CHAIRPERSON: It's Friday the 7th May 1999, it is the continuation of the amnesty applications of W F Schoon and others in regard to the Cosas Four Matter. The parties and the appearances are as previously indicated on the record.

Mr Visser have you got any reply?

MR VISSER IN REPLY: Chairperson, thank you. Very briefly, I hope, arising from not only my learned friend Mr Tshabalala's argument but also particularly from what Mr Jansen told you, there are just about five points which I just want to raise and very briefly deal with them.

We have attempted in our argument to deal with the words that you find in the provisions of Section 20 Sub-section 2 (b) and we have attempted in our written argument and oral argument to draw your attention to the difficulties which are caused by the expression implied authority, express or implied authority. My learned friend, Mr Jansen, put it quite pithily when he said that these difficulties are the ones that one might expect when you take a common law principle applicable to civil law and you apply it to a process such as the one that we're busy with because it has become an expression which is used without really thinking about it within your duties and within the course and the scope of your authority.

It is not surprising therefore, Chairperson, that in common law the issue of authority has been watered down tremendously. The latest catch phrase which is used in our decisions as far as the authority is concerned and in applying it to the facts of each case is that the court departs from the proposition that everything that is associated with your duties is taken to be part of your implied authority.

CHAIRPERSON: Associated with you?

MR VISSER: With your duties. With your duties, if you - the famous case in England, if you are a carriage driver, whatever happens to the horse for example is associated with your duties. If you have to act in order to protect the interests of your master as far as the horse is concerned, whatever you do whether it is specifically implied in your - specifically your authority, is taken to be part of your implied authority because you can't perform your duties without the horse. It goes to certain extremes even if one reads those cases, very interesting cases to read if one has nothing else to do, but the point is that what we are submitting very briefly in regard to Section 22(b) is at least there should be some distinction between a procedure such as an amnesty procedure and the civil law and in that regard we submit or we did submit that it should be even more widely interpreted in the present instance, given the other wordings of the Act referring to the struggle of the past, the professed intention that amnesty should be provided on as wide a basis as possible and not least, the fact that it makes no sense to assume that implied or expressed authority in Section 22(b) presupposes some legal authority because had that been so, there wouldn't have been an amnesty applicant before you because they would have simply said we had a legal express or implied authority. The point that the Amnesty Committee's deal with is offences and delicts. There could not have been authority for that.

Chairperson, dealing then with the next point, the issue of Section 22(f). I believe it is fair to submit to you that it is been accepted during the last two years by the Amnesty Committees that this means no more, the duties within the scope of his or her duties and within the scope of her express or implied authority that it means no more than that implied authority is what they thought was expected from them by the various pronouncements made by politicians, the State President, by people in higher places, by the use of certain words, I refer to that as the war psychosis and not the least of all, the fact that there was a life and death struggle going on in our country and the need to know principle which you have heard about many, many times has been accepted, Chairperson, and I submit that you will accept it, gives an explanation as to why when an illegal act had been performed that it was not publicised, it wasn't discussed with either their peers or even their commanders. We've seen this throughout the amnesty process.

General Erasmus in the Mthimkulu matter was asked this very question:

"Did you report higher up to head office about what you had done?"

and he said:

"No"

and they said

"Why not?"

and he said

And that's the reality of the past, Chairperson, and that's the reality which must be accepted in the proceedings in these amnesty applications, with great respect.

Chairperson, the issue which I mentioned about the other matters, I neglected to refer you to the so called Zero Hand Grenade incident for which Brigadier Cronje has also received amnesty. You will find that in his decision at page 9 starting at the bottom of the page under the heading "Hand Grenade Murder of Unknown Activists." In this particular incident there was intelligence that a group of young people wanted to attack the houses of policemen on a particular day. They were waiting for weapons to come in. What happened there was that the police decided that there was no way in which they could prevent the attacks from occurring. A plan was then made and then that plan entailed that a hand grenade, Russian hand grenades, were taken and the fuse delay was shortened so that there would be no delay at all which meant that when the pin was drawn it would explode immediately and in that process eight youngsters were killed and nine were injured and as I said before, Brigadier Cronje, for his part in that incident has already received amnesty.

Now as far as the issue of other amnesty decisions is concerned and I will be very brief to say this and I think I did say this in my argument, I know of no authority which applies the doctrine of stare decisis to Commissions of Enquiry.

ADV DE JAGER: Perhaps Judge Southwood ruled in the application of was it Gerber that the principle doesn't apply to commissions.

MR VISSER: That would make sense, I haven't read the judgement, unfortunately, but that would make sense, Chairperson, but the reason why it makes sense is that it is -not to substitute or replace, "dit word ondervang" by the - that's the best translation I can come up with, by the provision in the constitution and we're now living under a constitution which requires fair administrative action and it is my submission that it is eminently unfair to create the situation or to allow the situation to evolve where one Amnesty Committee would accept certain matters as read whereas another Amnesty would not and it would be grossly unfair to the applicants in the process seen as a whole that amnesty would be granted in matters which are less serious or weaker than the facts upon which others rely. We have to accept, Chairperson, on the basis of omnia rite exe acta that the original Amnesty Committee when they gave their judgements that they applied their minds to the requirements of the Act and that they did so seriously unless of course there are reasons which indicate ex facie the decisions that they did not do so. Once that is so and on the basis of fair administrative action we submit, with respect, that this Committee will have regard to the facts and the decision in regard to those facts handed down by original Amnesty Committee.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes and then of course we as a Panel have to apply our independent minds to the matter. We, as part of our duty of being fair in matter which are placed before us, we have to take regard of all these relevant factors which amongst others things would be the fact that a possibly similar matter in pari materia has been considered and we throw that into the scales in applying our minds.

MR VISSER: Yes indeed and it goes actually materially further. Section 20 Sub-section 4 with it's reference to the criteria in other legislation that had been repealed really opens up another enquiry and if one looks at the way in which those criteria were applied, I have unfortunately not got it in front of me but it was almost ridiculously widely applied.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Visser, my problem with that is the Act says I should look at the criteria. That doesn't say I should look at how it was applied, I should read the criteria and I should take note of the criteria, that's the regulations or the Act as such.

MR VISSER: Well Chairperson, let me just read this to you, it's not entirely correct what Commissioner de Jager puts to me, it says:

So ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: Ja but not how it was applied, the criteria applied, they applied it and that was a printed criteria?

MR VISSER: Yes well it really takes the matter not much further, the fact is ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: And also say in fact I'm of the view, I don't say I'm correct, but that this Act is even going further because it's taken - there you should have a real motive yourself and now it should be associated with the matter.

MR VISSER: That much is quite clear and that I have already argued and yes, you're absolutely correct.

Chairperson, as far as proportionality is concerned, looking at the amnesty decisions, you handed down as you said which was something that you will exercise in your independent mind will have regard to the question of proportionality has been approached on a very liberal basis. If it had not been done it is inconceivable that amnesty could ever have been considered or could ever be considered that judgement hasn't been given yet, handed down yet in matters such as the Church Street Bomb for example, in matters such as any of these bombs in which scores of people have been injured and killed. Chairperson, so the only point here is that the Committee will, I have no doubt, guard against being too technical about the approach in regard to proportionality because if you want to be principled about the matter, the taking of one single life could never be proportional to any political objective that one wishes to achieve so that is not the test which the Act clearly could have had in mind, it is a more liberal approach Chairperson and we would ask you to adopt that liberal approach.

Just lastly, in regard to this whole question in regard to Section 22(f), the issues of pressures exerted, I might just refer you to page 4 and this really concerns the issue which we debated during my argument, Chairperson. 4 of the Judgement, yes - of the decision of Cronje, I'm sorry. This really concerns the issue which we debated during my argument as to whether 22(b) could accommodate the person who actually took the decision and did not refer it higher up, it also in a certain sense applies to Mr Rorich's position but more particularly in regard where did he get his implied authority from when he, in the line of the command chain, made a decision and gave an order without referring it higher up. The original Amnesty Committee said at page 4:

And that is really the point.

Chairperson, thank you for listening to me, that concludes my argument and I repeat that we pray that you will grant the amnesty as we have asked you. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you Mr Visser. Ms van der Walt have you got any further submissions?

MS VAN DER WALT: Nothing thank you, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Jansen have you got anything that you want to add?

MR JANSEN: Yes, thank you Mr Chairman. As indicated, not anything specifically in reply but just I wish to deal with what I have been able to ascertain since yesterday on Cosas and it's position as an organisation. Now Mr Chairman, as stated I realised that to my embarrassment that I had throughout been in my mind actually thinking of the organisation Sasco and I hope you'll excuse me.

ADV GCABASHE: It's Saso, not Sasco. Sasco are the people who make bread. Saso.

MR JANSEN: Yes, it's Sasco.

ADV GCABASHE: My apologies.

MR JANSEN: It is a bit confusing and I assume that there are many, many more organisations but it seems is the following and this is what I gained.

Starting at the ANC itself, the ANC I think it's obviously well known that it's involved in a tripartite alliance with the Communist Party and the Trade Unions but that tripartite alliance is not referred to in it's own constitution and I am told that in fact there is not even a conference or a meeting of some sort where one would find a specific decision having been taken that there would be such an alliance, it is apparently a development of history and historical fact. Now that sort of alliance situation is found also in the student movements and today it is called apparently the Progressive Youth Alliance. Now the Progressive Youth Alliance today consists of Sasco, the South African Students' Congress, Cosas, the Congress of South African Students and that's obviously where the confusion then comes in because of the proximity or the closeness of the names and then the ANC Youth League. Now the ANC Youth League is actually the only youth organisation as such which as an integral part of the ANC by virtue expressly of it's constitution, that and the woman's league are the two things mentioned in it's constitution itself.

Sasco is really for tertiaries and organisations whose members are at tertiary education institutions, universities, technikons etc. Sasco is a latter day organisation in the sense that it was formed either in 1990 or 1991 after the unbanning of the ANC and it's constituent components that formed and amalgamated into Sasco was Nusas and Azaso. Now this then brings us back into the '80s with Cosas and them. These organisations, they were not part, not by virtue of their constitution, part of the ANC or formally aligned to the ANC but what they were, they were organisations who had regarded themselves as charterist organisations.

ADV DE JAGER: Well they couldn't be aligned because at that stage the ANC was an illegal organisation so they might have been at the best a sort of front organisation?

MR JANSEN: Yes, yes because the ANC was in a certain - it's existence internally was in a certain sense in suspension but I think the main thing to remember here is that main division in Black politics between the charterist organisations and the non-charterist organisations and apparently the interesting thing about Azaso is, which became one of the main sort of affiliates of the ANC is that it had Black consciousness origins but in the '80s at some stage it became a charterist organisation and then as I said amalgamated with Nusas to form Sasco.

Cosas on the other hand seems to have always been an organisation whose members are still at school, I would imagine mainly secondary school. But Cosas was a main player in the late '70s and early '80s and apparently one of the dominant players and the main player in the UDF. Exactly who it's leaders were and how it functioned and how widely it functioned, I don't know and that's what I would think at some stage one would maybe get some more accurate research on this but it would seem one gets the impression that Cosas was an organisation that had membership almost all over the country and at all schools and by virtue or how politically or in some areas how politically active many school children were, they obviously had wide support.

CHAIRPERSON: I assume they were unrestricted?

MR JANSEN: Sorry Mr Chairman?

CHAIRPERSON: I assume they were unrestricted particularly say in 19 ...(indistinct)

MR JANSEN: Yes were unrestricted but what happened to them later in the '80s seem to be uncertain whether they became a restricted organisation of some sort, I'm not sure of that, I could also not - the persons I got my information from were not certain themselves exactly what but they know that Cosas was certainly one of those organisations that were targeted quite heavily by the security forces, their leadership.

CHAIRPERSON: So in '81/'82 are you saying they were unrestricted?

MR JANSEN: Yes it would appear that they were unrestricted at that stage and they were then I suppose one of the many democratic or charterist movements that were starting to form the precursor to the UDF.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR JANSEN: And Cosas apparently still exists today and is part of this progressive youth alliance but it is apparently not as dominant in the political sphere as it was at that stage and yes, that's really about what I've been able to ascertain at this stage, Mr Chairman, I'd like to at a later stage maybe just get hold of their constitutions and maybe a little bit more of their history. In fact persons I spoke to could not even tell me whether Cosas existed prior to 1976 or whether it was came really essentially from that time period. Thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I think that concludes the submissions.

MS VAN DER WALT: May I then be excused?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, we have already excused Mr Tshabalala. I need some time to consider the decision in this matter and we will perforce in the circumstances reserve the decision and we will notify the parties once that is available.

Ms van der Walt and Mr Prinsloo you are excused and whoever else is not directly involved in the matters which we will be proceeding with, which, Ms Thabethe will be?

MS THABETHE: The Joe Pillay matter, Mr Chair.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------CHAIRPERSON: While you're doing that, I'm just going to get the record in order. The following application is that of W F Schoon, reference number AM4396/96. It is in respect of the Joe Pillay incident and the Panel is as previously indicated and the appearances on behalf of Mr Schoon are as indicated earlier. There is no other legal representative involved here and then of course the evidence leader is as indicated.

MR VISSER: I believe that Mr Jansen has an interest in the matter.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, perhaps you want to put that on record, Mr Jansen?

MR JANSEN: Yes, thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Jansen on instructions of Julian Knight Attorneys. We act for an implicated party, Mr Dirk Coetzee, in the next two incidents which is Joe Pillay and Griffiths Mxenge. Thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Jansen.

WILLEM FREDERICH SCHOON: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Chairperson, we have prepared a statement yet again in order to conserve time which will be the one on the exhibit list marked as C2. I understand it's already before you?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VISSER: If I may be permitted to then immediately carry on?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VISSER: Brigadier, you have given evidence previously in this series of amnesty applications before the current Committee?

MR SCHOON: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: We will not be reiterating everything. You have referred to Exhibit A and a series or at least you have already referred to other evidence which you wish to incorporate in your application?

MR SCHOON: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: Can we then proceed to your application which one can find in bundle 1 on page 10 to 12 and 39 to 43. Do you confirm the correctness of the contents of this statement?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

MR VISSER: And do you also confirm the correctness of Exhibit C1 which has been submitted on your behalf?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

MR VISSER: I beg your pardon, that's actually C2.

You request a limited amnesty in this particular matter namely defeating the ends of justice or any other offence or delicts which could emanate from the facts which has to do with an abduction, is that correct?

MR SCHOON: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: And this abduction took place from Swaziland?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

MR VISSER: In order to give the Amnesty Committee some background regarding Swaziland, could you please go to paragraph 2 in Exhibit C2 and move from there?

MR SCHOON: At the end of 1980 and at the beginning of 1981 a summit was held in Simon's Town where all the role players in the security community were involved. General Johan Coetzee reported back to us at security head office and said that a decision was taken at the summit, that there should be closer co-operation between the individual members of the security community and other divisions and departments with regard to the collection and exchange of information in order to prevent that there should not be a duplication of information and that certain members of the security community would not possibly have information at their disposal while it already was in existence with other members of the security community. It was also reported that the South African Defence Force which at that stage had been acting in support of the SAP internally would continue to do so but that there would be a clear division with regard to internal and external actions.

With regard to the internal situation it would fall under the jurisdiction of the SAP regarding external operations, this would fall under the jurisdiction of the South African Defence Force with the exception of Swaziland which also, despite the fact that it was a neighbouring state fell under the jurisdiction of the SAP. This was as a result of the good relationship which existed between Swaziland and the R.S.A.

I would just like to add, Chairperson, with special regard to the co-operation between the individual police forces.

MR VISSER: And that Simon's Town summit led to certain orders been given through?

MR SCHOON: That is correct. General Coetzee gave the order that information was to be collected regarding activities of members of the liberation movements in Swaziland.

MR VISSER: So you are talking about liberation movements?

MR SCHOON: Yes that is correct. I gave Captain Dirk Coetzee the order to liaise with General Jack Buchner, he was a major or a lieutenant colonel at that stage, as well as Colonel Baker in order to monitor information about persons in Swaziland and their activities and to report, among others, to myself as well.

MR VISSER: May I just interrupt you? What was General Jack Buchner at that stage and Colonel Baker, what were their tasks or positions at that stage? Why was Coetzee to liaise with them?

MR SCHOON: Because they were the persons who were responsible for interrogation and the collation of all information regarding terrorism. According to existing information, there were two Pillay brothers namely Ivan and Joe during that time who were actively involved with assistance to fledgling terrorists by accommodating and transporting them between Swaziland and Mozambique.

MR VISSER: Why do you say that, was that available information which existed at head office?

MR SCHOON: Yes that is correct. I was informed that after Mr Joe Pillay was abducted by operatives of Captain Coetzee, they handed him over at the R.S.A. Swaziland border to other operatives. Mr Joe Pillay was detained in terms of the stipulations of Section 6 of the Terrorism Act, initially at a police station in the Eastern Transvaal and after that at the Old Observatory in Pretoria. These premises were used by the military intelligence of the South African Defence Force.

MR VISSER: Might I just ask you, is that your own information or was that reported to you?

MR SCHOON: That was according to my own knowledge except that this detention in the Eastern Transvaal was reported to me.

MR VISSER: So you knew that he was being detained at the Old Observatory?

MR SCHOON: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: I was informed that Captain Dirk Coetzee in his Amnesty Hearing gave evidence that Pillay was first taken to Vlakplaas, that is in bundle 3, page 671 and we must just delete Captain there as well, it's incorrect and that he reported to me, bundle 3 page 672. I do not know that Pillay was taken to Vlakplaas, however, I will not deny this. It is also possible that Captain Dirk Coetzee reported to me. However I have no recollection of this.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, I don't see much point in reading those passages to you, what is there is what is precisely stated here so there's no reason to. Thank you.

Please continue, you are at paragraph 10.

MR SCHOON: Pillay was interrogated by Lieutenant Colonel Jack Buchner, SAP, and Major Kallie Steyn, MI. I deny that I had Andy Taylor or Jerry Fourie come in from Natal, bundle 3, page 672 and bundle 3 page 679. I believe that this could have been Buchner or Baker.

MR VISSER: That had them come in?

MR SCHOON: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: Please repeat that? Who had them come in?

MR SCHOON: Yes that is correct. I also do not know about the involvement of Messrs Andy Taylor and Jerry Fourie and their interrogation to which Captain Dirk Coetzee referred to in his evidence before the Amnesty Committee, bundle 3, page 673 to 674. However, I cannot deny this.

After Captain Dirk Coetzee's people had handed over Pillay at the border as already stated, they returned to Manzini. The group consisted of one Black member from Vlakplaas and three Mozambican citizens. The "was" should be changed to "who" - who were applied by Captain Coetzee as sources. Apparently (if one wants to believe stories) it was their intention to rob a bank.

MR VISSER: Where did you hear that?

MR SCHOON: I heard that somewhat later from the then Major Eugene de Kock and Colonel Jack Cronje.

MR VISSER: Very well, we will leave that as stories because it's not relevant with regard to the current application.

MR SCHOON: 15 - during the abduction of Pillay the Black police officer lost his appointment certificate or identity book at the scene. That was reported to me. The motor vehicle in which they travelled was apparently identified by the Swaziland police. When they were confronted by the Swaziland police, they chased away which led to their vehicle being shot full of holes. They were then arrested and detained in Swaziland.

MR VISSER: And this what was reported to you?

MR SCHOON: Yes, that was reported to me. I deny particularly that I had anything to do with the abduction of Mr Pillay.

Bundle 3 page 678 of Captain Coetzee's evidence, the entire affair was conceived by Captain Dirk Coetzee and his operative and executed by them as well. He stated in his evidence before the Amnesty Committee that he was in Pretoria when he was informed about the abduction of Lieutenant van der Lith.

Bundle 3 page 668 and 669 - ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: Might I just interrupt you once again?

I'm going to read to you from page 678:

towards the bottom of that page said, the question was asked of him:

because it wasn't a planning he had already previously said that it was just mentioned or the mention of the possible abduction of Mr Pillay:

and his answer is:

and that is what we're referring to.

And then at page 668, Chairperson, the evidence of Mr Coetzee in this regard, you will find at the top of the page, as to how this abduction or how he heard about it, he says - the question is:

The answer is:

Chairperson and if necessary I will refer again to that in argument.

Will you proceed from paragraph 18 please?

MR SCHOON: I do not know about any assaults on Joe Pillay, bundle 3 page 734 as well as pages 673, 674, 682, 683, 708.

MR VISSER: Yes and on those pages Mr Coetzee sets out the assaults which were committed with regard to Mr Pillay and you maintain that you do not know anything about this?

MR SCHOON: Yes that is correct, I have no knowledge of this.

MR VISSER: And you also maintain that it would appear from Bundle 3 page 720 that assaults could have been carried out against Mr Pillay during his abduction?

MR SCHOON: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: Paragraph 19 please?

MR SCHOON: The Swaziland government made objection about Mr Pillay's abduction. After high level negotiations that would be with Foreign Affairs, the Commissioner of the Swaziland Police, Mr Pillay was given back to the Swaziland authorities. I received the order that this was to happen. I assisted him by telling his family where he was. I was present at the Lothair border post or it could have been another border post when he was handed over by General Johan Coetzee and Mr Ray Killan of Foreign Affairs to the Swaziland authorities. I cannot say how long after his abduction he was handed back.

MR VISSER: Can you just pause there? Chairperson, we now know ex post facto that the abduction took place on the 19th February. That's according to Mr Pillay's affidavit that he has presented. I don't know whether that's been handed to you. According to that evidence we have no reason to doubt it, the correctness of that aspect. In paragraph 3, Chairperson, he says he was abducted on the 19th February and later on it appears that he was handed back on the 10th March, in paragraph 46, all of which took place in 1981. So it's from February 1981 to 10th March 1981.

Very well, please proceed?

MR SCHOON: I would accept that as correct because I know that he spent several weeks in detention and the reason why I know that is because General Coetzee personally on two successive weekends travelled to Swaziland in order to discuss this matter with the Swaziland authorities.

MR VISSER: In paragraph 20 the second sentence please continue?

MR SCHOON: I cannot say how long after his abduction this ...(inaudible) assaulted.

MR VISSER: Brigadier Schoon, you are not requesting amnesty with regard to any assault?

MR SCHOON: No Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Are you saying then that you were not at all aware that he had been assaulted?

MR SCHOON: No, I was not aware but what I was aware of was that he had been manhandled quite heavily during his abduction.

MR VISSER: Continue, paragraph 21.

MR SCHOON: As a result of diplomatic negotiations, the one Vlakplaas policeman and three Mozambican informers of Captain Dirk Coetzee were released and brought to the R.S.A. The three Mozambicans were accommodated for a while at Vlakplaas. As far as my knowledge goes, Captain Dirk Coetzee and all those under his command with regard to this matter acted without authorisation and on their own initiative.

MR VISSER: Yes and we know that this caused a great deal of embarrassment?

MR SCHOON: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: Continue?

MR SCHOON: (cont)

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairperson, that is the evidence-in-chief.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Visser. I just want to check with you for the purposes of the record, do we have a signed version of Exhibit C2?

MR VISSER: I don't know but he has confirmed it under oath, Chairperson, he has but we can have it signed, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Well let Ms Thabethe get a signed one. I see that C2 has been prepared in the form of just an ordinary statement, not an attested statement if I am not mistaken. Yes, I don't think that we need to get it attested, he can simply just sign it. Ja, alright. Thank you. Mr Jansen?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR JANSEN: Thank you Mr Chairman.

Mr Schoon, my purpose here today is simply to put Mr Coetzee's version to you and not to go into detail regarding the discrepancies between your version and his version, I do not wish to debate that. I would also like to put it on record that I believe that the most important distinctions which Mr Coetzee has regarding this matter with the other members of the security forces are actually worth General Johan Coetzee and not with you.

You have already discussed most of the aspects of Mr Coetzee's evidence and I would like to invite your commentary once again regarding why it would have taken approximately three weeks before Mr Pillay was returned to the Swaziland authorities.

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, the delay was ascribed to the fact that this matter had to be handled on a diplomatic level and that was quite a lengthy process. As I had already mentioned, General Coetzee on two successive weekends travelled to Swaziland in order to discuss this with the Swaziland authorities and in order to clear up the matter. Then there was also the one policeman and the three collaborators of Mr Coetzee who had been detained and we needed to negotiate their return from detention in Swaziland and this took approximately three weeks, it took three weeks to get these things to a point.

MR JANSEN: The other aspect is that much has been made since then of the fact that Mr Coetzee acted completely alone and that he created an embarrassment for the South African Government and the security forces. Now I would like to ask you the following question in relation to this. Why would the security forces and specifically the security police have associated themselves with the scandalous behaviour and embarrassing behaviour by bringing Mr Pillay to Pretoria and drawing advantage from his abduction by interrogating him, apparently allowing him to be interrogated by various people in the country. This person was abducted, he was in our hands in the republic and for that reason we deemed it acceptable to interrogate him and to see what kind of information he could give us.

MR JANSEN: You see the final aspect in this regard is that Mr Coetzee's version is that initially his superiors and more specifically General Coetzee were rather impressed with the fact that Pillay had been abducted even though it took place upon the own initiative of the Askaris but that this abduction became a bit of a problem and a hot potato when the people in Swaziland were arrested and I would like your commentary regarding this following statement of mine.

In 1982 the South African Security Forces and even the Attorney General did not regard it as unheard of that persons were abducted from neighbouring States, were interrogated here and even prosecuted here and my question is, do you have any commentary regarding this fact that according to Coetzee's version it would appear that it may have been a question of convenience to say that this was such an embarrassing incident.

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, the only commentary which I can give is that the evidence which we had at that stage was not sufficient in order to charge Mr Pillay and the actual person for whom this evidence was overwhelming was Ivan, his brother.

MR JANSEN: Well then, as Mr Coetzee has said, it appeared from Mr Pillay's interrogation that he had had no recent contact with the ANC machinery. You are aware of that aspect of Mr Coetzee's evidence?

MR SCHOON: Yes, that was the impression that I gained as well.

MR JANSEN: However, it would not have been strange that should he have had extensive knowledge and if he had been involved in these activities that he would have been charged, that would not have been strange?

MR SCHOON: I agree.

MR JANSEN: And if I recall correctly, one of the reasons why he was detained in the Lothair Police Station for a period of 10 days to almost two weeks was to treat swelling and other injuries which emanated from his assault, to give it the opportunity to disappear or to heal. Do you have any commentary regarding that?

MR SCHOON: I cannot agree with that, the process of his return was delayed as a result of the mediation of foreign affairs and nothing else. We were prepared to retain him immediately, however foreign affairs was involved and they arranged the whole matter and he was personally returned to their Ministers of Foreign Affairs at the border post.

MR JANSEN: Thank you Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you Mr Jansen.

Ms Thabethe have you got any questions?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS THABETHE: Yes Mr Chair.

Mr Schoon, have you seen the affidavit for the statement that was written by Mr Pillay?

MR SCHOON: I have not yet read the statement personally.

MS THABETHE: Well, basically in the statement he narrates how he was tortured during the abduction. What would be your comment to that? Would you know of such torture and assaults and would you associate yourself with them or not?

MR SCHOON: No Chairperson, in the first place I do not associate myself with that as I have already said. It was told to me that he had resisted greatly and I would not be surprised that he would have bruises which he had incurred during the abduction.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I just want to have this document marked, Ms Thabethe, I think that would now be?

MS THABETHE: I. Exhibit ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: I'm sorry Chairperson, there's also a covering letter, I'm not sure whether that forms part of what has been placed before you but I suppose all that is relevant is really the affidavit, I would submit.

MS THABETHE: Mr Chair, I would have thought that Mr Wagener and Advocate Visser won't be interested in the letter because he states that he has no ill feelings, I mean the letter, the last paragraph.

MR VISSER: It's not whether we're interested in it or not, it's a question of your decision what you're going to allow before - I'm just drawing your attention to the fact that the part of what is placed before you is not an affidavit, that's all I'm doing.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I haven't personally read these things so there is a letter. Ms Thabethe, in your view are all these things relevant to the proceedings?

MS THABETHE: Mr Chair, I would like it to form part of the affidavit, the letter.

CHAIRPERSON: Alright, we'll then mark the entire bundle as Exhibit J.

MS THABETHE: Thank you Mr Chair, can I proceed?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MS THABETHE: Mr Schoon, I understand you are applying for the obstruction of justice with relation to this incident. Are you also applying for the abduction of Mr Pillay or you're only applying for obstruction of justice?

MR VISSER: ...(inaudible) of justice whether that's exactly the same. I'm not making a point of it but it will fall under any other acts or offence. I'm not objecting to the question but I think we refer to it as defeating the ends of justice, it came afterwards.

MS THABETHE: Okay, are you applying for defeating the ends of justice together with the abduction of Mr Pillay or are you just applying for the defeating the ends of justice?

MR SCHOON: I am applying for defeating the ends of justice, Chairperson.

MS THABETHE: Thank you Mr Chair, I have no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Ms Thabethe.

Mr Visser, have you got any re-examination?

MR VISSER: No re-examination except that I must draw your attention to the fact that in bundle 5 we have bound in at page 42 the presentation, the written presentation which Brigadier Schoon made before the Human Rights Violations Committee in his evidence as we referred to earlier, Chairperson, on the 19th November 1996 and at page 42 at the bottom you will find that he deals with the kidnapping and assault of Mr Joe Pillay in 1981 in Manzini, Chairperson, I didn't refer you in particular to it because

it's identical to your evidence before you here today.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Visser. Have you got any other evidence that you were going to lead?

MR VISSER: There's no other witnesses which we wish to call and that's basically the application, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Right. Mr Schoon, you are excused for the purposes of this matter.

MR SCHOON: Thank you Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, would you like me to wrap this up and deal with the argument, because there really isn't an argument, you've heard the evidence?

CHAIRPERSON: I think so, I just wanted to - I assume you don't have any evidence that you want to place before us?

MR JANSEN: No Mr Chairman, unless argument, if argument is going to be short, it's not a problem, unless argument is going to be long I think it might be more convenient to deal with Mxenge Matter because that's going to be similarly be very short and then we can be excused and then argument can take place whatever the position is.

CHAIRPERSON: Alright, you won't have any evidence to him?

MS THABETHE: No Mr Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Alright, that concludes this matter then I think Mr Jansen's suggestion is a good one. Let's take the other one and then you take it together and then you deal with it. Alright.

WILLEM FREDERICH SCHOON: (s.u.o.)

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Yes, that is in order, Chairperson. We then perhaps - well, he is under oath so we could perhaps just get straight onto it, the Mxenge matter, Chairperson, requires another statement to be handed to you which will be Exhibit C3 and the evidence or rather the application in the Mxenge matter is similarly in volume 1, bundle 1 rather, page 35.

I must draw your attention to the fact that in this case Captain Dirk Coetzee has been granted amnesty for the murder itself of Mr Griffiths Mxenge. I'm not sure whether you have a copy of that decision before you. Well, perhaps Chairperson, I do refer to it in Exhibit C3 but perhaps at this stage there is one part of it and that appears at page 3 which effects Mr Schoon. The passage as found by the Amnesty Committee reads:

They were Nofomela and Tshikalanga if I remember correctly, Chairperson.

The point is, Brigadier Schoon's name is mentioned in that regard and we ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I assume that the first applicant would then be Coetzee?

MR VISSER: My learned friend inclines his head in the positive, Chairperson.

Brigadier Schoon, with regard to the application which you have made for the Mxenge matter, you request on page 2 for amnesty for the possible accessory after the fact with regard to this murder and defeating the ends of justice because you did not make public the facts which were known to you, you are also requesting for amnesty for perjury and any other omissions or delicts emanating from this?

MR SCHOON: That is correct, I am aware of the fact that Captain Dirk Coetzee or Nofomela and David Tshikalanga received amnesty for the mentioned murder. I was informed that the incident took place on 19th November 1981. This was shortly before Captain Dirk Coetzee left Vlakplaas as it's commander. I have no personal knowledge of the murder or any aspect of the planning or execution thereof. I was definitely not involved in the planning and execution of this murder. Captain Dirk Coetzee did indeed say himself that he received the order from Brigadier van der Hoven, bundle 3, page 730.

Brigadier van der Hoven and Colonel Andy Taylor were charged with Captain Dirk Coetzee, Almond Nofomela and Spyker David Tshikalanga in Natal of the murder during which Van der Hoven and Taylor were found not guilty.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, that is also referred to in the amnesty decision. I don't know whether you have it? Perhaps we can organise a copy if you don't.

CHAIRPERSON: We can get access to it, I don't have it immediately in front of me but we can hold of it without difficulty.

MR VISSER: Yes Chairperson, no we didn't believe it was terribly relevant but just for the sake of wrapping up all references to this document, I can refer to you at page one of that document where the Amnesty Committee said - he says the final cut-off date for the applications for amnesty has now passed and the three applicants have been charged and convicted of one of the offences in respect of which they apply for amnesty, that is for the murder of Griffiths Mxenge. They were charged with Brigadier van der Hoven and Captain Andy Taylor who were both found not guilty at the trial. That's all really all that we're referring to at this stage.

Please continue?

MR SCHOON: That's paragraph 5 - According to the best of my recollection, Brigadier Jan du Preez handed over an envelope with money in it to me approximately two weeks after the murder, it could have been shorter, and he then said that this was for Captain Coetzee's Black members. When Brigadier Jan du Preez handed over the envelope to me it took place in his office. It was a brown official envelope, approximately half A4 size. The envelope was thickly stuffed. I did not open the envelope but I had no reason to assume that there was not money inside. Brigadier du Preez said "give the money to Dirk, it comes from Koevoet." He also added that this was for Captain Coetzee's Black members. Brigadier Jan du Preez managed Koevoet's financial affairs while Brigadier Piet Goosen managed the Republic's secret fund.

After that I handed over the envelope to Captain Dirk Coetzee at Vlakplaas and informed him that it had come from Jan du Preez and was intended for his Black members. He appeared to know what it was about and nothing further was said in relation to this. Captain Dirk Coetzee said in his evidence in London before the Harms Commission, he referred to this money but he did not say that he had received it from me.

London Record, pages 324 and 325 - He did indeed say before the Amnesty Committee that he had received it from me.

Bundle 5, page 22 - I drew the inference that the money was intended as a reward for the murder Mr Mxenge. Consequently I made myself guilty of being an accessory after the fact. The reason why I drew this inference was because Brigadier Jan du Preez mentioned to me that it was apparently planned to send Mxenge's motor vehicle to Koevoet in Oshakati because it was a reasonably new motor vehicle. He also told me that he had given the order that the motor vehicle be burned immediately at the Swaziland border.

MR VISSER: Can we just pause there, Mr Schoon? There are people who are hearing evidence for the very first time which you and the others have been living with since 1990.

Chairperson, first of all if you'd like to pencil it in, if you'd like to pencil it in the London Record which reference is made to in paragraph 8 is also in the bundles before you, in bundle 5, pages 15(f) and 15(g), those are pages 324 and 325. They are before you.

Now we'll come to it in a moment but you also made an affidavit before the Harm Commission. Did the Harms Commission take place in 1990?

MR SCHOON: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: And you say that you were informed that this money came from Koevoet?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR VISSER: That is the same evidence that Dirk Coetzee gave and you have also stated that the motor vehicle was to be sent to Koevoet?

MR SCHOON: That is the impression which I gained.

MR VISSER: And that was coincidentally also the same evidence which Captain Coetzee gave. You refer in paragraph 11 to these facts which I have just mentioned. Are these the facts that you say are substantiated by the evidence of Captain Dirk Coetzee in London, before the Harms Commission?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And you give the reference, that will be bundle 5, page 15(c). Very well, can you continue with paragraph 12?

MR SCHOON: I drew the inference that it was silence money or reward money for the Mxenge murder. I may mention that it was the policy to give money to Askaris for their achievements. However, it was not given as a reward for illegal activities. Police members did not receive such financial allocations or rewards except in exceptional circumstances where they displayed particular bravery or did good work. This case was the only case of which I was aware during which policemen were given money for the commission of a murder.

Although I was not involved in the operation during which Mr Mxenge died, I inferred after discussions with Brigadier du Preez that the SAP had been responsible for the deed. I did keep silence about this knowledge and in the process I'm guilty of defeating the ends of justice. Captain Coetzee initially alleged that the radio which had been removed from Mxenge's motor vehicle was placed in my motor vehicle. That is not true, I have a yellow Ford Granada, official motor vehicle, which I inherited from General Viktor. This motor vehicle already had radio cassette player.

I refer in this relation to the record of the evidence of Coetzee in London pages 327 and 388. On page 327 he admitted that he had removed a radio and speakers from Mxenge's motor vehicle and placed them in Brigadier Jan du Preez' Mercedes 230 vehicle.

MR VISSER: Might I just interrupt you here?

Chairperson, that is bundle 5 page 16 and in the evidence and this is just presented to you for completeness and no point is made of it, the evidence was by Captain Coetzee in London:

So just for the sake of completion, we're referring it for no other reason.

Very well, you have discussed that, continue?

MR SCHOON: I submitted an affidavit before the Harms Commission in which I committed perjury by denying that I had any knowledge of the Mxenge murder.

MR VISSER: Could you please pause there?

Chairperson, I refer you again to bundle 5, page 24, where you will find that the Harms Commission affidavit is bound in at page 25 and the affidavit before Mr McNally is at 24.

Very well, will you proceed?

MR SCHOON: I made a similar affidavit for the McNally Commission, I request that amnesty be granted to me with regard to this perjury.

MR VISSER: What was the perjury that you committed, Mr Schoon?

MR SCHOON: In the McNally affidavit on page 24 of bundle 5 you stated in the second paragraph:

Is that correct?

MR SCHOON: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: And that was false?

MR SCHOON: Yes it was false.

MR VISSER: Because today you have told the Committee that you drew an inference that Captain Dirk Coetzee had to have been involved from what you heard from Jan du Preez?

MR SCHOON: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: And you kept quiet about it?

MR SCHOON: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: And in the fifth paragraph you say:

MR SCHOON: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: And this affidavit was made in 1989?

MR SCHOON: Yes that is correct, in December.

MR VISSER: If we can then study page 25, more specifically page 26, in paragraph 5 you stated:

Now the aspect for which you are requesting amnesty is about that first sentence in which you say that you have no knowledge of the murder of Attorney Mxenge during 1989 because you did indeed possess information from Brigadier Jan du Preez?

MR SCHOON: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: We have now come to paragraph 15, we have completed that and we have also completed 16. Could you proceed with 17?

MR SCHOON: I committed these acts or omissions on behalf of the South African Police and the former government and the National Party whose interests I wished to protect through that. The acts and omissions which I committed, I committed in the execution of my official duties and as part of my opposition to the struggle and it was aimed against supporters of a liberation movement. I request, with respect, that amnesty be granted to me for my acts and omissions in this regard.

MR VISSER: With regard to this perjury and false statements that you have made before the McNally Commission and before the Harms Commission, would you like to tell us why you did so?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, it was to protect the persons involved and not to create an embarrassment for the government of the day.

MR VISSER: And to protect yourself?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, my attorney draws my attention to again bundle 5, page 40, paragraph 7, which is again part of the written presentation made by Brigadier Schoon to the Human Rights Violations Committee on the 19th October or November, I can't remember which. At paragraph 7 where he refers to this issue, it's just one paragraph, which is in line with what he says here today.

CHAIRPERSON: I'm sorry, the reference that you gave to us now, page 40, is it a submission to the TRC, what did you say what was that?

MR VISSER: That's his written submission on the 19th, I believe, of October - November, 19th November 1996 and that you'll find at page 36, Submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission by Brigadier Schoon. That was in reaction to Section 19 subpoena, Section 29 subpoena. We did refer to it earlier Chairperson, it's still the same document that we're referring to.

CHAIRPERSON: So what is the effect that he lied in that as well?

MR VISSER: No, no, what he said there is true, what he said there is true but this is the evidence he repeated here today that with regard to the murder itself he had no personal knowledge. At that stage, Chairperson, of course they were already preparing his amnesty application for defeating the ends of justice, that is not specifically mentioned here but the fact that it's not mentioned does not amount and in our submission to perjury and in any event it was a statement made and not an affidavit so we submit nothing turns on that, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes but if you can help me, are you saying that this page bundle 5, page 40, paragraph 7, do you say that is correct that the two sentences that appear there?

MR VISSER: Yes that is also in line with his evidence today, Chairperson, he didn't have anything to do with the planning, he didn't know beforehand about it. Where his involvement came was after because of a discussion which took place in the office of Brigadier Jan du Preez where he was given information which led him to believe that Captain Dirk Coetzee was in fact involved and all of this evidence is directly in line with the evidence of Captain Dirk Coetzee.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you. Is that your evidence-in-chief?

MR VISSER: That is the evidence-in-chief, thank you Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Jansen, have you got any questions?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR JANSEN: Thank you Mr Chair.

Once again Brigadier, I do not want to debate any of the discrepancies with you, just for the purposes of the record the parts of Mr Coetzee's evidence are what I wish to put to you where he names you and I assume that you are aware of those instances. The one is where he says that when he was in Durban he called you and asked you to send Joe Mamasela down?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, he did not call me. I later heard that it was Colonel van Glinsberg who made the necessary arrangements for him and not I.

MR JANSEN: And one could grant that that is not difficult to think that there could have been a fault in terms of the identity.

The following aspect is an accepted fact even in the Harms Commission, was that a large group of Vlakplaas members was at that stage of Mr Mxenge's murder, this was the 19th November 1981, were in Durban and the whole Vlakplaas contingency went back to Vlakplaas the day after the murder?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, yes I had heard that just about all of them were there and this I heard from Colonel van Rensburg and nobody else remained. Even the mechanic was told to leave.

MR JANSEN: And Mr Coetzee says it was you who called them back, in other words had said that make sure that all the Vlakplaas persons returned from Durban and come back to Pretoria?

MR SCHOON: No Chairperson, it was not I.

MR JANSEN: And then in conclusion to the extent that Mr Coetzee says or Captain Dirk Coetzee says that there was a discussion or discussions with you afterwards or where there was reference to this aspect, do you say that he is wrong there?

MR SCHOON: That is correct, Chairperson, I did not discuss the issue with him personally.

MR JANSEN: Thank you Mr Chair, I have no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Jansen.

Ms Thabethe?

MS THABETHE: No questions Mr Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Ms Thabethe.

Mr Visser have you got anything?

MR VISSER: No re-examination, thank you Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: I assume that is your case in respect of this incident?

MR VISSER: Indeed so yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And there are no witnesses, Mr Jansen and Ms Thabethe?

MR JANSEN: Nothing Mr Chair. MS THABETHE: No Mr Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Mr Visser would you like to address us on these two incidents?

MR VISSER IN ARGUMENT: Chairperson...(inaudible) that the offence of manstealing, kidnapping is a human rights violation's offence, you know that and that is why the matter is before you. Brigadier Schoon knew nothing about the assaults, if he had he obviously would have asked for amnesty in that regard. I'm talking about Mr Joe Pillay now. He came to know of it one way or the other. Captain Dirk Coetzee suggested that he in fact was the one who told Brigadier Schoon about the abduction. That may very well be, that may very well be because Brigadier Schoon can't remember today clearly where he got the information from but the fact is, according to his evidence, he admits that he knew. At the time when Mr Pillay was still in the country and he did nothing about it where presumably one can argue that with the knowledge at his disposal he ought to have reported the matter to the relevant branch of the South African Police so that the offence could be investigated etc.

Chairperson, the personal contact which Mr Schoon had with Pillay, he explained to you he received instructions obviously from General Coetzee who was personally involved in the negotiations regarding Mr Pillay that he must be handed back, he didn't transport Mr Pillay himself but he was present at the border post where he spoke to Mr Pillay and he told you also that he made arrangements for Mr Pillay to phone his people from the border. He then further had nothing to do with it. He added that as far as his recollection goes, he cannot recollect seeing any marks on the body of Mr Pillay which would suggest that he was assaulted.

Mr Pillay has placed before you an affidavit in which he says that he was abducted, he stated that he violently resisted the abduction and he says that the abduction was accompanied by assaults and him kicking out at his attackers. There seems to be on his evidence in his affidavit a very clear picture that this was a rather violent incident at the time when he was abducted. You will find that in paragraph 7 and following where he says that

And then at paragraph 8 he says:

And he says in paragraph 9:

In the letter in Exhibit J Chairperson, at page 2, the same scenario is sketched. He states in the third paragraph:

And then he goes on to say how these people were then traced.

But quite clearly there was violent assault and in the language of Mr Pillay himself, several blows were administered to his face inter alia. You have heard the evidence, well the evidence of Captain Dirk Coetzee is that he was assaulted at the Observatory, he had marks on his body, he suggested that he was kept for as long as they did keep him in order to allow the swelling and the marks to heal before him being handed back.

Now Chairperson, Brigadier Schoon, having known nothing about the assaults and having only seen Pillay right at the end on the 10th March, can really in my respectful submission, not argue too strenuously with the evidence of Mr Dirk Coetzee. It's not as if Brigadier Schoon had seen him before the 10 days to which my learned friend, Mr Jansen, had referred and therefore we don't make any issue of that evidence of Dirk Coetzee simply because it's irrelevant to the present proceedings. Brigadier Coetzee, having known nothing about the assault does not ask for any amnesty in that regard and he only asks for that which he knew and which he did not bring forward and that is the fact that he was abducted. Oh, I said Coetzee, I mean Brigadier Schoon.

Chairperson, as far as that is concerned there really is very little to add, there is no evidence before you contracting the essence of the evidence upon which Brigadier Schoon relies for his amnesty application. I would ask you to accept that evidence. The probabilities do not show anything contrary to his evidence, in other words there's no inherent improbability in any way in his evidence.

Referring to my learned friend's cross-examination, Chairperson, I think even he conceded that there are no serious or material differences between him and Captain Dirk Coetzee and we would ask you to favourably consider granting him the amnesty for which he prays.

In the Mxenge matter, Chairperson, it was a matter which

received great publicity at the time. We know about that, the Harms Commission went into the Mxenge murder in quite some detail. Captain Dirk Coetzee, who at the time absconded from the country gave his evidence in London, he would not accept the indemnities which were offered to him to give evidence in South Africa. He gave full evidence about a number of incidents in which he was according to him involved including the Mxenge murder. As a result thereof, various people whom Captain Coetzee had implicated were asked to state their position on oath and it was because of that that the affidavit before the Harms Commission was made.

Prior to the Harms Commission the then Attorney General of Natal was instructed to enquire into the allegations by Mr Almond Nofomela, he was on death row in November 1989, made an affidavit in fact on the evening before his execution would have taken place in which he revealed the instances in which he was involved. This led to a stay of his execution and the McNally Commission as well as the Harms Commission then followed. McNally also asked people to state their positions on oath and that was the affidavit at page 24, bundle 5, to which we have already referred you to.

Chairperson, it is easy to understand why perjury would have been committed by Brigadier Schoon and many, many others in regard to incidences which took place during the shameful past of the struggle of our country. The obvious one will obviously be self-preservation, there's no question about that, that part of the motivation would have been not to give oneself away and I would be dishonest if I argued anything else and Brigadier Schoon also conceded that but we would submit that that aspect, Chairperson, does not disqualify a person who so acted when he now appears before you asking for amnesty because if it hadn't been for the struggle, clearly none of this would have happened. Then it would have been a straightforward offence, a crime which would have been dealt with in the normal course of events but all of this must be seen against the background of the struggle and the background which we sketched to you of the position of the members of the security police in their fight to maintain the government in power and to confront the revolutionary onslaught.

Again, in the present case even less so and in Pillay's case there appears to be no material dispute in the evidence between Captain Dirk Coetzee and Brigadier Schoon. In fact their evidence appears to be in line of that with each other. Why Brigadier Schoon is before you today is because of a conversation which took place in the office of Brigadier du Preez in which reference was made to Mxenge's motor car and that it had to be sent to the then South West Africa, now Namibia, to Koevoet because it was a new car and that he was informed that Du Preez said under no circumstances take it to the border and destroy it and from that he drew the inference of necessity that Dirk Coetzee, who he knew was in Durban with his squad at the time, had something to do with it and particularly because of the money which Brigadier Johan Coetzee asked Brigadier Schoon to hand to Dirk Coetzee. This is also, Chairperson, confirmed by Mr Dirk Coetzee and I might give you that reference, it's in bundle 5 at page 15(f). His Chairman asks him:

"What day was that?"

And then again at page 22 of bundle 5 he says - oh sorry, what we've done, Chairperson, is just for your information, is we have bound certain extracts from the so-called Mauritius Statement. Now just if you haven't been exposed to this part of the history before, can I just very briefly tell you what that is about?

When Almond Nofomela made his revelations, Captain Dirk Coetzee left the country. He contacted Mr Jacques Paau of the Vrye Weekblad whom he was friendly with and Mr Jacques Paau arranged for Captain Coetzee to leave the country and to go to Mauritius. At Mauritius Mr Jacques Paau and Captain Dirk Coetzee held a conference in which Dirk Coetzee then told him of all the incidents in which he was involved. That was recorded and retyped and that document became Exhibit B before the Harms Commission and it was generally referred to as the Mauritius Statement and in that statement we bound in at page 22 - yes it runs from page 18 but at 22 he talks about the money and he says:

So he takes it a little bit further, he suggests that the then Brigadier, the present General Hans Dreyer who was the Officer Commanding Koevoet ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: ...(inaudible) purposes of, he received the money from Jan du Preez? The evidence today and whether Jan du Preez received it from Dreyer or whoever it might have been, the fact that he received the money was the factor that triggered off his knowledge about this and that he didn't disclose?

MR VISSER: Indeed, Chairperson, I'm probably just wasting your time, that already as Commissioner de Jager points out is full disclosure, what I'm probably trying to do is to make fuller than full disclosure just to give you the background but in essence there is no problem that you have to be alerted to between the evidence of Captain Dirk Coetzee and Brigadier Schoon in regard to this particular application.

Chairperson, I really have nothing else to add. The other considerations which we've mentioned in our earlier argument we would ask you also then obviously to incorporate here and we don't see much point in repeating all of that again. Thank you Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you Mr Visser.

Mr Jansen?

MR JANSEN: Mr Chair, we're not opposing in any event so in any event we have no argument. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you Mr Jansen.

Ms Thabethe?

MS THABETHE: No argument, Mr Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Ja, I assume you won't have anything else to say?

MR VISSER: No thank you, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, that concludes the incidents of Pillay and Mxenge. We will take time to prepare our decision and we'll likewise indicate to the parties when that's available.

Now is there anything else that is on the roll for today?

MS THABETHE: Mr Chair, our agreement with Mr Wagener is that if there's some time left we could tackle the matters where Mr Schoon is the only applicant and where there are no interested or implicated parties who are going to appear before you, so I don't know whether we should proceed with this. It's the two incidents of murder of two ANC terrorists and the matter of two PAC detainees which are very short matters as well.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes well ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: Well Chairperson, this is what happens with when somebody sits in an office two weeks before a hearing and try to tell you what you're going to do and the hearing happens, the point simply here is this that we have already had on standby since Wednesday the applicants in the Take Five and Pillay matter because we thought that matters would progress much quicker than they did and they're still here and what we would suggest to you is that we start making a dent in that and perhaps even finishing it today. If you took the - if the Committee took the tea adjournment now, we start it at half past eleven on the nose, half past eleven, half past twelve, I believe, I'm almost certain that we're going to finish the evidence. ...(inaudible)

CHAIRPERSON: Okay, I wasn't sure whether there was anyone else involved in that?

MS THABETHE: Yes Mr Chair and I don't think it will be possible to hear the Take 5 incident today because yesterday the victims were here and they sat the whole day and we had to discuss with them, they said it would be possible for them to come back on Monday so because today there was nothing scheduled for today, Friday, and in our prehearing conference we had agreed with Mr Wagener that we leave Friday free so that we can do the short matters where Mr Schoon is also involved so due to the fact that the victims are not here and we have agreed with their lawyer and with them that we meet on Monday, I would say we proceed with that matter on Monday.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes it seems as if we've got no option but to do that. Mr Jansen have you got anything further?

MR JANSEN: May we just be excused that's our only request.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes indeed, I gathered that you wanted to do that. Well as we've indicated we will inform yourselves when the decisions are available but we thank you for your assistance.

MR JANSEN: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: You'll be excused. I'm going to take the tea adjournment now and perhaps you can apply your minds and perhaps let us know what is next?

MR VISSER: Yes Chairperson, I must just say that the agreement was in fact, yes, we would fill in with matters in which Mr Schoon is the only applicant but we're rather surprised that the victims were told to go away while our applicants have been sitting here waiting to go on. We were never consulted about that and they are now here again today and I really don't know what one must do about it. One must come to some better arrangement than this, with all due respect so that if victims are going to be told to go home, at least that that be cleared with us.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, no I take the point there. Obviously there's been a lack of proper communication here. But also it is as you yourself pointed out quite correctly, it's also very hard to always try work according to a schedule so let's do our best. If we can do anything else let's do it, if we can't, we can't. Let us know.

MS THABETHE: Mr Chair, can I say something on that? Yes I think it was an oversight on my part not to consult the applicants about this but I guess it was because the victims were panicking because they were sitting here the whole day yesterday listening to argument that didn't involve them and I would like to apologise to the applicants for that.

CHAIRPERSON: There seems to be some reconciliation. Now we will stand down at this stage.

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: We beg leave to move before you the application of Brigadier Schoon in the matter which is described as The 2 ANC's. You will find his evidence or rather his amnesty application in Volume 1 at page 20 where he describes it under "voorval 2" in which he refers to as "elimineering van 2 ANC terroriste" - the elimination of 2 ANC terrorists. The actual application you will find at page 21. We have prepared for you a statement of his evidence which he will confirm and that according to our lists is marked C5 and I'm told that that has been placed before you. Chairperson, if we may go on directly?

Brigadier Schoon, you are still under your previous oath?

WILLEM FREDERICH SCHOON: (s.u.o.)

MR VISSER: And you are bound to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth?

MR SCHOON: Yes Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You became involved in an incident during approximately 1972 you say which took place at or near Zeerust, is that correct?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

MR VISSER: And it involves two persons of whom you do not know their names?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

MR VISSER: And you are requesting amnesty for the murder of those two ANC supporters or any lessor judgement with regard to the aforementioned accessory after the fact and defeating the ends of justice and any other delicts or offence which emanates from the incident, is that correct?

MR SCHOON: Yes Chairperson.

MR VISSER: This matter has an interesting previous history and you address this in paragraph 2. Will you explain to the Committee from paragraph 2 what you know about this matter?

MR SCHOON: During 1972 one Alexander Mumbaris and his wife were arrested at the Koopfontein Hek Border Post between the R.S.A. and Botswana border. I believe that these arrests took place legitimately although I was not involved in these arrests. Consequent or subsequent investigations brought to light that Mumbaris would infiltrate a group of 26 members of the Special Operations Unit of the MK to the R.S.A. The boat with which they travelled went ashore somewhere along the coast of Africa which meant that the members of the group had to infiltrate the R.S.A. over land.

It also came to light that there were already various of these MK members who had entered the country in small groups of twos and threes. Mumbaris and his wife accomplished these infiltrations through Botswana and Swaziland. With the co-operation of Mumbaris, the most of these insurgents were apprehended and in terms of Section 6 of the Terrorism Act they were detained.

MR VISSER: Could I just interrupt you? What was the purpose behind the infiltration, what were they going to do here?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, they wanted to prepare for the insurgents of larger groups. They had to prepare the road. They were equipped with secret writing materials and secret codes which they were to use as well as contact addresses which they had to use for this purpose.

MR VISSER: Would you say that this was the precursor for what happened with Operation Vula for example?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

MR VISSER: Where were you in 1972 at the time of this incident, what was your position?

MR SCHOON: I was connected to the security head office, I occupied the rank of major at that stage and I had been deployed to the investigative unit in the old Kompal Building.

MR VISSER: Very well?

MR SCHOON: Because of the circumference of the investigation and the involvement of various divisions, head office decided that the investigation would be co-ordinated from Pretoria and that Major Roelf van Rensburg and I would have to prepare the police dossier for court. The investigation was managed from the old Kompal Building. Mumbaris maintained contact with his external commander and it was arranged with him to bring another two ANC terrorists into the R.S.A. from Gaberone.

MR VISSER: Who arranged this?

MR SCHOON: It was arranged by the operatives and the other investigators who were involved in the matter via correspondence.

MR VISSER: Very well, continue?

MR SCHOON: The matter was discussed with General Major Piet Kruger, I think he may still have been a colonel or a brigadier at that stage, who was the overall commander of the investigative unit.

MR VISSER: Where is General Major Piet Kruger today?

MR SCHOON: He has since passed away.

After discussion General Kruger ordered that the two terrorist be ambushed on the R.S.A. side and be shot. It was arranged with the counter-insurgency unit to make members available for this purpose. A member of the police intelligence division was used as a courier. Captain Hannes Gloy and Faan van Niekerk managed the operation from the security side.

MR VISSER: These people that you mention?

MR SCHOON: They were members of the investigative team of which I was the head at that stage. The latter mentioned persons later reported that two terrorists had been confronted near Zeerust and that one had been shot dead and the other captured. They brought the arrestee with to Pretoria.

MR VISSER: Were you involved in this incident?

MR SCHOON: No.

MR VISSER: Do you have any knowledge of what exactly took place there from your own knowledge?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, I was simply informed that one had been shot and the other had been arrested, exactly how this took place is unknown to me.

MR VISSER: Yes, that's the point, you are not aware of the precise circumstances under which the person died?

MR SCHOON: That is correct. The situation was once again discussed with General Kruger and he ordered that the detainee be interrogated and that he be eliminated afterwards.

MR VISSER: Were you present when he issued this order?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, according to the best of my recollection I was there because I remember the telephone call which he put through to the security branch at Potchefstroom.

MR VISSER: Yes, you are going to discuss that now?

MR SCHOON: That is correct. He contacted Lieutenant Colonel Jaap Bekker from the security branch in Potchefstroom and informed him that he wanted him to report to his office the following day because he had a package of which it had to be disposed, at least those were the words that he used to that effect. The detainee was handed over to Lieutenant Colonel Bekker the following day. I cannot recall the name of the two victims, however I know that a post-mortem inquest was undertaken with regard to the person who had been shot dead at Zeerust. Although I was not directly involved in the operation during which the two suspects were killed, I was constantly informed of the true facts. Seeing as I was aware at all times that the two victims would be killed in that aspect I am possibly guilty of conspiracy to murder. I'm also guilty of obstruction of justice because I did not report the matter and I also did not make any other report about it later. The person who gave the order in this case was General Major P Kruger, deceased.

I committed these acts or omissions on behalf of the South African Police and the former government under the National Party whose interests I sought to protect through this. The acts and omissions which I committed, I committed in the execution of my official duties and under the order of a higher officer as part of the opposition to the struggle and was aimed against all supporters of a liberation movement. I request respectfully that I be granted amnesty for my acts and omissions in this regard.

MR VISSER: Just one question, Brigadier? When General Kruger said that the two persons had to be ambushed, you were then a major, what was your personal sentiment regarding the order, did you agree with his order or did you personally feel that this was not the correct way, however you would obey the order?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, it was strange to me because I had not previously had to do with this sort of operation during which people were eliminated and at that stage I was a junior major in the security branch who had no authority.

ADV DE JAGER: Yes, just a question that connects with that? Was the objective of that ambush to kill them at that stage or was the objective to arrest them?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, the initial idea which I gained from the planning was that they would be shot dead there.

ADV DE JAGER: But then one was arrested and one was shot dead?

MR SCHOON: Yes that is correct, one was arrested and brought back.

MR VISSER: If we may discuss the person who was arrested, in his case it would have been an out and out case of murder?

MR SCHOON: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: And the question that emerges is what happened to him? Do you know at all what happened to him?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, according to the best of my knowledge, Colonel Bekker arrived the following day and the detainee was handed over to him and Colonel Bekker left with him.

MR VISSER: Did you have any other report or information about that person afterwards?

MR SCHOON: No.

MR VISSER: But for the purposes of your amnesty application you accept that Bekker would have carried out his order?

MR SCHOON: Yes I accept that.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairperson thank you, that is the evidence-in-chief which we want to present in the present matter.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you Mr Visser.

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Thabethe, any questions?

MS THABETHE: No questions Mr Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes I assume you wouldn't have any further questions yourself? Would that be the case for the applicant in respect of this incident?

MR VISSER: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Would it be more advisable to take the other incident as well like we've done earlier?

MR VISSER: Yes Chairperson, except that I would suggest that we wrap this one up, I don't really have an argument, the truth of the fact is that the facts speak for themselves and really, whatever I have to say will be a repetition of what I've already said, stated before you and what is already in the written argument as well as in the other documentation.

The fact here is that Brigadier Schoon at the time was a junior major, he received his instructions whatever that may have been which appears to be very peripheral because he was really doing the work of an investigator at the time in regard to the Mumbaris case and his biggest sin, if one may express it that way,

was the fact that he knew of what was going on and he did not declare it but it is conceivable that an Attorney General may have evidence at his disposal with which he might confront Brigadier Schoon as being somebody who was present at the time and therefore took part in the planning of this albeit in a minor way and that is the reason why we also ask for amnesty to be granted in regard to conspiracy to murder and then obviously it would include the murder of these two ANC persons.

Chairperson, we don't know what happened to the second person but on the evidence of Mr Schoon here before you today, it is not farfetched to believe that he would have met his fate at the hands of Mr Bekker. There is no suggestion and no knowledge that Mr Schoon has that the matters took a different turn and what he understood was given as an order and how it would have been executed and although we don't have information we would ask you also to assume for purposes of this application that the second person was first arrested, was in fact eliminated and that's really all I wish to add, Chairperson, unless there's something you would like to ask me?

ADV GCABASHE: Mr Visser has anybody else applied for amnesty in this matter, do you know for instance Jaap Bekker, is he deceased as well? Okay. And then Gloy and van Niekerk, Faan van Niekerk.

MR VISSER: Those two persons have been given notification according to Ms Thabethe. Oh, at this very second as your question was still hanging in the air, I was given a document which I haven't seen before. It appears to originate from J H Gloy. Could I perhaps just take a moment to read through it, Chairperson?

MS THABETHE: Mr Chair, sorry, maybe I can answer the Committee Member's question. Mr van Niekerk and Mr Gloy were notified in terms of Section 19.4 and both of them indicated that they have no interest in appearing in front of the Committee and there is a letter which I've just received now but it was received at the office sometime I think weeks ago from Mr Gloy.

MR VISSER: It appears to be relevant to the PAC matter which will be coming now and perhaps we could deal with it immediately. He says in his annexure to his letter the allegations against him as he understands them from Brigadier Schoon is totally untrue and he denies it in the strongest possible terms. He says that he's convinced that Schoon is confusing him with someone else because during 1981 he was not in the position to make such a drastic recommendation or suggestion or to give such an order and he says:

Chairman, the Two PAC members you will find at page 30 of Volume 1 and more specifically at page 31. My attorney suggests that we mark the covering letter and the annexure as Exhibit K before you. I've just referred you to the amnesty application itself. Chairperson, we also refer you to a statement which we prepared of the evidence of Mr Schoon in this regard and we - I think it's Exhibit C5 if I'm not mistaken - C6, I'm sorry. C6.

Brigadier Schoon, once again we are not going to repeat everything which you have already incorporated. Let us move directly to the matter at hand, the Committee is aware that you request certain evidence to be incorporated in your application. Might I refer you to paragraph 1 and request that you inform us about that.

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, I refer to the written submission above and my evidence given before the Human Rights Violations Committee of the TRC on 19 November 1996. In this submission I referred in paragraph 4 to an incident to which Captain Dirk Coetzee had referred in earlier evidence before the Harms Commission and elsewhere during which two persons were killed namely Selvi Mavuso and Peter Dlamini. I'm quoting the relevant paragraph for the convenience of the Committee. Quote:

MR VISSER: Brigadier, might I interrupt you?

Chairperson, bundle 5, we have bound that in for you at page 39, that is again the written presentation of Mr Schoon to the TRC and he has now just read to you to contents of what is there.

Please continue with paragraph 3?

MR SCHOON: Insofar as I have referred to the particular victims it is falsely believed that Captain Dirk Coetzee referred to the incident for which I requested amnesty during which two PAC supporters were killed. I fix the attention thereon that I did indeed refer to two PAC supporters in the quoted paragraph. Upon rereading the written submission I only realised much later that I had made an error. Indeed, I do not know anything about the murder of two ANC supporters with the names as mentioned, namely Selvi Mavuso and Peter Dlamini. Indeed, I meant to refer to the incident which has currently been served before the Amnesty Committee in which the two mentioned unknown PAC supporters were apparently killed. I refer to this incident in bundle 1, pages 30 to 34. As an excuse I would like to submit the following. During the beginning of the amnesty process there was a great degree of doubt among me and other members of the security forces about the honesty of the new government and the fairness of the amnesty process. Various meetings were held and addressed by J V van der Merwe, the former commissioner of the SAP, during which he attempted to address the fears of the members of the SAP and to convince them to participate in the amnesty process. Ultimately, General van der Merwe and Attorney Wagener convinced me and other members of the SAP to participate. Unfortunately these events meant that there was not much time remaining to serve applications before the cut-off dates. I must also confess that my memory has worsened over the years and this means that I'm no longer capable of relying on my own independent memory with regard to all the events in which I was involved and that there are certain aspects of detail which escaped me. Because of my position as commander of Section C in security head office, I was directly and indirectly involved in many actions. No documentary evidence exists regarding the incidents for which I'm requesting amnesty seeing as they were illegal deeds and omissions which by nature of the situation would not be placed on written record.

When I compiled my amnesty applications, I spoke with Director Karel Barkhuizen, not the inspector but direct to Karel Barkhuizen at head office in order to attempt to attempt to obtain a documentation. He informed me that where there was written documentation those files had already been destroyed. Therefore, I have to rely on my own weak memory and on information which I can gain from other members.

MR VISSER: Are you saying that with regard to the incident which Dirk Coetzee has referred to about these two persons, when you read about that case you assumed that it was the case involving the two PAC operatives?

MR SCHOON: That is correct. I contacted the now General Gloy and asked him whether or not he could assist me. I told him that I wanted to know the names of the two PAC terrorists and he denied any knowledge of the incident and that he didn't know what I was talking about.

MR VISSER: Yes, that concurs with what he has said in Exhibit K.

MR SCHOON: Consequently at that stage before I went to the TRC in the Cape I accepted that it was these two persons which Dirk had referred the PAC terrorists.

MR VISSER: Very well, there is also another aspect and you mention it because it is relevant with regard to your explanation regarding you bad memory. Paragraph 7 please?

MR SCHOON: My bad memory and the course of circumstances has also meant that in my written amnesty application I duplicated incidents 12 and 15. Instead of incident 12 referring to an incident during which three ANC terrorists were murdered in Swaziland on 12th February 1989, by means of my legal representatives I will attempt to correct this matter at an appropriate time.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, what we're referring to here are before you in bundle 1 at page 67, that is ...(indistinct) and at page 81. We don't want to pursue that matter at this stage because it really isn't relevant in the present application but we just want to alert you to that fact in the meantime and then there's another matter which I will deal with, when we deal with the matter and George and Brown and I can tell you now that for some reason because of duplication and because of what the witness has just told you, that incident somehow got lost in the wash and we will have to ask you to include Brigadier Schoon as an amnesty applicant when that matter comes before you. I only mention it now because it all fits in with the explanation which he has just given in regard to Mavuso and Dlamini.

Now in paragraph 8 you state?

MR SCHOON: I would like to emphasis that I did not mean to mislead the TRC in paragraph 4 of my abovementioned submission. The information, although faulty, can be ascribed to the circumstances as set out by me above. I would like to use this opportunity to correct the facts and simultaneously to apologise.

MR VISSER: On page 30 of bundle 1 you have referred to the murder of two PAC supporters and you request amnesty. I'm referring to page 5 of Exhibit C6, you request amnesty for the murder of two PAC supporters, conspiracy to murder, accessory after the fact, defeating the ends of justice and any other offence or delict emanating from the incident. Could you continue from paragraph 10?

MR SCHOON: The two PAC supporters were detained in terms of Section 6 of the Terrorism Act. The two PAC members infiltrated the R.S.A. in order to commit acts of terror. Based upon information which was previously obtained they were arrested just after they arrived in the country. I was informed that each of them had been in possession of an AK-47 when they were arrested. I never interrogated or saw them myself.

During 1981 - this could also be faulty, it may have been 1982. During 1981 a member of C-Section whose identity I cannot recall and I upon the request of Colonel Gloy met in Brigadier Brooderyk's office in order to discuss the release of two PAC terrorists. At that stage the Minister of Law and Order did not wish to extend their detention or charge them.

MR VISSER: I would just like to interrupt you again, Brigadier? Mr Gloy maintains that your memory fails you because he says that you also implicated somebody else beforehand, as I have read Exhibit K. The question originates who this other person is and you refer in paragraph 13 of your application to a person who was a member of Section C1 whose identity you cannot recall. Could you address the Committee regarding that? When you considered this matter what did you do in relation to this?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, initially I believed that the person who had accompanied me was Dirk Coetzee. Later it became clear that it had not been and I was under the impression that it was Colonel Jack Cronje but also denied it when I approached him and asked him whether or not he was involved. He said no and that is why I decided that I couldn't mention a name because I could no longer recall who it was, those who I had thought it was denied their involvement.

MR VISSER: But what you do know is that somebody in your section accompanied you to this meeting with Gloy in Brooderyk's office?

MR SCHOON: Yes. Gloy and I sat next to the tea table, Brooderyk sat behind his office and he was in earshot of what we were saying.

MR VISSER: What did you discuss?

MR SCHOON: Colonel Gloy insisted that the two PAC operatives be eliminated while I insisted that they be persuaded to work for the SAP as informers.

MR VISSER: This is 1981/82, what was your position then?

MR SCHOON: I was then a Colonel in command of Group C.

ADV DE JAGER: Did you and Gloy occupy the same rank?

MR SCHOON: At that stage Gloy was still a major I think.

Or at the very most a lieutenant colonel.

MR VISSER: And at this state you then spoke up and said that you did not agree with this and that you thought it would be preferable for them to be persuaded to become Askaris?

MR SCHOON: Yes that is what I thought, that was my argument.

MR VISSER: Continue, paragraph 15?

MR SCHOON: Colonel Gloy was adamant however, that the two be eliminated. Although I argued against this initially I ultimately agreed with it but on the condition that an attempt first be made to persuade them to work for the security police.

MR VISSER: Why did you agree with the idea of elimination eventually?

MR SCHOON: I came to the conclusion that the planning had already been undertaken beforehand and that Colonel Brooderyk was aware and they had perhaps declared it with a high authority.

MR VISSER: Was Colonel Brooderyk your superior or your inferior?

MR SCHOON: He was my superior.

MR VISSER: Was any consideration given to possible alternatives in relation to the two PAC persons elimination?

MR SCHOON: No Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Did you in your own mind think of alternatives regarding what could happen should they not be eliminated?

MR SCHOON: No Chairperson, I believed that they could possibly be persuaded.

MR VISSER: That was a possibility, that was your greatest consideration?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

MR VISSER: But you already knew that the Minister of Law and Order would not extend their detention?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

MR VISSER: And that they were not going to be prosecuted?

MR SCHOON: Yes.

MR VISSER: Paragraph 16 please?

MR SCHOON: The reason why I agreed with the elimination of the two should they not be prepared to cooperate was that they were supporters of the PAC, they were trained terrorists who had infiltrated the R.S.A. to commit acts of terror whereby which lives and property would be jeopardised. There was no talk of prosecuting them seeing as the minister had already decided against it. To prosecute them would according to my opinion have given the PAC a public stature which would have assisted them in their struggle seeing as they could have been placed in a position to receive money from foreign donors. At this stage the PAC was not very prominent. Any prosecution in this relation would according to me place them in the spotlight and they would then have received free publicity in this manner.

MR VISSER: And that would have fortified their struggle?

MR SCHOON: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: Let us return to the meeting. Paragraph 18?

MR SCHOON: During the meeting I already realised that the chances were very favourable that they would refuse to cooperate and should this happen the chances were also very good that they would be murdered. The attempt to persuade the two PAC detainees to cooperate with the SAP would be undertaken by members of Vlakplaas.

MR VISSER: Now those members of Vlakplaas to who are you referring when you speak of them?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, later I informed myself that this person was Colonel Cronje. I traced him and asked whether or not he could remember his involvement in that and he said no. To this very day I still don't know, I'm not certain who the person was.

MR VISSER: Yes but you refer to the same person that you referred to in paragraph 13?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

MR VISSER: So it is not a new person or another person?

MR SCHOON: No. The final arrangements for the release of the persons whose names are unknown to me were made between the aforementioned C1 member and Colonel Gloy. The former would take them to a safe house at Komatipoort and attempt to persuade them to cooperate with the security branch. Before his departure I once again emphasised it with the C1 member that he should rather attempt to persuade them to work for us. After approximately one month, the relevant C1 member returned and reported to me that he could not persuade the persons to work as informers and that they had been killed.

Two persons were consequently killed in this matter and their names are unknown to me. The person who in this case gave the order was Major General Hans Gloy, to me directly. By implication I believed that Colonel Brooderyk had given the authorisation. Based upon that I saw that the two persons could be killed and I reconciled myself that and because of this I am guilty to murder and/or conspiracy to murder. I have also committed defeating the ends of justice by not reporting the incident and also not making any further report afterwards about it. I committed these acts and omissions on behalf of the South African Police and the former government under the National Party whose interests I sought to protect through this. The acts or omissions which I committed were committed in the execution of my official duties and as part of the opposition to the struggle and were aimed against supporters of a liberation movement.

I request respectfully that my amnesty application be granted for my acts or omissions in this regard.

Chairperson, may I just add that I exposed these matters not to be held responsible later for not exposing all incidents that I was involved in or all information that I possessed to the Committee. This is the only reason why.

MR VISSER: In other words when you mention anybody in your affidavit it is according to the best of your recollection even though your recollection is weak, that is what you remember?

MR SCHOON: Yes that is correct.

MR VISSER: And not for any other reason to get them into trouble or anything like that?

MR SCHOON: No, I have done this so that I can make a full disclosure of relevant facts.

MR VISSER: Just to put paragraph 24 somewhat clearer, you say that the person who gave the order was Major General Hans Gloy? He was a captain then?

MR SCHOON: No he was either a major or a lieutenant, I think he was a lieutenant.

MR VISSER: But he didn't give you the order?

MR SCHOON: No he couldn't give me the order. He was reasonably serious that this was the only plan to be followed and that would be to kill them.

MR VISSER: But on the question of Commissioner de Jager, you understood that the ultimate authorisation came from Brooderyk?

MR SCHOON: Yes, that is how I interpreted it because he sat in and he heard what was happening.

MR VISSER: Brooderyk, was he your senior?

MR SCHOON: Yes he was my senior.

MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson, that's the evidence. Oh, I'm sorry, my attention has been drawn to a mistake which I personally made which has been repeated throughout Mr Schoon's statements and that is where reference is made to the amnesty applications in Volume 1, I referred to pages 10 to 12, well that is incorrect. What I intended doing, Chairperson, was to refer you to page 10 and 11 which - no it's correct. Chairperson, I'm happy to tell you that I didn't make a mistake, it is in fact correct but my attorney will argue with me on the way back to Pretoria, he will convince me that I was wrong. Chairperson, that is the evidence that we wish to present, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Schoon, did you contact Mr Gloy telephonically?

MR SCHOON: Yes Chairperson, I did.

CHAIRPERSON: At which stage was this?

MR SCHOON: This was before I went to the TRC on the 19th November in 1996, the previous evening.

CHAIRPERSON: And in what relation did you contact him?

MR SCHOON: I asked him to give me the names of the two persons, the two PAC persons because I believed that those were the persons to whom Dirk Coetzee referred in his affidavit.

CHAIRPERSON: And what was his reaction?

MR SCHOON: He told me that he did not know about them and that he had no knowledge.

CHAIRPERSON: So did he deny his involvement, any involvement whatsoever?

MR SCHOON: Yes he denied any knowledge of that whatsoever.

And might I add that later I was with Director Barkhuizen in his office and we called Brigadier Brooderyk in, he arrived and I put the same to him and he also denied any knowledge of the incident, he said that he didn't know anything.

ADV GCABASHE: If you could just help me with that. Barkhuizen or Brooderyk who said he knew nothing?

MR SCHOON: I beg your pardon?

ADV GCABASHE: Was that Barkhuizen or Brooderyk who said he knew nothing?

MR SCHOON: Brooderyk.

ADV GCABASHE: Brooderyk. Thank you.

MR VISSER: Just for the sake of clarity, Barkhuizen is a person who at the time worked as a legal advisor for the police and this witnesses evidence is that he approached him to find out if he couldn't lay his hands on documentation with regard to the incident and Barkhuizen then called Brooderyk and Brooderyk apparently denied.

CHAIRPERSON: So both Gloy and Brooderyk have denied knowledge of the incident? How good is your recollection regarding this incident?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, I'm not uncertain about this incident, I am one hundred percent certain of the facts here regarding Brooderyk and Gloy's involvement because they were the persons who administered the detentions. The detention orders and the release orders and so on came through them.

CHAIRPERSON: And Brooderyk, where is he today, is he still alive?

MR SCHOON: Yes he is still alive and living in Pretoria.

CHAIRPERSON: You are not certain or at least you don't have any first hand knowledge whether these persons were indeed killed?

MR SCHOON: No.

CHAIRPERSON: And when you refer in paragraph 22 to the C-Section member, is that one of the persons who you can no longer recall?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, that is the person to whom I referred who was with me when we were tasked to do this.

CHAIRPERSON: Initially you thought it was Dirk Coetzee?

MR SCHOON: Yes that is correct, initially I thought it was Dirk Coetzee and then later I thought it was Cronje.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you have absolutely no idea who that person was?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, after I established that it had definitely not been Coetzee, I was definitely under the impression that it was Cronje. I asked him and he told me that he didn't know anything.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you then accept that your memory was incorrect?

MR SCHOON: I didn't know what to think because I didn't want to implicate people any further and I couldn't think of who else it may have been because I was half convinced that it was Cronje.

CHAIRPERSON: Would Gloy and Brooderyk according to your knowledge know whether or not these people were killed?

MR SCHOON: No I don't think so, they would have the same knowledge as I have. They would not have any first hand knowledge.

ADV DE JAGER: The person who would have executed the order, would he have reported to them or to you?

MR SCHOON: He would have reported to both of us.

CHAIRPERSON: Didn't you hear anything further about these persons who you did not know or about the person whose name you cannot recall saying that he could not persuade the two PAC operatives to join the security branch.

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, I hoped that somebody would come forward who would also have an application in this regard and then I would have had some certainty.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes so you were also uncertain as to whether or not these persons were actually killed?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: Could it be established that these persons were detained under Section 6 and if so, would there be any record of that remaining?

MR SCHOON: That is why I went to Barkhuizen, Chairperson, and he could not assist me with anything.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you have Mr Brooderyk's address?

MR SCHOON: Yes Chairperson, I think it's in the telephone directory because that's where we found his number.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well.

ADV DE JAGER: He has been notified, has he? Was he given notice Ms Thabethe?

MS THABETHE: Yes Mr de Jager, I'm just checking his address here.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, if I may use the moment of silence, the problem here is that Brigadier Schoon is the only applicant in this incident so there's nothing that one can check his recollection by. The other problem is that he doesn't know who the names of these people were so that no enquiries could be made in that regard either. He has tried but without success.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes I assume we could try as well and that's why perhaps if we hear whether we've got an address because we don't seem to have a response from Mr Brooderyk. We know what Mr Gloy's position is.

MR VISSER: Well Brooderyk's position is precisely the same, he says he knows nothing about this.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

MR VISSER: Oh I see, yes. Yes.

ADV GCABASHE: Just for clarity Mr Schoon, are you saying you are still convinced that Mr Gloy was there or are you saying you said that your memory is faulty and he may not have been there, I'm just not clear on that aspect?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, in certain instances my mind wanders and my memory isn't what it ought to be and it is very troublesome to reorientate oneself especially when somebody comes along with correct and clear facts which you cannot recall and that is why I was asking these people for information.

MR VISSER: No but the question if I might put it is as you sit here today are you convinced that Gloy was indeed involved?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, that is one aspect regarding which I have no doubt.

MR VISSER: And can we ask you the same question with regard to Brooderyk?

MR SCHOON: With regard to him as well, I also asked him to come to the office and I put it to him and he simply said that he didn't know anything about this.

MR VISSER: But the member that you spoke of, you cannot remember this person?

MR SCHOON: No, I cannot remember him at all.

ADV GCABASHE: Sorry, just to tidy that up and you're saying in relation to Brooderyk, you are convinced today that he was involved? Just to clear that for me as well?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, he was present in the office where this discussion with Gloy took place. He did not participate in the discussion but he must have heard what it was about and he must have known.

CHAIRPERSON: I would just like to determine, we know when you spoke to Gloy. Can you tell us when you spoke to Brooderyk?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, I spoke to Brooderyk before I made my formal submission to the Committee and that would have been about a week or two before that.

CHAIRPERSON: So both of them were aware, Gloy and Brooderyk were aware that you were applying for amnesty specifically with regard to this incident?

MR SCHOON: Yes that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: That was before the cut-off date?

MR SCHOON: Yes, that was before the cut-off date.

ADV DE JAGER: And that was before the first cut-off date and after that we had an extension in the cut-off date?

MR SCHOON: Yes that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Ms Thabethe, have you got any questions?

MS THABETHE: Sorry Mr Chair?

CHAIRPERSON: Have you got any questions for this witness?

MS THABETHE: Just one Mr Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS THABETHE: Mr Schoon, how were these people identified as PAC members, how did you know they were PAC members?

MR SCHOON: Chairperson, they infiltrated the country as formerly trained PAC cadres, they made statements and it was unequivocal fact that they were PAC terrorists.

MS THABETHE: No further questions, Mr Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Ms Thabethe.

ADV GCABASHE: Just to again finish that off? Is your evidence that as far as you understand it they were killed because they would not become informants. Well, two things, because they were PAC members who would not become informants?

MR SCHOON: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes Mr Visser, have you got any re-examination?

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Just one question just to add to the question that Commissioner Gcabashe has just asked, with your leave Chairperson.

But also gave evidence that it was your conviction that they'd entered the country to commit acts of terrorism?

MR SCHOON: Yes that is correct. They were armed and they had been in the country for a few hours before they were captured.

MR VISSER: That is all I have for the witness.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you Mr Visser.

MR VISSER: Chairman, we don't have any further witnesses, he is the only applicant in this particular incident, is Brigadier Schoon.

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Thabethe has there been any response from Mr Brooderyk?

MS THABETHE: No Mr Chair, I would need to follow it up with the Witness Protection because all the implicated persons were traced through them.

CHAIRPERSON: You don't have at hand immediately as an indication as to the service of the notice on him and the possible response and so on?

MS THABETHE: No Mr Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, are you going to be able to follow that up?

MS THABETHE: Yes Mr Chair, I will have to do it through Section 30 I think.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MS THABETHE: Yes. But I will get in touch immediately with the Witness Protection just to find out what his response was but I don't have any report on it except that he was served.

CHAIRPERSON: Oh, you've got a report that they served a notice on him?

MS THABETHE: According to Shamrad Gold who was the evidence analyst on this, all the implicated persons were served.

CHAIRPERSON: Oh I see so it's a general report from the evidence analyst?

MS THABETHE: Yes so that's a general report. Yes and the next report was that out of the implicated persons who were served, Gloy and Mr van Niekerk responded, so I'm not sure about Mr Brooderyk.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes well from your side you have concluded your case. I got the feeling that in terms of submissions you wouldn't have anything substantially different from the previous ones?

MR VISSER: No Chairperson, there's just one aspect which I think I have to lift out and that is that in the present case, Brigadier Schoon was senior, the senior officer to Gloy so we must just not get confused here to think that what Schoon is saying is that Gloy ordered him. Gloy didn't order him, Gloy gave the order lower down but he, although he was a higher ranking officer, was aware of it. That's the basis of his application and what he says is that as far as he is concerned, Brooderyk must have given permission because Brooderyk and Gloy were working with the release of difficult prisoners at the time and he must have known about that.

ADV DE JAGER: And you were called to Brooderyk's office?

MR SCHOON: Where he was present?

ADV DE JAGER: Yes.

MR SCHOON: Yes.

ADV DE JAGER: Can you recall who asked you to go to Brooderyk's office?

MR SCHOON: Gloy approached me and asked whether this other person and I would accompany him to Brooderyk's office to discuss the matter.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes I assume that that has concluded what you wanted to say as well?

MR VISSER: Yes Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Ms Thabethe, you will follow up this situation around Mr Brooderyk and see whether you can find out anything further about what the situation is, would you?

MS THABETHE: Yes Mr Chair, I will right away.

CHAIRPERSON: Alright now, apart from that fact have you got any submissions in any one of these incidents?

MS THABETHE: No Mr Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Mr Visser, your client is going to be present at these proceedings in any event. We are going to let this matter stand down until Monday to allow us an opportunity to just follow up the issue that I've raised with the evidence leader and if anything turns on that then of course you would be able to deal with it and your client as well before we actually finalise the matter. So under those circumstances we're going to let it stand down until Monday to see if we receive any further information and then we'll take a further decision as to how we deal with it.

Yes, I assume that concludes what we have on the roll for today? Under those circumstances we'll adjourn until Monday at this venue and we'll reconvene at 10 o'clock on Monday morning. We're adjourned.