DATE: 27-05-1999

NAME: CHAPPIES KLOPPER

APPLICATION NO: 3762/96

MATTER: DE KOCK HEARING 1 : KOMATIPOORT 4

DAY: 4

--------------------------------------------------------------------------ON RESUMPTION:

C KLOPPER: (still under oath)

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS: (continued) Thank you Mr Chairman. Right, Mr Klopper, may I please refer you to page 21 of the Bundle, paragraph 2 thereof. It says -

"... during one evening one of the Ovambo members reported to Vlakplaas that there they were in a shooting incident and that four people had been shot."

Is that correct, do you still stand by that?

MR KLOPPER: As I have testified earlier, I had no other statements to assist me with this statement itself, there were two members that came to the base.

MR DU PLESSIS: Do you now say that there were two?

MR KLOPPER: That is correct yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: And can you at all dispute that those two were Lukas Culino and Simon Hiranbawasha?

MR KLOPPER: It was Lukas and Simon, that is correct, yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: Now in respect of the decision to do the cover up at the scene which we are in agreement, my client was responsible for the cover up at the scene, can you just explain to us again how that decision was taken and who was involved in the discussion?

MR KLOPPER: As far as I recall many people were present. I cannot recall precisely who said it, it is possible that I may have said it or one of the other members, but it was ultimately a collective decision as far as I can recall.

MR DU PLESSIS: A collective decision between who and - who were involved in this decision?

MR KLOPPER: I cannot recall precisely who said it, but everybody who was present there, agreed with it as far as I can recall.

MR DU PLESSIS: And those people, if we can just identify them, they were you, yourself, Willie Nortje and who else and Mr Tait?

MR KLOPPER: As far as I recall, most of the members who were involved there, were present during that discussion.

MR DU PLESSIS: All right, now who gave ...

CHAIRPERSON: Who were the members?

MR KLOPPER: According to what I can recall it was me, Willie Nortje, John Tait was there, Boesman, all the members whose names appear in the statements, along with members from the Task Force.

MR DU PLESSIS: Right, but who - what was Wouter Mentz' - what was he, was he a Warrant Officer or what was he?

MR KLOPPER: Yes, he was a Warrant Officer.

MR DU PLESSIS: So he was - you were his superior, is that correct?

MR KLOPPER: Yes, in terms of rank.

MR DU PLESSIS: Tait was his superior, is that correct?

MR KLOPPER: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: And Nortje was also his superior?

MR KLOPPER: I don't know about that.

MR DU PLESSIS: Well, would you dispute that because Nortje was at that stage also a Warrant Officer but he had been a Warrant Officer for a long time longer than Mentz?

MR KLOPPER: No, I don't know about that.

MR DU PLESSIS: Now somebody must have given Mentz an order to do this, do you agree with me?

MR KLOPPER: Chairperson, I cannot say that it is not so but I can say that Wouter Mentz' task was to investigate the nature of these incidents.

MR DU PLESSIS: You see, can we turn to page 39 of the Bundle, actually it is page 40, please, the second paragraph, the last sentence. He says -

"... it was then discussed among us where among others Lieutenant Chappies Klopper, Warrant Officer Willie Nortje and other members were present. During the discussion the decision was made that it would create a problem should it be made public that the Ovambo members had shot the smugglers."

Then turn over to page 41, then seven lines from the top -

"... a decision was then taken among others by Lieutenant Chappies Klopper and Warrant Officer Willie Nortje who was in command of the entire operation, that the operation was to be reconstructed so that it would appear that the weapon smugglers had been shot by the Task Force members."

MR KLOPPER: Yes, that is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Do you agree with that?

MR KLOPPER: I cannot recall that such a pertinent order was actually given as I have said.

MR DU PLESSIS: All right, let's read everything. Page 41, the final paragraph Mentz says -

"... I was then given the order by Lieutenant Chappies Klopper to give assistance with the reconstruction of the events."

Would you just give your comments on that?

MR KLOPPER: As I said yesterday, I cannot recall that it was that way. As I have explained, Wouter Mentz' work was of this nature.

MR DU PLESSIS: Do you concede that there is a possibility that you could have given this order as Mentz testifies?

MR KLOPPER: Yes, it is possible but somebody else could also have made a similar proposition.

MR DU PLESSIS: And you concede that it could have been possible that Nortje may have given the order?

MR KLOPPER: Yes, it is possible.

MR DU PLESSIS: And do you concede that those were the two most likely people who could have given the order?

MR KLOPPER: Anyone of the person who were present there, may have given the order. It could have been me, John Tait, Willie Nortje, Wouter Mentz, anyone of us.

CHAIRPERSON: Can I interrupt for a moment. What I understood you to be saying a little earlier, I may have misunderstood it, was that it wasn't really anything in the nature of an order, there was a discussion, you all agreed on what ought to have been done and then someone was just told to carry on?

MR KLOPPER: That is correct, yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes, thank you Mr Chairman. Maybe the way I phrased the questions ...

CHAIRPERSON: I don't understand that it was a deliberate order that I am now ordering you to do this and that, there was a talk and somebody said well, we'd better get cracking, you go ahead and do it.

MR KLOPPER: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: That could have been you, it could have been Nortje, it could have been - but somebody told him to go and do it and he went?

MR KLOPPER: There was a discussion, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Because the rest of you all saw that he was going and you must have realised that he was going to do it? None of you tried to stop him?

MR KLOPPER: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you Mr Chairman. And you all accepted that he was going to do the reconstruction, is that correct?

MR KLOPPER: Yes, it was accepted that he would.

MR DU PLESSIS: All right. Mr Chairman, if you will just bear with me please. You testified Mr Klopper that the day afterwards there was some commotion at Vlakplaas because of Mentz' action and I understood you that you testified that with those actions you referred to the fact that he removed the bodies, is that correct?

MR KLOPPER: Yes, due to the fact that there was no scene from my opinion when I arrived there with the photographers.

MR DU PLESSIS: Do you have or can I take you to page 22 please, paragraph 7, the third sentence -

"... afterwards there was a great upset among the members of Vlakplaas ..."

does this refer to your evidence which you gave, referring to the upset at Vlakplaas?

MR KLOPPER: That is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: All right, and then you were asked yesterday about the question if you knew that the reconstruction of the place where the shooting took place, that it would be reconstructed in such a way so as to give an indication that the Task Force was responsible for the shooting?

MR KLOPPER: That is correct, yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: You can't remember that that was the case?

MR KLOPPER: No, I can't recall that it was exactly that.

MR DU PLESSIS: But you cannot dispute that that could have been the decision which was taken?

MR KLOPPER: No, I can't.

MR DU PLESSIS: And it seems to be correct that that was the decision that was taken because from the affidavits of the Task Force members, De Jonge, Crooks and Laas in their first affidavits they all say that they were responsible for the shooting?

MR KLOPPER: Yes, if I study it today, it is correct, it is how it took place.

MR LAMEY: Mr Chairman, the first affidavits - sorry, I withdraw that.

CHAIRPERSON: While we are on the subject of the affidavits, do you know this Mr F.D. Holtzhauzen?

MR KLOPPER: Yes, he worked with us.

CHAIRPERSON: He was with you?

MR KLOPPER: I can't recall whether or not Holtzhauzen was there on that specific evening, but my recollection is that he managed the post mortem inquest.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. He prepared all the affidavits allegedly and then got people just to sign them? You don't know anything about that?

MR KLOPPER: I see his name here.

MR DU PLESSIS: Holtzhauzen was also a fellow member of Vlakplaas, is that correct?

MR KLOPPER: That is correct yes.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR DU PLESSIS

CHAIRPERSON: Was he stationed at Vlakplaas?

MR KLOPPER: Yes, he worked with us at Vlakplaas, he was a member of the Unit.

CHAIRPERSON: Because he gives his address as being Schoeman Street, Pretoria?

MR KLOPPER: Chairperson, if I recall correctly, we had an office at Schoeman Street at that stage, I am not entirely certain but that could be an explanation for that.

CHAIRPERSON: If you look at page 90, what is MID Head Office?

MR KLOPPER: Sorry, that is the Head Office of the Security Police in Schoeman Street, and that is why he gave that address.

CHAIRPERSON: Not to create the impression that that was where he was working?

MR KLOPPER: No, Vlakplaas was simply a base from where we worked, but the Head Office of the Security Police was at Wachthuis just opposite the Uniformed Branch, that is between Schoeman and Pretoria Streets.

CHAIRPERSON: I take it the IFP have no questions?

MS FIVAZ: No questions, Your Honour.

NO QUESTIONS BY MS FIVAZ

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS PATEL: Thank you, Honourable Chairperson. Mr Klopper, just to get a bit of the background to this incident, can you tell us were you involved in the planning beforehand?

MR KLOPPER: Chairperson, I cannot recall that I was involved in the planning phase, as I have said the operation was under the leadership of Boesman Pretorius and Tait, so I cannot recall that I was a member of the planning phase as such.

MS PATEL: Can you then explain how it came about that you were present when this incident took place, how did you become involved in the matter if you were not involved in the planning?

MR KLOPPER: If I could explain it as follows - I handled most of the paper work and the information notes and the report backs which were sent back to the higher command structure such as De Kock and Engelbrecht and that is why I was involved.

MS PATEL: Are you saying that your function generally was to do the report backs after the incidents had taken place?

MR KLOPPER: Yes, it was mostly the compilation of information notes and the administrative side of things.

MS PATEL: What information notes are you referring to in this specific incident?

MR KLOPPER: After every action that we launched, there would be information notes for Head Office which would inform all the Section Heads of the Security Branch with regards to the operations that Vlakplaas was busy with.

MS PATEL: Would you generally then, given that your function was to report back at the end of an incident, be involved in the prior arrangements to the incident, the planning to the incident, would you generally get involved from that stage through to the end or would you just come in at the end of an incident and get different people who were involved in that specific operation, to report to you? Can we just get clarity?

MR KLOPPER: Where I participated in chief was to compile information notes and to do the paper work if I might put it that way, the paper work of actions which were executed. In some of the cases, I was part of the planning and in other cases, I only came after the time to assist with the paper work.

CHAIRPERSON: In this case, did you report back?

MR KLOPPER: I can't recall specifically, but I am certain that I did.

CHAIRPERSON: And that would have been a report that a decision was taken to change the scenario, to make it clear that this had been done by the Task Force?

MR KLOPPER: Chairperson, the facts around the reconstruction would not have been about that, it would have been evident from the shooting report that these are the true facts.

CHAIRPERSON: I am afraid I am not with you. The shooting report, what shooting report? The report by Major Combrink?

MR KLOPPER: Yes, the same sort of report, but for Security Head Office.

CHAIRPERSON: But that was not true?

MR KLOPPER: That is what I am saying, I would have compiled a report for Head Office and this would be distributed among the Generals and staff and the leaders of all the Sections of A, B, C, D, whatever the case may be. We would then give them the facts as we wanted the facts to appear, and by that, I mean the false facts as true facts.

CHAIRPERSON: You in fact did not tell the various Heads of the Security Branch as to incidents Vlakplaas was involved in, you told them what you wanted them to know and believe?

MR KLOPPER: From my side, that is how I understood it. I don't know how it worked after that.

CHAIRPERSON: So you understood that you were merely to do what you were told and put up any report that fell in line with the Vlakplaas planning?

MR KLOPPER: That is correct, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: And disregard the providing information for the Heads of the Security Police, they weren't given the true facts?

MR KLOPPER: Not from my side, no.

MS PATEL: Sorry Mr Klopper, and given that, almost on or very shortly after this incident had taken place, steps were already taken in order to put forward the reconstructed version of what had taken place, you would then have been apprised of that because that is your function, not so?

MR KLOPPER: With this specific matter, I had nothing further to do with it.

MS PATEL: But why not sir?

CHAIRPERSON: You put up a report? You might have put up the wrong report?

MR KLOPPER: That is what I am saying. I can't recall specifically that I compiled information notes in this case, but this was a long operation which included this aspect and I compiled an overall report. I can't recall this incident specifically. Wouter and Dougie had more to do with this case, I didn't have anything further to do with this case.

MS PATEL: With respect sir, that makes no sense. If your specific function there was to get ...

MR LAMEY: Sorry Mr Chairman, it makes perfectly sense to me, with all due respect. Perhaps if my learned friend could just phrase it in another way, but I understand perfectly what Mr Klopper is trying to say.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, I am afraid I don't. This was a matter where four people were killed publicly, the bodies were taken to the Police mortuary, it would have been public knowledge and how can it then have just been, he doesn't know if it was in his report or not? He has told us that he was the gentleman responsible for filing reports.

MR LAMEY: I will come back then in re-examination, thank you Mr Chairman.

MS PATEL: All right, thank you Honourable Chairperson. Do you know Willem de Jonge, he was one of the gentlemen from the Task Force who was present?

MR KLOPPER: Yes, I knew most of these persons, that is correct.

MS PATEL: He states in his statement, that is part of the Bundle, Honourable Chairperson, I refer you to page 91 of the Bundle, he says that a planning for this operation took place a few days beforehand and that you were present when that planning had taken place? What is your comment on that?

MR KLOPPER: It is possible that I was present, I can't recall specifically that I was present regarding this specific planning, but it is possible that I was present.

MS PATEL: Can you perhaps just generally, to move on ...

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, can I come back on this, it caused me some confusion. As I understand it, the operation, the general operation was to prevent gun smuggling into the country?

MR KLOPPER: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And as part of this operation, you used these people from Koevoet - well, they were called something else?

MR KLOPPER: Ovambo's, Ovambo members.

CHAIRPERSON: Ovambo members who spoke Portuguese and could therefore communicate more readily with the gun smugglers?

MR KLOPPER: That is correct, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: And the operation that was being planned, was to set up traps to catch the gun smugglers?

MR KLOPPER: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that what Mr De Jonge is talking of in his thing, when he is talking about a planning a few days before? As I understand it and here is where I am very shaky, on the night, on the day in question, there was an ambush planned and that things went wrong, the gun runners wouldn't go with, into the ambush, they took the Koevoet people off on a side road and the shooting happened?

MR KLOPPER: As I understand it after having perused the statements, that is correct. I can explain to you how it started, how they planned the actions and how all actions were to work more or less the same.

CHAIRPERSON: Could you tell us how they were going to do it?

MR KLOPPER: According to my understanding of the statements, the smugglers would be lured to a certain point and as soon as the arms were observed, the Police members would overpower them and arrest them. That is how the planning ought to have worked. Perhaps Tait would be able to explain it better.

CHAIRPERSON: But that is, as I understand it from one of the affidavits, their communications broke down on this day? Carry on.

MS PATEL: Thank you Honourable Chairperson, it is in fact Lukas Culino who states that in his statement that there were no walkie-talkies at the time and there was a breakdown in communication. Mr Klopper, can you tell us, if the intention was to arrest the smugglers, why would the specific Ovambo members that you had now referred to, be used for the operation?

MR KLOPPER: I have already explained that it is very problematic, especially when one is working with Mozambicans who cannot speak Afrikaans or English but only Portuguese, these Ovambo members were proficient in Portuguese and could communicate with these people, they also knew about arms. It was simply easier to convince the arms smugglers to give arms to the Ovambo people.

MS PATEL: Are you saying that they would never have been used to testify at the subsequent prosecution, was that not the intention, otherwise it makes - I mean, we don't understand?

MR KLOPPER: I don't know about that. As I have explained Mentz and Holtzhauzen were more involved with the investigation, we never made it to the court as far as I can recall. It was very seldom that we would appear in court, we would usually appear in court when it had to do with a post mortem inquest.

CHAIRPERSON: As I understand it, what would have happened in court, is the Task Unit would say we saw a car driving along the road, we stopped them, we found these prohibited weapons in it.

MR KLOPPER: I understand it similarly. Should the case go to court, that would have been the evidence of the Task Force members, that is correct.

MS PATEL: But certainly then the risk was there that the smugglers would have testified that they were in fact led into a trap by members other than the Task Force?

MR KLOPPER: If one - all the evidence about the Third Force, there is much such evidence and nothing could be seen except for when the De Kock matter came about and that is the first time when the dam wall broke. I don't think it was a concern at that stage.

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Patel, are you seriously suggesting that the smugglers were likely to have pleaded guilty and said yes, we were taking the weapons there for the purpose of supplying them to somebody?

MS PATEL: No, not really Honourable Chairperson. Anyway, can I just get clarity, perhaps you can assist, the intention was to set the smugglers up that weapons would be purchased. In order to get some kind of credibility with the smugglers, Culino and company would have at least had to show them some money, can you tell us generally what the procedure was at Vlakplaas, where would the money come from, who would it be authorised by?

MR KLOPPER: Flash money is drawn from Head Office, let's say R100 000 or whatever the case may be and a member would sign for the money, the member who is in charge of the operation, Tait or Pretorius or whoever and Lukas Culino and Simon would take the money and would show it to these persons and tell them "we have money to buy arms" and the persons would hand over the arms, maybe at the same time or at some other stage.

MS PATEL: You are saying they would have to sign for the money?

MR KLOPPER: Yes.

MS PATEL: Who would have to authorise it though, were they at their rank in a position to authorise?

MR KLOPPER: No, a request or an application is filed to get some flash money and motivation has to be given why the money is needed and that you will undertake to bring the money back and to protect the money. I don't know how to put it, but the normal procedure, and then the money is handed over. I think Gen Krappies Engelbrecht or one of those persons, gave the authorisation to make the money available.

MS PATEL: Just to get clarity, you are assuming that Mr Engelbrecht would have authorised it or would that have been the normal procedure?

MR KLOPPER: Yes, that is the normal procedure. I would assume that it would have been one of those persons.

MS PATEL: Then the Task Force was brought in as a supportive role?

MR KLOPPER: That is correct.

MS PATEL: Can you explain to us just from what you had heard from the report from Culino when he came back, what was the meeting point, how was that arranged before hand or did you not know?

MR KLOPPER: I don't know, I don't have any knowledge.

MS PATEL: Somebody has mentioned, I am not sure exactly, I can look it up later, somebody has mentioned that, I think it was Mentz, that they were meant to wait at a specific point, Lukas and company didn't come back and they then, Nortje then gave the decision, gave the order to go back and they then went to Skomaans. Were you present at that meeting point before they had gone, everybody had retreated back to Skomaans?

MR KLOPPER: I cannot pertinently remember if I was involved, but the procedure was that we had to wait at some point and that is my assumption how most of these operations worked, but I cannot specifically recall that I was there in this instance.

MS PATEL: Surely there must have been some concern that they hadn't returned at the time - that Lukas hadn't returned at the time when he was meant to return and yet, all the members went off and from what I understand, some of them, if not all of them, had started drinking. Can you explain, if this was a serious operation, why weren't other steps taken in order to check perhaps what had gone wrong or what had happened?

MR KLOPPER: Most of the actions in a criminal line, for example with drugs and weapon smuggling, takes a lot of time, they waste a lot of time, I cannot specifically say what the circumstances around this was, I would assume that Lieutenant Tait could give you some better background with regard to that.

MS PATEL: Can you just confirm, was Lieutenant Tait, Lukas Culino's handler at the time?

MR KLOPPER: Yes, he was the Overhead Commander of the Koevoet or the former Koevoet members. They were in his group.

CHAIRPERSON: You put that they all went back, but in fact as I read the affidavits of De Jonge, they were sitting waiting, they were the trap. Crooks says the same thing in his and I think the other members did. It was a specific Unit of four or five people who were forming the trap that night and they sat and waited and waited until the people came and said there had been a shooting?

MS PATEL: Honourable Chairperson, if I may, I think there seems to be contradictions between the different statements in terms of that, I think Laas, De Jonge and Crooks say that they waited, whereas I think Mentz, I must just double check, I think Mentz ...

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, well they don't say Mentz was part of their Unit.

MS PATEL: No, I am saying Mentz in his statement, I am sorry, I think it was Nortje who said in his statement that they all retreated. I will just double check that. The difficulty with that is also that there is no indication that anybody after the two had returned to report at Skomaans as to what had happened, had then gone back to De Jonge and company to tell them what had happened.

CHAIRPERSON: But they were told on the way, De Jonge and company. If you look at De Jonge's affidavit.

MS PATEL: Which affidavit, are you referring to ...

CHAIRPERSON: Page 92, paragraph 9 -

"... (microphone not on) ... we have to help, people had been shot in a vehicle."

MS PATEL: Sorry Judge, not to take issue with you, but it is not clear from that paragraph whether the Ovambo members had come straight from where the incident had taken place or whether they had in fact first reported and then come back.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, you can't say there wasn't a report made to them?

MS PATEL: You can't say.

CHAIRPERSON: They did come and report to them and asked them to come and help and took them to the scene?

MS PATEL: I don't have a problem with that Judge, all I am saying, Honourable Chairperson, all I am saying is that it is not clear that the Task Force members who were present at Skomaans, had then together come back or they had asked De Jonge and company to come and assist or at what stage this had in fact taken place, whether they had gone, whether the Ovambo members went to them first and then reported to Skomaans or whether it was the other way around. There is no clarity on that Honourable Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: No.

MR KLOPPER: As far as I remember, all the people were within the basis at Skomaans at the same time. I cannot recall if people had waited outside for them.

MS PATEL: Is it possible though that they would have waited? You can't say?

MR KLOPPER: I can't tell you, unfortunately.

MS PATEL: Okay.

ADV SANDI: Can I just find out something from Mr Klopper? Mr Klopper, yesterday you said that you were drinking that evening?

MR KLOPPER: Yes, we were drinking continuously.

ADV SANDI: What time did you start drinking?

MR KLOPPER: That is difficult to say, I cannot tell you honestly, because during that time, we drank a lot. I cannot tell you whether we started six o'clock or seven o'clock, I cannot give you a specific time.

ADV SANDI: When Lukas came to give the report that a shoot-out had occurred, were you already under the influence of liquor?

MR KLOPPER: I cannot pertinently tell you, as I said, throughout the time we drank a lot, I cannot say if the people were under the influence or not, I cannot recall.

ADV SANDI: I am asking this question because I noticed that since you started testifying yesterday, all answers are possibilities. You keep on saying that is possible, I cannot remember.

MR KLOPPER: It is a long time back, I cannot recall the pertinent circumstances precisely.

ADV SANDI: Thank you, thank you Ms Patel.

MS PATEL: Thank you Honourable Chairperson, if I may just refer you sir, to page 39 of the Bundle, the second paragraph. Mentz in fact says that -

"... instructions were given by Willie Nortje that we had to withdraw and we went to Skomaans."

From that Honourable Chairperson, I inferred that nobody had stayed behind, rightly or wrongly, but that was my inference drawn from that paragraph.

MR LAMEY: Is that now out of Mr Mentz' statement and that is assumed to be correct?

MS PATEL: He also testified at the previous hearing, if you want me to ...

MR LAMEY: But he hasn't been cross-examined by any of the other legal representatives.

MS PATEL: You can argue the weight to be attached, if I may finish sir.

MR LAMEY: No, no.

MS PATEL: You may argue the weight to be attached to that at the appropriate time, I am saying that this is what I am basing my cross-examination on.

CHAIRPERSON: Most of the other affidavits that you put up had indicated that there was a group sitting and waiting and if you look at page 104, it appears that Mentz came with the two black men. Mentz was there rather, when the two black men came and talked to them and Mentz told them there was a shooting. One is left with more confusion because that seems to contradict everybody else.

MR LAMEY: Yes Mr Chairman, may I just say, I just want to place on record, I don't have an objection if phrases are put from other statements for the applicant to comment upon, but the moment it goes so far as to assume that what is stated there, is factually correct and accurately reliable and it is in that way put to the applicant, then it goes in my respectful submission, too far.

MS PATEL: With respect Honourable Chairperson, if one looks at the detail in all the statements that are put up in the Bundle, that could never be my position, there are so many contradictions between what all the parties who were present there, say. I am merely putting different aspects of the statements to the applicant, for his comment. It is as simple as that.

MR LAMEY: If it is purely for ...

CHAIRPERSON: Can we just continue. Carry on.

MS PATEL: Thank you Honourable Chairperson, I am just checking my notes if you would grant me a moment please. Sorry sir, can I take you to your own statement on page 79 of the Bundle, paragraph 32.8. You mentioned that there were powder marks, all right, you stated that your information regarding that had come from Dougie - Holtzhauzen I would imagine - and Willie Nortje. Can you just elaborate on that specific aspect for us please?

MR KLOPPER: It is possible that I heard this discussion from Dougie and Willie, but the facts that I give there is hearsay, this is what I heard, I didn't see it myself. I heard of these powder marks and this is all that I heard. This is not factual, this is just hearsay.

MS PATEL: Okay. Sorry Honourable Chairperson, just grant me a moment. All right, if I can just take you back, it is something I had omitted to get clarity on. Just the arm smugglers, were you involved in any investigations prior to this incident taking place on the smugglers and the smuggle route and the background information to that?

MR KLOPPER: As far as I know, this was a very long operation. I cannot recall which date it started. If I recall correctly, it was under Warrant Officer Pretorius' command and Tait later joined, this was a very long process. I think that there had been similar operations before this incident took place.

MS PATEL: Okay. And you don't have any personal knowledge of the nature of the investigations and what information might have come out from it?

MR KLOPPER: What I recall is for example at the border post a vehicle was stopped and there were weapons in the petrol tank of the vehicle. I suspect it was before this incident, I think this is how the whole investigation came about that this vehicle was found which was smuggling the weapons through to South Africa.

MS PATEL: Okay, sorry I may have missed that, you confirmed that Mr Tait was more directly involved in that?

MR KLOPPER: That is correct.

MS PATEL: Okay, we will leave that over for him then. Can I just ask, this has been put to Mr Mentz as well and I am not sure if the Honourable Chairperson has put it to you already, is that this was a legitimate operation from the start, the inception, the intention was that it would be a legitimate operation, not so?

MR KLOPPER: As far as I know, yes.

MS PATEL: All right, and the shooting incident, I am not talking about the allegations of Mr Mentz' involvement afterwards or whether he did or didn't kill anybody on the scene, but the shooting incident between the Ovambo members and the smugglers, that they had acted in self defence and that was legitimate?

MR KLOPPER: Yes.

MS PATEL: Okay. Can I then, it is something that I find curious, if your argument is, if your motivation in restructuring, reconstructing the event or the scene is so that the involvement of the Ovambo members does not come to light, would it not in the alternative, from the other point of view, be more advantageous to the State or to the State who was involved in the negotiations with the liberation movements at the time, for it to actually come out that during the time of the negotiations, that the ANC or the PAC or whoever were still purchasing weapons at a time when they should have been in bona fide negotiations? Would it not have supported Mr De Klerk at that stage, rather than go against the grain?

CHAIRPERSON: I don't understand the question at all, because they merely changed the people who had been involved with the smugglers, the fact of arms smuggling would be made public. The people who were in the process of attempting to smuggle arms into the country, had been shot? They weren't trying to cover up that fact? What they were trying to cover up was who they were shot by, because of the Third Force rumours about Vlakplaas, the using Ovambo ex-terrorists on the Swaziland border, we can imagine what the press would have made of it.

MS PATEL: Okay, no, you are right, Honourable Chairperson, I withdraw the question then. I think I am through then, thank you Honourable Chairperson.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS PATEL

CHAIRPERSON: Before you come to re-examination, can I ask another question about Mr Holtzhauzen, you said you knew him?

MR KLOPPER: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Did he have a beard?

MR KLOPPER: Yes, he wore a beard, but several of the members had beards at Vlakplaas.

CHAIRPERSON: I ask you this because Mr Laas in his affidavit at page 105 says that a man with a beard came to see them?

MR KLOPPER: That is correct, yes. I specifically recall I read this, it was Dougie Holtzhauzen, he wore a beard all the time that I knew him. Lieutenant Tait, Pretorius so I don't know who it could be. It is possible that it could be Dougie Holtzhauzen, but it could be any of the other persons.

MR HUGO: Mr Chairman, if I may be of some assistance, if you look at page 102, these are the false statements. You would notice that they were in fact taken by Holtzhauzen.

CHAIRPERSON: They were all taken by Holtzhauzen and the other people said he came to see them with an affidavit and merely said "sign here."

MR KLOPPER: I would accept that as correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Re-examination?

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Klopper, I did not handle this matter in your evidence in chief, but in re-examination I would like to return to this matter. As part of your general amnesty application, you have applied for various incidents in which you as a member of Vlakplaas were involved, is that correct?

MR KLOPPER: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: And which according to your judgement stand in political relation and for which there is a political motivation?

MR KLOPPER: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: On page 25 of the Bundle, we find the last page of your supplementary amnesty application, is that correct?

MR KLOPPER: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: That would then be page 35 of the supplementary amnesty application, but paginated page 25 of the Bundle?

MR KLOPPER: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: At the top it doesn't begin thoroughly, but what you do say there is something which you have touched upon in your evidence in chief, you testified during the De Kock trial and could you tell us how long you testified for?

MR KLOPPER: I spent about three months approximately under cross-examination.

MR LAMEY: During that trial, during your evidence in chief and cross-examination, you spent a long time testifying?

MR KLOPPER: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: With the compilation of your amnesty application, you had no vehicle for the refreshment of your memory, that trial and the record of that trial was not used to supplement your amnesty application because of the fact that it was quite a large body of information and it was not available to you during consultation?

MR KLOPPER: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And what you say there is that it is not your intention to contest the facts of the Amnesty Committee, your evidence today appears not to have a very clear recollection of facts and you say that it is not your intention to withhold facts from the Amnesty Committee n terms of the information that you can recall on the day of the signing of this affidavit and that the refreshment of your memory by means of former statements which you have made or evidence which you have given, would possibly be necessary?

MR KLOPPER: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: I would also like to put to you whether there is any other reason why your recollection with regard to this incident according to your evidence of yesterday and today, may not be very clear?

MR KLOPPER: Yes, I am blocking it. I have basically developed a mental block towards this information.

MR LAMEY: I would just like to ask you, you have a manner of speaking very quickly and your answer appears to be unclear, I would like for you to tell us what you have to say very slowly and clearly.

MR KLOPPER: Chairperson, I have discussed it so many times during the De Kock trial and I don't think about it any more, it is something which happened a long time ago and I am not interested in thinking about it any longer.

MR LAMEY: You used the word "block", you said that you were blocking it. Please explain to us what you mean by that.

MR KLOPPER: Chairperson, it is something that bothers one, it is not pleasant to return to it and to think about it again. I don't know how else to explain to you that I don't want to think about it any more, it is not something that I want to return to. I am just trying to live a different life from this point onwards.

MR LAMEY: Very well. To return to this operation, you spoke of Operation Excalibur?

MR KLOPPER: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: Would that be the name that was given to the total general operation in combating the arms smuggling networks and the consequent problems, the operation that Vlakplaas was involved in?

MR KLOPPER: Yes, that was the activities that Vlakplaas was involved in.

MR LAMEY: Can you recall whether Lieutenant Tait was in command and in control in general, of Operation Excalibur or whether it was only this specific incident with regard to the shooting incident that he was in control of?

MR KLOPPER: If I recall correctly, C10 was divided into three sections. De Kock had one team and Baker had another. If I recall correctly, all the authorisations for funding was obtained under the name Excalibur, so I cannot tell you pertinently that Lieutenant Tait was in command of it or whether De Kock was the Overall Commander or whether Baker was the Overall Commander, I cannot remember that specifically.

MR LAMEY: Let's accept that with regard to this operation, before Lukas and Simon went out to make contact with the arms smugglers, what is your recollection, who was in command of the operation?

MR KLOPPER: As far as I can recall, it was Tait.

CHAIRPERSON: The whole of this operation, was connected with arms smuggling, wasn't it? That is why you had gone to this place on the border and Tait was in charge of the whole of the operation, not just this incident?

MR KLOPPER: That is correct, yes.

MR LAMEY: Where Mr Mentz states that you and Warrant Officer Willie Nortje were in command of the entire operation, what would your commentary be about that?

MR KLOPPER: That is not correct.

MR LAMEY: Then you gave evidence and this is another aspect which you managed too swiftly in your evidence, usually you say that you would have compiled information notes. Is this in general or specifically with regard to this operation?

MR KLOPPER: Yes, in general and with regard to the Excalibur Operation. I am not saying that I compiled all the information notes, but I did compile a great deal thereof.

MR LAMEY: Can you recall whether you were ever in command during the entire Excalibur Operation of any specific actions which may have taken place during or after the operation.

MR KLOPPER: Because most of the actions were arranged by the Ovambo members because they were proficient in Portuguese, they never worked below me. I can't recall that I was ever in command of any one of those sort of operations.

MR LAMEY: If I understand your evidence correctly in summary, when the shooting incident was reported, you will not deny that there was a discussion that it could have presented a problem because of the fact that former Koevoet members were involved?

MR KLOPPER: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And in the light of your recollection, there was a collective discussion?

MR KLOPPER: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And then people were sent from there to the scene?

MR KLOPPER: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: Let's take it a step further. Mentz goes further in his application by stating that -

"... Lieutenant Klopper and Warrant Officer Willie Nortje were in command and I received my orders from them."

And he also says this specifically in his answer on page 51, paragraph 11(d) -

"... I acted under the direct orders of Lieutenant Chappies Klopper and Warrant Officer Willie Nortje."

MR KLOPPER: That is what he says, but it is not the truth.

MR LAMEY: Is that correct?

MR KLOPPER: No, it is not true.

MR LAMEY: Do you know who in general with regard to Operation Excalibur, who would have placed Tait and Pretorius in command?

MR KLOPPER: It would have been De Kock.

MR LAMEY: In the Bundle, if I may refer you to this, on page 108, or page 118 to page 121, there is a document which has been compiled?

MR KLOPPER: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: Were you the compiler of that document?

MR KLOPPER: No, I had nothing to do with this.

MR LAMEY: Your recollection is that you reported the shooting incident to De Kock?

MR KLOPPER: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: Can you recall whether you provided any further information notes thereafter?

MR KLOPPER: No, with regard to this specific case, I cannot recall that I provided any further information notes.

MR LAMEY: But in general, you are aware that you did this with regard to Operation Excalibur?

MR KLOPPER: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: What information would have been contained within this information notes in general?

MR KLOPPER: Chairperson, that there was information that there were smugglers who wanted to make weapons available to us as members of C10, that an action had been launched, that during the action, some of the members had been shot at and that fire was returned and that four persons had been killed and that x-amount of weapons had been taken into possession.

MR LAMEY: Perhaps you misunderstand my question, I am not talking about shooting incidents, I am talking about generally with regard to Excalibur.

MR KLOPPER: We would report about actions, how many weapons had been obtained, that sort of information.

MR LAMEY: If there had been a shooting incident, then that would have gone through in an information note?

MR KLOPPER: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: But you cannot recall whether that was done in this specific case?

MR KLOPPER: No.

MR LAMEY: Was there at any stage a moment which withdrew you from the events?

MR KLOPPER: I recall at a certain stage, I withdrew completely. I had nothing further to do with this incident.

MR LAMEY: Can you recall the reason for that?

MR KLOPPER: I will tell you from my side that I was upset regarding the actions that were taken, I did not agree with them. I had nothing further to do with the matter.

MR LAMEY: When you speak of Investigating Officers, who do you refer to?

MR KLOPPER: Holtzhauzen and Mentz who were from Vlakplaas.

MR LAMEY: Thank you Mr Chairman, I have got no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR LAMEY

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you Mr Chairperson. Mr Klopper, these smugglers were Portuguese speaking, were they South Africans?

MR KLOPPER: The most cases that we encountered were Mozambican citizens, they were not South African citizens.

MR SIBANYONI: And one will say they were not members of any political party in South Africa?

MR KLOPPER: No, as far as I know they were not a member of any political organisation within South Africa.

MR SIBANYONI: So also in this document it is said that they would sell these weapons to any willing buyer, be it from the left or the right?

MR KLOPPER: That is correct, yes.

MR SIBANYONI: And you said the operation was aimed at arresting them and the shooting was as a result of these Koevoet members acting in self defence?

MR KLOPPER: That is correct, that is my knowledge.

MR SIBANYONI: My question is, what makes this incident a political incident? What political objective was intended to be achieved? Is it not so it was just an ordinary Police duty trying to combat crime by arresting the smugglers?

MR KLOPPER: The presence of askaris and the former Koevoet members and the Ovambo members, was an embarrassment to the former government and the other political parties would have drawn advantage from that around the negotiating table because these people were under the command of the South African government and acted as murder or death squads and that was what the embarrassment was.

MR SIBANYONI: Also in your application you speak about the fact that you attended courses where you were made to believe that the ANC, PAC were a danger to South Africa. Are you saying you were brainwashed because you also say at that stage you were also at a very young age?

MR KLOPPER: Chairperson, that is correct. If one grew up as the regular Afrikaner boy of that time, from childhood you were told about the black or red danger, today I think it is absolute nonsense, but the cadets that you had to endure at school, you were taught military discipline, you had to keep short hair, after school you would go for military service or join the Police and the enemy was always held up as the PAC or the ANC.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Any questions?

ADV SANDI: No questions Chairman, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: I have one or two questions, one I think for your lawyer rather than for yourself. I heard on the radio this morning and you made mention earlier in your evidence of Section 204 indemnities, the radio this morning said you had been given such indemnities in two trials, do you have knowledge of them?

MR LAMEY: Sorry, are you directing the question to me?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. All I want to know, they don't apply to this incident, do they?

MR LAMEY: No, we are not exactly certain but as far as I could gather, this ...

CHAIRPERSON: Well, Mr Hugo who is intimately connected with the De Kock trial, is shaking his head.

MR HUGO: Mr Chairman, sorry, maybe I can just come in here, he certainly did not get indemnity for this. It was specifically aimed at specific incidents.

CHAIRPERSON: That is all I want, I don't want to know of the incidents. It doesn't apply to this? The second more general question, we have heard from you about the drinking that went on and set out some detail in Mentz' evidence and affidavit, was this a common practice of people from Vlakplaas when they were away from the station?

MR KLOPPER: That is correct, yes, they drank a lot. All of us drank a lot.

CHAIRPERSON: It was sort of a great festive holiday to be away and ...

MR KLOPPER: One could see it like that, that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: It is nothing unusual about everybody being drunk that night?

MR KLOPPER: There was nothing unusual about people drinking irresponsibly.

CHAIRPERSON: There was one other point, but I can't find the reference, so I will leave it, thank you.

FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HUGO: Mr Chairman, may I just ask a couple of questions, it pertains to a question that you have asked earlier, it should just clarify some aspects here. Mr Klopper, these reports which were compiled after incidents, is it correct if I put it to you that you were probably the most productive compiler of these reports at Vlakplaas?

MR KLOPPER: Yes, that is correct, I managed most of the administrative matters.

MR HUGO: And you compiled lengthy reports with regard to operations in which you were involved and even operations that you were not involved with?

MR KLOPPER: That is correct.

MR HUGO: Then the reports would be submitted to Mr De Kock for his approval?

MR KLOPPER: That is correct.

MR HUGO: And then from Mr De Kock, it would then be sent up to Brigadier Schoon?

MR KLOPPER: Yes, well from De Kock on it would have been sent to higher levels.

MR HUGO: And also to Gen Engelbrecht?

MR KLOPPER: That is correct.

MR HUGO: And just to place the scope of your administrative duties and your reports into perspective, can you recall that during the trial Mr De Kock's legal team asked for the trial to be postponed so that we could have insight into all these documents which were generated by Vlakplaas and that we spent two days studying thousands of documents which were compiled by you?

MR KLOPPER: Yes, I compiled many documents, I cannot recall whether there were thousands of them, but I know that I compiled many documents.

MR HUGO: And you will agree with me that in the greater proportion of these cases, these documents were false documents which presented false cover ups?

MR KLOPPER: That is correct.

MR HUGO: And these false cover ups were compiled in a very ingenious fashion by you along with other members from Vlakplaas from time to time?

MR KLOPPER: Yes, that is correct.

MR HUGO: And some of this were done in order to generate financing for operations in which Vlakplaas would be involved and would be launching and apparently they could not request funding for such operations in a legitimate fashion?

MR KLOPPER: That is correct.

MR HUGO: But this did not mean that the higher Officers and the persons to whom these proposals were submitted, knew exactly what that money was going to be used for actually?

MR KLOPPER: Yes, that is correct.

MR HUGO: Because one could not exactly portray the real story to the Auditor General and then hope and pray that he would provide the financing for this?

MR KLOPPER: That is correct.

MR HUGO: I've got no further questions, thank you Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HUGO

MR LAMEY: My learned friend, Mr Booyens, apparently indicated something but I want to indicate Mr Booyens can go first, but I just wanted an opportunity to perhaps just come back.

CHAIRPERSON: You've had lots of opportunities, haven't you?

MR LAMEY: I haven't asked a question following the question from Mr Sibanyoni, as it pleases you Mr Chairman.

FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, I would like permission from the Commission just to cover one aspect and that is in light of the question asked by you about the drinking. That basically just relates to Mr Tait's condition that evening. With the Commission's permission because he didn't say something about it, but he has now made a more general statement about the drinking habits and so on. May I?

CHAIRPERSON: If you think the answer will be of any value.

MR BOOYENS: Well, let me ask the question. Mr Klopper, Mr Tait tells me that although he does not deny in general that he did also partake of liquor, it was his usual pattern that when his teams were out, still out, he would not drink and this specific evening, he certainly at the stage when the discussion took place, hadn't had anything to drink. Are you in a position to dispute that?

MR KLOPPER: No, I cannot dispute that.

MR BOOYENS: Thank you Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR BOOYENS

FURTHER RE-EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: Mr Klopper, just with regard to the question regarding the operation pertaining to the arms smuggling network, did you also have specific information or let me put it this way, did you have knowledge of information that the smuggling networks for arms such as AK47's and other arms from Mozambique found their way to the liberation movements of that time and that this was also in the combating of the unrest related incidents of that stage?

MR KLOPPER: Yes, at that stage weapons could be sold to anybody and some of these weapons did end up with the liberation movements.

MR LAMEY: So basically the smugglers were prepared to sell these weapons to anybody, so they were criminals?

MR KLOPPER: No, they were business people, if anybody had the money, they could buy the arms.

MR LAMEY: But from those smuggling transactions, those weapons could find their way to anybody who was prepared to purchase them, but also specifically to the ANC, PAC and other political organisations at that stage?

MR KLOPPER: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: We are talking of some years ago when AK47's weren't common place, aren't we?

MR KLOPPER: Chairperson, Lieutenant Tait would be able to inform you much better regarding that, but there were many AK47's coming through that border post.

MR LAMEY: Thank you Mr Chairman, I've got no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR LAMEY

CHAIRPERSON: Are you leading any other evidence?

MR LAMEY: I've got no further evidence in this regard. I am considering my position regarding Mr Nortje still, but I am not certain yet.

CHAIRPERSON: At the moment you are not?

MR LAMEY: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Can we just move Mr Chairman? May it not be an appropriate time, may I suggest that we take the short adjournment now?

CHAIRPERSON: We will adjourn now, then you can rearrange.

MR BOOYENS: Then we can rearrange, thank you Mr Chairman.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION:

CHAIRPERSON: Klopper can be excused. There appears to me to be no need for him to remain here, he apparently wishes to return to the Cape, but if any of you have any views on the subject, will you let me know.

MR DU PLESSIS: I have no objection, Mr Chairman, sorry.

MS PATEL: Neither do I.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well, Mr Klopper, if you keep in touch with your lawyers in case they want to get any more information or you are needed, subject to that, you may go back.

WITNESS EXCUSED

NAME: JOHAN HENDRIK TAIT

APPLICATION NO: AM 3922/96

--------------------------------------------------------------------------

MR BOOYENS: Chairperson and members of the Committee, J.A. Booyens and we call Johan Hendrik Tait.

JOHAN HENDRIK TAIT: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS: Mr Tait, please page to page 26, your amnesty application. Do you confirm the particulars which appears on page 26?

MR TAIT: Yes, I do.

MR BOOYENS: On page 27, actually it starts at the bottom of page 26, from 1979 you were attached to the Special Task Force at Oshakati and attached to Koevoet and then from 1988, C1 at Vlakplaas, is that correct?

MR TAIT: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Would the statement be correct that in your whole Police career up to 1988 or up to 1993 when you were transferred to Radio Control, you were indeed involved with Operational/Combat Units of the South African Police?

MR TAIT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: You give a summarised version of background, of your personal background from page 27, 28, is that correct.

MR TAIT: That is correct Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: During your service period in the then South West Africa, were you involved in any contacts?

MR TAIT: In several contacts, Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: If you have to estimate, how many?

MR TAIT: Approximately 200 contacts, Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: For the information of those who don't have that background, contact means shooting incidents with insurgents, is that correct?

MR TAIT: That is correct Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Do you confirm the rest of page 28?

MR TAIT: I confirm Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Page 29? With regards to the date in paragraph (a)(2), we have surmised that the date was the 21st of April when this incident took place, is that correct?

MR TAIT: That is correct Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Sorry My Lord, he's got during end 1992 or during early 1993.

CHAIRPERSON: What does he say now?

MR BOOYENS: The incident took place on the 21st of April 1991. At that stage, was weapon smuggling from Mozambique to the Republic of South Africa, was it a problem at that stage?

MR TAIT: Yes Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: And you, along with a group of men went to the Komatipoort or a group of men went to the Komatipoort area and you joined them later?

MR TAIT: That is correct Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Did you then as senior Officer there, were you in command of the whole weapon smuggling operation in that area?

MR TAIT: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: The group of people that you had there, please tell us more about them? You name them or you call them Ovambo's, but what were these people actually?

MR TAIT: Chairperson, these persons were former Koevoet members and some of them were former Angolan citizens. Some of them were also 32 Battalion members.

MR BOOYENS: Do you mean 32 Battalion of the SA Army which consisted of South African Officers and Angolans who fought on the South African side?

MR TAIT: That is correct Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: The Portuguese speaking members of this group, were they Angolans or were they Ovambo's?

MR TAIT: Chairperson, some of them were Ovambo's, but there were also Angolans among them.

MR BOOYENS: What was the objective behind the operation, the global objective with this operation within the Komatipoort environment?

MR TAIT: The global objective was to arrest arm smugglers.

MR BOOYENS: How did you go about this?

MR TAIT: Usually we would make use of the Koevoet members such as Lukas who would speak Portuguese to make contact with these persons and then around that, an operation would be planned in order to arrest these persons.

MR BOOYENS: This supply of weapons, was basically as the previous witness has stated, it wasn't an issue to the weapon smugglers to whom they sold these weapons, whether it was ANC, PAC, it didn't really matter?

MR TAIT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: At the time of this incident, in other words we are now speaking about April 1991, how large was your group?

MR TAIT: I cannot say with certainty, however, I think at that stage we numbered about 15 to 18 members.

MR BOOYENS: And were various of these persons sent out in teams in order to activate the traps so to speak?

MR TAIT: Yes. There was more than one group that was busy with several information gathering activities.

MR BOOYENS: You were at Skomaans Base?

MR TAIT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: On the 21st of April there, you were aware ...

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, before you go on, can I ask something that - you have been talking up to now about you would use these Koevoet members to contact and then an operation planned to arrest. Who would carry out the arrests?

MR TAIT: Mr Chairperson, the arrests would be executed by Task Force members who we usually applied with regard to arms smuggling networks, along with members of C10.

MR BOOYENS: The operation was centred about Skomaans Base, is that correct?

MR TAIT: Yes, that is correct.

MR BOOYENS: And on the 21st of March, was there an operation planned which Lukas Culino and Simon whose surname I am not going to attempt to pronounce, they were involved in this operation and they had assisted with the planning?

MR TAIT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Was this operation according to the information which you had, was this operation ready to be executed?

MR TAIT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: And by that it means that people were deployed and that they would then deliver the weapons and the smugglers would be arrested?

MR TAIT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Tell us just for the sake of clarity what you can recall in terms of how far the operation had progressed. Were the persons who would set the traps in place, had they been sent out to the places where they would arrest the persons on that day?

MR TAIT: After the operation had been discussed, the people who were to be involved in the trap, went to the scene of the trap while Lukas and Simon returned to make contact with the people.

MR BOOYENS: Let us discuss the Task Force members and the weapon smugglers. So Lukas would have made contact with the weapon smugglers?

MR TAIT: Yes. They would have driven to take the weapon smugglers to conclude the transaction at the place where the arrest was supposed to take place.

MR BOOYENS: Where were you?

MR TAIT: At this stage, I was at Skomaans.

MR BOOYENS: Where at Skomaans?

MR TAIT: As far as I know, I was in the Base.

MR BOOYENS: And on that day, were other members of your team also in the field?

MR TAIT: Yes, as far as I know, there were still other members who were busy with work in the field.

MR BOOYENS: Mention has been made of the fact that members of Vlakplaas frequently used a lot of alcohol, is that statement in general, correct?

MR TAIT: Chairperson, at times people did use alcohol.

MR BOOYENS: What was your personal principle with regard to the consumption of alcohol during an operation or while you were visiting people?

MR TAIT: My principle was that regardless of whether or not it was an operation or the usual line of duty, I would never visit my people if I had consumed alcohol, because my principle was that if they saw me in an inebriated state, they would be able to return to me later and ask me why I was drinking and speak about the fact that they were not allowed to drink and I could not enforce discipline.

MR BOOYENS: On that particular evening, did you have anything to drink?

MR TAIT: At the time of the operation, I had not consumed any alcohol.

MR BOOYENS: While you were at Skomaans Base and you were waiting for the operation to be executed, what happened?

MR TAIT: What I can recall is that we waited for the Ovambo's to return. Lukas and Simon arrived at the Base with Warrant Officer Willie Nortje. I was present along with other members of C10 and Task Force members. At this time we were informed that there was a shooting incident.

MR BOOYENS: This was the shooting incident between who and who?

MR TAIT: That there was a shooting incident between Lukas and Simon and then the weapon smugglers on the other side.

MR BOOYENS: I see that you refer to them on page 30, as two Ovambo members namely Lukas and Simon. Were they both Ovambo's or was Culino an Angolan?

MR TAIT: As far as I know, Culino was an Angolan.

MR BOOYENS: Do you know whether or not he was ex-32 Battalion?

MR TAIT: It was known to me that he was a former 32 member.

MR BOOYENS: Let us refer to the Koevoet persons, the Koevoet persons that you used there, as far as you knew, were they all members of the South African Police?

MR TAIT: As far as I know, or as far as I can recall, some of the members were not yet members of the SAP at that stage. However, they were in the process of becoming members, but as far as I can recall, there were persons who were not yet full members of the Force.

MR BOOYENS: In practice, these persons would be issued with weapons when they were participating in operations, is that correct?

MR TAIT: Members who had already been appointed as members of the Force, would be issued with weapons, but there would be certain persons whom we would not issue with weapons.

MR BOOYENS: I see, why is that?

MR TAIT: Because there would be trouble if they were carrying weapons and someone was injured and they were not members of the SAP.

MR BOOYENS: Very well. You have stated that the two Koevoets then arrived at Skomaans Base, you were present when they reported that there was a shooting incident with the weapon smugglers?

MR TAIT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: From what was told to you at that stage, could you draw any inference as to whether or not their conduct had been legitimate, whether they had been justified in shooting?

MR TAIT: According to what I could infer, they acted legitimately.

MR BOOYENS: You say that they went to Willie Nortje, were you aware of a previously existing relationship between Nortje and specifically Lukas?

MR TAIT: Yes. Lukas and Willie ...

CHAIRPERSON: Did they go to, they didn't arrive with Willie Nortje, they went to him?

MR BOOYENS: Yes, they went to him Mr Chairman. Just for clarity sake, Willie was among others at the Base when they arrived there?

MR TAIT: Yes, Willie was already at the Base when the two reported.

MR BOOYENS: I would just like to return to my previous question, you say that you are aware of a former or previous relationship between Lukas and Willie?

MR TAIT: Yes, when Willie was in Ovamboland Lukas Culino was his direct Second in Command in his Koevoet team.

MR BOOYENS: His Koevoet combat team?

MR TAIT: Yes, his Koevoet combat team.

MR BOOYENS: But you heard the discussion between Willie and Lukas?

MR TAIT: Yes, I was present.

MR BOOYENS: When Lukas had finished speaking to Willie and told him what had happened, what happened next?

MR TAIT: According to my interpretation, or the way that I recall it, Willie proposed that we keep the Ovambo's out of the situation and that we should rather use Task Force members who would then have performed the shooting.

MR BOOYENS: In other words that the shooters be replaced with Task Force members?

MR TAIT: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: What was your reaction to that?

MR TAIT: I agreed with it fully because I believed that that was a good idea.

MR BOOYENS: What was your problem with the fact that the Koevoets had fired the shots and why did you want it to appear as if it was ordinary SAP members who had actually fired the shots?

MR TAIT: Because the members who had shot, were former Angolans and there was already a political situation surrounding this case and that is why I thought that if it came to light that South African Police members made use of mercenaries, it would cause a great uproar.

MR BOOYENS: At that stage the Harms Commission was underway, the ANC had been unbanned and there was a stage of negotiation between the then National Party government and the former liberation movements, is that correct?

MR TAIT: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: So did you foresee that this would cause uproar in the newspapers and create a great embarrassment for the government?

MR TAIT: Yes, that is what I foresaw.

MR BOOYENS: That is why you were satisfied that it would be a good idea?

MR TAIT: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Was Wouter Mentz also present as far as you can recall?

MR TAIT: As far as my knowledge goes, he was present.

MR BOOYENS: Wouter was a former Murder and Robbery Policeman who among you men there, along with Dougie Holtzhauzen, was the only conventional Policemen in order to put it that way, while the rest of you were all former Koevoet members and unconventional Policemen if one may put it that way?

MR TAIT: Of the members who were there, I can recall that Wouter and Dougie were the most experienced persons with regard to Police work among all of us.

MR BOOYENS: What was the objective, why were they attached to your Unit?

MR TAIT: Chairperson, in this case, they undertook the investigation work where people would be arrested or whatever the case may be.

MR BOOYENS: Your impression after the proposal was made regarding which you stated that you agreed with it, with Mr Nortje, did you have anything further to do with what happened later that evening?

MR TAIT: No.

MR BOOYENS: On page 31 you state that Willie Nortje spontaneously stepped forward and basically took over the matter. Could you please explain to the Chairperson what you mean when you say that?

MR TAIT: I could say that Willie used his own initiative in that case.

MR BOOYENS: With regard to the further organisation of the management of the matter, you had nothing further to do with it, is that correct?

MR TAIT: Yes, that is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Did you ever visit the scene of the incident at any stage?

MR TAIT: No, not at any stage.

MR BOOYENS: Some of the people did visit the scene, is that correct?

MR TAIT: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: As far as you can recall, who were those people that went out to the scene?

MR TAIT: As far as I can recall, it was Wouter and there may have been approximately 10 members with him. I don't know whether Task Force members also accompanied him, it could be possible.

MR BOOYENS: I see. There is a measure of confusion here in the documents regarding when this incident took place, this shooting, whether the arrest group was still in their position or whether they had already withdrawn or what the position was. What can you recall about this?

MR TAIT: I cannot recall whether or not they were still in position or whether they had collectively withdrawn or whether certain persons had withdrawn in order to determine why the people had not arrived yet. But I am not certain about that.

MR BOOYENS: So you are saying that it is possible that some of the Task Force members could still have been at the ambush point whilst C10 people could have returned to find out what was going on with the operation?

MR TAIT: Yes, that is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Were you in the OPS room when the previous witness, Klopper, came to contact De Kock?

MR TAIT: Yes, I was in the OPS room.

MR BOOYENS: This line to De Kock, was it an open line?

MR TAIT: Yes. It wasn't a safe line, it was an open line.

MR BOOYENS: Did you listen specifically to the discussion between Mr Klopper and Mr De Kock?

MR TAIT: No, I did not catch the specific gist of the discussion.

MR BOOYENS: But you did hear according to what Mr De Kock's legal representative said, that at that stage when Mr De Kock was informed about the incident, he was merely told that it was a shooting incident in which some of the Koevoet members were involved and no mention was made of covering up the incident. Are you satisfied that in all probability that is what would have happened?

MR TAIT: Yes, I am satisfied with that.

MR BOOYENS: To a certain extent you have already discussed the reason why you believed and agreed that the operation was to be covered up. Do you also then confirm the political objective as you have summarised it on page 33?

MR TAIT: Yes, I confirm this.

MR BOOYENS: Once again with the one qualification, you used the word Ovambo members which isn't a correct phrase, would that be Ovambo's and Angolans or former members of Koevoet?

MR TAIT: Yes, that is correct.

MR BOOYENS: At that stage there were frequent accusations of SAP co-operation with a so-called Third Force?

MR TAIT: Yes, I know about that.

MR BOOYENS: Should it come to light that former mercenaries are now in the service of the South African Police, for operations near the Mozambican border, would you expect that this would create a great problem and great embarrassment?

MR TAIT: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, it wasn't a question only of former mercenaries, was it, the fact that these people were foreigners meant that they were themselves mercenaries and that would have caused embarrassment.

MR TAIT: That is correct Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Yes, that is correct, the Angolans were still mercenaries but they were now in service to the SAP, is that correct?

MR TAIT: Yes, one could say that Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Just one more aspect, what was the general order with regard to Koevoet members and even askaris with regard to publicity in light of their activities and the fact that they assisted the Security Police?

MR TAIT: The general instruction was that they should be kept as far as possible out of situations which could lead to court appearances or problems for the government.

MR BOOYENS: I see. So their involvement had to be kept as secret as possible as practically possible?

MR TAIT: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Thank you Chairperson.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR BOOYENS

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, may I perhaps be afforded the opportunity to go first please, I have only one question. Mr Tait, did you ever see that Wouter Mentz shot any one of the arms smugglers?

MR TAIT: No.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR DU PLESSIS

MR HUGO: I have no questions, thank you Mr Chairman.

NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HUGO

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: Thank you Mr Chairman, Lamey on record, on behalf of Klopper and also Nortje who is implicated. Mr Tait, I have noticed in your amnesty application that you were discharged for medical reasons in August 1995, is that correct?

MR TAIT: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: Can you tell us the nature of these medical reasons?

MR TAIT: Post-traumatic stress disorder.

MR LAMEY: Are you still receiving treatment for this?

MR TAIT: Yes.

MR LAMEY: Has medicine been prescribed to you in order to manage your condition?

MR TAIT: Yes.

MR LAMEY: Are you undergoing psychiatric or psychological treatment for this?

MR TAIT: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: I beg your pardon, I did not hear your answer.

MR TAIT: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: Is it your experience that due to the fact that you are suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder, your short term and long term memory fails you?

MR TAIT: Yes, I do experience problems from time to time.

MR LAMEY: The events with regard to the Komatipoort incident, that which you have given evidence about and your recollection, could the fact that you are suffering from post-traumatic stress and that you are experiencing memory problems, influence the particular accuracy of your evidence?

MR TAIT: That is possible.

MR LAMEY: Then I would just like to return and ask whether it is a justifiable inference to make with regard to the entire Operation Excalibur in which former Koevoet members were used, that previously during the planning phase, the possibility may have been foreseen that an incident such as this one, which indeed took place later on, that such an incident could take place and that something could go wrong and that Koevoet members could also perhaps in a contact situation with smugglers, or end up in such a situation? In other words before this specific incident took place, was the probability of that foreseen?

MR TAIT: Yes, it could have happened.

MR LAMEY: Could that have been foreseen during the planning phase?

MR TAIT: Yes, it may have been predicted.

MR LAMEY: I beg your pardon, I can't really hear you very well, could you repeat your answer?

MR TAIT: Yes, it may have been predicted.

MR LAMEY: And that generally, should something like this take place, they would then as far as possible, be kept out of the shooting incident in order to avoid this embarrassment that you have referred to?

MR TAIT: Would you please repeat the question.

MR LAMEY: If it had already been foreseen in the planning phase of Excalibur that something could go wrong, that former Koevoet members could become involved in shooting incidents, is it correct to accept that at that stage in planning, it was kept in mind and made part of the planning that former Koevoet members with regard to evidence which may emanate from a shooting incident, be kept out of such an incident, in order to avoid embarrassment?

MR TAIT: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Isn't it the other way round that because it was predicted, they should not be involved in such incidents, it would only happen when something went wrong? It was predicted there could be trouble if they were involved, so the planning would have been not to involve them in shooting incidents?

MR LAMEY: Yes, no, no.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that the position?

MR TAIT: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: Then perhaps we should divide this into two sections, the one being that the general planning was that the smugglers would be lured into an ambush and that the Task Force members should there be a shooting incident between the smugglers and the other members, that the Task Force members would undertake the shooting?

MR TAIT: C10 members as well as Task Force members were there and the reason for that is because they were better trained and more effective in their action and that is why we always used Task Force members so that we would be able to protect our own people and not to expose them to such explicit danger.

MR LAMEY: My question is aimed at the predictability in general of such a situation during which something could go wrong. In other words, that the plan to lead smugglers to a point where there would be an ambush may contain a point at which something could go wrong, when contact is made between former Koevoet members and the smugglers and in that event, a shooting incident could take place during which the Koevoet members then would be involved and that should such a situation develop, they would be able to reconstruct the position in order to keep the Koevoet members out of the situation or out of the incident?

MR BOOYENS: Chairperson, could my learned friend - I think I understand what his question is, but could my learned friend please put the question to the witness simply and briefly because he is putting it in a very complicated fashion. I think what my learned friend wants to know is whether or not there was previous planning for the event of a shooting incident and the Koevoet members' involvement in that and whether or not it would be possible to cover it up. I think that is what he is driving at.

CHAIRPERSON: As I understand it, that is what you want to know?

MR LAMEY: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Had provisions been made for a cover up if Koevoet members did inadvertently get involved in a shooting?

MR TAIT: Not in this case. After they had been reported, it was decided that we should keep those members who had participated in the shooting, out of the incident and make use of the Task Force members.

CHAIRPERSON: The question was had this been anticipated beforehand? Was it a general understanding that you would do this?

MR TAIT: I would have done that.

MR LAMEY: Mr Tait, you made use of former Koevoet members and it is very sensitive to use them as it has appeared from your evidence, is that correct?

MR TAIT: Yes.

MR LAMEY: Anything could have gone wrong with regard to contact with smugglers. You must have foreseen and made provisions for a plan with regard to a certain operation should something go wrong and the Koevoet members then become involved in a shooting incident?

MR TAIT: There was not a previously formulated plan, but should things have gone wrong, we would have formulated a plan to keep them out of it.

MR LAMEY: You say that there would have been a level of planning to keep them out of it?

MR TAIT: Yes, in terms of the shooting incident which took place, we would then decide whether or not we were to keep them out of it or what the situation was. We would tailor a plan according to the situation.

MR LAMEY: Are you saying that should this take place, you would then formulate a plan?

MR TAIT: Yes Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: So you would firstly evaluate the situation?

MR TAIT: Yes. We would automatically be able to determine whether or not it was necessary to keep these persons out of the incident.

MR LAMEY: Suppose the shooting incident took place legitimately between the Koevoet members and the smugglers, or that the report is that it was a legitimate incident, what would you do then?

MR TAIT: I would still have proposed that we make use of the Task Force members as a result of what I have already stated with regard to the political motives behind the matter.

CHAIRPERSON: As I understand your evidence, the legitimacy of the act was immaterial, what was important was the outside world, the public, would not get to learn that you were using Koevoet members in these operations?

MR TAIT: That was our objective.

MR LAMEY: Very well, may I then accept just to take this further, that that was already part of the plan and already foreseen during planning that that would have been the situation in the event of such a shooting incident taking place?

MR TAIT: It was not planned beforehand, it was discussed after the people had reported to us that there was a shooting incident.

CHAIRPERSON: Let's get away from the word "plan", we agree there was no plan made beforehand, but was it the practice where any action by the Police could cause grave embarrassment, to take steps to avoid such action becoming known? Was this a policy?

MR TAIT: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: At a certain stage you gave evidence about when the former Koevoet members Lukas and Simon had left to go and meet these smugglers, you remained at the Base, is that correct?

MR TAIT: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: Can you recall at which stage you withdrew to the Base?

MR TAIT: Withdrew from where to the Base because we were at the Base?

MR LAMEY: Did they depart from the Base to go and meet up with the smugglers or were all of you at a pre-established point from which they went to go and meet the smugglers or from which you went back to the Base?

MR TAIT: Chairperson, there was a house in which these people resided, it was basically at the back of the Base, that is where they resided and they left from there. We remained on the Base which was basically in the same vicinity. It was simply a question of the house and the Base which is being discussed which would have been approximately a kilometre apart. That was their accommodation behind the Base, the house behind the Base.

MR LAMEY: Your recollection is that when they departed to go and meet the smugglers, you were at the Skomaans Base along with Klopper, Mentz and Nortje is that correct?

MR TAIT: Yes, that is correct. We remained at the Base.

MR LAMEY: I would just like to hear your commentary about something or whether or not you can recall anything about the following matter - on page 39 of Mr Mentz' statement he states that -

"... Lukas Culino, this is the second paragraph on page 39, Lukas Culino and the other Koevoet members waited in the big gravel road, they had their own vehicle there, they would meet the weapon smugglers there. At approximately seven o'clock that evening, they had not yet arrived. The order was given by Warrant Officer Willie Nortje that we were to withdraw and we then went to Skomaans, the Police Basis near where we stayed in order to go and rest."

As it appears from the statement, when the Koevoet members left to go and meet the weapon smugglers, some time was spent waiting next to a gravel road first and then the order was given by Nortje for you to withdraw and return to the Skomaans Base? What I want to ask you is whether or not Warrant Officer Willie Nortje would have given such an order at that stage because at that stage he was still in command of the operation?

MR TAIT: I don't understand your question.

MR LAMEY: Do you have page 39 before you?

MR TAIT: Yes.

MR LAMEY: Would you read it please?

MR TAIT: I have read it Mr Chairman. Could I then hear the question pertaining to this.

MR LAMEY: What appears there, is that the same as your recollection of the events?

MR TAIT: I cannot recall this, it may have been that way.

MR LAMEY: With regard to that paragraph, I would just like to put it in context and that is before the shooting incident took place.

MR TAIT: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: This paragraph states that you waited for the Koevoet members to rendezvous with the weapon smugglers at a point and when they had not yet returned at seven o'clock that evening, the order was given by Willie Nortje for you to withdraw back to the Base.

MR DU PLESSIS: Chairperson, nowhere in Mentz' statement is this person's name even mentioned. My learned friend says that you had to withdraw and that is not a reasonable question. If my learned friend wants to know whether or not the people who were there had to withdraw, then it would be an appropriate question but as far as I can recall, Mentz does not even mention John Tait's name in the statement.

MR LAMEY: But that wasn't my question.

MR DU PLESSIS: But then put your question in such a way that the applicant can understand it.

CHAIRPERSON: Wasn't your question "you must withdraw"?

MR DU PLESSIS: Yes.

MR LAMEY: I am referring to the group.

CHAIRPERSON: But he is not a member of the group, there is no suggestion he was. Are you putting it to him that he was a member of the group?

MR LAMEY: No, Mr Chairman, no.

CHAIRPERSON: How can you put "you" if he is not a member?

MR LAMEY: Perhaps I should then rephrase it. Mr Mentz states that the order was given by Willie Nortje that -

"... we had to withdraw and we then went to Skomaans."

MR TAIT: Yes. I cannot imagine that Willie Nortje would have said "we".

MR LAMEY: No, it isn't Willie Nortje who is saying that, this is Mr Mentz' statement.

MR TAIT: Well, then I cannot comment on that because I was not present and I don't know what was discussed there at all.

CHAIRPERSON: Was Willie Nortje away from the Base, you have just told us that "we remained at the Base. I was at the Base with Klopper, Mentz and Nortje."

MR TAIT: I was at the Base with Klopper and Nortje and what I mean is that at the stage when I was at the Base with Klopper and Nortje, it was when they withdrew and returned and waited there for the Ovambo's to return.

MR LAMEY: Did I understand your evidence correctly in that at the stage that the Koevoet members had parted to rendezvous with the weapon smugglers, when they had departed from Skomaans Base or the house to which you have referred, was it you and Klopper and Nortje and Mentz who remained behind?

MR TAIT: According to my knowledge members of C10 departed along with members of the Task Force members to set up the ambush in which the people were to move. I remained behind at the Base according to my recollection. Nortje and the others later returned to the Base where we waited together for the Ovambo's to return.

MR LAMEY: Is this recollection of yours clear or could it possibly be vague?

MR TAIT: My recollection about this is reasonably clear I believe.

MR LAMEY: Would you look at page 30, the second paragraph of your amnesty application. You say -

"... two Ovambo members by the name of Lukas and Simon went to rendezvous with the weapon smugglers while I was left behind at a predetermined Base and waited with other members of C10 and the Task Force."

MR TAIT: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: The other members of C10 to whom you refer, who are they?

MR TAIT: I can recall that Boesman remained there with me along with a number of Task Force members whom I cannot recall or whose names I cannot recall.

MR LAMEY: Very well. I can only put to you what my instructions are from Mr Nortje and that is that when the order was given to depart, he maintains that he did not give that order, you were not present and you cannot argue this. He says that the withdrawal took place much earlier that day, before the smugglers, but not at that specific time.

You cannot comment on that?

MR TAIT: No, I cannot comment on that. When Willie Nortje and I and the rest of the group were together, it was when we waited at the Base for the people to return physically.

MR LAMEY: At that stage before their return, were you already in command and control of the operation, is that correct? I beg your pardon Chairperson, I didn't get that answer. If there was an order on the way back to the Basis, would you have been the person to give the order?

CHAIRPERSON: If he was present. If he was not present, he certainly would not be the person.

MR LAMEY: Yes, as it pleases you Mr Chairman. Just to return to the time after the shooting incident was reported, it is your evidence that Lukas Culino arrived there and made the report and informed you about the shooting incident.

MR TAIT: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And you say that he spoke to Nortje?

MR TAIT: Yes.

MR LAMEY: But that everybody was present?

MR TAIT: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: Did you hear what he said with regard to that, that would be Lukas Culino?

MR TAIT: Yes, I did hear.

MR LAMEY: So was it the situation that he informed the group of people who were present there as such or did he only inform Nortje?

MR TAIT: He specifically spoke to Nortje, but everybody who was present could hear what he was saying.

MR LAMEY: And according to what he said, is it your recollection that it appeared that there was a reason for them to shoot the smugglers?

MR TAIT: From their discussion I could infer that there was a reason to have shot the smugglers, that their lives were in danger.

MR LAMEY: At that stage, had these events taken place reasonably quickly, in other words the departure of Wouter Mentz to the scene of the incident or how exactly did things take place after that?

MR TAIT: The events ensued reasonably quickly, exactly how, I cannot recall.

MR LAMEY: You say here in your amnesty application and I would like to request you to tell us what your recollection is, you say that that information given by Lukas and Simon made Nortje step forward spontaneously and take over, as he had done before. I want to know from you whether you are saying that Warrant Officer Willie Nortje with regard to this operation, actually took over the command of the situation out of your hands and basically handled matters from that point onwards?

MR TAIT: What I am saying is that he took over the initiative and that which he discussed there, was a logical solution and I agreed wholeheartedly with it.

MR LAMEY: You have said previously during your evidence in chief, that all of this took place upon his own initiative?

MR TAIT: The initiative for the proposal that we should use Task Force members, came from Willie Nortje.

MR LAMEY: Was there a group discussion about this?

MR TAIT: There was not a specific discussion, but I agreed with the situation and I believe that if there were persons in the group who did not agree with it, they could have expressed their disagreement.

MR LAMEY: Do I understand you correctly that when you say he took the initiative, this may have been a proposal which was put forward from his side, but not that he actually assumed command from that point onwards?

MR TAIT: It was a proposal from his side, as I have already stated and furthermore I agreed completely with that proposal.

MR LAMEY: Can you recall whether there was a detailed discussion about how precisely the reconstruction was to take place, the particulars surrounding that or was it a question of Mentz having to get to the scene of the incident as quickly as possible, evaluating the situation and then returning and reporting back about it?

MR TAIT: According to my recollection, he had to get to the scene as quickly as possible so that he could make an evaluation of the situation and then report back. So he had to go and see what happened there.

MR LAMEY: Would you say that a decision surrounding reconstruction and so forth within that context, had to be delayed until his evaluation of the scene could be made?

MR TAIT: As I have stated, the Ovambo members had to be removed and we had to use Task Force members. That had already been decided. He had to visit the scene of the incident and determine what had taken place and according to that, the scene would be reconstructed.

MR LAMEY: Do you know that photographers were dispatched to the scene?

MR TAIT: Yes, I know that Klopper contacted photographers.

MR LAMEY: Do you know that when Klopper and Nortje arrived at the scene with the photographers, neither Mentz nor any of the persons who had been shot, were to be found at the scene?

MR TAIT: No, I don't know about that.

MR LAMEY: Can you recall whether Mentz reported back after his arrival at the scene?

MR TAIT: Mentz did not report to me.

MR LAMEY: You have already given evidence that you suffer from memory problems and I would like to ask you specifically when you are testifying here and your memory is not exactly accurate and you are giving evidence about what happened at that point, and your answers in that relation, could this have been the situation that one sometimes tries one's best to recall certain things and you know for example that Lukas Culino and Willie Nortje served together in Koevoet and for that reason he may have directed this discussion at Nortje, but what I want to know is was it not more the case that there was already in general before the onset of this operation, it was already foreseen that should something like this present itself, a shooting incident, that Koevoet members were to be kept out of the picture, in other words when this happened indeed, that such an incident presented itself, there was a discussion after Culino and Simon had reported back and the possibility of such a reconstruction was discussed during that discussion, but that Mentz was supposed to go to the scene in order to evaluate the situation, the expectation would then be for him to report back and then a final decision regarding what you were going to do and how you were going to do it, would take place after the evaluation of the situation.

CHAIRPERSON: Hasn't he just said that? My note of his evidence is that -

"... it has already been decided that the Ovambo members would have to have been removed. Mentz had to visit the scene to see what had happened there, then to report back and we would decide how to reconstitute it."

Am I wrong in that note?

MR TAIT: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: That is what you are asking him.

MR LAMEY: Yes, I just wanted to make certain about my understanding here because that is, Mr Tait, those are my instructions from Mr Nortje that there was a discussion about such a matter and that it is his recollection that it could have been before Mentz' departure, however, he says that it may have been after Mentz' departure, but that the idea was, according to my instructions that Mentz, with his experience at Murder and Robbery, had to visit the scene with Culino in order to examine the situation and that the expectation was for him to report back and that after that, further decisions would be made about the situation. In the meantime, he was present when the photographers were dispatched. I would just like to put it to you according to his recollection, and ask you whether or not you could really dispute that which I have just put to you.

CHAIRPERSON: Who was present when the photographers were dispatched? You said he was present?

MR LAMEY: No, when the photographers were called, were called to come, Nortje and Klopper. When they went to the scene it was Klopper and Nortje, according to my instructions with the photographers. Mr Tait, can we just return to the matter, do you dispute what I have just put to you?

MR TAIT: As I have stated it, Wouter had to report back after he had evaluated the situation. Is that what Nortje means, because if that is what he means, then I will agree with him.

MR LAMEY: What I would just like to put clearly to you is that his recollection is that the reconstruction may have been discussed, but that the final decision regarding that, would be linked to the evaluation of the situation at the scene of the incident which Wouter Mentz would find after he and Lukas Culino had departed from there.

MR TAIT: That may have been possible, however what I can say is that the decision had been taken to undertake this reconstruction. How it was going to take place, would have depended upon what the person would report back after he had visited the scene of the incident.

MR LAMEY: In Mr Mentz' affidavit he states in page 38, paragraph 1, he says that Lieutenant Chappies Klopper was in command of the operation with regard to the weapons investigations. That is on page 38. I would accept that that is incorrect according to your evidence, you were with Boesman Pretorius and you were in command of the operation together?

MR TAIT: Yes, I was in command of the operation, I cannot say on what grounds Wouter Mentz drew the inference or whether Wouter really did receive an order from them.

MR LAMEY: Furthermore on page 41 he says and this is after the shooting incident was reported, it would appear that a decision was made, he mentions that a decision was taken among others by Lieutenant Chappies Klopper and Warrant Officer Willie Nortje who was in command of the entire operation that the operation was to be reconstructed. It is not correct that he, Lieutenant Chappies and Willie Nortje were both in command of the operation when the decision was taken to reconstruct the operation?

MR TAIT: I said in the beginning that I was in command of the operation with regard to planning and the reporting when they reported that the people had been shot. Then the initiative came from Willie and one can accept then that Willie took over.

MR LAMEY: You see, it would appear from Mentz' affidavit that he goes further than saying that it was simply a collective discussion, what he says is that Klopper and Nortje are pertinently highlighted when it comes to the people who were in command of the operation.

CHAIRPERSON: And nobody agrees with that, it has been said time and again by everybody else, I don't know what you are going on with this about? I don't want to stop you, but we have got to reach some finality in the matter and you are just repeating and repeating and repeating what has been already said.

MR LAMEY: Thank you Mr Chairman, I just wanted to ... (end of tape) ... of Mentz in this regard. Mr Chairman, I don't have any further questions, thank you.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR LAMEY

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS PATEL: Thank you Honourable Chairperson. Sir, is it correct that you were the handler of Lukas Culino during this operation?

MR TAIT: That is correct.

MS PATEL: And of Simon, is it Hiranbawasha? Were you his handler as well?

MR TAIT: That is correct.

MS PATEL: Okay, can you tell us the information upon which this particular operation was based, did that information come to you from Lukas?

MR TAIT: That is correct, the information came from Lukas that they had made contact with a group of people who were going to bring weapons over the Mozambican border into the country and that they had negotiated with them to purchase the weapons from them and that is the information around which we planned the operation.

MS PATEL: Okay, can you tell us whether or in a sense, what legend Lukas had given over to the smugglers during that initial contact period with them? Who did they give out that they were?

MR TAIT: With regard to this specific case, I cannot submit his particular agenda.

ADV SANDI: But in principle, they were going to trick them, not so? They were going to trick them and pose as if they were interested to buy arms genuinely?

MR TAIT: That is correct, yes.

MS PATEL: All right, can you then given that you can't recall what the specific legend in this specific operation was, can you perhaps be helpful in terms of whether generally perhaps they would have posed to be what, members of a specific liberation movement or what would the probabilities have been?

MR TAIT: As far as I can recall, they presented themselves as smugglers who wanted to purchase weapons and then re-sell them.

MS PATEL: Okay. Did you authorise the monies, the use of the monies that they would have used during this operation?

MR TAIT: As I have already stated, during any operation where funds were necessary, you would put in a written claim with a motivation and then those funds would be approved by Head Office and then be allocated to you with which then you could provide the funds to the various members of the operation.

MS PATEL: Would you have been the person who put in the claim with a motivation?

MR TAIT: Yes, that would have been me, I would have requested it.

MS PATEL: Would you have taken this decision to put in the claim independently or would you have consulted other parties at Vlakplaas before you did it?

MR TAIT: I would have discussed the matter with Mr De Kock to ensure that he was informed regarding why the funds were claimed and what we were going to apply these funds for. I would not request funds on my own initiative because he would also have to lend his approval for that.

MS PATEL: All right, can you recall whether there was a meeting a few days before the incident had taken place to plan the operation?

MR TAIT: I don't know about that, according to my recollection the planning of the operation took place at Skomaans.

MS PATEL: Okay, and who was present at the planning?

MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, with respect, he said he has got no knowledge of such a meeting, now my learned friend asks him who was present there.

MS PATEL: No with respect ...

CHAIRPERSON: He has just said the planning of the meeting took place at Skomaans, the question is now who was present during that planning?

MR BOOYENS: Oh, that meeting, okay.

MR TAIT: I cannot recall precisely who was present, Boesman Pretorius was present along with other members of C10 as well as the Commander of the Task Force in order to assist his people with the set up of the ambush regarding which he would have briefed them.

MS PATEL: Can you recall whether Mr Klopper was present during that planning meeting that you are now referring to?

MR TAIT: It is possible, but I would not express that as a fact.

MS PATEL: Okay. Sorry Honourable Chairperson, just grant me a moment. If I can just go to the actual incident now, you have testified that you were in the OPS room at the time when Mr Klopper called Mr De Kock. Can you give us a time frame on that please, was it the same evening or was it some days after or when?

MR TAIT: It was during the course of the evening, I cannot attach a specific time to that event.

MS PATEL: Okay. Can I just put to you, Mr Nortje in his statement on page 73 states that, at about line 10 from the top, Honourable Chairperson -

"... Wouter took Lukas, John and one or two more whites, I cannot recall exactly who, he took them back to the scene."

What is your comment on that?

MR TAIT: As I have already stated and will state once again, at no stage did I visit any scene.

MS PATEL: Okay. Did you receive a report after the entire incident had taken place, given that you were Mr Culino's handler, did he come back to you at some stage and report what had happened at the scene after Wouter and company had gone back there?

MR TAIT: I received no report from anybody afterwards, concerning what had taken place there.

MS PATEL: My next question is based on my ignorance of what would have happened so I would like you to see it in that light. Would it not have been standard procedure for Culino, given that you were his handler and that the operation was planned in conjunction with you, for him to report after the incident, to you? What would the position have been?

MR TAIT: As I have already stated in my affidavit, firstly when Lukas came to give us the information, he came to speak to Willie and he did not make any admissions to me. I don't know whether or not he made any admissions to Nortje about the matter, but he did not tell me anything.

MS PATEL: I - perhaps we are at cross purposes, I am asking whether Lukas Culino would not have, after the entire incident had taken place, after the reconstruction of the scene, etc, etc, whether he would not then at that stage have come and reported to you as to what had happened? I am not talking about the initial report when he came and said things went wrong and the smugglers had been shot.

MR TAIT: No, at no time thereafter, after the incident, did he return to me and make any report to me.

CHAIRPERSON: Changing the subject slightly, surely you as his handler, as the handler of the two of them, would have spoken to them and said "look, we have now changed the position, you must make no mention that you were involved in any shooting incident that night?" Isn't that one of the functions of a handler?

MR TAIT: Chairperson, it is a function but I did not discuss this with him.

MS PATEL: And you didn't discuss it with Simon either?

MR TAIT: No, I did not discuss this with Simon because at that stage I regarded the situation as having been taken care of.

MS PATEL: Okay, just as an aside, can you confirm whether Lukas Culino is in fact deceased? Do you have any idea?

MR TAIT: I have absolutely no knowledge of whether he passed away or not, whether he is still living or where he is at the moment, what his whereabouts are.

MS PATEL: Okay. If I can just take you to your political motivation on page 33 of the Bundle, Honourable Chairperson. Your first line of your political motivation you say -

"... the arrest of arms smugglers who had entered the Republic of South Africa and provided weapons to the struggling political parties in the reigning violence."

Given that, Lukas Culino's legend at the time when he negotiated or when he made contact with the smugglers, was that he himself, would have in all probability have been a smuggler. In regard to this specific incident, what information do you have that it was in fact said to the smugglers that that weapons would find its way to a liberation movement in the country or to any of the parties who were involved in the political violence in the country?

MR TAIT: I cannot see that this case would have differed from any other case in which we had actions, because according to information, these weapons were provided not only to persons who could use them for political reasons, but also to common criminals. So I cannot see why the weapons would then follow a different route.

MS PATEL: Right, thank you sir, I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS PATEL

MR LAMEY: Mr Chairman, may I just say that I, relating to the reference to Mr Tait, John, in the context of that sentence which has been quoted by Ms Patel, that he, Wouter Mentz and him went to the scene, page 73, my instructions from Nortje is that he could be mistaken there about the reference to John, being John Tait.

MS PATEL: Honourable Chairperson, if I may just for clarity on the previous page, Mr Nortje refers to John Tait and then further down he says "Boesman and John", so is it not the same John, is there a possibility that there was another John on the scene or is what the legal representative is putting forward, that he is not sure whether John Tait was in fact present?

MR LAMEY: I could just get, but as far as I understand there was only one John among the group and that was John Tait and the reference to John on page 73, is a reference to John Tait.

MS PATEL: I am done, thank you Honourable Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: No re-examination, thank you Mr Chairman.

NO RE-EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS

CHAIRPERSON: Any further witnesses?

MR BOOYENS: No, Mr Chairman.

WITNESS EXCUSED

CHAIRPERSON: Is anyone else intending to call witnesses in regard to this application?

MS PATEL: I can't find any, Honourable Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: Mr Chairman, as you know, I represent also Mr Nortje. I am still considering the position in his instance, but for this purpose, could I suggest that we take the adjournment and perhaps - there are certain aspects about this and also provisions of the Act which also I need to clear out first before coming to that decision. Could I perhaps request that I be afforded also the opportunity to discuss this in chambers with members of the panel?

CHAIRPERSON: I don't think we should discuss matters of that nature without all interested parties being present.

MR LAMEY: No, all interested parties present, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: I propose to take the adjournment now in any event, until two o'clock, if he does not, I would be delighted to hear argument from you gentlemen.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION:

MR BOOYENS IN ARGUMENT: Mr Chairman, it is my respectful submission that the applicant, Mr Tait, has complied with the requirements of the Act, to be granted amnesty. It would seem that in light of the evidence he has given, the offence of which he could theoretically be prosecuted, would be an attempt to defeat the ends of justice or something like that, the moment that they agree to change certain facts of something, at the moment they say unnatural death, there's got to be a judicial investigation as we know, whether it be by way of an inquest and the fact that they agreed to substitute somebody else there is a clear attempt, so I would submit the first requirement is there.

Now as far as the application complying with the second requirement, the application I submit, complies with the requirements of the Act. The only question that I think one has to consider here, is whether it was committed with a political objective.

Now, it is my respectful submission that he falls under Section 20(2)(b), he is an employee of the State and what they did is at that stage, they were still engaged in a struggle against the liberation movements. The point at which they decided to cover up the activities of the askaris, is the point where they took a political decision to protect the previous government against the type of propaganda that could be useful to members of the opposition of that government and more specifically the opposition parties, people like the ANC and the PAC who were involved in the struggle against the government.

CHAIRPERSON: Isn't it in this case different in that they were not, this wasn't really, it may have been part of the liberation struggle, but it was more aimed that at this stage there were already negotiations pending and the government might be gravely prejudiced in those negotiations, so it was part of the negotiating process, political objective there was to protect the government from embarrassment at the negotiations, not as we have in other cases, to prevent the blowing up of buildings or this or that?

MR BOOYENS: No, that was the purpose, but the purpose of course, it cuts two ways. Not only do you protect the government from that, but you do not give the opposition parties ammunition which they can use against the government, during the negotiations. It is for that reason that it is my respectful submission that this certainly does fall within the ambit of the Act and I would submit that it is clearly a case where Mr Tait qualifies in that regard, in so far as the question as to whether he made a full disclosure Mr Chairman, the Court has seen, the Commission has seen Mr Tait, I would respectfully submit that he is a soft spoken man, but he is certainly not being demonstrated to be untruthful about anything that happened there. I think he tried to answer the questions to the best of his ability and he was open about what happened there and the objective facts, in fact proved the correctness of his allegation.

The most important one being that he says that there was a proposal made by Nortje that they should substitute the members of the Task Force, that is made on the 21st. We know that people go out to the scene, by the 22nd, according to the document that I referred to in cross-examination, by the 22nd, the shooting report goes up and apparently it had been done. In the circumstances, my respectful submission is that it cannot be said even remotely that Tait has failed to make a full disclosure, and I would accordingly submit that he qualifies for amnesty in the circumstances. Unless there is something specific in this regard that the Committee would like to hear me on, those are my submissions.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, this is not really if we want to hear you on, I want to know if you agree with me, isn't one of the problems facing the Committee and our Leader of Evidence in this case, the fact that it is almost impossible having regard to the evidence and the papers before us, the affidavits and what have you, to come to any clear decision as to whose version is correct or not? Basic agreement yes, but there are so many odd conflicts between them that one is, can't as one can in other cases say well, he is contradicted on this point and that point by the other people and therefore we don't accept him because none of the other people - I am expressing only my own views here, not of the Committee as such - it seems none of the people involved in the present application, can say my evidence can be believed beyond all doubt? Your client has fairly conceded that he is receiving treatment and psychiatric treatment which might influence. The other applicant says he has been drinking all evening and that is the problem that we have. The other, Wouter Mentz, was apparently so drunk he didn't know what he was doing, so one can't attach the weight to the evidence of those statements that one otherwise do. The only fair way of doing it is to judge each person's evidence on its own?

MR BOOYENS: On its own merits, and I would submit respectfully that judged on its own merits, he certainly tried to make a disclosure to the best of his ability, that is why I deliberately didn't deal with the contradictions between him and the other people Mr Chairman. I mean we have only got to look at the witness statements that are attached, then a further story seems to be creeping out somewhere, but he certainly in this regard, we cannot say that on what he has told us, that he has been demonstrated to be false and for that reason, I would submit he has made a full disclosure.

As far as proportionality is concerned, Mr Chairman, I do not think what they did was disproportionate at the time, to the mischief that they tried to prevent, in fact the situation that we had, we were faced with a situation where the then government could be accused of employing mercenaries to some extent.

CHAIRPERSON: Not accused, be shown to be that way.

MR BOOYENS: Yes, exactly, it would have demonstrated them to be using mercenaries, that is the correct term. I agree entirely with you Mr Chairman, so in the circumstances my respectful submission is that he is entitled to amnesty.

CHAIRPERSON: All right, thank you.

MR LAMEY IN ARGUMENT: Thank you Mr Chairman. I will start off in my address on the full disclosure aspect. It is a requirement as we know, one of the criteria for granting amnesty. Mr Chairman, I would like to make a submission in that regard and that is that, the submission is that only where the evidence is of such a nature that the Committee could conclude that an applicant is making on purpose not a full disclosure, or he is purposely not telling the truth and that a negative inference in this regard, should be made.

If I can bring this to the evidence of Klopper, it is so that he was, he conceded possibilities but he had a lack of memory precisely as to the event that took place. I think the truth of this version and his intent to make a full disclosure lies therein that he was readily prepared also to concede that also he was a party to a discussion and a decision that there should be a cover up. It is also for that purpose that he asks amnesty for defeating the ends of justice in the manner that it has also been specified in Exhibit B and also in this regard, a conspiracy to do that.

CHAIRPERSON: Can I interrupt you at this stage, something that I should have put to Mr Booyens as well, is the offence attempting to defeat or did they defeat? They prevented a proper investigation of a killing, isn't that defeating the ends of justice?

MR BOOYENS: I think they did defeat, it is not just attempt.

MR LAMEY: Yes, Mr Chairman, in Annexure B, point 3 there Mr Klopper also asks indeed amnesty for defeating the ends of justice or attempt thereof. The difficulty which I would submit many applicants face before proceedings before the Amnesty Committee is that for various reasons, there is a problem with their memory. We have heard of such, for instance Tait, post-traumatic stress disorder, we don't have that evidence regarding Klopper, but he said a very important thing during re-examination and that is about that he has sort of blocked in his mind, the events of the past. That is after also his evidence in the De Kock trial.

Mr Chairman, my submission in this regard is that one can very much imagine a person in his position, to be that that be the case. One could think back that him being one of the first persons, if not the first person who made the disclosure to the Goldstone Commission about Vlakplaas activities and further on the subsequent trial where he was for three months' under cross-examination and though we don't have that record before us and one can imagine how much trauma a person in the position of Klopper has experienced in the past, relating to testimony and it is my submission that in also to appear before an Amnesty Committee in this regard and for what he has been through to again relate the events, is not an easy task.

On this aspect, it is my submission that if his evidence would appear to be vague, it is my submission in his position, he made an honest attempt to relate the events and it could not be said that he did not make a full disclosure.

CHAIRPERSON: What of his evidence that he had been drinking all evening?

MR LAMEY: Mr Chairman, exactly, he was not hesitant to say that.

CHAIRPERSON: Nobody challenged that and I must say it surprises me that if so, he can recollect any detail of the evening concerned.

MR LAMEY: Yes, that is a further aspect, but what I want to say is the fact that he is so open about that, indicates also his intention to make a full disclosure of all the relevant facts.

Mr Chairman, as far as the political objective is concerned, my submission is that the evidence as it has unfolded also and as also supported by the evidence of Tait and as well as also the submissions by my learned friend, I agree with that, what has been stated by him in the Exhibit A which is the political objective, addendum to his application, is in line with the evidence before the Committee.

He has specifically referred also as far as the cover up is concerned, defeat the ends of justice, also about the embarrassment, that this could have been caused and the domino effect thereof further on, for the Security Forces and as such, the government. I want to make, I want to add that we also have evidence here that these arms smuggling also found their way to the political opponents of the government and they played a role still in that time frame, unrest related incidents.

As such it is my submission Mr Chairman, that he qualifies for amnesty bearing in mind the provisions of Section 20(2)(b), that he was a member of the Force who acted in the course and scope of his duties in an act aimed against well known political organisations and liberation movements at the time which was still at that stage, in that time frame, engaged in a political battle against the government and that these actions were bona fide in an attempt to counter this conflict.

I want to go also further and say that Section 20(2)(f) would also be applicable, relating to reasonable grounds that they at least also believed that that would be the position.

Mr Chairman, the application of Klopper goes also a bit further and it relates to being an accessory after the fact in relation to defeating the ends of justice relating to murder by Wouter Mentz. I know we don't have the evidence before the Committee that a murder took place, but as I in my submission view the purposes of the process, is that should it transpire later and it is hypothetical, that Mentz has committed in fact murder, then my submission is that Mr Klopper should also be granted amnesty for being an accessory, that he just declined as an Officer at that stage, from what has been related to him in terms of information, to do anything about it.

CHAIRPERSON: What political objective, he just didn't want to do anything. He left it to De Kock or somebody else. He didn't inform them of it, what political objective has he shown?

MR LAMEY: Mr Chairman, he has stated and it is also in Exhibit A that he says that his omission to act against Mentz, would have had a domino effect that could also have caused a political embarrassment. One can also think that if he had to come forward and he was the person to take on his own, the step to relate to the authorities what had happened here, it is my submission that it would have had the same effect regarding Vlakplaas, killing people, wounded people and this in itself, during that time frame, would still as the case with the ex-Koevoet members, in my submission would have caused the same type of problem to the government.

He has also, his evidence also he reported, well, it was the shooting incident of the ex-Koevoet members but he also said and I understand that from his application, that he assumed that the Officer Commanding of Vlakplaas would act in his discretion at that stage. Now, it is my submission that there was also no problem as far as that was concerned.

Mentz himself was under the overall command of De Kock and that is my submission. I think what he has stated if one view it also in the general context and the general position that De Kock has also testified, that it would have been uncalled for for a person in his position, to take the initiative at that stage against Mentz, on his own.

CHAIRPERSON: Why uncalled for? He was the person who reported back to De Kock? Why not report back to De Kock?

MR LAMEY: Mr Chairman, I think the crux of his evidence that he assumed that De Kock, we must remember that Holtzhauzen was also a member of Vlakplaas, and his evidence was that Holtzhauzen took further also the investigation about this. I think his position and his evidence is to the effect that he left it there and assumed that if there had to be done something about that, that De Kock would know of it and would do something about it.

Mr Chairman, if I remember correctly in the general submission which was made also by De Kock, it was - I am not correct, I don't know whether it was on record, but if I remember correctly, there is some evidence to the effect that if he would have been in that position, he would also have covered it up in general.

What I want to submit Mr Chairman, is that the inference could be drawn here that from the whole total concept and the way in which Vlakplaas operated, that Klopper did not need I think to, need not require a direct instruction from De Kock to say nothing further and to do nothing further about this aspect of Wouter Mentz. If one view it in the total context, I would submit that he had in so far as Section 2(b) is concerned, the implied authority not to take this further. That is my submission Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MS PATEL IN ARGUMENT: Honourable Chairperson, I sit in the (indistinct) position of so many different versions to this incident, that I am afraid I am not sure which way to argue in the matter.

CHAIRPERSON: Isn't the trouble that the more one thinks about it, the more one can think of possible reasons and motives and they become more and more intertwined, that certainly I think I can speak for the whole Committee now, we have applied our minds to the evidence we have heard and what we have read and there seems to be a number of possibilities, but it is impossible on the information, the acceptable information before us to settle on any one of them. That is your position, isn't it that you can't invite us to believe any one version and say on that?

MR TAIT: Yes, absolutely Honourable Chairperson. One of the curious features of this case is the manner in which the smugglers were shot, if there was a shoot-out, what are the probabilities that they would all have been shot in the upper body and at close range as has been alleged by some of the members. I can take this matter no further, I will not make any further submissions, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: I have had the benefit of looking briefly at the post mortem reports and they add more to the confusion, because there are injuries as I understand them to the leg, to the elbow, to the arm, it is not a case of careful execution style killing, there was obviously some random shooting at some stage which would appear to support the version of a shoot-out. And we have had no evidence and none appeared surprisingly, in the reports as to what damage was done to the various motor vehicles.

MS PATEL: And the problem further with the post mortem reports is one is not sure whether they were part of the cover up and exactly whether one can accept the contents of those reports given the way in which the cover up had taken place. What does one rely on in this case, I am not sure, Honourable Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, it appears quite clear, I make no finding against the credibility of the Doctor concerned, that somebody had told him when the deaths took place, because if you look at the post mortem it says this death occurred 16 hours before, this occurred 16 and a half hours before, this occurred 17 hours before and his post mortems were performed at half hourly intervals, so he was certainly working on the basis that this killing took place at a fixed time because I must say I have seldom seen a Doctor who so confidently fixed the time of death before. It does seem that, and again one doesn't know what pressure was brought to bear on the Doctor, that the post mortems were performed very quickly and were available to be included in the report made on the day after the shooting. The post mortems were over by half past one I think it was, or two o'clock and again, I want to make it clear, I am not blaming the Doctor for an apparently responsible Policeman comes before him and gives him information that appears to accord with what he is seeing. One can't blame him for accepting it. But again, you get no help there, do you? And there appears to be no evidence that Mr Mentz in fact shot anyone, apart from his own story of a drunken reaction to some joke where he thought the people were dead, but he pulled out a gun and shot. There is nothing there to substantiate a charge of murder, is there?

MS PATEL: Absolutely Honourable Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Accessory after the fact, falls away?

MS PATEL: Certainly it does.

CHAIRPERSON: And do you agree that if they had committed any offence, it would be defeating the ends of justice?

MS PATEL: Certainly yes.

CHAIRPERSON: That is all?

MS PATEL: That is all, thank you Honourable Chair.

ADV SANDI: Sorry Ms Patel, sorry, do you accept that this incident occurred within the context of the conflicts of the past that we are looking into in terms of the Act? It seems to be clear to me?

MS PATEL: All right, there is a difficulty again with that. There are two legs as I understand it to that argument. The one was that they attempted to protect the government and the other one was that they didn't give opposition parties, the weapons didn't go to other parties who were involved in the conflict so as to fuel the political violence that had taken place. The question of protection to the government, I think there can be no argument or no dispute from my side in terms of that. In terms of ...

CHAIRPERSON: And isn't that enough?

MS PATEL: Certainly. Certainly, and so I didn't argue the second point which was in terms of handing over - there is no clear evidence that the final destination of that weapons in this specific incidents, would have indeed have been to any of the political parties who were involved in the struggle.

CHAIRPERSON: If you think back to those days, wouldn't any Policeman have believed that if automatic weapons were brought in ... (tape ends) ...

MS PATEL: You will get no argument from me in terms of that perception, Honourable Chairperson. Thank you.

MR LAMEY: Mr Chairman, may I just ask something. If - listening to the argument of Ms Patel and we have so many different versions, that also takes into consideration just affidavits that have been placed before this Committee in the total totality of the Bundle, does ...

CHAIRPERSON: We consider information that is made available to us, this is not a trial.

MR LAMEY: But Mr Chairman, does that mean that because before the totality of the information before this Committee and the Committee is unable to make a definite finding as to the fact, that that automatically would place an obstacle in the road of the applicants for purposes of amnesty?

CHAIRPERSON: We cannot make an order if we don't find that there was such an offence. How can we grant amnesty when we are not satisfied that an offence was committed?

MR LAMEY: Mr Chairman, it is just a hypothetical question, what if the - it is later proved that such an offence has been committed?

CHAIRPERSON: Well, then perhaps the applicant should have proved it.

MR LAMEY: But Mr Chairman, if such an applicant is not in the position to in fact prove it, but it later transpires ..

CHAIRPERSON: That is extremely unlucky for him, he can't come and say "well, I may have committed various offences, I don't know if I did or didn't, but give me amnesty." I don't even know if those offences were committed.

MR LAMEY: As it pleases you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: I should have said it earlier, everybody is aware, aren't they, that we are not going to sit on Wednesday.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS