CHAIRPERSON: Good morning everybody, I apologise for the late start. The reason was that the bringing of Mr de Kock from the Correctional Services was delayed. Yesterday we concluded the evidence of Gen van der Merwe and now I'm told, the evidence of Brig Schoon will be led, is that correct?

MS LOCKHAT: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR VISSER: Brig Schoon is available to take the oath, Chairperson.

WILLEM FREDERICK SCHOON: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser?

MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman. Good morning, Mr Chairman. Before you, you will find a statement by Brig Schoon, I'm told that it will be Exhibit E, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, yes. Has everybody got a copy of the statement? This will then be received as Exhibit EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Thank you, Chairperson.

Brigadier Schoon, you are also applying for amnesty in this atter, is that correct?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Your amnesty application is in bundle 1, page 148 to 239, is that correct?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR VISSER: Previously you have studied Exhibit A and with previous amnesty applications you have already confirmed the content thereof, do you once again confirm the content?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: As well as the evidence to which is referred in that document?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR VISSER: Previously you've also given evidence yourself on the 19th of November 1996, in terms of a subpoena relating to Section 29, also on the 9th of October during the Armed Forces hearing in 1997. Is that correct?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And do you also confirm then the content of your evidence which was previously given as well as the content of your application except insofar as there may be explanations or amendments made by you today, as being true and correct?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR VISSER: Can we go to page 3 of Exhibit E. Please begin at paragraph 1 and take the Committee through the document.

BRIG SCHOON:

MR VISSER: Now Brigadier, when you completed your amnesty application, did you have an independent recollection of the date upon which these events took place?

BRIG SCHOON: No, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And who did you consult in order to say in your application that the incident took place in 1986?

BRIG SCHOON: In the documents which were submitted by Brig Cronje.

MR VISSER: And you had insight into those documents?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And is that the reason why you also said 1986, while we all know now that it was actually 1985?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And this also let to another error on your behalf, but we will get to that shortly. Mr Chairman, paragraph 3, could I ask you to strike it out, it is a mistake on my part. It's a confusion between who the deceased persons were and who the injured persons were, but it's purely a mistake on my part and I only realised this morning that I haven't rectified it. I beg your pardon for that.

CHAIRPERSON: So we delete then paragraph 3.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairperson.

Would you continue, paragraph 4.

BRIG SCHOON:

....(intervention)

MR VISSER: That was actually Police.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, of Police.

MR VISSER: Brigadier, what was your position in the Security Police, during June 1985?

BRIG SCHOON: At that stage I was in command of Group C, at the Security Head Office.

MR VISSER: And what precisely did Group C involve?

BRIG SCHOON: It was generally known as the Counter-Terrorism Unit.

MR VISSER: Yes. Now yesterday, Adv Booyens put it to Gen van der Merwe that Mr Hattingh's recollection is that there was a meeting during which you and Gen van der Merwe and he were present, when the issue of the adjusted detonators was discussed. Do you have any recollection of that?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, Chairperson, I can recall that we discussed this matter and if I recall correctly, Col Hattingh said that it would be somewhat of a difficult task to adjust these items, or that he did not have the expertise to do so.

MR VISSER: Very well, we will get to that later. What did the authorisation involve, according to you?

BRIG SCHOON: The authorisation involved that the detonators of the handgrenades be adjusted to such an extent that there would be no time delay after it had been activated and that the handgrenade would thus explode, either near or next to the person who tossed it. I was given the order to arrange that certain Russian manufactured handgrenades be adjusted as such.

MR VISSER: You have just referred to the fact that Mr Hattingh may have been present, is it your recollection that you did indeed speak to someone dealing with explosives at the Technical Division?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR VISSER: And are you prepared to accept that it may have been Col Hattingh?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, it may have been him, because he was in command of the Demolitions Unit at that stage.

MR VISSER: Very well. Your recollection as you have just stated it, was that there was doubt regarding whether this could be done or not. Can you recall what you did then?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, I then went to Special Forces, and according to my recollection I spoke to Gen Joop Joubert and asked whether he would be able to conduct these adjustments for us.

MR VISSER: Now Gen Joubert has written a letter ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: It's Exhibit D.

MR VISSER: Exhibit D. Thank you, Mr Chairman.

... in which he stated that he indeed was not the Commander of Special Forces on the 25th or 26th of June, and that he cannot recall any discussion with you regarding this subject, and that he believes that you are mistaken. Now Mr Wagener did some homework last night and he has an extract which he gave to me, from the Armed Forces hearing of 8th of October 1997, and in this extract the Defence Force gave evidence in Cate Town and Gen Joubert said the following - he is asked, at the top of the page:

And Maj-Gen Joubert says:

And then Mr Goosen says:

Gen Joubert says:

Chairperson, I'm not certain whether there's any sense in handing it in, it's only that passage.

Brigadier, are you prepared to accept in truth and in fact, that Gen Joubert was not the Commander of Spes Forces in June 1985?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, I would accept that.

MR VISSER: Now then that brings us to the question of who you spoke to. Can you recall the person that you spoke to, or can you simply recall that you spoke to the Head of Special Forces?

BRIG SCHOON: Initially I tried to bring the person to the date and the date which I initially had was that this incident took place in 1986, in which case it would then have been Gen Joubert that I had consulted. However, seeing that the incident is placed in the middle of 1985, I will have to accept that it was not him and that it was, or may have been Gen Liebenberg that I spoke to.

MR VISSER: What you are saying is that you are inferring who you spoke to in terms of the date?

BRIG SCHOON: That is correct.

MR VISSER: So you have no independent recollection yourself regarding who you spoke to?

BRIG SCHOON: No.

MR VISSER: But you know that you spoke to the Head of Special Forces?

BRIG SCHOON: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Then what did you ask him?

BRIG SCHOON: I asked whether it was possible to modify these handgrenades so that they would explode immediately upon the activation of the detonator.

MR VISSER: And what did the Head of Special Forces say to you?

BRIG SCHOON: He said it wouldn't be a problem and that they could do so.

MR VISSER: And from paragraph 8 onwards, please proceed.

BRIG SCHOON:

MR VISSER: Can we just pause there?

BRIG SCHOON: Were there also detonators which were given to the Technical Division, the explosives experts of the Police?

BRIG SCHOON: They had weaponry which they had reclaimed for safekeeping, because they were demolitions experts and the only authorised personnel who were permitted to keep these items in supply.

MR VISSER: But no, what my question is, in terms of your discussion with Hattingh, would they also have adjusted handgrenade detonators which may have been applied during this incident?

BRIG SCHOON: I believe that they may have tried to do so.

MR VISSER: Very well. The fact is that you didn't have anything physical further to do with these things.

BRIG SCHOON: I did not handle these items myself.

MR VISSER: And you also stated that in paragraph 9 and 10 of your statement in Exhibit E.

BRIG SCHOON: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And later you heard that something else was required.

BRIG SCHOON: That is correct, I later was informed that a limpet mine was also required and that this also had to be adjusted.

MR VISSER: And who did you give that order to?

BRIG SCHOON: Also to the Demolitions Unit.

MR VISSER: That would be Mr Hattingh and his people?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that's correct.

MR VISSER: And as far as you know, that adjustment was carried out with regard to the limpet mine?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR VISSER: And as far as you know, even though you yourself were not personally involved, it later fell into the hands of Brig Cronje's people and ultimately with Mr Mamasela.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: At all times you were aware of the purpose behind the adjustments of the detonators of the handgrenades and the limpet mines.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And the aim was to give these items to persons who were going to attack targets.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Did you have any personal motive in the execution of these tasks?

BRIG SCHOON: None whatsoever.

MR VISSER: Any personal vengeance or malice which you harboured?

BRIG SCHOON: None.

MR VISSER: You acted under the orders of Gen van der Merwe?

BRIG SCHOON: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Were you ever informed that the order had come from somewhere else?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, he mentioned that it came from the Minister of Police.

MR VISSER: Did you commit these acts or omissions as part of your duties and in your opposition of the struggle?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And you also refer to the summary give by Gen van der Merwe regarding the background of the struggle, as given before this Committee?

BRIG SCHOON: That's correct.

MR VISSER: And it was aimed at supporters of the liberation movements?

BRIG SCHOON: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Did you also do this in order to combat political violence as you viewed it?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: An d in this manner to maintain the government and the National Party, to maintain them in power?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes.

MR VISSER: Would you bear with me a moment please, Mr Chairman.

Brigadier Schoon, did you have any knowledge of the precise course of events in terms of which these handgrenades or at least the detonators then, were prepared? Did you know precisely when Mr Mamasela became involved in the action and what precisely he did and what precisely Brig Cronje did and so forth?

BRIG SCHOON: No, I didn't.

MR VISSER: You have no knowledge thereof?

BRIG SCHOON: No, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Because it would appear that Mr Mamasela infiltrated the group after the approval had been given by the Minister. You wouldn't know about that?

BRIG SCHOON: No, I don't know anything about that.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman, that is the evidence-in-chief, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Visser. Mr Hattingh, do you have any questions you would like to ask the witness?

MR HATTINGH: I have no questions, thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Booyens?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS: Yes, thank you Mr Chairman.

Brigadier, when did you retire?

BRIG SCHOON: At the end of October 1989.

MR BOOYENS: How old were you then?

BRIG SCHOON: At that stage I was 59.

MR BOOYENS: Now Brigadier, I don't believe that there's any kind of factual dispute between us, I think that it is actually more about what people remember or what they believe they remember. Let us first deal with the meeting during which Mr Paul Hattingh was present. Mr Hattingh tells me that he recalls clearly that at the meeting he had already been called in regarding the technical viability of the proposition to adjust the detonator of a handgrenade. He himself said that he knew that it could be done but it would be difficult, but that he couldn't give you a final answer, that he had to discuss this with Wal du Toit, who was from the Technical Division. It resided theoretically below him, but it was an independent division from the Security Branch and he had to discuss it with them because if anybody could do it, then they could. Is it possible that it may been in Wal du Toit's division?

BRIG SCHOON: It is very possible.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Booyens, what was that name again? Du Toit you said.

MR BOOYENS: Mr Wal du Toit.

CHAIRPERSON: Wal du Toit.

MR BOOYENS: That's one of the applicants, Mr Chairman.

And Mr Hattingh says that it is his recollection that he then did discuss the matter with Mr du Toit and that Mr du Toit said yes, he thinks that they'd be able to do it. You have no dispute with that?

BRIG SCHOON: Not at all.

MR BOOYENS: Now I see in your statement, in paragraph 8, this is Exhibit E to which you have just referred, you say:

Can you give us more details, would the Explosives Division have taken it to Special Forces?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, I arranged for that.

MR BOOYENS: Can you recall who you arranged this with?

BRIG SCHOON: No.

MR BOOYENS: You see I'm wondering, because Mr Hattingh or anybody, none of them have a recollection that they ever received a modified weapon from Special Forces. Is it possible that you may be under the impression that you said take it to Special Forces, but that they already know that the Technical Division could do it and then took it to Technical Division and that is where the modification was undertaken?

BRIG SCHOON: No, the modification was executed at Special Forces.

MR BOOYENS: Did you receive later confirmation that it had been done at Special Forces?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, the person who performed the modification there contacted me after the items were ready and then I once again arranged with the Demolitions Unit to fetch it.

MR BOOYENS: You cannot recall with who at Demolitions you arranged for them to fetch it?

BRIG SCHOON: No.

MR BOOYENS: Then it would appear to me that it is entirely possible because I can assure you that Mr du Toit would definitely not apply for something if he didn't have anything to do with it. I don't believe that anybody is that enthusiastic to appear before this Committee. Is it then possible that the right hand may not have known what the left hand was doing and an order may have come from Mr Hattingh and the others, that Mr du Toit and the others would modify another group of detonators and ultimately there were two sets of detonators and two sets of handgrenades which arrived at Demolitions?

BRIG SCHOON: I don't know about it.

MR BOOYENS: But you wouldn't be able to exclude the possibility?

BRIG SCHOON: No, I cannot dispute it.

MR BOOYENS: Well it would appear to me that this is probably what happened. And possibly - just with regard tot he limpet mine, this modification of the limpet mine was not undertaken by Mr Hattingh's division, the Demolitions Division, but was undertaken by Mr Wal du Toit in his division.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, I later heard that.

MR BOOYENS: Thank you Chairperson, I have nothing further.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Booyens. Mr Cornelius, do you have any questions?

MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chair, no questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Mafora, do you have any questions you'd like to ask?

MR MAFORA: Thank you, Mr Chairman, no questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Ms Lockhat, would you like to put some questions?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS LOCKHAT: Thank you, Chairperson.

Brigadier Schoon, in your first meeting or your meetings with Gen van der Merwe, were you informed as to the reasons for this Zero-Zero Operation?

BRIG SCHOON: I cannot recall that, Chairperson, although the reports which went through to him in this regard would have arrived at my desk as well and I would have been aware of it.

MS LOCKHAT: So you can't recall that these COSAS members were problem persons in the area and that certain policemen's homes were being attacked and therefore they needed this operation?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, that information was conveyed to me and I was aware of it.

MS LOCKHAT: Tell me, your usual procedure, would you say that your usual procedure would go to the Head of Special Forces to actually give him this instruction to prepare these handgrenades?

BRIG SCHOON: No, not to give in instructions, I went to him and it was simply out of politeness that one would go to the commander and not to his subordinates, but I went to him with this request, which he then granted.

MS LOCKHAT: And you say that is Mr Liebenberg, is that correct?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes Chairperson, if it was not Gen Joubert, then it must have been Gen Liebenberg. But I do doubt this.

MS LOCKHAT: I just want to refer you to your Section 29 hearing. That is contained in bundle 2A, Chairperson, from page 317. I want to refer you to page 319. Just further down you say:

...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: What line are you referring to?

MS LOCKHAT: Page 319, Chairperson, it's just ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: They've got lines down the side, is it 115 of ...(intervention)

MS LOCKHAT: It's 35, just below 35, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Just below 35, thank you.

MS LOCKHAT: Then you go further:

Is that what you requested, for a dozen or two of handgrenades?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, that is correct. I just want to add that I did not ask Special Forces to provide the detonators, we ourselves provided it. And according to the best of my knowledge, it was approximately 24, which was then delivered to them.

MS LOCKHAT: Where did you obtain these handgrenades?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, these were handgrenades which were taken into possession during the course of regular police activities.

MS LOCKHAT: And then Adv Goosen asks you, at line 42:

And then you respond:

And then he goes on:

You further state:

Just explain that.

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, Chairperson, it was as it is known here, Gen van der Merwe who started the whole matter, Brig Cronje was involved and after that I also became involved in the provision or the preparation of the handgrenade detonators.

MS LOCKHAT: Just the next question that also Adv Goosen put to you regarding black handgrenades, so that they could be identified. It's just below line 10.

CHAIRPERSON: ... 20.

MS LOCKHAT: That is correct, Chairperson, page 320. He asked you:

So I just want to check with you, was it possible that these handgrenades could have been coloured as black handgrenades in order to actually identify that these were the handgrenades that were booby-trapped?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, I never saw these items, so consequently I cannot say whether they were coloured or painted, but I would accept that the detonators which were intercepted or modified would have been marked in some way so that they could be identified as dangerous.

MS LOCKHAT: And then just at line 45, Adv Goosen asks you another question:

And then you responded:

Can you just elaborate on that for us, what did you mean by that?

BRIG SCHOON: Well Chairperson, such an operation couldn't simply be launched from the lower levels from the average Joe Soap, it would have to be a decision that had been taken on a relatively high level and I knew that - at that stage I might not have remembered it, that the Minister of Police had approved the operation.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Brigadier, just on this point. Why would you say that you would believe that it should have got approval from such a high level? Why I ask the question is that we have heard many applications involving operations also of a very serious nature, which resulted in the death of people, which never went beyond, approval-wise, beyond yourself for instance or at least beyond head office of the Security Police.

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, this was first in its kind and there had not been previous incidents such as this, that is why I regarded it as an exceptional operation.

MS LOCKHAT: Brigadier, so when you were informed that these people were actually going to be, could be injured, eliminated, did you in yourself agree with this operation? ...(end of side A of tape)

BRIG SCHOON: ...(inaudible)

MS LOCKHAT: .... commander.

BRIG SCHOON: Please repeat the question.

MS LOCKHAT: Your commander, was it ...(intervention)

BRIG SCHOON: General van der Merwe was my senior.

MS LOCKHAT: Why I'm asking you this, in your mind do you feel that you were just following instructions in this instance?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, Chairperson.

MS LOCKHAT: Did you feel that you could tell Gen van der Merwe that you did not want to proceed with the elimination of persons, could you be in that position to do that?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, I was in that position, but I didn't because I believed that it was urgently necessary for something to be done about the tossing of these handgrenades to innocent people.

MS LOCKHAT: So what you're saying is that you could have told him look, I don't want to be part of this operation?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, I could have said so.

MS LOCKHAT: But then you thought it was necessary though?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, I thought so.

MS LOCKHAT: Thank you, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Visser, do you have any re-examination?

MR VISSER: None thank you, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Adv Gcabashe, do you have any questions you'd like to ask?

ADV GCABASHE: No thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Malan?

MR MALAN: No questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Brigadier Schoon, I'd just like to ask you, the structures, we've heard that there was a Technical Division within the Security Police, is that correct?

BRIG SCHOON: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that where Col Hattingh worked?

BRIG SCHOON: Yes, Chairperson, that is where he worked. At the Demolitions Division, he was in command of Explosives.

CHAIRPERSON: And Mr Wal du Toit, where did he work?

BRIG SCHOON: He was in Technical.

CHAIRPERSON: And the Special Forces, why did you got to Special Forces and not to your Explosives or Technical Division?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, we approached them first and ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I want to know why if you had your own technical people.

BRIG SCHOON: Because they couldn't do it at that stage.

CHAIRPERSON: And is there any reason why, any particular reason why you sent plus-minus 24 grenades for modification?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, not the grenades themselves, but the detonators.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, the detonators, what made you choose that number?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, it was simply so that we could have quite a few in stock.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you know whether numbers were mentioned at all, as to how many people were to be the targets?

BRIG SCHOON: Chairperson, I don't believe that any pertinent number was mentioned, but the initial information was that there was a small group who were interested in continuing with this operation.

CHAIRPERSON: And then you said that you were later informed that a limpet mine also required modification. Who informed you about that and how much later did that information come to you?

SCHOON: Chairperson, that was approximately at the same time and it was Brig Cronje.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you know why a limpet mine, or were you told why a limpet mine was required?

BRIG SCHOON: He told me that there was one of these persons who wanted to blow up a power station or a sub-power station and for those purpose they required a mini limpet mine.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Are there any questions arising out of questions put?

MR VISSER: No, thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you, Mr Schoon, that concludes your testimony, you may stand down.

BRIG SCHOON: Thank you.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I then beg leave to call Brig Delport. We have prepared a statement for him as well, it has not been handed to you yet, which will be F, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes thank you, we will then receive this statement from Brig Delport as Exhibit F.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Delport, your full names.

JAKOBUS MARTHINUS DELPORT: (sworn states)

ADV DE JAGER: Thank you, you may be seated.

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Brigadier, you are an applicant in this matter, is that correct?

BRIG DELPORT: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You have studied Exhibit A, is that correct?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes.

MR VISSER: Is there anything in Exhibit A which according to you and your knowledge, is incorrect?

BRIG DELPORT: Nothing.

MR VISSER: And do you confirm then, regarding your knowledge, the content of Exhibit A and do you also request that this be incorporated into your application, as well as the evidence which is thereafter referred to?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes.

MR VISSER: You have listened to the evidence of Gen van der Merwe.

BRIG DELPORT: Correct.

MR VISSER: Do you concur with his evidence?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, I do.

MR VISSER: Do you also particularly concur with the background of unrest and violence which reigned in the East Rand in 1985?

BRIG DELPORT: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: In paragraph 2 of Exhibit F you say that during 1985 you were the Divisional Commander of the Security Branch on the East Rand.

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Where were you stationed?

BRIG DELPORT: I was stationed at Springs.

MR VISSER: And as such you received information from the members of the Security Branch, who served below you?

BRIG DELPORT: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And was information obtained from informers who were handled by your subordinate members?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes.

MR VISSER: And in this manner information was obtained from an informer with regard to the events which led to your current amnesty application?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: In paragraph 3 and 4 and 5, you have summarised what the problems were which you experienced and you refer to school boycotts, stay-away actions, malicious damage to property, arson, murder and a video, or two videos were displayed here yesterday, which gave an idea of what you had to deal with.

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Just to put it clearly, the videos were not all of application to the East Rand necessarily.

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: There was one aspect of it which related to Soweto if I recall correctly.

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, that is entirely correct.

MR VISSER: However, did those videos create the correct impression of that which you had to deal with, when you speak of these school boycotts, stay-away actions, malicious damage to property, mass actions and so forth?

BRIG DELPORT: Without any doubt.

MR VISSER: Now in paragraph 5 you refer to the problem which existed regarding attacks, specifically on police members and also specifically members of the police who resided in black residential areas.

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And you stated there that according to your recollection, within a number of weeks 90% of all the police members' residences had been burnt to the ground and broken down.

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Would you proceed from paragraph 6 and tell the Committee what your impression was of the circumstances at that time.

BRIG DELPORT:

MR VISSER: Now this violence, Brigadier, was this something which had started shortly before the events of the 25th/26th of June, or was this political violence which had built up over a period?

BRIG DELPORT: No, it was definitely political violence which had already come into existence since the last part of 1984, specifically October 1984.

MR VISSER: And from when did COSAS come to the fore with regard to this violence? COSAS as an organisation or the members of COSAS.

BRIG DELPORT: COSAS members were involved, as far as I can recall with regard to February/March, they became more pertinently involved.

MR VISSER: Is that from 1985?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes.

MR VISSER: You say in paragraph 7 that there were requests for you to act in order to protect persons, what did you do for example in order to protect policemen who resided in these residential areas as well as their homes?

BRIG DELPORT: Chairperson, we went to the extent - as a result of the petrol bomb attacks which had been launched on the homes of police members and council members, we provided them with large fire extinguishers and in certain cases we also enforced policemen's windows so that bombs could not be thrown through the windows.

MR VISSER: Would that be by means of fencing made of expanded metal? I don't know what one would call that in Afrikaans, some form of steel reinforcement in front of the windows so that petrol bombs could not be thrown through the window.

BRIG DELPORT: That is correct.

MR VISSER: I don't what the Afrikaans is, it's expanded metal, Chairperson, it's a steel - one sees it often in front of homes. It's more than just wire, it's steel plate.

The consequence of the reinforcement of the homes of police members, did you achieve any success with this, regarding your knowledge?

BRIG DELPORT: I would say that we achieved a certain measure of success.

MR VISSER: In other words, success in the sense that petrol bombs were no longer really effective when used in attacks on police homes, is that correct?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Very well. You say in paragraph 8 on page 4, that you and your staff were approached daily by members for assistance, protection and guidance and you also state that you submitted reports to Security Head Office. Now I want to ask you, was there only one report or did you send a number of reports into Security Head Office regarding the political unrest on the East Rand?

BRIG DELPORT: No, there would have been more reports. As these things took place, they would be reported.

MR VISSER: Yes. And if the informer of one of your subordinates had for example, provided a list of names to you, these names would have been sent through?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, the names would definitely have been sent through.

MR VISSER: Then you say in paragraph 9 - can you continue with that?

BRIG DELPORT:

...(intervention)

MR VISSER: If you could just pause there. The question was put that these activists threw stones and petrol bombs, now why would they want handgrenades or weapons? What would be your commentary regarding that?

BRIG DELPORT: Chairperson, I would allege that as a result of the precautionary measures which were taken, they decided to look for something more drastic, which would have had a far better impact than a petrol bomb.

MR VISSER: The petrol bombs didn't work on the houses because the houses had been secured.

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Continue.

BRIG DELPORT:

MR VISSER: And this information was also reported to Security Head Office by you?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Was there any reaction to this report? Did Gen van der Merwe contact you?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, Gen van der Merwe contacted us.

MR VISSER: And he paid a visit to Springs?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And you say in paragraph 10 that you recall that you were present during the meeting and that Brig Cronje and other members, who you can no longer recall, were also present. Would you accept that Col Venter was also present during that meeting?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, I would accept that.

MR VISSER: Because that was the evidence. And what did Gen van der Merwe tell you? If you look at paragraph 11.

BRIG DELPORT: Gen van der Merwe informed us that he was convinced that in the light of the information, if something was not done swiftly and drastically against these inciters, police members and black council members, their families and even others, would be killed and/or seriously injured.

MR VISSER: Please continue.

BRIG DELPORT:

I can only say that at that stage many police homes had been attacked.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, while the witness refers to that, what we have - Gen van der Merwe said yesterday in his evidence that we will attempt to find some statistics for you. The only statistics which we were able to find, which are pertinent to the East Rand, appear from the record of the criminal trial of some of these people that had been prosecuted, as we know, before his Lordship, Justice Stafford and an assessor. And it appears, Chairperson, that from that record it appears that up and to the 25th of June in 1985, for the period immediately preceding that period, 31 homes of policemen were in fact burnt down. These do not include, as I understand it, the attacks. Now the problem which we have, Chairperson, is ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, would that be the 1985 figure?

MR VISSER: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: For the first six months of, more-or-less six months of ...

MR VISSER: One could put it down to the first six months of 1985.

CHAIRPERSON: And is that East Rand or is that national?

MR VISSER: East Rand, particularly East - this is only in relation to the East Rand. Chairperson, I'm told - I haven't read this myself, I'm told that you've got to read through the whole of the evidence because different people gave evidence before Justice Stafford, to say that his house was burnt down. So you've got to add it up as you go along. Now that exercise was done last night by Mr Steenkamp - Mr Prins, I'm sorry, and he informs me that he counted 31. He also found another reference, Chairperson, at page 2528 of that same record of the criminal trial, where a certain Mr Sithole, who is a policeman, gave evidence that his house was attacked 10 times. So it appears from this, Chairperson, that attacks on policemen's houses were rather prevalent at the time.

ADV GCABASHE: Mr Visser, before you put the Sithole one down, 10 times, again between January and May/June? Or does it not indicate?

MR VISSER: No, no, as I understand it Chairperson, it was specifically for the period immediately preceding June 1985. Because you will recall that the trial was about this particular incident, so the only relevant evidence would have been relevant to June 25/26, before his Lordship, Justice Stafford. But again, I haven't read it and I just put it before you for what it is worth.

Chairperson, and perhaps in the Further Submissions and Responses by the ANC to the TRC, dated 12th May 1997, there is a reference, unfortunately it is not complete, but at page 82 there is a reference to SAP Building and Personnel, Brakpan SAP Barracks, three explosions and no details, on the 15th of May 1985 and again on the 15th of May 1985, Government Buildings, Brakpan Commissioner's Court. But clearly what is attempted to be set out here is not the attacks on private homes, it's the big attacks that the ANC have ...

ADV GCABASHE: Mr Visser, before you finish. The killings, do we have anything on killings in those records, how many policemen might have been killed? We're just talking burnt houses.

MR VISSER: No, this only refers to attacks on homes, Chairperson, unfortunately. But we're still looking and we might find specific information about the East Rand for you. Of course the problem which we have is at the time, the statistics were really not specified to particular areas, but it was more nationally orientated, although there was some specific statistics in regard to areas. We'll try to find something for you.

Chairman, as far as Sithole is concerned, my attorney has just picked it up, on page 2529 he's asked - actually the page just before that, at 2528 to which I referred you, he was asked:

And he says:

And then at the bottom of the page he starts giving examples and the one is on the 7th of May 1985, and then on the 11th of May 1985, and then over the page at 2529, on the 12 of May 1985, and then on the 16th of June 1985, and on the 19th of June 1985 and on the 23rd of June 1985, and apparently thereafter on the 26th of August 1985, and he goes on, Chairperson. The 14th of December 1985, he says at page 2530, there was clearly a message for him in this whole affair.

Brigadier, we were busy with paragraph 11 if I recall correctly, and this has to do with the meeting. Certain admissions are made to you there regarding a plan which was formulated.

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And we all know that the plan which was formulated was that the detonators of handgrenades were to be modified so that they would explode in the hands of the persons who wanted to throw them.

BRIG DELPORT: That's correct.

MR VISSER: Did you agree with that operation?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, I did.

MR VISSER: Did you think that this was the most effective method to combat violence?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes.

MR VISSER: And to protect lives?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Please proceed with paragraph 12.

BRIG DELPORT:

MR VISSER: If I might just pause there with you. You already had the names of certain activists which you had already submitted to head office at that stage, is that correct?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Now how would you have reacted if it was suggested to you that the simple method of combatting this situation of political violence was just to detain these persons?

BRIG DELPORT: No, it definitely would not have helped.

MR VISSER: Why do you say that?

BRIG DELPORT: Because nobody would have come forward in the first place, to give evidence, no informer would ever have risked his life in this regard.

MR VISSER: And if you were to detain them in terms of Section 29, and if you did not detain the informer, what would the situation then have been?

BRIG DELPORT: The situation would just have deteriorated.

MR VISSER: And if you were to detain the informer, how would he feel about it?

BRIG DELPORT: Well naturally the informer would not have agreed with it.

MR VISSER: We watched the videos, Brigadier, and I want to ask you because you were in command in this region, was it your experience of that time that it was only a small group of people who were inciting and committing the violence, or what was the situation?

BRIG DELPORT: No, Chairperson, it was a singular exception when there were groups of 10 to 20, usually we dealt with groups of 200 and bigger.

MR VISSER: Now did Gen van der Merwe issue any particular orders or instructions? I refer to paragraph 14.

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, General van der Merwe emphasised that there should be no enticement or incitement to commit a crime and that the weaponry should only be delivered to the activists under the impression that it was from the ANC, and that it was available for application as planned by themselves.

MR VISSER: Yes. The idea was to strike those who had already decided to go over into attack?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes.

MR VISSER: Would there have been any sense in enticing persons who were not involved in this objective?

BRIG DELPORT: No.

MR VISSER: Now Brig Cronje gave evidence during his trial or his hearing, and I think Ms Lockhat referred to page 185 of bundle 2A, but he gave evidence that he received a list from you consisting of names - yes, that is page 185, Chairperson, that he received a list from you containing names. Would that be correct?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, that would be correct.

MR VISSER: And he also testified that he had not given the list to Mr Mamasela and Nkala and that instead he had used it as a check list to ensure that the persons with whom Mamasela had made contact and the people who he had infiltrated were the same persons that you suspected.

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, if he says so, I would accept it as such.

MR VISSER: And Mr Mamasela gave evidence that he was taken by a member of the East Rand Security Branch, to the home of Congress Mtweni and that this house was identified to him. Do you know anything about this?

BRIG DELPORT: No.

MR VISSER: Is it possible that it may have taken place?

BRIG DELPORT: I suppose it is possible that something like that may have occurred.

MR VISSER: Would you proceed with paragraph 15 please.

BRIG DELPORT:

MR VISSER: Did you know anything about training which may have been provided?

BRIG DELPORT: No, I don't.

MR VISSER: And those aspects were left over to Brig Cronje?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, Brigadier was there every day, he dealt with this operation. I had a whole other division with many other branches in Benoni and Germiston and Tembisa, which I also attended to. Brig Jack Cronje managed this matter.

MR VISSER: Now did Gen van der Merwe tell you there during the meeting where this order had come from, or where the approval for the action had come from?

MR MALAN: I beg your pardon, before you continue with that. Do I understand you correctly when you say that at that stage Cronje was permanently on the East Rand and that the operation in other words was for all executionary purposes, something from Vlakplaas?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, that is correct.

ADV GCABASHE: Can I just ask, did that mean that your members were not involved at all with the Vlakplaas people, none of your personnel?

BRIG DELPORT: No, Vlakplaas did not operate from our offices, they operated on their own.

ADV GCABASHE: The question is really, did any of your members work with them because they were working in your area?

BRIG DELPORT: It's very difficult to say because there may have been liaison with them from the staff. It is possible.

ADV GCABASHE: You don't know about it?

BRIG DELPORT: No, I don't know about any other staff members who liaised with them, apart from myself.

ADV GCABASHE: Okay.

MR VISSER: Just to return to Mr Malan's question. There were two questions:

The other question was:

BRIG DELPORT: No, he was not stationed there.

MR VISSER: What was indeed happened was that from time to time they went out to the various divisions where there were problems, is that correct?

BRIG DELPORT: That's correct.

MR VISSER: And on the occasion of June 1985, they were stationed on a plot in the De Notter vicinity.

BRIG DELPORT: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And to continue with what Commissioner Gcabashe had asked, it would be logical would it not, that Vlakplaas' people would work together with the people of the division under you?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, that is very possible.

MR VISSER: But if they needed information there was no other way to get it other than getting it from you?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, I liaised with Brig Jack Cronje.

MR VISSER: Excuse me, I once again arrive at the question, did Gen van der Merwe tell you at the meeting who had approved the order?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, Chairperson, Gen van der Merwe mentioned that mt came via Minister le Grange, and it was approved by Minister le Grange.

MR VISSER: And your comprehension, as you have said, at the meeting was the execution of the operation was left to Brig Cronje and his people and the modified detonators and handgrenades would be supplied to Mamasela.

BRIG DELPORT: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: The point is that after the meeting, it was only after the meeting that Mamasela had to infiltrate the group.

BRIG DELPORT: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And you are aware that handgrenades with modified mechanisms were handed over to certain people.

BRIG DELPORT: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: In paragraph 22 you state that as far as you know it was General van der Merwe, Mr Cronje, yourself, Mr Roelf Venter, Mr Eugene de Kock and Joe Mamasela who were involved in the execution of this operation.

BRIG DELPORT: We were aware thereof, that's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: But would you accept that there were also other people, as we will eventually hear, who were also aware of this whole exercise?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And you state that in paragraph 23. Would you like to continue with paragraph 24.

BRIG DELPORT:

MR VISSER: What would your task be?

BRIG DELPORT: My task was to ensure that on the particular evening of the 25th or 26th of June, a team of explosive experts would be placed on a ready basis to investigate the explosion scenes, to conduct investigations.

MR VISSER: We know that some of your people were indeed there, can you recall whom as explosive experts were brought on a contingency basis?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, it was Lt Steenkamp at that stage.

MR VISSER: Anybody else?

MR VISSER: Andre Roos and Lt Prins.

MR VISSER: And all three of them are also applicants before this Committee?

BRIG DELPORT: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Was there a specific instruction to Steenkamp?

BRIG DELPORT: Do you mean that particular evening?

MR VISSER: Yes. Did Steenkamp have to visit all the scenes?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, I instructed him to visit all the scenes and to handle everything there.

MR VISSER: And what was the purpose thereof?

BRIG DELPORT: Chairperson, at that stage he was the officer who handled the handing out of explosives, the investigation of storage places, and just to use one person to give evidence in Court later whereas otherwise we would have used many witnesses and many explosives experts in Court and I foresaw that it would be better if only one person gave evidence.

MR VISSER: And he was the person whom you chose to visit all the scenes?

BRIG DELPORT: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And we know on that evening several explosions took place, which were visited by the explosive experts and later there were prosecutions of the persons who had survived.

BRIG DELPORT: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And we know that eight COSAS members were killed and seven were injured. And the information which you put in Exhibit F is information which you received from the Investigative team of the TRC, is that correct?

BRIG DELPORT: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And paragraph 29, if you would complete it.

BRIG DELPORT:

MR VISSER: Very well. So you were satisfied that he was referring to this instance?

BRIG DELPORT: That's correct.

MR VISSER: Can I just get clarity with you, you say he visited the people where the black policemen were housed in tents and when he left from there he congratulated you with ...

BRIG DELPORT: No, no, he landed with a helicopter and after he landed we took him with the vehicle and he travelled in the car with us, and the moment he climbed into the car he congratulated me.

MR MALAN: But that was not the order in which you gave your evidence.

BRIG DELPORT: I am sorry, that is how it was, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser?

MR VISSER: Can you continue please, paragraph 32.

BRIG DELPORT:

MR VISSER: Yes. This is the only case for which you apply for amnesty, is that correct?

BRIG DELPORT: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Do you confirm the content of your amnesty application as it appears in bundle 1, page 57 to 67?

BRIG DELPORT: I do so, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And then you, on the grounds of your association with the action, you request amnesty for the murder of the eight COSAS members and attempted murder or any lesser finding with regard to the seven persons who were injured, is that correct?

BRIG DELPORT: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Hattingh, do you have any questions you'd like to ask?

MR HATTINGH: No thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Booyens?

MR BOOYENS: No questions, thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Cornelius?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR CORNELIUS: Only one question, thank you Mr Chairman.

Mr Delport, page 4, paragraph 9 of the document, the source, did the source give the names of the activists to you?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: Was this handed up to Gen van der Merwe?

BRIG DELPORT: Chairperson, it happened so, as the names were made available it was sent up to head office.

MR CORNELIUS: So eventually the targets would be identified?

BRIG DELPORT: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: And furthermore you don't know which instructions were given by Jack Cronje to the operational team? You had no knowledge of it and you did not know what methods were to be used?

BRIG DELPORT: No, Chaivperson.

MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Cornelius. Mr Mafora, do you have any questions you'd like to ask?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR MAFORA: Yes thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr Delport, when did you have this meeting with Gen van der Merwe, approximately?

BRIG DELPORT: Chairperson, I think it was in the beginning of June that we had this meeting.

MR MAFORA: And who was present at that meeting?

BRIG DELPORT: As I have already said, Chairperson, it was myself, Gen van der Merwe was present, Jack Cronje was present and I accept that Roelf Venter was also present.

MR MAFORA: And at that meeting you discussed the whole incident, you planned the incident that we are about today, is that correct?

BRIG DELPORT: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR MAFORA: And I suppose you are aware that the idea came from Gen van der Merwe, is that correct?

BRIG DELPORT: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR MAFORA: And the instructions that he basically gave you to implement, to carry out the mandate, did he - did you make any further contact with him? You know, after - I mean during the process, until the instruction or mandate was terminated.

BRIG DELPORT: I must state it clearly, Chairperson, that Gen van der Merwe - this instruction specifically to Brig Jack Cronje in my office, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: But the question Mr Mafora asked you was, after that meeting - I presume, Mr Mafora, between that meeting and the 25th of June, did you have any other communication or contact with Gen van der Merwe regarding this particular incident.

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, I believe that reports would have been sent to head office.

MR MAFORA: I'm ...(blank in tape) whether you personally, Mr Delport, whether you had any further contacts with him direct on the matter.

BRIG DELPORT: I don't understand the question, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: The question is, during the period, from that meeting until the 25th when the explosions took place, did you have any personal contact with Gen van der Merwe regarding the incident.

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, I believe that I would have, Chairperson. CHAIRPERSON: Mr Mafora, I see you were speaking to Ms Lockhat. The answer was yes, he believes that he would have had personal contact with Gen van der Merwe in that period.

MR MAFORA: Thank you, Mr Chairperson.

You see the evidence of Gen van der Merwe has been that he gave instructions, delegated the process down and you know, the thing was carried out and he finally got the report you know, that the thing was done. What discussions, if any, as you have said there could possibly been, what did you discuss with him?

BRIG DELPORT: Chairperson, later, after the incident, I informed Gen van der Merwe, but during that time period I would not be able to say what discussions there were, I was still the Divisional Commander of the East Rand, which included a large area and I would have discussed a variety of things with him and I would have discussed other problems with him in my division.

ADV GCABASHE: No, you see Mr Delport, I understood your evidence to be that concerning this incident, this incident, you would have had discussions with Gen van der Merwe, which is why the follow-up question is, what would the nature of those discussions have been?

BRIG DELPORT: Chairperson, I cannot recall anything specifically, except that I sent through reports continually to head office and to Gen van der Merwe.

ADV GCABASHE: Are you talking about just general reports about everything that happened in your area?

BRIG DELPORT: That's correct, Chairperson, it would have included amongst others, this.

MR MAFORA: Mr Delport, the issue is you know, Mr Schoon earlier on testified that this was one of the first operations of its kind, did you no of any similar operation previously, prior to this incident?

BRIG DELPORT: No, Chairperson.

MR MAFORA: Were you ever involved in any of this - a situation of this nature previously?

BRIG DELPORT: No, Chairperson.

MR MAFORA: So it was something that was fairly new in your line of operations, is that correct?

BRIG DELPORT: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR MAFORA: Then one would assume that you have had you know, constant touch with Gen van der Merwe, to discuss strategy, to inform him how things were going and how the whole operation would be carried out. Would that be feasible in your mind, or what to you think, what would your comment be?

BRIG DELPORT: No, Chairperson, Brig Cronje would have handled that with Gen van der Merwe.

MR MAFORA: You were in possession of the list, is that correct?

BRIG DELPORT: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR MAFORA: And you got the list from your subordinates, is that correct?

BRIG DELPORT: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR MAFORA: Can you give us the names of those subordinates who provided the list to you?

BRIG DELPORT: I don't understand the question properly.

MR MAFORA: The names of the people who provided the list to you, your subordinates.

BRIG DELPORT: It was provided by a source, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Directly to you? From the source to you or was it from the source to a subordinate of yours and then to you, what is the situation?

BRIG DELPORT: That's correct, Chairperson, it was from a source to a handler to me.

CHAIRPERSON: Now the question asked by Mr Mafora is, who gave you that list.

BRIG DELPORT: This list was supplemented from time to time and the person who handed up the list was Lt Oberholzer, he was at that time in command of the Terrorist Unit which existed at the Springs Security Branch.

MR MAFORA: And you were the overall commander isn't it, in the area for Springs, is that correct?

BRIG DELPORT: That was indeed so, Chairperson.

MR MAFORA: And you should have been aware of an incident that took place in kwaThema earlier in that year, in the Tobela family. Do you know anything about that, where their house was bombed and two children in the family were killed?

BRIG DELPORT: It is difficult to recognise the surname, but there were people who were murdered, but I cannot recall the surname.

CHAIRPERSON: In which area was this, Mr Mafora, do you know?

MR MAFORA: I think it was in Duduza, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: In Duduza.

BRIG DELPORT: That's very possible, Mr Chairperson.

MR MAFORA: Was the general understanding or belief in the area is that your men or members of the police were involved in that, because those members were members of COSAS? What would your comment be on that?

BRIG DELPORT: I would not know whether he was aware of it, Chairperson.

MR MAFORA: And that was one of the things that actually triggered the violence and the violence was actually you know, instigated, or the riots were instigated by your - the police action against the Tobela family, what would your comment be?

BRIG DELPORT: No, Chairperson, I cannot comment to that. I don't know that that was the reason which caused the unrest, the unrest came about since late in 1984.

MR MAFORA: But then did you believe in the general philosophy that existed at the time, that there was - that has been given, related here in these hearings, that there were no other measures of containing the situation other than to proceed in the manner in which you have carried out your actions, by booby-trapping the handgrenades? Is that correct?

BRIG DELPORT: I'm not sure what the question is.

CHAIRPERSON: The question is, we've heard evidence and do you agree with it, that there was no other step to be taken to protect the attack or the proposed attack on police houses, other than modifying these grenades as what actually happened?

BRIG DELPORT: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR MAFORA: And the general belief in the community is that you actually as members of the police, were primarily responsible for the general you know, acts of unlawfulness and violence. You know, you were primarily responsible for those actions. What would your comment be?

BRIG DELPORT: If I understand the question correctly, that we cared for the life of the community, then I would say yes.

MR MAFORA: But the community's view is that you went on a total onslaught against them and you created situations which would - you know, which would justify you taking drastic measures and actions which were aimed at either killing or maiming or injuring members of the community. What would your comment be on that?

BRIG DELPORT: No, Chairperson, I think the total onslaught was the other way around, it was aimed at innocent people.

MR MALAN: If I understand the question correctly, then the question was whether you would concede or agree that the perception of the community was that the police's actions had caused this violence, with dispersing them or whatever.

BRIG DELPORT: It is difficult to say if that is the perception. I cannot say that that would have been a perception with the community. The community many times asked us to help them and we conveyed it on our part to the Divisional Commissioner, who was the uniforms, who was in control.

MR MAFORA: Mr Chairperson, I see it's five to eleven and I'm getting quite a number of notes, may I beg your indulgence just to adjourn now so that I can ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, if you want to just take further instructions during the tea adjournment. It's now in fact even closer to eleven than five to, we'll take the short tea adjournment now.

MS LOCKHAT: Please stand.

JAKOBUS MARTHINUS DELPORT: (s.u.o.)

MR MAFORA: Yes, thank you. Mr Mafora?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR MAFORA: (cont)

Mr Delport, let's just go back to that list that you had in your possession, of the COSAS members. Do you, you know, now can you link up the names or can you recall and make any linkages between the names then and the names of the people who were subsequently injured and you know, oppose the hearings now?

BRIG DELPORT: No, I cannot.

MR MAFORA: So you cannot match the two. And the - my instructions are that the police actually were primarily responsible - and I'm going to put this to you because I put it to Gen van der Merwe, but you may shed some light, in instigating this whole operation about the weapons and the attack and the use of weapons. The weapons were never contemplated by the members who were injured in this operation, it was something that was suggested by Mamasela. What would your comment be to that?

BRIG DELPORT: No, Chairperson, it wasn't like that.

MR MAFORA: Did you have any discussions with Mamasela as to how this operation was to be carried out?

BRIG DELPORT: No, Chairperson.

MR MAFORA: Would you then be in a position to dispute the allegation of the - I would want your comment on this, of the victims when they say that they obtained training from Mamasela and that this whole operation was instigated or was at his instance?

BRIG DELPORT: Chairperson, if Mamasela alleges that, it would be completely incorrect.

MR MAFORA: How so? Because you were not involved in the actual operation and he was.

BRIG DELPORT: The orders were very clear, that nobody should entice these persons or incite them or encourage them.

CHAIRPERSON: But do you exclude the possibility that Mamasela might have exceeded his orders?

BRIG DELPORT: No, he may have done that, certainly he may have done that, but not with my knowledge.

MR MAFORA: And that the police were I mean, actually using such tactics throughout the period you know, to contain the violence, ie they were using criminal tactics to contain the violence in the area, would you deny that?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, I would deny that.

MR MAFORA: And that the police would create or stage events which would actually justify the actions - I mean, which would just justify them acting against the members of the community, would you deny that?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, I would definitely deny that.

MR MAFORA: Why then if the police were so clean and never involved in criminal activities, why did you agree to be party to this criminal activity?

BRIG DELPORT: I cannot say that the police were not involved in anything whatsoever, but with regard to my knowledge, I do not know of any cases in which the police were involved.

CHAIRPERSON: The question Mr Delport is, this particular operation was a criminal activity, why did you personally involve yourself in it seeing that it was unlawful?

BRIG DELPORT: There was no other way out.

MR MAFORA: Was this the only incident where people were involved in activities which threatened the security of the members of the police and their families? Or was this the only grouping of people - let me put it this way, was this the only grouping of people that you knew were involved and were a threat to the life and property of members of the police or the then black town councillors?

BRIG DELPORT: Chairperson, this is the only case where I became aware that these persons were looking for stronger things than petrol bombs.

MR MAFORA: Now I'm asking you whether you were aware of any other case - grouping of people, who were a threat to the members of the police or the local councillors in the area of Springs, that was under your control?

BRIG DELPORT: It was of such a nature that there were constant incidents in which the police acted.

MR MAFORA: And how did you deal with those people?

BRIG DELPORT: Many of those cases were never solved, people were murdered and they were never charged, people's vehicles were burnt and they were never charged, they simply got away with it. They conducted this in groups and the police came to hear of it afterwards or the uniform police were near the scene and they simply heard of it.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you have, during that period or at any time, situations where you had received information about a proposed attack in which information contained details relating to a particular group that were about to launch such an attack?

BRIG DELPORT: No, Chairperson.

MR MAFORA: So you couldn't do - did you at any stage you know, either before this incident or afterwards, have any number of people that you suspected that were involved in attacks on police and their families and - on members of the police and their families, subsequent - I mean before or subsequent to this incident? Did you have any suspects on your records?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, I'm sure that there were investigating teams at that stage in the residential areas who had such information, but not that I can recall.

MR MAFORA: And how did you deal with those people, those suspects?

BRIG DELPORT: Those persons, according to the best of my knowledge, if they could be traced or if you could be caught with your hands in the till so to speak, there would be no other method to arrest them.

MR MAFORA: So are you saying you had people that you suspected but you couldn't arrest them?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, it is possible that there were such cases, Chairperson.

MR MAFORA: But you failed to arrest them?

BRIG DELPORT: That we could not arrest, there may have been such cases.

MR MAFORA: Okay, and why didn't you use these drastic measures that you used in this incident?

BRIG DELPORT: Well we were convinced in this case that the information at our disposal indicated that an attack was going to be launched on the homes of policemen and we believed that they and their families and the council members could be killed in such attacks.

MR MAFORA: I put it to you that that is not true, this was an action that you simply planned against the leaders of COSAS in the area and you devised this plan specifically to injure, maim and kill them. What would your comment be?

BRIG DELPORT: No, that is not true.

MR MAFORA: Would you deny that young people in the '80s were very instrumental in mobilising the people?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, definitely, they were the front runners.

MR MAFORA: And that your actions were primarily aimed at eliminating and creating a vacuum in the leadership, in the student leadership and the community leadership because the young people were leading? What's your comment to that?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, we wanted to ensure and prevent them from continuing with their activities.

MR MAFORA: You wanted to prevent them to continue with their activities, but this had - I mean, the whole plan came from you, is that correct?

BRIG DELPORT: No, Chairperson.

MR MAFORA: The question of the use of handgrenades and the works was a plan which was hatched by the police and sold to them by Mamasela. What would your comment be on that?

BRIG DELPORT: No, Chairperson.

MR MAFORA: No further questions, thank you Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Mafora. Ms Lockhat, do you have any questions?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS LOCKHAT: Thank you, Chairperson.

Mr Delport, how long were you at the Springs branch, how long were you stationed there?

BRIG DELPORT: Chairperson, I was there from the beginning of 1970.

MS LOCKHAT: So you knew the area very well?

BRIG DELPORT: I knew the area reasonably well, Chairperson.

MS LOCKHAT: You said in your examination-in-chief that COSAS members really came alive more in February/March 1985, is that correct?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, Chairperson, that is correct.

MS LOCKHAT: Were they a small group of people?

BRIG DELPORT: Initially, as we gathered the names, there were just a few names that we obtained. That is correct.

MS LOCKHAT: So because there were so few of them it was easier to target them and in so doing possibly eliminate them, as it was afterwards planned.

BRIG DELPORT: No, Chairperson.

MS LOCKHAT: Tell me, how many black members were stationed at your police station?

CHAIRPERSON: You're talking now Security Branch?

MS LOCKHAT: That's correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

BRIG DELPORT: Are we referring specifically to this period in time?

MS LOCKHAT: That's correct, ja.

BRIG DELPORT: Probably - I would estimate about eight persons.

MS LOCKHAT: Was it possible for you to assist these eight persons by maybe taking out of their community and housing them somewhere else?

BRIG DELPORT: Chairperson, it wasn't only aimed against these members of the Security Branch, it was aimed against all policemen.

MS LOCKHAT: But in your instance those eight policemen could be housed somewhere else, isn't that so?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, and later they were re-established as a result of these attacks on their homes.

MS LOCKHAT: I just want to get back to the meeting, you said that Venter was also present at the meeting, is that correct?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, that is correct.

MS LOCKHAT: Now in Nkala's statement that he made to the Attorney-General, he was - de Kock and Venter were basically the link with them. Do you know of that?

MR VISSER: Sorry, I don't understand the question.

MS LOCKHAT: Let me just rephrase that. Nkala, that was one of the persons that went out into the community, that was approached from Vlakplaas to go and also - his instructions were to actually go and infiltrate MKs, that's in his statement. It's contained in bundle 2A, page 155. He makes a statement there and in that he says that his instructions were to basically come into Springs and infiltrate MKs with Joe Mamasela. And I just want to - that's why I asked you if Venter was with you at that meeting. So I just want to just draw the link, I just want to explain to you what I'm getting at. He goes on further that Venter and de Kock then told him that they must infiltrate these COSAS members, but they must infiltrate them in separate regions, in three separate - in that area, but three separate regions. So my question to you is, at that meeting was there a discussion as to how these people were going to be infiltrated, as to the regions where they're supposed to be infiltrated?

And then Nkala goes on further and he actually mentions a total of 20 people, where he was instructed to get about 20 people from this COSAS and from three different regions. Can you comment on that?

BRIG DELPORT: I don't know about that, Chairperson.

ADV GCABASHE: Ms Lockhat, we don't have that reference, can you just help us find it.

MS LOCKHAT: It's on page 155, bundle 3A - sorry, Chairperson, it's 3A. It's on - at paragraph 4 on page 155, he states:

And then he goes on further:

I'll turn the page to page 156, at paragraph - it's also 4, but 4.1 he says his instructions were the following:

And therefore I just wanted to clarify whether at that meeting, because Venter was there, whether any of these were discussed. Because Mr Delport was there as well, Chairperson, and he said - his answer was "No".

ADV GCABASHE: Can I just ask. Mr Delport, apart from that particular meeting, do you know anything at all about the recruitment of COSAS members?

BRIG DELPORT: No, Chairperson.

ADV GCABASHE: Thank you.

MS LOCKHAT: And then on the same page, page 156, the last paragraph, at paragraph 8 he goes on further, it's regarding the list. He says:

So my question to you is, is it possible that the very list that you had in your possession was the list that came from Nkala and Joe Mamasela, is it possible that that list actually originated there with them at this point in time?

BRIG DELPORT: No, I don't believe so.

MS LOCKHAT: Is it possible though?

BRIG DELPORT: Perhaps it is possible.

MS LOCKHAT: So it could be possible that they were instructed to come into the area to identify who the MK soldiers were in that area, draw up the list - because you had one name, that was Congress Mtweni, you had one name who could actually identify his other fellow comrades and the identification, with the help of Nkala and Joe Mamasela this is where this list actually originated from and thereby the plan actually started as to eliminate them. Is that possible?

BRIG DELPORT: No, Chairperson, we already had those names at our disposal and it was consistently reported.

MS LOCKHAT: I also just want to clarity one other aspect. At that meeting, was it intended to eliminate these people, was it the intention to kill them basically?

BRIG DELPORT: I would say yes, that this person who was prepared to kill somebody else with it, would kill himself in the process.

MS LOCKHAT: I'll tell you why I ask this question, I'll revert back to the issue of the meeting because Venter was also there. De Kock in his statement to the Attorney-General stated that he asked explicitly, he asked Venter whether these persons had to be eliminated and Venter then said to him "Yes, definitely they needed to be eliminated". I can also refer to that page, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Ms Lockhat, is this taking us any further if the witness wasn't at this meeting at all? What more can he speculate about?

MS LOCKHAT: I'm just putting it to him, Chairperson, because he said Venter was at the meeting. I just wanted to check whether any of these plans actually were made at that particular meeting and that Venter was actually informed of everything when he met de Kock and when he met Joe Mamasela. That is just where my questions are leading to, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: I didn't want to interfere with Ms Lockhat's questioning, but there seems to be a confusion of meetings here. I don't know whether the questions, except that Venter was at the meeting where Venter and de Kock gave instructions, because there seems to be a confusion here.

CHAIRPERSON: No, my understanding, and correct me if I'm wrong, Ms Lockhat, you're referring to the meeting, the initial meeting which was attended by Mr Delport, Gen van der Merwe, Brig Cronje and Venter.

MS LOCKHAT: That is correct, Chairperson, I just ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Where the plan was first mentioned and developed.

MS LOCKHAT: That is indeed correct, Chairperson, I just want ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: As long as you understand that de Kock and Nkala and Mamasela were not there.

MS LOCKHAT: No that is exactly my point and I just wanted to check because Venter was the link between all of them, Venter was the link between de Kock and then Nkala and everybody and he was also the link with the Generals and Brig Delport. And I just want to just canvass these issues with him.

MR VISSER: Now where's the evidence that Venter was the link with Delport or van der Merwe?

MS LOCKHAT: I'm not saying he was, I'm just canvassing this issue, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: No, but I think you can just ask the questions, we needn't get any argument now at this stage.

MS LOCKHAT: It's just on page 146 in bundle 3A, it's at paragraph 3.5. De Kock says:

And that just goes into the initial meeting where - Brig Delport did say that the intention was to eliminate them, and that is just - I just want to get he comment there.

CHAIRPERSON: Was it mentioned at that meeting that the people on the list be eliminated or killed?

BRIG DELPORT: Would you repeat that please.

CHAIRPERSON: Was it mentioned at that meeting, the first meeting, that the targets, the persons on the list be killed?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, I accept that it was said that these persons had to injure or kill themselves if they were prepared to kill other innocent people.

MS LOCKHAT: And just one other issue. You said that you got the list - the whole operation was you got the list, but the names of these people were not given to Joe Mamasela, he had to go and actually create his own list in a sense as to, just to clarify your list. Is that correct?

BRIG DELPORT: I did not negotiate with Joe Mamasela.

MS LOCKHAT: Thank you, Chairperson, I have no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Visser, do you have any re-examination?

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Yes just one perhaps, Chairperson, with your leave.

Mr Delport, I don't understand so well. Ms Lockhat put it to you whether there was a possibility that the list which you spoke, that would be the list which you sent to head office, was a list which may have originated after Mamasela and Nkala had infiltrated, and then you said it was possible.

BRIG DELPORT: No, it is not possible at all, it is not like that.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Adv Gcabashe, do you have any questions you'd like to put?

ADV GCABASHE: Mr Delport, if we go back to page 4 of your statement, Exhibit F, paragraph 9. Just to explain this to me, the second last sentence, that the activists were expecting weapons before they would get involved in an operation. That's the rough English translation of that, yes?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, that is correct, Chairperson.

ADV GCABASHE: Now tell me, you had been given information that was from the informers, what did the informers say, via Oberholzer, who were these activists expecting would provide them with these weapons? I'm assuming you had the bigger picture from the informer. Take us through that.

BRIG DELPORT: That is correct, Chairperson, they were waiting for the ANC to provide them with weaponry. He waited for the ANC, they were in anticipation.

ADV GCABASHE: But you know I visualise these fairly young people talking about, if we could get hold of this and get hold of that, this is what we would do. All of it just being general talk, it would have nothing to do with a definite idea to source from X, weapons a, b, c, d. This is why I want you to help me understand what the informer said to you. Did the informer say there's this general talk amongst the activists, or did the informer say they are actually waiting for X to provide them with these things?

BRIG DELPORT: That is precisely the way it was, they were waiting to be provided with weapons.

ADV GCABASHE: But not from a definite source, the were just hoping somebody would pop by and give them - I don't understand this, just help me through this.

BRIG DELPORT: No, the information which was available indicated that these persons were in anticipation of weapons. As I stated before, they saw what the results were of using petrol bombs and other such items and that it wasn't very successful, and on the basis of that they - the information which was submitted to us indicated that these people were waiting for weapons, that they were looking for weapons from the ANC.

ADV GCABASHE: Okay. Let's take it step by step. In looking for these weapons, did the informer say to Oberholzer, therefore they have contacted so and so to try and source weapons, they have also contacted X in Botswana or Swaziland or Lesotho? Did you get that type of information?

BRIG DELPORT: No, Chairperson, except that they were looking for weapons. Nothing wpecific or pertinent was mentioned about names from people in other countries.

ADV GCABASHE: So this person really just put two and two together, that these young people are talking about attacking the policemen or councillors and this person assume that they were then going to hope, or expecting to get weapons just generally, from the ANC? There's no hard evidence of any of this?

BRIG DELPORT: No, there had been incidents within the Republic at that stage where they had found weapons from other members of the ANC, so these people were also talking in the same direction, that they were waiting for weapons which they could use in actions against the police.

MR MALAN: If I may peruse this question, because I asked certain questions of Gen van der Merwe on this score.

I understood, Mr Delport, that the weapons were under way and that was the urgency. When Gen van der Merwe gave his evidence. Now I don't want to quote him, but that is the impression that I have received here and from you I have the impression that there were people who said, we want weapons and if somebody could just provide us with weapons, we could use these weapons.

BRIG DELPORT: No, Chairperson, I said that they were awaiting these weapons.

MR MALAN: No, let us not play around with the word "wait", let us achieve clarity about what the information was. Were these persons who were saying, if we could get hold of weapons, specifically handgrenades and so forth, we could do the things that petrol bombs cannot do, or were these persons who were waiting specifically for a consignment which was under way to them?

BRIG DELPORT: I would say it was person who were waiting for a consignment, that is the inference that I drew.

MR MALAN: So if they were waiting for a consignment you would also have the information of the source from where it was coming?

BRIG DELPORT: From the ANC yes, but not necessarily from precisely who in the ANC.

MR MALAN: Thank you, Leah.

ADV GCABASHE: You will accept a lot of talk amongst young people then was about going out of the country to join the struggle, wherever, yes?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, from 1976 onwards it was so.

ADV GCABASHE: Did your informer give you that information as well, that these particular people are also very keen on leaving the country to go and train and come back and be active?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, I believe that such information was available, but I cannot say it with certainty.

ADV GCABASHE: I'm really trying to relate it to this specific group of young people, who couldn't be too different to any other group of young people.

BRIG DELPORT: I don't know Chairperson, whether there were some of them who had already stated that they were going to leave the country. It is possible.

ADV GCABASHE: Let's talk about the meeting that you had with Gen van der Merwe and the other persons. You say there were no options, what options did you consider? I'll tell you why I ask this. If you were to hand me that as happened, that grenade, I maim myself with it, you haven't - you're not rid of me, I will come back and do whatever I had been doing anyway. What was the thinking, what were the plans, how were you going to stop me from coming back again and again and again?

BRIG DELPORT: Well there was no other manner in which to prevent them from conducting the action that they wanted to carry out. And to make use of methods of arrest would not have helped.

ADV GCABASHE: But that can't be right because for instance, Lukele was eventually arrested and imprisoned, but that's only because he wasn't killed. Why could you not work on a plan that would lead to an arrest such as happened with Lukele, but not lead to the elimination of people? I'm just trying to understand the mind-set in what you were discussing at that meeting.

BRIG DELPORT: Chairperson, I am not at all aware that Lukele was arrested and charged and spent time in jail.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, it just comes to mind, why couldn't it have been planned in such a way to say well let's take the gunpowder out of the handgrenades, let's give them handgrenades that just won't work, duds, and then we'll get them all together, we will arm them with these handgrenades, they'll go to their houses and we'll jump out of the bushes and arrest them there and charge them with being in possession of explosives and handgrenades and that sort of thing? I think this is what Adv Gcabashe is getting at. Couldn't there have been a plan that led to their arrest and deter them that way?

BRIG DELPORT: Personally I did not know what the action on that particular night involved. I knew that it was going to take place in different areas and conducted by different people.

ADV GCABASHE: No, but that's not correct Mr Delport, because you knew they would be eliminated, that was the essential decision that was being discussed at that meeting, elimination. Now my difficulty is with the elimination. From what I understand of the evidence, policemen's houses had been burnt, they had been harassed, they had been intimidated, I haven't heard of killing of policemen in that period leading up to this incident. Why do you then kill, why don't you meet - if you are going to go for an eye for an eye, why don't you meet that threat with a similar threat? Yours seems to have gone a little way beyond meeting that particular threat that presented itself. And I won't understand it unless you are able to communicate the situation that had you agree with van der Merwe to the elimination of these people.

BRIG DELPORT: Chairperson, there was no other way to prevent that, they were determined in their intentions to attack the homes of black policemen and black council members and they could have killed them in that.

ADV GCABASHE: Then we come to the killing, because the decision was to eliminate. Now how would the rest of the community know that it was the ANC that supplied defective handgrenades? Who was going to communicate this to the rest of the community?

BRIG DELPORT: The inference would have been drawn that these persons had obtained their weaponry from the ANC.

ADV GCABASHE: Did you discuss this at that meeting, this type of thing, you know the repercussions, what - I mean you were all seasoned police officers, did you discuss this type of thing?

BRIG DELPORT: No, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, I think there's a difficulty with the mikes, I'm not getting the translation coming through.

ADV GCABASHE: Oh, I'm talking too fast.

CHAIRPERSON: No, I think it's the actual mikes, there's something - I'm not getting the translation coming through. I heard the translator speaking there, but it wasn't coming through the earphones and there also doesn't seem to be much in the way of amplification now when I speak into the mike.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Yes, sorry.

ADV GCABASHE: Mr Delport, I was asking about, as seasoned police officers why it is that you didn't look at all these possibilities?

BRIG DELPORT: Chairperson, it must have been investigated at a later stage, but I cannot say that before the time it was specifically discussed. However, I believe that we accepted it that these weapons, or at least that the community would accept that these weapons were provided by the ANC.

ADV GCABASHE: You are essentially saying you don't recall the detail of the discussion, you are not just reconstructing and assuming that you inferred then, you just don't recall why you may or may not have discussed it. What is the position?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, I accept that we would have discussed it, but I wouldn't be able to recall in finer detail.

ADV GCABASHE: Thank you. Thank you, Mr Delport.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Malan, do you have any questions?

MR MALAN: Mr Delport, on this very same point, you know if one looks at the statements which have already been made about the matter and also some of the applications which will be served before us during the course of this week, it would appear that another objective was understood, namely to transmit a greater message to the broader community that we, the Security Branch and the Security Police are everywhere, we can reach you, we can present ourselves as ANC and we can see to it that you are obliterated. In other words, if the message wasn't supposed to go to these specific persons or if the objective was not to prevent them from launching the attacks, but instead to send out a message that if anybody else had similar plans they should think about it twice. It would definitely concur with the stories of the other applicants or at least their versions, which state that you had to recruit people, recruit activists. Would you agree with that?

BRIG DELPORT: What I've said here, Chairperson, is that this must have served as a deterrent.

MR MALAN: No, not for the persons who were going to throw the handgrenades, because they would be dead. In other words, for other persons.

BRIG DELPORT: Correct, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: And the probability - and it ran that way as well, we know that, is not that they suspected the ANC of providing poor ammunition, but that they immediately suspected the Security Police.

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, there were all sorts of allegations that were made after the fact, that is entirely correct.

MR MALAN: Yes, immediately.

BRIG DELPORT: Which were also faulty.

MR MALAN: With the exception of the implication of the Security Police, which was not incorrect.

BRIG DELPORT: Yes.

MR MALAN: And that took place immediately. The ANC was never accused, not according to my knowledge from that which I have read, which has at least been presented to us.

BRIG DELPORT: That is correct.

MR MALAN: In other words, if it was supposed to be a deterrent, it had to be a message which was sent to the broader community of activists.

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, that is correct.

MR MALAN: And then it would concur, then it wouldn't have been inappropriate to recruit and train some of the activists if that was the plan, because then it wouldn't have been as effective.

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, that is correct.

MR MALAN: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Delport, you said that these police houses had been protected with fire extinguishers and putting this mesh over the windows to stop handgrenades being thrown into them. This mesh is sort of like the mesh you get on a braaivleis grid, that ...(indistinct)

BRIG DELPORT: One hundred percent the same, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: If you threw a handgrenade at that mesh, wouldn't it just bounce off and blow off in the garden?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, that would have contributed to it that it would have helped.

CHAIRPERSON: So what was the big difference then between a petrol bomb and a handgrenade, insofar as attacking those particular houses are concerned? Because you've got the situation where you've got young untrained people, all they're going to do is lob the handgrenade, it's going to bounce off the mesh or the wall. They're not going to get into the house like a trained MK soldier might have done, got into the house and lobbed it through the front door sort of thing, they're not doing that, they're untrained. Why was the handgrenade perceived as such a huge difference in attacking police houses?

BRIG DELPORT: The East Rand consisted out of quite a few residential areas and it was completely impossible to secure everybody's house.

ADV GCABASHE: Can I just ask you about this Sithole who has been mentioned in the Court record, did you know him?

BRIG DELPORT: No, Chairperson.

ADV GCABASHE: He wasn't part of the Security Branch?

BRIG DELPORT: No, Chairperson.

ADV GCABASHE: And you had never heard of him in particular, having difficulties within the community? Him in particular.

BRIG DELPORT: No, Chairperson.

ADV GCABASHE: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: If the activists were waiting for a consignment of arms, then the probabilities are that they had already made contact with some person about getting those arms.

BRIG DELPORT: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: They now get infiltrated and they get supplied arms by the police, surely immediately there's a problem with those arms that they have received they would go - the person who had contacted them would immediately realise that there's been an interception by the police or an interference by the police in the operation because they would know that they didn't supply the arms. So what I'm trying to get at is, the probabilities must have been apparent from before it happened, that seeing that they were waiting for a consignment of arms, if they were given arms by the police it would soon be realised that the arms didn't come from the ANC. So I can't see how that could have led to a reduction in violence following the incident because the people now didn't trust ANC arms.

BRIG DELPORT: Chairperson, I believe that that weaponry was given to these activists probably on the day of the action.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but then the person who they had contacted for the arms would have come and said, we didn't give those arms to them, who did they get them from, no-one know, it must have come from the police.

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, there must have been a risk if they specifically had contact with somebody else.

CHAIRPERSON: And then from the answers you gave to Mr Malan, it would seem that it was almost immediately thereafter realised that the arms didn't come from the ANC because there were no allegations made against the ANC by members of the community.

BRIG DELPORT: I cannot say with certainty whether there was any allegation against the ANC at that stage, but it is so.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, are there any questions arising from questions that ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: May I just follow up on this last question again.

I just heard your answer in Afrikaans and that is how you responded. Upon the question of the Chairperson you said that there was a risk that they had had contact with somebody else.

BRIG DELPORT: No, what I was trying to say is that there was a certain risk. As I understood the Chairperson, he wanted to know about when they would be provided with the weaponry and if somebody else said, be careful, that belongs to the police. So if they were in contact with somebody, then that possibility existed. That is what I'm trying to say.

MR MALAN: No, Mr Delport, it was quite a course to ask of you why they would have thought that these were ANC weapons, because other persons, if they had been approached, somebody else would have been able to say, wait we did not provide those weapons. And the Chairperson spoke to you regarding an evaluation of after the event. And then when he asked you that, you said yes, there must have been a risk, that they already had contact with somebody else who specifically would bring them the weapons.

BRIG DELPORT: Yes.

MS LOCKHAT: So if that risk existed, then such information wasn't available, otherwise it wouldn't have been a risk, it would have been a certainty.

BRIG DELPORT: No, I cannot say that specifically.

MR MALAN: You see, if I have to analyse your answer in terms of all the other alternatives which are available to us on paper and you refer to the risk that they contact with somebody else, then the probability emerges for me - and I want your commentary on this, that these persons as Adv Gcabashe put it, generally spoke about, if only we had weapons and handgrenades. Then that becomes the probability.

BRIG DELPORT: No, Chairperson, the information was that they were waiting for this from the ANC.

MR MALAN: What in heavens name does it mean when you say that they were waiting for it?

BRIG DELPORT: That they were waiting for the weapons.

MR MALAN: That they would obtain from where?

BRIG DELPORT: From the ANC, but not with regard to specific particulars, those were not available to us.

MR MALAN: So you had a highly reliable source which you did not doubt in the correctness of his information.

BRIG DELPORT: Yes.

MS LOCKHAT: Could he tell you that they were waiting for weapons specifically from the ANC abroad or in another branch or that they had contact with another person?

BRIG DELPORT: No, I don't think that they said specifically that there was someone who was going to supply these weapons to them pertinently.

MR MALAN: They were simply waiting?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, they were looking for weapons, definitely.

MR MALAN: Yes, that is correct, they were looking for weapons, but that is something different than waiting for delivery of weapons, Mr Delport. And please give me some clarity regarding this. What was the framework of the source and his message to you, via Mr Oberholzer, that they were waiting for weapons, that they wanted to obtain weapons, or that a delivery was going to be made to them?

BRIG DELPORT: Definitely that a delivery was going to be made to them.

MR MALAN: Was there any date for this delivery?

BRIG DELPORT: No, Chairperson. In the near future.

MR MALAN: Thank you, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, just one question. This list that you got, you said it was supplemented from time to time and you sent it through to head office, now I presume that your office would have kept copies of the names? After all they were activists in your area, the fact that you sent it off to head office doesn't mean you don't keep your own. Would there still be a copy of that list around?

BRIG DELPORT: No, Chairperson, we made enquiries, there is no such list in existence.

ADV GCABASHE: Sorry, my follow-up was going to be on what Mr Malan had questioned you about, the same issue that bothered me. So they were waiting for a delivery you say?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, Chairperson.

ADV GCABASHE: Who were these weapons going to be delivered to?

BRIG DELPORT: It would have been delivered to this group.

ADV GCABASHE: Who in the group? You cannot deliver a consignment of weapons to a group of 15 to 20 young people, who in the group? Didn't your informer tell you this?

BRIG DELPORT: No, I cannot say that there had to be a specific person, it may have been delivered to a group.

ADV GCABASHE: A group doesn't live together. You see if a consignment comes it will come to my house, it will come usually to a person who has some kind of leadership role. The informer didn't give you any information at all about those types of issues?

BRIG DELPORT: What I can recall, Chairperson, is that the group as such were waiting for the delivery.

ADV GCABASHE: You see, part of the ...(intervention)

BRIG DELPORT: There wasn't a specific person who was going to be in command of this consignment.

ADV GCABASHE: But as I understand it the group of 20 who were on the list were from various parts of the East Rand, not all of them were from Duduza, some were from Duduza, others from kwaThema, is that correct or have I got that wrong?

BRIG DELPORT: That is correct, Chairperson.

ADV GCABASHE: This is where my difficulty is. You then deliver to a group who did not even live in one street, in the same street in Duduza.

BRIG DELPORT: But this group had liaison on a daily basis with one another, they were part of the total onslaught.

ADV GCABASHE: Yes, and they went to school at different schools at that, but came together for meetings.

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, I would doubt whether there was any school attendance during that period in time, the way that schools operated. These persons may have met at a school, but at that stage there was a total stay-away action, nobody attended school.

ADV GCABASHE: Anyway, just to summarise this. So you don't know who in the ANC or which part of the ANC was going to send the weapons and you don't know who specifically of the group was going to be receiving the weapons?

BRIG DELPORT: That is entirely correct.

ADV GCABASHE: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Are there any questions arising from the questions that have been put by Members of the Panel?

FURTHER EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Yes, one please Mr Chairman. In 1985, according to your recollection were there already handgrenade attacks launched by members or supporters of the ANC on anyone?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, they had been committed.

MR VISSER: Were weapons such as handgrenades in circuit in the country, were they available to the people?

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, that is entirely correct.

MR VISSER: Did you in your area find so-called DLBs? That you can recall. DLBs being weapons stockpiling locations or store places.

BRIG DELPORT: Yes, there were weapons stockpiling locations, but I cannot recall whether they were specifically in our area. However, I do know of the existence of such places.

MR VISSER: But weapons of war were available in 1985

BRIG DELPORT: Yes.

MR VISSER: In other words, if you had received information that people were waiting for weaponry, would you have put this off as a pipe dream, something which would never happen? What was the situation?

BRIG DELPORT: No, Chairperson, I took it very seriously and accepted that they would obtain those weapons.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Any further questions arising? Thank you, Mr Delport, that then concludes your evidence, you may stand down.

BRIG DELPORT: Thank you, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, according to our list, Mr Hattingh would not proceed, but we spoke about this during lunchtime and it makes sense, Mr Chairman, that I complete my three witnesses to come. I was hoping that we will be able to finish them today. There's no special reason in the order of the witnesses, it won't make any difference, Chairperson. So I would beg leave to call Mr Prins.

Mr Chairman, we have similarly prepared a statement on behalf of Mr Prins, for your assistance. That would be G I think it is now.

CHAIRPERSON: It will be G, no ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: I am told F.

CHAIRPERSON: The last one was F.

CHAIRPERSON: E was Brig Schoon, F was Brig Delport. So this is G.

MR VISSER: G.

MR MALAN: Mr Prins, are you Afrikaans speaking?

MR PRINS: Yes.

MR MALAN: Your full names are Lawrence Charles Phillip Prins.

LAWRENCE CHARLES PHILLIP PRINS: (sworn states)

MR MALAN: Thank you, you may be seated.

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Prins, you are also an applicant for amnesty regarding the current incident. You have completed an application for amnesty. This can be found on page 115 to page 125. In paragraph 7(a) and (b) on page 115 of bundle 1, where you were asked to respond whether you were an officer bearer or official of any political organisation, institution or liberation movement and you answered "Not Applicable" and when you were asked what your office was you also answered "Not Applicable". Do you understand now that what was meant by that is whether you were a member or a supporter of a political party? And is it your recollection that you were indeed a supporter of the National Party?

MR PRINS: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, in that respect we have explained this before, that there was some measure of confusion about this and we would ask for you to accept that 7(a) should read "National Party" and (b) should read "Supporter".

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, then in fact that amendment, unless there are any objections to it, page 115 of volume 1, paragraph 7(a), deletion of "N/A" and substituted with "National Party" and similar with (b) just to indicate Mr Prins is a supporter.

MR VISSER: As it please you, Mr Chairman.

You then confirm the content of your amnesty application and you have also studied Exhibit A, is that correct?

MR PRINS: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Do you also confirm that the content of Exhibit A concurs with your insights?

MR PRINS: Yes.

MR VISSER: And that it is correct according to you?

MR PRINS: Yes, correct.

MR VISSER: And you also request that Exhibit A and the evidence which is referred to therein be incorporated with your evidence.

MR PRINS: Correct.

MR VISSER: You have listened to the evidence given by Gen van der Merwe as well as Brig Delport, regarding the general background of the political violence in the country at that stage and more specifically in the East Rand, is that correct?

MR PRINS: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Do you concur in essence with what they say?

MR PRINS: Yes.

MR VISSER: And in Exhibit G from paragraph 4 to 11 you have verbally stated the insights of Brig Delport.

MR PRINS: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: On page 4, paragraph 12, would you begin and inform the Committee regarding your knowledge and participation in this incident.

MR PRINS: Chairperson, from paragraph 12 onwards:

MR VISSER: Would you pause there please. Would you later determine why you were supposed to bring your wife along?

MR PRINS: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And in principle, what was the reason for bringing your wife with?

MR PRINS: A so-called hit-list existed upon which my name appeared and Col Venter was concerned that my house would be attacked when I was not at home and then requested that I bring my wife with.

MR VISSER: Very well.

CHAIRPERSON: What was your position at that stage, what rank of office did you hold, what work did you do?

MR PRINS: I was a Warrant Officer.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Visser.

MR VISSER: No, Mr Chairperson, that is a relevant question.

And what were you? With the exception of a Warrant Officer, what were your duties?

MR PRINS: Chairperson, my primary task at the Security Branch at that stage was the management of information regarding labour relations, more specifically and secondly, I was also a demolitions expert.

MR VISSER: Very well. Would you proceed with paragraph 13.

MR PRINS:

MR VISSER: Now, may I just interrupt you there once more. Was your wife involved in this meeting which you referred to?

MR PRINS: No, Chairperson, my office was on another floor than the Divisional Commander's office and I first took her to my office and then I went to the Divisional Officer's alone.

MR VISSER: Very well. And you were shown a so-called hit-list.

MR PRINS: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Would you proceed with paragraph 13. Where did this list come from.

MR PRINS:

...(intervention)

MR MALAN: Before you continue, were the names of other white members also on that list?

MR PRINS: Chairperson, there was one other name which did not have any particulars regarding which there was a reasonable dispute. They couldn't identify the name. It appeared to be the name of a white member because there was a white member at our branch with that name, but regarding the particulars which would have indicated identification, my name was the only one.

MR MALAN: And what was the name of the other person, can you recall it?

MR PRINS: Hilton, simply the name Hilton.

MR MALAN: Was that the christian name or surname of the person?

MR PRINS: It was his surname.

MR MALAN: And how was he identified, or how were you identified?

MR PRINS: My surname and my address were there.

MR MALAN: And you say in this paragraph that you read to us, "apparently obtained from COSAS".

MR PRINS: Yes, that is correct. If I recall correctly, it was Col Roelf Venter, the same person who had contacted me, who showed me the list and who told me that this came from COSAS members in the vicinity.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Prins. Can you think of any reason why your name got on the list and not other colleagues of yours in the Security Branch in Springs?

MR PRINS: There were other members of the Security ...(end of side A of tape).

CHAIRPERSON: ... white members name on the list from that branch?

MR PRINS: Chairperson, no, I could speculate about it, but I would like to know, I myself would like to know.

CHAIRPERSON: And where was your residence at that time?

MR PRINS: In Springs.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Please continue, paragraph 14.

MR PRINS:

MR VISSER: Who sent you to fetch the limpet mine?

MR PRINS: It was Brig Cronje.

MR VISSER: Brig Cronje, very well.

MR PRINS:

MR VISSER: Up to this stage, were you informed at all in any way whatsoever what the plan was which had been formulated and which would be put into operation?

MR PRINS: No.

MR VISSER: Please continue.

MR PRINS:

...(intervention)

MR VISSER: Please read a little bit slower, it has to be interpreted.

MR PRINS: I beg your pardon, Chairperson.

MR PRINS:

MR VISSER: This Sgt Gert Kruger, as far as your knowledge goes, did he know about the prior planning in this regard?

MR PRINS: No, he didn't know about it, definitely.

MR VISSER: And you also didn't tell him about it?

MR PRINS: I also didn't tell him about it. On the contrary, shortly afterwards - he was the scene for approximately 10 minutes, I sent him home with the permission of Brig Delport, who I discussed it with first and told him that we needed demolitions persons who would be rested the following day, and that would be the reason to send him home.

MR VISSER: Very well, continue.

MR PRINS:

MR VISSER: Where was that?

MR PRINS: In kwaThema.

MR VISSER: What were the consequences of these explosions, if any?

I see that certain members of the audience do not like the idea that you could live on in peace, but please continue.

MR MALAN: Mr Visser, I don't think that that comment was necessary. I don't think that that is what anybody read into it, but continue nonetheless.

MR VISSER: What were the consequences of the explosion?

MR PRINS: The consequences of the explosions were that a number of people were killed and that a number of people had been seriously injured.

MR VISSER: And on the general level of violence and political violence in the area?

MR PRINS: Chairperson, I can say that political violence showed a serious decrease. I received information that for example, from the 17th of February that year to the 20th of June, only in the black residential area of Duduza, at least - and I say at least because this comes only from one statement, at least 31 policemen's houses had been burnt down and after that there were no such incidents, at least not in those numbers.

MR VISSER: And you refer now to what we have referred the Honourable Committee to previously, that is an extract of the evidence given before Judge Stafford in the matter of the STATE VS JOSEPH TITUS MAZIBUKO AND SIX OTHERS, of which you read the record and counted these cases.

MR PRINS: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Very well, continue.

MR PRINS:

MR VISSER: Statements have been put to Brig Delport, that the community immediately knew that these weapons originated from the police and that they would never have thought that they originated from the ANC. What do you have to say about that?

MR PRINS: No, I don't agree with that. In the first place, the weaponry which was used consisted of weapons which came from the East, in other words the type of weaponry which at that stage was used by the military wing of the ANC. In the media it was published and we expected it to be published in the media. So whenever explosions or incidents took place during which weaponry was used of eastern block origin, an immediate connotation would be attached to the ANC.

MR VISSER: And as a result of your involvement in your visitation of the scenes, did you make any statements?

MR PRINS: Yes, that is correct, I made a statement.

MR VISSER: And did you provide all the facts as known to you in that statement?

MR PRINS: No, I did not, I bent the truth.

MR VISSER: Was it an affidavit which you made?

MR PRINS: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And then you would have committed perjury and defeated the ends of justice?

MR PRINS: Correct.

MR VISSER: Would you continue with the final paragraph, 27.

MR PRINS:

MR VISSER: Later, after the incident, you also became aware when you were busy compiling your amnesty applications, that the Minister of Police, the deceased Minister le Grange, indeed gave the order. At that stage you were not aware of this, nobody informed you about it at that stage?

MR PRINS: No.

MR VISSER: You then also request the Committee to grant you amnesty. Now these acts and omissions that you have referred to, Mr Prins, are based upon the fact that shortly before the events you realised what the planning and the operation was about.

MR PRINS: Correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And for the reasons that you have already motivated, you associated yourself with that action?

MR PRINS: Correct.

MR VISSER: And that is what you are requesting amnesty for?

MR PRINS: Correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, at page 2.

Consequently you request amnesty for the murder of eight COSAS members mentioned in paragraph (b), as well as attempted murder or a lesser judgment with regard to the seven COSAS members who were injured, perjury, as well as defeating the ends of justice or any other crime such as conspiracy, accessory before and after the deed and so forth.

MR PRINS: Yes, that is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: The question of the illegal possession of explosive devices, you went to fetch the explosive device in Pretoria and so forth, and that sometimes presents a problem in amnesty applications. But Mr Chairman, I will address you about that in argument, with reference to what was granted in the case of Brig Cronje and Venter.

In either event, as far as it is required you request amnesty for any illegality in your possession of explosive devices specifically related to this incident, is that correct?

MR PRINS: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Although you were a licensed explosives expert and that you were entitled to possess explosives under certain circumstances.

MR PRINS: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Visser. Mr Hattingh, do you have any questions you'd like to ask?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Mr Prins, could I just determine beforehand whether you are the correct person to which I should put the questions which I want to put. ...(transcriber's interpretation)

For how long were you attached to the Security Police at that stage?

MR PRINS: I was transferred to the Security Branch in 1972.

MR HATTINGH: So you were there for quite some time?

MR PRINS: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: At the time of this incident were you aware of how the communities in the traditionally black residential areas had ordered themselves in the township with regard to self-defence and so forth?

MR PRINS: Yes, I could say yes, but I would like you to be more specific.

MR HATTINGH: Let me be more specific. Are you aware that they had established block committees and street committees?

MR PRINS: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And they held meetings regularly?

MR PRINS: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: To discuss the problems that the community experienced?

MR PRINS: That's correct.

MR HATTINGH: And that regularly they liaised with each other in the broader community?

MR PRINS: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And are you aware that there was liaison with members of the ANC who were abroad, or with trained MK members who were in the vicinity?

MR PRINS: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Are you also aware that they established Self Defence Units?

MR PRINS: That's correct, Chairperson, it was referred to as the SDU ...(intervention)

ADV GCABASHE: You're not saying that the SDUs were established in 1985? I thought these were general questions, have I missed something here?

MR PRINS: Chairperson no, I only said that the Self Protection Units were generally known as, amongst others, the SDUs.

ADV GCABASHE: But not in 1985, that's all I want cleared up.

MR PRINS: Not specifically in 1985.

ADV GCABASHE: Ja, there weren't any, there weren't any in 1985. From the evidence we have heard as an Amnesty Committee. Unless you have better evidence of course.

MR PRINS: Chairperson, I cannot attach a specific date to the establishment thereof, but the function of those block committees and street committees were based on the same principle.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Mr Hatting.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

May I refer you to bundle 2A, page 296. It is a statement of a Mr Joseph Titus Mazibuko and more specifically on page - the statement starts and 272, and more in particular on - excuse, I don't think it is his statement, it is the statement of Mr Joseph Mashiane which starts on page 295.

MR MALAN: Of which bundle are you speaking? Did you say 2A?

MR HATTINGH: ...(indistinct)

INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone is not on.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr Hattingh, if you could push your speaker on.

MR HATTINGH: I'm sorry, Mr Chairman.

At the bottom of page 295, Mr Mashiane is asked to put his version and he said:

It's an indication whether they were officially known as SDUs or not, but in the community there had already been groups who organised themselves to protect themselves from violence, whether it be taxi violence or any other violence.

MR PRINS: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Excuse me, Mr Hattingh, the date here is 1990.

MR HATTINGH: It's my mistake, excuse me Chairperson. I thought that it was in regard to this incident. I did not have regard for the date.

But can I just ask you in general, were such actions formed and units formed, that they could protect themselves?

MR PRINS: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And did you have knowledge about the information which the Security Police had about arms which were expected or that was needed by members of the community?

MR PRINS: Chairperson, it is difficult to specifically say that I had information available about arms which they were waiting for, but the total circumstances as it had reigned in those years was, namely I was personally involved with the "lig" of DLBs, dead letter boxes, where at a safe place arms which had come in from abroad into the RSA, which was buried and would later be applied in explosions within the country. So yes, there was that tendency.

MR HATTINGH: Can I also refer you to volume 2A, page 275. Mr Chairman, I hope that I'm not going to make the same mistake, I don't seem to find a date that this person is speaking about here, but my overall impression is - yes, June 1985. Yes, it's June 1985, Mr Chairman. So this was the relevant period.

On page 275 at the top, maybe we should start at the bottom of 274 and I start there. He speaks - about eight lines from the bottom in the middle of the line:

Then I go a bit lower down, the last paragraph:

Maybe I should pause there. At the top it seems that this persons says that they were not surprised that they were approached by these persons and the offer was made to them to supply them with handgrenades.

MR PRINS: No, it does not sound like that, it sounds as if it was generally acceptable that the ANC would supply them with weapons.

MR HATTINGH: And if one would go to page 285 ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: Excuse me, Mr Hattingh, I would just like to get certainty that I understand you correctly. You say that they easily accepted, you don't say that they referred to other ANCs, because from this statement it seems that he referred to Mike and James.

MR HATTINGH: The point that I'm trying to make, Chairperson, is that they were not surprised to be approached with an offer for weapons because they expected help from the ANC.

MR MALAN: They would have read from the ANC what the ANC's policy was.

MR HATTINGH: On page 275 it is even more clear, Chairperson. This time it is still Joseph Mazibuko - oh, excuse me, 285. I wish to refer to 285. This time it is Mr Vally Mazibuko and on page 285 he says at the top:

...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Hattingh, it's the same Mr Mazibuko, J T.

MR HATTINGH: It would seem so, Mr Chairman, but his name is given somewhere as Vally as well. It's a bit confusing, but the name is not important Mr Chairman, it's the contents that I would like to point out.

I read for you again, Mr Prins:

...(intervention))

CHAIRPERSON: Probably "where it hurts most".

MR HATTINGH: Probably "where it hurts most" yes.

It makes it very clear that these people were awaiting the ANC to approach them with arms, and that is why they did not ask any questions. Is that correct?

MR PRINS: That seems to be the case, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Mr Prins - excuse me, Mr Hattingh, if I put it to you that another clear inference, and I put clear in quotation marks, in the light of the statement at the conference in '85, that it was not strange, would you agree?

MR PRINS: Chairperson, unfortunately I don't know to which reference you refer.

MR MALAN: I shall put it to you differently, the reference to the ANC here, who says that they would train people inside the country. If these people thought that they were approached by Mike and James as a flow-out of this new policy that people would be trained within the country, would that not be a clear interpretation of the statement of Mr Mazibuko?

MR PRINS: Chairperson, with all respect, I don't understand the difference between the two. As I understood it, the ANC here established a principle that people would be trained within the country and these people saw this infiltration as part of the whole ANC strategy.

MR MALAN: That's correct, that is what I put to you.

MR PRINS: Yes.

MR MALAN: Thank you very much.

MR HATTINGH: Mr Chairman, my attention was drawn to the fact that this is indeed the version of Mr Vally Mazibuko and not Mr J T Mazibuko. On page 281, Mr J T Mazibuko concludes his evidence and he then said:

And Ms Seroke:

And then he's then sworn in, Mr Chairman.

Mr Prins, you are also aware that the areas, the traditionally black residential areas where the violence was, was an area of no-go for white police officers, specifically at night, is that correct?

MR PRINS: I would not say at night, I would say during the day as well. I would say that at night it was probably easier because you would not be seen, so the first part yes, but the second part no.

MR HATTINGH: But the suggestion was made that grenades would have been given to them, of which the explosives had been removed and then they could have set up ambushes for them where they could have been arrested. Would it be possible to send enough police officers into the area so that they could guard all the police officers' residences to combat all these attacks?

MR PRINS: Chairperson, that was indeed the problem. If one wanted to protect a policeman's house by means of guards, then one would have placed one guard there to sign his death warrant, they would have killed him as well. You would have had to place a Force large enough at a house to combat an attack from a large group of people. So it was actually a practical impossibility.

MR HATTINGH: And these houses were close to each other?

MR PRINS: Yes, in the traditional black residential areas the houses are very close to each other.

MR HATTINGH: Would it be possible to hide a group of people there without anybody being aware of it?

MR PRINS: No, not easily.

MR HATTINGH: And if they were inside the house, they had to come outside the house to arrest the perpetrators and by that time they would have got away.

MR PRINS: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And are you also aware that during these times of political unrest in the traditional black residential areas a communications system was set up amongst all the residents, so that when a police vehicle enters the area the message would be spread throughout the whole community that the police had come into the area?

MR PRINS: Yes, this was part of these protection units.

MR HATTINGH: Would you bear with me a moment please, Mr Chairman. Thank you, Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.

ADV GCABASHE: Just a quick point of clarity. Are we talking about traditional black areas here, are we talking about townships? I don't want to get confused. We're talking about the townships in the East Rand?

MR PRINS: We speak of the black residential areas as it was at that time. It's the same thing, the townships and the traditional black residential areas.

CHAIRPERSON: The traditional residential areas are - I come from Transkei and they're out in the countryside and there's lots of open veld and huts, that's what I consider to be a traditional residential area.

MR PRINS: Excuse me, Chairperson, but here in our urban areas we refer to our locations, the old black locations, as traditional black residential areas because the circumstances probably differ.

CHAIRPERSON: I see that it's now 1 o'clock, we'll take the lunch adjournment.

LAWRENCE CHARLES PHILLIP PRINS: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Booyens, any questions?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr Prins, ...(intervention)

INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone is not on.

MR BOOYENS: Mr Prins, will you please look at bundle 2A, page 277. I think that this is still Mr J T Mazibuko who is giving evidence. I would like to read you something upon a question and I will explain to you while I'm going to ask you this question. You are an experienced security man from the East Rand.

MR PRINS: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: And certain statements are made by people who were on the opposition side of the Security Police. You see there is a paragraph which begins with Mrs Seroke, and I'm more interested in the second paragraph:

Do you see that?

MR PRINS: Yes, I do.

MR BOOYENS: And then we have an answer:

Could you possibly inform the Committee what that statement means "a product of 1984"? What is the significance of 1984, specifically in this regard, what took place?

MR PRINS: Chairperson, I will not say specifically that I would interpret the frame of mind of the person speaking, but in my mind 1984 stood out like 1976, it was a second phase during which nationwide political unrest escalated and was at the order of the day.

MR BOOYENS: I see. So the statement in other words, as a so-called "product of 1984" referred to violence?

MR PRINS: Yes, according to my interpretation.

MR BOOYENS: And apparently, according to the interpretation of the witness, because I see that just below that J T Mazibuko says:

I don't know what that was about, I'm sure he must have switched to another language. So what he says here, does this fit into the picture that you had of the youth at that stage?

MR PRINS: Yes, completely.

MR BOOYENS: In other applications in which I was involved, I viewed documents in which it was the declared policy to render black residential areas ungovernable. Would you say that some of the residential areas in the East Rand were already at that stage, in 1985, ungovernable?

MR PRINS: Yes, Chairperson, I would just support this by referring to the same document from which I extracted information earlier, in June or May. From 1985, in one month, six council members of Duduza resigned as a result of the violence which ruled there and that would by nature of the situation, just that one aspect would render that area ungovernable.

MR BOOYENS: And if the statement is further put that the police could not move around freely any longer, your - let us speak of your regular uniform policeman in his yellow bakkie, who has to investigate a burglary. In such an ungovernable area he would not be able to move around, it would be dangerous for him, is that correct?

MR PRINS: Yes, I can specifically recall branch commanders of the Detective Branch, who would say that they could no longer perform their regular functions because their personnel could not enter residential areas in order to investigate matters and interview persons because it would render their task impossible. MR BOOYENS: And that was already the situation in 1985?

MR PRINS: Yes, that was the situation in 1985, Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: And it was asked about the viability of this operation or not and I would like to elaborate on that. Normal police action I have also heard, although this was in other areas such as the Eastern Cape, there was a very effective alarm system so to speak, the minute you entered a rural town area the whistles would start blowing and the alarm would be sounded. Is that how it worked here as well?

MR PRINS: Yes, the whistle system was very well-known. As soon as an identification was made, or any possible identification was made of any division of the police entering that area, this system would go into operation. I experienced it quite a few times myself.

MR BOOYENS: So to arrest somebody was everything but simple?

MR PRINS: Not only not simple, but to a greater extent impossible.

MR BOOYENS: Would I be correct in saying that when the police moved into these areas you would usually have to move in with armoured vehicle, such as casspirs and so forth?

MR PRINS: Correct. We received an order - I cannot recall specifically whether the order came from the Divisional Commissioner, I would accept that originally it came from head office or the Divisional Commissioner, that when such urgent circumstances took place, for example in my case as a demolitions expert who had to be at the scene of an explosion to undertake certain investigations, that I should not go into such an area with an unarmoured vehicle, but that I should arrange to enter the area in an armoured vehicle.

MR BOOYENS: And was it in these areas that the explosions ultimately took place?

MR PRINS: Yes, and more specifically in Duduza.

MR BOOYENS: Thank you, Chairperson, I have nothing further.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Booyens. Mr Cornelius, do you have any questions?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

I refer you to paragraph 17 of your application, the instruction that you received to fetch the limpet mine in Pretoria. Who gave you this instruction?

MR PRINS: Chairperson, to the best of my recollection it was Brig Cronje who told this to me.

MR CORNELIUS: I understand. And according to your observation, it was clear that Brig Cronje was in command of this operation?

MR PRINS: Correct.

MR CORNELIUS: And when you delivered this limpet mine to Joe Mamasela, you also had no doubt that he was completely informed regarding what he was supposed to do?

MR PRINS: Yes, it was very clear to me when I delivered it to him, that he knew that it would come to his side, he was expecting it. There was actually no exchange of words between the two of us.

MR CORNELIUS: I see. And at that stage when the limpet mine was handed over various members of Section C were present, can you recall who they were?

MR PRINS: As far as I can recall, Brig Cronje was present as well as Col Venter, logically Joe Mamasela was there because I gave him the limpet mine. And I believe I am correct, but I am not a hundred percent certain if I say that Mr de Kock was also there.

MR CORNELIUS: I see. And in conclusion, you believe that with your participation in this action and with this action, you succeeded in combatting the violence, in other words you dealt a sever blow to the participants in the liberation action?

MR PRINS: Yes, think that the consequences speak for themselves.

MR CORNELIUS: Yes, but what I mean is that you achieved your political target.

MR PRINS: Yes, I do believe so.

MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Cornelius. Mr Mafora, do you have any questions you'd like to ask?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR MAFORA: Yes, thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr Prins, you indicated in your testimony that you were shown a list which contained police officers who were going to be targeted by COSAS, is that correct?

MR PRINS: That is correct.

MR MAFORA: Were you informed as to how the list was compiled and how it was obtained?

MR PRINS: No, Chairperson. As I have already said in my evidence, the list, I'm sure that it was Col Venter who showed it to me and told me that it came from COSAS members.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Mafora, if I could just ask on that question.

Can you recall approximately how many names were on the list and addresses?

MR PRINS: Chairperson, I can recall that it was a single sheet of paper and that if it wasn't filled up, it was nearly full because my name was approximately three-quarters down in the page, but I didn't count. I also didn't have it in my possession for such a length of time.

CHAIRPERSON: And you say a page of paper, A4 size?

MR PRINS: No. I beg your pardon, Chairperson, I think it was a smaller size, such as the type that one would normally find in school books, the lined pages that one would find in school writing books.

MR MAFORA: And on that list your name was there, isn't it?

MR PRINS: As I have already testified Chairperson, my surname was there as well as my residential address.

MR MAFORA: And you were told that you are one of the people who were being targeted by COSAS for attack, is that correct?

MR PRINS: Chairperson, I cannot recall the precise words and whether it was Col Venter who showed me the list, but it was conveyed to me in broad terms that this was a hit-list and that my name was on this list and that it came from COSAS members.

MR MAFORA: And you were then advised of the plan which we are about today, the Zero-Zero plan. Were you at that stage informed of ...(intervention)

MR PRINS: No, no, not at all, it was a number of days before the actual plan came to execution.

MR MAFORA: And on that list - I mean, were you not given any details about when was the attack going to be possibly carried out on police officials or - you didn't have any of those details?

MR PRINS: No, Chairperson. If I may inform the Committee of what exactly took place in order for them to comprehend it fully. I recall that evening shortly after the list was shown to me, Brig Delport and I requested leave to go home, seeing as my wife was waiting in the office there. I can also recall clearly that Brig Delport was upset about the fact that I had taken my wife along and he said that at that stage it was not necessary and he then gave me permission and I returned home.

MR MAFORA: Why was he upset that you had brought your wife along? Because earlier on you testified that you were asked to bring your wife along.

MR PRINS: Chairperson yes, but it was Col Venter who told me over the phone to bring my wife with and when Brig Delport was informed by me that I had brought my wife along, I could see that he was upset in that regard, that he believed that nothing would probably happen that evening and that we were over reacting and that we were creating panic in the minds of people, which was unnecessary. I think that's what it was all about.

MR MAFORA: Okay, now let's just go back to the incident after the explosions. You indicated that you were responsible for carrying out the investigations, is that correct?

MR PRINS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR MAFORA: And you further indicated that you prepared false reports, is that correct?

MR PRINS: Chairperson, later I made an affidavit which comprised part of the statements submitted in the criminal trial in which the deceased were charged. That was the only false allegation or affidavit which I put in writing. I did not prepare other reports or submissions with false statements.

MR MAFORA: But the issue is you knowingly prepared an affidavit which was incorrect, is that so?

MR PRINS: Yes, that is entirely correct.

MR MAFORA: Why should we believe you today, that after taking an oath, what you are saying is true and correct?

MR PRINS: Chairperson, certainly for quite a few reasons because it is a prerequisite of amnesty legislation to make a full disclosure. I don't think that for me who played a very minor role, if I may put it that way, it would prejudice me if I tried to cover up any facts. At that stage we were working under extraordinary circumstances and today the situation has normalised completely, therefore today it would be completely futile for me to say something which isn't true.

MR MAFORA: I mean, have you not colluded with your co-applicants to present a version to this hearing?

MR PRINS: Chairperson, the agreement among the applicants is that we are here to disclose the truth, we are recognising our participation in cruel violations of human rights. I cannot see how that can be interpreted as false.

MR MAFORA: Let's just take one aspect, the issue of Joe Mamasela. Gen van der Merwe indicates that - indicated in his evidence that he didn't know what finally happened down the line and the involvement of Joe Mamasela in the whole scenario, and you are coming here and you are testifying that at one stage Joe Mamasela was involved in this thing. There's this deliberate you know, cutting off of one person from the chain to make as if the commanders gave down the instruction and they were not involved in following up to establish what actually took place. What I'm trying to put to you is this, that this is a collusion on your part with your co-applicants and you all knew of the involvement of Joe Mamasela and you were all aware of what took place through this whole incident. What would your comment be on that?

MR PRINS: Chairperson, much has been said and if I may comment on it, it would be that the versions provided here makes sense in the light of my knowledge of how the Police Force operated back then. Gen van der Merwe was a very senior officer, who occupied a senior position at head office and it is just logically acceptable that such a person who occupied such a high position in the hierarchy would not be involved on the evening when an operation would be executed at night so far away from him.

If one understands the operation of the police hierarchy, then the applications of all the applicants make complete sense to me thusfar, because that was the operation of the hierarchy.

MR MAFORA: You see what's strange Mr Prins, is that the plan, the originator of the plan is Gen van der Merwe and this was a very unique - according to the co-applicants, this was a unique situation you know, they had never been - Delport was never involved in it previously. Or let me just ask you, were you ever involved in it previously yourself?

MR PRINS: No, Chairperson, not before and not after.

MR MAFORA: You see this was what one would call a landmark kind of an operation and I find it strange that Gen van der Merwe wouldn't have had a very keen interest and even contributed towards how the thing was to be carried out, and liaised with you down the ranks.

MR PRINS: Chairperson, I could possibly understand how a person who was not involved in the Police Force will have no knowledge of the functioning of the Police Force and may find it strange, but to me it is not strange at all, to me it is entirely logical and practical.

MR MAFORA: You also indicated that the use of - the measures that you took were the you know, were the only measures that could be taken. Actually, you confirmed the evidence of the applicants that went before you, that there was no other effective method of containing the situation, is that correct?

MR PRINS: Under the circumstances which reigned at that stage I would say Chairperson that I could understand completely. Although I was not involved in the planning itself, I can understand completely how the persons who were indeed involved in the planning regarded it as the only viable counter-achievement.

MR MAFORA: But then why did you target these people? I mean because the attack on police, as earlier stated, was the order of the day. Why did target these people, these victims?

MR PRINS: They were not targeted by me, Chairperson. If I am asked to express an opinion as to why they were targeted, then I could express an opinion about that, but I personally did not target them.

MR MAFORA: Yes, I mean you were party to the group that targeted them.

MR PRINS: No, Chairperson, I was not.

MR MAFORA: Your involvement in this thing, was it not motivated party by the fact that you had an axe to grind with them, because you knew that they were COSAS members and you had been earlier informed that COSAS was targeting a number of police people to attack and your name was also included?

MR PRINS: Chairperson, as I have already testified, I was tasked to be involved in this operation, firstly because I was a demolitions expert. My involvement as I may put it, emanated from instructions given by senior officers. I did not participate in the planning phase of the operation and I did not cherish any sinister motives, as have been reflected here.

MR MAFORA: Thank you, Mr Chairperson, no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Mafora. Ms Lockhat, do you have any questions?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS LOCKHAT: Yes, thank you, Chairperson.

I just want to get back to the hit-list. Were there only policemen's names on this hit-list?

MR PRINS: Chairperson, after I had completed my amnesty application and after we had discussed this matter during consultation, it occurred to me that there were also council members and I can recall two specific council members from Duduza, two brothers by the names of Namane. At the time of my application I could not recall it, but after the consultations certain things refreshed my memory and yes, there were two such members whose names also appeared on the hit-list. They were two council members.

MS LOCKHAT: And there were also other black policemen on the list, is that correct?

MR PRINS: That is correct, many names who were not familiar to me.

MS LOCKHAT: I just want to clarify. That evening when they called you in, were you the only person on that hit-list that was called into the office to inform you about this?

MR PRINS: I don't have any knowledge about that. I believe that the others were also informed, but I can honestly not give any evidence about that.

CHAIRPERSON: But you didn't see any of the other people when you were there that night, you didn't see any of the other people whose names appeared on the list, at the offices?

MR PRINS: Chairperson, to be honest with you I would have to say no, I cannot recall that I specifically saw anything about them on that evening. But I must also sketch the actual circumstances, that I spent a very short time there, they may have been on other floors or in other offices and I didn't see them. So they may have been there, but I don't believe that I saw any one of them, no.

MS LOCKHAT: And your relation - how long had you been working with Brig Delport?

MR PRINS: Quite a number of years.

MS LOCKHAT: So you say Mr Namane's was also on this list?

MR PRINS: Yes, the two brothers.

MS LOCKHAT: Would you say that these MKs or the COSAS members identified him on that list?

MR PRINS: No, I cannot say, I did not know about how the list had been compiled or who compiled the list. I did not know anything about the origin of the list, apart from that which Col Venter told me and that was that it came from COSAS members.

MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, just for the record, I have spoken to Mr Namane and the family members, persons did come to their house on that night and there were bodies found in their grounds, the persons that were booby-trapped, Chairperson. And he also just stated to me that I must place it on record if I have the opportunity, which I think is perfect now Chairperson, that his family - he just wants to make a statement in the sense that his family was never part of a vigilante group and that his family - because his name also appeared on this hit-list and that they were targeted, that he also just wants to place on record that he denies ever being part of a vigilante group and that they experienced - their houses were burnt down, they also had lots of businesses Chairperson, that were also burnt down, and he just wanted to inform the community -because he says they still feel, that the family still feels hurt by all of these actions and I just have to place it on record that they deny that they ever were part of any vigilante group. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Ms Lockhat.

MR VISSER: I'm sorry, I'd just like to know what Ms Lockhat is saying. Is she saying that the police went to his, I don't know who the one is or is it both. I don't know whether it's one or both of the Namane's and whether the police went to them to warn them. I'm not sure what she's saying.

MS LOCKHAT: What I'm actually saying is Chairperson, that at the night of the incident they were targeted as well, their house was targeted and that bodies were found on their property as well and also that they had experienced lots of loss and damages to properties after this incident as well. That's all, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MS LOCKHAT: Just before this incident Mr Prins, you said that later on you drove with Brig Cronje and Delport and then they informed you of this operation. I'm referring to paragraph 18 of your annexure. Can you just kindly tell us what exactly did they inform you of. It's Annexure G.

MR PRINS: I beg your pardon, could you please repeat the last part of your question.

MS LOCKHAT: At paragraph 19 on page 5 of Annexure G you said that:

Kindly explain to us what did they inform you of, what are the details?

MR PRINS: Chairperson, if I may just observe this in perspective, I drove the vehicle and the two Brigadiers, one or both, I can't recall, requested that I drive the vehicle because I knew the areas very well. I was then informed that the limpet mine which I had given to Joe Mamasela had been modified with the detonator so that the time delay would be taken away and that the detonators of the other handgrenades had been modified with the zero delay and that approximately 12 o'clock that night they would be delivered to a group of activists who would then attack targets which they had selected and kill or serious injure themselves in the process. But the precise choice of words and who precisely said what is something that I cannot recall, but that would be the information that I received regarding the operation.

ADV GCABASHE: Can you just help me with one small aspect. You were driving around, where? With these two.

MR PRINS: Chairperson, from the premises outside De Notter, where I handed the limpet mine to Mamasela, we drove in the direction of the three black residential areas. The three areas, Tsakane, Duduza and kwaThema were very closely situated to one another and we drove out in that direction so that we could be nearby, should the explosions take place.

ADV GCABASHE: And were you in radio communication with anybody? I mean how would you know that these had occurred at a specific time?

MR PRINS: Yes, Chairperson, we were in radio communication. As I have already stated, Lt Steenkamp later gave me an instruction per radio to visit a certain scene, so we were in radio contact with one another.

ADV GCABASHE: That's with Steenkamp and anybody else, with Mamasela?

MR PRINS: No, the radios were only a communication measure between members of the Security Branch and then we could also contact the East Rand control station where incidents of crime or murder were reported, we could communicate with that centre.

ADV GCABASHE: Thank you. Thanks, Ms Lockhat.

MS LOCKHAT: And then Mr Prins, can you just tell us what your role was, you said that the scene had to be "behoorlik beveilig", what does that include, just give us more detail.

MR PRINS: Chairperson, that would mean that I as a demolitions expert at such a scene would have to ensure that the entire scene was secured. In other words, such as in the case which really took place, where there were handgrenades lying around which had not gone off in a professional manner, I would have to see to these grenades so that nobody would be injured by them.

MS LOCKHAT: Were there any black handgrenades there?

MR PRINS: No, I only know about one black grenade, which I personally was not involved in, but this was in my area during my time, involving an incident on a road. This grenade was used in an attack on a bus. Then there were also black handgrenades of Czechoslovakian origin, which were used by terrorists, although these handgrenades were very rare. They were the only black handgrenades which I knew of in my entire career as a demolitions expert.

MS LOCKHAT: Just one last question. After the incident, who told you to perjure yourself and then fill in these false statements? Who gave you that instruction?

MR PRINS: Chairperson, according to the best of my recollection I cannot recall whether I did this out of my own motivation because I interpreted the circumstances correctly, or whether someone pertinently gave me an instruction. It was generally accepted that the actual facts of police involvement had to be covered up and it may be that I did this out of my own motivation and that nobody gave me a definite instruction.

MS LOCKHAT: Thank you, Chairperson, I have no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thanks, Ms Lockhat. Mr Visser, do you have any re-examination?

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: If I may, Mr Chairman.

Perhaps just for those of us who do not know, Mr Prins. You say that you also handled informers.

MR PRINS: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: I wonder if you could give us some background about an informer. Let us suppose and take this group of 20 or whatever number, and among this COSAS group of 20 there would be one person who was your informer, let us just suppose this. Now to begin with, the informer would necessarily have to be one of the leaders or what would the position be?

MR PRINS: Not necessarily one of the leaders, an informer is simply a person who infiltrates, who has been recruited by us and who was prepared to be recruited and it wasn't always possible to recruit leaders in organisations. So an informer could have been an ordinary member or an executive member of an organisation.

MR VISSER: Very well. Would that mean that the informer would not necessarily possess all the information about one particular project?

MR PRINS: Definitely so, Chairperson. In many cases it happened that an informer did not possess all the information and that this was also very dangerous for him to obtain all the information because he is trained by his handler not to ask any unnecessary questions or to ask questions which could arouse suspicions that he may be seeking information to convey elsewhere. There was a great degree of sensitivity in all the banned organisations about informers and informers were specifically tasked not to reveal themselves by means of posing sensitive or other questions which may label them as informers.

MR VISSER: Yes, you have basically answered the question. So to summarise, the informer would not very easily make enquiries about things such as who is the MK member from whom we be receiving the weapons or when will it be delivered or where will it be delivered, those would not be questions which an informer would very easily ask.

MR PRINS: Under certain circumstances he could have asked it without arousing suspicion, this all depended upon his position and then under other circumstances it would have been fatal for him to ask such a question, so it is a bit of a generalisation to give one answer. He may have asked such a question with relative ease or such a question may have posed extreme danger for him.

MR VISSER: Yes. And is it also true that frequently the Security Police had to put together information which was received from various places, before anything emerged?

MR PRINS: Yes, definitely.

MR VISSER: And the reasons that you have just furnished us with, would those be the reasons for it?

MR PRINS: Yes, because one informer would not necessarily possess all the relevant information.

MR VISSER: Yes. And just another thing, you have already been examined on this by my learned friend, Mr Hattingh as well as Mr Booyens. The position during those years, as I understand from you, was that the police could not freely enter these areas.

MR PRINS: No, not at all. I think that I have already given evidence about it, especially with regard to my circumstances which dictated that I had to use an armoured vehicle, that there were specific instructions from the Divisional Commissioners. I can recall that there were even follow-up reports in which members of the Force had ignored it and where they were threatened with legal steps because there had been damage to vehicles and there were medical costs and they were actually held responsible because they acted against instructions to not enter these areas because it was dangerous.

MR VISSER: And you have also confirmed as it was put to you, that there was a warning system, a whistle system. As soon as a policeman or a casspir or a buffel had entered into a black area, whistles were blown and the whole area would know.

MR PRINS: Yes, Chairperson, the so-called whistle system as we called it, was very pertinent, it was part of the street and block committees of those units. It was definitely so. And I personally had heard of this a lot.

MR VISSER: With this as background, what would you say would the chances be to set up a trap for the people to whom the handgrenades had been given, so that they could be arrested at the place when they wanted to throw these handgrenades?

MR PRINS: Chairperson, under the circumstances of that time, I would want to say it was almost impossible, it would have been known before we had even implemented a plan of action.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Adv Gcabashe, do you have any questions?

ADV GCABASHE: Thank you, Chair.

Mr Prins, the informers you handled, did they give you any information at all pertaining to this group that was killed on the 25th?

MR PRINS: No, not at all. I did not handle any informers with regard to these aspects with the Security Branch, I only at that stage handled informers with regard to labour issues, which was my chief function.

ADV GCABASHE: Thank you. Thank you, Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Malan?

MR MALAN: No, questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you, Mr Prins - sorry, is there any question arising out the question put by Adv Gcabashe?

MR VISSER: No, thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: That concludes your testimony, Mr Prins, you may stand down.

MR PRINS: Thank you, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I next call Capt Steenkamp.

MR MALAN: Mr Steenkamp, you only have the one name, Francois?

FRANCOIS STEENKAMP: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser?

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Steenkamp, you also apply for amnesty with regard to this incident. Your application is found in bundle 1 on page 126 to 134. Is it correct that paragraph 7(a) in your application and (b) also needs to be amended? That 7(a) needs to read "National Party" and 7(b) "Supporter", for the same reason which we have said for the other applicants?

MR STEENKAMP: That is so, yes.

MR VISSER: Would it please you, Mr Chairman, to allow that amendment to be made.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I take it there's no objections. Yes, paragraph 7(a) and 7(b) on page 126 of volume 1 are amended by changing the answers contained therein. The first one to "Nasionale Party" and the other one 7(b) to "Ondersteuner".

MR VISSER: As it pleases you, Mr Chairman.

Mr Steenkamp, you confirm the contents of your amnesty application, is that correct?

MR STEENKAMP: That is so.

MR VISSER: As well as the contents of Exhibit A, which you have studied beforehand.

MR STEENKAMP: That is so.

MR VISSER: And to the evidence which is referred to in Exhibit A.

MR STEENKAMP: That is correct.

MR VISSER: You have - with regard to the general background of violence, political violence on the East Rand, you have heard what Gen van der Merwe and Brig Delport and Mr Prins, who had given evidence before you, had said.

MR STEENKAMP: That is so.

MR VISSER: Do you agree with the information that they have given before this Committee?

MR STEENKAMP: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And you briefly deal with that on page 3 up to paragraph 11, is that so?

MR STEENKAMP: That's correct.

MR VISSER: Actually up to paragraph 9.

MR STEENKAMP: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Visser, I think just for the record, is this the statement of Capt Steenkamp? That will be H.

MR VISSER: Oh I'm sorry, yes, yes, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: We'll receive that as Exhibit H.

MR VISSER: Exhibit H. And you say you have dealt with that up to paragraph 9, can you confirm that that would be your evidence before the Committee?

MR STEENKAMP: That is so.

MR VISSER: Will you continue with paragraph 10 and tell us what your participation was in these events that had taken place.

MR STEENKAMP:

MR VISSER: So what you are saying is that you had later become aware by means of what was said to you, that this was planned beforehand, as we have heard in the evidence of Gen van der Merwe and Brig Delport before this Commission?

MR STEENKAMP: That's correct.

MR VISSER: And at the time of the incident itself, when the explosions took place, you were not aware of it?

MR STEENKAMP: No.

MR VISSER: Please continue.

MR STEENKAMP:

MR VISSER: Yes. You have - in bundle 1 on page 128, you refer to this discussion and it's at the top of the page in bundle 1, page 128, and there you say:

And then you say:

So are you saying now that in - this was said in hindsight because only afterwards you found out about this?

MR STEENKAMP: That's correct.

MR VISSER: So it was not mentioned to you there?

MR STEENKAMP: No, it was not pertinently put to me that that was exactly what the plan was.

MR VISSER: But what they had told you was that some people would get a surprise and we would work the whole evening. Please continue. And you say in the light thereof ...

MR STEENKAMP:

MR VISSER: Can you please pause there. What were your instructions which you received from Brig Delport? Would you go to one of the scenes or what was the position?

MR STEENKAMP: The position was that I did not even know how many explosions would take place because I was a standby officer. If there were scenes that evening, I would be personally responsible for those in giving evidence.

MR VISSER: So wherever explosions had taken place, you would visit the scene?

MR STEENKAMP: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And do you accept what Brig Delport had said, that it was his idea that if there were any Court cases or investigations, he would send one man who would give all the evidence?

MR STEENKAMP: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Please continue.

MR STEENKAMP:

MR VISSER: Before you continue with paragraph 19, can you recall today, at the scenes which you visited, how many explosive devices you picked up or had found there, which had not yet exploded?

MR STEENKAMP: At the very first scene in Tsakane, I think it was before Ntabazita Street 6460, I found a handgrenade which had not exploded and at the other scene in kwaThema there was also a handgrenade which had not exploded but that was destroyed by the then W/O Prins.

MR VISSER: Yes, he told us about it.

MR STEENKAMP: That's correct. These scenes stretched up to the following morning, approximately 9 o'clock or even later.

MR VISSER: Can you recall how many handgrenades you had defused?

MR STEENKAMP: The afternoon later, I defused another one. That was in Tsakane. And his handgrenade was burnt by fire, so it had a black shine. All the others were green, but this was burnt black by the grass.

MR VISSER: So it was not painted?

MR STEENKAMP: No, it was not.

MR VISSER: Please continue with paragraph 19.

MR STEENKAMP:

...(intervention)

MR VISSER: Which survivors are we talking about? Are these which you refer to on page 2 under (c), Gosia Lekosane and John Mlangene and Samuel Lekatsa and Humphrey Tshabalala and Johannes Mazibuko and Joseph Mazibuko and Cedric Dladla? Are these the people you refer to?

MR STEENKAMP: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Were they all together at these identifications or just some of them, or can you not recall?

MR STEENKAMP: As I can recall, all seven survivors were taken out for these identifications, all of them pointed to the same place, but I think accused number six, Lekosane, who pointed me in the wrong direction, where the others pointed in the direction where the handgrenades would have been thrown.

MR VISSER: While you speak of accused here I wonder, for purposes of assistance to the Committee, if we could have a look at the list on Exhibit 3A. I am preempting this, but you have indeed testified before Justice Stafford in a matter where these persons which we've heard of now were charged, is that not so?

MR STEENKAMP: That is so.

MR VISSER: Would it be correct, and correct me if I am wrong, that accused number one - Mr Chairman, if you look at the index on 3A, it might be easy for you to just jot them down in the margin. Joseph Titus Mazibuko was accused number one, is that correct?

MR STEENKAMP: That's correct. Accused number two ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: Just a moment. The reference to that, Chairperson, if you want to jot that down, is bundle 2A, page 334. That is where Justice Stafford refers to the numbers of the accused.

Accused number two was John Mlangene. That does not form part Chairperson, of your list, so you'll have to write that in.

CHAIRPERSON: That's right at the bottom of the index, is that right?

MR VISSER: Well I'm right at the top of the index. I see him there, yes. I'm sorry, yes, Chairperson, I missed that. He was accused number two. The reference to that is bundle 2A, page 336.

Very well. Accused number three, was that Samuel Lekatsa?

MR STEENKAMP: I think he was number three and Humphrey ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: One moment please before you continue. Mr Chairperson, bundle 2A, page 337.

Very well. Number four would have been Tshabalala?

MR STEENKAMP: That's correct, that's Humphrey Tshabalala.

MR VISSER: ... (inaudible), Chairperson.

And who was number five?

MR STEENKAMP: Number five was Johannes Vally Mzibuko.

MR VISSER: Now Chairperson, that's not quite clear from the judgment on sentence, but the reference is 2A, page 338, but one has to infer it from a reading of that page.

And then number six was?

MR STEENKAMP: Was Len Gosane.

MR VISSER: Len Gosane. That's bundle 2A, page 339.

And then number seven was Nicholas Dladla? That's the only one which remains.

MR STEENKAMP: No, Cedric Dladla.

MR VISSER: Cedric Nicholas Dladla. And that is page 342 of bundle 2A, Chairperson.

I have interrupted you there, you say that you were at the scene which was pointed out to you by the injured, who were later the accused in the criminal matter. Where was this scene?

MR STEENKAMP: It was at an abandoned mine between the two residential areas of Tsakane and Duduza, in a field.

MR VISSER: Was this removed or away from all the residential areas where there were no people?

MR STEENKAMP: Yes, it was closer to Tsakane, I would say approximately two kilometres from Tsakane.

MR VISSER: But it was a remote area?

MR STEENKAMP: Yes, it was.

MR VISSER: And you say it was a mine heap.

MR STEENKAMP: No, it was an abandoned mine and the mine shaft had been closed down.

MR VISSER: Did you notice anything there, did you find anything there?

MR STEENKAMP: That's correct. With the visit of the first identification at the scene I found shrapnel of an RG42 handgrenades at the scene and I had photos taken and I also testified to that fact.

MR VISSER: Continue with paragraph 20.

MR STEENKAMP:

MR VISSER: Very well, proceed.

MR STEENKAMP:

MR VISSER: So you say that a number of these persons were charged, is that because we don't know whether there were other people involved as well?

MR STEENKAMP: That's correct.

MR VISSER: Please continue.

MR STEENKAMP:

MR VISSER: Please go a little slower.

MR STEENKAMP: Very well.

MR VISSER: If you refer to the knowledge that you had afterwards or that you had drawn the inference of, or what was told to you?

MR STEENKAMP: That's correct, and as the investigation progressed.

MR VISSER: Very well.

MR STEENKAMP:

MR VISSER: And for how long did you give evidence?

MR STEENKAMP: Chairperson, I think it was two days to explain my statement to the Court. So it was a very prolonged matter, it was approximately a week or so.

MR VISSER: Were you confronted in cross-examination with the possibility that the SAP had been involved here?

MR STEENKAMP: Yes, I was confronted.

MR VISSER: And what did you say?

MR STEENKAMP: I did in cross-examination concede the possibility that the SAP could have been involved with this incident, but I did not disclose my further knowledge about this in Court.

MR VISSER: So in this instance you perjured yourself?

MR STEENKAMP: Yes, I have.

MR VISSER: As well as obstructing justice?

MR STEENKAMP: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Please continue with paragraph 24.

MR STEENKAMP:

MR VISSER: So you say although you in this regard had perjured yourself technically, it was because you were convinced at that stage that it was not possible and nobody told you about a mini limpet mine, beforehand.

MR STEENKAMP: That's correct.

MR VISSER: Proceed.

MR STEENKAMP:

MR VISSER: Yes, and that is on the question which Commission Malan had put, and I think the Chairperson as well, that reasonably quickly after the explosions there were already the allegations that the police had something to do with it.

MR STEENKAMP: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Now I wish to ask you, in cases - was this a new thing that the ANC, from the ANC's side, had blamed the police when the explosions had taken place where ANC members were injured or killed?

MR STEENKAMP: No, according to my knowledge it was not a new thing. With regard to the report the following day, it was that handgrenades were thrown from casspirs and the detectives whom I referred to here were appointed by that the media people, and this newspaper report was investigated.

MR VISSER: So it was not suggested as if the police had given adjusted handgrenades to the activists?

MR STEENKAMP: No, not the following morning.

MR VISSER: Was it mentioned later that the police had been involved in some other manner?

MR STEENKAMP: That's correct.

MR VISSER: And that was during the Court case.

MR STEENKAMP: Yes, during the Court case and media reports. MR VISSER: Very well, proceed.

MR STEENKAMP:

...(intervention)

MR VISSER: You have missed something. Can you recall whether you made any false statements to that investigative team?

MR STEENKAMP: I cannot recall if I had made any statement to them.

MR VISSER: But as far as you have, you apply for amnesty for any perjury or defeating the ends of justice in that regard?

MR STEENKAMP: That's correct.

MR VISSER: Very well, proceed.

MR STEENKAMP:

MR VISSER: Can we just address that. That was the evidence of Brig Jack Cronje and Mr Venter, but they both conceded at the hearing - and I would give the references to the Committee later on if necessary, that they were mistaken when they said that they thought that you were present at the meeting which was addressed by Gen van der Merwe.

MR STEENKAMP: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Can you just conclude your statement?

MR STEENKAMP:

MR VISSER: Can I interrupt you there, did anybody give you instructions to perjure yourself or to obstruct the ends of justice in order to cover up the facts or did you do this out of your own motivation?

MR STEENKAMP: If one can put it as such, I associated myself with it by myself.

MR VISSER: Please continue.

MR STEENKAMP:

MR VISSER: And later you realised during the amnesty process that the Minister of Police of that time, Minister le Grange, was also involved.

MR STEENKAMP: Yes, that's correct.

MR VISSER: Very well.

MR STEENKAMP:

MR VISSER: And you feel that you acted within the scope of your duties as a policeman and you believed that you acted within the scope of your express or sworn duties?

MR STEENKAMP: That is correct.

MR VISSER: If we could page to page 2. Your application states that you apply for amnesty for the murder of eight COSAS members - I will address the Committee later about this, attempted murder and then (d) speaks of the unlawful possession and application of explosive devices. We know that you were an Section 2 explosives expert, but as far as it is necessary for the purposes of this application, insofar as it may be alleged that the explosive devices were illegally applied, you also apply for amnesty for that.

MR STEENKAMP: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And perjury and for accessory before or after the act?

MR STEENKAMP: That is so.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, at this stage I will leave it at that. I think perhaps on the evidence when we come to argument stage, we should deal with Mr Steenkamp separately to see what he should be entitled to, if he's entitled to amnesty.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Hattingh, do you have any questions you'd like to ask?

MR HATTINGH: No thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Booyens?

MR BOOYENS: No questions, thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Cornelius?

MR CORNELIUS: I have no questions, thank you, Mr Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Mafora?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR MAFORA: Just one question, Mr Chair.

You indicated that you were only informed of the plan on the day when the attack would take place, is that correct?

MR STEENKAMP: The evening I was not officially informed, I drew inferences and from the discussions and after I visited the explosion scenes I realised that this was an action of the police.

MR MAFORA: And you also state then that the incorrect information that you submitted at Court, you know when you testified, you did it out of your own accord, is that correct?

MR STEENKAMP: If I could just explain. My evidence was basically the observations which I had observed at the scenes and the concession which I made under cross-examination, that the police might have been involved I also conceded, but I did not elaborate on that, that the police had indeed been involved there. So that I did not disclose to the Court.

MR MAFORA: You did not disclose that to the Court?

MR STEENKAMP: That's correct, yes.

MR MAFORA: But you were not given any instructions not to do so, you did it on your own accord?

MR STEENKAMP: I drew that inference afterwards and I associated myself with that. In other words, I acted under the command of my commander, Brig Delport.

MR VISSER: You know, what I want to find out is, when you realised that the police were involved you simply associated yourself with the actions, but you were not given any specific instructions to say please, do not divulge anything that you know about this incident?

MR STEENKAMP: No, Chairperson, I inferred this from the circumstances.

MR MAFORA: No further questions, thank you, Mr Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Mafora. Ms Lockhat, any questions?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS LOCKHAT: Thank you, Chairperson.

Just the investigating officer, Mr Oberholzer, did he know that this whole mission was planned by the South African Police?

MR STEENKAMP: It's possible. I believe afterwards he did know.

MS LOCKHAT: But he also worked for that Security Branch at Springs?

MR STEENKAMP: That's correct.

MS LOCKHAT: And Mr Delport was also his commander, is that correct?

MR STEENKAMP: That is so.

MS LOCKHAT: Thank you, Chairperson, I have no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Visser, any re-examination?

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Just one question.

Where is this Mr Oberholzer, the Lieutenant Oberholzer?

MR STEENKAMP: Chairperson, he is deceased.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Adv Gcabashe, any questions?

ADV GCABASHE: None, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Malan, any questions?

MR MALAN: No questions, Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Captain Steenkamp, that concludes your testimony, you may stand down.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I call my last witness, Mr Andre Roos, and I beg leave to hand up to you his statement. I don't know whether you feel the same way ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: So we go to J?

MR VISSER: ... about it as does your brother. Yes, indeed Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: No, no, I don't feel strongly about it, but I've always done it, we skip Exhibit I and from H to J. This is Exhibit J.

MR VISSER: J, thank you Chairperson.

ANDRE ROOS: (sworn states)

MR MALAN: Thank you, please be seated.

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: You are still a member of the South African Police Services?

MR ROOS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And your rank is Director?

MR ROOS: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: If that is the rank, I don't know what one calls it these days. You apply for amnesty in regard to this incident, is that correct?

MR ROOS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And your application is in bundle 1, page 135 to page 147, is that correct?

MR ROOS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You have previously given evidence before the Amnesty Committee, is that correct?

MR ROOS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And this was in the matter attacks on houses, can you recall the names of the persons?

MR ROOS: The attacks on the house of one, Godfrey Kwabe and Gregory Tulare.

MR VISSER: Gregory Tulare. Now you also gave evidence there?

MR ROOS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You have studied the contents of Exhibit A, do you confirm the correctness thereof?

MR ROOS: I do, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: As well as the contents of your amnesty application.

MR ROOS: I confirm the contents, with one exception Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Yes, what is that?

MR ROOS: The position which I have now differs from what I was, the position that I occupied when the application was drawn up.

MR VISSER: So you are now a Director?

MR ROOS: Yes, but the post I occupied then, that needs to be amended.

MR VISSER: Well it is not necessary to officially amend it, we know what your official rank is now. You have heard the evidence of Gen van der Merwe and Mr Delport, as well as the other previous witnesses, is that correct?

MR ROOS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: The political violence and mass actions to which they testified, was that also your knowledge in that part of the struggle?

MR ROOS: I confirm so, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You deal with that from page 3 to page 4, up to paragraph 10, is that correct?

MR ROOS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Can you continue from paragraph 11, what you part was in this action?

MR ROOS: Chairperson, thank you.

MR VISSER: Can you recall who gave you the instruction or where the instruction came from?

MR ROOS: I cannot specifically recall, but I would accept that it would have come from my then branch commander, Cpt Smith.

MR VISSER: Can you continue.

MR ROOS:

MR VISSER: Mr Roos, can you please tell the Committee, before the explosions had taken place were you informed that these explosive devices which would be applied had been doctored?

MR ROOS: No, I was not informed, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Please continue and just a little bit slower.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Visser, just on this before he moves on. You say in this statement that you were told by Brig Cronje that there was going to be a number of grenade attacks on houses of black police members and councillors. Did Brig Cronje say who would be doing the attack or whether it was - the police were involved in any way in the attack, or were you just told they expect a number of attacks, no information?

MR ROOS: Chairperson, the role for which I was called in for was Inspector of Explosive Devices and the information was given to me that there would be a number of explosions and that they had information to that effect and it would be carried out allegedly by COSAS members.

CHAIRPERSON: So it was just a routine operation for you basically?

MR ROOS: Absolutely correct, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: May I just ask you on this point, according to your evidence Cronje told you that it would be black council members' houses, black members of the Force and installations. In other words, you knew what the targets would be, so you did not ask him why don't we stop it?

MR ROOS: I was a relatively junior officer at that stage, Chairperson, I did not think it just to question his orders.

MR MALAN: You've heard Mr Steenkamp, that he drew the inference that the police were involved. Did you draw the same inference?

MR ROOS: Yes, I did Chairperson.

MR VISSER: When did you draw this inference, there and then when Brig Cronje addressed you or later?

MR ROOS: No, after the incidents, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And on the previous theme, one of the witnesses said that Brig Cronje was not a person whose orders were easily doubted.

MR ROOS: Indeed, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Very well, please continue.

MR ROOS:

MR VISSER: And you cannot recall how many and where?

MR ROOS: I cannot recall the exact number, Chairperson, but it was between two and three explosions. What I do recall is that I was personally responsible for the detonation of one handgrenade.

MR VISSER: Did you make any statements with regard to this incident?

MR ROOS: To my knowledge I did not make any statement.

MR VISSER: You say in paragraph 15 that shortly after the incident you became aware of exactly what the police' role was in this matter, and for apparent reasons you made yourself guilty of defeating the ends of justice.

MR ROOS: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And then in paragraph 16 and further that the acts and omissions committed by you were done in the execution of your official duties as you see it and as part of your opposition to the struggle and that it was aimed at the supporters of a liberation movement. And what you had done you had done to combat the political violence and to protect the lives of the people and that it also had to serve to protect the government against whom the political violence was aimed and to maintain the National Party's interests.

MR ROOS: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: What would have happened if you disclosed your knowledge that the police were involved with these adjustments of the detonators of these handgrenades, which had caused that eight people had been killed and seven had been injured? During the time period of that time, what would you say what would have happened if you had disclosed that knowledge of yours?

MR ROOS: Chairperson, I would have been labelled as a sell-out in the circles and I would have been obliged to give evidence against my fellow colleagues.

MR VISSER: And it would have been an embarrassment for the government.

MR ROOS: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And you say you acted in the execution of your official duties as a policeman and you believed that what you had done, fell within the ambit of your express duties, and like Mr Steenkamp, in your application you basically request amnesty for the possession of illegal explosive devices and defeating the ends of justice. Is that correct?

MR ROOS: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: In your application it says you ask for murder and attempted murder, but we will address the Committee later on that aspect.

Now Brig Delport had beforehand referred to an incident where you were present during a visit by Mr le Grange, do you recall that?

MR ROOS: I recall that, yes Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, that was in Exhibit F, paragraph 31.

Were you indeed at a stage present when a discussion took place between Minister le Grange and Brig Delport in a vehicle?

MR ROOS: I would not refer to it as a discussion, but I recall that I was given instructions to accompany Brig Delport, where we would meet the Minister and where he would have arrived in his helicopter from Pretoria. The reason why I had to accompany him was I had undergone a training course to protect very important persons and I drove the vehicle with which we fetched or collected the Minister and after he had climbed into the vehicle, he made some remark to the Brigadier, which boiled down to the effect that he said congratulations with the operation.

MR VISSER: To which operation did you think he referred?

MR ROOS: I accepted that it was the reasonably recent operation.

MR VISSER: Were there any other large operations on the East Rand to which he could have referred?

MR ROOS: No, not which would elicit the congratulations of the Minister.

CHAIRPERSON: Have you finished, Mr Visser?

MR VISSER: I thank you, yes thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Hattingh, do you have any questions?

MR HATTINGH: No thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Booyens, do you have any questions?

MR BOOYENS: May I just take instructions here with ...(indistinct)

CHAIRPERSON: I'll ask Mr Cornelius in the meantime. Mr Cornelius, do you have any questions?

MR CORNELIUS: I have no questions, thank you, Mr Chair.

MR BOOYENS: I've also got no questions, thank you, Mr Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Booyens. Mr Mafora, do you have any questions?

MR MAFORA: No questions, thank you, Mr Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Lockhat, any questions?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS LOCKHAT: Just a couple of questions, Chairperson.

I just want to check with you, who was your commander at the time?

MR ROOS: The overall commander was Brig Delport.

MS LOCKHAT: The overall commander. And Capt Smith?

MR ROOS: He was my branch commander at the time.

MS LOCKHAT: So was there a duty on you to disclose this information to your branch commander at this time, at that time?

MR ROOS: I don't believe so, I think we functioned on a need-to-know basis, Chairperson. And if we have to follow the letter of the law strictly, then I would have had to inform him, but I did not.

MS LOCKHAT: Would he have reprimanded you in this instance if he had found out about this operation, that you were involved in it?

MR ROOS: My knowledge of my branch commander, he would also have associated himself with the act.

MS LOCKHAT: Thank you, Chairperson, no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Any re-examination, Mr Visser?

MR VISSER: No, thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Adv Gcabashe, any questions? Mr Malan?

MR MALAN: No questions, Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Roos, that concludes your evidence, you may stand down.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, that concludes the evidence of our applicants. Before we commence, I was hoping ...(end of side A of tape) ... but more seriously, Chairperson, that some of ...(indistinct), I take it, will have to be changed.

CHAIRPERSON: We'll take a brief five to ten minute adjournment now because there might be changes, I don't know, but it will give the interpreters - even if they don't want to smoke, a break.

MS LOCKHAT: Please stand.

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Hattingh?

EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr de Kock, you are applying for amnesty with regard to this incident, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And your application appears in bundle 1, from page 2 onwards.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: In June 1985 you were already connected to C1, which was stationed at Vlakplaas.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And at that stage you still served under the command of Brig Cronje.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And at a stage in June, you were called from Durban where you were busy with your activities.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Who did you meet, or who called you?

MR DE KOCK: I received a call at Marion Hill that morning early, it was approximately 7 o'clock, and the message was that I should contact Springs urgently and drive to Springs. A telephone number was provided. I called and found a person there, although I don't know who the person was, he simply mentioned that Col Cronje urgently requested for me to come to Springs.

MR HATTINGH: Did you then go to Springs?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And who did you find there?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, upon my arrival there I found Capt Venter, he was also connected to C1, and later that afternoon he took me to a house near De Notter, which was identified to me.

MR HATTINGH: Did you receive any direct instructions from Brig Cronje at that stage?

MR DE KOCK: The instruction was that I should go through the following day with Capt Venter to head office and that we were to fetch handgrenades which had been prepared to detonate as soon as the pin was pulled or released.

MR HATTINGH: And was that message conveyed to you by Roelf Venter?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, he also told me, he informed me. At that stage he was Col Cronje's second-in-command there at Springs.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. And did you go to Pretoria the following day?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, we went to Pretoria.

MR HATTINGH: And did you go to head office?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And did you receive handgrenades there?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, we did. I studied some of the handgrenades and found that the grenades had been divided into half approximately and according to my memory they were RG5 grenades, which is an offensive grenade, and the others were F1 handgrenades, which were defensive handgrenades. And all the grenades were of eastern block origin.

MR HATTINGH: Did you know how the handgrenades would be applied, or for what it would be applied?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, at that stage I knew.

MR HATTINGH: Who told you?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, with the exception of Capt Venter, Cronje also informed me about it.

MR HATTINGH: And how would they be applied?

MR DE KOCK: As I understood it and if I recall correctly, there at De Notter, Col Cronje informed me that a group of activists who were attacking the homes of policemen had already infiltrated and that these handgrenades were going to be provided to these activists.

MR HATTINGH: With the intention to eliminate them?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Did you express any opinion about the capacity of these grenades to kill persons?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I asked Capt Venter if he wanted all of them killed or just half, he said all of them. I then informed him that they would not kill everybody. I said this as a result of my experience in four and a half year's worth of training in the north of South West, where I saw the effect of handgrenades, of various sorts of handgrenades, where accidents had taken place involving handgrenades of which the enemy perhaps had held the handgrenade too long or the handgrenade may have fallen back. And that is why I also asked him whether the person or the leader or the chief activist would recognise Joe Mamasela, upon which he answered yes, and then I suggested that this person receive a limpet mine in order to ensure that he be killed.

MR HATTINGH: And at that stage the limpet mine was not among the handgrenades that you had received?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: What was his reaction to that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, regarding the fact that the handgrenades would not kill everybody, he was rather sceptical. It was clear to me that he did not believe me, but with regard to the limpet mine, he was favourably inclined. I cannot recall that we spoke to Brig Schoon, but it was arranged for us to go to the Technical Division ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr de Kock, you said not all of them would be killed, which grenades would have been the more lethal of the ...(intervention

MR DE KOCK: Those would have been the F1 handgrenades.

CHAIRPERSON: The defensive one would have been - you were of the opinion that they would have killed the people handling them?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, definitely, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: With regard to the RPG5s - RG5s, you were of the view that they wouldn't necessarily kill somebody?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, the RG5 handgrenade had a very light aluminium cover, which was used by troops who were attacking. The troop could receive shrapnel, but it wouldn't be fatal. If you stood too close, it could lead to your death, but then one will have to study this in the context of a battalion of 2000 men who were being attacked. You could lose 20 men as a result of an offensive grenade. But I would say that it was a very powerful shock grenade in a very light aluminium cover.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

The limpet mine was then not among the handgrenades which you took into your possession.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And did you and Roelf then go to the Technical Division in order to investigate the possibility of preparing a limpet mine similarly?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And with who did you consult there?

MR DE KOCK: According to my recollection, it was Wal du Toit, Maj Wal du Toit.

MR HATTINGH: And did you express the need that you experienced to him?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And did he say that they would be able to do this?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, if I recall correctly, he said that they would see if they could do anything.

MR HATTINGH: And did you then depart from there?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Without the limpet mine?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And did you then go to Springs with the handgrenades?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And what did you do with the handgrenades there?

MR DE KOCK: The grenades were given to Col Cronje for use. I just want to mention here that I came in at the tail end of the operation, in the last two to three days of the operation. I'm not saying this so that I can indicate that I don't know anything, I will tell you everything that I know. It is just that at times I don't have a very clear recollection of the precise sequence of events.

MR HATTINGH: The handgrenades were delivered, and how long after the delivery would they then be applied?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it was not applied on the day that we returned and delivered the handgrenades to Col Cronje, because we did not yet have the limpet mine. And as far as I can recall, it was due for the following evening, that is when the operation was launched.

MR HATTINGH: You did not fetch the limpet mine?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. On page 6 of bundle 1 you say with regard to Mr Mamasela:

In light of the fact that you say in paragraph (b), that Brig Jack Cronje actually handled Joe Mamasela, you did not know exactly what his instructions were and that you were not present when the grenades were delivered, I want to take you back to paragraph (a) where you say that his primary objective was to use this man in order to incite other activists to attack the homes of policemen and so forth. About the word "incite", was that ever said to you or is this inference?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, this is an inference from discussions which I heard, so it wasn't said to me that he had to incite these persons. That was no clear statement to me.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. On the evening which was selected for the attacks, were you present in the area?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, according to my recollection it was at approximately 2 o'clock in the morning - I listened to the other applicants, but I don't really have a very clear recollection thereof, we were on the north-west side of kwaThema, which was the back way to Brakpan through the smallholdings and the detonations took place practically in a series, simultaneously at the preselected hour.

MR HATTINGH: And on that evening, did you visit any of the scenes where the explosions had taken place?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, the following morning at approximately 8 or 9 o'clock, Col Cronje and I and Capt Venter drove and visited, as far as I can recall, one of the homes where a man lay who had been killed. We also visited a power station where a tremendous explosion, according to my opinion, had taken place and where body parts lay strewn.

MR HATTINGH: Were these the only scenes that you visited?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And after that, did you have anything further to do with the further course of events?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Were you involved in the arrest of any person?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: With the interrogation of any persons?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Did you leave the area?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And when I refer to you, I read somewhere that Brig Cronje stated in his evidence that you and he left the area.

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: Was it only the two of you who left that area or were there others?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, if I speak of the area where the scenes were, as far as I can recall it was that same afternoon late or the following day that we left Springs and returned to Pretoria. but that was the entire unit.

MR HATTINGH: So you had nothing further to do with the explosions which took place there that evening and the subsequent investigation?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: The deeds that you committed, you committed under the command of Brig Cronje?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Did he inform you in any way whether that order came from a higher level?

MR DE KOCK: No, however I was under the impression that it went as far as Brig Schoon. I did not know about any other approval. For me the channel went as far as Brig Schoon.

MR HATTINGH: Was the order which was given to you to fetch the handgrenades and to deliver them, and you knew what they were meant for?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And did you agree with that?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: Why?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, an activist did not attack the home of a policeman, a terrorist would attack the home of a policeman, and in my mind one fought terrorism with counter-terrorism. That was my opinion.

MR HATTINGH: So you believed that you were acting in the struggle against terrorism?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And that is why you executed your order?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: What was your rank at the time of this incident?

MR DE KOCK: I was a Captain.

MR HATTINGH: And that of Brig Cronje?

MR DE KOCK: He was a Colonel.

MR HATTINGH: You received no reward for your participation, nor did you participate out of malice or vengeance towards the victims?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Mr Mamasela in his statement or his evidence somewhere, states that he received a reward after the incident, are you aware of that?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Did you not deliver it to him?

MR DE KOCK: No, I did not hand over anything to him.

MR HATTINGH: One of the victims, I forget who it was, either in a statement or in evidence during other proceedings, stated that you were present when he was arrested and that you participated in the arrest and that you also assisted in his interrogation as well as the assault which was carried out on him during interrogation.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, then I would have requested amnesty for it and I would have stated it during these proceedings.

MR HATTINGH: Therefore you are applying for amnesty for murder, assault with the intention to do grievous harm and various transgressions under the Explosives Act, along with the illegal possession of handgrenades?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Something else has just occurred to me. Someone else, I don't know who it was, it may have been Mamasela, alleged that not only handgrenades and limpet mines were handed over to him, but also two AK47s. What do you have to say about that?

MR DE KOCK: I do not know anything about that. I cannot say that it didn't happen, but I don't know about it.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you saying you can't remember or you didn't hand any over yourself?

MR DE KOCK: No, I did not hand over any guns. It was during the last two to two and a half days before the completion of the operation that I was contacted to assist. I don't wish to minimise my responsibility in this matter, but I just want to give you an indication of the scale of my involvement or my participation.

MR HATTINGH: You accept responsibility for your own actions in this matter?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I accept responsibility for my own actions, my own input and my association with the objectives and also insofar as the matter with the limpet mine is concerned, for the Technical Division and then also the members who prepared the limpet mine, that it was my idea to prepare this limpet mine. And with the exception of the preparation they had no other share in it, so I accept responsibility for my actions and their actions in that regard.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman, we have no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Hattingh. Mr Cornelius, any questions?

MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, I think the sequence has been that I was always second, perhaps it will ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, we'll stick to that. Mr Booyens, any questions?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS: Yes. Thank you, Mr Chairman, just a few brief aspects.

Mr de Kock, just one aspect. This question of the limpet mine, Mr du Toit's recollection is that the instruction to manufacture the limpet mine was sent to him by Hattingh, is it possible - you say that you cannot recall that you visited Brig Schoon, or something like that, but is it possible that before you went there you spoke to somebody else and that the instruction may possibly have arrived at Mr du Toit in that fashion?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it is possible.

MR BOOYENS: Because Mr du Toit says that you and he knew each other very well and that he cannot say that you did not visit him at some point during this incident, but what he says is that the instruction to manufacture the limpet mine came to him from Mr Hattingh.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I would accept it as that, because I could not remember anything about Brig Schoon and I'm not prepared to implicate anybody in this unnecessarily.

MR BOOYENS: Just one further aspect, Mr de Kock. It would appear to me that according to your personal role in this matter, with the exception of your recommendation, you may just as well have been left in Durban because you didn't really play such a significant role.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, on both sides of the struggle of the past one did not need any stimulation for meanness and I believe that Mr Cronje took me into his confidence, that there was really nothing that I could add to the incident to make it even more of a success.

MR BOOYENS: Thank you, nothing further.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Cornelius, any questions?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chair.

Mr de Kock, I am representing Daniel Nkala. I believe that he was an askari at the Vlakplaas unit.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: Now we have led much evidence about it and we have a very thorough history of the background of Vlakplaas, indicating that an askari was someone who had been taken over from the enemy to Vlakplaas and had become an operative who worked with you.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: The askaris also functioned on a very strict need-to-know basis, you gave specific orders which they had to carry out.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: And if an askari at any stage returned to his previous political affiliation, it would present serious consequences to your detrement, for example, with the Penge incident as we have seen. And you also had an Askari Disciplinary Committee, which sat at Vlakplaas with the purpose of disciplining askaris if they did not carry out their mandates.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: Now Mr Nkala's mandate to me is that he received an instruction from Mamasela, who was his senior, was this the case, was he his senior?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR CORNELIUS: And he also informs me further, and says so in his application, that he received an order during a meeting with you and Roelf Venter, to recruit members from COSAS.

MR DE KOCK: When I arrived here that organisation had already been infiltrated, there was no input that I could give. I had seen Col Cronje that evening and the following morning we drove through to fetch the handgrenades, so whatever was decided had already been decided and issued, no other persons could be recruited.

MR CORNELIUS: Did you know that there was a recruitment of at least five persons in every area and no more than 20 in total?

MR DE KOCK: No, I simply knew about an organisation which was attacking the homes of policemen and which had already infiltrated.

MR CORNELIUS: I see. Did you have any knowledge of the fact that Mamasela and Nkala were supposed to provide training for these recruited COSAS members in the use of handgrenades?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: This operation was actually under the command of Jack Cronje.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: And it would appear to me that Roelf Venter also played quite a significant role in this.

MR DE KOCK: Yes. I must just mention something, the share that Daniel Nkala performed at that stage was to provide support, for it to be an ANC situation, because he could speak the language, the camp language, that would be the ANC language, the use of certain innuendos and the basic language which the group would speak. It was to ensure that he would appear to be a bona fide ANC member. That is the importance that I saw in it.

MR CORNELIUS: And at that stage you must have known that Mr Nkala came from AZAPO in 1977 and received training from AZAPO and ANC?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, he was very well trained, one of the best that I had.

MR CORNELIUS: Yes, and he was specifically trained in the use of hand weapons and handgrenades?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: And so-called booby-traps?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: You did not give any orders to Nkala and tell him before the time precisely what the objective of the operation was and that zero-det(?) handgrenades would be handed over to the group?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: And I accept that the reason for that was because it wasn't necessary for him to know that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I'm not certain, I gave no input regarding the handgrenade or its application. I'm not really certain what was said to them by Col Cronje. let me put it this way, I did not instruct them operationally in any sense.

MR CORNELIUS: The inference that you drew regarding the incitement of activists, you say you inferred from the discussions that you heard before you left the operation finally?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it was an inference that I drew.

MR CORNELIUS: And in conclusion, my client will also give evidence according to his application, that he received R2 000 from you as a reward for his participation in the operation. What do you have to say about that?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, at that stage I did not have access to the funds or the delivery of funds.

MR CORNELIUS: And then my client also puts it that with the delivery of the handgrenades, you and Mr Venter were present at the hostel with the expert.

MR DE KOCK: I was at no hostel, Chairperson, not at all.

MR CORNELIUS: Were you ever provided with a thorough list of names of targets?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: That is an aspect that Mr Nkala will give evidence about, he said that when they recruited members they got hold of the names and handed it over to de Kock and Cronje. What do you say about that?

MR DE KOCK: No, I must say that my surname de Kock has rolled off the tongues of people too freely since 1985, all I can say is that I did not have such an extensive share in this matter, I have nothing to hide.

MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Cornelius. Mr Visser, do you have any questions you'd like to ask?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr de Kock, I am not certain whether you will recall this, but you must have listened to Steenkamp's evidence regarding a discussion which was to have taken place, not that the discussion is in any way important, but that it was said, I think he said that you said that there would be a surprise, "the people won't sleep tonight". Is it possible that such a discussion may have taken place?

MR DE KOCK: I don't know, I have no independent recollection of anything like that.

MR VISSER: Very well. The issue of the limpet mine, Mr Venter gave evidence - now I know that you were not represented when the applicants in the Cronje 5 matter gave evidence, coincidentally we were there, but we were not allowed to cross-examine, whatever the case may be, on page 38 of bundle 2A - I beg your pardon, I have been rectified by my learned friend, I'll find the reference to the evidence if it's necessary - he says at the bottom of page 38:

Do you have it before you? The final sentence.

And then he says:

Now it would appear as if Venter recalls the matter differently to what you have testified and it would appear that according to his evidence the inference has been drawn that the request for the limpet mine actually came from one of the activists or terrorists. Is it possible that you may have been mistaken today or is he mistaken, what would be the position? Because we have two conflict situations here.

MR DE KOCK: This was about the identification of Joe Mamasela because he was the person and as far as I know, the only person who had come face to face with the chief activist.

MR VISSER: Yes. Just one further aspect. Somewhere in the documents I read, and I cannot really recall exactly where, but Mr Beeslaar - or firstly, was Beeslaar also a member of Vlakplaas at that stage?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, what's that name?

MR VISSER: B-E-E-S-L-A-A-R. There's a statement by him somewhere, my attorney has just found it. It is in bundle 3A, from page 127.

And in this statement somewhere he has said that he went with you to fetch the handgrenades in Pretoria. I'm just mentioning this because it is a bit of a loose thread.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I cannot place Mr Beeslaar on the scene, I'm uncertain thereof, but I do know that Capt Venter and I went to Pretoria, he and I specifically.

MR VISSER: Well whether Beeslaar accompanied you or not is not really significant.

MR DE KOCK: Very well.

MR VISSER: May I just ask you, the detonators for an RDG5 handgrenade and an F1 handgrenade, would they have been the same? Would you have used the same detonator on both or would you have used different detonators?

MR DE KOCK: The detonation mechanism would be the same, but the lever would be different because an RDG5 is a more round, egg-shaped handgrenade, while an F1 is more oval, but one can adjust this simply by bending it somewhat.

MR VISSER: But the point is, that if somebody said to the Technical Division and asked them to adjust 24 detonators to a zero time delay, they could be adjusted for an offensive or a defensive handgrenade.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I think the word is that they were interchangeable, there was no problem with that.

MR VISSER: Yes, interchangeable. And just one final question if you will grant me this, Mr de Kock. I don't know if I understood you correctly, but upon a question of the Chairperson you said that to be certain that you would kill somebody you had to use either an offensive or a defensive handgrenade.

MR DE KOCK: No, it was the defensive handgrenade.

MR VISSER: Would that be the one with the tortoise ...(intervention)

MR DE KOCK: Yes, the people like to refer to it in the movies as a pineapple.

MR VISSER: A pineapple?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR VISSER: And the other one you described as a smooth shell, an aluminium shell.

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR VISSER: And would you say that the offensive grenade with the smooth shell could not kill somebody?

MR DE KOCK: No, it could, those pieces of shrapnel were razor sharp and against that high speed and temperature they were designed so that troops using them would have the minimum injuries.

MR VISSER: So if you wanted to be dead certain that you would kill someone you would use a defensive handgrenade?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Visser. Mr Mafora, do you have any questions you'd like to ask?

MR MAFORA: I do, Mr Chair, but I see it's almost 4 o'clock.

CHAIRPERSON: ... maybe if we could finish this witness it might be good. I'm told that we probably won't finish because we'll do a little bit of research before asking questions. So in that event it would be a convenient time to adjourn. I think after this morning's lesson we'll adjourn until half past nine tomorrow morning. Would that be better? Hopefully. Thank you.

So we'll adjourn until tomorrow, same venue, at half past nine in the morning.

MS LOCKHAT: Please stand.