now also be necessary. We have one copy apparently available if you don't have your copies with you.

Mr Crause, you've testified earlier in front of this Committee, is that correct?

COL CRAUSE: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: You have Exhibit A as your evidence, handed in, and you have confirmed it as correct. Could you please page to page 33 of Exhibit A.

COL CRAUSE: Yes, I have the page.

MR VISSER: Could you perhaps just say what you know of this McKenzie operation, Colonel.

MR CRAUSE: That is paragraph 103, Chairperson. During March/April '87 with Loots I had a meeting at Pienaarsrivier. I just want to put it correctly, I wasn't quite sure at which river, but it must have been the Hennops Pride River.

MR VISSER: So it's the Hennops River?

MR CRAUSE: Hennops River. That was at Pretoria. During this meeting the following people were present, it was myself, Brigadier Cronje, Colonel Loots, Goosen, Momberg and possibly other people.

MR VISSER: Well we know that Commandant Charl Naude was also present.

MR CRAUSE: I just omitted him. We were informed that McKenzie had been bringing weapons and ammunition for the ANC from Botswana and McKenzie was requested by Lester Dumakude to take or get weapons in Botswana over the Easter weekend to transport that to South Africa ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: Just to put that in the right perspective, I think the evidence of Mr Momberg was that it wasn't said over the telephone, but that was the inference that was made.

MR CRAUSE: Yes, that is correct, that is how I understood it. It was planned to use this false compartment which was built into McKenzie's vehicle for the transportation of weapons so that they would then be killed or could then be killed by this compartment, or the bomb there.

It was discussed that an operative of Special Forces, stationed in Botswana, would activate the bomb after the MK took the vehicle from McKenzie. McKenzie was introduced to us at some stage. He was informed - that was what was told to me, I was not personally present, that the plan was to have a tracking device built into his kombi and apparently he was not opposed to that.

Colonel Loots and myself saw McKenzie's kombi when it went to Kopfontein border post when it left South Africa.

MR VISSER: Now what you have forgotten and what you now remember, you had a specific task, can you remember what that was?

MR CRAUSE: Yes, that is correct. The members who did the search at that stage were under my control. I was staff officer in Potchefstroom and I prevented them to search the vehicle and I also kept the dogs away from the vehicle.

MR VISSER: There is evidence of Mr Momberg and Goosen that McKenzie was not aware of the explosive device in his kombi and you have no reason to contest that?

MR CRAUSE: No.

MR VISSER: And you also later heard of the explosion and that people had been killed?

MR CRAUSE: Yes, that's correct.

MR VISSER: And you received your instructions from - from whom did you receive your, or on whose instruction did you act?

MR CRAUSE: That was Brigadier Cronje and Brigadier Loots.

MR VISSER: So in paragraph 114 you want to add Brigadier Loots, Brigadier Cronje and Loots as well?

MR CRAUSE: That's correct.

MR VISSER: Did you anticipate that things could perhaps possibly go awry and that other people besides ANC people or supporters could be killed or injured?

MR CRAUSE: Yes, I did foresee that.

MR VISSER: Now in the light of the objective, the targets who had to be eliminated, did you accept that risk?

MR CRAUSE: Yes, I accepted that.

MR VISSER: And the result of that was that you now apply for amnesty in respect of the death and the damage of the property of the people in Botswana?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Did you reconcile yourself with the aim to kill Dumakude and Mnisi and Pule?

MR CRAUSE: Yes, I did.

MR VISSER: Why was that?

MR CRAUSE: They were all involved in Special Operations, they were responsible for the Church Street bomb as well as many other serious bomb attacks in the Republic of South Africa.

MR VISSER: And paragraph 16, can you perhaps just read that?

MR CRAUSE: Is that 116?

MR VISSER: Yes.

MR CRAUSE:

MR VISSER: Now that is evidence that has already been led and it is also part of the argument with regard to the Nietverdiendt case.

Chairperson, that is the evidence-in-chief, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, won't you enlighten us, we see that in paragraph 115 there is some mention of one, Lambert Moloi.

MR VISSER: Yes.

Perhaps I have to ask you ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Before you proceed to do so, no evidence has been led whatsoever about this by the other applicants.

MR VISSER: Yes, I believe, yes ...

Perhaps I just have to ask you, in paragraph 115 you say that:

Did you mean to say that that was the aim of this operation, that Lambert Moloi had to be targeted?

MR CRAUSE: No, the idea was that he would have been one of the targets even if it is in another operation, but he wasn't a target of this operation.

MR VISSER: So you here pay attention to the most important people acting in Botswana.

CHAIRPERSON: Now was the name of Lambert Moloi ever canvassed at the meeting that you attended?

MR CRAUSE: No, he was never discussed, I included it because he was also involved in the infiltration of people into the RSA and smuggling of weapons although it was not for Special Operations.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but when the planning of this operation took place at, you say Hennops Pride, is that a river?

MR CRAUSE: Hennops Pride, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: You initially said Pienaarsrivier.

MR CRAUSE: That's correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: But you are willing to concede that it could have been at Hennops Pride?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that a river, is Hennops Pride a river as well?

MR CRAUSE: I think it is a river, I don't really know the areas that well.

CHAIRPERSON: Because evidence was led that it was a picnic spot.

MR CRAUSE: It was a picnic spot, but they call it Hennops Pride. That is what I heard today.

ADV DE JAGER: The Hennops River is a river and there are various picnic spots along the river. Usually people go and have a picnic next to the river.

MR CRAUSE: Now I don't Pretoria that well, I accept that.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but his name did not feature at all at that meeting that you've alluded to?

MR CRAUSE: No, it did not.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you. Mr Alberts, do you have any questions?

MR ALBERTS: Thank you, Chairperson, I have no questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr du Plessis?

MR DU PLESSIS: This time I have no questions, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: For which we are grateful. Ms Lockhat?

MS LOCKHAT: No questions, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, may I just, just to explain the name of Lambert Moloi, where it is and in that context. If you look at Exhibit A, page 15, paragraph 37.1, it really is a repetition of what was stated there, not to intend to say that Lambert Moloi was one of the targeted persons at that time, but it was in the context of what 37.1 says, where it says that:

And Lambert Moloi was mentioned there and it was more in that sense, it wasn't to indicate that he was at all discussed or proposed as a target.

CHAIRPERSON: We have to blame you for that, Mr Visser, shouldn't we?

MR VISSER: And again my attorney has just point out ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, we have to blame you for that?

MR VISSER: Absolutely, you know I'm just getting so tired of apologising, but I must say, Chairperson, that in defence of myself, that it was a very short time and I had to type it myself, but it is clearly my fault. I'm sorry about that.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you have any re-examination to do on Mr Crause?

MR VISSER: No thank you, Chairperson. This came across badly, I meant to say, I didn't mean to say that I'm getting tired of apologising to you, I intended to say I'm sure you're getting tired of my apologies. So I didn't express that correctly. I didn't intend any offence.

CHAIRPERSON: Either way it's been well taken.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Lax?

MR LAX: Mr Crause, just one small point that worried me. In an effort to explain and almost in a sense to make your evidence fit in with the evidence already given you were asked a question about the nature of the information that had come to you about what McKenzie was going to do and a distinction was made which is different from what is in your affidavit here and the distinction was well, you people inferred that he was going to go and pick up arms. You personally didn't have any knowledge of the telephone conversation?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct. I think I mentioned that it was explained to me that that is what he was going to do, Chairperson.

MR LAX: I'm just not wanting the wrong impression to be created, that you had personal knowledge of that telephone.

MR CRAUSE: No, no.

MR LAX: You simply were told at the meeting that this is what they thought was going to happen and you accepted it as such?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: That's paragraph 106 I think you're referring to?

MR LAX: Correct.

MR VISSER: Yes, he says apparently, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: I take it that Mr Visser wouldn't like to put any questions flowing from what Mr Lax has just stated to Mr Crause.

MR VISSER: Thank you, no, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Crause, you are excused.

MR CRAUSE: Thank you, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Well then we've finished in time, half a minute past four ...

CHAIRPERSON: Are we starting tomorrow with the evidence of General van der Merwe, Mr Visser, on the understanding that after completing his evidence we will be in a position to proceed

to give argument?

MR VISSER: Yes, indeed, Chairperson. Argument from my side will be very brief in fact.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that the situation with Mr Alberts as well? You would be in a position to argue tomorrow?

MR ALBERTS: I will get myself ready to argue tomorrow, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: We'd appreciate if you could definitely get yourself ready to argue tomorrow.

MR ALBERTS: As it pleases you.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr du Plessis as well?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, I'm going to be very short, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, you don't have to indicate whether you're going to be short or not, as long as you are ready to argue.

So we will then adjourn for today and reconvene tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock.

MS LOCKHAT: Please stand.