NAME: EUGENE DE KOCK

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CHAIRPERSON: ... Mr du Plessis. I have spoken to certain people, and think that it would probably be desirable that we adjourn at half past three this afternoon. There may be a lot of traffic going to the airport, and I gather quite a lot of people are catching planes this afternoon. Does that suit all of you? Very well.

EUGENE DE KOCK: (s.u.o.)

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR WAGENER: (cont)

Thank you, Mr Chairman. It's Jan Wagener speaking and I will proceed with my cross-examination of Mr de Kock.

Mr de Kock, on this which I omitted, could you give us an indication of until when you were the Commander of Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I was the Commander until my retirement by means of package, until March or the end of March 1993.

MR WAGENER: Did the command of Vlakplaas not transfer on the 1st of February 1991, to Mr Baker?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, Vlakplaas still existed as a group. It was divided and there were two other fundamental farms, apart from Vlakplaas and while Baker stayed at Vlakplaas, the others diversified. However, I still occupied the highest rank and I was the de facto Commander of C1.

MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, my instructions are that from the 1st of February 1991, you were no longer the Commander of Vlakplaas.

MR DE KOCK: That is not correct, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: And that it was Mr Baker.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, he worked from Vlakplaas and he was the Commander of the specific group, however I was still the Head of C1. There was no other appointment for the Head of C1, I was still the Head of C1.

MR WAGENER: Please don't misunderstand me. That you were the Commander of C1 is something that I will accept, but I'm proposing that you were no longer the Commander of Vlakplaas.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it's simply an issue of distance between two premises. I had access to Vlakplaas at all times and if I wanted to work from there, I would have done so without requesting this from Mr Baker. As a result of etiquette one would have requested it, or requested his permission, but furthermore I was fully authorised to launch operations from Vlakplaas or to store weapons at Vlakplaas, or whatever I wanted to do.

MR WAGENER: Then just a few final aspects, one of them being that you gave colourful evidence here yesterday, regarding how General Engelbrecht would have covered up evidence according to you. In your evidence during this hearing, in this relation, you have referred to certain examples. It is not my objective to take you through each and every one of those examples, however I would like to pause at one or two of these examples, for a brief moment.

You gave evidence about the incident, the incident which is referred to as the Nelspruit incident, if I'm correct.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that is correct.

MR WAGENER: I accept that we understand each other regarding which incident this is, there is no uncertainty here?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: And it was your evidence that with this incident, General Engelbrecht was the one who covered it up - at least I'm not certain about the exact vocabulary that you used, but it was something to that effect.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: Is it correct that this shooting incident took place in the middle of the night?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I wouldn't say it was the middle of the night, I would have said it was early morning, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: Approximately 2 o'clock in the night?

MR DE KOCK: Well, that would be early morning, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: Very well, early morning, 2 o'clock in the night. Is it correct that a local senior police officer from Nelspruit, and I mean that he was then a Colonel Alberts, was on the scene after approximately a half an hour?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I'm not certain of the exact time. I cannot give you a time factor here. However, there was such a Colonel who arrived there.

MR WAGENER: And that there and then on the scene a relation was give to him of what would have happened?

MR DE KOCK: No, that is not correct, Chairperson. I gave him no version of the events, it wasn't possible for me. This Colonel came walking up to me and I referred him to Captain ...

MR WAGENER: Geldenhuys?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, to Captain Geldenhuys, because I didn't have the capacity or the authority to explain the situation because I wasn't completely informed about the situation.

MR WAGENER: Yes. I would just like to state it clearly that it wasn't necessarily you who would have put this version to him, but that within half an hour he arrived at the scene and that he found members of your unit there and that a version was put to him there and then regarding what would have taken place during this incident.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I wasn't present when the version was put to him, and I wouldn't like to speculate about it.

MR WAGENER: I put it to you that this was the case, can you deny it?

MR DE KOCK: I would deny it because I wasn't present when the version was put to him.

MR WAGENER: Thus you deny it?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: It's not being put as I understand it, that you put the version to him, it's that someone else put the version to him. How can you deny it if you weren't there?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, let me just clarify this. When Colonel Alberts arrived by me, I referred him to Captain Geldenhuys and referred him to this person for an explanation as a senior person who was on the scene. I cannot tell you what Captain Geldenhuys' version was.

MR WAGENER: Yes, I accept that. The only statement that I'm making is that Colonel Alberts was already given a version there and then, about involved members at the scene, regarding what happened. That he would have put this on paper and that later - and this would be during your criminal trial, I'm not certain whether it was your criminal trial or whether it was the trial about this incident, but that he later gave evidence about this in Court.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, he did give evidence about this before me.

MR WAGENER: Now the question is this naturally, Mr de Kock, here we already have a version immediately after the time - perhaps I should just put this to you first of all, General Engelbrecht wasn't there that night?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, he arrived there later that morning, during the early morning, - if I might put it like that. I would say between 7 o'clock and 8 o'clock or 7 o'clock and 9 o'clock.

MR WAGENER: Yes. My instructions are that he was there approximately at noon on the following day.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I'm not certain. That is my recollection of the time that he was there.

MR WAGENER: Anyway, when he arrived there, there was already a version which had been told by the members who were on the scene and this was the version that they told to Colonel Alberts.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that would be probable.

MR WAGENER: Was Colonel Alberts a security policeman?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: Now Mr de Kock, how must General Engelbrecht amend or manipulate or adjust a version after the time, after your members have already given a version there and then on the scene?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the morning that General Engelbrecht arrived at the scene I went to him and told him that things had happened here which weren't right, things had happened here which would create problems. In other words, problems for the unit, problems for C1 and naturally then problems for the Security Police and the SAP, in particular.

And from my evidence which was given, or at least not my evidence but evidence from one of the others, the other witnesses from the unit, I would Sergeant Holtzhauzen, General Engelbrecht then mentioned to the members that nobody should make any statements on that day, and no statements were made on that day, as what was the due process after such an incident. Such statements were only made later, approximately a week or a month later here in Pretoria at the covert house from where we worked.

And General Engelbrecht arrived there and he synchronised all these statements from Holtzhauzen, Geldenhuys and the others. Thus, no statements were made at the scene of the incident, or taken down by Colonel Alberts at the scene of the incident. As far as I can recall, certain amendments were brought to the shooting report, with regard to the use of ammunition.

MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, my instructions are, and I put it to you that General Engelbrecht -

MR DE KOCK: I will stand by my version here, it is correct.

MR WAGENER: Just another case that I want to refer you to, the case of Japie Maponya. Is it correct that members of your unit, and I include you in this, that members of your unit made statements to Adv McNally, when he and General Conradie were appointed for their investigation at the end of 1989?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I do recall that. It is vague, but I recall making such statement.

MR WAGENER: Yes, those are my instructions, that you made statements which were in fact dictated by Adv McNally.

MR DE KOCK: Well I don't know whether or not he dictated it. We made the statements. I would just like to clarify however how that situation operated at that stage. Adv McNally was not aware of it, and also not General Conradie, but these statements and interviews took place in the office of the Head of the Investigative Branch, which was a adjacent to the Security Police Head Office and there was a tapping device which was installed in the office where Adv McNally and General Conradie and our members were and the rest of us who still had to make affidavits were sitting on the security side of the building and listening to what was happening there. The entire thing was orchestrated and manipulated.

MR WAGENER: So you made false affidavits to Adv McNally?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that is obvious.

MR WAGENER: And a few months later during the Harms Commission, you once again made affidavits to your own legal representatives.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson. That was before we went to the legal representatives. As I stated yesterday there was a euphemism, we held school. We would look at where the gaps were in our stories and where there could be documentary evidence of something which could indicate something else, and after that we went to the legal representatives.

MR WAGENER: And that was the legal team under the leadership of Adv Sam Maritz of the Pretoria Bar?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: Is that what you're speaking of?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. Sam Maritz and the others were all misled. If we had told them the truth they would have had to withdraw or they would have had to make it public and that was not expected of them.

MR WAGENER: And after the Harms Commission there was a post-mortem inquest?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that is correct.

MR WAGENER: And you and your members once again made affidavits regarding the dossier.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I don't know whether or not we made new statements or whether we used the statements that we made for the Harms Commission.

MR WAGENER: Whatever the case may be, is it correct that the same false version which you gave in the first case to Adv McNally, was put through to the Harms Commission and later the same version was put to the post-mortem inquest, before a Magistrate from Pretoria?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, with the assistance of General Engelbrecht and General van Rensburg and the others, we succeeded in this. The interest was of such that when Warrant Officer Nortje and I waited at the Pretoria Court to give evidence, we were visited by General Johan le Roux and we were congratulated and only the best was wished to us, and he told us that we would be able to succeed with this case, which we did.

MR WAGENER: Yes, now you're dragging somebody else into this whole story, General Johan le Roux, that's not necessary. We all know what the condition of his own amnesty application is. The Japie Maponya matter will be the subject of a later amnesty hearing, so I'm not going to dwell upon that right now. What I'm trying to say, Mr de Kock, is that the deception of the Court is exactly the same line that you and your men had taken from the time of the very first affidavits that you made before Adv McNally in 1989.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, within necessary expertise to help us through it, Chairperson, and precisely from the side of the Generals and the police. I did however go at that stage and make statements, or I made these statements when Judge Goldstone proposed this to me. I had done that Mr Wagener's clients would all be in jail right now and they would be sitting without the benefits of medical aid and pension. That's basically my summary of the events.

MR WAGENER: Yes, this is all very interesting. Is it your evidence that General Engelbrecht manipulated the version and the evidence before the post-mortem inquest, that he covered it up and manipulated it?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, by the time we arrived at Court, all those things had been arranged.

MR WAGENER: When did he do this, according to you?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, from when General Engelbrecht came in among others, he was, or after he took over at least, or when he became the successor to this cover-up he continued among others, to investigate the Japie Maponya situation further, to such an extent that - and I'm just going to repeat the evidence of Nortje, that he sent Nortje to Krugersdorp to fetch a register there which was in use during the Maponya incident. Warrant Officer Nortje returned and gave this to him, to Engelbrecht, and consequently it was destroyed because it was quite a deadly piece of evidence.

Furthermore, there was also manipulation of the work register or work charts of Japie Maponya, where he worked at the bank. This was also done by Engelbrecht. ...(intervention)

MR WAGENER: I beg your pardon. I'm sorry, I interrupted you.

MR DE KOCK: No, you haven't, I'm finished.

MR WAGENER: Thus do I understand you correctly, that you yourselves decided to lie to McNally, that this wasn't Engelbrecht's idea, that he inherited it as such and that he continued with it? Would that be your evidence?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, we are not speaking here of inheritance in the sense that you don't know where these things come from and that you are purely fortunate or lucky.

From the very first day it was an absolute crisis and from that point on it was a situation of permanent crisis management. Not only myself, but Joe Mamasela and all these persons were told from the very beginning "You don't know anything" - the English word for that is "stonewalling", and we kept to that.

MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, my instructions are that you and your men decided to lie to McNally, and that General Engelbrecht at that stage had absolutely nothing to do with it.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it was a very simple situation for Engelbrecht and for Conradie. There was enough or sufficient other documentary evidence which would indicate that we were involved, but they would have had to arrest other Generals and probably a few Brigadiers as well.

MR WAGENER: Yes, I will deal with your obsession later, with regard to the Generals. It seems to me to be a very important aspect to you.

Just to conclude with Maponya. General Engelbrecht denies that during the later course of events he covered up any evidence as you have put it, or manipulated any evidence and that this is purely the idea of you and your men and that you are trying to involve him maliciously in a matter in which he cannot be culpable.

MR DE KOCK: My evidence during my own trial and even here yesterday has never shown any malice towards Engelbrecht. I have never wished anything malicious for him or spoken maliciously to him. I did not refer to him in any derogatory manner, I have always had the most time and respect for him and it will continue as such. I understand his modus operandi of denial, it's nothing new. This has been going on for years.

MR WAGENER: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: And you have the full respect for this man whose modus operandi of denial has been going for years, is that what you're telling us?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, yes, not because he remained silent, but because he was a really good investigator, he was a good officer. He was a good person who was drawn into things which, according to my belief I don't think he agreed with but for the greater interests of the SAP and the country, he decided to become involved with and then offered further assistance in order to protect the country.

MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, I will come back to this aspect of your evidence where you put these wild unsubstantiated allegations about people, specifically Generals, based upon no proof whatsoever. I will return to that.

Just to return to the whole financial aspect, I would just like to ask you two or three questions. Last week you gave comprehensive evidence about the financial set-up at Vlakplaas and how false claims were used in order to finance numerous aspects. - if I might express it that way. Can you recall this?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: You even went as far as saying that in this manner, by means of false claims, you purchased furniture for the Minister?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that's correct.

MR WAGENER: Now how on earth did you get that right, were you the furniture supplier for the Minister?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I was the person who provided the funds from the Secret Fund and it went to Colonel Koekemoer who was the Head of the Financial Division and then they would have made these purchases. However, at a certain stage I did provide furniture and I purchased furniture for Colonel Herman du Plessis, who was General Nick van Rensburg's second-in-command. This was furniture that suited his managerial status. It was worth approximately R18-20 000. The money for this furniture was also obtained by means of false claims.

MR WAGENER: Well let us just keep to this matter of the furniture supply business for the Minister. Did you visit the Minister and see that his furniture wasn't up to standard and decided to purchase some new furniture for him, how did this happen?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, Colonel Louis Koekemoer as he did many times in the past, lodged a request and he also gave me the reasons for his request for this money.

MR WAGENER: So it all boiled down to the idea that the Ministry of Law and Order, if they wanted new furniture for the Minister, didn't have access to the usual budgeted funds which they could use to purchase furniture for the Minister, and they had to go over into a process during which policemen would literally steal money in order to buy furniture for the Minister, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I don't know what the situation at the Department of Law and Order was, however I did obtain the money for those purposes by means of false claims.

MR WAGENER: With the greatest of respect, Mr de Kock, if you believed that that was how the Minister was supposed to obtain furniture, then you would also believe in Father Xmas and the fairies, really.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, since the age of four I have not believed in Father Xmas.

MR WAGENER: Well I am putting it to you that this is absurd. It is absurd that this was the manner in which a department had to obtain furniture for its Minister.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I will reiterate this. This is the reason why I put in these false claims and I had no reason, or at least I was never informed and I never asked Mr Koekemoer, and he never told me any mis-truth about why he required this money.

MR WAGENER: And without going into too much detail, I'm putting it to you that it is equally absurd that many of the other previous examples that you have given by means of which certain apparatus or equipment had to be purchased, that this was done with stolen money. The police could have done so by means of the usual budget process and using State funds.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I don't know, I just deal with the requests that were put to me, I executed them and that is why I mentioned those situations. There is no other reason for this.

CHAIRPERSON: I just want to clarify something in my own mind. When Colonel Koekemoer came to you, this was furniture for the Minister's office was it?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: There's no suggestion of any personal benefit for the Minister?

MR DE KOCK: No, there was no personal benefit for the Minister. I just want to confirm further that when Colonel du Plessis left the Force, that furniture remained behind at the Security Office, he didn't take it home or attempt to sell it.

CHAIRPERSON: And I take it that the furniture would appear on the records of the Department ...(intervention)

MR DE KOCK: I don't know, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: ... as the normal way in Government offices? It is an inventory of the contents of offices.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, yes, annually those items would have to be accounted for because otherwise what were they doing in the office? However, I don't have any record of that.

MR WAGENER: And I also accept, Mr de Kock, that you are aware of the normal Civil Service practice, that there are committees responsible for - I think they use the word "Procurement Administration", and they're usually responsible for buying equipment and furniture and so forth. Are you aware of such a process?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. I only have knowledge of the Department of Public Works. They provided the furniture. I don't know the rest, it wasn't my field.

MR WAGENER: And then just to add to the question of the Chairperson. This component of a department, and in this case your department, would then have to account for all the equipment and furniture, that it is on a register and so forth?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I had no record and I never gave record. I can give you an example where we had bought 4 .22 Ruger pistols with silencers and telescopes and that was bought by means of the Secret Fund, and these pistols were used in covert operations.

MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, I find that you every time try to talk away from the furniture. Every time when I refer to the Minister's furniture, it's either Colonel du Plessis' furniture or pistols. I'm just trying to indicate the absurdity concerning the furniture for the Minister, and every time your answer tries to take it away from that.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I maintain what I have said, it is correct as I have put it. If Mr Wagener wants to see it as being absurd he is welcome to do that.

MR WAGENER: Another instance of claims. You testified about funds which were given to Joe Mamasela during the Harms Commission, by means of false claims.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: Are you quite certain that it was by means of false claims?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, because I wrote out false claims and I only received the receipts, I didn't even receive the money.

MR WAGENER: My instructions are, Mr de Kock - and once again I'm going to give some evidence, as State Attorney I had instructions concerning the claims of Mamasela, whether it could be paid from the special account. Are you aware of that?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, as far as I can recall Mr Baker and myself wrote false claims from the Secret Fund to keep Mamasela within the framework.

MR WAGENER: Are you aware of the fact that there was legal opinion given that these monies could be paid from this fund?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I did not have knowledge of that. The claims that I submitted were not for Mr Mamasela and then the reference for the approval with the operation number, these claims were written out by means of a so-called fund for two limpet mines or three weapons and the amount was then given for the purpose thereof - well to keep Mamasela within the framework.

MR WAGENER: I want to put it to you that there was official authority requested and it was given for these claims and that it wasn't necessary to steal the State's money for this. It would have been a normal transaction.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, that was most probably how it had to work, but that is not how it happened and I did write out false claims for Joe Mamasela, and it was on more than one occasion.

MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, then I also just briefly want to address issues concerning your own application for amnesty. I noticed that, I think the last 20/25 incidents in your amnesty application are all incidents where you yourself were not involved, where you did not commit any offence, but where you had heard stories from other people and on the basis thereof you then thought that it would good to apply for amnesty. Can you remember?

MR DE KOCK: If you can perhaps just mention the incidents, then I can answer you.

MR WAGENER: I mode notes of them all. Just as an example let's just discuss one or two. You applied for amnesty for the murder of Anton Lubowski, do you remember that?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I did not apply for his death. There was information on the periphery that I provided, and that was on the basis of the testimony of the spoken word of people who had been there.

MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, on page 754 of your application you apply for the murder of Lubowski.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, not for his murder. If I had information and I did not give it to someone, then in that process a finger could be pointed at me. But the amnesty process as far as I can remember, then wants you to make all relevant information available.

MR WAGENER: And I see in this particular incident a colleague phoned you, that was the day after Lubowski's death, and asked you whether you had read the news.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, as far as I can recall it was early in the morning, well not early in the morning, I think it was approximately eight in the morning, and Mr Lubowski was shot at night and ...(intervention)

MR WAGENER: I beg your pardon, sorry. And based on this telephonic conversation your very rampant imagination then led to you applying for amnesty without any evidence of any nature.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I had the information. I provide it for further investigation. This process is to get information about the past and based on that you then provide all the information at your disposal.

MR WAGENER: Now because a colleague phoned you and told you to look at the news, you then make this great inference that it must have been him or one of the other colleagues and then you apply for amnesty. You have no evidence whatsoever.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, what happened was a former colleague whom I know quite well - when the phone call was made he was a member of the CCB and he was resident in a hotel where other members of the CCB were present and they are now being involved with the Lubowski issue. That was the information that I had and it's relevant. And because of the nature of the work that we were involved with later on you could perhaps say that a certain operation had a fingerprint. In other words you could perhaps say that this was a military operation or a police operation.

MR WAGENER: I'm going to argue the fact Mr de Kock, that this incident and also the other incidents and examples that you have given in your testimony, that you very vaguely heard the bell ringing, that you then draw your own conclusions without any evidence or proof and that you also then have it here as the absolute truth. And that is without you having any substantial factual basis for it.

MR DE KOCK: I will leave that to Mr Wagener's imagination to continue with that, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: If the Chairperson will allow me, I'm not going to deal with all these incidents, but perhaps just another example where you refer to the poisoning of Rev Frank Chikane.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Are these matters being heard later?

MR WAGENER: I don't know.

MS PATEL: I'm not certain what the status of those matters are at this stage, but I believe ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: If it's an application for amnesty in respect of a murder, surely it must be a public hearing.

MS PATEL: Ja. I don't know that they've been scheduled yet though, Honourable Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, I don't want discuss the merit of these applications, the only point that I'm trying to make is that also in this incident and then also based on the hint by the Chairperson I will not deal with the facts, but that you are sitting in a bar and you hear stories and based on those stories you then draw conclusions and then you see them as being facts. That's the only point that I'm trying to make, and that will be part of my argument.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct) that's he's too prudent, that he's too careful and makes application for matters that he may be involved in just in case he is. Is he being blamed for that now?

MR WAGENER: Mr Chairman, it's got nothing to do with being careful. The point I'm trying to make is that this applicant before you, giving evidence here, has a notion to hear often, even in a pub situation, vague references to matters of which he doesn't know the true facts and he presents it here before you as being factually correct. That's the point.

CHAIRPERSON: That is when he gives evidence. When he makes his application he is merely doing so in cases where he may be vicariously responsible, isn't he? Does he say more than that in this application? Does he say he had any personal dealings with it?

MR WAGENER: That's exactly the point, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Does he say it, that he had any personal dealings in connection with the death of Lubowski?

MR WAGENER: That's exactly the point. He was not involved at all.

CHAIRPERSON: So what he's frightened of, if it is frightened, is vicarious liability.

MR WAGENER: Although Mr Chairman, with due respect, the point is there is no basis for him even to draw this as a factual deduction. That is the point. The fact that he's very careful, it may even be attributed to trying to be sensational.

ADV SANDI: Sorry Mr Wagener, just for my own clarity, this Anton Lubowski incident you've been referring to, has Mr de Kock implicated your client, Mr Engelbrecht?

MR WAGENER: Not at all, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: So you're no longer representing your client, you're having a general attack at the applicant at this stage.

MR WAGENER: Mr Chairman, I was under the impression that I would allowed to ask questions beyond the Chand incident, but if you indicate to me that I'm not allowed to ask questions ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I can't see the relevance of them. If it's a matter that's going to be heard, you can ask those questions when it is heard. If he has made such an application it will have to be heard.

MR WAGENER: Of course, Mr Chairman - I haven't seen on the schedules that these incidents have been scheduled, but course you're correct. If those hearings are scheduled, then these questions could be asked there, of course. The mere point I'm trying to raise is regarding the credibility of this witness, and I was under the impression that I'm entitled to do so, but I'll step off this point.

Mr de Kock, I will make this the last point. In your criminal trial and also during evidence at amnesty hearings on various occasions I have heard how you then said things about the Generals, do you remember that?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I made very strong statements, that's correct.

MR WAGENER: Are you embittered?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson. In the house that I grew up and during my service inside and outside the borders of the country, my perception has always been - and that was also the way in which I saw life, that the Generals had walked ahead. A General had moral integrity and he does not turn his back on his men.

Mr Wagener made a big issue of this, to say that I'm a liar, that the Generals say that I'm a liar. They said it in '94, they said it '95, they said it in '96, during the trial. Now once again they're saying that. But if we think back to last year, and this is within my context, and we think of Khotso House, all these Generals who had said that I had lied applied for amnesty. I don't know, perhaps there is a problem with the Generals.

MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, where Generals have been guilty - this is my instruction, well that's according to the Generals for whom I'm appearing, they are applying for amnesty where they feel that they have been guilty. And you refer correctly to Khotso and Cosatu house. My question is in general, although you say that you are not embittered towards the Generals, I have to say to you that throughout I detect an embittered attitude, enmity, towards the Generals.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, in 1994 before Judge Goldstone where the opportunity was given to me and where I could have made statements, then he would have visited his clients in C Max and he would have consulted with them there. And I still maintain that.

MR WAGENER: Mr Chairman, thank you for the opportunity granted.

CHAIRPERSON: Before we go on, I would request Ms Patel to make enquiries of the office in Cape Town as to whether the Lubowski matter has been set down for hearing, if so, when or whether it is going to be set down for hearing, and when she has obtained such information, to let Mr Wagener have it.

MR WAGENER: Thank you.

MS PATEL: I'll certainly endeavour to do so, Honourable Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Because there have been matters in the past

where due to computer failure, if one can be kind, applications have been set down which don't cover all the persons who have referred to them, and it may be that this has been set down as a separate incident without having notice of Mr de Kock's application in regard to it.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS PATEL: Thank you, Honourable Chairperson. Ramula Patel.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you appearing for the victims?

MS PATEL: For the victims, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: I see.

MS PATEL: Mr de Kock, from your evidence yesterday, do I understand you correctly that the motivation or one of the motivations in attacking the Chand family was as a result of Tony Oosthuizen having lost control over Mr Chand and the infiltration route for the PAC that had been set up with Mr Oosthuizen's assistance?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the inability of Mr Oosthuizen to further manage and control this operation led to the fact that - I don't want to say that there was a whole flood, but that there were many trained PAC people who infiltrated the country with weapons.

MS PATEL: Okay. Can you give us an indication perhaps of how long this had taken place? Over period was Tony Oosthuizen involved with Mr Chand?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I can't give you the specific time-frame I became involved with the Chand situation. The first opportunity was when we caught the four PAC members and Mr Oosthuizen's manager close to Magaliesburg and from there I became involved, but not intensively. I wasn't really drawn into DCC and the whole situation was not explained to me.

MS PATEL: Can you perhaps tell us, before your involvement then with Mr Oosthuizen, would some the PAC members who had been arrested as a result of that operation, would they have been turned into Askaris and landed up at Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, if some of them had been arrested then they didn't get to Vlakplaas, because the one only four Askaris from the whole infiltration process were the four that we had captured.

MS PATEL: Alright. And who would have been in control of those Askaris, those PAC Askaris? Would it have been Mr Ras or would it have been you personally?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, as the Commander of C1 and Vlakplaas they would have fell under my command, but with the deployment of members to different areas or regions in the country, they could have been divided as individuals or in groups of two to go out with the different section leaders.

MS PATEL: Would that be the different section leaders of Vlakplaas though?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct. I was in command and then there was a second-in-command and during deployment of the groups we also acted as a control or as visiting officers. And depending on the requests made by the different areas where the people had to work, we could divide them in groups of eight or perhaps in four, but then you had a bigger group. That was depending on the nature of the task.

MS PATEL: Alright. The reason I ask you this is because we had an amnesty application that was heard recently in which it was alleged by the applicant, Mr Dlova, that in 1988, July of 1988, they had infiltrated the country with the assistance of Mr Chand, but were subsequently, some of the members were shot and he managed to get away, but this resulted in a roadblock at Lichtenburg in which many police officers were apparently injured.

If my memory serves me correctly, one of the persons who were in the van with them at the time was shot and killed. And they went further to say that one of the parties had been arrested and according to their information had become an Askari. Do you bear any knowledge of this incident?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, not by means of only newspaper, but security reports, I know that there was such an incident. We at C1, at Vlakplaas were not involved in that incident, we weren't even in the area. If the person had become an Askari then he was most probably using one of the branches in the Western Transvaal, but he was definitely not at Vlakplaas as far as I can recall.

MS PATEL: Would Vlakplaas members have had access to those Askaris then, that were used at the Western Transvaal branch?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no. Section C2 which did identification and interrogation of terrorists would have had access to them. The only opportunity that I am aware of where Vlakplaas co-operated with such a group, well similar to Askaris, was in Boputhatswana and a group who worked under the Boputhatswana National Intelligence Service or the Boputhatswana, it's the Internal Intelligence Service.

MS PATEL: Okay. Can you tell me Sir, the PAC Askaris that you would have had at Vlakplaas at the time of this operation, can you give us an indication of how many they were?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it's going to be very difficult, but I think it would be in the region of perhaps 80, and perhaps even more. It's a very rough estimate. We later divided and some of these Askaris went to East London and Durban, where they also formed units.

MS PATEL: Okay, now I'm basically interested in your figures as at the time of this incident. Do you have any idea which parts of the country these Askaris would have come from? Would some of them have come through the infiltration route that Tony Oosthuizen had set up?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the operation that was launched against the Chands dealt with PAC members who were infiltrated by the Chands. We didn't have any other infiltration routes, for example through Zimbabwe or Lesotho, it was only this one specific line that we had.

MS PATEL: Would it be fair for me then to infer that a large number of those Askaris would then have come through the route and possibly through Mr Chand, into the country and then to Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the only Askaris that we got were the four PAC members who later became Askaris and then came to Vlakplaas. I have no knowledge of any other who were captured or arrested or who were kept at other places or who were recruited elsewhere, I only have knowledge of the four.

MS PATEL: Is it correct then for me to say that you're not really certain, bar the four that came through this infiltration route, where the rest of your Askaris had come from?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, usually we were told that there was an Askari coming from Soweto, he has already been interrogated, he had already testified or will testify. You would for example get an incident where a person was captured in Kimberley and the same situation would occur there.

Former members of the ANC or PAC came to us within two weeks, in other incidents it took more than a year before they came to Vlakplaas. There wasn't a specific set rule.

MS PATEL: Alright. After Mr Ras had given you the information that you had asked him to collect, I would imagine that a plan was put into place. Can you give us the details of that plan, who was meant to do what?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it is very difficult to say after such a long time, but I will do my best. The information that he would have gathered would have been among others, about the area that we would have to move in first, what the area on our side was like, what the area on the other side was like, the Security Forces on our side, the Security Forces on the other side. In other words, the Botswana border patrol and so forth. We would have to investigate the possibility of the construction of the house, fencing, lighting, alarms. One would have to investigate the general movement of the public in that environment, one would have to investigate whether Mondays are quieter than Sundays or whether Saturdays would be busier that Friday nights for example.

In this case one would have had to examine how busy the border post was over weekends in comparison to midweek or Wednesdays. Wherever it was possibility within our ability, we had to obtain as much knowledge of the spectrum as possible. And upon that basis infiltrate the country for purposes of the operation.

CHAIRPERSON: I understand that on this occasion you sent Mr Ras off in the morning and he came back in the afternoon and you did the operation that night.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, no. There had already been information that had been collected. And when I sent Mr Ras for the last time was after we had undertaken the planning, packed the weapons and arrived at the starting point and that is when I sent him for a final time, just to make certain of everything.

In other words the last time that I sent him was that morning and he returned that afternoon. And that was basically the final confirmation of circumstances, as already determined on the basis of information that was collected. We had to determine whether conditions were still the same or that no observable changes had taken place, such as border patrols on their side or our side.

It was almost like a final reconnaissance and a final assessment of the situation, so to speak.

MS PATEL: Mr de Kock do you have any idea how many times or for how long Mr Ras would have reconnoitred the Chand premises?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no, I cannot give you any indication. I don't want to attempt that because I can't.

MS PATEL: Okay, and ...(intervention)

ADV SANDI: Sorry, Ms Patel, just on this, if you will dealing with another aspect. Colonel, are you saying you sent Mr Ras to do a final assessment of the situation for the last time and that was at the stage you had already collected information, how did you go about gathering this information before you sent Mr Ras for the last time?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, this is information that Mr Ras had already been working on, that he had already obtained by means of interrogation of those four PAC Askaris who had been captured by us, and other information that he could collect wherever possible. The problem that we experienced, apart from the time-frame, was also that we couldn't consult with other Intelligence Units in this regard, not even within the SAP.

ADV SANDI: Thank you, Ms Patel.

MS PATEL: Thank you, Sir. Alright. Given the background information, my question was also twofold. What specific plan was put into operation, can you tell us?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the operation which was put into working was that which took place. No other method was formulated. This method based upon the information, was the most effective method and that is the one that we followed.

MS PATEL: Were members of the team given specific instructions, and if so, what were these instructions?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I think two members were tasked with the external defence of the building and by nature of the situation they would have to act if anybody from buildings in the vicinity or surrounding buildings were to interfere. The rest of the team consisted then of the internal penetration group that would go into the house.

MS PATEL: Okay. Just to backtrack for a second. You stated that when the plan was devised all parties would have been appraised of at least the basic reasoning for the operation, not necessarily the relationship between Tony Oosthuizen and DCC, but that the house was being used a transit house. Would the parties have been told that it was used as a transit house for PAC members only?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, according to the information that we had and especially about the PAC members who were in our custody, there was no indication that the ANC was using it or that the Black Consciousness Movement was using it or any other activist organisation.

MS PATEL: The reason I asked you that was because I picked up from Mr Mentz' application or his hearing that he'd indicated that it was ANC who were being infiltrated through the Chand house. Would you like to comment on that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I think he is mistaken because it was definitely a PAC structure. There was never any mention of the ANC.

MS PATEL: Alright, thank you. Did Mr Ras give you the specifics of the interrogation? Did he give you details as to who was living in the house at the time? Did he have that information available according to you recollection?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I have no independent recollection thereof, but he would have indicated that to me. What happened with the interrogation of these Askaris and the information that they provided was that it would be collated and concentrated and then be put forward as a final product. It is possible that he mentioned this to me, but I have no independent recollection thereof.

MS PATEL: And just - if you just for a sec refresh my memory on the information regarding the children, well not the children but the progeny of Mr and Mrs Chand. Did he indicate to you that they did have sons in the house?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I have no recollection of that. What would have emerged however, and now I'm merely inferring, is that there may have been an indication of a number of people, but no specific reference to children or boys, not that I can recall. If he did that then it is only me that has no independent recollection thereof.

MS PATEL: You also say that you expected, besides the family I would imagine, PAC persons in the house, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, one could have readily accepted that.

MS PATEL: What was that expectation based on, was it just generally that the house was used as a transit house or was there specific information in that regard at this specific time?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, at that stage we had already captured or arrested four persons who had infiltrated from there. Furthermore, the information which I collected from Martin Naude at Section C2, indicated that there was a group of 76 terrorists who had already infiltrated or who were already in the country with their weapons, and given those numbers we could reasonably expect that there weren't only person who wanted to infiltrate, but wanted to ex-filtrate for the purposes of reorientation or rest and that they could find themselves at that transit house.

ADV SANDI: Sorry, de Kock, when you say you expected PAC people in the house, do you mean people who have received military training or just ordinary members of the PAC?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, in terms of those persons that we had arrested who were fully armed, as well as the others who had already infiltrated and who were also armed, I expected armed members.

ADV SANDI: Thank you.

MS PATEL: Sir, you mentioned that you also accessed information from Martin Naude. Do you have any idea what he based his information on?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, what I do know is that Martin Naude liaised with the Intelligence Division of the branches in the Western Transvaal and that they were involved in the analysis of information. Head Office was a centralisation point for all information and from there it was processed. And if my memory serves me correctly, he also attended meetings of a group which was called "Trevits". However, I'm not saying that this was the group that made a stipulation, but in that regard Mr Naude had a very broad understanding of the situation in the Western Transvaal, with regard to PAC infiltration.

MS PATEL: Okay. So at least prior to the operation, Mr Naude, if you had requested it from him, would have been able to access information that the other branches, not of Vlakplaas, but the other Security Branch branches would have had on the Chand family, if there was any. Is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I wouldn't know. What he did inform me about - and that is why I recall that number so specifically, what he did inform me about was that there was a number of 76 PAC terrorists had already infiltrated the country by means of that facility, and in guerrilla terms that was a very large number. He didn't tell me whether it was going to happen at one time or whether there would be various group or whether this would take place over an extended period of time. (transcriber's own interpretation)

MS PATEL: I sorry, I may have misunderstood you. Did you say that there were a group of 76 who still wanted to infiltrate or who had already infiltrated the country by the time this operation had been organised?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, that group of 76 had already infiltrated the country, they had already come into the country with their weapons. And in retrospect I wondered after that whether that number of persons who had infiltrated and over whom control had been lost, were not in all probability the activation facility or the activators at least, of this order which was given.

MS PATEL: Okay. My question to you earlier Sir was, would you have been in a position to request from Martin Naude, to ascertain whether there was any other information available on the Chand family at the time?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I didn't request that from him, my order was already very clear. This was a question of which terrorists there were and what he knew about it, about the infiltration and that specific group, and if he had known more about weapons or special equipment he would have informed us about it, but I didn't ask him anything about the structures or the persons as such.

MS PATEL: Can you explain why you didn't attempt to ascertain whether there was other information available? Is it that you merely left it to Mr Ras?

MR DE KOCK: I left it to Mr Ras. As I've already said yesterday, I assume responsibility if there was a lack of information and if it was consequently my fault.

MS PATEL: Can you say whether Mr Ras would have been in a position to request information from Mr Naude?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, yes, I believe that he could have gone directly, however he would probably have done this through me. And that which I had already collected was sufficient for my purposes.

MS PATEL: Okay. Sorry, Honourable Chairperson, if you will bear with me for a moment.

Now - okay, perhaps I should put it to Mr Ras, but in all fairness I think I should say it to you as well, that according to my instructions the guard that you say you didn't expect, apparently that guard was placed at the gate on a 24-hour basis.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it may be so. However, I don't know whether he was appointed as a guard who stood there all day and whether he remained there all the time. I don't wish to speculate about that. I would accept that he was a 24-hour guard.

MS PATEL: My instructions are also that Mr Samsodien Chand had three sons who lived with him all the time, that their names were Imran, who was 17 years old, Armien, who was 23 years old and Riedwaan, who was 26 years old. The latter two were both deaf and dumb and had, inasfar as it was possible for them given their limitations, had assisted the family in the business but were not gainfully employed anywhere else given their limitations, and this is has always been the case. The younger son Imran was still schooling at the time and was schooling in an area nearby. And that they were all three killed in this attack on the house.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the first section of the question I will take not of here. With regard to the second section of the question, regarding the fact that were killed, I am aware of it and by nature of the situation, as in my other applications, I would like to tell the family that that loss can never be recovered and that I deeply regret that loss as unnecessary as it was, that we in this country would sooner fight each than talk it out.

MS PATEL: You've stated ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Before you go on. You mentioned they assisted the family in the business, what business?

MS PATEL: May I take instructions on what the nature of the business was, Honourable Chairperson?

CHAIRPERSON: And where was it carried on.

MS PATEL: Alright. Do you want me to do that now, Honourable Chairperson?

CHAIRPERSON: You can do it at the adjournment.

MS PATEL: At the adjournment, okay.

If I may proceed, Sir. Mr de Kock, on page 6 of your application you state that:

It is the last line on page 6.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MS PATEL: Given that it was - I would imagine, common knowledge that Mr Chand lived there with his wife and so he had a family. Why was there never any proper investigation down as to exactly who else would be in the house? - give that the instructions were that everybody was to be killed.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, in this case the man and the woman were targeted by General van Rensburg - we refer you to a plurality of persons, and that was my idea when it came to everybody in the house. Apart from the fact that I said that we could expect that if other persons were there, they could be members of the PAC. I believe that if we had been granted a longer period of time, if it hadn't been so urgent, if we had more time to undertake observation over a period of a month or two or three we would probably have had that portion of the picture as well. However we did not purposefully destroy these people.

MS PATEL: Given the timing that you had, I'm instructed by the daughter of Mr Chand, that she was told by her mother the week before the attack had taken place, that she was very concerned because there were helicopters flying around in the area. Can you ...(intervention)

MS PATEL: ... can you tell us whether Mr Ras had access to helicopters as part of his reconnaissance?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, we didn't use helicopters, we also didn't use microlight aeroplanes and we didn't have any helicopters that were flying in that area.

MS PATEL: Okay. Sorry, I'm sure I've asked you this already, but if you can just bear with me. Mr Ras at no stage said that bar the husband and wife, there was any other family in the house? - or you couldn't recollect whether he had said that or not.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I have no independent recollection thereof, but he may have mentioned to me that there were more people than the man and the wife in the house. If he had said that to me we would probably have regarded this as more members of the PAC.

MS PATEL: Well I want to put it to you Sir, that if Mr Ras had done his job properly he would have, he must have known that there were sons in the house and that this information would have been relayed to you.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, Mr Ras' work had always been thorough in my opinion, however there was no mention of which I have an independent recollection, during which he mentioned sons or family that were living with the Chands. Yesterday I also explained that I would have incorporated this in the planning of an operation. However I have no independent recollection thereof.

MS PATEL: Okay. What was the purpose in bombing up, in using the explosives?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, that was to ruin that building as a facility and to deprive the PAC of that building as a facility. Due to it's proximity to the border post we would also not be able to search the house in order to determine whether or not there were weapons there. These weapons would probably have been concealed along with any other explosives. However, that was of secondary importance. The primary objective was to deprive the PAC of this structure as a facility.

MS PATEL: Sorry Sir, what did you say about the weapons? I didn't get that.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MS PATEL: Okay, alright.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you going onto something else now?

MS PATEL: I'm just checking my notes, I might be almost through.

CHAIRPERSON: Perhaps this would be a convenient stage and you can take instructions on that other point.

MS PATEL: Okay, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: We'll take the short adjournment now.

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: (s.u.o.)

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS PATEL: (Cont)

Thank you, Honourable Chairperson. In response to your query, the nature of the business, it was just a normal general dealer store that they had and the buildings were separate. The house ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Was it adjoining the house?

MS PATEL: No, it wasn't, it was about 15 metres away from the house.

CHAIRPERSON: Well that's ...(indistinct)

MS PATEL: Ja, ja. Okay.

Mr de Kock, are you ready, can we proceed?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MS PATEL: Sir, you stated that during the operation you were injured because you fell down the embankment. Can you tell us where this embankment is, is it close to where the guard was standing at the gate?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, when you moved along to the fence in the direction of the house, there was a kind of embankment and after the third shot, if I recall correctly, I moved backwards to get a better silhouette. There is a hospital close-by to this settlement and it was these kinds of lights, a similar sort that you would get a sports stadium, but I had to get a better silhouette.

It was difficult to shoot this person, and in moving backwards, and not to lose sight of your target, I then had almost a free fall and landed on my left knee. And then my knee was injured to such an extent that I thought that I had shot myself or perhaps that someone had accidentally shot me but at that stage the people moved away. It's a kind of embankment which goes down like this.

MS PATEL: Sir, there are two things that arise from your response. Firstly, my instructions are that there is no hospital nearby and secondly, that there is no embankment near the fence where the guard was.

CHAIRPERSON: Let's deal with them one by one. Firstly, it's been put to you there's no hospital there. What do you say to that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I could perhaps confuse this with another incident, but as far as I can recall it was a hospital set up there where the floodlights were used.

CHAIRPERSON: And the next question - it was put to you there is no embankment.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, there was most definitely. It wasn't a question of me losing my balance and slipping and for that distance that I fell there was no ground and then this sudden bang on my knee. And as I can recall there was a type of embankment.

MS PATEL: A moment please. Honourable Chairperson, thank you for that.

My instructions are Sir, that the lights that you refer to don't come from a hospital, that it's possible that it comes from the border gate lights. So that sorts that out. And then secondly, that the embankment is not near the fence, that it's at least 20 meters away from the fence where the guard is.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I would not disagree concerning the slope or this embankment, but I did not move backwards for 20 metres, I would say that it was for approximately a metre to two metres that I moved backwards, whilst my weapon was still aimed at the guard so that I could not lose him as a target because the silhouette wasn't very good. And I will accept with regard to the lights, that that was the situation. I would concede that.

MS PATEL: Sir, can I ask you - just to move onto a different aspect, that at the end of the day Mr Chand, Tony Oosthuizen was Mr Chand's handler, he set him up, he gave him the money to run the operation and he gave a 4x4 vehicle, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I have no knowledge of the 4x4, the only 4x4 that I saw was driven by a black man who was an employee of Tony Oosthuizen, or an agent and then the four PAC members that we captured.

Regarding the money for the Chands or whatever their remuneration was, I can't give you any information on that, but they were most definitely sources for DCC, and also members of the PAC, as I understood it.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you give any money to Oosthuizen?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, this was a DCC project and the project of DCC is purely and alone. And I also said yesterday that it had been approved or had to be approved on a much higher level because it also had foreign implications that would include vehicles, liaison with other departments, also funds. So as project, it should also have been established and approved on a much higher level than Mr Oosthuizen.

MS PATEL: You wouldn't be in a position to deny however, that Mr Chand was given money and that he was given a 4x4 vehicle with a specific intention of assisting in infiltrating the PAC members into the country.

MR DE KOCK: I would not deny it, and with the advantage of hindsight I will confirm it.

MS PATEL: Alright. Now my question to you Sir, is that if it was Tony Oosthuizen who had set up the Chands, if he was assisting DCC, if Mr Chand was assisting DCC, and it was Tony Oosthuizen who in all likelihood had gone against the grain, why was it necessary to deal with the problem in the manner that you did? I mean why didn't you rather go to Tony Oosthuizen and say: "Look, we're experiencing this problem" and discipline him rather than take an innocent person out, who was assisting you and who was in fact set up by you? I don't understand the reasoning behind that, could you perhaps help?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, C1, or my unit never had any terrorists infiltrated, we also did not put the Chands to assist with the infiltration of terrorists or acts of terror. Personally the idea surfaced with me that we should perhaps go and talk to Tony Oosthuizen. In that regard I didn't know how approachable he would have been, he had his own style of management. My instruction was not to ...(end of tape)

MR DE KOCK: ... with Tony Oosthuizen, the instruction was to destroy the facility, the man and the woman as well, and if Brigadier or General van Rensburg would have wanted us to frighten them or scare them, there would have been many ways in which we could have done it. We could have fetched them during the night, taken them to the RSA, where van Rensburg could have talked to them, where he could have told them to stop it. I don't know whether there were any decisions on a higher level. The fact that the Chands assisted the PAC to infiltrate the country, never assisted anyone, Chairperson.

MS PATEL: Did you not question your instructions, given your knowledge that Tony Oosthuizen was in fact the person who had set up this operation with the Chands?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson no, my questioning would have been - after I'd received the instruction from van Rensburg I went to Martin Naude and it was a question of confirmation, I wanted confirmation of what van Rensburg had told me, whether that was in fact the case. And it was confirmed and I went from van Rensburg's office to Naude.

MS PATEL: But you had known by that stage already what Tony Oosthuizen was doing, not so, because you had assisted him in previous cases where he needed help, and also you realised that what he was doing in a sense wasn't kosher, to put it - if you understand.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, here we have a situation, we could perhaps have thrown a shock grenade to the house and they could decide that evening to leave the house, but that would not mean that the infiltrations of terrorists would have been stopped. It would also not stop the infiltration of weapons into the country, and would also not have prevented the public from being, having difficulties. I don't want to make a statement here that I only carried out orders, I won't do that,

I will take responsibility for my people. The idea that I have is that this operation went too far and I am not aware of it if perhaps they hadn't talked to Tony Oosthuizen and that he ignored it. That is an inference that one could make if you analyse the information. And the death of the Chands, not the physical aspect thereof, but if one looks at the reasons and the way in which they had been drawn into it, I would blame him for that.

MS PATEL: Then finally, just the question of the urgency. From the information we have - I mean I look at the Lichtenburg incident, it occurred at least two years prior to the attack taking place, it seems obvious that Tony Oosthuizen had to an extent lost control over the infiltration route for a long time. Can you then explain, given that, why it was so urgent that you couldn't plan this operation properly, that alternatives weren't discussed?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I did not know during the incident at Lichtenburg, that Tony Oosthuizen had been involved with something like that. If I can recall correctly, I didn't even know that there was someone like Tony Oosthuizen.

My liaison with DCC was with Colonel At Nel, who was second-in-command of DCC, and two of the other members who were involved with ANC issues. I did not really become involved with the PAC issues. The PAC wasn't a problem for us in the same nature as the ANC was, to the same extent. They were just as dangerous, but it was not to the same extent and scope that the ANC was.

CHAIRPERSON: Then was this Lichtenburg matter ANC?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, my information was that it was PAC.

MS PATEL: Alright. Thank you, Honourable Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Re-examination?

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr de Kock, the instruction was that the facility had to be destroyed, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Could you just repeat.

MR HATTINGH: The instruction that you had received was that this facility had to be destroyed and that the people had to be killed and the house had to be destroyed.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Now if you had known - this is hypothetical, if you had known that there were adult sons living in the house, would that have led to the fact that you would not have executed the instruction?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, we would still have executed it. I perhaps would just have amended it or adapted it, based on the information at our disposal.

MR HATTINGH: You have already said that you foresaw the possibility that there could also have been armed terrorists in the house.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, it was expected that there would be people.

MR HATTINGH: And was the attack launched on that premise?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, the attack was aimed as the approach of a hard target, in other words we're going to fight to get in and fight to get out.

MR HATTINGH: Was that the type of situation where you would enter the house and first wake the people and ask them who they are and what they were doing, or was it a different kind of situation?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, that kind of operation and as it had been planned and also the same with other incidents in the past, in the first instance it was a surprise element, you attack with everything at your disposal and you also destroy everything in your way. On to the operatives, it was expressly stated that they had to use their own discretion, we were not here involved with a zombie force.

MR HATTINGH: Was the operation planned in such a way that the house had to be entered and that people would be shot at randomly?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And according to what you obtained later on, was it also executed in that way?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: If you had known that there were grown-up sons in the house which was used as a terrorist venue, would you have thought that they would be part of this?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I would because obviously it is impossible for adults to live in such an environment every day and not be members of the PAC, or to see terrorists, one could assume that if people are infiltrated to the RSA, although the weapons might not have been conspicuous, that they would in fact be armed.

MR HATTINGH: Colonel de Kock, the reconnaissance which was done by Mr Ras, did it reveal that apart from Mr and Mrs Chand, there were also members of the family staying with them?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I can't recall that independently, but that information would have been gathered by the interrogation of the Askaris that we had at Vlakplaas. We could not at that distance have seen that that was a member of the family or that would only be a visitor. That was one of the problems that you have and that would limit your observational ability.

MR SIBANYONI: When the four PAC members were interrogated, they mentioned that they were infiltrated through the Chand family. Was this problem raised with Mr Tony Oosthuizen?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, at that stage it was only Mr Ras, myself and a small group of people who had knowledge of that. The instruction was clear that this information, this operation, would not go any further than the gates of Vlakplaas because of the sensitivity thereof.

CHAIRPERSON: But these four men, as I understood it, Oosthuizen had asked you to take action against them and to kill them. You said you arrested them

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And he had told you they were coming through, they were infiltrators coming into the country.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson. I realised later on after the arrest of these people, that Oosthuizen saw that as a danger for his sources, in other words the Chands who assisted with this infiltration. In other words that the reference that these four PAC members, that they could make to identify the Chands, could perhaps have been leaked and that would have jeopardised the whole operation. That is one of the reasons why these people were never charged, all four were sent to Vlakplaas.

MR SIBANYONI: Did I hear you correctly when you were answering questions from Ms Patel, that according to your information the Chand family were PAC members?

MR DE KOCK: I won't say that they were members of the PAC, but they worked for the PAC as well as for the DCC. They were double-agents.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you, no further questions, Mr Chairperson.

ADV SANDI: Just one, thank you.

When you say the Chand family were working for the PAC and the DCC, do you mean each and every member of that family? Who are you talking about in that family?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, in this instance the information and instruction was that it was the Chand man and woman who were responsible for the infiltration. In other words, they were the determining factor in this whole project, the project of Oosthuizen.

Let me put it to you in this way, I had no doubt that the PAC did not know that the Chands were also working for Military Intelligence, otherwise they would never have sent their members to them. In other words, the PAC had the wrong impression, that the Chands were working for DCC.

ADV SANDI: And you had no such information about the three other members of the family that have been referred to, the children of the Chands? You didn't have such information?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I have no independent recollection that it had been said, or where there was reference made of three children or sons, but by determining the figures it's very important to know the number of people, that perhaps that could have been mentioned, that we could expect more people. And in that regard, I would have made the inference and the observation that we could accept that it would be members of the PAC, or busy with an infiltration or ex-filtration.

ADV SANDI: When you testified last week, I personally gained the impression that you were not just an ordinary commander, you had some measure of discretion. Would that be a fair understanding of your testimony last week?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, each commander had discretion that he has to apply. Just to give you an indication, your Special Force, like your reconnaissance people are usually selected from the ordinary members because they are people who can think independently, they don't have cattle mentality. The person from day one has to act as an individual person, so yes, you can use your discretion. Your discretion is then confined and limited, based on the danger of the situation in which you find yourself.

The attack on the Chand house is not a normal police function, and you have a different kind of approach in handling such cases.

ADV SANDI: Is there any reason why in your discussions with Mr van Rensburg you did not suggest to him that: "We should not be killing the Chands, but rather we should deal with Oosthuizen or even organise a clandestine killing of Oosthuizen, if need be"?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I think by the time the instruction came to us or myself to attack the Chands, nothing could be done concerning Oosthuizen. In other words, this situation could perhaps have been approached with him or his superiors, and that he ignored it, and that the infiltration of PAC terrorist was continuing and that was the only way to put an end to it. I don't know what the interpersonal liaison was higher up of General van Rensburg to other units.

CHAIRPERSON: The problem with an approach to Oosthuizen was that the contact between the Chands and the PAC would have remained. He wasn't merely Oosthuizen's operative, he was working for the PAC, the Chands were working for the PAC.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, they worked for the PAC and they worked for Oosthuizen and this process would have continued. In some other manner, let us use the word "neutralise", which doesn't necessarily indicate that we would have to kill them "let's persecute them, let's blow up his shop and phone him and say you're next", but that was never told to us. At the time that I received the instruction it was, level the facility.

ADV SANDI: Thank you, Colonel. Thank you, Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: I take it Mr Ras will be giving evidence. Do you know if that is the position?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: So he can tell us about what he did. I won't bother you then. Thank you.

MR DE KOCK: Thank you, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: We haven't discussed at the pre-trial meeting, the order in which the applicants should give evidence, and I don't know whether you gentlemen have discussed amongst yourselves or whether we should merely proceed with the order on the list. I'm in your hands there.

MR JANSEN: Mr Chairman, if I could come in here. We, subject to your approval, agreed that Mr Ras be the next applicant. Logically that would make the most sense.

CHAIRPERSON: It seems to be sensible, he's the one who can give us the background and the others should just slot into place after that.

MR JANSEN: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well.

MR JANSEN: Thank you, Mr Chairman. It's Jansen on record, I appear for Mr Ras and I wish to call him as a witness in his application. Thank you, Mr Chairman.

MR LAMEY: Mr Chairman, before we proceed, I was given to understand by my colleague Rossouw, who attended on my behalf at the last pre-hearing meeting, that he made available a supplementary portion of Willemse's amnesty affidavit, which is not complete in the bundle. Ms Patel told me she can't remember whether that in fact happened.

CHAIRPERSON: I don't seem to have it, I have another one from Mr Ras. None of us have one from Willemse.

MR LAMEY: Thank you, I'll then give it to Ms Patel and see to it that ...

MS PATEL: I was given the extra page by my learned friend earlier on and they've made copies.

MR LAMEY: That is in connection with Bosch, not Willemse. I do have a copy of Willemse also.

MARTIENS D RAS: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR JANSEN: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr Ras, you are an applicant for amnesty with regard to the murder of six persons, including the Chand family during April 1990, is that correct?

MR RAS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR JANSEN: During April 1990, what was your rank?

MR RAS: I was a Warrant Officer.

MR JANSEN: You were stationed at Vlakplaas.

MR RAS: Correct, Chairperson.

MR JANSEN: At that stage you had already been, since 1984, connected to Vlakplaas.

MR RAS: That's correct.

MR JANSEN: Just for the sake of background I would like to discuss a few background matters. What did your general work at Vlakplaas involve?

MR RAS: Chairperson, my general duties as a group leader was to work with former PAC and ANC members and I also worked primarily in the Botswana region with the identification of PAC and ANC members who were infiltrating, and the subsequent arrest of such persons.

MR JANSEN: And the group of which you were a leader, was that the typical group within which Vlakplaas had been divided into, these small operational groups which consisted of white officers, black police members and Askaris?

MR RAS: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR JANSEN: And the are in which you worked was the Western Transvaal and the Botswana border?

MR RAS: Yes, primarily.

MR JANSEN: So for an operation in Botswana, you would have been the natural choice as a person, with the preparation of such an operation or for involvement in such an operation?

MR RAS: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR JANSEN: Then before we come to the collection of information with regard to the Chand family and this specific operation, I would like for you to discuss the general manner of information gathering in the police and how you as operatives had access to it. Could you perhaps explain the general structure to the Committee?

MR RAS: Chairperson, there were Security Branches throughout the country who had informers in residential areas and in neighbouring states, who were connected with the ANC and the PAC. Such PAC/ANC informers would report back to their handlers at the various branches, who would compile reports.

Those reports were sent to Head Office, and went to a Desk, either the PAC or the ANC Desk, or to the Schools and Universities Desk. Those files would eventually be sent to the persons who were involved with them, and ultimately they would be filed in a file at Head Office, either the PAC Western Transvaal or ANC Western Transvaal.

MR JANSEN: In other words, it was an information system which was centred at the Head Office in Pretoria?

MR RAS: At Security Head Office, Pretoria, that's correct, Chairperson.

MR JANSEN: And if it was your responsibility to collect information for an operation, whether it be in any place in the country, you would have had access to that information?

MR RAS: Yes, I could obtain such a file from Head Office.

MR JANSEN: And that information I assume would be processed by persons at Head Office, and the value of such information would be evaluated, and in such a manner there would be a certain measure of processing of such information?

MR RAS: Yes, that's correct, Chairperson. C2, at that stage under the leadership of Martin Naude and the others, was responsible for the interrogation of arrested PAC and ANC members, as well as the processing of all information which came their way from the various branches in the country.

MR JANSEN: I assume that you would also have had access to the information officers or persons who dealt specifically with the processing of information?

MR RAS: Well if we were sharing the same floor we saw each other every morning and we were at Head Office together, so I had access to that.

MR JANSEN: Now to come to your application itself. You have before you your initial application, which you compiled for the purposes of the particular Act, the Act for the Promotion of National Reconciliation?

MR RAS: That's correct.

MR JANSEN: Mr Chairman, that's from page 116 of the papers, of the bundle.

Along with this application you have recently, on the 19th of May, submitted an additional affidavit about this specific incident, is that correct?

MR RAS: Yes.

MR JANSEN: Mr Chairman, may I enquire whether you actually have that copy before you yourself, and the Committee Members. I know it was given out at the pre-trial hearing. Thank you. Could we mark that A, Mr Chairman, or could that be Annexure A or Exhibit A, or ...

CHAIRPERSON: We haven't had anything else ...(indistinct)

MR JANSEN: We haven't as far as I know.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, may I perhaps just come in here and place on record that I was never notified of the change of the time of the pre-trial conference, and you will recall that I arrived at the end of thereof. I was never placed in possession of any of the extra documents that were handed out at the pre-trial conference, I did not even know of these documents.

CHAIRPERSON: Perhaps your colleagues could assist you in this, that those who handed in documents, perhaps they could make available copies to you.

MR JANSEN: Yes, I'm just placing that on record, and I will take it up with Ms Patel. Thank you, Mr Chairman.

MR WAGENER: Mr Chairman, Jan Wagener on record. You will recall we handed up a document called: "Algemene Agtergrond" and as far as I can remember this is Exhibit A.

CHAIRPERSON: Well I think that was Exhibit A in the original hearing, not in this application.

MR JANSEN: Thank you, Mr Chairman. Will this then be A Exhibit or Exhibit A in the Chand incident?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR JANSEN: Mr Ras, I would like for you to begin with the preamble to this operation. Do you confirm the information that you provide in the first paragraph, regarding the contact between the person who is described as Tony Oosthuizen and Colonel de Kock?

MR RAS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR JANSEN: Could you perhaps tell us, you describe in the first paragraphs very briefly and you say in the additional affidavit, Exhibit A, you state that you agree in broad terms with what Colonel de Kock has stated in his amnesty application.

MR RAS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR JANSEN: Can you then tell us in your own words, very briefly, what your recollection is of the incident which apparently led to this incident.

MR RAS: Chairperson, I didn't know Tony Oosthuizen before the operation during which the four PAC members were arrested. What took place there was primarily an exchange of words or a discussion between de Kock and Oosthuizen.

Mr de Kock simply told us that - there was a vehicle of a certain description which he gave us, and mentioned that there were two or four PAC members who wanted to infiltrate the country.

The vehicle was followed from Swartruggens area. If I can recall correctly, a roadblock was established at Magaliesburg, and the four persons were arrested in the vehicle. All of them were armed.

MR JANSEN: If we can just pause there, I don't want to go into too much detail regarding that incident. But your position at that stage was that what you knew about this incident was purely of an operational nature, you didn't really have any knowledge at that stage of the connection with the Chand family and how they fitted into the whole picture?

MR RAS: No, Chairperson.

MR JANSEN: Once again, without discussing too much detail of the incidents, how did this incident lead to the stage when Colonel de Kock gave you the instruction to plan an operation for the destruction of the Chand house and the elimination of the inhabitants of that house?

MR RAS: Chairperson, after this incident Mr de Kock informed me that we had to assist Tony Oosthuizen with a weapons stockpiling location and the arrest of PAC members near Pietersburg.

Once again we used Task Force members who accompanied us. The place where the weapons would have been buried in that vicinity and the vehicle that was supposed to have arrived to fetch these weapons, and regardless of the fact that we undertook 24-hour observation for two days, we did not uncover anything. We then drew the inference that either Mr Oosthuizen had lost control over the weapons which according to him had already been stored in a cache somewhere in the country and he also didn't know where to find the other persons who were going to come and fetch those weapons. I then went to discuss this with Mr de Kock.

MR JANSEN: Very well. And during these discussions, what emanated from these discussions?

MR RAS: It appeared that upon a previous occasion in which Mr de Kock himself had been involved, it also occurred. And I can't recall specifically how long after it took place, Mr de Kock told me that I should plan an operation with regard to the Chand house in Botswana.

MR JANSEN: Now we know that the incident took place approximately on the 21st of the 22nd of April, how long before that incident did this instruction from Mr de Kock come to you, can you recall?

MR RAS: If I recall correctly, it was approximately one month. Firstly, ...(intervention)

MR JANSEN: Before you continue, did Colonel de Kock tell you how and where you should obtain your information, or would he have accepted that you knew?

MR RAS: Chairperson, at that stage I believe that he knew. Because I worked in Botswana he asked whether I knew where the Chand house was. I didn't know exactly where it was and I started at that point with my investigation and enquiries.

MR JANSEN: And what would the purpose of your information collection have been, would it have been for the purposes of operational requirements or for the verification of the Chand family's political activities?

MR RAS: Chairperson, at that stage I believe that the background of the Chands had already become very clear for the other persons and my purpose was to act operationally.

MR JANSEN: Where did you begin with your collection of information?

MR RAS: Chairperson, firstly I began with the persons who I immediately knew had used the house or the facilities at that house. I approached the four PAC members who had been arrested on the farm, the one whose names was Vietnam. I questioned them about the facilities, the persons who were present there and I question individually and asked each one to make me a sketch of the house, both interior and exterior.

MR JANSEN: Okay. We can continue with the process of those discussions later. Which other sources, if I may refer to them as such, did you consult?

MR RAS: Chairperson, I also withdrew the PAC file at Head Office, where I also saw that the Chand family, upon various occasions were mentioned as a transit house, but there were no sketches with regard to the facility as such.

Furthermore, I spoke to Warrant Officer du Plessis from Zeerust, without informing him about the reason for our discussion and for my enquiries, and it didn't appear strange because at that stage I was working with PAC and ANC members who were infiltrating the country from Botswana. Warrant Officer du Plessis was a specialist in his area and from his side he also mentioned that the Chand residence was used as a transit house for the PAC.

MR JANSEN: Did you undertake any observation - or let's get to this point first, how far was the house from the border post? - that would be the Derdepoort border post.

MR RAS: Chairperson, if I recall correctly it was approximately two kilometres. It may have been somewhat less, it may have been between one and two kilometres. That would have been the distance from the border post.

MR JANSEN: What observation did you undertake with regard to the house itself? Did you undertake any observation at all?

MR RAS: Yes, Chairperson, it was possible for me to drive on the border roads, for the purposes of patrol at that stage. There was a hill behind the Derdepoort border post and from there I attempted to take photographs of the premises and also from the gravel road in a northerly direction from the border post.

The place was recognisable as a result of a big eucalyptus tree on the premises, but I couldn't monitor the movements on the premises itself or at the shop which was nearby.

MR JANSEN: Mention has been made of a settlement which was in the vicinity. This isn't a town that we are discussing, it was more a rural kind of settlement?

MR RAS: Yes, a rural settlement in the rural area.

MR JANSEN: Why for example, did you not send in an example to move around in the vicinity of the house, one of the black members or an Askari to patrol in the vicinity of the house?

MR RAS: Chairperson, if I had done so at that stage he would have been identified immediately as a person who didn't belong there, unless he could say who he was visiting or who he was living with. There would have been questions about his presence there.

It was an open area, it was impossible for me to undertake observations from a close point to the area itself, and for those reasons we decided that it wasn't necessary to go any further.

MR JANSEN: What information did you have regarding who the inhabitants were, the inhabitants of this house, who one could expect to find inside the house?

MR RAS: Chairperson, I knew about the guard at the house, Mr Chand and his wife and their two sons who were deaf and dumb.

MR JANSEN: Where did you obtain this information?

MR RAS: From the four PAC members who had spent the night in the house before they infiltrated the country. It came from all four of them that there was a guard in the house and also that two sons who were living in the house were deaf and dumb. The two sons were also responsible for accompanying them to the border, from which point they were picked up and came into the country.

MR JANSEN: Just to be certain, was it there information that the two boys had specifically accompanied those four members to the border crossing point or that it had been them in general?

MR RAS: Chairperson, it wasn't their opinion. I cannot say whether both sons were involved in taking them to the border post, but one of them accompanied these four PAC members as a group to the border post, from where they were picked up and brought into the country by means of a courier.

MR JANSEN: Was there any information about a third son, apparently somewhat younger? The one that we know now as Imran.

MR RAS: Not of them mentioned him and I didn't hear from anyone else that there was a third son in the house.

MR JANSEN: Mention was made during the examination of Mr de Kock, with regard to helicopters which were flying around in that area, do you know anything about this?

MR RAS: Chairperson, at that stage I did not make use of helicopters or aircraft. It was used on previous occasions as a result of my activities there, in order to determine where persons were crossing over from Botswana into the RSA.

MR JANSEN: Did you think at any point that you should undertake observations from aircraft?

MR RAS: Chairperson, no I did not consider it. In the fist place, as a result of the fact that I could make people at the house suspicious. I also knew, as a result of those four person who had lived in the house, how the house looked. They gave me independent sketches of the house, all of which correlated. I knew of at least five persons at the house, and it wasn't necessary for me at that stage.

The photographs that I had, as a result of the big eucalyptus trees near the house, provided clear and sufficient identification for me. I therefore felt that it wasn't necessary to undertake further observation by means of aircraft or helicopters.

MR JANSEN: This information I think it common cause, that you reported everything back to Colonel de Kock.

MR RAS: Yes, that's correct, Chairperson.

MR JANSEN: And some of the other applicants allege that you compiled this operational team or selected this operational team, can you please tell the Committee who exactly decided upon who the members of this particular operational team would be.

MR RAS: Chairperson, what happened was that Mr de Kock selected the members who would go along on this operation. At Zeerust, on the farm where we stayed before we undertook the infiltration, Mr de Kock told me that I should lead the operation, that he would observe it and he told me to select the members that I would want to place in the operation.

MR JANSEN: How long before the incident itself were the other members involved?

MR RAS: Chairperson, it was on short notice, it was approximately a day or two before we left. That is when Mr de Kock told them to prepare themselves for the operation.

MR JANSEN: And then they got together at Zeerust?

MR RAS: Yes, Chairperson.

MR JANSEN: Who informed them there of what the operation would entail and what the operational detail would be?

MR RAS: Chairperson, it's a long time ago, but I think what happened there was that Mr de Kock told them that it was concerning a PAC transit house and the people who were going to be eliminated. I had a sketch plan of the house and the shop, as well as the photos. And then the operation was planned the day before we went in that night.

MR JANSEN: You were also - on the day before the incident you were sent by Colonel de Kock to make, is that correct?

MR RAS: Yes, that was the afternoon before we would enter the night.

MR JANSEN: Can you remember what you told the other operatives concerning who would be present in the house?

MR RAS: Chairperson, if I can recall correctly, we had knowledge of the guard, Mr Chand and his wife, as well as the two sons who permanently resided in the house. It was also mentioned to them that the house was used continuously for transit purposes for infiltration or ex-filtration and that we could possibly also expect additional PAC members who were weaponed, armed.

MR JANSEN: Can you remember what you told those members, whether it was children or if it was sons of Mr Chand, or if it was family of his? Can you remember what your words were, or would you be speculating if you have to say something about it?

MR RAS: As I can recall, I referred to them as the sons.

MR JANSEN: In your application you then continue and you describe the incident - it starts on paginated page 119, continuing to the next page. Do you confirm your exposition here of the events?

MR RAS: Yes, Chairperson.

MR JANSEN: Is there anything that you would like to add concerning the incident?

MR RAS: No, Chairperson.

MR JANSEN: Now after the event, did you hear anything about the incident or did you read anything about it?

MR RAS: As far as I can remember a few days later I read in the newspaper of the incident and also if my recollection is correct, one of the members of the Chand family died on the way to the funeral.

MR JANSEN: At that stage did you read that another family member, the son of the Chands had been present in the house?

MR RAS: Yes. That night Willie Nortje mentioned to me that they found another person in one of the other rooms, but in the newspaper I read later that the other one was a young son, and I didn't have knowledge of him and that he was also a Chand.

MR JANSEN: In your additional affidavit, Exhibit A, you say in paragraph 13 that you know of the Chand family, but that you don't know what the identity was of the other person in the house. That's in paragraph 14 specifically, is that correct?

MR RAS: Yes, Chairperson.

MR JANSEN: These were enquiries that we as your legal advisors only did recently.

MR RAS: Yes, that is correct.

MR JANSEN: Now from Booysens, Adv Booyens, we received clippings of a report in the Beeld of 16 April 1990, did you have a look at that?

MR RAS: Yes, Chairperson.

MR JANSEN: Mr Chairman, I want to hand this up. Mr Chairman, this is not a photocopy of the original article, clipping of the newspaper itself, it seems to be retrieved from a computer or an electronic retrieval system. I will attempt to get the more original one before the end of this hearing. Unfortunately this only came to our knowledge yesterday, Mr Chairman, while we were busy during the investigation. Mr Chairman, may I just hand this up as Exhibit B?

Just to put it clearly, your knowledge concerning Imran, the third child, that was based on hearsay, it is not something that you gathered from the information that you collected at that stage, is that correct?

MR RAS: No, Chairperson.

MR JANSEN: In other words, it is subject to confirmation or further qualification from people who had more personal knowledge and who could give that information to the Committee?

MR RAS: Yes, that is correct.

MR JANSEN: Well you would not have knowledge of it, but perhaps you could give comment on this. Now in this report, in the second paragraph the last sentence something is said about Imran's or, a statement for his presence that day. The paragraph reads as follows:

Can you say anything about that?

MR RAS: Chairperson, the only comment that I have is that when the other four PAC members used the house that night, that that son was not present. I don't have another explanation because not one of the four mentioned the son to me. But it would appear as if that could be a possible logical explanation for the fact that he was not the usual resident, or at times he was not resident. According to the newspaper report it seems to be the case, but I don't know whether he was there permanently or not.

CHAIRPERSON: What was the date of this event?

MR JANSEN: It was 21/22 April 19 ...

CHAIRPERSON: It might have been the Easter holiday.

MR JANSEN: Yes, Mr Chairman, that is also assuming that the holidays follow more-or-less the pattern in South Africa. But in any event, we don't know where this information comes from, we'll try and verify it first.

Mr Ras, at each incident that you deal with in your amnesty application, you also give your personal background and the political motives. You give an exposition thereof, is that correct?

MR RAS: Yes, Chairperson.

MR JANSEN: And do you confirm that part of your application in this regard?

MR RAS: Yes, I do.

MR JANSEN: You are also aware that we as your legal advisors, have discussed it with you that there was testimony given last week by Mr de Kock concerning Vlakplaas in general and the type of operations that were planned and executed and that that was part or is part of this evidence, is that correct?

MR RAS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR JANSEN: And you also want it to be considered in terms of your application for amnesty for this incident, is that correct?

MR RAS: Yes, that is correct, Chairperson.

MR JANSEN: And then there's one aspect that I perhaps have omitted, the issue of lights in the vicinity of the Chand's house. Where did those lights come from according to your information or knowledge?

MR RAS: Chairperson, the only lights that I can think of would be the lights from the border post which is on a hill approximately 1½ kilometres from there.

MR JANSEN: Another aspect. It was quite dark during the execution of the operation.

MR RAS: Yes.

MR JANSEN: The lighting in the vicinity of the house, was it bright?

MR RAS: No, there was almost none.

MR JANSEN: And the duration of this operation from the point that you came across the guard and where you withdrew, what was the time-frame here?

MR RAS: Chairperson, it was short, three minutes.

MR JANSEN: Thank you, Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman, Hattingh on behalf of de Kock.

Mr Ras, you also heard Mr de Kock's evidence and you also read his application, is that correct?

MR RAS: Yes, that is correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Is it correct that because it was your area, that while he was overarchingly in command that you were under his command?

MR RAS: Yes, I also testified in this regard.

MR HATTINGH: And you were then responsible for the planning.

MR RAS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: You also heard that he testified that besides the fact that you used Scorpion pistols, that you were also equipped with AKs, is that correct?

MR RAS: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Why was that necessary?

MR RAS: Chairperson, instead of for example getting five people in the house, we also foresaw that there could have been PAC members and that would have led to shooting, although we had the surprise element on our side there could be a shoot-out. The border post is nearby, the army members could have been in the vicinity and there was a possibility that we would have to shoot ourselves out of trouble.

MR HATTINGH: Now if you say that, do you meant that the possibility was foreseen that you could for example, have to cope with an attack from the house, inside the house?

MR RAS: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: But if it would then proceed to a shooting situation - could I ask you, the AKs that you had, did they also have silencers?

MR RAS: No, not as far as I could remember, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And this shooting would then have been clearly heard on the border?

MR RAS: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Did you foresee the possibility that the members of the Botswana Defence Force would also come to the scene?

MR RAS: Yes, we made provision for that.

MR HATTINGH: And would you then have given over to them or would you have resisted?

MR RAS: No, we would not have given ourselves over.

MR HATTINGH: Now if they had started shooting at you, would you have returned fire?

MR RAS: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: So you would have tried to fight your way out of Botswana.

MR RAS: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Am I correct in saying that you foresaw all possibilities and the operation was planned to finalise it within the shortest period of time?

MR RAS: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And that was to prevent it from reaching the people at the border?

MR RAS: Yes, that is why we made use of the Scorpions and Makarovs with silencers.

MR HATTINGH: So the idea was, attack the house, execute the operation as quickly as possible and then withdraw across the border back to the RSA?

MR RAS: Yes, that is correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Do you know whether the house of the Chands had electricity?

MR RAS: Chairperson, referring to the lights earlier I started thinking, and I don't know whether we used flashlights. I can't remember, it happened so quickly. I really cannot recollect anything.

MR HATTINGH: Did you execute the planning in such a way that people would be defending around?

MR RAS: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And you decided who the people would be?

MR RAS: Mr de Kock left it to my discretion, yes.

MR HATTINGH: And he then approved your decision in this regard?

MR RAS: Yes, he was there observing.

MR HATTINGH: When you went nearer to the house, approached the house, was there any sort of light from the house?

MR RAS: No, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Any lights outside of the house?

MR RAS: No, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Any lights at the shop outside?

MR RAS: No, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Or inside of the shop?

MR RAS: No, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: So the buildings were dark?

MR RAS: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: You heard Mr de Kock's evidence where he said that he fell down an embankment, did you see the fall, were you aware of it when it happened?

MR RAS: At that stage Douw Willemse and myself were some distance from there, we were busy at the gate. I wasn't present when he fell.

MR HATTINGH: You referred to a dog at the house and that it was shot at, why was that necessary?

MR RAS: Chairperson, when the shooting started where Mr de Kock shot at the guard, Douw Willemse and myself jumped over the gate, ran in and on the porch the first thing that approached me was an Alsatian and I shot the dog.

MR HATTINGH: So the dog attacked you?

MR RAS: Well he came right at me.

MR HATTINGH: Before you entered the house, did you see any people in the house?

MR RAS: Mr Chand showed with a flashlight through the window and asked what was going on.

MR HATTINGH: And then you entered the house?

MR RAS: I shot him.

MR HATTINGH: Did you shoot him from the outside of the house?

MR RAS: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And then you entered the house?

MR RAS: Douw Willemse hit the door open with a hammer. I entered first and at the door, on the left-hand side, a person was lying in bed, I shot the person. I immediately went to the room where Mr Chand had been standing, he was already dead on the bed.

As far as I can remember his wife stood in the corner. I shot at her as well as, I can't remember whether it was Douw Willemse or Willie Nortje. I immediately went to the room next to that room and there was another person in the bed. I fired one shot at the person and John Tait was next to me and I realised that although I had extra magazines with me, I had already fired quite a few shots, and I asked him to shoot another two shots.

MR HATTINGH: Now the impression that I get of the attack inside of the house was that different people went to different rooms.

MR RAS: We were three or four people and went into the house very quickly and penetrated quickly.

MR HATTINGH: And the idea then was that as quickly as possible every room had to be entered to resist any resistance?

MR RAS: Well we expected armed people in the house, and you don't enter the house with any other objective than to kill the people in the house.

MR HATTINGH: Now the person that you saw lying in the bed, was the person under blankets?

MR RAS: As far as I can remember only his head was visible.

MR HATTINGH: Can you remember whether there was any light in the room?

MR RAS: No, if I can recall we only used flashlights or torches.

MR HATTINGH: And you said that it all occurred very quickly.

MR RAS: I doubt whether it exceeded three minutes.

MR HATTINGH: The inhabitants were shot, the explosives were set and you then withdrew from the house.

MR RAS: That's correct.

MR HATTINGH: Did you then only determine that Mr de Kock had been injured?

MR RAS: As far as I can recall I had already heard outside that somebody was shouting: "Mr de Kock has been injured", and if I recall correctly, I told Louw van Niekerk to assist him in the meantime and the rest of us went into the house.

MR HATTINGH: If we can just return to an earlier question of mine, if there was a person lying under the cover of blankets or sheets, was it possible for you under those circumstances to determine the age of this person?

MR RAS: Apart from the fact that I could not determine the age of the person I could also not determine whether or not that person was lying in the bed clutching an AK47 or a Scorpion pistol.

MR HATTINGH: Judging from the posture of the person, did it appear to be a child or an adult?

MR RAS: It appeared to be an adult.

MR HATTINGH: And after that you withdrew to the place where you had left the vehicles.

MR RAS: Yes, that's correct.

MR HATTINGH: After which you left for Natal, in order to create the impression that you were busy with an operation there.

MR RAS: We first went back to the farm where we fetched all our things and then we departed.

MR HATTINGH: In the investigations that you undertook before the time, approximately a month before the time, did you collect any information with regard to Mrs Chand's involvement with the PAC?

MR RAS: Not that I can recall directly, but as I have already mentioned I spoke to the four PAC members on the farm and all of them said that Mrs Chand knew that they were sleeping in the house and it wasn't questionable to ask what was her share in the whole matter.

MR HATTINGH: The reason why I'm putting this question Mr Ras, is because we have been furnished with the documents, it would appear to be the record of a Section 29 examination, and according to this document it would appear among others, that Mrs Chand at a certain stage was arrested in the Rustenburg area along with PAC activists. Did you have any knowledge of that before you uncovered that information during the course of your investigations?

MR RAS: As far as I can recall I simply wanted to know how the house looked, and as a result of that and the discussion that I had with Mr du Plessis, it came to light that the Chands were involved with infiltrations. We didn't go any further about it because otherwise this whole issue would have come back to us, they would have wanted to know why we were curious about it. So I can't recall that anybody told me that she was detained under the terms of Section 29, because of being arrested with PAC members.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chairman. Wim Cornelius, acting on behalf of the third applicant, Dawid Britz and the seventh applicant, Nicholas Vermeulen.

Mr Ras, you worked in groups on a strictly need-to-know basis, is that correct?

MR RAS: Yes, that is correct. I would just like to add that this was the sort of operation where great differences ensued, not great differences but differences as a result of persons who were informed at the eleventh hour, and this was one of those operations where the persons who were together on the farm never discussed the matter again.

MR CORNELIUS: So it was strictly need-to-know. But to put it to you as follows, the members who participated had not doubt that they were attacking a political target.

MR RAS: Colonel de Kock and I both made it very clear to them that it was a PAC facility.

MR CORNELIUS: So they knew that they were attacking a PAC political target. So we can accept that all members who participated had the same objective?

MR RAS: Yes, that's correct.

MR CORNELIUS: Vermeulen, as I understand, was not involved in the attack on the house itself, he was simply involved, according to his evidence, in the packing of the equipment.

MR RAS: No, he did not accompany us to Botswana.

MR CORNELIUS: Very well. And if it is his evidence that he was in Richards Bay as a result of the cover-story, would it then be possible?

MR RAS: Yes, it is possible.

MR CORNELIUS: And then with regard to the applicant D J Britz, he is known as Duiwel Britz, was he involved in the operation in Botswana?

MR RAS: Yes, that's correct.

MR CORNELIUS: And his evidence will be that he did not penetrate the house, but that he stood by Eugene de Kock after he was injured.

MR RAS: Yes, that's correct, he did not enter the house as far as I can recall.

MR CORNELIUS: I've no further questions, thank you Mr Chair.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS: Booyens on behalf of the applicant, Tait, Mr Chairman.

Mr Tait tells me that he cannot recall pertinently that any reference was made to the fact that these people had sons, but are you satisfied that you did mention it? He says that it was not mentioned or he can't remember it.

MR RAS: I have no doubt that I did indeed mention it.

MR BOOYENS: Good, then we will accept it as that. And according to his recollection, it was made clear that this was a PAC transit house through which PAC members were infiltrating the country, is that correct?

MR RAS: Yes, that's correct.

MR BOOYENS: So they knew exactly were to attack the place and who to expect there?

MR RAS: Yes, that's correct.

MR BOOYENS: Then Mr Tait states that his initial instructions were that he was to determine whether or not there were people coming from the external buildings, however it was so dark that he couldn't see anything and that's why he went into the house. This was after the first few members went into the house. What is your recollection, what was initial task?

MR RAS: if I recall correctly, the first time that I saw John was when he was standing next to me in one of the rooms. Douw Willemse and Willie Nortje were supposed to go into the house with me, he wasn't supposed to be in the house.

MR BOOYENS: So John Tait could possibly have been tasked with seeing to the buildings outside the house?

MR RAS: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Mr Tait also maintains that his recollection of what took place in the room - and I'm sure that there's room for the interpretation from both of you, is that you passed each other in the doorway of the room, you were entering and he was exiting, and in the process you possibly told him to continue shooting the person and you recall only one shot being fired because his weapon stalled, is that possible?

MR RAS: Yes, it is possible because I had been in the room before him and the bed was positioned on the left-hand side of the door as you entered the room.

MR BOOYENS: I see that you also told them while you were compiling the explosive device, to go through the house and to make sure, and by implication you mean if there's anybody else there, kill them?

MR RAS: Yes, that's right.

MR BOOYENS: Just a further aspect, if you could just look at page 120, the second paragraph. Mr Baker tells me that he was contacted per telephone by DCC, but not by Tony Oosthuizen, but by Anton Nieuwoudt and that you did make enquiries about Mr de Kock's whereabouts and that Mr Baker believed that you were in Natal, and that he told them that you were in Natal. Would that fit into the measure of covertness with which this operation was launched?

MR RAS: Yes, that's correct.

MR BOOYENS: And then by implication, that Mr Baker did not know about this information.

MR RAS: No, he didn't know.

MR BOOYENS: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR WAGENER: Mr Chairman, Jan Wagener on record.

Mr Ras, I have just studied Exhibit B. At the bottom of the first page it states that this attack would have taken place on a Monday morning at two thirty, that is the attack itself. Can you recall which day of the week it was, could it have been a Monday, as it appears to be here?

MR RAS: I cannot tell you what day of the week it was.

MR WAGENER: Was this approximately two thirty in the morning or can you also not recall that?

MR RAS: No, as far as I recall it was earlier, approximately midnight.

MR WAGENER: I have studied my electronic computer at home and it tells me that the 26th of April, which is probably the day of this report, was a Thursday. So according to that, if the attack had taken place on the Monday morning or Monday night it would appear that it took place on the night of the 22nd/23rd of April. After midnight would have made it the 23rd of April. Can we accept that?

MR RAS: Chairperson, I think evidence has already indicated that it was the 22nd(sic), the night.

CHAIRPERSON: What date did you say?

MS PATEL: The 21st, Honourable Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: The night of the 21st, going into the 22nd or the night of the 20th, going into the 21st?

MS PATEL: ...(indistinct)

CHAIRPERSON: That is the date fixed by the family.

MR WAGENER: Mr Chairman, then according to my calculator it says it's got to be a Saturday to Sunday night and not a Monday night, as in Exhibit B apparently.

MR RAS: Chairperson, as I have already indicated, if we have to go according to what appears in the newspaper, that person had to have been on holiday at home. I cannot tell you what day of the week it was, we're talking about 10 years ago.

MR WAGENER: Thank you, Mr Ras. Might I just ask you briefly with regard to page 116, in which you commence with the particulars of your application. You say that during 1988, and from that can I infer that the first incident, the arrest of the four PAC members, took place during 1988 or is that not your intention?

MR RAS: Chairperson, I cannot say. My legal representative has already consulted me with regard to that. I don't know whether or not this should actually read as 1989. I cannot tell you, I'm not certain about the date and I don't wish to speculate.

MR WAGENER: Then Mr Ras, you state on page 118, the second paragraph, that you received the order from Mr de Kock and that you undertook certain investigations and then you say that you evaluated and analysed the information and conveyed this to Mr de Kock. Do you see where that is typed on that page?

MR RAS: Yes, I see it.

MR WAGENER: Then actually my question is the following; the information that Mr de Kock had regarding the Chand house and what was happening there, did he obtain this from you, in other words?

MR RAS: No, if one reads this piece holistically - I just want to make certain of this, Mr de Kock had at that stage already given me the order to plan the operation. I just reported back to him after the fact, in order to tell him this is what I've done and this is the information that I have and then he went to Brigadier van Rensburg. I myself did not discuss this matter with Brigadier van Rensburg. The only person who discussed this matter with me was Colonel de Kock.

MR WAGENER: But I'm not certain if you understand me correctly, or perhaps I misunderstood you. If I read that paragraph it appears to me that you collected certain information, evaluated it, analysed it and then conveyed it to Mr de Kock. That is the first sentence.

MR RAS: Yes, that is correct, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: Then you also say that de Kock at later stage, approximately a week later, came to you and told you that he had discussed the matter with Brigadier van Rensburg and that it have been agreed that you should continue with the planning of the operation, is that correct?

MR RAS: Yes, that is correct.

MR WAGENER: In other words then, at the stage when Mr de Kock, according to you would have discussed the matter with Mr van Rensburg, he, Mr de Kock already had all the information from you with regard to the Khan residence and what was happening there.

MR RAS: Chairperson, if we can just return to page 117, the final paragraph. Eugene de Kock at that stage had already told me and most probably he wouldn't have told me to investigate the matter further if he hadn't received instructions for that from somebody else. I simply gave him feedback at that stage, which he then in all probability, if I could infer correctly, discussed with Mr van Rensburg.

MR WAGENER: Yes, but my question remains simple. If we read the second paragraph on page 118, it states, and this is according to my reading of it, that at the stage when Mr van Rensburg apparently gave the order to Mr de Kock that we should continue with an operation, de Kock already had the information with regard to this facility and that this information came from you. That is what appears there, or at least that is how I read it. Is that correct?

MR RAS: If you read the paragraph in isolation, I would agree with it, but one must read this within the context that it appears in.

MR WAGENER: Furthermore, on the very same page 118, you state in the final paragraph, that the operation was highly sensitive. Was the order from Mr de Kock that DCC was not to know that you were going to execute this operation?

MR RAS: Yes, Chairperson. None of the other members who were on the farm were to know anything else about this operation.

MR WAGENER: Why was DCC not supposed to know?

MR RAS: Chairperson, Chand was an informer for DCC and regardless of whether Mr Chand allowed certain members to go through and reported others, the source of information with regard to DCC would no longer exist and they would not have been very satisfied with that situation.

MR WAGENER: But Mr Ras, if you are finished? Aren't the facts then that here was a situation with DCC, which had spun out of control and the entire operation that you undertook was actually a favour to DCC, to help them out of a nasty situation?

MR RAS: Well you could look at it that way, Chairperson. There were also other members who worked with Mr de Kock at DCC, who at that stage in my opinion, should not have been endangered.

MR WAGENER: Was there a reason why there was such a great level of silence, not only because it was an illegal operation?

MR RAS: Chairperson, this is an inference. Firstly, according to my knowledge we had two groups who had already brought weapons into the country and DCC didn't know where those weapons were anymore. There were places where those weapons were stored which were unknown to DCC. We had the infiltration of the persons who were shot at Lichtenburg, who also came in from Chand and until this very day it was Chand who assisted them in entering the country. And I cannot understand why it is said that this was a completely illegal operation.

MR WAGENER: Mr Chairman, I see it's 1 o'clock, I've got one question left.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well continue.

MR WAGENER: Mr Ras, you have stated that this operation was one of urgency and that it had to be carried out urgently, is that correct?

MR RAS: No, Mr de Kock said that it was urgent and he told me to plan the operation. I told you that I took about a month to plan the operation.

MR WAGENER: I'm sorry, I must have missed that. So you say that a month elapsed from the time that Mr de Kock told you that Mr van Rensburg said that you should continue and then a month later the operation took place?

MR RAS: No, from the time that Mr de Kock told me to investigate and the time that the operation was carried out, it was a month.

MR WAGENER: And what was the time span between the time that Mr de Kock told you that you had to continue and the operation being carried?

MR RAS: If I have it correctly, it would have been a week.

MR WAGENER: After the decision was taken, the people were called together and the operation was launched.

MR WAGENER: Thank you, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: 2 o'clock, or does anybody think we can start earlier? 2 o'clock, very well.

MARTINUS D RAS: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: We have been given some more papers. The one is Willemse, should we call that C? And the other is page 50 of the Bosch application. I think that can just go into the application. Right, shall we continue.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Mr Chairman. Du Plessis on record, on behalf of Mentz.

Mr Ras, let's go back to the information that you had beforehand and that you had gathered regarding who was in the house and who would be in the house. Am I correct in saying that the information would have been correct regarding the two children who were living in the house?

MR RAS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR DU PLESSIS: And at that stage, did you have any knowledge of their ages?

MR RAS: I knew that they were adults, Chairperson.

MR DU PLESSIS: Did you know that they were deaf-mute as reports said?

MR RAS: Yes, I knew, Chairperson.

MR DU PLESSIS: Was your information that they assisted their parents with the activities pertaining to the house and the infiltration route?

MR RAS: That is correct, Chairperson, to the extent that they assisted the PAC members to get to the border.

MR DU PLESSIS: In other words, as far as you would have considered Mr Chand and his wife as terrorists, you would also consider them to be terrorists?

MR RAS: Yes, Chairperson.

MR DU PLESSIS: And we could then also accept that the information that you gave to the people who went along with you on the operation, that you would also have explained it in those terms?

MR RAS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR DU PLESSIS: In other words, one can understand Mr Mentz' evidence where he says that there would have been terrorists in the house and that they had been eliminated and that the residents of the house also had to be eliminated?

MR RAS: Yes, to the extent that the transit house acted as assistance. We also expected armed PAC members in the house.

MR DU PLESSIS: Together with the people in the house?

MR RAS: Yes, Chairperson.

MR DU PLESSIS: Well that then corroborates Mr Mentz' evidence. Now another issue that I want to take up with you is that Mr Mentz testified that no-one really knew who was in the house and that the information was actually information that you had gathered and that you had known precisely. Now I want to ask the next question. Would you have given all the information regarding the house and its people to the people with you or would you just have explain it in broad terms?

MR RAS: Chairperson, at that stage where I had informed them, I would have informed them thoroughly concerning the people who would have been in the house. What I have already mentioned, the reason why some members can't perhaps remember everything, I spent approximately minimum of a month on this attack. I did the planning whilst the members were informed only once-off during an information session concerning the aim and the people in the house. In 10 years nothing has been said about this incident, up to the point that we're here with the Truth Commission.

MR DU PLESSIS: Do I understand you correctly that your recollection would be much better than theirs concerning the information of who would be in the house?

MR RAS: Yes, I believe that to be the case, Chairperson.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Ras, Mr Mentz testified that he was in the so-called backup group. That means he and Mr Andreovitch walked behind when they approached the house and it was also the case when they approached the house and when they went back. How do you remember it?

MR RAS: Yes, as far as I can remember, that was the case.

MR DU PLESSIS: And this specific action against this transit house, would I be correct in saying that it was primarily an action against the PAC as a liberation movement?

MR RAS: Yes, that is the case, Chairperson.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR DU PLESSIS

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr Ras, in the ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Would you put yourself on record please.

MR LAMEY: I apologise, Mr Chairman. Lamey, on behalf of Willemse, Nortje and Bosch. Thank you.

Mr Ras, I don't know whether you had the opportunity to look at the evidence that was transcribed concerning a Section 29 hearing, that was for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, where Christo Nel mentioned or gave information regarding Tony Oosthuizen, DCC and so forth.

MR RAS: I never read it, Mr Chairperson.

...(end of tape)

MR LAMEY: ... from this document that Security Branch Western Transvaal, and specifically a person by the name of Loots, who was the apparently the Commander of the Security Branch Western Transvaal at that stage, had great problems because of the operations and the way in which DCC operated and then also the problems with the infiltration of PAC members. I'm just giving a summary based on the context and what I infer from this document. Did you also get information in that regard from the Security Branch Western Transvaal?

MR RAS: Yes, I had knowledge that Chand was Tony Oosthuizen's informer. I was involved with an incident in Pietersburg, where weapons got lost, where people didn't arrive and that he didn't know whether PAC members who had already infiltrated the country. The information that I had was that there were many other PAC members who had been arrested, who also infiltrated the country by means of the Chand's house. We heard earlier today that the people who infiltrated at Lichtenburg. Inter alia one person who was arrested there was a Howard. I personally arrested him. I didn't have knowledge of the fact that he made use of the Chand house. And it is then logical that one would infer that it must have been a problem for the Security Branch.

MR LAMEY: Now specifically reference is made of an incident at Lichtenburg, where infiltrated PAC members, where their handgrenade exploded and people were injured and that there was shooting. Do you have any knowledge of that, of such an incident?

MR RAS: Chairperson, I was on the scene. I can't say whether the other person was also killed. The person who was killed with the handgrenade killed himself because while the people were standing around at the kombi he pulled the handgrenade and held it against his body and it exploded.

The one person that I arrested ran away. Someone from the public came to me and said that there was a strange person at their house and the person who later became an Askari, that was Howard, I arrested him.

MR LAMEY: Now this incident, would one consider that to be an example where control had been lost over the infiltration of PAC members?

MR RAS: I cannot absolutely recollect where the information came from, whether it was an ordinary roadblock or information that the people would come through or where the information came from, or whether it was an informer from the Western Transvaal, or where it came from, but I can't really recall that I got the information from DCC.

MR LAMEY: Let's then for the moment assume that Security Branch Western Transvaal had great problems with this way of operation and the uncontrolled infiltration of PAC members. Now from your experience and the modus operandi that would have been followed from Security Branch Head Office, it would be a logical inference to make that Security Branch Western Transvaal would have given that information to the Head Office Western Transvaal.

MR RAS: Well all the information that they received was given to the Head Office in Pretoria.

MR LAMEY: If I understand you, then it is that Mr Chand - I don't know whether I understood it correctly, that Mr Chand was the DCC source and that his wife and their sons were giving assistance with regard to the infiltration, but Mr Chand was the main figure.

MR RAS: According to the information ...(intervention)

MR LAMEY: That is Mr Chand that you refer to as Khan. Some of the members do that, but we know it is Mr Chand. Would he be considered to be the primary figure in this whole situation?

MR RAS: The Chand's house was used as a facility and as far as I knew we always referred to Chand as the informer. I don't if the other members, for example the wife, whether they had been remunerated directly for being informers.

MR LAMEY: Mr Nortje, or how he doesn't remember it is that he can't specifically remember that at the farm or over there - and he's not really contesting what you are saying here because Mr Willemse, the other applicant remembers specifically the sons when referring to the Chand family, but Mr Nortje had in his mind specifically Mr Chand, and that there would be armed terrorists but he can't specifically recall the wife or someone else. But he does not dispute what you are saying. I'm just putting it to you.

Mr du Plessis, my colleague, also asked a question in this regard concerning Mentz, that the emphasis, and this is what Nortje had in his mind, that everyone in that house you could have expected would be PAC terrorists or insurgents. And that is what he can recollect of this information session that you had.

MR RAS: Chairperson, as I have already said I informed all the members thoroughly, I had a sketch of the house, I said who I knew would be in the house at that stage. It was also mentioned that there could be other PAC members in the house and I also took photos, although it was at a long distance, with the house with the eucalyptus trees and that was given to all the members at that stage, before the operation.

MR LAMEY: And then in this statement you refer or mention that after you'd entered the house you mention that Mr Willemse shot the wife or the woman. My instructions are that Mr Willemse cannot specifically recall that, what he can recall is that he had to open the door with a hammer and as he also states it, is that - how he recall it, is that he was involved with the gate that he had to open and the problem with the guard, the shooting and then they opened the door with a hammer. And as he can recall he had his Makarov pistol with him, but he had to go and fetch his AK47 that he left outside. But he says that he cannot really recall that he shot the woman. Could it be someone else?

MR RAS: Chairperson, as I have already testified, when I entered the room where Mr Chand was lying on the bed and the woman was there, I shot myself and I then said it was either Douw Willemse or Willie Nortje who also shot at the woman. I did specifically say that it was Douw Willemse, that it was only him.

MR LAMEY: He also doesn't want to deny it, he just says that he cannot recall that.

MR RAS: No, I cannot say that it was only he who shot. I know that they were together in the room, I know that I fired a shot.

MR LAMEY: Did you also fire a shot at the woman?

MR RAS: Yes.

MR LAMEY: Thank you, Chair, no further questions.

COUNSEL: No questions.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS PATEL: Thank you, Honourable Chairperson. Ramula Patel on record.

Mr Ras, when you received your initial instruction from Mr de Kock, what was the specific ambit of the instruction? Did he explain to you for what purpose he required the information?

MR RAS: Chairperson, at that stage the instruction came after I had an unsuccessful effort at Pietersburg to get this cache, Mr de Kock informed me that I had to plan regarding the Chand house in Botswana and also along with that the destruction of the whole site.

MS PATEL: Did he explain to you who the specific target should be?

MR RAS: That would be Chand and the specific facility.

MS PATEL: Chand being Mr Chand only and the premises, or was the initial instruction Mr Chand, his family and the premises?

MR RAS: At that stage Chairperson, when the investigation started, it was the facility as well as Chand.

MS PATEL: Bearing this in mind, given that your initial instruction was only that Mr Chand would be taken out, you then came back and reported to him that there were two sons who were living on the premises as well, correct?

MR RAS: That is correct.

MS PATEL: Okay. Was there then a discussion about this?

MR RAS: Chairperson, as I have already mentioned, my first source of information was PAC members who had been arrested, who already worked at Vlakplaas for us. Independently from them or from one another, they gave the same information and also sketches of the house. And I just cannot remember whether both sons took them to the border or whether it was only one son, but I inferred that the sons were directly involved with the infiltration, they slept in the house, and that the house was used as a facility.

MS PATEL: Can you tell us regarding the involvement of the sons, can you recall what specific tasks they would have performed in the infiltration process?

MR RAS: Chairperson, according to the information that I had it was that people were taken from Francistown, Zambia, taken tot he house, they stayed there for the night and then this son or sons then took them to the border where they then crossed by foot and a courier would collect them on the other side and then they would be taken to a specific part in the RSA.

MS PATEL: Sorry, Sir, are you saying that the boys would have accompanied the PAC activists on foot to the border?

MR RAS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MS PATEL: Your information from the four Askaris that you spoke to, was definitely that there were only two sons on the premises?

MR RAS: Chairperson, I simply knew of the man, the woman and the two sons, along with the guard ...(intervention)

MS PATEL: There was no - sorry, are you finished?

MR RAS: Ja, I'm finished.

MS PATEL: Okay. There was no information that there might have been a third son as well?

MR RAS: No, Chairperson, I had no such information.

MS PATEL: Well my instructions in this regard are that at all times the three boys used to be at home, that the youngest son - as is alleged in the report from the Beeld that he was away on holiday is not correct, that he in fact schooled at home and went to school every day from home. So he was present at all times.

MR RAS: Chairperson, what is being said to me now is that the son never visited friends or never went anywhere else. We are talking about a night and not a weekend. I don't know when these persons infiltrated, but I spoke to all four of them and all four of them told me the same thing about the two sons living at home. All that I can assume is that the third son was not at home on that night that they infiltrated. I really didn't know about the other son.

MS PATEL: Did you speak to Martin Naude about what other information he might have had on the Chand family?

MR RAS: Chairperson, I can't recall that I spoke to him as such. I do know that I withdrew the PAC file, that I studied the file and that I spoke to Dup from Zeerust, who was a specialist with regard to PAC activities in the RSA.

MS PATEL: Did you ask him whether he had any specific information on the inhabitants of the house, of the Chand house? Can you recall?

MR RAS: All that I can remember is that I asked him: "Where is the Chand house", and he said: "It's near the shop at Derdepoort", but I didn't go into detail at that point because I didn't want to involve them in this operation as well.

MS PATEL: And you mentioned that you arrested Howard at the Lichtenburg incident and that he subsequently became Askari. Did he become an Askari at Vlakplaas or was he sent out elsewhere?

MR RAS: No, he was at Vlakplaas, he worked under me.

MS PATEL: Okay. How is it that you didn't know that he had infiltrated through the Chand house into the country, if you were his handler?

MR RAS: Chairperson, I cannot recall specifically at this stage that I discussed it with him, all I know is that I spoke to those four members and I was satisfied with the information that they gave me regarding the matter. I didn't go to all the PAC members on the farm and discuss the matter with them.

MS PATEL: Is it possible - you're saying you cannot recall, is it possible that you might have spoken to him?

MR RAS: Not that I can recall.

MS PATEL: Because the information we have at our disposal is that, from one of the other members who had infiltrated the country with Howard, was that they had in fact got to the Chand house on the Friday night, late on the Friday night, and had only left there on the Sunday morning. - Sorry. The information from - as I was saying, the information was that out of the group that had infiltrated and who were arrested at Lichtenburg, that they had spent two nights at the Chand house. So he would have been in an ideal position to tell you exactly what the set-up was at the Chand house.

MR RAS: Chairperson, that's correct, he could have given me more information, but I can't recall that I made specific use of it. All I know - once that you've mentioned it now, is that one of the two persons at Lichtenburg, who was not arrested at Lichtenburg, was missing.

MS PATEL: Yes, he's the one who subsequently applied for amnesty. And this incident occurred at the - the Lichtenburg incident occurred two years prior to this incident happening.

MR RAS: It’s not really Lichtenburg, it was actually at Rooigrond where this incident took place, at the crossing near Rooigrond.

MS PATEL: But you confirm that it occurred at least two years prior to this incident?

MR RAS: Yes, that's correct, Chairperson. And I'd just like to add - I beg your pardon for interrupting, as a result of infiltrations many of the roads were placed under observation by us, we drove through there at night. And I can't recall that I asked him specifically about the Chand incident.

MS PATEL: I'm sorry, you didn't ask who? You didn't ask Howard specifically about the Chand incident?

MR RAS: No. And because you mentioned this to me earlier, I went out of my way to determine who the person was because I couldn't recall Howard's name and it took me half a morning to remember his name. I just want to make it known that any person could have asked him, but I can't recall that I asked him about the matter because I felt that I had enough information from those four that I knew had used the Chand house. My order was to determine who was at the house, to identify the house and to prepare a target, and that's all that I did. And I felt that I had obtained enough information by talking to the other four PAC members.

MS PATEL: Okay. Can I infer then from what you are saying, that to a large extent it wasn't really important who would be in the house and that you did your reconnaissance on that basis?

MR RAS: Chairperson, the order and objective was to obtain information about the family and the house and then afterwards to destroy the structure, so that the house could no longer be used by the PAC as part of its infiltration route and to prevent the Chands from being used any further by Tony Oosthuizen to allow that any other members of the PAC enter the country in an uncontrolled manner.

MS PATEL: Sorry Honourable Chairperson, if you'd grant me a moment. Thank you, Honourable Chairperson.

Your information about Mrs Chand, what was the source of that information, was it the Askaris as well?

MR RAS: Yes, Chairperson, they made use of the house, they slept in that house and any person - well I can't see that Mrs Chand could see four persons coming in, see that her sons are involved in accompanying these persons to the border, and then could have remained uninvolved.

MS PATEL: If we can just move to the incident itself, you've stated that you yourself shot Mrs Chand. Do you know in which part of the house you had shot her? Where specifically, was it in the main bedroom where Mr Chand was?

MR RAS: If you stand in front of the window, the right-hand window in front of the bedroom I shot through the window. He looked out the window, asked what was going on and I shot him once in the head.

MS PATEL: I'm talking about Mrs Chand, Sir.

MR RAS: Mrs Chand was shot by me in her room, Chairperson.

MS PATEL: Alright. My instructions are that her body was found in the kitchen the next morning, can you possibly explain?

MR RAS: The only reason for the fact that she was found in the kitchen could be the explosion.

MS PATEL: Okay. Were you the only person who shot her, can you recall?

MR RAS: No, as far as I can recall I wasn't the only one. I did shoot her and as we have heard previously, it could have been Douw Willemse, I don't know whether it is him, or it could have been Willie Nortje.

MS PATEL: Can you recall how many times they shot at her?

MR RAS: If I recall correctly it was one shot and the other person shot two to three times. Everything happened very quickly, I can't recall exactly.

MS PATEL: Okay. And who else did you shoot? You shot one other person in the house, or was it two other people in the house?

MR RAS: I shot Mr Chand first. When you go into the door, the person who was sleeping on the left-hand side of that doorway on the bed, I shot him as well. After that I shot the wife, then I went through to the back room where I shot another person in bed.

MS PATEL: The person that you shot in bed, Sir, did you shoot him once only?

MR RAS: As far as I can recall I fired two shots in the head of the one person and the last one I fired one shot and I told John Tait to fire another two shots. As we have already heard, he fired one shot and after that he stored his gun and went back to the room where the Chands slept and set the explosives.

MS PATEL: Can I ask, after the boys were all shot, was the house never searched for weapons, or for weapons on them specifically, no?

MR RAS: Chairperson, no, it wasn't the idea because when we went into the house with guns fitted with silencers and the noise that ensued after the guard began screaming, we decided to leave as quickly as possible. I gave the others orders to go through the house to look if there were other people in the house. There wasn't any time to look for weapons. We didn't take anything out of the house.

MS PATEL: Regarding the events subsequent to the operation and the reports that were heard, or the newspaper reports that children were in fact killed, was there a discussion between you and Mr de Kock once these reports had hit the media?

MR RAS: I can't recall anything like that. The third son that was shot was the only person in the house who had not been foreseen, all the others had been foreseen.

MS PATEL: No, my question relates more to the ages of the sons. Was there not a discussion about the fact that you expected adult sons and the media reported children that were killed?

MR RAS: If I understand the newspaper incident correctly the ages were given. So it wasn't a question of having killed children, I knew what the age of those persons were, with the exception of the one.

MS PATEL: And these ages were relayed to Mr de Kock at the time of the planning.

MR RAS: I can't say that I allocated ages to them, I just said that there were two sons in the house who were involved and helped to take persons to the border post, or at least the border fence.

MS PATEL: Okay. Regarding the assistance of the boys my instructions are - well it can't be an outright denial, but my instructions are that to a large extent, as far as the victims can recall, that the boys had mainly only assisted in the business and were not involved in anything else with their parents.

MR RAS: Chairperson, with interrogation I did not doubt because it would have been very strange for Mr Chand or Mrs Chand to go through to the border fence with four persons at their age. Why would they take four persons, three persons or two persons and walk all the way with them to the border fence when to send the boys to go with these persons to the border fence or to the point to where they would cross would not have created any questions?

MS PATEL: Sorry, Honourable Chairperson, bear with me a moment.

Can I just ask you, Sir, at the time of the planning or at the time that the instruction for the operation was given to you, did you not question why the problem was not dealt with in a different way, in that Tony Oosthuizen should rather be disciplined rather than the Chand family be killed?

MR RAS: Chairperson, in the first place I had already mentioned this to Mr de Kock, that people were out of control. It was clear that Mr Chand was a double-agent according to my limited knowledge, because he would allow certain persons to be arrested and others came in without being arrested. This wasn't the first incident in which a facility in Botswana had been destroyed and persons eliminated, it happened with ANC members and which will still appear before the Amnesty Committee.

MS PATEL: Just on that question, just from the information, given the Lichtenburg incident that had taken place at least two years prior, it appears that your allegation in terms of Tony Oosthuizen being out of control or not being able to control that specific situation, that he'd been out of control for a long time already.

MR RAS: Chairperson, if I could answer the question as follows; I don't know Mr Oosthuizen like that, I know him to a limited degree, I saw him on a minimal basis. Everybody is blaming for Mr Oosthuizen in this case, but the question that must also be asked is, did Mr Oosthuizen keep information from us, did he keep information from the police, did Mr Chand allow certain groups to go through or did he provide information from other groups, leading to the fact that they were arrested or shot? Ultimately that is a question which I will not be able to answer.

MS PATEL: But either way it can't be disputed that this scenario had existed for quite some time, the problem with the infiltration route.

MR RAS: That's correct. This is not a decision which was taken lightly. The first time that one heard of a house being used for such purposes, that such a house would be destroyed or blown up and the inhabitants of such a house would be shot. Such an incident would take at least six months before we decided when to take action or how to take action.

MS PATEL: Given that that was the case, could you explain the urgency of this operation then, given its history?

MR RAS: I was told to investigate the matter urgently. It's difficult to decide today how urgent it really was. If PAC members were coming into the country, killing people, planting bombs, where would we have been then, how urgent would it have been? The whole idea was to prevent PAC members from infiltrating the country and committing acts of terror. I was told that this was urgent and that was how I handled the matter.

MS PATEL: Sorry, Honourable Chairperson. Thank you, Honourable Chairperson, that will be all. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Any re-examination?

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR JANSEN: Thank you, Mr Chairman, just a single issue.

Mr Ras, upon a question of Mr Wagener, you made a side remark that due to the circumstances the operation could not be regarded as illegal. Could you please place that into context. You would accept that what you did there was a crime that you committed and that you can be charged for that?

MR RAS: But that's the reason I looked for roadblocks and other such things. Yes, it was illegal, but it wasn't something that we decided to do ourselves, it was something that according to my knowledge at that stage, was approved. It was legal within the legislation of the country but ...

MR JANSEN: But would you say that it wasn't atypical of that which you were involved in, or at least that which you'd regarded as justified?

MR RAS: It's similar of the case of the ANC members that I mentioned earlier, an order was received from a Commissioner and in my mind this was not incorrect, although it was illegal.

MR JANSEN: Thank you, Mr Chairman. That also concludes the evidence in this application, thank you.

MR SIBANYONI: Mr Ras, two possible questions, maybe more than two, but I've got two specific questions. There is no positive information or evidence that Mrs Chand was involved in this operation. You are saying that the mere fact that she was there, there were people coming in there, she should have had knowledge of them and also you suspect that she must have been part of the scheme.

MR RAS: Chairperson, if one is involved in accommodating persons on the other side, if one is involved in helping them to enter the country with weapons of terror and if one is involved in operating a transit house in Botswana, the mere fact alone that this person received informer money from Oosthuizen - although I don't have any solid proof that this did take place but this is based on evidence given by Mr de Kock, indicates that this person is much more involved than simply receiving people and letting them go.

MR SIBANYONI: Would you say the guard was also involved in the scheme?

MR RAS: Chairperson, to be honest with you, the day that I heard that there was a 24-hour guard at the house and that the facilities were being used by the PAC, I believed without any information about it, that the guard had been placed there by the PAC for their purposes, because I don't know of anybody else who would keep a 24-hour guard at their home or at their place of business at that stage, and I believed that the guard was armed and that he had been placed there by the PAC for their purposes.

MR SIBANYONI: Lastly, Mr Ras, from the moment I was studying this bundle, the question which bothered me was why was the action taken against Mr Chand. I was saying that if I was in your position I would definitely have taken steps against, not necessarily take steps against Mr Oosthuizen, but raised the matter with DCC, and I was looking at it that that would have solved the problem because that was the source of Mr Chand being able to infiltrate people into the country. Why was that not done?

MR RAS: Chairperson, as I have already mentioned she was a resident in the house, she lived there, she saw when people came over and as already stated here today during the evidence of one of the others, she was arrested with PAC members in Rustenburg. So her assistance, although I didn't know everything about it, fuelled the fact that I had to plan the operation and prepare for the operation.

CHAIRPERSON: I think you were being asked about Mr Chand, weren't you?

MR RAS: Oh sorry, I thought Mrs Chand. Sorry.

CHAIRPERSON: The suggestion was that you could have - if Mr Oosthuizen had stopped using Mr Chand, he couldn't have done anything.

MR RAS: But the point is, Mr Chairperson, he continued. The information indicated that everybody is blaming Mr Oosthuizen. The fact is that people entered the country without Mr Oosthuizen even knowing about hit and he was an agent for the PAC. It would appear to me from the information at hand, that he was a double-agent, he helped the government and the PAC at the same time by allowing certain PAC people to enter the country and allowing others to be arrested or killed. That's the only inference that I can draw.

MR SIBANYONI: I think without Mr Oosthuizen, Mr Chand would have been able to infiltrate people into the country.

MR RAS: That's correct, Chairperson. We have an example that I've heard of today - I don't have the facts before me, but the example is that Mrs Chand was arrested with PAC members in Rustenburg, without Mr Oosthuizen's knowledge. I don't have the facts before me. I would just like to study it once more before I give an educated answer about it.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you, Mr Chairperson, no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR JANSEN: Yes, Mr Chairman, that concludes the evidence on behalf of this applicant.

WITNESS EXCUSED

CHAIRPERSON: Have you decided gentlemen ...(indistinct)

MR BOOYENS: Mr Tait, Mr Chairman. May we just move to there.

J H TAIT: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, the Committee would have noticed that there are in fact two applications. I'm referring to the one starting at page 85, that is the later one.

Mr Tait, you have already given evidence during the Komatiepoort hearing. We see your background, which is on page 85 to page 88. Do you confirm the content and correctness thereof, in conjunction with what you've stated during the Komatiepoort hearing, is that correct?

MR TAIT: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: You are applying for your share in the death of persons, six persons and the explosion of a house in Botswana which housed alleged collaborators of the PAC.

MR TAIT: Yes, that's correct, Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: And while we all said that it was in early 1990, that this incident occurred, we are all in agreement that it was the 21st of April, is that correct?

MR TAIT: Yes, that is correct, Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: During 1990, as you can see on your application, page 88, you were present at a roadblock where four Askaris were arrested, who later found themselves at Vlakplaas.

MR TAIT: Yes, that is correct.

MR BOOYENS: At a later stage - this date of 1990, is this correct, are you sure? - the date upon which the four Askaris were arrested.

MR TAIT: I'm not certain of that date, Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Then on page 89, you mention the order that you received from Colonel de Kock, is it correct as Mr Ras has stated, that you had very short notice?

MR TAIT: Correct.

MR BOOYENS: And what was the motivation behind the operation that was given to you, why was the house supposed to be attacked?

MR TAIT: Chairperson, we were told that this house was being used as a transit house, where PAC members who were going to infiltrate or ex-filtrate the country would stay overnight and that the persons living there were involved in bringing these people into the country.

MR BOOYENS: Did you have any information about DCC, the Directorate for Covert Collections involvement in this matter, and that Mr Chand was an informer for DCC?

MR TAIT: No, I had no such information.

MR BOOYENS: So according to you they were persons who collaborated in assisting PAC members in entering the country?

MR TAIT: That's correct.

MR BOOYENS: And that was sufficient reason for you to participate in such an operation, to stop this insurgency?

MR TAIT: Yes, that's correct.

MR BOOYENS: Then the second paragraph, page 89, there is one error, is that correct? You refer to Snor Vermeulen who was present during the operation, is that correct that you made an error?

MR TAIT: Yes, it is incorrect.

MR BOOYENS: Can you briefly tell us why you thought he was involved?

MR TAIT: According to what I could infer, Chairperson, I knew that when it came to explosives and demolitions, Snor usually assisted and because the house was destroyed by means of explosives, I may have thought that it was him that was involved in this.

MR BOOYENS: So you are satisfied then that the other persons whose names are mentioned there were involved in the operation?

MR TAIT: Yes, that's correct.

MR BOOYENS: You have heard the evidence of Mr Ras and Mr de Kock regarding the execution of the operation, that you stayed on the farm, that you went to the border and that you crossed the border on foot and went to the Chand house.

MR TAIT: That's correct.

MR BOOYENS: And also with regard to how the operation was executed and what took place there?

MR TAIT: Yes, that's correct.

MR BOOYENS: What were your instructions, what were you supposed to on the premises?

MR TAIT: My instructions were that I had to ensure that nobody from the external buildings interfered with this operation. From where I was however, I couldn't see any external buildings and I myself penetrated the building from the front.

MR BOOYENS: I think one of the other applicants mentioned that you - and this is on page 41, there he stated that you kicked the door in, is that correct? This would be Willie Nortje's application, at the bottom of the page:

Is he correct?

MR TAIT: That is not correct.

MR BOOYENS: Was the door already open when you entered the house?

MR TAIT: That's correct.

MR BOOYENS: What was your instruction with regard to the persons occupying the house?

MR TAIT: That all the occupants in the house had to be killed.

MR BOOYENS: And did you also fire shots at these persons as you have described?

MR TAIT: Yes, I shot a person.

MR BOOYENS: Can you briefly tell us, or at least what did you expect to find in the house, did you expect to find people living there or were there any other possibilities?

MR TAIT: There were definitely other possibilities because it was known that it was a PAC transit house and we expected to find other PAC members who were armed in that house.

MR BOOYENS: Tell us in your own words what you can recall about what you did in that house.

MR TAIT: Chairperson, as far as I can recall I entered the house, I went past a room where persons in pyjamas were lying on the floor, I went to the room right next door. As I can recall, Mr Ras and I encountered each other. I saw somebody on a bed. I don't know whether or not he was already dead or whether he had been shot, I fired one shot at him upon which I put my weapon away.

MR BOOYENS: And after that, although there were silencers on the weapons, you could still hear a feint noise of a gun being shot or fired.

MR TAIT: Yes, that's correct.

MR BOOYENS: Were any other shots fired within the house?

MR TAIT: As far as I can recall, I heard other shots being fired, however I cannot say who fired how many shots in whichever room, because everything happened too quickly.

MR BOOYENS: What was the light like?

MR TAIT: The light was very limited and we made use of torches in the house.

MR BOOYENS: Mr Tait, Mr Ras has also stated that he gave you instructions to ensure that there were other persons in the house while he was preparing the explosives. Can you recall such an instruction?

MR TAIT: I cannot recall it in memory, but I cannot dispute that he would have given such an instruction.

MR BOOYENS: And this would have been a logical instruction under the circumstances?

MR TAIT: Yes, that's correct.

MR BOOYENS: After the operation, did you hear that a total of six ......(end of tape) ... been killed?

MR TAIT: That's correct.

MR BOOYENS: And did this question or children and such, with regard to you, did you see anybody who resembled a child or were you in any way concerned that little ones had been shot?

MR TAIT: No, not according to me, according to me everybody appeared to be adult.

MR BOOYENS: And you have already discussed this to a certain degree, but your political motivation for your participation in this matter, which appears on page 91, would those be the reasons as set out there, that it was a PAC transit house and that the PAC was involved in an armed struggle with the Republic of South Africa, according to your knowledge?

MR TAIT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: And according to you, these PAC members who were armed, who came through, were responsible for violence in South Africa and that you as members of the Security Forces were involved in a war against them, is that correct?

MR TAIT: That's correct.

MR BOOYENS: And equivocally you were also convinced that the destruction of such a facility would complicate the PAC's activities and contribute to the decrease in violence in South Africa?

MR TAIT: Yes, that is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

MR HATTINGH: We have no questions, thank you, Mr Chairman.

MR CORNELIUS: Wim Cornelius for Britz and Vermeulen, I have no questions, thank you Mr Chairman.

MR JANSEN: Jansen, on behalf of applicant Ras. No questions, Mr Chairman.

MR WAGENER: Mr Chairman, Jan Wagener, I have no questions for this applicant.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, du Plessis on behalf of Mentz. I've got two questions, Mr Chairman.

Mr Tait, did you ever give an affidavit to the Attorney-General?

MR TAIT: No, I never, this is my only statement.

MR DU PLESSIS: If we can use the ordinary language, you never became a state witness?

MR TAIT: No, never, Chairperson.

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Tait, the last question that I would like to ask regarding this incident, can you in any way recall anything more than what you have testified concerning what had been said to you regarding who would be present in the house?

MR TAIT: Chairperson, what I have testified is what I can remember.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Mr Chairman, no further questions.

MR LAMEY: No questions, Mr Chairman.

COUNSEL: No questions.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS PATEL: Thank you, Honourable Chairperson.

Mr Tait, there's just one aspect I'd like clarity on. You state in your application on page 91, as part of your political objective, that:

Now just a clarifying question, was there a distinction drawn at the time that instructions were given, between exactly who must be killed or was it a blanket instruction that everybody who was found in the house must be killed?

MR TAIT: As I understood it, it was that anyone who was present in the house had to be killed.

MS PATEL: Alright. Thank you, Sir.

MR BOOYENS: No re-examination, thanks Mr Chairman.

MR SIBANYONI: No questions, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR BOOYENS: May Mr Tait be excused from further attendance, Mr Chairman?

CHAIRPERSON: Any objections? I take it he will be available if urgently required?

MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: He's not leaving the country?

MR BOOYENS: No, no, but he's leaving this part of the country most certainly, he's going to a place called "Witelsbos", which I understand you need a very good map if you want to find out where it is.

CHAIRPERSON: Well if we need him we'll send you to find him.

MR BOOYENS: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------CHAIRPERSON: Right. Next on the list?

MR CORNELIUS: Mr Lamey represents Willemse and Nortje and Bosch. I think he will be the appropriate one.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct)

MR LAMEY: I will start with Mr Willemse, Mr Chairman. Can we just rearrange the seats.

D G WILLEMSE: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: Mr Willemse, you're an applicant in this hearing and you're applying for amnesty resulting from your involvement in the operation in Botswana, during which the Chand family - and we know the correct name now, where they had been killed, is that correct?

MR WILLEMSE: Yes.

MR LAMEY: In your application you refer to the Khan family, but it should be Chand.

MR WILLEMSE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: Initially before you obtained legal counsel, there was an amnesty application submitted at the TRC, dated 12 December 1996, and it was included in the bundle from page 16 up to page 24, is that correct?

MR WILLEMSE: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: And it was signed on the 9th of April 1996, and it was signed at George by yourself, is that correct?

MR WILLEMSE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: Now in this initial amnesty statement, on page 14 and 15, 16 and 17 with regard to the political objective, you gave a general broad political motivation concerning the incidents which you have listed and of which you have given brief information in this amnesty application.

MR WILLEMSE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: Do you also confirm what is contained therein?

MR WILLEMSE: Yes.

MR LAMEY: And that then being the broad general background against which you as a member of the Security Police and then also in particular a member of Vlakplaas, where you were involved in.

MR WILLEMSE: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: You also mentioned that you joined the police in '87. On page 13 there is a short background with regard to your training and when you joined the Security Branch, is that correct?

MR WILLEMSE: Yes.

MR LAMEY: At the time of this incident - as it is now known it was in April 1990, you were a member of Vlakplaas?

MR WILLEMSE: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: Under the command of Colonel Eugene de Kock, is that correct?

MR WILLEMSE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: In the initial application that you compiled there is also a short summary of the detail concerning the Chand incident, is that correct?

MR WILLEMSE: Yes.

MR LAMEY: Page 23. And you obtained legal representation subsequently and an annexure has been prepared as a supplement to your application, that is now in relation to different applications, is that correct?

MR WILLEMSE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And then also with regard to the Botswana attack on the Chand family.

MR WILLEMSE: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: The relevant part regarding the Chand family has been placed - Mr Chairman, am I correct, it's Exhibit C? The document, the supplementary portion, is that Exhibit C?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR LAMEY: Right. Do you also confirm the content thereof?

MR WILLEMSE: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: Could we have a look at the first page of the document, it is page 12 of the supplementary application. Do you also confirm what is contained there, that you also ask for amnesty for conspiracy to murder and then also anything that would be forth-flowing from that, is that correct?

MR WILLEMSE: Yes.

MR LAMEY: Could you perhaps just in brief say how long before this operation was launched were you, did you become involved?

MR WILLEMSE: I became involved in the operation, it was on short notice before the operation occurred.

MR LAMEY: And from whom did you receive your instruction?

MR WILLEMSE: It was from Colonel de Kock and Warrant Officer Ras.

MR LAMEY: You also say that as far as you can recall Mr Ras was in command of the planning, is that correct?

MR WILLEMSE: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: And then you also mention that before the operation was launched, that you gathered at a farm - that is in paragraph 2 on page 13, where certain preparations were made.

MR WILLEMSE: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: You also made mention in the supplementary application the name of Snor Vermeulen, is that correct?

MR WILLEMSE: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: Is that an error, as him being one of the members who were involved with the execution?

MR WILLEMSE: Yes, that is correct, he was not involved with the operation as such.

MR LAMEY: You also record that later on.

MR WILLEMSE: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: And then you also made mention in paragraph 3, how the activities later on proceeded and Ras led you to the house because he had knowledge.

MR WILLEMSE: Correct.

MR LAMEY: You had a specific instruction to open up the lock at the gate.

MR WILLEMSE: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: And whilst you were busy with the lock, picking it, you heard shots being fired with silencers, is that correct?

MR WILLEMSE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: Just to return to that, with which kinds of weapons were you issued?

MR WILLEMSE: I had a Makarov pistol with a silencer, as well as an AK47. The other members had Scorpion machine-pistols.

MR LAMEY: Now you say whilst you were busy picking the lock you heard shots being fired, that was with silencers.

MR WILLEMSE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: So you looked up and you saw that Colonel de Kock fell backwards.

MR WILLEMSE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And nearby him there was a man on the ground screaming.

MR WILLEMSE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: You said that you didn't know at that stage whether the person had been shot or whether he had shot Colonel de Kock. You say that Colonel de Kock shot the guard but he wasn't dead and was on the ground screaming.

MR WILLEMSE: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: And you went closer and then you then shot the guard.

MR WILLEMSE: That is correct, I went closer and I shot him through the head.

MR LAMEY: With the Makarov pistol?

MR WILLEMSE: Yes, with the pistol.

MR LAMEY: And later on it transpired that Colonel de Kock injured his knee and that that was after he shot at the guard?

MR WILLEMSE: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: And you then recall that you went back to the gate, is that correct?

MR WILLEMSE: Yes, that is correct. The other members moved towards the door and they struggled to open the door. I went back to the gate where I had a hammer that we took along. I took the hammer and then I hit the door open.

MR LAMEY: You also mention that there were lights in the house that went on, could you just explain?

MR WILLEMSE: What I can remember quite well is that the torchlight that was in the house, there was a person in the house with a torch shining to the outside. That I can remember quite well.

MR LAMEY: So if you're referring to lights, it's not as if it was an electrical light being switched on in the house, you are referring to a light from a torch?

MR WILLEMSE: Yes.

MR LAMEY: You then say that that is how you can recall it, that after the door had been hit in by a hammer you went back to where your weapon was.

MR WILLEMSE: Chairperson, I couldn't handle the hammer with the weapons that had with me, that was the AK47 as well as the pistol. Everything happened so quickly that when I went back to get the hammer I left my weapons there. I fist hit the door open and I can remember that I went back to take my weapons and then I went back to the house where I entered the house.

MR LAMEY: Mention was made that you could also have shot or fired shots in the house, and specifically the woman. Your comment?

MR WILLEMSE: Chairperson, I am not here to lie, if the other applicants say that I shot the woman, I cannot specifically recall it, but I will not also deny it. If I shot inside and people said that they saw me, I would not deny it. I just cannot really recall it.

MR LAMEY: Could I just perhaps ask you and specifically, do you also have problems with remembering events where you were involved?

MR WILLEMSE: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: You also mention that you know that explosives were taken along and were placed and you suspect it was Ras and that the house was blown up.

MR WILLEMSE: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: And after that, after the shooting was completed you tried to get out of the house as quickly as possible.

MR WILLEMSE: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: So you say it is possible that you also could have fired shots in the house, but you cannot remember it clearly.

MR WILLEMSE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And further, with regard to the particulars, on page 14 you say that you don't have knowledge of the people in the house, but you know that it was the Khan family who resided in the house.

MR WILLEMSE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: You also don't know who the guard was that was shot dead.

MR WILLEMSE: No.

MR LAMEY: Your political objective, specific reference to this incident and we have to read that added to the broad general political background, you said that the objective with the conspiracy to eliminate the Khan family was to detect PAC members and to prevent them from coming into the country and to commit acts of terror.

MR WILLEMSE: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: You also say that the action was aimed to protect the government of the day and to also combat the activities of the PAC and the revolutionary struggle.

MR WILLEMSE: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: And you also say, question 10(b), that during the information session that was held - and can I also ask you, can you remember where the information session took place?

MR WILLEMSE: Chairperson, it was on the farm that we stayed. That was before we entered for the operation.

MR LAMEY: Can you remember that Mr Khan was identified as a person who actively supported the PAC by accommodating them and from where attacks were then launched against the people in the country, in the RSA?

MR WILLEMSE: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: You believed that it was necessary for this operation and in the struggle of the Security Forces against the liberation movements.

MR WILLEMSE: Yes.

MR LAMEY: Could I perhaps just ask you, you also received specific instructions to be part of this group and in particular from Colonel de Kock.

MR WILLEMSE: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: An operation which is in fact a foreign operation, you don't know specifically from whom Colonel de Kock received his instructions.

MR WILLEMSE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: Could I perhaps ask you, did you believe that it had to be cleared at Head Office?

MR WILLEMSE: Yes, I was under the impression.

MR LAMEY: You also say that during the information session it was specifically mentioned that the Khan children are involved with assistance to PAC activists by walking with them in a group of ahead of them when the border was crossed. Now reference is made of the Khan children in your application, could you perhaps just elaborate on that?

MR WILLEMSE: Chairperson, the information that was given by Warrant Officer Ras boiled down to the fact that the Khan children who had been mentioned weren't really children, but that they were adult sons. As I understood it during the information session, that they acted as guides to take the people, the PAC people up to the border.

MR LAMEY: So if mention is made of children, at that stage it wasn't a case of them being young children, that wasn't discussed.

MR WILLEMSE: No, I did not form the idea that it would be young children, 10, 11 or 9 years old.

MR LAMEY: And do you also confirm the issue concerning the instruction that the operation was planned and executed under the command of Colonel de Kock?

MR WILLEMSE: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: Mr Chairman, I just want to make sure whether I've covered everything. I think so. Mr Chairman, I think that is my evidence-in-chief, thank you.

MR HATTINGH: Hattingh on record, Mr Chairman, ...(intervention)

MR LAMEY: Just to come back - my apologies.

I'd just like to return to the following. Did you also know that the house itself would also be a target with regard to an explosion?

MR WILLEMSE: Yes, that is correct, the house as such was also a target and the people in the house.

MR LAMEY: So that would also now be the destruction of the house.

MR WILLEMSE: Yes.

MR LAMEY: So you would also like to apply for amnesty for the property, the damage of the property.

MR WILLEMSE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: You carried the explosives in, didn't

you?

MR WILLEMSE: I can't remember that I carried as such, but I remember that I had a bag in which I had a hammer and a cutter for the lock. I remember I carried that. Chairperson, I could perhaps also say that I'm not an explosives expert. I would also not have handled it.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct)

MR HATTINGH: Hattingh on record, Mr Chairman. We have no questions, thank you.

MR CORNELIUS: Cornelius, Mr Chairman, on behalf of Britz and Vermeulen. I have no questions.

MR JANSEN: Jansen, on behalf of Ras, no questions.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR WAGENER: Jan Wagener, just one question.

Mr Willemse, on page 20 of the bundle - if you could just page to there, paragraph 11, you refer to a party where certain people had been present. I'm not quite sure what the relevance of this party is, but you mention the names of people who are my clients. Could you perhaps just tell me what this paragraph is all about?

MR WILLEMSE: Chairperson, I would just quickly want to read.

CHAIRPERSON: This was to celebrate your transfer in 1985, wasn't it?

MR WILLEMSE: Chairperson, when I made this statement it was in front of the Investigating Team and there were so many parties on the farm that I can't really place this, why I specifically mentioned it. There was an incident one afternoon where I carried gravel to Vlakplaas and after which Colonel de Kock invited me to enjoy a beer with them. I don't know whether that is referred to in paragraph 11.

MR WAGENER: So you're not trying to say something here where I have to read between the lines?

MR WILLEMSE: No, that is not the intention.

MR WAGENER: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

MR LAMEY: Mr Chairman, I must just say, there are portion here which are not really relevant to this specific incident, which is also just by, by accident just formed part of the bundle. There is no real reliance placed on that in this incident, thank you.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Mr Chairman, one, maybe two questions.

Mr Willemse, this affidavit is the one that you gave to the Attorney-General, and that was with the intention of becoming a State witness.

MR WILLEMSE: Yes, that is correct.

MR DU PLESSIS: Thank you, Mr Chairman, no further questions.

MR BOOYENS: Booyens on record, no questions.

COUNSEL: No questions.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS PATEL: Thank you, Honourable Chairperson.

Mr Willemse, the instructions that you received at the farm before you went out on the operation, do you confirm the previous applicant's recollection of it, that everybody in the house was to be killed?

MR WILLEMSE: That is correct.

MS PATEL: And can I ask you, the guard that you shot and killed, was he armed?

MR WILLEMSE: Chairperson, I can't remember that I saw a weapon with him.

MS PATEL: Alright. My instructions from the family are in fact that he wasn't armed, that the guard didn't carry a weapon.

MR WILLEMSE: I cannot comment on that.

MS PATEL: And then the question of the embankment, you say you saw Mr de Kock fall at this particular embankment.

MR WILLEMSE: Yes, I saw that he fell down the embankment.

MS PATEL: Do you recall how far from the gate where the guard was, this embankment was?

MR WILLEMSE: I cannot remember precisely, but regarding the lighting, there were some of those lights that you would get in the black townships. It wasn't a very bright light, but you could identify people.

MS PATEL: Would you dispute the family's saying that this embankment, that there is an embankment but it's about 20 metres away from the fence itself, that it doesn't fall straight or flush up against the fence?

MR WILLEMSE: I can't really recall what the distance is.

MS PATEL: Okay. And you say you can't remember at all shooting Mrs Chand.

MR WILLEMSE: I cannot recall it. I can specifically remember the guard, but I cannot deny that I shot anyone in the house. If I did, I won't deny it.

MS PATEL: I find that strange, Sir, were you involved in so many operations that you cannot recall having shot a woman or what is this lack of memory?

MR WILLEMSE: Chairperson, I could also have said that I didn't fire a shot. I'm not here to tell lies. I really cannot remember that I specifically fired a shot in the house. But is there are other people who say that they saw that I fired a shot, then I won't deny it.

MS PATEL: Honourable Chairperson, if you'd grant me one moment please.

MR WILLEMSE: Chairperson, I might just add that I'm suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder and that certain aspects of my recollection are not that good anymore. My long-term memory has suffered greatly as a result of my disorder.

MS PATEL: Thank you, Honourable Chairperson, I'm done.

CHAIRPERSON: Re-examination?

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: I omitted just to ask one thing in chief-examination, which I realised afterwards. With regard to the question regarding additional compensation or remuneration in the additional amnesty application, you said that it was not applicable. Can you recall whether you received any additional remuneration which was connected to this operation?

MR WILLEMSE: No, I didn't.

MR LAMEY: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you, no questions, Mr Chairperson.

ADV SANDI: Mr Willemse, have you been diagnosed by a doctor to be suffering post-traumatic stress?

MR WILLEMSE: That is correct, Chairperson, I have diagnosed by a psychologist as suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder. As a result of this disorder I have lost my job in the police.

ADV SANDI: Thank you.

MR LAMEY: Mr Chairman, will this be a convenient stage?

CHAIRPERSON: Well knowing that some people are keen to take their departure because they feel they have other more important things to do tomorrow, perhaps we'll take the adjournment now. What time on Thursday?

MR DU PLESSIS: Mr Chairman, may I suggest 10 o'clock on Thursday, seeing that people are going to go away to some distant parts of the country.

CHAIRPERSON: Well that's what I want to know. Is anybody coming back on Thursday morning? Are you?

MR DU PLESSIS: No, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: I think everybody is coming.

MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, the way it's going I think we'll comfortably finish the application in the allocated time.

CHAIRPERSON: Right, 10 o'clock on Thursday morning.

MR LAMEY: Mr Chairman, may I just enquire, Mr Willemse is from Mossel Bay, could he be excused if so advised by his legal representative? - from attendance.

CHAIRPERSON: On the same basis as the previous applicant. If for some unforeseen reason you require him, he'll have to come back.

MR LAMEY: As it pleases you, Mr Chairman. Thank you.