CHAIRPERSON: For the record, it is Tuesday the 8th of June 1999, it is a continuation of the session of the Amnesty Committee, at Telkom Park in Pretoria. The first matter on the roll for this morning are the applications of David Solomon Simelane, reference AM5305/97 and Christopher Mnisi, reference AM6059/97.

The Panel and the Leader of Evidence are as indicated previously on the record. Mr Koopedi for the applicants.

MR KOOPEDI: Thank you, Chairperson. I confirm that my name is Brian Koopedi. I appear on behalf of the two applicants, being Mr Simelane and Mr Mnisi.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Mr Koopedi, can we proceed to hear their evidence.

MR KOOPEDI: Chairperson, we are ready to proceed. I will request that we not follow the chronological order in terms of names, and instead of starting with Mr Simelane, start with Mr Mnisi. I believe the Committee will be able to understand the evidence better that way, and I will ask that he be sworn in. Mr Mnisi is sitting on the extreme right of my side.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you, Mr Koopedi. Mr Mnisi, can you hear the translation?

MR MNISI: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: In what language will you be giving your testimony?

MR MNISI: Zulu.

CHAIRPERSON: Please stand. Can you give your full names for the record.

CHRISTOPHER SHILANE MNISI: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Koopedi?

EXAMINATION BY MR KOOPEDI: Thank you, Chairperson.

Mr Mnisi, is it correct that you are a co-applicant in this matter?

MR MNISI: That is correct.

MR KOOPEDI: Is it also correct that this application refers to the killing of two persons, one known as Disco and one know as Selepe, who was a Security Branch member?

MR MNISI: That is correct.

MR KOOPEDI: Is it also correct that these killings occurred in Mamelodi?

MR MNISI: That is correct.

MR KOOPEDI: Are you a member, or were you ever a member of a political organisation?

MR MNISI: Yes.

MR KOOPEDI: Which organisation?

MR MNISI: The ANC.

MR KOOPEDI: When did you become a member of the ANC?

MR MNISI: In 1980.

MR KOOPEDI: Now is it correct that whilst you were a member of the ANC, you were also a member of MK?

MR MNISI: Yes.

MR KOOPEDI: Now whilst a member of MK, did you partake in any missions, did you do anything as a member of MK?

MR MNISI: Yes, I did.

MR KOOPEDI: Now where were you based, were you always in South Africa, or were you based outside South Africa?

MR MNISI: Yes, I did go out of the country and I came back and I was commissioned through Joe Slovo to go and reconnoitre a police station in Nelspruit, where we were arrested, captured by the Askaris.

At the time we did not know that they were Askaris. We were taken to the Kruger National Park, where we were tortured. I was put into a coffin by Mashigu and the other white police and put into a grave and my colleague was also tortured similarly.

As these people were interrogating us they wanted to know whether we were going to give the same story and we did give them the same story and we were taken to White River, but we did not see each other, we were locked up separately.

MR KOOPEDI: After being arrested, is it correct that you finally ended up in Vlakplaas?

MR MNISI: That is correct.

MR KOOPEDI: That is yourself and Isaac Moyema?

MR MNISI: That is correct.

MR KOOPEDI: Is it also correct that this Isaac Moyema was so-to-speak, your immediate commander?

MR MNISI: That is correct.

MR KOOPEDI: Now at Vlakplaas, is it correct that whilst at Vlakplaas you were able to conduct communication with your regional commander?

MR MNISI: That is correct.

MR KOOPEDI: Is it also correct that your regional commander was situated at Maputo, or in Maputo?

MR MNISI: That is correct.

MR KOOPEDI: And who was your Special Operations commander is Maputo?

MR MNISI: Solly Simelane.

MR KOOPEDI: Is it correct that Solly Simelane is the person seated next to you, your co-applicant?

MR MNISI: That is correct.

MR KOOPEDI: Now whilst at Vlakplaas, you then had to escape, is that correct?

MR MNISI: That is correct.

MR KOOPEDI: And was this ever discussed with your regional command, as you say you were able to communicate with them?

MR MNISI: Yes, we did everything under the command. We received instructions as to what we had to do. The command wanted us to stay and collect as much information as possible, which information we would in turn pass on, but then we felt that it was not safe because they would discover what mission we had come for and that would be the end of us.

MR KOOPEDI: Okay. Now I want you to get to the stage where you had to escape from Vlakplaas, did you get any instructions or advice from your regional command as to whether you can or cannot escape?

MR MNISI: We communicated our concern that we were not in the position to stay on at Vlakplaas, because they wanted us at Vlakplaas to go out and kill as many ANC members as possible and we were still fresh and we knew many trained comrades inside and outside the country, so that the situation did not permit that we could stay. We informed our connections outside that we were going to flee. There were many whites and they were all working there.

And we used to get - we used to be monitored all the time. One of these people who were monitory us was Disco, and they would follow us to our homes. Isaac I think, indicated that it was known that Disco is an informer, indicated that Disco was known to be an informer and then we decided to do something about this because for us to be able to escape and go back, it would not be possible, we would be captured and killed and a decision was then made to the effect that we should kill him, but we should not use a firearm. We decided to make use of a knife.

Isaac came, I met him at a gubela shop and he showed me the person and I stabbed him, after which I left. I went to my girlfriend's place. Before I could even settle, police came and arrested me. And this was possible because I was being monitored all the time. So that the following day, Coetzee came to pick me up where I was locked up at Mamelodi Police Station. I was supposed to appear in Court and they took me.

We went to Makanajaneni, a place near Mabopane. We were based there and that used to be our hide-out as Askaris, together with people like Coetzee. They said they wanted me to give them a statement of what I did. When I did the statement I did not tell the people that the person was a informer, I told them instead that I have killed an ANC person, I stabbed him. The reason being that he was apparently organising that I be beaten up or I be captured. And the people were at the same time surprised that I was moving about freely at Mamelodi. Now the statement that I gave to Coetzee as well as Vermeulen.

MR KOOPEDI: Now, did you finally escape from Vlakplaas?

MR MNISI: Yes, we spent January and February and around March, I think it was on the 15th, we went to Tonga. Vermeulen took my friend, Isaac, I think Isaac Moyema. I think they possibly had suspected that we were planning to escape.

After killing Ace we went back to the farm. I was scared now because I didn't know where he had disappeared to. I said to Vermeulen that I would like to have some money, R200, because I wanted to get married. He gave me the money and after taking receipt of the money, I was with another brethren by the name of Johannes Mnisi.

The money which I received from Vermeulen was not necessarily for a marriage, I gave to Freddy Shongwe, who would in turn use the money to drive us back to Swaziland. We crossed the border and then we met with Gabuza at Mbabane and that's how we fled.

MR KOOPEDI: Now let's go to the second incident, which would be in 1983. Were you still a member of Special Operation at that stage?

MR MNISI: Yes, I was still a member.

MR KOOPEDI: And did you have any operations within the country?

MR MNISI: Yes.

MR KOOPEDI: Now let's get to the killing of Selepe, the Security Branch member. How did this happen, was it ordered by anyone, did you do it on your own, please tell this Committee how it happened.

MR MNISI: No, an order was issued.

MR KOOPEDI: By whom?

MR MNISI: It came from Solly.

MR KOOPEDI: Where was he when he issued the order?

MR MNISI: In Maputo.

MR KOOPEDI: Were you also in Maputo?

MR MNISI: Yes, that was our base. We would leave Maputo for Swaziland and then come to South Africa, and that's how we moved about.

MR KOOPEDI: Okay. Now were you told why Selepe has to be killed?

MR MNISI: Yes, he was actually stopping liberation armies to free the country.

MR KOOPEDI: Let's get to the day you killed Selepe. How did you go to Mamelodi?

MR MNISI: I was fetched from Swaziland. I then sneaked into the country and placed at Promed, where I spent some time at comrade Ngubene's place, from where I was taken and went to Freddy's place.

I spent some time at Freddy's place and around 6, 7, 8, I think it was on the 7th of November, they then took me to show me Selepe's place. I waited for him. I actually went inside the homestead and requested a toilet, but I learnt he was not at home and I went out. As I was coming out I saw somebody coming, carrying a paper bag. I called out his name and he responded. That's when I shot him. I shot, or should I say fired warning shots into the air at the same time, to keep any other person away who might disturb me. My comrades took me away from the area because the police were just about to begin their investigation.

MR KOOPEDI: Now these comrades of yours, those who collected you, would that be Freddy, Shongwe and Jerry Magubane?

MR MNISI: Yes.

MR KOOPEDI: Are these people still alive today?

MR MNISI: No, they died in a Pretoria car bomb blast because they were members of our unit as well.

MR KOOPEDI: Okay. Now inasfar as the two killings are concerned, are you satisfied that you have told this Honourable Committee all there is to tell, the whole truth, that concerns you?

MR MNISI: Yes.

MR KOOPEDI: Now for these two killings, were you ever paid anything, did you personally gain anything out of that?

MR MNISI: No, I did not benefit, save for the freedom that we have today.

MR KOOPEDI: Do you regard these two killings as having been politically motivated?

MR MNISI: Yes.

MR KOOPEDI: Do you think that the political objective was achieved?

MR MNISI: Yes.

MR KOOPEDI: Chairperson, that will be the evidence of the first applicant.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you, Mr Koopedi. Any questions, Ms Mtanga?

CROSS-EXAMINATION MS MTANGA: Yes, Chairperson, I've got about two questions.

Mr Mnisi, what were the real names of Disco, that you killed?

MR MNISI: I don't know him.

MS MTANGA: Are you able to give us the exact location where you had stabbed him?

MR MNISI: It was a little bit dark, but I think I stabbed him at the back.

MS MTANGA: I mean the place where the stabbing had taken place?

MR MNISI: Yes, it at Mamelodi, S&S.

ADV GCABASHE: What is S&S, Mr Mnisi, is it a shopping centre, is it a house?

MR MNISI: It is an area called S&S, it's like blocks.

MR KOOPEDI: If I can assist, S&S is a section in Mamelodi.

ADV GCABASHE: And at that section, where at that section, in his house, at a friend's house, just give us the location, where would that have been, in S&S.

MR MNISI: It was next to the road, just in front of houses.

MS MTANGA: Was this Disco working with you at Vlakplaas, or was he just a person in Mamelodi?

MR MNISI: He was an ordinary person at Mamelodi. He was an informer and he kept me under surveillance. Each time I came back, Isaac would tell me that such and such a person was monitoring my movements. He was a person operating in Pretoria. He knew many things. I'm talking here about Isaac, he knew more than I knew in this area.

MS MTANGA: On Incident 2, paragraph 15, you state that after you had carried out the operation on Mr Selepe, you went on to another target, but you couldn't find that target. Can you tell us where did you go, the exact location that you went to.

MR MNISI: I retreated and went back to Swaziland.

MS MTANGA: Mr Mnisi, your paragraph 15 reads as follows:

So my question is, where was that target, where were you going to find that target?

MR MNISI: In Naledi, at Mamelodi. It is Hlongwane, I think it's Sergeant Hlongwane.

MS MTANGA: That ends my questioning, Chairperson, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Ms Mtanga.

Mr Mnisi, when did you kill Disco?

MR MNISI: It was in December, I think it was on the New Year's Eve.

CHAIRPERSON: In which year?

MR MNISI: I think it could have been 1981, it was in 1981.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you. Are there any other questions?

ADV DE JAGER: And you killed Selepe in 1983, is that correct?

MR MNISI: That is correct.

ADV DE JAGER: Round about February or March?

MR MNISI: I think it was in November.

ADV DE JAGER: But I understood you to say that you were only at Vlakplaas for two months. You stayed at Vlakplaas for, was it January and February?

MR MNISI: They took us from the White River Police Station. I think it was in October or thereabouts, and we spent November and December. We were supposed to escape in December, but this Disco incident delayed us, so we spent five, not two months.

ADV DE JAGER: But you say that you've still been a member of the Security Police when you killed Selepe - no, you were a member of Special Operations, you weren't a member of the Security Police.

MR MNISI: I was a member of Special Operations.

ADV DE JAGER: Thank you.

ADV GCABASHE: Mr Mnisi, I just have a bit of a gap in my notes, you're going a little too fast for me. You killed Disco and gave a report to Coetzee, yes?

MR MNISI: That was the following day, yes.

ADV GCABASHE: Then you went on to tell us that on the 15th of March you went somewhere, I just didn't get that name, where did you go to?

MR MNISI: That was during the operations, I went to Tonga, in the company of Vermeulen. We were in the course of our duty, trying to identify comrades which we would then capture.

ADV GCABASHE: Yes, and Vermeulen took somebody and - just go over that bit as well, I missed that.

MR MNISI: He took my commander, Isaac Moyema.

ADV GCABASHE: Yes, and what's important about him taking Isaac? Why did you tell us that?

MR MNISI: There were two of us in the operation.

ADV GCABASHE: Yes. So Vermeulen took Isaac and you went somewhere else, is this what you're saying?

MR MNISI: No. They took Isaac in the evening, that's from where we had camped. We used to camp in the veld or in the bush. Isaac and myself were assigned to monitor everything so that we could report back to the MK.

ADV GCABASHE: Yes.

MR MNISI: And as we were conducting the operations, Vermeulen took Isaac and left with him.

ADV GCABASHE: And what happened to Isaac, is that what is important?

MR MNISI: That's the last time I saw him.

ADV GCABASHE: Okay.

MR MNISI: When we went back to Vlakplaas, the other comrades started speaking. There is this slogan that they used to chant, saying something like "laga laga", and that implied or meant that one of us had been taken away by the boers.

ADV GCABASHE: Then you talk about "after killing Ace", is Ace somebody else or is Ace, Isaac?

MR MNISI: Ace is Isaac. Ace is actually is MK name.

ADV GCABASHE: Because the note I have is:

But you are really saying that you surmised that Isaac had been killed because that was the last time you saw him, when he left with Vermeulen. You know nothing about what happened to Isaac really?

MR MNISI: As we were sitting on the farm, there were talks that people just disappear. You will just disappear, you will either be burnt and there will be no grave because as far as I am concerned, Vermeulen came back on the following day, on the 15th, in the morning.

ADV GCABASHE: That's find, thank you very much.

CHAIRPERSON: Any re-examination, Mr Koopedi?

MR KOOPEDI: None, thank you, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Mr Mnisi, you are excused.

WITNESS EXCUSED

APPLICATION NO: 5305/97

CHAIRPERSON: Who is the next witness?

MR KOOPEDI: The next witness is also a co-applicant. His name is David Solomon Simelane. I will ask, Chairperson, that he be sworn in and then he gives evidence.

CHAIRPERSON: Are your names, David Solomon Simelane?

DAVID SOLOMON SIMELANE: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Koopedi?

MR KOOPEDI: Chairperson, for the sake of expediency, I'm going to ask my witness here to read through his statement. I think it will be faster.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I see that there are two statements here, have you handed these statements in, Mr Koopedi? There's one statement by Mr Mnisi and another one by Mr Simelane. Have you handed them in this morning, or where are they from?

MR KOOPEDI: I handed them in this morning, Chairperson. Because of the lateness, one could not explain ...(indistinct)

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, yes. Then just for the record, the statement of Mr Mnisi would be Exhibit A and the statement of Mr Simelane would be Exhibit B. Yes, you want to refer the witness to Exhibit B?

EXAMINATION BY MR KOOPEDI: That is indeed so, Chairperson, and I would ask the witness to read through Exhibit B.

MR SIMELANE: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

MR KOOPEDI: Thank you, Mr Simelane. Now when this order to kill Selepe was taken, was Mnisi still a member of the Special Operations?

MR SIMELANE: Yes, he was, he was still a member of the operation, Special Operations.

MR KOOPEDI: Including the people he has referred to in his statement?

MR SIMELANE: Yes, that's correct.

MR KOOPEDI: Now when these two killings happened, is it correct that you were personally not present?

MR SIMELANE: I was not present, I was based at Maputo.

MR KOOPEDI: So your involvement in these two matters is purely that of an order, having given an order?

MR SIMELANE: Exactly.

MR KOOPEDI: Now is it also correct that you - is it correct that you have applied for amnesty, not only for these two incidents, but other incidents where you are implicated as a person who has given orders?

MR SIMELANE: Correct.

MR KOOPEDI: Now inasfar as these two are concerned, do you believe that you have disclosed all the truth to this Honourable Committee?

MR SIMELANE: As far as I am concerned, yes.

MR KOOPEDI: Now in the issuing of these orders and the subsequent killing of these two persons, was there anything material that you personally gained?

MR SIMELANE: Except the precious freedom that we have today, sitting in these warm chairs.

MR KOOPEDI: Do you regard these killings as having been politically motivated?

MR SIMELANE: Politically motivated, yes.

MR KOOPEDI: And do you think any political objective was achieved by this?

MR SIMELANE: The liberation of our country from oppression.

MR KOOPEDI: Chairperson, that concludes the evidence of this applicant.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR KOOPEDI

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you, Mr Koopedi. Ms Mtanga, have you got any questions?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS MTANGA: Just one question, Chairperson, thank you.

Mr Simelane, on paragraph 5 of your statement you stated that Mr Selepe was a notorious Security Branch person and that's how he was perceived by the Regional Command, and hence the order was given for his killing. Can you tell us briefly what activities he was involved in that made him appear so notorious to the Regional Command.

MR SIMELANE: Well you have to understand that the ANC also had a long arm, we worked with some of the Special Branch here, supporters of the ANC, we did not only rely on our intelligence, trained cadres, but there were wide Special Branch which were working with us, Black Special Branch, ordinary policemen, the population, the underground network here, ANC. They were passing on the information. We were not operating in a vacuum, so we knew exactly what was happening here.

MS MTANGA: Can you give us examples, examples of the activities?

MR SIMELANE: The harassment of our people, the arresting of our people, torturing them. He was part this - what is it, the Vlakplaas. There was communication between them. You go to any person who lived during the era of Selepe here in Mamelodi, they will give you the history of Selepe. Which Special Branch can forward to us and say: "I have clean hands, I've never done anything" to the people, in the harassment of our people.

MS MTANGA: Thank you, Chairperson, no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, are there any other questions?

ADV GCABASHE: ... for clarity, page 4 of your application, the "1981 - unknown", does that refer to Disco or just - 1981, the acts, omissions and the dates, which one would that refer to? I don't know if that would be Disco, because he was killed in 1981.

MR KOOPEDI: If I may assist.

ADV GCABASHE: Please do.

MR SIMELANE: Disco.

ADV GCABASHE: That's Disco, okay. And then 1978 is Shlube, which is a matter that we are going to hear after this one.

MR SIMELANE: Right.

ADV GCABASHE: And the Mdantsane one is yet another one for a different hearing, it's not part of this hearing, is that so?

MR SIMELANE: Right.

ADV GCABASHE: Okay, fine. Thank you.

ADV DE JAGER: To whom did you report in Maputo?

MR SIMELANE: Joe Slovo, the late comrade Joe Slovo.

ADV DE JAGER: And did he ...(intervention)

MR SIMELANE: He was my superior.

ADV DE JAGER: And did he give you the orders to carry out these operations?

MR SIMELANE: Yes, we would - right.

CHAIRPERSON: Have you got any re-examination, Mr Koopedi?

MR KOOPEDI: None, thank you, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that the case for the applicants?

MR KOOPEDI: That will be the case for the applicants, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Mtanga, have you got any evidence that you intend leading?

MS MTANGA: None Chairperson, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Mr Koopedi, have you got any submissions?

MR KOOPEDI IN ARGUMENT: Thank you, Chairperson.

Chairperson, I will ask this Honourable Committee to grant amnesty to these two applicants. Chairperson, I appreciate the dilemma which his Committee might find itself in, inasfar as the killing of the first person, only known as Disco, in that there hasn't been any other information as to who this person really is. We have tried on our part to do our investigations to find out who this person is, but we've drawn a blank. However, inasfar as the applicants are concerned, I believe that they have fully disclosed what is known to them.

They had further had no personal benefit out of this and that the killing of this Disco was a political necessity for them to be - that is the first applicant, to be able to escape from Vlakplaas and take through this valuable information to his Regional Command in Maputo.

Similarly, the killing of the Special Branch policeman, known as Selepe, regrettable as it may be today, I believe that full disclosure has been given to you. I believe also that there is evidence before you that there has been no personal gain by any of these applicants, and further that it was also a political necessity that the two people be, I mean the policeman be killed.

And it is on those brief grounds that I will ask that amnesty be granted to these two applicants. Thank you, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you. Ms Mtanga, have you got any submissions?

MS MTANGA: I have no submissions, Chairperson, I will leave the matter in your hands. I also wish to stage on behalf of the family, of the Selepe family, that they are not opposing the application.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you, Ms Mtanga.

ADV DE JAGER: Ms Mtanga, the other incidents refer to 1978, that's Shlube and 1982, Mdantsane, are they scheduled somewhere?

MS MTANGA: Chairperson, the Mdantsane matter is not scheduled as yet, but the Shlube matter is coming up in the Potsane, Masango, Makhura and Masina incidents. It's been scheduled.

ADV DE JAGER: ...(inaudible)

INTERPRETER: The speaker's mike is not activated.

ADV DE JAGER: ... any other people involved, or could it be heard now?

MS MTANGA: I've got no briefing of the office, but I don't think it's been investigated as yet because they needed some information from the applicant about it. And if it gets set down, it will be set down in the Eastern Cape, not here.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you. I assume you don't have any further submissions, Mr Koopedi?

MR KOOPEDI: No further submissions, thanks Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you. We'll adjourn for a brief moment.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

This is an application for amnesty in terms of Section 18 of Act 34 of 1995, by David Solomon Simelane and Christopher Mnisi, in respect of the following two incidents:

The killing of a male person, known as Disco, on or about New Year's Eve in 1981, at the SS Unit in Mamelodi and the killing of Phillipus Matkliheri Selepe, during or about November 1983, in Mamelodi. The deceased having been a member of the Security Branch of the then South African Police.

Both the applicants have testified before us. Although there are members of the family of the later Mr Selepe, present at the proceedings, they have indicated through the Leader of Evidence, that they are not opposing the application in respect of the death of the late Mr Selepe.

The facts which are undisputed are briefly, insofar as they are relevant for the purposes of our decision, that the second applicant, Mr Mnisi, and his immediate commander at that time, Isaac Moyema, both members of Umkhonto weSizwe, infiltrated into the Republic of South Africa during 1980 and were subsequently captured by the police through the help of what is referred to as Askaris, that is former members of the liberation movements, who have joined the ranks of the South African Police. They were both taken to Vlakplaas, a police farm, to join the police unit on the farm, under the command of Mr Dirk Coetzee. They somehow managed to maintain contact with their Regional Command, Regional Umkhonto weSizwe Command in Maputo, who ordered them to obtain as much information as possible before fleeing from Vlakplaas. It soon became apparent to them that they were being held under surveillance by the police, which factor would complicate their intended escape.

The deceased in the first incident, that is Disco, who was a known police informer, was one of those responsible for surveilling them. On instructions of the Regional Command, they had to eliminate Disco in order to facilitate their escape. It was decided not use firearms in doing so, but rather to stab Disco.

Eventually Disco was pointed out to the second applicant, Mr Mnisi, who then stabbed and killed him. The second applicant was arrested, but was subsequently taken into his care by Coetzee, and the second applicant continued with certain Vlakplaas activities.

On one such operation, Isaac Moyema was removed by a Vlakplaas member, Vermeulen, and second applicant never saw Isaac Moyema again after that. Second applicant subsequently managed to escape through Swaziland to Maputo.

Pursuant to instructions from the Umkhonto weSizwe Regional Command, second applicant was to effect the elimination of Mr Selepe, a member of the Security Branch. Second applicant proceeded to do so during November 1983, when he shot and killed Mr Selepe, as the latter was walking towards his home in Mamelodi.

First applicant, Mr Simelane, also testified to the effect that he was at all material times the Regional Commander of Umkhonto weSizwe's Special Operations based in Maputo. He had given the orders to eliminate the two deceased. He in turn reported to and received his instructions from the late Mr Joe Slovo.

Having carefully considered all of the evidence and the material that was placed before us, as well as the argument submitted on behalf of the applicants, we are satisfied that the incidents constitute acts associated with a political objective, as defined in Act 34 of 1995, and that the applicants have made a full disclosure of all material and relevant facts in regard thereto.

In the circumstances, the applicants are GRANTED amnesty in respect of the killing of Disco and Mr Selepe, as indicated above.

...(end of side A of tape)

... Mamelodi west, the son of the late Mr Selepe, is a victim in relation to the killing of Mr Selepe, and the matter is accordingly referred for consideration in terms of the provisions of Section 20(2) of Act 34 of 1995. That is the decision in respect of this matter.

MR KOOPEDI: May we be excused, Chairperson?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you for your assistance, Mr Koopedi, you are excused and your clients as well.

MR KOOPEDI: I know I did not apologise earlier, Chairperson, I'd hoped I'd find time to apologise for being late. I hope I'll have another opportunity to come and explain. Thanks, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Thank you very much, you're excused. Ms Mtanga, what else have we got on the roll?

MS MTANGA: The next matter on the roll, Chairperson, is the matter of Potsane, Makhura, Masina and Masango.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that one ready to proceed?

MS MTANGA: Yes, we are, Chairperson, but I would request a five minute adjournment just to organise ourselves.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, we will just have a very brief adjournment to enable the next matter to be prepared. That is the applications of Masina and others. We adjourn briefly.

CHAIRPERSON: This is the continuation of the amnesty hearings. The next matter is the applications of Obed Masina and others. Now Ms Mtanga, you must assist us. Mr Simelane is involved in one particular incident, the Shlube one, which was referred to in the previous application. Now what is the position here, because the other four applicants who are on the original papers before us, their applications of course relate to a whole number of incidents. How are we dealing with the matters, are we dealing with Shlube on its own, or how are we proceeding?

MS MTANGA: It's been agreed between myself and the attorneys for the applicants and Mr Koopedi, that the ...(indistinct) applicants will lead evidence of Mr Simelane and of Mr Masina, who are involved in the Shlube incident first and then we'll proceed with the rest of the incidents of the units afterwards.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well. Then for the record, we have before us the applications of Obed Masina, reference AM5886/97, Frans Ting-Ting Masango, AM7087/97, Neo Griffiths Potsane, AM7159/97, Joseph Elias Makhura, AM7695/97 and David Solomon Simelane, AM5305/97, specifically in respect of the Shlube incident.

For the record - Mr Berger, will you put yourself on record?

MR BERGER: Thank you, Chairperson, Honourable Members of the Committee. My name is D I Berger: B-E-R-G-E-R. I'm instructed in this matter by Mr K Lengane, of the firm Bell Dewar and Hall.

CHAIRPERSON: And on behalf of these four ...

MR BERGER: Chairperson, we act on behalf of Mr Masina, Masango, Potsane and Makhura.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Berger. What is the position of Mr Koopedi and Mr Simelane?

MS MTANGA: Mr Berger will lead the evidence of Mr Simelane.

CHAIRPERSON: Alright. And then for the interested parties, can you put yourselves on record?

MR BOOYSEN: Thank you, Mr Chairman. My name is Booysen, I'm from the firm ...(indistinct) and Booysen Attorneys and I'm acting on behalf of certain of the victims, in connection with the bombing in Silverton.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Booysen.

MR RAMMUTLA: Thank you, Mr Chairperson. My name is John Rammutla, from the firm ...(indistinct) Lamkhuzi and Mhlango. I'm acting on behalf of one of the victims, Mr Lukhele, whose husband was murdered in Mamelodi. Thank you, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much. Ms Mtanga, you're leading evidence.

Yes, Mr Berger, will you proceed?

MR BERGER: Thank you, Chairperson. Chairperson, as has already been indicated to you, what we've agreed to do is to lead the evidence surrounding the death of Mr Chaupe, also known as Shlube, first, because that incident happened in 1978, and then what we'll do is after - Mr Masina will only give evidence in relation to the death of Mr Chaupe and then Mr Simelane will also give evidence in relation to the death of Mr Chaupe and then after that we will then lead the evidence of the four applicants again, in relation to their work as a unit, because those incidents occurred much later, in 1986 in fact.

I might just say at the beginning, Chairperson, that the death of Mr Chaupe, formed part of several charges which were brought against the four people whom I represent and you'll know from the bundle of documents that has been prepared by the TRC, that from page 77 through to page 105, is the entire charge sheet. The matter was heard in the then Supreme Court and came before Judge de Klerk, sitting with two assessors, Dr Botha and Mr de Kock.

You will see also that charge 13, which is at page 80, was only in relation to then accused number 1, who was Mr Masina, and the particulars of the charge appear at page 87. It was a charge of murder relating to the death of Mr Orphan Chaupe on the 25th of June 1978, in Rockville, Soweto.

I can tell just a brief history of the trial. The four accused appeared before Judge de Klerk, and refused to plead to the charges, refused to recognise the jurisdiction of the Court, on the grounds that they were soldiers of Umkhonto weSizwe and that the Court as a civilian Court had no jurisdiction to try them. They dispensed with the services of counsel and were represented only by an attorney, Mr Peter Harris, who held a watching brief. He did not participate in the proceedings at all. And those were his instructions.

The trial proceeded and throughout the trial, after every witness had given evidence, the accused were asked whether they had anything to say or whether they had any questions to ask, and consistently throughout the trial they refused. They refused to participate, they refused to answer any questions. There was a trial within a trial, relating to confessions which had been extracted from them.

At the start of the trial, Mr Masina had made a statement saying that the confessions had been extracted under torture, but he didn't say anything further than that. Witness after witness was led in the trial within a trial, and the accused refused to participate at all. They were convicted on the basis of their confessions. Three of the accused were convicted of murder, amongst them the charge of murder of Mr Chaupe, that was Mr Masina, and the other incidents which we will come to. There was the murder of Sergeant Vuma. The first and second accused, Mr Masina and Mr Masango were convicted of that murder. And then there was the murder of Mr Lukhele and Mrs Dludlu. The first, second and third accused as they then were, Mr Masina, Mr Masango and Mr Potsane, were convicted of those murders and the attempted murder of Mrs Lukhele.

All four of the accused, including Mr Makhura, were convicted of planting the bomb in Silverton, and they were convicted thereof attempted murder because no-one was killed in that incident. They were also convicted of damage to property.

There's also an incident of planting a landmine Soshanguve, and all four of them were convicted of that charge as well. There is one incident which we will come to later, which is the planting of a landmine in Mamelodi, for which they seek amnesty, but for which they were never charged.

At the end of the case, on the merits, the judge then moved to the question of extenuating circumstances and he informed the accused that the onus was on them to establish extenuating circumstances and if they failed to lead any evidence and establish extenuating circumstances, there was a distinct possibility that they would be sentenced to death, because then the imposition of the death would be mandatory. They still refused to participate and they still maintained their position that they were soldiers of Umkhonto weSizwe, and that they were not going to participate in the proceedings at all.

At that point their families became very concerned for their welfare and instructed counsel - it was an Adv Kuny and Adv Revelas, to appear and to lead evidence in, to establish extenuating circumstances. The accused said "our families can do what they feel they must do, but we are not participating". The judge allowed the families to lead evidence in extenuation and one of the witnesses called was Prof Bundy, the present vice chancellor of Wits University, and he needed to consult with the accused and they said "well we can't consult with you because we are not participating in the proceedings".

At the end of the evidence in extenuation, the Court was split. The judge - even though the accused had not participated, the judge found extenuating circumstances. The two assessors however said there are no extenuating circumstances. And because a question of extenuating circumstances was a question of fact, not of law, the judge was overruled and he was bound and did impose the death sentence on Mr Masina, Mr Masango and Mr Potsane. Mr Makhura was sentenced to 25 years in prison, as were Mr Masina, Masango and Potsane, in relation to the other incidents, including the Silverton bombing. All the sentences were to run concurrently.

After they'd been sentenced to death, my clients persisted with their refusal to participate in the South African legal system, on the same grounds that they were soldiers of Umkhonto weSizwe, and were not prepared to appeal against the imposition of the death sentence. And it was only after an instruction came from Lusaka, instructing them to appeal, that they actually appealed. The appeal went to the Appellate Division and the decision there is reported as State vs Masina & Others 1990 (4) SA, starting at page 709, judgment of the Appellate Division. During the interval being sentenced to death, which incidentally was on the 27th of April 1989, and the hearing of the matter in the Appellate Division, the law was changed, giving an automatic right of appeal and changing the focus of death penalty cases from whether there was extenuating circumstances to whether there was any mitigation and giving the Court a wider and broader discretion as regard the imposition of the death penalty.

What happened then was that the Appellate Division set aside the death sentences and imposed a term of imprisonment of 25 years, to run concurrently with the other sentences. So after that judgment all four, Mr Masina, Masango, Potsane and Makhura were serving a term of imprisonment of 25 years. They were subsequently released in terms of the deals that were struck between the ANC and the then Government of South Africa.

I might add, after a hunger strike of 38 days, when they lost approximately 20% of their body weight, finally they were released. So they have been charged, convicted, sentenced and released and they now come and seek amnesty for those offences as well as for one offence for which they were never charged. Effectively the purpose of the amnesty applications is to set out the truth, the whole truth and ask this Committee to grant them amnesty so that their records can finally be cleared.

Chairperson, with your leave we will now begin with the evidence of Mr Masina, on the Shlube incident.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, or Orphan Chaupe.

MR BERGER: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: And this relates only to Mr Masina and to Mr Simelane?

MR BERGER: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well. Could you please stand and give us your full names please.

JABU OBED MASINA: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, please sit down. Mr Berger?

EXAMINATION BY MR BERGER: Thank you, Chairperson.

Mr Masina, is it correct that you were born on the 26th of December 1950?

MR MASINA: That is correct.

MR BERGER: And you were born in Rockville, Soweto, is that correct?

MR MASINA: That is correct.

MR BERGER: When was it that you left South Africa?

MR MASINA: I left 1977, around December, if I still remember very well.

MR BERGER: Very briefly, could you tell the Committee what your reasons were for leaving the country.

MR MASINA: What happened was that I left school, I think it was in 1969, because my family did not the financial capacity to take me through school, and I went to work for eight years at a company in Selrose, but I spent the other three years working at CNA in Elandsfontein ...(intervention)

MR BERGER: Mr Masina, can I just ask you to speak a lot slower because your evidence needs to be interpreted and the Committee needs to write down your evidence.

MR MASINA: As I was working it happened that - it was on a Friday, I'd just been paid, I got robbed by thugs and they took all the wages that I had and they also stabbed me on the arm, injuring me. That led me into deciding to go back to school.

I went back to school even though I had passed Form 1, I went back to the same class because I did not have proof that I had completed this standard. The only thing that I had was my standard six certificate with no proof for my Form 1 class which I had passed.

MR BERGER: You returned to school in 1974, is that correct?

MR MASINA: That is correct.

MR BERGER: You remained there until 1977.

MR MASINA: That is correct.

MR BERGER: Why did you decide to leave after now being back at school for three years?

MR MASINA: I was driven into leaving because I saw no future in South Africa. I tried to work, I got injured and I decided to go back to school to improve myself to get a better job now that I had my arm injured, but then this 1976 thing started on the 16th of June, so that we were not able to sit for our exams. We did not sit for our exams and I repeated my Form 3, because I was doing my Form 3 in 1976.

MR BERGER: Mr Masina, were you doing Form 3 in Soweto in 1976, when the riots began?

MR MASINA: That is correct, I was studying at Sinownwe(?) Junior Secondary School.

MR BERGER: So as a result of that you had to repeat Form 3, in 1977?

MR MASINA: That is correct.

MR BERGER: At that stage, were you politically active at all?

MR MASINA: No, I was not, I knew nothing about politics.

MR BERGER: What happened in 1977, that made you leave?

MR MASINA: I happened to meet with one of the ANC people, his name was Vincent Simelane. He told me that if I wanted to go and study overseas he would facilitate that and he said I should not tell anyone, he make means that I should leave and study overseas.

MR BERGER: Did it happen then that you left the country, as a result of your conversation with Mr Selane?

MR MASINA: Yes, that is correct, I left.

MR BERGER: And your purpose then was to go and further your studies?

MR MASINA: That is correct, I left with an intention of studying, but I when I arrived in Swaziland we crossed the border into Swaziland. On that very same evening in Swaziland, we were supposed to cross the border yet again into Mozambique.

On arrival in Mozambique I met with comrade Solly Simelane, the following day of our arrival in Mozambique. I got to know him because he stayed in the same street as myself at home. We then conversed and I indicated to him that I wanted to further my studies and he committed to ...(intervention)

MR BERGER: Mr Simelane was also from Rockville?

MR MASINA: Yes, he came from Rockville.

MR BERGER: But he had left the country some time before you left the country, is that correct?

MR MASINA: Yes, he had left the country earlier.

MR BERGER: Did Mr Simelane make arrangements for you to study further?

MR MASINA: Yes, he tried. After I had spoken to him we came to an agreement that he would facilitate, but I got a surprise. When he came back the following day I actually told him that I am no longer to continue with my education, but instead to train as an MK member. The reason being that there was an evening, I cannot remember whether it was the following evening or not, I saw one comrade who was guarding in Maputo. He was sitting under a tree, but I could see that there was something next to him as he was sitting under the tree. This seemed like a firearm to me and this boy tried to chase me away because I was not supposed to be close to him.

I managed to speak to him and asked him about this stick, which I eventually discovered was an MK, and he explained to me about the soldiers etc.

MR BERGER: Mr Masina, did you say that the stick was an MK?

MR MASINA: AK.

MR BERGER: AK, yes.

INTERPRETER: Thank you, Chairperson.

MR MASINA: Basically that is how I changed my mind so that I joined the MK instead of going to school. And comrade Solly then told me that he was going to take me to a crash course.

Before that actually, he asked me if knew any police who stayed in Soweto, bad police. I explained to him that yes, there are such police and I gave him the names of such police. And he said there is a crash course which he wanted to take me through, after which I would have to go back home to eliminate these police. Indeed that was the case. I went through the crash. I attended this crash course at Funda in Angola. I think it could have taken three months. In was in 1978, in April or thereabouts. Then I came back to South Africa.

MR BERGER: Mr Masina, are you saying that you finished the course in about April of 1978?

MR MASINA: That is correct.

MR BERGER: And that was the course at Funda?

MR MASINA: That is correct. The course lasted for three months. It started in January, February, March. It ended in March, but I came to South Africa in April.

MR BERGER: Very briefly, could you tell the Committee what you learnt during this course?

MR MASINA: What I learnt during the crash course was to use an AK and pistol called TT, a Makarov. I learnt about war basically. I also learnt about politics, as well as military combat work, MCW.

MR BERGER: When you say you learnt about politics, could you elaborate a little on that? What were you taught, what areas did it cover?

MR MASINA: They were teaching us that an MK is not an organisation, or I should I say the ANC and the MK are not an organisation or organisations that kill innocent people or just kill people without reason. They explained that people should not go about killing people for no apparent reasons.

I would say they removed the haze in my eyes, which made me understand our position in relation to the boers and I got to understand why I was not able to continue with my studies. Because the people or the students were fighting in 1976, because they did not want to receive education in Afrikaans. I learnt about all those things. And basically that is that.

MR BERGER: You also mentioned, although it wasn't interpreted, that there were discussions about apartheid.

MR MASINA: Yes, we did.

MR BERGER: So would it be correct to say that the history of South Africa was also covered during this course?

MR MASINA: Yes, we did.

MR BERGER: Then you returned to Mozambique, and did you meet again with Mr Simelane?

MR MASINA: Yes, I met with him again.

MR BERGER: And what happened then?

MR MASINA: He told me that he had already made preparations for me to come back to South Africa to kill the one police person who was very troublesome, and he said that we were going to meet in Swaziland and we were going to meet with one now deceased, Dan, a comrade who was going to be my commander from Swaziland.

MR BERGER: Was the name of the policeman discussed, the one that you were going to go back to South Africa for?

MR MASINA: Yes, we did discuss the name in length, because he was known. He was notorious for shooting people and students and he told me that this person was a political target. If we could hit this Shlube, the ANC and Umkhonto weSizwe would be very delighted because what we were taught was that we should defend the people of South Africa, because Shlube was a person who was harassing the people of South Africa and if we hit him, the ANC and the MK would be pleased.

MR BERGER: Did you know Shlube, yourself?

MR MASINA: Yes, that is correct.

MR BERGER: And did you know about his reputation as a notorious policeman?

MR MASINA: Yes, I knew that, even though I cannot explain, but what I remember Shlube doing was that when we were still at school in 1976, there was a march for students, we were marching to his house with an intention of burning it.

One of the students was carrying a petrol bomb and just when this petrol bomb was just about to be thrown to his house, it hit the brick wall next to the burglar-proof and it fell outside the house instead of inside and we fled.

MR BERGER: You were then sent by Mr Simelane back into South Africa to eliminate Shlube, is that right?

MR MASINA: That is correct.

MR BERGER: Were you armed?

MR MASINA: Yes, I was armed.

MR BERGER: With what?

MR MASINA: The very same - we used to call this firearm "tete", it is actually TT, it is a Russian-made firearm.

MR BERGER: How was it possible for you to get back into the country, what arrangements were made?

MR MASINA: Solly introduced me to a comrade in Swaziland and I was given this Swaziland passport and this tete, which I then tied around my leg and I went through the Swaziland border. When you are in Swaziland, coming into the Republic of South Africa, they give you something like 14 days, so that I was given 14 to go back to Swaziland, because I was using a Swaziland passport. That is how I came back into the country.

MR BERGER: And did you return to Rockville?

MR MASINA: Yes, I went back to Rockville, my home. And the reason why I went back to Rockville was that I had a legend(?). I had relatives who stayed in Benoni. So people who were asking my whereabouts, I would tell them that I was with my relatives in Benoni.

MR BERGER: Did you say that you had a cover-story?

MR MASINA: That is correct.

MR BERGER: Did you then spend or start looking for Shlube, to kill him?

MR MASINA: That is correct.

MR BERGER: Were you successful?

MR MASINA: No, I did not manage to get hold of him in the 14 days that I had. I hunted him down until the end of the 14 days, and one of the boys with whom we were growing up indicated to me that the person knows that he is being sought by the MK, so he doesn't stay in one place. I sought him, did not get him, until I went back to Swaziland, where I reported to Dan.

I cannot recall whether comrade Solly was in Mozambique or where at the time, I did not see him. I reported to Dan, indicating to him that I did not manage to get hold of Shlube. He then got me a place to sleep over, saying that I would spend some time there because he wanted to speak to Solly.

After several days, it could have been three days, Solly then came. We had a discussion about my trip, indicated to him that I did not succeed in getting hold of this person and he asked if I wanted to go back to South Africa and I said yes. He said other arrangements would have to be made. Indeed I came back to South Africa. On that every same occasion I was give 14 days.

MR BERGER: Mr Masina, what did you understand was the purpose of Mr Simelane's question to you whether you wanted to go back to South Africa?

MR MASINA: According to my understanding I think he could have thought that I was afraid of shooting Shlube. In actual fact I did not see him. I think he could have thought that I was scared of shooting Shlube. I did not see him, that is why I did not shoot him.

MR BERGER: And when you said that you were prepared to go back into South Africa, what was your understanding of why you were going back into South Africa?

MR MASINA: I understood it to mean that indeed I would have to go back to South Africa, seek Shlube and shoot him. That is how I understood it, that it was very important for me to get hold of him so that I can shoot him.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Berger, I think we'll accept that he received instructions to shoot Shlube, he didn't manage to do it on the first occasion. We've got the background and if you could try and get to the actual ...

MR BERGER: Thank you, Adv de Jager.

Having received now a second instruction to go back to South Africa to kill Shlube, were you successful this time round?

MR MASINA: Yes, the second time round I was a success, but though on the last day within the 14 days that I had, what happened on that day was that I knew he was travelling in a brown Ford Grenada. I saw this vehicle because I was monitoring the movements in his house often times. I saw this vehicle driving past the streets and it stopped at a corner where two girls alighted, after which it went to Shlube's home and then I saw him and confirmed it was him through the registration of the car as well.

I waited for him. You see it was this main taxi route in Rockville. Shlube came back to pick up these very same girls, but when I was supposed to draw my firearms so as to shoot him, a police vehicle came. You see the area is nearer the Moroko Police Station. I did not shoot him there and concluded that he would come back.

I went to a school called Ndondo. This school is opposite his home. I waited for him there and at midnight I was beginning to dose off myself, I heard this vehicle approaching and stop outside his house. He got out of his car to open the gate. I came out from a direction so as not for him to see me and approached him from the direction that would enable him to see me as I came. When he saw me he got a shock. He produced his firearm and on doing so - I was a little distance away from him, I pretended to be drunk because I wanted to get closer to him and he asked if I was alright and I said yes I am alright. He put back his firearm, put it back into the holster. I was close to him at the time, I drew mine and fired.

And on attempting the second shot the firearm jammed. I tried to cock it, I failed. At that time Shlube was now trying to draw him firearm and when he was just about to shoot I jumped to the other side of this vehicle, where I took cover and I tried to fix the firearm that I had. I failed and realised that this one is now going to shoot me. Indeed he fired a shot. I left from my cover and started fleeing. He fired, it could have been eight times, but kept missing because I was now trained in the guerrilla warfare. I zigzagged my way through home.

MR BERGER: Mr Masina, can you recall where on his body you shot him?

MR MASINA: If I am not mistaken I shot him on the side of his right arm, because he was not facing me directly, he was actually going towards his vehicle and he was coming from the side.

MR BERGER: You're indicating somewhere on the right-hand side of your chest near your right arm, would that be correct?

MR MASINA: Yes, that is correct.

MR BERGER: You ran away from the scene and then ultimately you left the country, is that correct?

MR MASINA: No. I indicated earlier on that I found Shlube on the last day of the days that I had, the days that I had been given by the Swaziland Government. I then did not go back through the border gate because I feared for questioning at the border gate. It was then known that the police were busy during those days at the border and in the township, so on that day I did not go to the border gate.

I then - I'm not sure whether the person that I later on met was working with the ANC or not, but he was working with Vincent Selane, who was the agent recruiter. And this Vincent Selane had already skipped the country at the time. He too helped me for the second time, to go back to Swaziland for the second time. I came though or I went back through the Botswana border.

MR BERGER: Eventually you returned to Swaziland, is that correct?

MR MASINA: That is correct. That was after the chief representative of Botswana had made arrangements for me because I told him who I was and that I was supposed to give a report in Maputo. I was supposed to report to Solly in Maputo, so that he made those necessary arrangements for me to leave Botswana to go and report.

MR BERGER: So from South Africa you went to Botswana, from Botswana you went to Swaziland?

MR MASINA: No, from Botswana this time I flew to Mozambique, where I reported.

MR BERGER: And who did you report to?

MR MASINA: To Solly.

MR BERGER: And you told him that you had successfully completed the instruction which he had given you.

MR MASINA: That is correct, but he had already received that information. He could have received it from the newspapers of the news. He was so excited. The only thing that I did was to give him the details of how I shot him.

MR BERGER: Your commander at that stage, the person you referred to as Dan, is it correct that when you returned to Maputo you received news that Dan had died?

MR MASINA: Yes, that is correct. I learnt that he was arrested by the Swaziland Police. But then there was no certainty as to whether he was killed by the Swaziland Police, because it also seemed like he was asthmatic. I don't know whether he died as a result thereof.

MR BERGER: And was a decision taken that you were going to take over - this is now after you had reported the successful completion of your mission, that you were going to take over from Dan?

MR MASINA: That is correct.

MR BERGER: And who told you that you were going to take over as commander from Dan?

MR MASINA: It was Solly.

MR BERGER: Chairperson, that would conclude the evidence relating to the death of Mr Chaupe.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you, Mr Berger. Gentlemen, I assume that you won't have any questions in regard to this incident?

MR BOOYSEN: None thank you, Mr Chairman.

MR RAMMUTLA: No questions, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Mtanga, have you got any questions in regard to this incident?

MS MTANGA: I have no questions, Chairperson. I would also like to state that the Chaupe family was notified, but they have not attended the hearing and they did acknowledge receipt of the notice. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Ms Mtanga. I assume you wouldn't have anything else, Mr Berger.

MR BERGER: No, I have nothing further, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Mr Masina, you are excused in respect of this particular incident.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------CHAIRPERSON: Alright, we'll take the testimony of Mr Simelane before we adjourn. Mr Simelane, you will have to take a fresh oath. We have your full names.

DAVID SOLOMON SIMELANE: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, please sit down. Mr Berger?

EXAMINATION BY MR BERGER: Thank you, Chairperson.

Mr Simelane, I'm going to be very short with your evidence. You've heard the evidence of Mr Masina, in relation to the instructions which he got from you and the report that he made back to you. Before we discuss Mr Chaupe and why a decision was taken that he should be killed, do you have anything to add or modify in relation to the evidence given by Mr Masina?

MR SIMELANE: I don't think I have anything to add. All that he said is the truth, nothing else.

MR BERGER: You confirm that you gave him an instruction to kill Mr Chaupe, in Soweto?

MR SIMELANE: I gave him the instructions after I was recalled from Italy to lead the special operation. This was broadly discussed with my superior in Lusaka, after my return from Italy as ANC representative and I was given this responsibility of the leading the special operation.

I was told that this very notorious policeman of Special Branch in Soweto has been terrorising our people, the school children and so on. Jabu and the other group went into a rigorous training in - after the assessment was made of people who come from that area, who knew the area very well and Shlube, they underwent a special training, shooting from a moving car and so and so on and using an AK, ...(Russian) that time.

After they passed their training he was then sent back to Maputo, debriefed on his mission and sent to Swaziland, Swaziland to South Africa.

MR BERGER: And then he returned to you after the first mission to say that he was unsuccessful.

MR SIMELANE: That's correct.

MR BERGER: You sent him in again to try and successfully complete the mission this time?

MR SIMELANE: That's correct.

MR BERGER: The identification of Shlube as a target, was that made at a level higher up than you?

MR SIMELANE: It was made a higher level, yes, in Lusaka.

MR BERGER: When you - did you receive the news that Shlube had been killed from Mr Masina, or did you hear about it before?

MR SIMELANE: Officially I got it from Masina, but it was already in the news that - he had not died by then, I think he died at the hospital, it was already in the newspapers and the radio. And later on, I think in the later afternoon the information came to us that he's already dead.

He was not buried in Soweto because there were fears that people will demonstrate or they will burn his body, so he was sent to the Transkei. I don't know where in the Transkei. But there great jubilation from the people in Soweto and those who were in exile at that time.

MR BERGER: Thank you, Mr Simelane, I have no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Yes, I assume gentlemen, your position wouldn't change.

MR BOOYSEN: That's correct, Mr Chairman.

MR RAMMUTLA: That's correct with me, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Mtanga, have you got any questions?

MS MTANGA: I have no questions, Chairperson, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Berger, I assume you don't have anything else.

MR BERGER: Nothing further on ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: Could you just help us, who identified him as a target? From who did you receive the instruction?

MR SIMELANE: Well I received the instructions from the late Joe Slovo. They had a list of a number of notorious Special Branch when I came from Italy and I was shown that list.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Mr Berger?

MR BERGER: Nothing further, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Simelane, you are excused.

MR SIMELANE: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Have you got any other testimony in regard to this incident, Mr Berger?

MR BERGER: No other testimony, no.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that the applicants' case in respect of this one?

MR BERGER: Yes, that is.

CHAIRPERSON: I assume there is no other evidence that you would want to lead in respect of this incident.

MS MTANGA: Yes, that is so, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: You can address us at the end of all of the testimony in respect of this incident and all of the others.

MR BERGER: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: We'll adjourn for lunch for 30 minutes.

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Mtanga, there was a person with a notice that come into us during the adjournment or the lunch break, have you attended to them?

MS MTANGA: Do you mean the Chaupe family, Chairperson?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MS MTANGA: Yes, I've spoken to them and they don't have anything to say. What I've said to them is the best we can try and do is to give them copies of the part of the transcript that relates to their father's, the evidence relating to their father.

CHAIRPERSON: So you've made an arrangement that is to their satisfaction?

MS MTANGA: Yes, Chairperson, I have. The person who is attending is the daughter, who was at that time very young. The mother was unable to attend and therefore she doesn't have anything to add to what has been said.

CHAIRPERSON: Was it more simply to attend to hear what transpires and what's the evidence and so on?

MS MTANGA: I have explained everything to her and the role played and what exactly would have been the position if they had come earlier.

CHAIRPERSON: You're satisfied that that matter is sorted out?

MS MTANGA: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Alright.

MS MTANGA: And she is also satisfied.

CHAIRPERSON: Ja, we assume they're not opposing the application as such.

MS MTANGA: No, she is not, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Alright. So we're able to proceed with the other incident?

MS MTANGA: Yes, we are. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------CHAIRPERSON: Yes Mr Berger, what is the next matter?

MR BERGER: Chairperson, we're now with your leave, going to deal with all the other matters together. And the next witness would be Mr Frans Ting-Ting Masango.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Masango, can I just ask you to remain standing. Are your full names Frans Ting-Ting Masango?

FRANS TING-TING MASANGO: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, please sit down. Mr Berger?

MR BERGER: Thank you, Chairperson. Mr Masango will be giving evidence in English. Chairperson, before I start with the evidence of Mr Masango, do I understand it correctly that you have a bundle of additional statements, sworn statements containing statements of Mr Masango, Makhura, Potsane and Masina?

CHAIRPERSON: That is quite correct. It is a document that is paginated up to page 14.

MR BERGER: Yes, perhaps if that could be marked Exhibit A.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, there's another document that has found its way to the desk here, which seems to be extracts from Setchaba.

MR BERGER: Yes, Chairperson, I handed copies to my learned friends and I made copies available for the Committee. I'm going to be introducing that document during the evidence of Mr Masango.

CHAIRPERSON: We'll mark that one when the appropriate time arrives then, but in the meantime Exhibit A contains the statements by the four applicants.

EXAMINATION BY MR BERGER: Mr Masango, is it correct that you were born on the 14th of August 1958, in Pretoria?

MR MASANGO: That is correct.

MR BERGER: Could you give the Committee a very brief background about your family, your school situation and how it was that you came to leave the country.

MR MASANGO: As I've said I was born in Mamelodi on that date you've just mentioned. I grew up like all other young boys in Mamelodi. I must also say that as I was growing a bit older, as Mamelodi was next to Silverton, next to Eastlynne, next to Meyerspark, as a schoolboy I used to go and work there as a gardener. That was due to the poor economic conditions of my family. My mother was a domestic worker, my father an ordinary night watchman.

It was there as I was growing old as a young boy, where I realised the disparities that were existing between us the black people and the white people. It was also at those houses as a gardener where I realised that white people were living much better than we were living.

However, I grew up right into 1976. I was conscientised into politics by then. Like all other students at that time I was in high school then. I was involved heavily in politics. I do not remember a single political incident that happened in Mamelodi at that time without my knowledge, without my participation or without me taking part in one way or the other.

You know it's during those times, shortly after 1976/1977, that a young man of Mamelodi, Solomon Mhlango as a member of MK and ANC, was arrested and eventually sentenced to death. I was in the committee in 1979 and prior to that, in the committee that campaigned to save the life of Solomon Mhlango. We campaigned and campaigned that his life should be saved.

I remember well on the 5th of April, the eve of Solomon's execution, we had a vigil there. We appealed again there that he should not be hanged and I've made a public vow that should he be hanged, that would have been the following day, should he be hanged I'm going to leave the country, join Umkhonto weSizwe and the ANC. Two weeks after his execution I did exactly that, I left the country.

MR BERGER: Can we just go a little bit back to 1976, when the riots started. You were a student at Mamelodi High, is that correct?

MR MASANGO: That is correct.

MR BERGER: Were you a student leader at that time?

MR MASANGO: I was, I was involved in politics, I was in the leadership of the students. There were others who were much higher than me, but I was involved in all the activities there. I don't know if I could describe myself as a leader then, but I was involved.

MR BERGER: And later in that year you came into conflict with the school authorities, is that right?

MR MASANGO: That is correct, yes.

MR BERGER: And as a result of that, what happened?

MR MASANGO: The principal of their school then, Jack Lekala, expelled me from school.

MR BERGER: Because you refused to disassociate yourself from politics?

MR MASANGO: That is correct, yes.

MR BERGER: Prior to Solomon Mhlango being sentenced to death, even before all of that happened you'd already come into conflict with the police, is that right?

MR MASANGO: That is correct, yes.

MR BERGER: And you'd also been detained?

MR MASANGO: Shortly, not for a very long time though, about two days, but there were police who were coming in before that, who were coming in to look for me and they would find me at not at home because during those times you rarely slept at home.

MR BERGER: Subsequent to the execution of Solomon Mhlango, you've already said you left the country after having made that vow at the night vigil. Where did you - that would have been April 1979, am I right?

MR MASANGO: That's correct, yes.

MR BERGER: Where did you go to after you left South Africa?

MR MASANGO: I went by train to Komatipoort and into Mozambique.

MR BERGER: Can you tell the Committee how it was that you came to join Umkhonto weSizwe?

MR MASANGO: Well as I've said there I've actually vowed before even having arrived in Maputo, that I will joint Umkhonto weSizwe after Solomon Mhlango's execution, but then in Maputo where we were staying then, we were first asked if we would like to go to school or any other place other than the army. I insisted that I want to go to the army. I remember Jacob Zuma was amongst the people who said to me that "you look very brilliant and wanted to take you to school", saying something like that: "why don't you go to school?", but I insisted that I should go to the army.

MR BERGER: Is it then correct that you went for training?

MR MASANGO: Ja, after some months I went to Angola for military training.

MR BERGER: Can you sketch briefly for the Committee how you moved through MK, from the time of your initial training until 1986, when the unit was formed. Well, 1985, in fact, when the unit was formed.

MR MASANGO: For Maputo, I think a month or two after my arrival there, I was tasked with gathering news for other comrades there, from the radio, from various radio stations. Then in the morning they will gather, I will read the news for them. I continued with that job of gathering news right into Vienna, that is in Angola, right in the camps during my training, until I was made a political commissar of a unit in the camp and the youth leader also there, in Pango Camp.

MR BERGER: Can you explain to the Committee what a political commissar was.

MR MASANGO: A political commissar in military terms would be the deputy of a commander, but then he's more responsible, he's responsible for other things other than a military, he's a political link between the leadership, the command and the unit, he's a political disseminator, he's a propagandist of that particular unit.

MR BERGER: Now in the camp where you were a political commissar, would your functions be any different?

MR MASANGO: No, not at all, that would be the same thing.

MR BERGER: You would still be disseminating information?

MR MASANGO: That is correct.

MR BERGER: Political information?

MR MASANGO: Political information, propaganda and all that.

MR BERGER: What were your sources of information?

MR MASANGO: All various applications. Well firstly, it will be a radio because I've worked with the radio for a long time, different radio stations as I've said, ANC publications, MK publications, Setchaba, Dawn and all others, newspapers in Angola that we were able to get in English. There were some newspapers that we were getting, old as they were, but we were getting some newspapers.

MR BERGER: And as a political commissar in the camps, were you responsible for any political education of the cadres?

MR MASANGO: Yes, as a news person there, a news disseminator, I would organise political discussions, news analysis, any relevant matter, any relevant development in the country or internationally that relates to South Africa. I'd organise such discussions, analysis, such debates and at times I would even ask the commissariat above us to organise maybe a leader or so to address us on a particular development, a particular topic or so you know.

MR BERGER: Now in June of 1985 there was a national consultative conference of the ANC, held in Kabwe, Zambia. Do you have any knowledge of that conference?

MR MASANGO: Ja, I do have because I was a delegate in that conference, representing MK from Angola, a delegation from Angola, MK delegation from Angola. I was one of the delegates there.

MR BERGER: Is it correct that that was the, that the national consultative conference before that one, the one at Kabwe in 1985, was in fact the conference at Morogoro in 1969?

MR MASANGO: That is correct, ja.

MR BERGER: Can you tell the Committee what your recollections of Kabwe are, what was discussed as far as you can recall?

MR MASANGO: The Kabwe conference, it should be remembered that it took place, it was preceded by an attack by the SADF in Botswana, where some of our comrades were massacred. It took a form of a counsel of war. There were very many resolutions that were taken to intensify the campaign for solidarity, to intensify the campaign to recruit young people into MK and the ANC in general.

Amongst those resolutions taken there at that conference, was that the line between soft and hard target is going to disappear, that as our struggle, our armed struggle intensifies, whites will have to bleed as well. And with that I refer to white civilians.

MR BERGER: What was contained in the concept of a hard - I don't know if I've been off all the time, no just now. What was meant by the concept "hard target/soft target"?

MR MASANGO: Hard targets in those terms would have been, it was military installations, any person who is working with the system, who is associated one way or the other with the system, soldiers, the police. That would be hard targets. Soft targets would refer to civilians.

MR BERGER: I want to show you a document, it's a copy of the first - we managed to get 15 pages, of the August 1985 edition of Setchaba. Can you tell the Committee what Setchaba was.

MR MASANGO: Setchaba was the official organ, the official mouthpiece of the ANC, a political mouthpiece of the ANC.

MR BERGER: And you've already told the Committee that one of your sources of information was Setchaba. This particular edition, August 1985, would you have received this?

MR MASANGO: We as the staff of Radio Freedom, because at this time, August 19985, I was working with Radio Freedom, so there was no way that it could bypass us, going to any other body before it goes first to us and then it's possible that I might have read it. If I was in Radio Freedom at this time, which I was, I must have come across this, across it, ja.

MR BERGER: And you would then have had the task of disseminating the information or the policy line in this document to cadres of the ANC, cadres of MK?

MR MASANGO: At that time I was working directly with the cadres as such, but then I was in radio. But then we had contact with the commissars in the nearby camp like Vienna, who would come to us for discussions, for material and so, and then we'll always give over this material to them.

MR BERGER: Chairperson, could the document be marked Exhibit B please.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR BERGER: I want to refer you, Mr Masango, to the editorial of this document and in particular to the bottom of page 1, talking about the Kabwe conference. Do you see at the bottom of the second column numbered page 1, it reads:

Bottom right-hand corner.

MR MASANGO: Sure, that is correct.

MR BERGER: I want to read this to you and I want to ask you whether this correctly reflects what was discussed at the conference. It reads as follows, it says:

I've read the whole section at length because it deals with decision taken at conference. Can you confirm that this is a correct reflection of decisions taken at the Kabwe conference?

MR MASANGO: Sure I do, that is correct.

MR BERGER: Besides the decision at Kabwe, that the line between hard and soft targets should disappear, was there any other indication for you in your experience in the ANC at that time, that suggested that the struggle was going to be intensified and that this line between hard and soft targets was disappearing?

MR MASANGO: Ja, I readily recall a visit by Moses Mabida, the late Moses Mabida, who was the member of the NEC, the ANC's National Executive Committee, was also in the Communist Party, the leader of the Communist Party, Moses Mabida. As I've said we were always organising as a commissariat there in the camp, organising some visits by the leadership.

In one of those visits Moses Mabida, as we were discussing this issue of soft and hard targets, he said to us that whilst we should mourn - I remember very well we had discussions about soft and hard targets in our camps, whereby the general members of the ANC there, the cadres, were also accepting that no, white civilians should be targeted.

We took people like Bo Andrew Zondo as heroes ...(intervention)

MR BERGER: Andrew Zondo was executed for his planting of a mine in Amanzimtoti.

MR MASANGO: That is correct, and I believe civilians were killed in that bomb. We sang about Andrew Zondo, we wrote poems about Andrew Zondo, we took him as a hero and I still do today take him as a hero.

MR BERGER: And when you say "we", was that the attitude in the camps only of the cadres, or was it the attitude of the leadership in the camps as well?

MR MASANGO: The leadership knew those songs, they read those poems, so everybody knew about that.

MR BERGER: And everybody regarded him as a hero?

MR MASANGO: Everybody.

MR BERGER: Now that was 1985, and you say at that stage you were working for Radio Freedom. But you left Radio Freedom after a while and you got involved with a unit, with the unit that we now know about. How did it come about that you left Radio Freedom and got involved in the unit?

MR MASANGO: Whilst I was in Luanda, working with Radio Freedom, I was approached by the late Chris Hani who said that the military has earmarked me for a mission in the country, but he said he's also learnt that, from the political department there, that I was also earmarked for Holland, for a journalism course. Then he asked me I want, still want to go to Holland or to South Africa, I said no, rather come here in South Africa than be sent to Holland for that radio journalism course. Then he told me that there is a unit that is being formed, that is going to be led by one, Freddy Legoka, that will be an elimination unit and would I be prepared to join that unit, then I agreed.

MR BERGER: You then left Radio Freedom?

MR MASANGO: I then left Radio Freedom for Lusaka.

MR BERGER: Now in Lusaka, was the unit constituted?

MR MASANGO: At that time it wasn't as such. That is where I met Jabu Masina. If I remember well I met Jabu Masina and we were told about the other members of that would later join us.

MR BERGER: What happened to Freddy Legoka?

MR MASANGO: He was in Botswana at that time.

MR BERGER: When was it that the unit was constituted, can you remember?

MR MASANGO: It could be about late, very late '88, '85 or early - no, no, it's very late '85, ja.

MR BERGER: Now you say that Chris Hani spoke about the establishment of an elimination unit, what were the instructions given to your unit, what were you instructed to do?

MR MASANGO: To eliminate a notorious policeman, to eliminate politicians or people we regarded as puppets and any high top government official, any other individual who was on the side of the enemy.

MR BERGER: You were also furnished with arms and ammunition, is that right?

MR MASANGO: That is correct, ja.

MR BERGER: Which you then brought into the country. Could you describe the type of arms and ammunition that you brought into the country?

MR MASANGO: Other than the ordinary hand guns that one would use for an elimination purpose, there were also heavy material like landmines, like Bazukas and limpet-mines, handgrenades as well.

MR BERGER: Besides elimination of people, individuals, what were you supposed to do or what were your instructions in regard to the landmines, limpet-mines, grenades and so on?

MR MASANGO: Whilst our unit was an elimination unit, we were also given these arms whereby we were told that we could use our own discretion, that we could attack any target that we feel it's within the mandate, within the authority, within the policies of the ANC.

MR BERGER: Now your position in the unit was that of political commissar, is that right?

MR MASANGO: That is correct, ja.

MR BERGER: And Jabu Masina was appointed the commander of the unit?

MR MASANGO: That is correct.

MR BERGER: It's also correct is it not, that you and Mr Masina entered South Africa in advance of the rest of the unit?

MR MASANGO: That is correct, ja.

MR BERGER: When was it that you entered?

MR MASANGO: That was about in 1986, early 1986, could be February or March, round about there.

MR BERGER: Where did you go to?

MR MASANGO: I first - we first went to Winterveld, where we established safe-houses.

MR BERGER: At this time when you came into the country you were carrying the arms and ammunition that you've just described, is that right?

MR MASANGO: No, just enough for the two of us. The other material that I've just described was brought in with the other unit, the rest of the unit.

MR BERGER: What did you and Jabu Masina bring in, if you can remember?

MR MASANGO: We must have had one landmine, some few handgrenades ...(end of side A of tape) ... AKs, two pistols or three, just light armament.

MR BERGER: Now, the first operation that you were involved in as a unit took place in Mamelodi West or in Mamelodi, is that right?

MR MASANGO: That is correct, ja.

MR BERGER: Can you tell the Committee what prompted you to undertake this particular operation and what it encompassed.

MR MASANGO: That was during the state of emergency and the townships, Mamelodi like all other townships was occupied by the SADF, and there was a call, a general call by the civic organisations, by the students' organisations, by the ANC itself, that the soldiers should be withdrawn from the townships. So we were shown - as we were seeing them, these soldiers, we were shown that they were also in Mamelodi and there was a spot where they like going to, so we decided to plant a landmine on the route that they were using, just on the outskirts, the little outskirts of Mamelodi towards the mountain there. We decided to plant a landmine there.

MR BERGER: We're talking about the area which is now covered by Moritela Park, is that right?

MR MASANGO: That is the place, ja, in that vicinity.

MR BERGER: Yes. Now the landmine that you planted was on a sand road, is that right?

MR MASANGO: It was on a sandy road, ja.

MR BERGER: Do you know what happened as a result of planting that landmine?

MR MASANGO: Ja, as I've said we were sure that it wasn't a route going outside Mamelodi, it was a route that was used by the soldiers, they had a base there or a camp there, where they were camping after their missions or so. So we learnt in the radios, in the media generally, that it has been detonated, detonated by a casspir.

MR BERGER: Do you remember the reports about what was happening at that time when the casspir detonated the mine? What was your information?

MR MASANGO: Well the people we asked about there told us that they've seen some helicopters coming to pick up the injured or the dead. We don't know if there were any people dead other than what we were told by the people, we've never seen how many people were injured and how many people were killed in that incident, but the people told us that they've seen helicopters going there and they've seen the casspir being towed away from that area, it was covered with a huge canvass.

MR BERGER: You have deposed to a sworn statement. If you have a look at the bundle, it's Exhibit A. Your statement runs from page 1 through to page 4, do you confirm that that is your statement and that is your signature at page 4?

MR MASANGO: That is my signature, that is correct.

MR BERGER: The incident that we are referring to now is dealt with in paragraph 8 of that statement. Do you confirm the contents of paragraph 8?

MR MASANGO: That is correct, I do confirm it.

MR BERGER: You say in paragraph 8.5 that you in fact informed the police who had arrested you about this incident, but nothing ever came of it, is that right?

MR MASANGO: That is correct, ja.

MR BERGER: Now the next incident after that - well let's put a date to that incident. You say that that incident was early 1986, February or March 1986?

MR MASANGO: That's correct, ja.

MR BERGER: Chairperson, for the assistance of the Commission, I can tell you that in the further submissions by the ANC to the Truth Commission dated the 12th of May 1997, at page 86, there is an incident described there next to the date 16 February 1986, which simply reads:

That's the only incident that we've been able to point to which seems to accord with the evidence that you've just heard. It doesn't appear as though anyone was injured in that incident.

The next incident, and we have a date for that, that's the 16th of March 1986, is the death of Sergeant Vuma, and that you deal with in paragraph 10 of your sworn statement. In your own words could you tell the Committee why Sergeant Vuma and how did that incident unfold.

MR MASANGO: Obviously if one was to describe Sergeant Vuma, one would refer to him as Mamelodi's Shlube, the Shlube of Mamelodi. I've heard about Senki Vuma whilst I was in Botswana, from some new recruits there, some people who were going for further training and so, who were in Mamelodi, who knew Vuma, that he was harassing people there.

There was a massacre in Mamelodi the previous year, '85, in which Vuma was seen by many people to have been there shooting also at the people and harmed old woman who were marching against rent hikes. We have heard of stories where Vuma was torturing some activists in Mamelodi Police Station. And when we left Botswana, already we had in mind that Vuma was to be among the first that we were going to remove.

MR BERGER: Did you receive any specific instruction from the leaders or the leadership to eliminate Vuma, or was he one of the people who was killed in the exercise of your discretion, you decided who was appropriate, who was not?

MR MASANGO: Ja, he fell within the general instruction, the mandate of the unit. As a notorious policeman, as the enemy of the people he surely was to be our target, but we were not given a specific mandate, a specific instruction that we should go for Vuma, although after having eliminated him, we did report to the leadership in exile, in Botswana.

MR BERGER: And what was the response? Or let me put it this way, was there any negative response from the leadership in Botswana?

MR MASANGO: It was very, very welcome there.

MR BERGER: How did you go about killing Senki Vuma?

MR MASANGO: Well he knew also that he is a target of MK. It was very difficult getting him at his place, he wouldn't be there until very, very later at night. So as we were shown his house, we went to his house there on several occasions.

We were surveilling the house to see with whom is he staying, at what time is he leaving, at what time is he coming back. But since he knew that he was a target, he didn't follow a specific or just a common way of life, he would change. Today he would be in, the following day he would not be in. He would change cars like any other thing. But until such time that we realised that he normally comes on Friday evenings - that's what we established, that every Friday evening at least he would be there, and we laid him at his place there ...(intervention)

MR BERGER: Did you discover that he was living alone?

MR MASANGO: We also discovered that he was living alone. We heard that his wife was staying with his parents, with her parents or his parents, but he wasn't staying with him there.

MR BERGER: What other steps had he taken to protect himself?

MR MASANGO: As I've said, he knew that he was a target. The house, the yard there was covered with corrugated iron, there were broken bottles there, there were burglar-proofs. You know empty tins, anything that will make him, that would serve as an alarm should anybody come in that yard whilst he is asleep or any other time whilst there, he should be forewarned now that there's somebody coming in.

MR BERGER: Now on this particular Friday night?

MR MASANGO: Because we knew that he would be coming on Friday, that very Friday, we came in earlier with Jabu Masina and took up positions there ...(intervention)

MR BERGER: Was it just you and Jabu Masina?

MR MASANGO: It was myself and Jabu Masina only, ja.

MR BERGER: The same as with the anti-tank landmine in Mamelodi, it was just you and Jabu Masina?

MR MASANGO: That is correct, ja.

MR BERGER: Alright. Is it because the other members of your group hadn't yet joined the unit, hadn't yet entered South Africa?

MR MASANGO: That is correct, ja.

MR BERGER: Alright. You were saying that you and JABU Masina went to the house.

MR MASANGO: Ja, we waited until close to midnight when we heard a car coming in there. We were positive that it was Senki Vuma, because he was using one of the cars that we've once seen him with. He parked his car next to the door. He didn't come the way we expected him to be coming, where we were waiting for him, but however he did manage to go into the house.

I've heard something like a gun being cocked and then he went into the yard. I could see him through the window. There was a small window there that was burglar-proofed, but it didn't have a glass on there, only burglar-proofs there. I could see him moving about from the kitchen to his bedroom or so, until he opened his - I saw him opening his fridge, coming towards the room where I was standing. He sat down there. I think he was having in his hand a bottle also, or it might be a beer or wine, but it was a bottle with a glass and then he sat down. I could see him from - he was seated and I could see him there through the window and then I fired at him.

MR BERGER: You were outside looking through the window?

MR MASANGO: I was outside, ja.

MR BERGER: You fired at him with what?

MR MASANGO: And AK47.

MR BERGER: What happened to him?

MR MASANGO: I saw him falling against, you know hitting the wall and thereafter falling on the floor there. I kept on firing until the whole room was full of smoke from the AK, that I couldn't see him any longer and then we decided to leave.

MR BERGER: You say you reported that incident to the leadership in Botswana.

MR MASANGO: In Botswana, that is correct.

MR BERGER: Do you confirm the contents of paragraph 10 of your statement?

MR MASANGO: That is correct.

MR BERGER: The next incident ...(intervention)

ADV GCABASHE: Just before you go on to the next incident, just a small matter. The window through which you shot him, you said it just had the burglar-proofing, it had no glass pane.

MR MASANGO: It had no glass pane, ja.

ADV GCABASHE: Thank you.

MR BERGER: Thank you. Now the next incident relates to the death of Mr Lukhele and Mrs Dludlu and the injury to Mrs Lukhele. Before I get to this incident, I forgot to ask you whether you had any knowledge - you killed Senki Vuma on a Friday night and his body was only discovered on a Monday morning after he'd failed to report for work.

MR MASANGO: Yes, that is correct, ja.

MR BERGER: Did you have knowledge of that?

MR MASANGO: Ja, because I - we did have knowledge of that. We were also surprised - we were sure that we shot him on Friday, then on Saturday we listened to the news, the papers, from the radio, the papers, there was nothing. On Sunday as well. We only started hearing about it on I think Monday evening, that they did finally find his corpse there.

MR BERGER: And is it correct that you heard about the fact that they'd only found out about his death on Monday morning? You discovered this during your trial.

MR MASANGO: No, not during the trial.

MR BERGER: Was it before?

MR MASANGO: We heard it before the trial, ja, whilst we were still operating.

MR BERGER: Okay. Let's move now to the next incident. What did you know about Mr Lukhele?

MR MASANGO: I didn't personally know the late Mr Lukhele, but as we were operating in Mamelodi, I came across a pamphlet, a pamphlet that was signed by his, or signed in the name of his Party and said to be from his Party and himself.

In that pamphlet amongst other things, was that Kangwane should be incorporated into Swaziland and that the police, in that pamphlet, the police should continue detaining, arresting the youth there until some of his demands that Kangwane - the police should remain in the township, arresting those youths there, detaining them, until Kangwane is incorporated into Swaziland. I took this pamphlet - there were many of them, they were distributed there in Mamelodi, I showed it to some members of the unit, that we should do something about him.

MR BERGER: Now he was involved in Kangwane politics, you knew that.

MR MASANGO: That is correct, ja.

MR BERGER: Did you know about the involvement of Mr Enos Mabuza as well?

MR MASANGO: Mr Mabuza was a friend to the ANC, he would lead delegations to Lusaka for meetings with the ANC leadership, so we were sure that we were having a friend in Mabuza and we felt that Lukhele might be promoted, might even be made to take over from Mabuza.

MR BERGER: Did you know that Mr Mabuza' Party and Mr Lukhele's Party were in opposition to one another?

MR MASANGO: Mr Lukhele's Party was an opposition Party in Kangwane.

MR BERGER: Now after you discussed Mr Lukhele with other members of the unit, did you take a decision there and then that Mr Lukhele should be eliminated?

MR MASANGO: We didn't do that, we said it might be possible that Lukhele perhaps might be also the friend of the ANC, because the ANC had also, some of the people who were regarded as puppets, but who were very close to the ANC, who were co-operating, collaborating with the ANC, so we were not sure if we should take such a decision ourselves to eliminate Lukhele. We sent a message to the leadership, our commanders on Botswana, gave them the pamphlet and told them about Lukhele, who is Lukhele.

We said we were interested in him, we wanted to eliminate him, but we were asking for permission if we could do that because we are not sure exactly who is Lukhele, because we were afraid we might be killing our own person. They said they will give us, they will come to us in a week or so. After two weeks they gave us the green light to go ahead with the mission to eliminate him.

MR BERGER: Alright. How did you go about the operation?

MR MASANGO: I was not involved personally in the operation itself, but it was discussed amongst the members of the unit that Neo Potsane and Jabu Masina would see to it as they were staying in Mamelodi and we were in Soshanguve and Winterveld.

MR BERGER: You knew that Neo Potsane and Jabu Masina were going to embark upon a mission to kill Mr Lukhele.

MR MASANGO: That is correct, I knew.

MR BERGER: In fact you were party to that decision.

MR MASANGO: That is correct, yes.

MR BERGER: You also knew that, or did you know - let me ask you this, how Neo Potsane and Jabu Masina would be armed?

MR MASANGO: I knew obviously that they would be armed with AK47s or so. That I have known.

MR BERGER: And did you know that it was possible that other people could be killed in the attack on Mr Lukhele?

MR MASANGO: That was a general knowledge, that in whatever operation or target we were going for, it is generally known that some other people might be injured, but concerning this incident it was only a question of going for Lukhele. That's what we know, that we're going for Lukhele. We didn't know about what will happen after that or before that.

MR BERGER: Yes. In going for Lukhele, you say that it was generally known on all operations that other people could be killed in the process, other people could be caught in the crossfire? Was that generally known?

MR MASANGO: That was known generally, not specifically for this one.

MR BERGER: Yes. And if an AK47 was used, would the same still apply, that it was generally known in operations where AK47s were used that other people could get caught in the crossfire?

MR MASANGO: That is correct, ja.

MR BERGER: And you knew that at the time when Neo Potsane and Jabu Masina embarked upon this mission to kill Mr Lukhele?

MR MASANGO: That other people were going to be injured?

MR BERGER: Not were going to, but it was possible that they could be injured or killed.

MR MASANGO: Generally I did know, not in that specific incident, that there are going to be other people injured in that, but it was a general knowledge.

MR BERGER: Yes, it's a general knowledge which you had at that time?

MR MASANGO: That is correct, ja.

MR BERGER: And that never deterred you, it never made you think well perhaps they shouldn't go on this mission?

MR MASANGO: It never came to our mind at that time if there were going to be people. If we knew that there are going to be people who are going to be injured, then another position would have been taken, but at that time we never thought of any other people.

MR BERGER: No, my question to you is this, seeing as though he had the knowledge at that time, that it was possible that other people could be killed or injured in the process, would it be correct to say that that never stopped you from sanctioning this mission?

MR MASANGO: Sure, the possible injury of people who were not targeted would not necessarily deter us from carrying out that operation.

MR BERGER: It would not deter you?

MR MASANGO: Yes, that's correct.

MR BERGER: Were you involved in any reconnaissance mission around the home of the Lukhele's?

MR MASANGO: I only knew that he stayed somewhere in the east. It was not per se my operation, Jabu and Neo were to look into that.

MR BERGER: When were you informed about the results of that operation?

MR MASANGO: It was surely after it was carried out. I'm not sure if it was the following day or it was the same day, but I did learn of it immediately after they have done it. I can't just tell whether it was the same night, the same day, the following day, but I did learn after.

MR BERGER: You talk about this incident in paragraph 9, at page 3 of your statement and you refer to Mr Potsane's statement. Mr Potsane deals with it at page 9, and he says in paragraph 8.6 on page 10, that:

That the three of you decided that that would happen.

Do you confirm the contents of that paragraph in relation to you?

MR MASANGO: That is correct, I do confirm that.

MR BERGER: The next incident is the limpet-mine which was placed at the Silverton bus stop. Can you tell the Committee how it came about that a decision was taken to plant this limpet-mine at the Silverton bus stop.

MR MASANGO: I think I should start off by saying that I have grown in a situation whereby I have considered whites to be on the side of apartheid. Apartheid was designed not only to deny us our general rights, it was designed to protect white people, it was designed to privilege white people at the expense of black people. The white people of this country have taken sides with apartheid.

The Nationalist Party Government was not imposed on them, they have voted in their increasing numbers for all the successive years, in all the successive elections, for the Nationalist Party with its apartheid policies. And by that I believe that whites were also on the side of apartheid.

MR BERGER: What did you think - let me ask you this, why did you choose that bus stop?

MR MASANGO: It was a symbol of apartheid, it was a symbol of our oppression ...(intervention)

MR BERGER: Why?

MR MASANGO: It was a whites only bus stop, whereby black people were not to be near it, or I mean to board buses there, they were not allowed to do that. It was a symbol of apartheid, a symbol of oppression, that is why we chose it.

MR BERGER: What did you think or what did you hope would be the result of a bomb exploding there and killing or injuring white civilians?

MR MASANGO: The Nationalist Party Government, the apartheid government at that time prided itself of having the support of the majority of white people. It was also at the time when we were told to take the struggle into white areas.

We also wanted to isolate the supporters, the electorate of the Nationalist Party Government, we also wanted to conscientise then to the situation in our townships, not only our townships, in South Africa generally, that there was a war going on, there was one section of the population that was oppressed for their privileges. We wanted them to be aware of that political situation.

MR BERGER: What did you hope whites would do after seeing that this war in now affecting us, what did you hope they would do?

MR MASANGO: I can recollect an incident in Angola when white young boys were killed in Angola, white mothers protested that no, let their sons come back. So an operation like Silverton would also sensitise then to that situation, it would make them to realise that no, no, no, we can't die for apartheid, we can't injured, we can't bleed for apartheid, let it end. Because they've always voted for that Nationalist Party Government and there's no single election that was delayed, that was stopped or whatever because whites didn't want to participate in those elections because of the exclusion of black people. So we thought by that, that will bring to ...(indistinct) that no, there is such a situation in South Africa.

MR BERGER: Did you believe - and when I say you, I mean you and your unit, that you were authorised by the ANC and MK to carry out such an operation?

MR MASANGO: I don't think, I don't even think our unit would have done anything that will not be approved by the ANC. There was an implied mandate, there was an implied authority that we can go on, we can do such an operation.

MR BERGER: On what did you base that implied authority?

MR MASANGO: From the statements that white civilians can be targeted, that the distinction between the hard and soft targets should disappear and on the fact that there were other incidents prior to ours, whereby we've never heard a single leader of the ANC or even the ANC leadership in general, condemning such an act. So we thought that such an act will be welcomed by the ANC.

MR BERGER: Subsequent to the explosion, did you report your participation, your units participation in that bombing to the leadership of the ANC?

MR MASANGO: Ja, if we thought it is something that would not have been approved by the ANC, we wouldn't have reported it, but we did report that.

MR BERGER: Why do you say "if we knew that it wouldn't have been approved, or didn't carry the approval we wouldn't have reported it"? What do you mean by that?

MR MASANGO: We were sure that it was going to be approved by the ANC, that similar incidents were approved.

MR BERGER: What could have happened to you if you had performed an act which did not carry the approval of the ANC?

MR MASANGO: There are various forms of punishment as an offence. We would have been recalled, that would have been one of them and ...(indistinct) know what would have happened to us in the camps, we would have been demoted and sent somewhere in one of the camps there to stay there. But we were not recalled, we were not reprimanded or any other thing.

MR BERGER: Were you aware at that stage of the military code of Umkhonto weSizwe?

MR MASANGO: Yes, we were aware.

MR BERGER: And were you aware of the punishments for unjustifiable homicide?

MR MASANGO: We were aware of that.

MR BERGER: And you say that if you had believed that what you had done did not carry the approval, you wouldn't have reported it?

MR MASANGO: We wouldn't have reported it, yes, that's correct.

MR BERGER: Let's go to the incident itself. You say this incident, the planning was discussed by the unit as a whole?

MR MASANGO: That is correct.

MR BERGER: The four of you, but it wasn't carried out by the four of you, am I right?

MR MASANGO: Sure.

MR BERGER: Who participated in the actual operation?

MR MASANGO: Makhura, Joseph Makhura was actually the person who placed the limpet-mine in the dustbin there whilst I kept guard.

MR BERGER: You deal with the incident in paragraph 7 at page 2 of your statement.

MR MASANGO: That's correct, ja.

MR BERGER: I just want to make one correction. If you look in paragraph 7.2, you deal with the Kabwe conference, you say there "June 1995", that's a typographical mistake, it should be June 1985, am I right? Middle of 7.2.

MR MASANGO: I don't understand what would be wrong.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Berger, where do we get the charge sheet?

MR BERGER: Yes, I do Adv de Jager, it's charges 20 to 37, page 81, which are the attempted murder charges and 38 to 49 are the malicious damage to property. And then it's dealt with again ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: ...(no microphone)

MR BERGER: It's 20 to 37, bottom of page 88 through to page 89 and then 38 to 49, also on page 89 is the damage to property charges. And the incident took place on the 4th of July 1986.

Mr Masango, I had confused you. I was referring to paragraph 7.2, where you said:

MR MASANGO: '85, it's supposed to be.

MR BERGER: Yes. Besides that change, do you confirm the contents of paragraph 7?

MR MASANGO: Sure, that's correct, ja.

MR BERGER: The last incident for which you're applying for amnesty is the incident in Soshanguve, which took place on the, well the bomb exploded on the 21st of July 1986. You deal with that in paragraph 6 of your statement, at page 2, and you refer to Mr Makhura's statement. Can you in your own words explain to the Committee why it was that it was decided to place a bomb in Soshanguve and how you went about it.

MR MASANGO: Soshanguve was also at that time under the state of emergency, just like in Mamelodi. The same soldiers that were occupying Mamelodi were also there in Soshanguve and there were same calls made, that they should withdraw from that township. It was also existent in Soshanguve. So it was in that context that we placed this landmine in Soshanguve.

MR BERGER: Mr Makhura describes in his statement how the landmine was placed in a heap of soil across the road that was blocking a road, do you remember that?

MR MASANGO: I do remember that very well because I was there. ...(indistinct) in the car. They did tell me immediately after that how did they plant the bomb there.

MR BERGER: Why was it decided to plant the bomb in that heap of soil?

MR MASANGO: We have learnt that the military vehicles were able to surpass, to surmount that heap of soil. We then thought this is a safer place because there is no civilian car or ordinary car that will go over that heap of soil. We have seen also that it was police vehicles that were passing there, casspirs in particular. That's how we decided on planting the limpet-mine at that heap of soil.

MR BERGER: Mr Makhura says at page 6, paragraph 6.4 of his statement, that the night when you went to plant the bomb, that it was you, Mr Potsane, Mr Makhura and a man by the name of Mandla. Do you recall that Mandla was present?

MR MASANGO: I do recall very well.

MR BERGER: Who was Mandla?

MR MASANGO: Mandla was also a member of the unit who later, who was recalled in Zambia and who later disappeared. Up to now we don't know what happened to him. But he was the member of the unit also, a trained MK cadre.

MR BERGER: In 6.5, Mr Makhura says, as you've already told the Committee, that you remained in the car whilst they planted the bomb.

MR MASANGO: That is correct, ja.

MR BERGER: Do you have knowledge that the bomb wasn't detonated for two or three days?

MR MASANGO: Ja, that is correct, I do have knowledge of that.

MR BERGER: What happened after that?

MR MASANGO: After two days, after we realised that - on the third day when we realised that the bomb was not going off, so we were surprised as to what was happening because we were sure that the casspir would pass over that place.

Then on the third day we decided that no, that's a busy place, people on foot do pass there. We feared that it might end up being discovered and then we decided that we should go the same evening, on the third day, go and remove that. We discussed that during the day. But now the same afternoon we learnt over the radios again that that landmine has been detonated by a bulldozer or a road grader or whatever, as they were constructing the road there.

MR BERGER: Do you know if anyone was injured in that explosion?

MR MASANGO: No, no, no, we don't know, though we've heard that the driver - after we were arrested we heard that the driver was thrown on air, but we were never told if he was injured or what.

MR BERGER: You say you were afraid that someone might discover the mine. Did you have any fear that someone could be injured by the mine, someone walking over that heap of soil?

MR MASANGO: No, it could only be detonated by a weight of over 120kgs, so a person walking on foot over it, it would cause any danger to him. It's only a vehicle that will detonate it. It's an anti-tank landmine, it needs very, very heavy weight to be detonated.

MR BERGER: Heavier that 120kgs?

MR MASANGO: Ja, it should be heavier than 120kgs.

MR BERGER: No, the reason - you said 120, but I can think of some people who weigh 120kgs.

MR MASANGO: There could be - oh, they are very, very rare, it could - unfortunately a person over 180, it could be unfortunate if you will pass over that place and then it could detonate, though I doubt still that we have so many people in that area, in Soshanguve.

MR BERGER: What you're saying really is that this was an anti-tank mine and it needed an incredibly heavy weight to set it off.

MR MASANGO: A heavy weight, ja.

MR BERGER: Mr Masango, it was subsequent to this explosion in Soshanguve that you were arrested, is that right?

MR MASANGO: Sure.

MR BERGER: You've heard what I said before Jabu Masina was called to give evidence in my opening address this morning.

MR MASANGO: Ja.

MR BERGER: Do you confirm that what I said was true and correct?

MR MASANGO: It was true and correct, yes.

MR BERGER: That you maintained throughout your trial that you had acted in respect of all the incidents with which you were charged, as a soldier of Umkhonto weSizwe?

MR MASANGO: That is correct, ja.

MR BERGER: Thank you, Chairperson, I have no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you, Mr Berger. Mr Booysen, any questions?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYSEN: Yes, thank you, Mr Chairperson.

Mr Masango, you gave evidence regarding that Setchaba meeting, that white persons must bleed, is that correct?

MR MASANGO: Could you come again please?

MR BOOYSEN: In your evidence you testified about the Setchaba meeting and your own words you said that white people must bleed, is that correct?

MR MASANGO: That is correct, ja.

MR BOOYSEN: What about coloured people, Mr Masango, and black people, where did they stand? Should they have also bled?

MR MASANGO: No, in this incident - this was aimed at white people, it was at a whites only bus stop. It is unfortunate that coloureds and blacks were there at that time.

MR BOOYSEN: Okay. Earlier you testified you were born in Pretoria, you were brought up in Mamelodi, is that correct?

MR MASANGO: That's correct, ja.

MR BOOYSEN: Silverton is next to Mamelodi, is that also correct?

MR MASANGO: That's also correct.

MR BOOYSEN: You knew Silverton?

MR MASANGO: I knew Silverton very well, ja.

MR BOOYSEN: You also know that now still today there's a Checkers about two or three metres from that bus stop, is that correct?

MR MASANGO: That is correct, ja.

MR BOOYSEN: If necessary, people will come and testify that there were always many black people and coloured people walking around there, can you deny that?

MR MASANGO: I agree there were many people there.

MR BOOYSEN: It's a very busy area, there's lot's of shops in that - it's Pretoria Road, I think.

MR MASANGO: That's correct, ja.

MR BOOYSEN: So you knew there could have been black people and coloured people as well.

MR MASANGO: We placed that limpet-mine at a spot which we recognised, which we believed at that time, at that particular time when it explodes, there will be at least a number of white people around it as it was at the bus stop, a whites only bus stop.

MR BOOYSEN: So you said as long as we get five blacks, never mind - five whites, never mind if 10 coloureds or two black people die as well? - even if their political views are the same as yours.

MR MASANGO: We have placed that limpet at a place which symbolised apartheid, a place we should believe that several whites, more than what we actually were thinking of, would be there.

It is unfortunate that blacks at that time, coloureds at that time, or any other person who passed at that time, the limpet whom it was not intended against was injured. It is unfortunate.

MR BOOYSEN: Yes, but still you said okay, the black people and coloured people can be injured? Never mind that, they must be injured, they could even have died. Because that bus stop, Mr Masango, was about five metres from Checkers, it was in a busy place, everybody was walking around there, even black and coloured people. Never mind that there was a bus stop for white people, black and coloured people walked around that bus stop to get into Checkers and other shops as well, and you said it's okay they must also die then.

MR MASANGO: I don't remember myself saying that it's okay any other person can die.

MR BOOYSEN: But surely ...(intervention)

MR MASANGO: Otherwise we would have put it right in Checkers, if that was the case.

MR BOOYSEN: Ja, but surely there could have been coloured and black people in Checkers as well. There was no apartheid from Checkers, everybody went there to do some shopping.

MR MASANGO: That is why we placed that limpet at the bus stop, a whites only bus stop.

MR BOOYSEN: Did you, before you placed that bomb there, make any observations on that site? How long before you placed the bomb did you plan this bombing?

MR MASANGO: I didn't really need to take over many days because I knew Silverton, I knew that that bus stop, many white people were using that bus stop.

MR BOOYSEN: No, surely you couldn't have planned this, Mr Masango, because you know Silverton, you know Checkers and you knew there were many black and coloured people, but still you went on and you placed the bomb. You must have felt nothing for black people and coloured people that could have had the same political objective that you had.

MR MASANGO: They were not our targets.

MR BOOYSEN: Ja, but you knew they were going to be injured or killed, is that true?

MR MASANGO: We didn't intend it.

MR BOOYSEN: How could that be, Mr Masango? I've sketched a whole scenario for you and still you want to deny and say they couldn't have been injured. You saw there was lots of people, the bomb was placed five metres outside of Checkers, on the pavement where many people walked.

MR MASANGO: I have never ...(intervention)

ADV DE JAGER: I know you're conversing in English, but they've got to translate it for the benefit of other people too, so you should kindly go slower.

MR BOOYSEN: I beg your pardon, I seem to forget. Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Can we come back to that one again, Mr Masango, because your explanation is not good enough. There are black people and coloured people sitting here - luckily nobody was injured - nobody was killed, and they need to know why did you not think of them at the time of the bombing.

MR MASANGO: Who wants to know, the black people?

MR BOOYSEN: Well some of my clients are coloured people and there's black people here as well. I'm not representing them, but some of my clients are coloured people.

MR MASANGO: That bomb was not intended for them, it was intended for white people.

MR BOOYSEN: Mr Masango, don't you think the leadership of the ANC, although they adopted their policy to white, to soft targets that were supposed to be white people, they would have wanted you to be more serious or be more direct to white targets? I think they - wouldn't you think they would have wanted you to eliminate black or coloured people getting hurt? Don't you think they would have wanted you to be more thoughtful before you acted in such a way?

MR MASANGO: Obviously, but when I recognised, when I've identified a target and then - I've said earlier that it was stated as a whites only bus stop and it's unfortunate that blacks and coloureds were injured. And I've said that if I have to go on as we did with that operation, the injuries of some of the people ... the bomb was not intended against, wouldn't deter us from going ahead with that operation.

MR BOOYSEN: Mr Masango, why did you risk being reprimanded by the MK for the bombing instead of obtaining their approval prior to the bombing? Would it have been better to obtain it prior to the bombing and give them a site where you're going to do it and an explanation of how many people are there?

MR MASANGO: At times that would be the wise thing to do, but we didn't always operate that way. We felt this was within the general mandate of the ANC of the unit, so we were also tasked to use our own discretion. So we didn't need to go outside to go and find clarification for each and every operation we wanted to do.

MR BOOYSEN: Okay. You only testified, Mr Masango, that there were previous approvals of this sort of action by you, is that correct?

MR MASANGO: Not by us, not by us as the unit, but other MK operatives.

MR BOOYSEN: Okay. Can you tell us was that also a bombing of soft targets?

MR MASANGO: Ja, in my view some of those were also soft targets, like the Silverton siege for instance. These were civilians who were held hostages there.

MR BOOYSEN: Was there any policy on civilians being held hostage by the ANC?

MR MASANGO: The policy of the ANC at that time was that whilst you can be targeted in whatever form, after Kabwe it was said that they could be targeted in whatever form, it could be hostage taking, it could be whatever.

MR BOOYSEN: Because I see it wasn't specified here as hostage taking. So you concluded that hostage taking was one of the objectives?

MR MASANGO: If as a soldier you are told that now you can attack whites too, you'd use your own discretion as to how are you carrying out that instruction. It would be up to you whether you do it by hostage taking, by limpet mines, by whatever means.

MR BOOYSEN: Mr Masango, did you ever consider the pain of innocent people, black, white or coloured, after the bombing of their relatives, the pain of having losing somebody or the pain of the victims themselves? Did you ever consider that before placing that bomb?

MR MASANGO: We were not murderers, we were not murders. We knew that the taking of life is not an easy thing, but we had a war, we had a struggle to wage.

MR BOOYSEN: Thank you, Mr Masango. One last question, can you tell us why are you applying for amnesty today?

MR MASANGO: Like all people who fought for this freedom that we are enjoying today, I've applied for amnesty that, particularly for this incident, that those people who were injured should understand that we were involved in a war, people were killed at that time, people were detained, some were in exile, people wanted to come back home. It was in that spirit. We are now free, all of us.

We are all South Africans and the past should remain what it is, the past. There should be that reconciliation. We should go forwards with our lives and try to build together South Africa. That's why I basically applied for amnesty.

MR BOOYSEN: Okay. I just want to get this clear, there's a rumour and there's no substance for that, that you applied for amnesty because you can't get progress in your jobs. Is that true or not?

MR MASANGO: I can't what?

MR BOOYSEN: Because there's no progress and promotion for you in your job, is that true?

MR MASANGO: I doubt if there will be any job here in South Africa that will deny you. Actually, should they see that I was involved in such types of operations and such types of ... should they realise that I was an MK cadre, I will immediately be taken, given one of the top jobs there.

MR BOOYSEN: Okay, so that's not the truth, that's not your objective in applying for amnesty today, is that correct?

MR MASANGO: No, no, no.

MR BOOYSEN: Will you do something like that again, Mr Masango? Would you like to do something like that again?

MR MASANGO: I'd wish we wouldn't have such a situation that will force me to do such things.

MR BOOYSEN: So what you're basically saying is you're glad it's over?

MR MASANGO: I'm glad it's over, ja.

MR BOOYSEN: Thank you, no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you, Mr Booysen. Mr Rammutla?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR RAMMUTLA: Thanks, Mr Chairman.

Mr Masango, coming to the incident of the killing of Mr Lukhele, Mrs Dludlu and the injury to Mrs Elizabeth Lukhele, did you take Mr Lukhele to be the enemy of the African National Congress?

MR MASANGO: Yes, he was professing, he was promoting political ideas that were opposed to the general ideas, political ideas of the ANC. He was what we refer to as a puppet. He was working within the structure of apartheid.

MR RAMMUTLA: Mr Masango, was Mr Lukhele perhaps involved in the murdering, the torturing and the acts of similar nature against members of the ANC, or perhaps was he just only puppeting in the distributing of information which was anti-ANC at that time?

MR MASANGO: We don't know of any act, I don't know of any act whereby he was involved and whereby people were killed, in which he was involved. But the struggle at that time was not about who was killing who, that should be killed, it was also on which side, political side were you on.

MR RAMMUTLA: Coming lastly to you, Mr Masango, you took Mr Mabuza, Enos Mabuza to be the sympathiser and the friend of the ANC, was that so?

MR MASANGO: That is correct, ja.

MR RAMMUTLA: But in the same breath - how do you reconcile this Mr Masango, in the same breath taking Mr Enos Mabuza, your sympathiser, the person who was leading a homeland, who was upholding the laws of the previous government, the government which was oppressing you, but on the other hand you go about killing the others who were leaders of the homelands? How did you reconcile that?

MR MASANGO: Mr Mabuza was becoming a friend of the ANC and we felt that he should not be removed from Kangwane, as a leader there because obviously he was against Kangwane being granted full independence or so. But we have somebody like Lukhele who was opposed to all that, who wanted actually that part of Kangwane, that that part of South Africa be incorporated into Swaziland. We have policemen, we had policemen who were working for the ANC.

I mean that in relation to Mabuza working for the system at that time. We had policemen who were working for the ANC, but still being policemen. So we would have had people who worked within Bantustan system, as our friends.

MR RAMMUTLA: So lastly, Mr Masango, are you feeling sorry and you are saying you are sorry for the murdering of Mr Lukhele, Dludlu and the injury to Mrs Lukhele?

MR MASANGO: I am not a murderer, generally I am always sorry for all the murders, that the eliminations that have taken place. That will be a general answer, but then even before the TRC became fashionable, during our trial we said we were sorry, we apologise for the unintentional killing of, and injury of the two ladies, Mrs Dludlu and Lukhele's wife. That we have said long before the TRC became fashionable.

MR RAMMUTLA: Okay, thank you, Mr Masango, thanks a lot.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Mtanga, questions?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS MTANGA: Thank you, Chairperson.

Mr Masango, in the light of the evidence of the bus stop where you planted the limpet-mine - sorry, it's the limpet-mine next to Checkers, in the light of the evidence that you were aware that there were people of mixed races moving around that area, did you take any steps to ensure that people who were not white wouldn't be injured?

MR MASANGO: There was one person there who saw me around, a black person, and I did tell him to tell his friends there, his other black friends to move away from that spot.

MS MTANGA: In similar incidents - if you had the same similar operations where you would have people, people of the public moving there, what other warning could you have given to people that you were not targeting, other than the way you have with it in that situation?

MR MASANGO: Unless if you are given a similar situation as that one, that there wouldn't be any other way of warning them to go away otherwise you would be arrested before that thing explodes.

MS MTANGA: Okay. Would it be correct to say that you did foresee that people who were not whites could be killed in that bomb blast?

MR MASANGO: Obviously people will always be caught in a cross-fire in any situation.

MS MTANGA: And what was your attitude about that?

MR MASANGO: We had a struggle to wage, we had struggle to wage really.

MS MTANGA: So are you saying you just thought they would be caught up in that fire, in that cross-fire and that was it for you?

MR MASANGO: Ja, I've said that such an incident we didn't ...(indistinct) to stop an operation.

MS MTANGA: You've also testified that after each operation you'd report back to the leadership in Botswana. What I want to know is, in your reporting, would you account for the victims in each incident and in that accounting would you specify the race of the people, especially in the background that the ANC never targeted black people and coloured people.

MR MASANGO: Well we reported to the ANC, we said that you know it has exploded and then white, black and coloureds were injured.

MS MTANGA: And what was the response you got from your organisation?

MR MASANGO: The response was only that we should clearly define our target.

MS MTANGA: And then you also, in all the incidents you stated that you were reporting to the leadership in Botswana, who was the person responsible for reporting in Botswana, in your unit?

MR MASANGO: Tengwe Mtinso(?)

MS MTANGA: Was he also a member of your unit?

MR MASANGO: She was our commander, but based in Botswana. She must have been, maybe a commander for other units as well.

MS MTANGA: And who was the person in South Africa reporting to Tengwe in Botswana?

MR MASANGO: The unit commander, Jabu Masina.

MS MTANGA: Okay. Thank you, Chairperson, no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Ms Mtanga.

Mr Masango, what time of the day was it about when you left the limpet-mine at this bus stop?

MR MASANGO: It could have been midday, but it exploded long after that.

CHAIRPERSON: And what was the delay on the detonation of the limpet-mine, how long was it between placing it and the explosion?

MR MASANGO: It was supposed to have exploded between 20 and 30 minutes of our placing it there.

CHAIRPERSON: Now when you placed it, were there any people at this bus stop?

MR MASANGO: There were one or two white people I saw there, exact like the, at the bus stop, at the shelter of the bus stop.

CHAIRPERSON: They were waiting for the bus?

MR MASANGO: Ja.

CHAIRPERSON: Have you had any idea about the timetables of the buses that were supposed to use that route?

MR MASANGO: No, no, no, we didn't have any timetable.

MS MTANGA: So it wasn't planned to explode at about a time when there was supposed to be a bus at the bus stop?

MR MASANGO: No, it was just set to explode 20 minutes after we had placed it there, there wasn't a particular time, a specific time when people would be there or when the bus would be there as such.

CHAIRPERSON: So you were not sure whether there would be a bus or whether there would be people waiting for a bus?

MR MASANGO: It was a bus stop, we were sure that there would be some people who were waiting for the bus there.

CHAIRPERSON: But you'd assumed that, you hadn't factored it into your planning, you hadn't looked at the, for example at the timetable to see that there would be a bus say at 12H30, and therefore you would place the limpet at 12 o'clock and set the detonation for 30 minutes afterwards, that type of thing? You didn't do that kind of planning?

MR MASANGO: No, but the previous day when I was there, the time at which we placed that bomb, the previous day, there were many people there the previous day.

CHAIRPERSON: At about midday?

MR MASANGO: At about midday, ja. The time at which we placed it.

CHAIRPERSON: Were those white people waiting for the bus at the bus stop?

MR MASANGO: They were at the bus shelter there, Sir, they could have been waiting for the bus.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you keep observation on the bus stop for a while the previous day, or was it purely coincidental that you were there at about the same time and saw that there was all these people?

MR MASANGO: Not for long. I didn't stay long, I just saw some white people at that time and I just looked at the time and said no, at this time around there are many of them and then I left. I didn't stay long.

CHAIRPERSON: I don't have a personal knowledge of this area, but is this a main route, is it a busy sort of route?

MR MASANGO: Ja, it's along the main road there.

CHAIRPERSON: If you still have - was there any indication of the sort of relative numbers of people that were injured between white and black? We have a whole list of complainants in regard to this particular explosion, it's a whole string of attempted murder charges, which give some indication, but I don't know if you have an indication still as to what ratio there was eventually.

MR MASANGO: We did see that list of victims. I did see it and then I did realise that white, blacks and coloureds were injured.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. And you didn't - if you can still recall, from the reports at that time or even from that, have you formed any idea about the ratios, white/black?

MR MASANGO: Well since the names were released a day after that explosion we did see that there were, the ratio was not equal, was not balanced, there were more blacks injured than the intended whites.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that what in fact happened eventually, were there more blacks injured than white people?

MR MASANGO: By blacks I'm including coloureds as well.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR MASANGO: Ja.

CHAIRPERSON: And from the, possibly from the trial or from the subsequent reports, was there any indication of anybody, of the nature of the injuries? Were there people sort of killed at the bus stop waiting for the bus or seriously injured and say others in the vicinity injured by shrapnel or debris or that kind of thing? Have you formed any idea about that sort of thing?

MR MASANGO: Before placing the bomb?

CHAIRPERSON: No, no, afterwards.

MR MASANGO: Ja, we did discuss that, we did analyse that and then when there were so many we said to ourselves it can't have been so many black people who were at the bus stop, obviously they were hit by shrapnel or so, they might be some metres away.

CHAIRPERSON: So have you concluded that the bulk of the people were injured through shrapnel and debris and so on?

MR MASANGO: That was our ...(indistinct), because we said to ourselves there's no way that we could have had so many blacks, coloureds and Indians standing at - I mean coloureds and blacks standing at that whites only bus stop, they might have been caught metres away from that place.

CHAIRPERSON: Was that the sort of conclusion that you came to, that there were fewer, let's call them direct victims at the bus stop, fewer of those than victims of people in the vicinity who got injured through all this, flying objects and so on?

MR MASANGO: That was the conclusion of course, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you, Mr Masango.

ADV GCABASHE: Mr Masango, just one really, about planning as a unit. Did you say Mr Makhura was the unit leader?

MR MASANGO: Masina.

ADV GCABASHE: Masina. Did you all live together or you just saw one another occasionally, how did that work?

MR MASANGO: They were staying in Mamelodi, whilst we were staying in Winterveld. We would phone one another, discussing some of the things, not serious things over the phone, but for meetings or so. But we'll always drive to Mamelodi or they will drive to Winterveld, where we will meet and discuss, or we'll meet anywhere in town and discuss whatever question we were discussing.

ADV GCABASHE: Did any one particular person have the duty of identifying targets, or how did you go about identifying your targets?

MR MASANGO: Anybody could identify the target.

ADV GCABASHE: And then bring that into the discussion and you would all talk about it?

MR MASANGO: Sure, but in this instance I identified the target and then I talked to Masina, because we had to be given the go-ahead by Masina, whatever operation we are carrying out.

ADV GCABASHE: And did you all tend to agree on your targets each time you discussed the various ones?

MR MASANGO: We've always agreed. We might perhaps differ on how the operation must be carried out, but on that it should be attacked, that it should be done, we would always agree on that.

ADV GCABASHE: Over what period of time did you execute these particular operations, in terms of months or weeks?

MR MASANGO: All of them together?

ADV GCABASHE: Yes, just the general period.

MR MASANGO: That could be about seven - until the time we were arrested, that could be from February to September because we were ...(indistinct) in September.

ADV GCABASHE: Okay, thank you. Thank you, Chair.

ADV DE JAGER: Why didn't you choose a different bus stop further down the road, not within two or three or five yards from Checkers, where all the people would assemble?

MR MASANGO: It could have been at any other bus stop, but we decided that should be the one. It was the most busiest than all other bus stops, because it was almost at the centre.

ADV DE JAGER: Yes, so that was also the bus stop where black people and coloured people would be in the vicinity of Checkers, because that's the main buying place for people in Silverton, isn't it?

MR MASANGO: The limpet mine was much closer to the bus stop, the shelter, than even to the Checkers itself, though I do admit that shrapnel would have reached Checkers as well.

ADV DE JAGER: Yes, and you knew it, you've learnt to work with limpet-mines, didn't you?

MR MASANGO: Sure, we did.

ADV DE JAGER: And you're a person planning and identifying the spot, so you must have foreseen that you would kill other people or injure other people too, not only whites?

MR MASANGO: Ja, when a limpet is placed at a bus stop, directly at the bus stop, the shelter, obviously from any, any military person would know that a person who is away, metres away will also be injured, but whilst the actual target is exactly at the bus stop it goes without saying that the people metres away will also be injured, but the aim of the target, the target where it will be, that is what is important at that time.

ADV DE JAGER: But this bus stop is on the pavement where all the people are moving up and down going to the shops and coming out of the shops.

MR MASANGO: That is correct, yes.

ADV DE JAGER: And the dustbin was even nearer to the shops than to the street, wouldn't it be?

MR MASANGO: It was nearer to the shops than the street.

ADV DE JAGER: Ja. So in fact you didn't take care of other people being killed or injured, black people that may be members of your own Party.

MR MASANGO: If we were to carry an operation and then some people like blacks and coloureds will also be injured, that wouldn't deter us necessarily from carrying out that operation.

ADV DE JAGER: No, I can understand that, but if there's an obvious choice you could have chosen the next bus stop which wasn't so near to the shops where black people, maybe people of your own Party would have been involved.

MR MASANGO: A different bus stop as I've said was smaller than that one because that one was in the centre, it would have had very little political impact.

ADV DE JAGER: Just another aspect, it's not really important, but I see you're using the word "eliminate", "we've been instructed to eliminate this person". Was the word "eliminate" actually used, the very word, for killing?

MR MASANGO: It was a military term meaning to kill.

ADV DE JAGER: So it was a known military term?

MR MASANGO: It was a military term, ja.

ADV DE JAGER: Ja, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Berger, any re-examination?

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR BERGER: Just a few questions, Chairperson.

Mr Masango, you said that a smaller bus stop would not have had, would not have been politically significant. What did you mean by that?

MR MASANGO: Each and every operation that we were doing was supposed to have a very wide, a very serious political impact. So a bus stop down the street there wouldn't mean anything, people would know about that, but it wouldn't mean much as a bus stop that is in a centre of a city.

MR BERGER: Did you want people to know that this was a bomb that was being placed by MK, to make a point against segregated bus stops?

MR MASANGO: Exactly.

MR BERGER: Did you have any desire to target black or coloured people?

MR MASANGO: Not at all.

MR BERGER: Could that have served the interests of the ANC or MK, in any way?

MR MASANGO: Not at all.

MR BERGER: Was that your understanding at the time?

MR MASANGO: It was our understanding at the time, ja.

MR BERGER: Thank you, Chairperson, I have no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you, Mr Berger. Yes, Mr Masango, you are excused.

MR MASANGO: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: We have come to the end of the day. There obviously are a few witnesses left in these proceedings, so there's no reasonable prospect of conclude it today, we'll have to postpone it until tomorrow. This and another partly-heard matter that stood down are the only remaining matters on the roll for this Panel, so we proceed with this matter tomorrow morning at 9 o'clock. We're adjourned and we reconvene here at 9 o'clock tomorrow morning.