CHAIRPERSON: Good morning everybody, we resume with the Zero-Zero Grenade hearing. When we adjourned yesterday, Mr Mafora was about to commence with his questioning of Mr de Kock.

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Mafora?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR MAFORA: Thank you, Mr Chairperson.

Mr de Kock, prior to this incident, how long had you known Mr Mamasela for?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I met Mr Mamasela when I started working at Vlakplaas, it was the 1st of July 1983. Somewhere during that time I met him for the first time.

MR MAFORA: And prior to this incident, you had previously worked with him on other operations, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, on one occasion there was an attempt in Swaziland to kill the chief of the ANC, Mr Zweli Nyanda, which was unsuccessful. At the second operation, Mr Mamasela was not present. ...(transcriber's interpretation)

MR MAFORA: And how well did you know him as a person, particularly on the question of obeying instructions that were given by you or other commanders is concerned?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, he never worked with me. In all my time I worked more in Northern Zululand and Western Transvaal, against the Pondrif area between Zimbabwe and Botswana. We worked in those border areas. During those times, Mr Mamasela never worked with me.

ADV GCABASHE: But Mr de Kock, would you have any other knowledge, ...(indistinct) from your colleagues, about the manner in which he would take orders, whether he was the type of person who would obey them to the letter etc., etc?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I personally, and it's my personal opinion, did not like Mr Mamasela, he usually followed his own head. He was not a person who could work in a team, he was not a team-worker. That is how I experienced him. At times he was mean with specifically the askaris, but he got on well with other persons, for example, Brig Cronje and Mr Venter. But the two of us personally did not see eye to eye.

MR MAFORA: Okay. How long had you worked with him for, prior to this incident? Or what - can you just give us the full extent of the period with which you worked with Mr Mamasela?

MR DE KOCK: I think we have to define it, that I served in the same group with him from July 1983 up to this incident, but he did not work in my section if I was sent out for field work.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, you mentioned that one operation in Swaziland, did you work together there, the Nyanda one?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, he was present, although I was not in control of the operation and I only saw him when he reported back to Col Cronje.

MR MAFORA: In your testimony yesterday you indicated that there was - you had strict disciplinary measures that were carried out in an event where an askari failed to follow instructions, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, after I took over the command I set up a system.

MR MAFORA: Oh you set up the system?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR MAFORA: Okay. Would Mamasela be subjected to those disciplinary measures even though he didn't work under you directly?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, when I took over on the 1st of July 1985, Mr Mamasela left my service because of his problems with other members and approximately a month to five weeks he was gone from my unit and the choice was put to him that he either co-operates and that people sort out their problems so that the work could get done, or that he chooses to leave the unit, and he left the unit.

MR MAFORA: But was he ever, to the best of your knowledge, maybe called to a disciplinary hearing for failure to obey instructions?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I would not know, because he did not serve under me and I did not have that problem.

MR MAFORA: And in your experience, would a - Gen van der Merwe, is it possible that he wouldn't have known that Mamasela and other operatives you know, that he was not fully aware of how this whole operation was going to be carried out? In your experience.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I would not know. If I was involved from the start with the operation, then I would have been able to comment.

MR MAFORA: In other operations, had you had any dealings with senior police officers?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR MAFORA: How was the briefing carried out in those operations, were they simply giving out instructions and they were not fully briefed as to how the full operation was going to be carried out, or what was your experience?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, if I could refer to an incident like the Lesotho operation, a submission was made, a request from a senior officer, the submission was made, the capabilities were set out there and the report-back is brief, it does not entail any detail as to who fell where, whose head was where and who bled, how long and whether some persons body was cut in half or those type of details. It was a brief report, eight people were killed or one was caught and documents were seized and weapons were seized. It is short and to the point.

MR MAFORA: But the seniors, were they not briefed of the operators, the people who would be carrying out the operation, the names and so forth?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson yes, but I think it would go to a certain level. I don't believe that Brig Schoon would for example, go to Gen van der Merwe and say Joe yesterday had contact with Jan or Koos. If I understand the question correctly.

MR MAFORA: And the - on the question of training you know, there has been this debate whether an instruction was given or not given you know, to train the victims. How did you - is this - I just want your comment here, if training was carried out, would it be in your experience, be something that is contrary to the way you used to carry out your operations? In trapping you know, potential victims.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I think each operation is unique on its own, in its own approach and the objective that has to be reached. The approach is never the same because circumstances are never the same. So each and every operation or infiltration is - although there might be a basic guideline, it would be unique on its own, in its own approach that has to be followed.

MR MAFORA: Thank you, Mr Chairperson, I have no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Lockhat, do you have any questions you'd like to ask?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS LOCKHAT: Yes, thank you, Chairperson.

Mr de Kock, I just want to refer you to bundle 2A, page 198, Chairperson, that is Mr Cronje's evidence before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, just the fourth line where Ms Khampepe is questioning Brig Cronje. She asks him:

And Brig Cronje answers:

Can you explain to us what did he mean by the planning of the operation? What was your role there?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I don't know, the only input which I delivered was with regard to the limpet mine. Maybe - and I must draw an inference or speculate, and that is that if there were any gaps he would have wanted me to say it, or what I would say with regard to the staff, but that is speculation.

MS LOCKHAT: I just want to take you also to bundle 2A, page 186, also regarding Cronje's evidence regarding the limpet mine. He says - it's in connection with Adv du Plessis' questions to him, he says:

... just the top of the page:

So I just want to get clarification here, who requested the limpet mine, you or ...(intervention)

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, it was me. My recollection is clear about that.

MS LOCKHAT: Did you personally go and request this limpet mine or did Cronje go and request on your behalf? Kindly just elaborate on that.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, when we collected the handgrenades from head office that discussion took place between myself and Venter and it was thought then about the situation of a limpet mine, to ensure that the chief activist would be killed and that was because of the handgrenades which were of such a nature that the chances to survive would be high.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Ms Lockhat, what did Cronje know about the limpet mine at that stage, when did he get to know about the limpet mine and what circumstances did he get to know about the limpet mine?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, when we returned to Springs, Venter and I - and I have a vague recollection thereof, I told him about this and that is when I informed him. I may be corrected, but that is my recollection thereof.

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Lockhat?

MS LOCKHAT: Thank you, Chairperson.

So you suggested that for this limpet mine, in order to basically eliminate Congress, is that correct? Mtweni.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, if I understood it correctly, then from the information he was the only person who could identify Joe Mamasela.

MS LOCKHAT: And then one other issue. I just want to get some clarification. You were requested to come from Durban, basically just to fetch the weapons and then your other only input was suggesting the limpet mine, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MS LOCKHAT: Why do you think you were called in, Mr de Kock, couldn't somebody else actually go and fetch these weapons? Why were you required, anybody could do that surely.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, up till today I still don't know. I have thought much about it and speculated about it, and if I have to speculate again, there can only be one reason for it and that is that if this operation did not take place in this manner with the handgrenades, then they must have had an alternative operation in mind. But that is pure speculation, because for me to drive to Durban, from Durban to Springs and stay there for two days where I never gave any input and only collected the handgrenades, it is unclear to me. But someone like Brig Cronje would not do anything without any reason and I accepted that there would have been a plan B or C if the handgrenades did not work. But as I have said, it is pure speculation.

MS LOCKHAT: So you didn't discuss plan B or C?

MR DE KOCK: No, as I say now, it is speculation. I request permission to speculate because that is the only other reason that I could think of. As I have said yesterday, not one of the two parties on both sides needed stimulation to be mean towards each other.

MS LOCKHAT: And then I just want to get some - just to see whether you know anything about this. Nkala testifies on page 156, bundle 3A, Chairperson, the top of the page he states:

Can you tell us whether you indeed had given Nkala these instructions, or whether this is just a fabrication?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I would not say it's a fabrication, it is probably that he might be mistaking me with somebody else. And I think where Joe Mamasela's confusion comes in and also Mr Nkala, was that they thought I was there all the time on the East Rand, only for the last two days was I there. After the infiltration had taken place, after everything had been arranged, even the handgrenades had been arranged, that is when I entered the picture.

MS LOCKHAT: And then I just want to take you further down the page as well, on page 156, the last line:

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I did not have any lists. I had no names and I had no lists.

MS LOCKHAT: Did you ever see a list?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I didn't see a list.

MS LOCKHAT: And then I want to bring you to the next issue of the R2 000 that gets sprayed through all the papers. Matexinge(?) on page 134 in the same bundle, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: 3A?

MS LOCKHAT: That is correct. At paragraph 9 he states:

I can't understand that word, but probably his part.

And then Nkala, on page 159 of the same bundle, at paragraph 21:

And then Mamasela, on page 184, also states at paragraph 20:

Now my question to you is, why all three of these persons with these very same story, kindly elaborate whether you have any knowledge whether this took place or if this is also just a mere fabrication.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, if they were paid money, it was not by me. I cannot say that they were not paid, I cannot say that, but I did not pay them, I did not write out any claims for this operation, I did not submit any claims for this operation because it was not my operation. So I cannot say that they did not receive money. If they did receive money, it was not from me.

MS LOCKHAT: Mr de Kock, was there a secret fund where people could actually get paid out at Vlakplaas for operations like this?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the Secret Fund, one has to submit claims and it goes through the channels and it has to be approved. For example, I can write out the claims, but there are two other situations through which the claim has to go. It has to go through Brig Schoon and he would recommend it and then the recommendation is taken to the Chief of Security and he has to approve it, depending on the amounts which are claimed, but I could not write out a claim for, in this instance, R6 000, draw the money and pay it to them. Not even our Father could do that.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr de Kock, when did you take over control of C1?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the 1st of July 1985.

CHAIRPERSON: Because on this page 159, Nkala said that it was about two weeks later that he received the R2 000 from you. So that would have been in July, after you were the Head of C1.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that is so.

CHAIRPERSON: Would it not therefore be possible that you may have paid them the money even though it was not your operation, because it was Cronje's operation and he was no longer there and you were now the head? I mean, who else would have paid the money?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, then he would have had to submit the claim, that was Brig Cronje. If I paid out the money I have no problem in saying so. There was an official remuneration, a reward scale if a terrorist was killed or caught, so it's not because I am scared to say that I did it if I did it, but I have no recollection that I paid these people for this operation and I did not submit any claims for this operation.

CHAIRPERSON: Is it then possible that maybe the claims might have been submitted by Cronje before he left, on the last few days of June, and then when they came through that you actually paid over the amounts to the people concerned physically and that you might not be remembering it?

MR DE KOCK: That may be, Chairperson, although I don't have any independent recollection thereof, but if Brig Cronje had submitted the claims then I would have made the payouts.

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Lockhat?

MS LOCKHAT: Thank you, Chairperson.

Mr de Kock, did you have any contact with any of these members, any of the victims, after this incident?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I did not.

MS LOCKHAT: Why I'm asking you is because Philip Lukele says that he was arrested and that he was arrested by - after this incident, by Brig Cronje and yourself. I shall refer you to that statement, it's in bundle 2A, Chairperson, it's page 223, it's at line 10. This is basically where he was - he came home and where he was actually arrested. He says at line 10:

And then he goes on further:

Can you just explain this to us, Mr de Kock? You just said now you didn't have any dealings with any of these victims afterwards, but clearly here it seems as if you actually went to go and arrest one of these people.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, the only thing that I can say is that the evidence that this man gave here was entirely false. I would go so far as to say that he is lying, and I will stand by that. If I went to fetch him from his house or out of the ceiling, then I would have said so, I have no problem with saying so.

MS LOCKHAT: And just one last question, just regarding the infiltration. Did you know whether there were any instructions, just by mere - just you being there and part of this operation, whether you heard of anything where it was given that Joe Mamasela, Nkala and maybe Matexinge had to go and actually infiltrate these people in the different areas and then obviously give them the weapons and so forth? Do you know anything of that, you personally?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, when I arrived in Springs this whole group had already been infiltrated. I was not aware of people - that people had to be recruited one by one in these areas.

MS LOCKHAT: And then just another issue, just regarding the money issue. Is it normal practice for people to get rewarded in operations like this, especially when it was authorised at such a high level?

MR DE KOCK: There were remunerative scales, yes.

MS LOCKHAT: Did you get any remuneration for this operation?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MS LOCKHAT: Why not?

MR DE KOCK: I did not fall into that classification.

CHAIRPERSON: What was the classification for remuneration payments?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it was usually of application to members of the public and then also, it was applied to the askaris. If they had caught or injured a terrorist their remuneration would be R2 000, or if they had done anything to lead to the arrest or death of such a person. This was an official remunerative list or scale, which was adjusted on an annual basis, that for example, an AK was worth R600 or R800 if it was handed in, a limpet mine was worth R2 000, a mini-limpet mine was worth R1 000, ammunition for example would be worth R25 for 75 rounds of ammunition, for a SAM7, that's a service to air missile, it would be R7-R8 000.

CHAIRPERSON: So there was a tariff.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson, and it was adjusted as necessary, in order to obtain information.

MS LOCKHAT: So this didn't apply to any members of the Police Force, is that what you're saying?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, it didn't.

MS LOCKHAT: Thank you, Chairperson, I have no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Hattingh, do you have any re-examination?

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr de Kock, you were examined regarding the evidence of Mr Cronje when he made his amnesty application. Do you know anything about the answer to his amnesty application?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And you were not represented to be examined in this regard?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: The question of who requested the limpet mine, you have already explained that it was your idea and that you expressed this idea to Mr du Toit and asked whether it could be done, and your recollection is that you also reported to Brig Cronje about it.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Is it possible that Brig Cronje afterwards may have consulted the Technical Division in this regard and given them instructions?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it is possible.

MR HATTINGH: Then with regard to Mr Mamasela, during your criminal trial he also testified against you.

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And from his evidence it appeared very clearly, and let us put it lightly, that there was no love lost between you and him.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Is it correct that you and he, as you have already given evidence, didn't really get along, but it went further than that, in fact you clashed quite severely.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. His manner of working, as he regarded it, was not in accordance with the discipline at Vlakplaas. And I must just mention for example, that after he left Vlakplaas, approximately five weeks later, within a week or two, he shot dead an eight year old girl and he alleges that he was attacked. This was somewhere in Vereeniging. So that is the type of person that I did not want surrounding me.

MR HATTINGH: And where did he go after he left you?

MR DE KOCK: He went to Vereeniging and after the shooting of the child or the murder of this child, which was covered up, he went from there to the Security Branch here in Pretoria, where he worked under Brig Cronje, who had the capacity to control Joe to a certain extent.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Hattingh. Adv Gcabashe, do you have any questions you'd like to put to the witness?

ADV GCABASHE: Yes, thanks, just one or two.

Mr de Kock, let's come back to the limpet mine. I understand that that was your idea.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

ADV GCABASHE: Was there any suggestion, either from you when you spoke to Cronje, or from Cronje himself or anybody else that Congress, the leader, should be killed because he was the leader of COSATU. Was there any link or any discussion around that at all?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, it was about the identification of Joe Mamasela. I didn't even know that his name was Congress, that is why I referred to him as the chief activist. I didn't know their names, I didn't know who I was dealing with. These were simply persons who were infiltrating - had been infiltrated.

ADV GCABASHE: When you spoke to Cronje about this, did he indicate to you at all that some of the other members, some of the other activists might be able to identity Mamasela or Nkala as well?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson no, as I understood it during that brief period of time that I was there, Joe basically liaised on a one-on-one basis with Congress and he was a latent danger. And if he survived the operation he would be able to identify Joe Mamasela and that would create problems for the Security Police.

ADV GCABASHE: I say this because there's a statement from one of the activists in our bundles, that does identify Mamasela as somebody who he recognised when he saw him on TV. It must have been much much later, but he realised that this was the chap who had taken them through the basic training they'd been through.

MR DE KOCK: Very well, I would accept that, I would not dispute it. However, this is the concentration of the information that I had at my disposal after the entire situation had developed.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, if I could just on that point. One would imagine that the persons to whom the grenades had been given had to receive some sort of training, how to pull the pin, how far to throw the grenade in order for it to be safe, that sort of advice, and one would imagine that that would be given in a group situation rather than just to the main activist to relay it on.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I would concede to that, that it had to be that way. I must just state that a handgrenade although it is one of the most powerful weapons, it is also one of the simplest weapons because any person who found himself in the infantry was simple minded in any way. It is an extremely simple weapon, it is like a stone with a handle and a pin, you pull the pin and you throw it, that's that, and then you would just have to see to it that you had to be at least 10 metres away from the grenade otherwise you might encounter shrapnel, but that is a bit technical.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you.

ADV GCABASHE: Did I understand you to say that on the night of the incident, you were in a motor vehicle with Mr Delport and Mr Cronje?

MR DE KOCK: No, I did not see Mr Delport there, it was me Cronje and Venter. There may have been other people, but I only went to greet Brig Delport. It would be highly undisciplined not to visit the head of the unit if you were in his area.

ADV GCABASHE: But you didn't have any detailed discussions with him?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, not at all.

ADV GCABASHE: Had you before this incident, heard at all what problems Delport might be having in the East Rand, just generally? Because you were kept informed you know, or areas that you would have to go and help out in. Had you heard anything at all about the East Rand?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I grew up in those areas and I grew up in an area such as Springs for example, after that I stayed in Boksburg. The Vlakplaas unit, C1, operation on a national basis or at least all the reports which were sent through on a national level every day were also channelled through C1. And before this operation the East Rand was an absolute melting pot, it was a witches brew of violence, so it wasn't necessary for me to go to Mr Delport to find out whether or not he was really experiencing problems. There was violence on a daily 24-hour basis in the East Rand, but the same situation prevailed in the Eastern Cape, such as Port Elizabeth and because we worked so close to the area we were quite involved in it.

ADV GCABASHE: On the night of the incident - if I can come back to that, I forgot to ask, were any of your men deployed near any of the targets that were to be hit that night?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I drove with Brig Cronje. If he had deployed any of the other persons I wouldn't have known about it, but I would have found it strange because one wouldn't want one's people in such an area because they ran the risk of being caught by the uniform police and the uniform police didn't know who the askaris were.

ADV GCABASHE: Then finally if I can ask you to look at 3A, it's Mr Mamasela's statement. He says on page 182 that you decided that Nkala should assist him. Are you saying that that's incorrect?

MR DE KOCK: No, that would not be correct.

ADV GCABASHE: Then if we look at - this is 2A, Mr Lukele's statement, that's one of the victims, page 223. Ms Lockhat referred you to an earlier portion. Further down on page 223, around line 20 and below, about 24, he says that you put a gun into his father's mouth and he talks about - further down, that he was taken to a forest, his feet were handcuffed as well as his hands, right at the bottom of that page. I hear you when you say this was not you, you were not there.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, definitely not.

ADV GCABASHE: Did you get to know about anything of this nature that might have happened there?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I never handled any of these persons, I didn't even make enquiries or request progress reports for further reference later on.

CHAIRPERSON: Just on that point. Do you know whether Brigadier or Colonel or whatever he was then, Cronje was involved in the arrest of any of the activists?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, if I recall correctly, at that stage the only reason why we moved the following morning to some of these areas where the explosions had taken place was because we were a counter-terrorism unit and it would have been strange if we did not visit these places. But then Brig Cronje also had to report about it and that is the only reason why we returned to those areas. He did not make any arrests whatsoever. And on that day in that case, I spent the whole day with Brig Cronje and I can assure you that under no circumstances would I have withheld this here. If I had arrested Lukele or interrogated him, I would have been able to provide much more detail regarding the interrogation, if that had been the case.

ADV GCABASHE: Thank you, Chair. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Malan?

MR MALAN: Just on this point, who would usually have carried out these arrests, if there is such a concept?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it would have been members of the uniform branch from the bottom unit and the Security Branch which was operational in that area, because they would have had to investigate these matters. Then also perhaps members of the Detective Branch, who were co-opted. I'm just providing this as a broad range of possibilities.

MR MALAN: Vlakplaas would not usually have been involved in arrests, is that what you're saying?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, not in this case, we would definitely have kept away from these people.

MR MALAN: Thank you.

MR VISSER: I wonder Mr Chairman, whether I couldn't assist. It has nothing to do with my case, but it is important to know that Lukele wasn't one of the persons arrested and charged together with the group of survivors. We don't know why he was arrested and when it was done, those questions were never asked of him, but he was clearly not arrested in regard to the criminal trial which followed against the survivors of the handgrenade incident. I thought that might be relevant to Mr Malan's last question.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr de Kock, I know that you say you weren't involved in the planning of the operation at all, or the conceiving of the idea and how it should be carried out, but we've heard and you've heard the evidence that information was received that these people were wanting to attack police or councillors' houses and that they were waiting for arms and so the plot was hatched to anticipate that by infiltrating them, giving them booby-trapped handgrenades and kill them. Can you think of any reason why in those circumstances it should have been so strongly stressed that those people should not in any way be incited to commit any attack or crime, once they've been infiltrated?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson yes ...(intervention

CHAIRPERSON: I'm just trying to find out what the logic is behind it, if there is any or why was that stressed?

MR DE KOCK: Well I have two ideas about that, the first is that if there was information that these people were waiting for weapons and that information was channelled through to the Security Branch, then one could even point out the Piet Retief incident here, where you would be one step ahead of your opposition, you would take the place of someone who was supposed to come, that would be basic interception.

The second option would be that it wouldn't help to incite people who did not want to attack the homes of policemen, because those persons that you had incited could be killed or injured, but the original persons would still be there. That's my perception of it. So you would have to see that you reach the right people. It doesn't help to swot the flies but leave the eagles.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but there would have been certainly incitement in relation to the limpet mine, because that was taken to some power supply or power station which wasn't contemplated before the limpet mine idea came to the fore.

MR DE KOCK: I have no recollection of who made the target indications and I don't have any information about that, I would simply expect that if there were target identifications, this would come from the group itself. I would not be able to testify whether Joe Mamasela told him to make certain identifications of people or homes, Mamasela would have to give us explanations about who identified the targets. I wouldn't be able to do that.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Are there any questions arising out of questions that have been put by members of the Panel? Thank you, Mr de Kock, that then concludes your testimony, you may stand down.

MR DE KOCK: Thank you, Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairperson, Mr Cornelius' client has just arrived here. He and I have agreed that I will deal with my team of technical personnel first, so with your permission, may we please make the seating arrangements so that we can all take our positions. Could we adjourn, I don't know what your position is.

CHAIRPERSON: We'll just take a five minute adjournment.

MS LOCKHAT: Please stand.

MR MALAN: Mr Booyens, who is your first applicant?

MR BOOYENS: I beg your pardon, it is Mr Hattingh.

MR MALAN: Mr Hattingh, your full names for the record?

PAUL JAKOBUS HATTINGH: (sworn states)

MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, this applicant submitted a very cryptic application just at the cut-off date, where he applied for amnesty for "aangepaste wapentuig" but we have subsequently - and I trust the Members of the Committee are in possession a more comprehensive application, it's a loose document that's subsequently been handed to you, a typewritten one.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I have it, Adv Gcabashe has it, I'm sure Mr Malan's got it, but can't find it.

MR BOOYENS: That's a reasonable possibility, Mr Chairman. My attorney has got an extra one.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, no, he does have one. So this will be ...

MR BOOYENS: Exhibit K.

CHAIRPERSON: We'll call it Exhibit K. This is the application form of Paul Jakobus Hattingh. Yes, Mr Booyens?

EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS: Thank you, Chairperson.

Mr Hattingh, before you you have your amnesty application, is that correct?

MR HATTINGH: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Do you confirm what appears on the first, second, third and fourth pages?

MR HATTINGH: Yes, I do.

MR BOOYENS: Now with regard to your involvement in the modification of these weapons, it does not appear from your application documents, but how did you become involved? At that you were the Head of the Demolitions Division.

MR HATTINGH: Yes, that is correct.

MR BOOYENS: And you were a Colonel?

MR HATTINGH: Yes, that is correct.

MR BOOYENS: The Technical Division was an independent division under the command of the then Maj Wal du Toit, I think, which actually resided under you, but they were independent, however, for administrative purposes they fell under your division, is that correct?

MR HATTINGH: Actually Chairperson, they were an independent unit of the Security Head Office and we were also an independent division, however we worked very closely together under certain circumstances.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry I'd just like to get this straight, Mr Hattingh. So you had a Technical Division which was - you call an independent unit of the Security Police.

MR HATTINGH: That's right, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: And then the Demolition Division, was that ...(intervention)

MR HATTINGH: That was my division, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: ... was that also independent or was it just part of ...(intervention)

MR HATTINGH: No, we were independent divisions, Mr Chairman, but we were both attached to Security Headquarters and my division had a branch commander, if I can call it that, and they had their branch commander.

CHAIRPERSON: And you were the Branch Commander of the Demolition ...(intervention)

MR HATTINGH: I was the Branch Commander of the Explosives Section, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: You call that the Explosives Section.

MR HATTINGH: That's right.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR BOOYENS: And during 1985, you were requested to go to Gen van der Merwe's office.

MR HATTINGH: Yes, that is correct.

MR BOOYENS: And once you arrived there, Gen van der Merwe was there, and during consultation you told me that you can recall that Brig Schoon was there and that there were others, but that you cannot recall exactly who they were.

MR HATTINGH: Yes, that is correct.

MR BOOYENS: That was in Gen van der Merwe's office, who was at that stage second-in-command of the Security Head Office?

MR HATTINGH: Yes, that is correct.

MR BOOYENS: And there you attended a discussion or part of a discussion which had to do with the modification of weaponry.

MR HATTINGH: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Can you tell the Committee what it was about.

MR HATTINGH: Chairperson, very briefly, it was explained to me that weaponry would be required for an operation on the East Rand, but full details were not provided. However, handgrenades and a limpet mine would be involved and if possible the detonators of he handgrenades and the limpet mine had to be adjusted so that it would detonate immediately, in other words without the time delay.

MR BOOYENS: And what was your reaction to this?

MR HATTINGH: Chairperson, I told them that I thought that it could be done, but that it required more expertise than that which the usual man possessed and that I would take up the matter with Wal du Toit from the Technical Division.

MR BOOYENS: When you refer to the usual man, do you refer to the usual member of the Demolitions Unit?

MR HATTINGH: Yes, your average man on the street and your average person in the Demolitions Division.

MR BOOYENS: Did this appear to you as something which had to go to the Technical Division?

MR HATTINGH: Yes, it did.

MR BOOYENS: Just with regard to the detail of the operation, did you draw the inference of that which was said to you, that the weaponry had to be delivered to the opposition in some or other fashion?

MR HATTINGH: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Let us just deal with this now, Mr Hattingh. At that stage although you were employed in the Technical Division of the Security Branch, you were up to date with the security situation in the country?

MR HATTINGH: Yes, that is correct.

MR BOOYENS: And you were also up to date regarding the activities and the situation on the East Rand.

MR HATTINGH: Yes, we received regular security reviews, where we could get a picture of what was going on.

MR BOOYENS: Now this plan to detonate these items as you inferred, without the time delay, the clear intention then would be to kill or injure the handler of the weaponry?

MR HATTINGH: Yes, that is correct.

MR BOOYENS: And that would be illegal in terms of the law?

MR HATTINGH: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Did you have a moral problem with that?

MR HATTINGH: No.

MR BOOYENS: Why not?

MR HATTINGH: Chairperson, our division was tasked with various tasks of which this would simply be one. We were directly linked to the revolutionary struggles, we had to find counter-measures to combat the onslaught, so we were always busy with research. We were involved in a war against the enemy and I regarded this as part of our job, this was our contribution to the struggle.

MR BOOYENS: You also told me that you could recall that at a stage Gen van der Merwe left, but that you cannot recall at which stage this request was given to you, or at least the question was asked of you as to whether or not this could be done.

MR HATTINGH: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Did you then depart from there with the attitude of "I'll find out from the Technical Division" and did you then go and visit Wal du Toit?

MR HATTINGH: Did you discuss the matter with du Toit, whether or not this was technically viable and did he then give an indication that they would see what they could do?

MR HATTINGH: Yes, he indicated that.

MR BOOYENS: Did he contact you afterwards to tell you whether they would succeed in modifying the handgrenade detonators and the limpet mine detonator, as per the instructions?

MR HATTINGH: Yes, that is correct.

MR BOOYENS: And can you recall personally what took place with the weaponry afterwards?

MR HATTINGH: Chairperson, the weaponry was modified, or at least the detonators were modified by Mr du Toit and his staff and I received it back from them, and it was fetched from us to be taken to the East Rand, along with the bomb. In other words, the handgrenades and the limpet mine were taken together.

MR BOOYENS: Mr de Kock says that he came to fetch the handgrenades, but you cannot recall who came to fetch the handgrenades or whether it was fetched from you in fact?

MR HATTINGH: No.

MR BOOYENS: So you don't have a problem if Mr de Kock states that?

MR HATTINGH: No.

MR BOOYENS: And after that the weaponry was out of your hands, and did you have anything further to do with it?

MR HATTINGH: No, I didn't.

MR BOOYENS: And did you find out by means of the press later on, that explosions had taken place during which people had been killed?

MR HATTINGH: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Then just to return to your application. You confirm the rest of your application?

MR HATTINGH: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: And you also confirm that the motive for your co-operation or participation in this operation was because it was part of the struggle between the Security Police and the liberation movements at that stage in our county?

MR HATTINGH: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Just one further aspect, just to amend something on page 5. The date that you have provided there is stated as 1986, that is incorrect, it ought to be 1985.

MR HATTINGH: Yes, that is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Can I just request that amendment please, Chairperson. It's page 5 of the application.

CHAIRPERSON: That is the amendment to paragraph 9(a)(2), by the deletion of 1986 and the substitution of ...

MR BOOYENS: 1985.

CHAIRPERSON: ... substituting it with 1985. Any objections to that?

MR BOOYENS: I think that's actually just a typing error, because ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I see it says "gedurende ..." ...(intervention)

MR BOOYENS: ... it says '85.

CHAIRPERSON: In sub-paragraph 1 it mentions '85, it looks like a typing error.

MR BOOYENS: Ja. Thank you, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Hattingh, do you have any questions you'd like to ask?

MR HATTINGH: No thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Cornelius?

MR CORNELIUS: I have no questions, thank you, Mr Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, perhaps just one.

Do I understand you correctly that you actually acted according to the instructions of Brig Schoon and Gen van der Merwe?

MR HATTINGH: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Mafora, do you have any questions?

MR MAFORA: No questions, Mr Chairperson, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Lockhat?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS LOCKHAT: Yes, Chairperson.

I just want to clarify, the request for the handgrenades and the limpet mine, did it come together in one request to you, or was it - did it happen on different occasions?

MR HATTINGH: Chairperson, I really don't recall, I have listened to the evidence of others who have testified here and it is possible that the two requests were not put in on the same day, it may be that the limpet mine only came forward later, but I cannot recall.

MS LOCKHAT: Over how many days did it take to modify these weapons?

MR HATTINGH: Chairperson, Mr Wal du Toit would perhaps be able to give more thorough evidence about that, I would assume that it would be a day to three days, but I'm not certain.

MS LOCKHAT: And just then the last question is, who was your commander at that time, who was your Head?

MR HATTINGH: We resided directly below Security Head Office. Every unit had a unit commander. I cannot recall whether at that stage it was Brig Schoon, because he was also our commander to a certain extent. I recall cannot recall who was our immediate Head of our unit.

CHAIRPERSON: We know that you had, I think it was C-Section and there was C1 and C2 and later I think, C3. Did the Technical and Explosives Section, were they - what was A-Section and B-Section, do you know?

MR HATTINGH: No, they were all different sections, Mr Chairman, with different functions. So it was just a letter allocated to each section.

CHAIRPERSON: What was yours, can you remember?

MR HATTINGH: We were - it changed through the years, I was there for 10 years and sometimes we were under C and sometimes we were under another one. I can't recall in this specific instance under which letter we resorted.

MS LOCKHAT: Thank you, Chairperson, I have no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Booyens, do you have any re-examination?

MR BOOYENS: No, thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Adv Gcabashe, do you have any questions?

ADV GCABASHE: No, thank you.

MR MALAN: No questions.

MS LOCKHAT: Chairperson, just one last aspect relating to Mr Hattingh's application. I don't know if you've noted, but his application didn't appear in the bundle, the original bundle, but we couriered copies of page 285 that we paginated to 287 of his application and informed everybody to insert it. I have made copies for everybody and if we could just circulate it, and just for record purposes, that we do actually have it, Chairperson, and then mark it Exhibit L. I don't know it that's necessary or if we should just include it.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Hattingh, before you go, can you recall approximately how many handgrenades there were?

MR HATTINGH: Mr Chairman, no I can't. I listened to Mr de Kock's testimony and I must agree, it could have been that amount, I can't remember.

CHAIRPERSON: And can you remember if there was anything notable about the colours of the ...(intervention)

MR HATTINGH: No, Sir, they were the original colour, it's a sort of a khaki-green, we didn't paint them or change them at all.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Any questions arising from questions that have been put by Members of the Panel?

FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, merely because you appear to be interested in it, perhaps I could ask a question or two.

Mr Hattingh, in 1983, you were Group K, not so?

MR HATTINGH: It could be so, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Was your immediate Head, Mr Cruywagen?

MR HATTINGH: Of the unit, no. Let me explain it like this, Mr Chairperson. The Demolitions Unit was subdivided into two sections, the one group of people were responsible for commercial management and Cruywagen was in charge of Demolitions with regard to mines, the transfer of commercial explosives, my unit was involved with the Bomb Disposal Unit. We worked throughout the country on a decentralised basis, we trained personnel, we gave lectures to the public, we did research, we were directly involved in bomb disposal and damage control, and that is what the other group did not do.

MR VISSER: No but the Chairperson just wanted to know who your direct commander was.

MR HATTINGH: No, I was in command of that specific unit.

MR VISSER: And then you resided under head office?

MR HATTINGH: That is correct. We simply referred to it as senior management. Now in this case I refer to senior management and that would be, in this case, Gen van der Merwe and Brig Schoon. That is what I meant.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Thank you, Mr Hattingh, that concludes your evidence, you may stand down.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: The next witness is Mr Wal du Toit, Mr Chairman, and his application can be found on page 240 of bundle 1.

MR MALAN: Your full names of Wybrand Andreas Lodewikus?

WYBRAND ANDREAS LODEWIKUS DU TOIT: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Booyens?

EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr du Toit, you have your amnesty application before you.

MR DU TOIT: Yes, that is correct.

MR BOOYENS: And on page 242, 43, 44 to 248, you deal basically with your career history and where you were employed.

MR DU TOIT: Yes, that is correct.

MR BOOYENS: And on page 249 you sketch the background of what exactly the Technical Division of the Security Branch was.

MR DU TOIT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Just to clarify certain aspects, Mr du Toit. There may be the perception in the minds of some people that the Technical Division of the Security Branch was only involved in offensive actions, such as for example this modification of weaponry, in this case and in other cases and so forth. Would you please explain to the Committee exactly how the Technical Division functioned. Try to be brief, but I think it is important.

MR DU TOIT: Thank you, Chairperson. I would just like to say from the beginning that this perception is not correct, the primary function of the unit was to provide technological support for the court oriented information gathering actions. We had an official mandate, it was in line with official practice and there was nothing sinister about the existence of the unit.

MR BOOYENS: Very well. And with regard to the modification of weaponry and so forth, later in your application you refer to the fact that you modified various types of weaponry, that you modified mines, limpet mines, mini-limpet mines, grenade detonators, even ammunition, is that correct?

MR DU TOIT: Yes, that is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Is this something which you did on a daily basis or was it a sporadic occurrence?

MR DU TOIT: No, it occurred sporadically due to the fact that there was a limited level of expertise in that unit and that we had the infrastructure to deal with such occurrences.

MR BOOYENS: Then there is just one technical aspect that I wish to clarify here, and I think that you should explain this to the Committee, because especially in previous applications if we study the evidence given by Brig Jack Cronje and others, the statement has been made essentially, that handgrenades or the detonators of handgrenades were adjusted to such an extent that they would explode as soon as you pulled the pin.

MR DU TOIT: No, that is not correct. The lever which folded over the handgrenade had to be loosened first, in other words the pin that was removed was actually a safety mechanism, the lever had to be removed first before the handgrenade would go off.

MR BOOYENS: And that would take place once a person had tossed the handgrenade, that is after the lever and the pin had been removed?

MR DU TOIT: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: And in this case the handgrenade would have gone off.

MR DU TOIT: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Now Mr du Toit, regarding your involvement in offensive operations, in 1985, can you recall whether Mr Paul Hattingh came to you regarding an issue of the possibility of zero-det handgrenades, the possibility of modifying the detonators of such handgrenades?

MR DU TOIT: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Now were you aware of an incident in 1978 at Meleeuskop(?), which was a training base, where a handgrenade apparently went off - was it 1978 or 1988?

MR DU TOIT: It's 1978.

MR BOOYENS: ... where a handgrenade, an eastern block handgrenade went off immediately and policemen were injured?

MR DU TOIT: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: And were you also aware that there was talk of the existence of so-called zero-det handgrenades?

MR DU TOIT: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Did you and Mr Hattingh then discuss the matter?

MR DU TOIT: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: And did you investigate the technical viability of this practice and come to the conclusion that it could be done?

MR DU TOIT: Yes, that is correct.

MR BOOYENS: You also received a request, can you recall whether this was at the same time or possibly later, the request being also to modify a limpet mine for the purposes of immediate detonation?

MR DU TOIT: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: And was this also investigated and carried out?

MR DU TOIT: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Possibility just to take it as far as 1989, because you refer to this at stages, did you also receive further requests or instructions for the modification of other forms of weaponry, and was this executed?

MR DU TOIT: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: I think it might just be necessary, just for the sake of completion, for you to elaborate on this. I have read in your application about limpet mines and mini-limpet mines, what is a mini-limpet mine?

MR DU TOIT: It is an anti-personnel mine.

MR BOOYENS: Yes, is it a smaller mine?

MR DU TOIT: Yes, it is.

MR BOOYENS: And then we have also read about the modification of the handgrenade detonators, can you tell us - you heard yesterday afternoon that Mr de Kock said that the detonators could be used on both offensive and defensive eastern block handgrenades, would you agree with that?

MR DU TOIT: Yes, I agree.

MR BOOYENS: You also refer to the fact that ammunition or the regular rounds of ammunition were modified at times.

MR DU TOIT: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: And did Technical Division ever do these things out of their own initiation or motivation, or were there requests or instructions for this to be done?

MR DU TOIT: There were always requests and instructions.

MR BOOYENS: Your division didn't really have the appropriate information to evaluate the exact nature and so forth of an operation in which those things that you had manufactured would be used?

MR DU TOIT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: So it fell beyond your line function?

MR DU TOIT: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: You were not a division who worked in the field, you were technical?

MR DU TOIT: Yes, that is correct.

MR BOOYENS: And in this specific case what we are dealing with here, after Mr Hattingh said to you what the request was, did he briefly inform you what it was about and what they were considering it for?

MR DU TOIT: Voorsitter, my herinnering daaraan is dat dit primêr so wees om as afskrik middel to dien en om persone wat hulleself bereid verklaar het om ander te dood, op hierdie wyse to elimineer. ...(no English interpretation)

MR BOOYENS: And he also told you that it came as an instruction from the top?

MR DU TOIT: That's correct.

MR BOOYENS: Were you satisfied that although it was legally wrong, that it was morally correct with regard tot he situation which was at hand?

MR DU TOIT: Yes, I was satisfied, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Did you and the other applicants who apply for amnesty make the necessary work to do these modifications?

MR DU TOIT: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Mr du Toit, you request amnesty - let me just ask you, you confirm the correctness of the application in total?

MR DU TOIT: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Let us just get your application in order. You request amnesty for any offence which might flow out of your involvement with the modification of the arms.

MR DU TOIT: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Or any offence or delict. I know here we only refer to conspiracy, but it might be accessory and certain transgressions of the Act on Explosives.

MR DU TOIT: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: And with regard to the preparation of these - of your application as well as the Kok brothers and Mr Louw, you did not have legal representation at that stage.

MR DU TOIT: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: And you basically prepared your own application and because you had a computer you also assisted the other persons in the completion of their applications.

MR DU TOIT: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: The first handgrenades to which the detonators had been modified, was this the handgrenades about which this incident is about, as to which Mr Hattingh gave evidence?

MR DU TOIT: I believe so, Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: And in your application you also mentioned that at a later stage you stopped modifying detonators because of two explosions.

MR DU TOIT: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: In which you and the applicant, Mr Kobus Kok were involved and the explosions took place 10 minutes after each other.

MR DU TOIT: That's correct.

MR BOOYENS: And at that stage you thought that something might have changed and no modifications were made thereafter.

MR DU TOIT: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: And can you recall when this was?

MR DU TOIT: I don't have a recollection thereof, I think it was in the early '90's.

MR BOOYENS: Thank you, Mr Chairperson.

ADV GCABASHE: Could I just ask on that point, you are not saying these are the only adaptations you made?

MR DU TOIT: That's correct, Chairperson, there were others.

ADV GCABASHE: There were others that you made.

MR DU TOIT: There was.

ADV GCABASHE: But this was the first?

MR DU TOIT: These were the first yes, Chairperson.

ADV GCABASHE: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Booyens. Mr Hattingh, do you have any questions?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr du Toit, you have heard Mr de Kock's evidence that he and Mr Roelf Venter visited you and asked you to modify a limpet mine in the same manner, can you recall that?

MR DU TOIT: Chairperson, I don't have a recollection thereof. I cannot deny it though, it may be so.

MR HATTINGH: Can you recall whether you had indeed modified such a limpet mine?

MR DU TOIT: I did, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Cornelius?

MR CORNELIUS: I have no questions, thank you, Mr Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser?

MR VISSER: No questions, thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Mafora?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR MAFORA: Just one question, Mr Chairman.

How many handgrenades did you prepare?

MR DU TOIT: Voorsitter, kan ons die vraag net meer spesifiek kry, verwys u na hierdie besondere geval? ...(no English interpretation)

MR MAFORA: No, for this incident.

MR DU TOIT: Vir hierdie insident?

MR MAFORA: Yes.

MR DU TOIT: I don't have a clear recollection thereof, Chairperson, I will agree with what the other applicants have said. I assume that it must be to the amount of 20.

MR MAFORA: Thank you, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Mafora. Ms Lockhat?

MS LOCKHAT: I have no questions, thank you, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Booyens, any re-examination?

MR BOOYENS: No re-examination.

CHAIRPERSON: Adv Gcabashe, any questions?

ADV GCABASHE: Were any brought back to you after this incident, for safekeeping?

MR DU TOIT: No, Chairperson.

ADV GCABASHE: Or for further alteration, adjustments?

MR DU TOIT: Are you referring to these ...(intervention)

ADV GCABASHE: These particular ones, yes.

MR DU TOIT: No, Chairperson.

ADV GCABASHE: No. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Malan?

MR MALAN: No questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr du Toit, that concludes your - sorry is there a question arising out of the question put by Adv Gcabashe? No questions.

That concludes your evidence, you may stand down, thank you.

MR DU TOIT: Thank you, Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: I call Jakobus Kok, Chairperson. My attention is being drawn to the fact that it's time for the short adjournment. Would it an appropriate time to adjourn for the tea break? The following applicant will be Mr Kock.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you, it's now 11 o'clock, we'll adjourn for tea now until twenty five past eleven, thank you.

MS LOCKHAT: All rise.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairperson, the following witness is Jakobus Kok, his application is on page 30 of volume 1.

JAKOBUS KOK: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS: Mr Kok, your amnesty application appears from page 30 to page 47, is that correct?

MR KOK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: I will repeat that. Your amnesty application appears from page 30 to page 47 in this application, is that correct?

MR KOK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Do you confirm the correctness thereof?

MR KOK: I do, Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: You worked in the Technical Division, under the command of Wal du Toit?

MR KOK: That's correct.

MR BOOYENS: You have heard the evidence of Mr Wal du Toit that he has delivered here?

MR KOK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Do you agree?

MR KOK: I agree completely, Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Mr du Toit amongst others, gave an explanation as to what the Technical Division did, do you agree with what he had said?

MR KOK: Yes, I do, Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: And further that you as the Technical Division received orders, you were never in a position to consider the merits of an operation, is that correct?

MR KOK: That is indeed so, Chairperson, we only acted on requests and not from our own initiative.

MR BOOYENS: And when this instruction came for the modification of the handgrenade detonators as well as the mine, did you accept that it would be done in the struggle against the enemy forces of the past?

MR KOK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Were you also aware that such actions would be illegal?

MR KOK: Yes, I was, Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: But did you see it with regard to the background which reigned at that stage and you saw it morally justifiable in the struggle?

MR KOK: Yes, I had no objection to it and I accepted it as such and executed it in the spirit thereof, Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Mr Kok, through the years you had modified arms sporadically, is that correct?

MR KOK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: And it was amongst others, handgrenade detonators, limpet mines and mini-limpet mines as well as firearm ammunition?

MR KOK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: And these things, did you always receive instructions from your commander which you accepted that he received instructions from somebody else?

MR KOK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Do you confirm that you apply for amnesty for any offence or delict which might flow out from your involvement with the adaptation of arms?

MR KOK: I do confirm, Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Thank you, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Booyens. Mr Hattingh, do you have any questions?

MR HATTINGH: No, thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Cornelius?

MR CORNELIUS: I have no questions, thank you, Mr Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser?

MR VISSER: I have no questions, thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Mafora?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR MAFORA: Just one questions, Mr Chairperson.

Who informed you that these things would be used in this operation?

MR KOK: Chairperson, I was not informed what the purpose - for what purpose these things would be applied, the merits were only explained to me in the sense that the users would be terrorists seen from my side, who were prepared to launch handgrenades and it morally justified me to go through with the adaptation of the arms.

MR MAFORA: So you didn't get any full details?

MR KOK: We never received complete information with regard to an operation, we only received the request from my commander, Mr Wal du Toit at that stage, as he put it to me.

MR MAFORA: Thank you, Mr Chairperson, no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Ms Lockhat, any questions?

MS LOCKHAT: No questions, thank you, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Booyens, any re-examination?

MR BOOYENS: No thanks, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Adv Gcabashe? Mr Malan?

Can you recall how many grenades you modified, Mr Kok, in this particular incident.

MR KOK: Chairperson, it's basically impossible to recall. I cannot isolate this instance specifically, so I would not be able to say.

CHAIRPERSON: And can you recall, maybe not from your last answer, how long it took, how long you worked with these grenades and the limpet mine?

MR KOK: If I think of how we went about it, it would not have taken longer than one day to do it, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And how many of you would have worked on them?

MR KOK: At that unit there were only four persons who worked in that unit and we usually worked in a team together, because everybody had a certain function to perform, so in that instance I would accept that it would only be the four of us. If ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: So all four of you would have worked on each of the handgrenades?

MR KOK: Usually, Chairperson, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Thank you. Are there any questions arising out of questions put?

Thank you, Mr Kok.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------- MR BOOYENS: The following applicant is Mr Willem Petrus Louw. His application appears from page 20 to 29, Chairperson.

WILLEM PETRUS LOUW: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Booyens?

EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS: Thank you, Chairperson.

Mr Louw, you have your amnesty application before you, is that correct?

MR LOUW: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: And with regard to paragraph 7(a) and (b) you say with regard to the political party in the role, you were a supporter of the National Party, is that correct?

MR LOUW: That is so, Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Can we just request that amendment, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: That's paragraph 7(a), to delete "NVT" and put "Nasionale Party" and in paragraph 7(b), delete "NVT" and put "Ondersteuner". This is on page 20 of volume 1.

MR BOOYENS: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr Louw, you have your amnesty application before you, is that correct?

MR LOUW: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: And you worked under the command of Mr Wal du Toit, is that correct?

MR LOUW: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: You have heard his evidence with regard to the instructions received?

MR LOUW: Yes, I did, Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: And do you confirm his evidence?

MR LOUW: I agree, Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: And you as well as the other members of the Technical Division were never placed in a position to consider the merits of an operation because you did not receive full details about it?

MR LOUW: That's correct.

MR BOOYENS: And the technical assistance which you gave with regard to the modification of arms through the years, did you accept that it would be used in the struggle against the forces who were opposed to the government at that stage?

MR LOUW: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: And do you confirm the contents with regard to your background as it appears in your amnesty application?

MR LOUW: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: And do you confirm that with regard to the modification of these arms, as your colleagues, that you were aware that the application would be illegal and did you have any problems with the fact that it was with regard to the moral justification thereof?

MR LOUW: I did not have a problem with it, Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: You apply for amnesty for any offence or delict which might flow from the modification of arms, is that correct?

MR LOUW: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: And as to the rest you confirm what appears in your application?

MR LOUW: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Booyens. Mr Hattingh, any questions?

MR HATTINGH: No, thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Cornelius?

MR CORNELIUS: No questions, thank you, Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser?

MR VISSER: No questions, thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Mafora?

MR MAFORA: No questions, Mr Chair, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Lockhat?

MS LOCKHAT: No questions, thank you, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Adv Gcabashe?

ADV GCABASHE: No questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Louw, that concludes your evidence.

MR LOUW: Thank you, Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Jacob Francois Kok, 48 to 56, Chairperson.

JACOB FRANCOIS KOK: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS: Mr Kok, you have your amnesty application before you and it appears on page 48, is that correct?

MR KOK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Do you confirm with regard to 7(a) and 7(b), that you were a supporter of the National Party?

MR KOK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Once again, Chairperson, may we request that amendment?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I take it there's no objection. Paragraph 7(b) and 7(b) as they appear on page 48 of volume 1, will be amended by deleting the letters "NVT" in both paragraphs and substituting in paragraph (a) with the words National Party or "Nasionale Party" and in 7(b) the word "Ondersteuner".

MR BOOYENS: Do you confirm the contents of your application?

MR KOK: I confirm it as correct, Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: You have heard the evidence of Mr Wal du Toit?

MR KOK: I have, Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: And do you confirm that you were in the same position as your other colleagues, that you were never able to evaluate the merits of the situation because the background was not available to you?

MR KOK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: And through the years when you modified arms, you modified these arms with the belief that it would be used in the struggle against the opposition to the then government?

MR KOK: Yes, Chairperson, I confirm so.

MR BOOYENS: And in this instance, were you aware that the probable application of the arms would be illegal, but were you at peace that the application would be morally justifiable?

MR KOK: Yes, Chairperson, the application by the other side.

MR BOOYENS: And you also apply for amnesty for any offence or delict which might flow from your involvement with this incident, is that correct?

MR KOK: I do so, Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: And you confirm the correctness of the rest of your application?

MR KOK: Yes, I do, Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Thank you, Chairperson.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR BOOYENS CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Booyens. Mr Hattingh, any questions?

MR HATTINGH: No, thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Cornelius?

MR CORNELIUS: I have no questions, thank you, Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser?

MR VISSER: Nor do I, thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Mafora?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR MAFORA: Just one question, Mr Chairperson.

Do you perhaps know how many handgrenades were prepared?

MR KOK: For this specific incident?

MR MAFORA: Yes.

MR KOK: No, it's impossible to remember because I could not isolate it over the years which we worked.

MR MAFORA: Thank you, no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Ms Lockhat?

MS LOCKHAT: No questions, thank you, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: I take it there's not re-examination?

MR BOOYENS: Not.

CHAIRPERSON: Adv Gcabashe, Mr Malan? Thank you, Mr Kok, that concludes your testimony.

MR KOK: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Chairperson, with regard to Mr Kobus Kok, on page 30, I don't know if the people are ashamed to say that they were supporters of the National Party, because not one of the applicants do that. I don't know whether you find it necessary to recall him about that, but I would ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I don't think it's necessary, we've been explained why we've got this "NVT" instead of the statement that they were supporters of the National Party. I take it as the same. So we'll amend that application as well. On page 30 of volume 1, 7(a) to read "Nasionale Party" and 7(b) to read "Ondersteuner".

MR BOOYENS: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Booyens. That concludes the evidence of the applicants that I appear for, Mr Chairman. May I ask whether there's any objection if those of them - they've got other employment and so on, if those of them who wish to leave may be excused from further attendance?

CHAIRPERSON: Would there be any objection to that? Certainly, if they wish to leave they may do so.

MR BOOYENS: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------CHAIRPERSON: Mr Cornelius?

MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chair. I understand here's a Zulu interpreter available. I'll need a headset.

CHAIRPERSON: We need headsets for the legal representatives please.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Has everyone now got headphones? Thank you.

Mr Nkala, are your full names Tonjelwa Daniel Nkala?

TONJELWA DANIEL NKALA: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, you may be seated. Mr Cornelius?

MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chair. You will notice I filed an additional application to his amnesty application. The original application was prepared by him without legal assistance, which consists basically for Form 1, but I've amplified it with the documents before the hearing at the moment.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Cornelius. Can we then mark this document that's head "Further particulars and Amplification of Amnesty Application Number 2460/96", as Exhibit L.

MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Are all the parties in possession of a copy of this?

MR CORNELIUS: I've given everybody a copy.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

EXAMINATION BY MR CORNELIUS: Mr Nkala, you've prepared an application without legal representation, on the prescribed Form 1, in terms of Section 18 of Act 34/96, and submitted it to the Committee, is that correct?

MR NKALA: Yes, that is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: You were an employee of the South African Police and you were employed of Section 20(2)(a) and Section 20(2)(f) of Act 34 of 1995, is that correct?

MR NKALA: Yes, that is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: You served with the section known as Vlakplaas, Section C1 of the South African Police, is that correct?

MR NKALA: Yes, that is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: It is also correct to give a little bit of background on personal particulars, that you were recruited by AZAPO in 1977 and in May 1977 you were transferred to a refugee camp in Botswana, is that correct?

MR NKALA: Yes, that is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: While at t the refugee camp you were handed over and recruited to the African National Congress.

MR NKALA: Yes, that is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: You were trained in Zambia for a period of six months, at Molengure(?) and this training site you were trained in extensive use of small firearms or handgrenades, is that correct?

MR NKALA: Yes, that is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: You confirm the details set out on pages 1, 2 and 3 of the supplementary application to your amnesty application, is that correct?

MR NKALA: Yes, that is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: What is important is that when you infiltrated into South Africa at Piet Retief, you were then arrested by the Security Police of Middelburg, is that correct?

MR NKALA: Yes, that is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: At that time you had two AK47s and handgrenades in your possession and after a long interrogation you were recruited to Vlakplaas.

MR NKALA: Yes, that is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: Fine. Just a second, Mr Chairman.

In June 1985, you were given instructions to report to Springs, to work in that area to identify MK operatives, is that correct?

MR NKALA: Yes, that is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: You were to work in the areas Duduza, kwaThema and Tsakane.

MR NKALA: Yes, that is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: While in Springs you received certain instructions from Joe Mamasela, is that correct?

MR NKALA: Yes, that is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: Was Joe Mamasela your senior in rank?

MR NKALA: Yes, that is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: Now I understand ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: What was your rank at that time, or your position at that time, Mr Nkala?

MR NKALA: I was a Constable.

CHAIRPERSON: And Mr Mamasela, can you remember?

MR NKALA: He was an experienced Constable, a senior Constable.

MR CORNELIUS: And did you as a Constable, have to carry out the instructions of a senior Constable?

MR NKALA: Yes, that was the rule in the Police Force.

MR CORNELIUS: I see. Now you were to infiltrate the organisation known as COSAS, is that correct?

MR NKALA: Yes, that is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: You have read your statement made on pages - I refer the Committee to exhibits, bundle 3A, page 155 to 159 - you've read that?

MR NKALA: Yes, I read that statement.

MR CORNELIUS: Do you confirm the contents thereof?

MR NKALA: Yes, that is true.

MR CORNELIUS: I see. Now according to the particulars on page 155, you were to infiltrate and take the role as a commissar to ascertain if MK members were operative in this area.

MR NKALA: Yes, that is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: After you received instructions from Joe Mamasela, who did you then approach?

MR NKALA: Joe left with me, he took me to Col de Kock and Capt Venter.

MR CORNELIUS: What instructions were you then given?

MR NKALA: We were given instructions to get into the Duduza township and Tsakane and kwaThema in order to recruit members of COSAS.

MR CORNELIUS: How many people did you have to recruit?

MR NKALA: We were told to recruit people, not more than 20.

CHAIRPERSON: By that you mean between the two of you, or each 20?

MR NKALA: No, the two of us, myself and Joe Mamasela had to recruit that number of people.

ADV GCABASHE: Can I just ask.

Mr Nkala, where were you based at this time, were you still at Vlakplaas at the time you received these instructions or had you already moved to the farm at De Notter?

MR NKALA: We were at Springs.

ADV GCABASHE: Where exactly at Springs?

MR NKALA: On the other side of the town, on the western side of the town.

ADV GCABASHE: Was this the township that you were living in?

MR NKALA: It was a place that looked more like a plot.

ADV GCABASHE: And who was with you at this plot or smallholding?

MR NKALA: On this plot we were working in it was a unit that was under Capt Roelf Venter, Adj Koole, Adj Beeslaar and Joe Mamasela and Steven Mbanda. I cannot remember the other people's names who were there.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Nkala, if you could just repeat those names again a bit more slowly. I've got Roelf Venter, Mamasela, what other names did you mention?

MR NKALA: Adj Joe Koole, who was in charge of the blacks there.

ADV GCABASHE: Yes, and there was Beeslaar and Mamasela and Steven Mbanda?

MR NKALA: Yes, that is correct.

ADV GCABASHE: Anybody else?

MR NKALA: I cannot remember because that is something that took place some time ago. Those are the only people that I can remember.

ADV GCABASHE: But was Mr de Kock with you at the plot when you were with all these other people?

MR NKALA: No, he was not there at the time.

ADV GCABASHE: Maybe I should leave the rest to you, Mr Cornelius, thank you.

MR CORNELIUS: Thank you.

Did you see Mr Jack Cronje there?

MR NKALA: He came and he left again, he left for the head office.

MR CORNELIUS: And I understand Mr de Kock joined at a later stage, is that correct?

MR NKALA: Yes, he came after some time.

MR CORNELIUS: After a couple of days, or how long were you there?

MR NKALA: I think he came after a week.

MR CORNELIUS: Fine. Now you were given instructions to recruit people to COSAS, can you remember how many people in each area you had to recruit?

MR NKALA: The people that we were supposed to recruit were not supposed to be more than 20.

MR CORNELIUS: I see. After you received the instructions, what happened then, who did you approach?

MR NKALA: As we got this instruction from Roelf Venter, as a person Joe Mamasela was my senior. I do not understand exactly about this instruction, what the question around this instruction in terms of time.

MR CORNELIUS: Let's make it easier for you. You were then introduced to a certain chap called Congress Matsweni, is that right? Mtweni.

MR NKALA: Yes, that is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: Who introduced to Congress Mtweni?

MR NKALA: It was Joe Mamasela.

MR CORNELIUS: And what was the position of Congress Mtweni in COSAS?

MR NKALA: Joe told me that he was a leader of COSAS, he was going to find him in Potchefstroom.

MR CORNELIUS: Fine. Did you meet him?

MR NKALA: Yes, we met with Congress.

MR CORNELIUS: What instructions were given to Congress Mtweni?

MR NKALA: He was instructed to recruit in Duduza, Tsakane and kwaThema and to start recruiting three people who were the leaders of COSAS in those three places, so that those three people would further recruit five people each and those five groups these three people would be their section commanders, of those groups of five. That's what he did.

If I remember very well, there was a gentleman named Willie and another one whom we used to call Ngugujane. I cannot remember the third person, but the surname of Mlangeni. Those were the first people.

MR CORNELIUS: When you got the names of these three people, who did you give the names to?

MR NKALA: We left with those names, we went to report to the office where we were based, we reported to Capt Roelf Venter and Col Eugene de Kock.

MR CORNELIUS: A later meeting was then held again with Mr Congress Mtweni, is that right?

MR NKALA: Yes, that is correct, there was another meeting.

MR CORNELIUS: How many names did you then obtain?

MR NKALA: Congress told us that he had obtained other comrades. If my memory serves me well, we counted them up to 10 - up to 17 people, including Congress.

MR CORNELIUS: I see. And how many names did you then give to - what did you do with the names that you got?

MR NKALA: As usual if you are involved in an operation, you take each and every detail, even if it's a minor detail, you had that detail over to your superior.

MR CORNELIUS: Who did you give it to?

MR NKALA: We handed them over to Capt Roelf Venter and Eugene de Kock.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Nkala, did you get the names of all the people that had been recruited and did you give the names over to Capt Venter and Col de Kock?

MR NKALA: Yes, that is correct, we gave them those names.

MR CORNELIUS: Now these COSAS members, did you advise them - were they going to receive training or what did you tell them?

MR NKALA: We told them that they were going to receive training in using handgrenades. As we were told before that those leaders should be trained to use the handgrenades so that they can further their struggle or objections of the struggle.

MR CORNELIUS: Did you obtain any handgrenades to use in training?

MR NKALA: There were two handgrenades that we were given, they were of Russian origin and we used them in the training.

MR CORNELIUS: Can you tell the Committee about the training session?

CHAIRPERSON: Those handgrenades that you used in the training were ordinary handgrenades?

MR NKALA: The two of them, the first ones, when I looked at them I realised that those are the types of handgrenades that I've seen before, because when I opened the other one I saw a safety fuse - detonator, I beg your pardon, I saw it and I realised that this is the type of handgrenade that I know.

MR CORNELIUS: Yes, well what the Chairman actually meant is that, these were normal handgrenades, you don't know if there was tampered with the handgrenades.

MR NKALA: The first two that were given to me to train, to use them in the training of the COSAS members, I did not notice if they were tampered with or not because those times you couldn't trust anyone, even if it's a person next to you, but when I took a closer look I realised that these handgrenades, there was no problem when I looked at them.

MR CORNELIUS: You also worked on a need-to-know basis, is that correct?

MR NKALA: Yes, that is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: Fine. You then took the group in a kombi to a mine for training, is that correct?

MR NKALA: Yes, that is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: Did you give a demonstration?

MR NKALA: Yes, I demonstrated with one grenade as I was told. I demonstrated to them how to launch it and how to remove the safety pin and handle it, pressing down the other lever that was on top of the grenade, the safety pin that is. They were all there, I told them to stand behind me and I launched the grenade. Though I was not sure of what was happening, but when I had launched the grenade I realised that - I told one of them, whose name was Willie, I told him to do the same as I had just demonstrated. He pulled a certain button called a fuse, he handled the other part that is on top of the grenade and then he did the same. There was no damage.

MR CORNELIUS: There was an explosion obviously?

MR NKALA: Yes, there was an explosion, but at that particular spot where we had aimed.

MR CORNELIUS: What instructions were then given to the leaders, to the COSAS members?

MR NKALA: We were told to tell the leaders of COSAS that as they now know how to use the grenade they were supposed to look for bases where they can attack boers. But they told us that in Duduza, Tsakane and kwaThema they had already destroyed everything, there was nothing left.

MR CORNELIUS: Was the area at that time in turmoil, was it ungovernable?

MR NKALA: I was just seeing that - I just heard that for the first time, that there was a place without police in that place. I do not know whether we can call it a place that was ungovernable.

MR CORNELIUS: What was the further instructions that when should the detonators - when should the handgrenades be detonated?

MR NKALA: As we went back we told them about the difficulty that we had experience, that the people who were given the handgrenades to attack the government bases, it looked more like a difficult thing because they had told us that they had destroyed everything. But we were told to try and tell them to launch the grenades at the same time, all at the same time, at about 12 midnight. They must make no mistake, there should be an explosion to show everyone that the struggle was going on.

MR CORNELIUS: And the time that was set for the explosions?

MR NKALA: The time that was set for the explosion was to be between two in the - before two - 12 midnight, I beg your pardon.

MR CORNELIUS: 12 midnight. Is that why the operation was called Zero-Zero?

MR NKALA: Yes, that is why it was called Zero-Zero, because it was a zero hour.

MR CORNELIUS: Did you later receive handgrenades and detonators and a limpet mine?

MR NKALA: Yes.

MR CORNELIUS: Where and from whom did you receive it?

MR NKALA: If my memory serves me well, I think Col de Kock was there, Capt Venter and the other white authorities, two of them in that particular house as we came with Joe Mamasela.

MR CORNELIUS: You received 20 handgrenades, 20 detonators, 1 limpet mine and 1 limpet mine detonator, is that correct?

MR NKALA: Though I cannot be that certain about the number, I think it was something like that.

MR CORNELIUS: Were the grenades then given to the COSAS members?

MR NKALA: Yes, after receiving those grenades we went to the members of COSAS to give them the grenades.

MR CORNELIUS: Yes. Can you tell the Committee what you and Joe Mamasela and Congress Mtweni then did?

MR NKALA: After receiving those grenades - I think we were driving in a Golf, we went to a place where we were supposed to meet with Congress. We would go to another place where we would meet the other leaders. We found them in some place, they took us to another place as they said that that place was not safe. We went to a certain house with a high wall on the left-hand side. That is where we handed over the handgrenades.

MR CORNELIUS: Yes, and then, what happened then?

MR NKALA: After that, after giving them the grenades, we were told that Congress should be given the limpet mine, we gave the others the handgrenades and we decided to tell Congress that he is supposed to leave with us so that he can select his own spot where he was going to launch his limpet mine.

We left with Congress, we left the others behind with the grenades. The detonators were already inserted in the handgrenades. We left with Congress. We went to a place where he said there was a power station that was still intact, he said he was supposed to launch it there.

When we arrived there on that particular power station, Joe said "Mr Nkala, I am going to wait for you here and you better leave with Congress to go and plant this limpet mine". I left with Congress and I was thinking that there was some damage that was going to take place because I was suspecting that there was something wrong with these weapons or stuff.

When we arrived at that particular power station, Joe left in a car immediately. He left and I said "Congress look, maybe Joe realised that there was something wrong, let me wait here on this corner with an AK47, so that I can see what is happening, perhaps there were police around". He took a turn, he was very fast because after taking that corner, I just heard a very loud explosion.

MR CORNELIUS: Were you advised that these handgrenades were booby-trapped or zero detonated handgrenades?

MR NKALA: No, we were not told about that, those were just suspicions. In those times you couldn't ask a lot of questions, you were supposed to find answers on your own. These handgrenades, the first ones, because I was not sure of what was happening, but when I inspected the first ones there was nothing wrong about them, but the second group of grenades when I checked a detonator, the one that is on top of the grenade, when I looked at it just there where you are supposed to see a mercury, you would see just a line, it looked like a special line that was painted in red.

MR CORNELIUS: Now I see on page 16 of bundle 1, in your application you drafted yourself, you say that you thought that maybe Capt de Kock had in mind that he wanted to ambush the student leaders. Is that what you thought?

MR NKALA: Though it's something that I cannot say straight, that it's what was in his mind, but when they said that those people were going to be trained - according to my experience during a conflict or fight or war, if you are involved with your enemy you want him to come and attack you at a certain time, you want to attack that - ambusl that particular person, you would tell that particular person where to go.

But what came as a shock to me or as a surprise, these people were not told as to where to go and that is where I suspected that something very strange was taking place. Though I did not know as a person who was in the middle of all this, I did not show - I was not sure whether I was supposed to be in there, to be part of that or what.

MR CORNELIUS: I see. But the bottom line is, if you did not take cover you would have been killed along with Congress Mtweni?

MR NKALA: Yes, I would be dead by now, I would be with my grandparents.

MR CORNELIUS: After the explosion you then returned back to the base, is that correct? To Springs.

MR NKALA: Yes, that is what we did, we went to report back to the base. After reporting back, if my memory serves me well ...(break in tape) then the following day we went back to Vlakplaas.

MR CORNELIUS: You later learnt at Vlakplaas that eight people were killed and seven were seriously injured, is that correct?

MR NKALA: Will you please repeat the question, Sir.

MR CORNELIUS: You later were informed that eight people were killed and seven were seriously injured, is that correct?

MR NKALA: Yes, that is correct, that is what I heard.

MR CORNELIUS: Fine. Just for full particulars, at the time when you negotiated with the COSAS members you used the nomdeplume of James Molotswa and Joe Mamasela as Mike, is that correct?

MR NKALA: I did not get the question properly.

MR CORNELIUS: At the time when you negotiated with the COSAS members you introduced yourself as James Molotswa, you didn't use your correct name.

MR NKALA: Yes, that was a rule from the MK that wherever you go you must use a codename.

MR CORNELIUS: Did you receive any reward for your actions? Or bonus?

MR NKALA: When we came after some vacation, Col de Kock gave us an envelope, when I opened my envelope I found R2 000.

MR CORNELIUS: I see. You realised at the time when you joined up with Vlakplaas that you were promoting their political objectives, is that correct?

MR NKALA: Yes, that is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: And you were in fact fighting against the infiltration of the ANC and SACP and PAC, is that correct?

MR NKALA: That is what I was told, that if you are involved in the war and you are captured by the other side of the enemy, you are told there that you are no longer fighting, you are given instructions all the time, you cannot initiate anything, you cannot raise any opinion of yours.

MR CORNELIUS: But at the time when you joined up with Vlakplaas, obviously you knew that you were siding with them and their political objectives.

MR NKALA: Yes, that is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: Yes, and you religiously carried out the instructions of Col Eugene de Kock and the previous commander - well, Eugene de Kock specifically and Jack Cronje, is that correct?

MR NKALA: Yes, that is correct, and you could not say no to anything, you cannot defy anything if you are with soldiers.

MR CORNELIUS: At the time when you carried out your instructions in this specific operation, you didn't have any reward in mind, you didn't have any bonus in mind, you just received your normal salary?

MR NKALA: Yes, I was just doing the job as instructed.

MR CORNELIUS: You didn't have any personal grudge or hate against the people that got killed?

MR NKALA: No, in a situation of war you do not fight that particular person because you hold a grudge against him, you just fight for the cause of the war.

MR CORNELIUS: Fine. And you've made a full disclosure of all facts known to you, of this specific operation?

MR NKALA: Yes, as far as I can remember. I think things that I've written down and what I've said, I think I have made a full disclosure.

MR CORNELIUS: You apply for amnesty on eight counts of murder of the people listed, seven counts of assault to do serious bodily harm and attempted murder, the unlawful possession, control and application of explosive devices and any other crime or omission which might flow from these actions, including crime in delict, is that correct?

MR NKALA: Yes, that is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Cornelius. Mr Hattingh, do you have any questions you'd like to ask?

MR HATTINGH: Yes, we do have questions, Mr Chairman, but on account of the logistical difficulty that we explained to you, having access to Mr de Kock after hours and weekends, we've not had an opportunity since we received these papers, to consult with Mr de Kock, particularly on the statements of this witness and Mr Mamasela and we would therefore need some time. What I would like to suggest, Mr Chairman, is that instead of me going first, somebody else should go first and that you then instead of taking three quarters or an hour for the luncheon adjournment, to

take an hour and I think that should be sufficient for us to take instructions from Mr de Kock.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Booyens, are you going to ask any questions?

MR BOOYENS: Not as presently advised, Mr Chairman, no thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, do you have any questions to ask?

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman yes, we do have questions, but we have taken by surprise now by my learned friend ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Do you think we can take that hour's lunch adjournment now and start again at half past one? I see it's half past twelve now, or almost half past twelve.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, if I may just explain my position. It may be that I have no questions after I've heard Mr Hattingh.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, yes. No I understand, but if we're going to take an hour for lunch, if we can take that now and start again at half past one and then in that way we would have lost no time at all. Thank you. We will now take the lunch adjournment and we will resume at half past one.

TONJELWA DANIEL NKALA: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you. Mr Hattingh, are you now in a position to commence your questioning?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman, I am and I am indebted to you for the indulgence of the extra half an hour.

Mr Nkala, these events about which you testified here today happened some 14 years ago, is that correct?

MR NKALA: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And I get the impression - I got the impression when I listened to your evidence, that your memory is somewhat vague about the events.

MR NKALA: That is also possible because we were not recording anything down.

MR HATTINGH: Yes, you didn't at the time expect that 14 years later you would be asked to cast your mind back and to try and recollect the events again.

MR NKALA: Yes, that was not expected.

MR HATTINGH: And I get the impression that you are particularly vague when it comes to the persons who were present at the various meetings that you had.

MR NKALA: The people that I cannot remember are the people that were supposed to be recruited by me without knowing them. It is very difficult to remember people who are involved in an operation, people who were unknown to me. Therefore it becomes difficult for me to say someone was present or absent.

MR HATTINGH: Mr Nkala, as an askari at Vlakplaas your work procedure was that you would go out to a certain area for some three weeks, you would then return to Vlakplaas and then you would be given off the last week of the month, is that correct?

MR NKALA: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Can we accept therefore that when you were sent to Springs, you were sent there, you and your group were sent there at the beginning of June of 1985?

MR NKALA: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And that you would therefore have returned during the last week in June of 1985?

MR NKALA: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Now who was your commander at the time, your commander at Vlakplaas at the time when you were sent to Springs?

MR NKALA: Are you talking about a commander who was in charge of Vlakplaas or a commander who was in charge of a subsection that was supposed to go to Springs, or a commander or a Head, a white authority who was on E-Section, the one that was supposed to go to Springs? What kind of commander that you want to know about?

MR HATTINGH: I'm talking about the commander of Vlakplaas.

MR NKALA: It was Col Jack Cronje at the time.

MR HATTINGH: And who sent you out to Springs?

MR NKALA: It was not a procedure for one to be sent as a specific person and bring someone else, they would select groups, after selecting the groups people would be told by their immediate commander, who would be black as us who were going to Springs. We were under Adj Koole, who told us that we were going to Springs.

MR HATTINGH: Was he the only person who told you that you were going to Springs?

MR NKALA: I cannot remember very well because if you go to a certain place sometimes the black group leaders would be told as to where to meet with the Colonels. After being told, they would come back to the other subordinates to tell them that we were going to such and such a place.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. When you arrived at Springs, who was your commander, the commander of that particular group?

MR NKALA: I said there would be two commanders, there would be an immediate commander who was in charge of the overall issues in the group, who would be a black person and there would be another overall commander who would be a white officer. Sometimes it would happen that the black would be an Adjudant, but the white one would be a Sergeant, but he would be superior than the black one who was an Adjudant. Please explain to me what commander are you talking about, are you talking about the immediate commander or the overall commander?

MR HATTINGH: Give us the names of both of them please.

MR NKALA: The overall commander was Capt Roelf Venter, who was a white officer in charge of the whole unit, the one who was in charge of the black officer was Adj Koole.

MR HATTINGH: And was there also a man by the name of Beeslaar?

MR NKALA: No. - Yes, he was there.

MR HATTINGH: Was he part of your group?

MR NKALA: You mean our group when it was sent for the operation or part of us at the base? Which one are you looking for?

MR HATTINGH: The group of people who were sent from Vlakplaas to go and do duty at Springs.

MR NKALA: Yes, he was present.

MR HATTINGH: When you arrived in Springs, where did you stay?

MR NKALA: We were staying in that small plot.

MR HATTINGH: And for how long had you been in Springs when you were approached by Mr Mamasela for assistance with this particular operation?

MR NKALA: Though I cannot remember well, I think it was about a week.

MR HATTINGH: And at that time Mr de Kock was not there.

MR NKALA: Yes, he was not present.

MR HATTINGH: And where were you when you were approached by Mr Mamasela?

MR NKALA: I was in the house where the blacks were staying.

MR HATTINGH: Was Mr Mamasela alone when he came to you?

MR NKALA: Yes, he was alone and then he took me to Roelf Venter because he said he had decided to take me to work with him because he was still busy doing some job.

MR HATTINGH: Did he explain to you what that job was?

MR NKALA: Yes, he told me that it was to infiltrate or get into the COSAS leaders in three townships in Duduza and he further explained to me that before coming to fetch me he knew that I was a third person that he selected because he had selected another person before me and there was another one, but he later decided that he won't fit and then he came to me, as a last resort.

MR HATTINGH: And you said in your evidence under cross-examination just now, that Mr Mamasela then took you to Mr Venter, is that correct?

MR NKALA: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Are you certain about that?

MR NKALA: Yes, I am certain, though that incident took place some time ago, but I think the person who was there at the time was Mr Venter.

MR HATTINGH: Because you've already told us that at that stage Mr de Kock wasn't at Springs, is that correct?

MR NKALA: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And therefore he couldn't have been present when Mr Mamasela took you to Mr Venter?

MR NKALA: Will you please repeat the question, Sir.

MR HATTINGH: And therefore - I put it to you that you've already conceded that Mr de Kock was not there at the time and now I'm just putting it to you further that therefore, Mr de Kock couldn't have been present when you were taken by Mamasela to Mr Venter.

MR NKALA: He was not yet there, he was still in Durban.

MR HATTINGH: And did you then make a mistake in your statement, which appears in bundle 3A, at page 156, where you said the following:

There you were referring to Mr Mamasela.

Was that a mistake?

MR NKALA: Yes, I can see this, the way the things are recorded here. Sometimes when you write you don't write the same way the things happened. Let me tell the Commission. When the first one who was chosen by him, Maxinga(?), when he left with Joe, when they decided to remove him, Eugene de Kock came from Durban. I think it was him and the late Moses Nzimande and Eric Maluka and then Joe was supposed to go with Moses Nzimande. It looked like Nzimande had a problem and he decided to remove him and then when he came to fetch me, Joe was actually relating me the story of what happened. When he came to me it was just like I was just involved into something that was started by the staff.

I am trying to explain that it might have happened that on the very first day when Joe told me about the operation, where he was about to take me to, when I came to the office, Mr Venter was there, I think he told Venter that he was going to work with me. I cannot remember well whether it was during the time when de Kock had arrived or it was the time when Venter was still alone. It's that kind of a situation.

MR HATTINGH: Mr Nkala, Mr de Kock gave evidence before this Committee too and he denied that he was present when Mr Mamasela took you to Mr Roelf Venter, as stated in your statement. So would you concede that you - I think you've already done that, you concede that you made a mistake when you said in your statement Mr de Kock was there.

MR NKALA: That is what he says, what I'm saying is this. The operation itself when it was started, I was placed somewhere to work with Joe and Venter was in charge. At that time de Kock had arrived from Durban, he was with us in this plan because the person that he brought from Durban, the late Moses Nzimande, was once suggested to work with Joe. That proves that de Kock was present. Though I did not write anything down, perhaps he had gone out somewhere or to Pretoria or pay a visit somewhere, but the situation is as I am telling. I cannot say a person was there whereas a person was not there.

ADV GCABASHE: Can I just ask, Mr Hattingh, on this same point.

Mr Nkala, are you saying Mr de Kock came back and then went back to Durban again to return yet later? I'm not sure about that side of things.

MR NKALA: In this statement, in my statement it says that when I was being introduced, Venter and de Kock were there. Yes, Venter and de Kock were present at the time, though I cannot remember well whether de Kock was at the head office or what, but he had arrived where we were.

ADV GCABASHE: And he didn't leave again after that?

MR NKALA: No, no.

MR HATTINGH: I'm somewhat confused now, Mr Nkala. I asked you right at the beginning whether Mr de Kock was there when Mr Mamasela took you to Mr Venter and you said "No", and I asked you whether you were certain about that and you confirmed that you were. Are you now saying that he was there or what are you saying?

MR NKALA: I am also confused by this. Joe Mamasela when he took me to our senior - a person that I used to know is my superior. I knew Mr Venter as my superior. Even if de Kock was there, I cannot say for certain that he was there or not. Let us say I cannot say whether he was there or not.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. Now what were the instructions that you received on that occasion, when Mr Mamasela took you then to Mr Venter?

MR NKALA: On the very first day Joe said he was going to work with me. I cannot remember being given instructions on that first day.

MR HATTINGH: Why did he take you to Mr Venter then?

MR NKALA: I think that is a question that you can pose to Joe Mamasela.

MR HATTINGH: Didn't he take you there to receive instructions from Mr Venter?

MR NKALA: Yes, we were supposed to get instructions from Mr Venter, he is the one who was responsible of giving us the instructions.

MR HATTINGH: Now did you get instructions from him or don't you remember?

MR NKALA: On the first day when he was introducing me to him, I think I was left behind, I was at the base, we did not go out, I did not even take a bath that day, but when I went back to take a bath he was left there with Venter and I came back later. That is when I remember that this whole started because Venter and de Kock were there. The debriefing started there.

MR HATTINGH: You've got me totally confuse now, Mr Nkala. But let's proceed, let's not waste too much time on this issue. Whether you received instructions or not, what was the next thing that you did, after you had been taken to Mr Venter?

MR NKALA: When we were about to be given instructions I remember very well the people who were there, Col de Kock was present, Col Venter was present and one white man that I cannot remember his name. He used to be there in our meetings. That is when we were given the instructions as to what to do, what is it that we were going to do in those three townships. We were told to train ...(intervention)

MR HATTINGH: Sorry to interrupt you, I'm not asking you what the instructions were, I'll come to that, but can you tell us how long after you were taken by Mr Mamasela to Mr Venter, did this second meeting take place that you are telling us about now?

MR NKALA: I cannot remember whether it was a day or hours.

MR HATTINGH: Can you tell us what you were doing in-between this first meeting and the second meeting, how were you occupying your time?

MR NKALA: I was just in the camp

MR HATTINGH: Doing nothing?

MR NKALA: I did my washing, I did my laundry and when the others were not present I would do the cooking.

MR HATTINGH: Mr Nkala, I'm not going to hold you to the estimate that you gave us, but you did say that Mr Mamasela came to you about a week after you'd been sent to Springs, is that correct?

MR NKALA: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And that would take us then to roughly round about the 7th of June, would that be correct?

MR NKALA: That is approximately.

MR HATTINGH: Yes, very well. And then you cannot tell us how long after you saw Mr Venter with Mr Mamasela you saw him and Mr de Kock again, you cannot give us an estimate?

MR NKALA: All the time if we had been on a trip to the township, we had to report back and tell them what had happened and if we go to the township again we had to report to tell them that we are going to the township. If they would like to give us further instruction they would do so. But there was a time, or there were times as Joe Mamasela who was my senior, he would go alone and he would come back and tell me that today we are going to do 1, 2 and 3.

CHAIRPERSON: I think the question asked or what Mr Hattingh is asking you is, how long after that meeting that you had when Joe Mamasela took you to Mr Venter the first time to say that you were going to work with him, how long after that time did you meet with Mr Venter and Mr de Kock, when you got instructions? What was the time gap between those two meetings?

MR NKALA: I cannot say, Your Honour, I cannot remember.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. You were then - did Mr Mamasela take you to Mr Venter again, on the occasion when you found Mr Venter and de Kock present?

MR NKALA: This question it's very difficult for me to answer because there were so many occasions where Joe Mamasela would take me to Venter, so sometimes I cannot understand what occasion are you referring to. I wonder if you cannot explain further.

MR HATTINGH: I think I made it quite clear, Mr Nkala. I'm referring to the second time that you went to Mr Venter and according to your evidence, Mr de Kock was there and that was the occasion on which you received your instructions.

MR NKALA: Yes, Mr de Kock was present.

MR HATTINGH: But the question was, did Mr Mamasela take you to them?

MR NKALA: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And where did this meeting take place?

MR NKALA: In this small plot where we were staying there was a house where black people were staying and there was another house where the overall commander was staying, that is where the meeting took place. When Joe took me he took me to that particular house where we would find the authorities.

MR HATTINGH: And apart from Mr Venter, Mr de Kock, who else was present?

MR NKALA: There was another white man who used to be there, but I did not know him very well.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, was he a member of Vlakplaas, the other one that you don't remember?

MR NKALA: I had not seen him at Vlakplaas.

MR HATTINGH: Was Col Roelf - sorry, was Col Cronje there?

MR NKALA: I cannot remember seeing him there when we were told. Him as an overall commander, he was - let me answer like this. As a commander who was in charge of de Kock and Roelf Venter, he would come and brief them and they would brief us, that was the procedure. That is what I can remember. Those are the people who were giving us the orders.

MR HATTINGH: Yes, but do you recall whether he was present at that meeting that you had with Venter and de Kock, or don't you recall?

MR NKALA: I do not remember seeing him.

MR HATTINGH: Is it possible therefore that he might have been there?

MR NKALA: No, that is not possible, he was not there. He was not present in our debriefing meetings.

MR HATTINGH: And what instructions were you given on this occasion, Mr Nkala?

MR NKALA: This is the day when we were told to go and infiltrate the COSAS members.

MR HATTINGH: For what purpose? Why did you have to infiltrate them?

MR NKALA: We were told that we are supposed to infiltrate them and tell them that we were there to train them to be MK members.

MR HATTINGH: Were those your instructions right from the outset?

MR NKALA: Yes, those were the instructions. And it used to be a normal procedure that if you get into the township, looking for details or information, you get information concerning trained people. I remember at some stage we were told that there were other people who were trained, there was one person who was trained and he was residing there, but no steps were taken, no follow-up was made.

MR HATTINGH: No, I'm not talking about what your usual procedure was, I want to know what your instructions were. Your instructions were to infiltrate COSAS, for what purpose again?

CHAIRPERSON: He said to tell them that they were to be trained - to train them as MK members.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, thank you, Mr Chairman.

Now was that all that you had to tell them?

MR NKALA: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: When Mr Mamasela came to you, what did he want you to assist him with?

MR NKALA: To go with him when he was going to infiltrate the COSAS members.

MR HATTINGH: In order to tell them that they were going to be trained as MK members?

MR NKALA: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Can I refer you to your statement which appears in bundle 3A, at page 155, paragraph 4:

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, I think just on the interpretation, you said commissioner, it should be commissar.

INTERPRETER: I beg your pardon, Chair.

MR HATTINGH: There no mention in this paragraph of your statement that you had to infiltrate COSAS in order to inform them that they were going to be trained as MK members. In fact, quite the opposite. Here you said that your mission was to go and ascertain whether there were MK members active in that part of the town. COSAS members, sorry.

MR NKALA: This is quite a long story, what is the question?

MR HATTINGH: The question is, why did you not say in your statement in this particular paragraph, that Mr Mamasela wanted you to assist him with the infiltration of COSAS in order to inform them that they were going to be trained as MK members?

MR NKALA: It happened that it was omitted by mistake because there are a lot of things. It's just like an error when - it's just like when you say you talk about a commissar, the person who is teaching the people about politics, it is also omitted. Even there that was omitted, that was going to educate them politically.

MR HATTINGH: Then you continue with your statement, you say:

...(intervention)

MR MALAN: I beg your pardon, Mr Hattingh, might I just interrupt you for a moment. I have just listened to the Afrikaans interpretation and I heard that the witness said: - it's really a question to Mr Nkala, that the purpose was to educate them politically, not to train them militarily.

MR NKALA: I was explaining the commissar, that in the military the commissar is an MK, is a guerrilla. A guerrilla is a person who is training people, conducting political education. That was - I was told that I was going to be dealing with a person who knows about politics.

MR MALAN: Thank you very much.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you.

You continue, you say:

And I want you to listen carefully to the next sentence:

I get the impression from this part of your statement, that immediately after you agreed to assist Mr Mamasela he took you to Venter and de Kock, where you received your instructions.

MR NKALA: If when you say immediately I was taken, do you mean that I was taken at that time or after? I do not understand "immediately", whether it is referred to the same time or a day before.

MR HATTINGH: Mr Nkala, you already conceded that you were taken to Mr Venter after you'd agreed to assist him, by Mr Mamasela, the only thing that you were uncertain about was whether Mr de Kock was there as well or not.

MR NKALA: In the first meeting, when Joe took me to Venter, I think Venter was alone, Beeslaar was there cooking, if I'm not mistaken. The person who was talking to us was Venter. At that time de Kock was back from Durban, but when we were given the instructions as to what to do in the townships, the commanders were together. On the very first day when Joe was introducing me - I only remember Venter when Joe was introducing me.

MR HATTINGH: Very well, I'll leave that for argument. And then in - let's continue with your statement. In paragraph 4.1 you said:

Is that correct, is that what you were instructed to do at that meeting?

MR NKALA: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Now I want to put it to you, Mr Nkala, that Mr de Kock's evidence was, and he was confirm - that evidence is confirmed by evidence given by other people in front of other Committees, and I think given here, that Mr de Kock was in Durban when he received telephonic instructions to return to Springs and that that happened approximately two days before the day on which these people were killed and injured with the handgrenades.

MR NKALA: I think that is what he thinks or says. What happened and something that someone - there's a difference between what happened and a person's memory, but in your question you should take note of this, if they talk about two days, it could have happened that he was that - the day when they tried to transport - to take Nzimande to some place and they realised that he got a shock and then he couldn't talk to the people. Because as I can remember, Moses Nzimande was still under de Kock, with Eric Maluleka, they came, those are the people who came in this plan, in this operation. They got involved in this operation before me. When you say two days, let us check that, that if that whole thing can happen within two days.

MR HATTINGH: Mr Chairman, I think I've lost my train of thought now, but may I just take instructions on one point before I proceed?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, certainly.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr Nkala, Mr de Kock tells me that when he returned from Durban he was accompanied by Mr Nzimande and Brian Nqgulunga and that they arrived here approximately two days before the 25th of June.

MR NKALA: That is what he remembers.

MR HATTINGH: Is it possible that you are mistaken when you say that on the day when you received your instructions, Mr de Kock was present?

MR NKALA: No, I am not mistaken.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. After you received your instructions, what did you then do?

MR NKALA: After receiving instructions we left for the township with Joe Mamasela. I am not sure whether you want me to expand on that, to tell you what happened in the township.

MR HATTINGH: What I want to know from you is, did you immediately go into the township in order to infiltrate COSAS?

MR NKALA: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: This must have occurred then within about the second week of June, not so?

MR NKALA: I cannot remember what week was it, second or third week, I cannot remember.

MR HATTINGH: How much time lapsed between the day on which you received your instructions and the day that you went into the township to infiltrate COSAS?

MR NKALA: I am not sure, my guess would be taken as something that happened. I hope that my guess won't be taken as something that happened. I can say when Col de Kock came from Durban and the time when we were infiltrating COSAS in the three townships, it was not more than a week or two.

MR HATTINGH: And in-between the day on which you received your instructions and the time that you went into the township to infiltrate COSAS, what did you do?

MR NKALA: We were walking in Springs in town, looking for trained ANC members.

MR HATTINGH: After you'd received your instructions from Venter and de Kock?

MR NKALA: After receiving these instructions we were involved mostly in training, that was the instruction that was given to us. That is what I was doing with Joe.

MR HATTINGH: I'm sorry, I don't understand. You were involved mostly in training, what are you referring to?

MR NKALA: Training COSAS members as we were told by our superiors.

MR HATTINGH: But that incident - if I may jump ahead of it, couldn't have taken more than half an hour, the training which you described here.

MR NKALA: Training was not something that you would set a specific time for it, because we were working with other people who had their own time, but if we say that something, we didn't take a time like, as if we're in control of everything, or maybe I was supposed to tell these COSAS members to hurry up because I want to do something at a certain time, at a specific time. I do not understand the question.

ADV GCABASHE: Can I just ask, that training that you are referring to, Mr Nkala, what was the nature of that training, what did you do? Maybe that might help us.

MR NKALA: After getting the instruction that we were supposed to train them with grenades we took them to a mine that was chosen, that is where the training took place.

ADV GCABASHE: Yes, but what was the form of the training that you gave them, because you have just said that you couldn't tell how long it would take. Were you only training them in the use of handgrenades?

MR NKALA: No, we were not using grenades only. Sometimes if you are talking to a person, convincing him to do what you want as training, a lot of things would be discussed and there was - soon there was another 26th of June that was called "Freedom Charter Day". I cannot remember what is it that we discussed on that day.

CHAIRPERSON: What you're saying is, when you went to that mine dump to train them with the use of handgrenades, you didn't just go there and show them how to throw a handgrenade and then leave again, but you were there for some time talking about all sorts of things. Is that what you're saying?

MR NKALA: Yes, there were discussions in the car on our way.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Hattingh?

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

I'll come back to the training, Mr Nkala. What I'm trying to ascertain is, how long did it take you to infiltrate COSAS and to obtain the names from them before you were able to report back to Mr Venter and de Kock, according to your version, and hand over to them a list of names?

MR NKALA: The time, I think it was about a week and a half.

MR HATTINGH: And that is now up to the stage where you were able to hand a list of names to Mr Venter and de Kock, on your version?

MR NKALA: Yes, the list of names were supposed to be given to our superiors because they also had other people that were wanted by the Security Branch of Springs. The list that we got we were supposed to hand it over to them.

MR HATTINGH: I want to refer you to Mr Mamasela's statement and I ask you for your comment on this particular paragraph on page 181 of bundle 3A:

What is your comment on that please, Mr Nkala?

MR NKALA: ...(no English interpretation). As I've said before that what is said by Mamasela, as I was a third person to be chosen by him to infiltrate the COSAS members, things that had taken place before and the plan that he had initially, I couldn't get it, even then. That is why it is difficult for me to explain that when he went to Congress' place and he went to find him somewhere in Potchefstroom, how did he get hold of him. It will be difficult for me to explain that.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Hattingh.

So by the time that you started working on this operation with Mr Mamasela, he had already made contact sometime before with Congress, is that correct?

MR NKALA: Yes, that is correct, he had met with him. I remember that he found him in Potchefstroom, he brought him to Springs.

CHAIRPERSON: And you don't know what happened between him and Congress before you worked with him?

MR NKALA: No, I won't lie, I don't know what happened.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Hattingh?

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman. Now - would you just bear with me one moment, Mr Chairman.

I would like to refer you - once again I suppose you will say you don't know what happened between Mr Mamasela and Mr Tobogo, but I would like to refer you to paragraph 5 of the statement as well, on page 180:

Do you know anything about that?

MR NKALA: I got that information when I was called.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. Now from the time that you started working with Mr Mamasela, were you busy talking to COSAS members and did you actually tell that they were going to be trained to become MK members?

MR NKALA: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: Did they make any enquiries from you as to your background in the ANC, where you were coming from, who you were getting your instructions from?

MR NKALA: Yes, there were questions, but we were evading those questions.

MR HATTINGH: What type of questions were they asking?

MR NKALA: They did ask whether in the camps - they did ask what was happening in the camps. I cannot say exactly, but they were asking questions like how was the training conducted in the camps, because we were telling them that others would be sent outside, out of the camps.

MR HATTINGH: And why - or rather let me put it this way. When you obtained the names of these peoples, did you write it down in front of them, did you write these names in front of them?

MR NKALA: Yes, the names were written down.

MR HATTINGH: Did you tell them why you needed their names?

MR NKALA: We told them that their names should be known in Lusaka, they should know who is trained so that if there is something - something goes wrong, they should know who is trained and who is involved.

MR HATTINGH: And were they satisfied with this explanation?

MR NKALA: The explanation, they seemed to be satisfied.

MR HATTINGH: Did you know, Mr Nkala, why you had to obtain their names?

MR NKALA: In my view and my experience in investigating it is that when you get the names, taking them to your superior and who would further hand them over to someone else, that is when the branch in that - the members in that branch like Springs would see that -would know if there are suspects or targets are there. That was my opinion.

MR HATTINGH: Were you at any stage aware of the fact that there was a plan to eliminate certain members of COSAS?

MR NKALA: At the time I did not suspect that.

MR HATTINGH: When did you find out about it for the first time?

MR NKALA: I started suspecting during the time when we were told that there was a trained person and I only knew that our aim was to get that person in a certain street, but no-one said anything about that.

MR HATTINGH: Sorry, I don't understand, who told you there was a trained person and why did that make you suspect that there was a plan afoot to eliminate these people?

MR NKALA: The COSAS members told us that.

MR HATTINGH: Just repeat for me, Mr Nkala, what did the COSAS members tell you?

MR NKALA: They told us that there was an MK member, a trained MK member in the area.

MR HATTINGH: And why did that make you suspicious?

MR NKALA: When we went to report we were not instructed to follow up on that street where it was said that person was staying.

MR HATTINGH: Instructed by your commanders?

MR NKALA: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Why did that make you suspicious?

MR NKALA: I was suspecting that this training, they wanted them to go and attack the police station at a certain time so that in that police station the police would be told that some people were coming to attack.

MR HATTINGH: Was that just a suspicion of your own or did anybody say anything that led you to think that that was the plan?

MR NKALA: No-one told me about it, it was just my suspicion.

MR HATTINGH: You were taken by Mr Mamasela to meet Congress, is that correct?

MR NKALA: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Where did you meet him?

MR NKALA: I cannot remember the first meeting, but I think when I first saw him it was during the night in Tsakane, if I'm not mistaken, next to the shops.

MR HATTINGH: And was he alone?

MR NKALA: I cannot be so sure because when you meet in such situations you will find out that a person had left a certain group and then he would come alone and the other members of the group would keep guard.

MR HATTINGH: And what was the conversation which took place between Congress and the two of you?

MR NKALA: We discussed with him as we were instructed, that he was supposed to get three people who were going to further recruit four or five people, so that they can come and be trained.

MR HATTINGH: And did he - how long after that meeting did he report back to you?

MR NKALA: It looks like we are going to face the same problem of time here. ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: You must just - Mr Nkala, if you can remember you must obviously answer the question and tell us, if you can't remember then just say so, but if you can give an estimate of the time, do so.

MR NKALA: The meeting that - meetings would take place during the night between six and ten in the evening.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you meet every evening between six and ten with him?

MR NKALA: Our meetings would be held that time of the evening, not during the day.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Hattingh?

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

But the question that the Chairman asked you was whether you met every day at that time.

MR NKALA: I cannot remember.

MR HATTINGH: Can you remember at all how many meetings you had with Congress?

MR NKALA: I remember meetings, two meetings. I only remember two meetings.

MR HATTINGH: Excluding the meeting at which you trained them in the use of handgrenades or including that one?

MR NKALA: When they were trained they were all together. I thought the question was about Congress, not the whole group.

MR HATTINGH: Very well, I accept that. So are you saying that you met with Congress only two times?

CHAIRPERSON: I think if you can perhaps just repeat your question, I don't know if there's been a problem, it seems to be taking quite a long time.

MR HATTINGH: I'm sorry, I thought they were still busy interpreting.

Are you saying that you met with Congress only on two occasions?

MR NKALA: All the meetings where I would be present with Congress, if I can count them they can come up to four, four meetings. But now it is not clear whether you are asking about Congress alone or the whole group, whether you want to know Congress with the group of the people or Congress alone.

MR HATTINGH: Let's try and cut this short, Mr Nkala. How long after you met him for the first time were you handed the list containing the names of people on it?

MR NKALA: I cannot remember.

MR HATTINGH: And you said in your evidence here that there were 17 names on the list, including the name of Congress.

MR NKALA: Yes, it might happen that there were 17, there were 17 names, but I am not sure about the number, but it was somewhere there.

MR HATTINGH: Because in your statement you said that you recruited approximately 15 members.

MR NKALA: Yes, in my statement it is stated like that, but sometimes a person would bring a friend whose name was not on the list. There was no deadline.

MR HATTINGH: And to whom did you hand this list?

MR NKALA: We gave it to our superior, Venter.

MR HATTINGH: Was he alone when you handed him the list?

MR NKALA: I cannot remember whether he was alone or not.

MR HATTINGH: Would you bear with me a moment please, Mr Chairman, I'm just checking his evidence.

MR MALAN: Mr Nkala, while Mr Hattingh is just looking through his notes, on these occasions that you reported back to Venter, did you always accompany Mamasela or did he on occasion go alone?

MR NKALA: I did mention that - say that as a person who was Mamasela's subordinate, sometimes he would go alone and get instructions, sometimes both of us would be summoned to the office.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

But you were present when the list was handed to Mr Venter?

MR NKALA: Yes, I was present on that day.

MR HATTINGH: Because in your evidence before this Committee, your evidence-in-chief, you said that the list of names was handed over to Venter and de Kock.

MR NKALA: You know sometimes when I mention Venter and de Kock, it means that de Kock was present, but a person who was in charge of the unit and people that we were working under was Venter. De Kock's presence as one of the authorities, I did not take that as something that I should mention time and again that he was mentioned. I apologise for that.

MR HATTINGH: But I asked you specifically whether Mr de Kock was present and you said now under cross-examination a minute or two ago, you couldn't remember whether he was present. Do you know remember that he was or what is your recollection?

MR NKALA: We have been doing this report-back for a number of days, sometimes when you are doing this report-back, Venter is there but de Kock is not there. But a person who was always in the office was Venter, sometimes de Kock wouldn't be there. I remember that. But they were working together, de Kock and Venter that is. But when we were handing over this list of names, if my memory serves me well, I think Venter was present because we wouldn't make any appointment to tell them to come together, we would give it to Venter because he's the one who was always in the office. I'm not sure if you understand this.

MR HATTINGH: I'm not sure that I do, but be that as it may. Are you saying now that you don't recall whether Mr de Kock was present on this occasion or not?

MR NKALA: I cannot say whether he was present in that meeting and he was absent in this other meeting, I cannot say.

MR HATTINGH: Because in your statement on page 156 of bundle 3A, paragraph 5, you also said:

MR NKALA: There is something that is confusing me here. What was happening there, there was a procedure and there was a real situation. The procedure was this, when we go to that place as we were working under Venter, we had to report back to Venter. De Kock's presence and if I say I gave him the list of names, what I remember very well here was the procedure, but in a number of meetings de Kock and Venter would be there but sometimes de Kock wouldn't be there and Venter was always there because he was the person who was in charge.

MR HATTINGH: Yes. I want to suggest to you, Mr Nkala, that you have no recollection as to whether Mr de Kock was present on any of these occasions where you mentioned his name.

MR NKALA: I remember that de Kock was present, though sometimes he would miss a day during a report-back, but he was always there.

MR HATTINGH: Mr Nkala, now can you just clear up one thing for me. Did you hand the list over to Mr Venter before you trained these people in the use of handgrenades or did you first train them and then obtain their names and then it handed it over to Venter?

MR NKALA: The list was handed over before and the training came after.

MR HATTINGH: But at that stage you had already told these COSAS members that they were going to receive training, is that correct?

MR NKALA: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: How long - I'm asking you for an estimate again, how long after you handed the list over to them did you receive the grenades which you used in order to train them?

MR NKALA: You want me to estimate the time. I think it was - we got that list, say we got that list today, after getting the list we would plan for another meeting where we would meet with these COSAS leaders, with our authorities and then after getting further instructions we would go there to those COSAS members. I think it was three days, if I'm not mistaken.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. And did you then meet with them in order to train them?

MR NKALA: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Can you tell us how many of them attended this training session?

MR NKALA: We were in a kombi, a 15-seater including the two of us, therefore we were 17, but sometimes it happens that you find an overload. But I cannot remember how many, but maybe there were between 15 and 20.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. You then demonstrated to them how they should use these handgrenades, and what did you tell them thereafter?

MR NKALA: After that we told them that they were going to receive their own grenades.

MR HATTINGH: Anything else?

MR NKALA: We told them that. I cannot remember anything else, except that we told them that they were going to get their own handgrenades and they were also going to select their targets. That is when we were told that there were not targets left in those townships.

MR HATTINGH: And what did you say to them when they informed you that there were no targets left?

MR NKALA: We said that we'll take care of that later on, we'll discuss that later.

MR HATTINGH: And then you went and reported this to whom?

MR NKALA: I remember there we found Venter and Col de Kock, we told them that those people told us that there were no more targets. I remember de Kock telling me that "Nkala, you are to tell them that they should throw those grenades in any manner, but they should do that all at once in one hour, at one time".

MR HATTINGH: Do I understand from you that de Kock told you that it didn't matter how or at what these grenades were launched, that they simply had to throw them and let them go off at the same time?

MR NKALA: Yes, that is correct, Sir.

MR HATTINGH: Are you sure that Mr de Kock was there on this occasion?

MR NKALA: On that particular day I am sure that he was present, yes, he was present.

MR HATTINGH: Why are you so sure that he was there on this day?

MR NKALA: It is solely because he had uttered some words saying that "You should tell them to throw them wherever they liked". I remember those were his words, that is why I can still remember very well that he was present on that particular day.

MR HATTINGH: And did you then report back to them that this is what they had to do, or did you only do that when you handed them the grenades?

MR NKALA: I do not remember whether we went to tell them to throw the grenades, but I remember that when we were talking about these targets they said they wanted -they suggested that what if they keep those grenades for further attacks, so that if they were being attacked they should defend with those grenades. We told them that those handgrenades were supposed to be thrown and to explode all at once. That was the instruction.

MR HATTINGH: But did you tell them why that had to happen?

MR NKALA: We were told that that was in furtherance of their struggle, to show the people that they were in the struggle.

MR HATTINGH: You then received these handgrenades from whom?

MR NKALA: When we were called, that was myself and Joe, we were called to that particular house where we used to meet, there was a big box on the floor, there was Mr de Kock and Capt Roelf Venter. If I remember well, there were two white men who were not known to me, but I remember that there was another third white man and it looked like he was the one who was telling us about the grenades.

MR HATTINGH: What was he telling you about the grenades?

MR NKALA: He was telling us how to handle the grenades and how to remove the safety pin.

MR HATTINGH: Surely you knew that, Mr Nkala, you've been trained by the ANC and by Vlakplaas in the use of handgrenades.

MR NKALA: Yes, that is correct, but a boss is a boss or a "baas" is a "baas". Even if you know something he always thinks that you are going to make a mistake, knowing very well that you know your job.

MR HATTINGH: So what did this person explain to you, how did he instruct you in the use of these grenades?

MR NKALA: He told us that he was demonstrating and then we said that when we get there to those people, before giving them the grenades I should first take a handgrenade and something else and screw in and close and remind that particular person that when he was about to throw a grenade he should pull this other object that was on top and throw the grenade.

MR HATTINGH: But didn't you tell him that you had already instructed these people in the use of handgrenades?

MR NKALA: No, I did not tell him that.

MR HATTINGH: Why not, Mr Nkala?

MR NKALA: I was taking orders. If you are given orders you are not to say anything, you just have to listen to cut matters short and do what you are told to do.

MR HATTINGH: In your statement in bundle 3A at page 157 you refer to a person as a "deskundige". You say:

Is that the person who gave you instructions?

MR NKALA: This person I think he just gave us, telling us what to do when we were giving them the handgrenades. Mr de Kock and Venter on that particular day, they looked like people who did not know how to use those grenades, how to use the explosives.

MR HATTINGH: Surely you must be joking, Mr Nkala, are you really saying that Mr de Kock looked like a person who didn't know how to use a handgrenade?

MR NKALA: I don't think this is a place for jokes, if I was joking I would start by laughing. I'm trying to explain that de Kock did not tell me and say "Mr Nkala, this is a grenade, this is a safety pin, you just screw in". The only person who was telling me that was this man that I'm talking about. They never said anything, that is de Kock and Venter. That doesn't mean that they were seeing the grenades for the very first time or they never used the handgrenades in their lives.

CHAIRPERSON: It's just he manner in which he expresses himself, that he said that yes, that he remained silent.

MR HATTINGH: Yes, I accept that, Mr Chairman.

But Mr Nkala, what exactly - I'm a bit confused now, what exactly did this person demonstrate to you about the handgrenades?

MR NKALA: I made an example with this glass. I don't know whether you want me to repeat one thing over and over again. He said "This is a handgrenade and then this is a detonator. Before giving these members this handgrenade, just first take the handgrenade and take this object and insert it or screw in as if you are closing a bottle". I am saying that for the second time now.

MR HATTINGH: Now what was the object that you had to tell them to screw into the handgrenade first?

MR NKALA: It is called a detonator.

MR HATTINGH: So are you saying that when you received the handgrenades the detonators were not yet attached to the handgrenades, they were separate from the handgrenades?

MR NKALA: That is what I can still remember, they were separated and even the rule when it comes to explosives, you do not take the grenade with a detonator, you only do that when you are about to use it. Even if you have a grenade you should separate it from the detonator, so that if it doesn't have - if it has to explode, it should explode away from each other. That is what I knew as a rule.

MR HATTINGH: And you are saying therefore, Mr Nkala, that what you received, you received some handgrenades and an equal number of detonators, separate from the handgrenades?

MR NKALA: No, I cannot remember, but I saw the detonators and I saw the handgrenades. But what I remember is that when we were giving them to the COSAS members there was a number of grenades that were left and the detonators.

MR HATTINGH: So when you handed the COSAS members these handgrenades, did you hand them each a grenade and a detonator and did you then explain to them how to screw the detonator into the handgrenade?

MR NKALA: There was no time for that because it was in the township and we were afraid that even the police would come. I would screw it in and give one.

MR HATTINGH: So you did it yourself, is that correct?

CHAIRPERSON: He said he screwed ...(intervention)

MR NKALA: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Sorry, sorry. Would you bear with me one moment please, Mr Chairman. Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Now you said here a few moments ago present on this occasion were de Kock, Venter, this person who demonstrated to you how to screw the detonator into the handgrenade and I think you said about two others, is that correct?

CHAIRPERSON: He said other white people who he did not know.

MR HATTINGH: Yes, thank you, Mr Chairman.

In the same paragraph on page 157, you continue:

When you made this statement you could only remember de Kock, Venter and one other member of the Springs Security Branch. Now you mention a person whom you regarded to be some sort of an expert, plus two others. How is that?

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry before you answer that, Mr Nkala, it might be a little bit misleading here because the "deskundige" might have been the second person. You see it starts off:

It might just be only one extra person and not two, as put by yourself.

MR HATTINGH: I concede that that's so, Mr Chairman, but then there's one short.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, yes.

MR NKALA: If you check carefully this statement and the way I remembered when I was doing this statement and the way I remembered now as I'm testifying, there was de Kock, Venter, myself and Joe Mamasela and another person who used to come to the camp, the person that I regarded as a member of the Security Branch of Springs, and another person. I think there were six people there. And as it is written here, this person wrote this statement with a language that I do not understand. Perhaps I was writing - I was saying something else and then the person would write something else.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, before you proceed, Mr Hattingh.

When you wrote this statement, Mr Nkala, the one that's been referred to, was there an interpreter present speaking Zulu to you and were you speaking to this person? I see the person who took it was one, - I don't know who took it, but the person who took it, was that person speaking through an interpreter to you?

MR NKALA: No, I do not remember making a statement in the presence of an interpreter.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you know what language this person was speaking to you when you made the statement?

MR NKALA: The language that we were using, it was Afrikaans.

CHAIRPERSON: And how good is your Afrikaans, or how bad is it?

MR NKALA: It is not that bad, but there are parts when you speak a foreign language you get problems and say something that you were not supposed to say.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I understand. What you're saying is you're not fluent in Afrikaans?

MR NKALA: Yes, that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Hattingh?

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman. In fairness to the witness I should also point out to you that the person who took the statement from him on page 155, and he did that with all the other witnesses who didn't speak English or Afrikaans, he says:

So is it correct, Mr Nkala, that he spoke to you in English and you replied in English and then he translated your English into Afrikaans? Is that what happened?

MR NKALA: Yes, I think that was the case. He would ask me in Afrikaans and if I did not understand - if I can understand him in Afrikaans, he would write that in Afrikaans, then he would ask me again in Afrikaans and perhaps I wouldn't understand the question, we would switch to English.

MR HATTINGH: Mr Chairman, could you perhaps be of assistance to me, the note that I have doesn't correspond with - my attorney's note - it went very quickly, but I have a note here ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible) cross-examination?

MR HATTINGH: No, this would have been in-chief, Mr Chairman. That was shortly after - that was when they received the handgrenades. He says the time was set for 12, that's why it's called Zero-Zero. Just after that I have a note which in telegram style reads something to the following effect ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON:

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman, it's the ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: That's my notes, I don't know if it coincides with my colleagues'.

MR HATTINGH: It coincides with my note on the question as to whether de Kock was there or not. That's the important point that I want to deal with now, Mr Chairman.

Mr Nkala, when you gave evidence here in-chief, and when you spoke about the occasion on which you received grenades, you weren't certain as to whether Mr de Kock was there because you said that you thought that he was there.

MR NKALA: I think you are putting words in my mouth. In the meetings that we used to have - there was quite a number of those meetings, report-back meetings, in one meeting de Kock would be there, in one meeting he would be present, but the meeting that I remember is a meeting when you find a person if you are there for a report back and if there is particular person who would utter something, that you can remember. Now you are talking about my statement in page 157, that de Kock was present. On this particular day when we were getting the grenades and the limpet I am sure that de Kock was present because I remember him telling me to tell those people that they should just throw the handgrenades anywhere.

MR HATTINGH: But what I'm putting to you, Mr Nkala, is what you said here today, this morning before lunch, when you gave your evidence you said:

MR NKALA: I think you are talking about paragraph 2 of my statement in page 156, where I said when I was talking about Joe Mamasela who was going to introduce me, of which I am not sure whether de Kock was present or not. And he did not mention anything directly to me that can make me remember very well that on a particular day so and so said this.

CHAIRPERSON: No, no, I think what Mr Hattingh is referring to, and I'm reading the notes that I took when you were giving evidence, as translated through the interpreters and I'm going back some pages from where we are now, to what I wrote, and this coincides with what Mr Hattingh has written as well and I will read it to you, and it not a verbatim word for word what you said, but it's my notes:

That's my notes. And the relevant part which Mr Hattingh is referring to now as it's written here, you said when you gave evidence before lunch:

That's what you said before lunch here. And now you say you're certain and before you said you think, you weren't so certain because you said:

And he's asking you what is the position. One can listen to the tape if one wants to. Yes, and of course there is interpretation intervening in-between.

MR CORNELIUS: That is the way I recall it as well, Mr Chair.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

You say that it was on the occasion when you received the handgrenades that de Kock told you to tell them that they must all throw the handgrenades at the same time.

MR NKALA: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: I haven't got a note to that effect, but my recollection is that you've previously said that that is what de Kock told you when you reported back to them that these people said that there were no more targets to attack, or am I mistaken?

MR NKALA: Some things would happen at the same time, but I do not remember at any stage - I do not remember them, that when they were telling me that there were no more targets - I do not remember if I told them before we were given the grenades. We had already reported back that there were no targets. I remember de Kock's response on the day when we were given the handgrenades. I am not sure if you do understand that.

MR HATTINGH: What then was de Kock's response when you told them that these people informed you that there were no targets to attack anymore?

MR NKALA: He said that they should just throw them anywhere and they should go off all at once.

MR HATTINGH: Yes. The same thing that he told you when you received the grenades then, is that correct?

MR NKALA: No, I cannot remember if he did mention that again when we were getting the grenades, but on that particular day when we - he - when we were getting those grenades, but the report that there were no more targets, it was already there before getting the grenades.

MR HATTINGH: But I thought you said a few moments ago that you remember de Kock was there on the occasion when you received the grenades, because that was the time when he told you that these grenades should be thrown at the same time and they should all go off at the same time. That's why you remembered that he was there. ...(end of side A of tape)

MR NKALA: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: But now why would he tell you the same thing twice? Did he ...

MR NKALA: When we were receiving the handgrenades I remember him telling me to tell them that they should just throw those grenades. I do not remember him at any stage responding in that manner.

MR HATTINGH: Very well, I'll leave the rest for argument. Did you only receive handgrenades and one limpet mine from these people on this occasion?

MR NKALA: Yes, those are the things that I can remember, and two AK47 rifles.

MR HATTINGH: Why were you given the two AK47 rifles?

MR NKALA: To show that we were not we were not imitation of MK cadres, we were not fake.

MR HATTINGH: But weren't they satisfied at this stage already that you were genuine?

MR NKALA: Yes, it looked like they were satisfied.

MR HATTINGH: I want to put it to you, Mr Nkala, that Mr de Kock's version is that he wasn't present when handgrenades and limpet mines were handed over to you.

MR NKALA: Yes, he was present. Even now I cannot remember - I cannot say other things, but he did mention that we can tell them to throw those handgrenades. Now we are talking peace, people are - he wants to say that I am ...

INTERPRETER: I'm struggling to understand the witness, I would ask him to repeat again.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Nkala, the interpreter has requested if you could just repeat what you've said, she lost track.

MR NKALA: Okay. Yes, he was present.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Now after you received the handgrenades and the limpet mines and as you say, the two AKs, did you then go into the township that same evening?

MR NKALA: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Had you made a prior arrangement with these people where you were going to meet them?

MR NKALA: Yes, there was an arrangement as to where to meet, but what I can still remember is that I think Joe had some knowledge that if we did not meet with Congress he knew how to get hold of Congress. That was their agreement.

MR HATTINGH: And did you get hold of Congress at the place where you'd arranged to meet him?

MR NKALA: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: Was he alone or were the others with him?

MR NKALA: I think we found him with other people, three or four people.

MR HATTINGH: You say you think, you say you think you found him with other people, aren't you sure?

MR NKALA: I am not sure because we left for another house where the others were coming in and when we left that house and going to places and Congress knew those houses. We would go to different places and get the other people. We wouldn't - we couldn't find them in a group as people who were underground.

MR HATTINGH: And were they all assembled in one place before you handed them the grenades?

MR NKALA: They were not in one place because we found Congress in a place with three and ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Nkala, I think the question was - you've described how you collected these people, but when you actually gave them the grenades, were they all together at that stage, or did you give them grenades as you met them piecemeal, one after the other over a period of time?

MR NKALA: Yes, they were all together in one place, a large group.

MR HATTINGH: And did you then know what they were going to attack, where they were going to launch these grenades?

MR NKALA: No, I did not know.

MR HATTINGH: And to whom was the limpet mine handed?

MR NKALA: It was given to Congress.

MR HATTINGH: Was there a reason for that, that you knew of?

MR NKALA: No, I did not know the reason, but it was mentioned that as a leader he should be given that limpet.

MR HATTINGH: Can I just come back to the training, there's one thing that slipped my mind. When you trained these people in the use of the handgrenades I believe you were at an old mine site, is that correct?

MR NKALA: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And when you instructed these people there in the use of these handgrenades, were you wearing some sort of mask?

MR NKALA: No, I do not remember wearing any mask.

MR HATTINGH: Do you remember whether Mr Mamasela was wearing a mask of some sort?

MR NKALA: No, I do not remember seeing anyone with a mask.

MR HATTINGH: Because I want to refer you to the evidence of Mr J T Mazibuko in volume 2A, at page 280. About two thirds down the page, a Mrs Seroke asked you the following question:

Sorry, not asked you, asked Mr Mazibuko.

Sorry, I'm reading at the wrong place. Mrs Seroke is asking Mr Mazibuko:

To which Mr Mazibuko responded:

So Mr Mazibuko said he couldn't see Mr Mamasela because he was wearing a balaclava. Do you have any knowledge of that?

MR NKALA: No, Sir, I do not have any knowledge. How would we put balaclavas?

MR HATTINGH: Alright. Now coming back to the - after you'd handed out the grenades and the limpet mine, did you and Mamasela then accompany Congress to the place where he wanted to go and explode his device?

MR NKALA: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Did he find the place himself or did you suggest to him where he should go?

MR NKALA: He is the one who had chosen the place because he knew the place very well.

MR HATTINGH: Now up until that stage, Mr Nkala, you still had no knowledge of the fact that these grenades and the limpet mine were booby-trapped?

MR NKALA: No, I was suspicious.

MR HATTINGH: But Mr Venter didn't tell you, Mr de Kock didn't tell you and neither did Mr Mamasela tell you?

MR NKALA: No, I do not remember them telling me that those were the booby-traps, I was just thinking that they were going to do something else.

MR HATTINGH: And when you arrived at the target that Congress selected, you say that Mr Mamasela told you to go with him?

MR NKALA: Yes, he told me to accompany him.

MR HATTINGH: And did he explain to you why you had to do that?

MR NKALA: He said that I should be there so that if the police were coming I would try and defend him as I was handling - I was having an AK47.

MR HATTINGH: And was the intention that you should go with him all the way to where he was going to place the limpet mine?

MR NKALA: I am not sure about the aim.

MR HATTINGH: Do you know why Mr Mamasela drove off?

MR NKALA: Mr Mamasela, I think he was scared. He had deep knowledge as compared to me. If I screw in the grenade in front of him he would send me out.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Hattingh.

Now that you know that that limpet mine was booby-trapped, now, do you think that Mr Mamasela was trying to kill you? The fact that he asked you to go off together with Congress, with this highly dangerous mine that will blow up unexpectedly as soon as it's triggered. What do you think personally?

MR NKALA: In my opinion he also found himself in that situation that a person should go to a certain place and Mamasela knew very well that I wouldn't - that person wouldn't come back. He thought that he should be accompanied by someone else. I will not know even if he was planning to kill me, because I don't know the original, the initial planning.

MR HATTINGH: But it's clear from Mr Mamasela's statement and his evidence that he knew all along that these grenades and this limpet mine had been booby-trapped. Are you aware of that?

MR NKALA: I was not aware that those were booby-traps when they started, but after we had gone out, when I was screwing in a detonator to the grenade, he would get a scare and it looked like he thought that when I was doing that it was going to explode, but I knew that even if it's defaulted, it will only explode when you pull that object.

MR HATTINGH: But on your evidence it seemed to me that you were going to accompany Congress if, until you became suspicious.

INTERPRETER: Will you please repeat the question, Sir.

MR HATTINGH: If I understood your evidence correctly, you said that you didn't go with Congress all the way because you became suspicious yourself.

CHAIRPERSON: That is when Mamasela drove off.

MR HATTINGH: Yes.

MR NKALA: I was with him all the way, because I was suspicious that if Congress opens this and I was suspicious that some damage would happen, but when Joe drove off I thought quickly and I wanted to tell Congress to turn back, and I had to stand there at the corner.

MR HATTINGH: Why did you want Congress to turn back?

MR NKALA: It is because I was suspecting that something was very wrong, because you cannot just train a person with handgrenades and tell that person to throw those handgrenades to, that person being an enemy, without having an agenda, without people who would come and attack him.

ADV GCABASHE: If I can just clarify one point. As I understood your evidence, it's not a matter of wanting Congress to turn back, you wanted him to go around the corner. That's how I understood you. He would be obscured from you, am I right?

MR NKALA: At the time - let me make an example. Say for instance where this glass is there's a road and there's a distance from the road to the car and just in-between, before the fire station and then this car now is driving off and then when this car is driving off, I said try to put that limpet quickly and then when I went back, though I cannot remember whether I took cover, there was no time, whereas I was standing there I just heard an explosion.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Nkala, if Mr Mamasela didn't drive off, do you think you might have accompanied Congress all the way to the place where he would have placed the grenade - the mine?

MR NKALA: No, Joe Mamasela was not going to accompany them, because even when it comes to touching ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: No, the question was - if you can just listen to the question. If Joe Mamasela did not drive away, would you have kept in company of Congress the whole way to the place where he would have put the mine?

MR NKALA: I am not sure exactly because I was not yet frightened at the time.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Did Mr Mamasela come back after the explosion to pick you up again?

MR NKALA: No, I just saw a car and then I went up to him.

MR HATTINGH: So you got a lift from somebody else?

MR NKALA: No, when he drove off I just walked through to the other side so that when he comes from the other side we should meet at a certain point.

MR HATTINGH: And did you then meet?

MR NKALA: Yes, he saw me and then I got into the car and we left.

MR HATTINGH: Did you ask him why he drove off and left you there alone?

MR NKALA: Yes, I remember that I enquired, I asked him why was he running away. I do not remember his direct response.

MR HATTINGH: You then returned to base, is that correct?

MR NKALA: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: Where you slept that night?

MR NKALA: Yes, we slept that night.

MR HATTINGH: And the next morning you returned to Vlakplaas.

MR NKALA: Yes, I remember that.

MR HATTINGH: Together with Venter, de Kock and all the other Vlakplaas members who were there?

MR NKALA: When we left there we were in a kombi, our kombi, and our superiors were using the cars that were given to them, but we met, we eventually met at Vlakplaas, though we were moving in separate cars.

MR HATTINGH: The one thing that I find significant about your whole account is the fact that you hardly seem to mention Brig Cronje at all, did he not play a role in the planning and the execution of this whole incident?

MR NKALA: I will not know. I was a junior as a Constable, all I knew as usual, was to take instructions from your immediate supervisor. Even if Jack Cronje would come there, he would come and inspect. That is what I knew, that he was in charge of inspecting all the groups that were sent outside. In the meetings I do not remember seeing him there. If possible he would instruct the others to instruct us.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you, Mr Hattingh. I see it's now quarter past four, this would be a convenient time to adjourn. We'll adjourn until tomorrow, again at half past nine in the morning. So it's the same venue, half past nine tomorrow morning. Thank you.