DATE: 11TH AUGUST 1999
NAME: H J P BOTHA
APPLICATION NO: AM4117/96
MATTER: ELIMINATION OF DION CELE
DAY : 2
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CHAIRPERSON: Are we ready to proceed? Yes.
MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I see you're looking at me. Visser on record. Perhaps you would like some feedback on the position of the victims. I didn't make enquiries this morning. I see there's nobody here to represent them. Perhaps Ms Thabethe wishes to address you on that before we start with the incident.
CHAIRPERSON: Can we proceed in their absence?
MS THABETHE: Thank you, Mr Chair. I will be representing the interests of the victims in this matter.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, they're not here, but we can proceed.
CHAIRPERSON: Thanks.
MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: They are aware of the fact that we are starting at half past nine?
MS THABETHE: Mr Chair, they were present yesterday, they are aware.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Yes, Mr Visser.
MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, before we get down to the amnesty application in regard to Mr Cele, we have made good our threat yesterday of drafting a further document for you in regard to the violence in Natal and which also refers to Operation Vula. If you have Exhibit A which we handed in yesterday, before you, Chairperson, could I ask you to turn to page 20 of Exhibit A and could I ask you and the Members of your Committee to tear out from page 20, the rest of those pages of Exhibit A. We will now hand to you a document which will run from page 20, which will replace the documents which you've now torn out.
Mr Chairman, while we're about handing up to you documents, we have prepared for you an extract from the written presentation made by the Foundation for Equality before the Law. You will recall, Chairperson, that that's quite a thick document. I've got one in my hand. You will recall - you will remember when you see the cover page, what that document looks like. We're not going to deal with that whole document. What we've done is we have extracted Chapter 17 from that document and Ms Thabethe has kindly assisted in making copies for you, Chairperson, and we will ask you to accept that as Exhibit B, which we'll hand up to you. Perhaps I should hand to you these documents now so that you can follow better. May I approach, Chairperson?
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, please do. You'll hand us the substituted pages as well?
MR VISSER: These are the substituted pages, Judge, that's part of a, b, c, d.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, the substituted pages will be the first document. That won't be given a new exhibit number because that forms part of Exhibit A. And it now runs to page 35 if I'm not mistaken, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, it does.
MR VISSER: Yes. Then you have a document which is headed "Chapter 17", we would ask you to mark that Exhibit B. That's the extract from the Foundation for Equality before the Law. B for bravo. Oh yes, my attorney just reminds me that that document, the Foundation's document, was the original Exhibit P45. So we mention that as well.
Then Chairperson, you'll see another document. That document has a chap, a rubber stamp on the top of it stating "Facts to Gail Wannenberg". Chairperson, this document was made available to us by the TRC on the last occasion when we appeared before your brother, Justice Wilson, Malan and Sigodi, in the other applications concerning Natal incidents.
We make that available to you, Chairperson. We won't specifically rely on it, we're not even certain whether all the detail here is correct. But it is an interesting document. It was compiled by a Dr Robert Henderson from Canada and it gives an interesting perspective on Vula. And that is for your own reading pleasure, Chairperson.
Then lastly, we hand up to you a summary of the evidence of Lt-Col Botha, who will be the first witness. And may we suggest that that be marked Exhibit D.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes.
MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I don't propose to deal with the new pages 20 and further from the bar as it were, Col Botha who is now going to give evidence in the Cele matter before, when we commence with that matter, is far more au fait with the facts and we thought it better for him to run through that document with you, so that if there are any questions which may occur to the Members of the Committee, they could raise it with him because he's the ideal person to deal with issues which may arise from Vula and Butterfly etc.
ADV BOSMAN: Mr Visser, I don't have a copy of Exhibit D, can you perhaps assist me please.
MR VISSER: I'm terribly sorry, Chairperson. Terribly sorry.
ADV BOSMAN: Thank you.
MR VISSER: Yes. Well Mr Chairman, if you are satisfied so far, then we are ready to proceed with the Cele matter.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, please do.
MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, we appear in the kidnap and killing of Mr Dion Cele, on behalf of Col Botha, Col Vorster, V-O-R-S-T-E-R, and W/O Wasserman, W-A-S-S-E-R-M-A-N. Perhaps you would require the other interested parties perhaps to just place them on record, Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, well I think we already have, we did that yesterday.
MR VISSER: Alright. If I may proceed then, Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes.
MR VISSER: I call Col Botha to give evidence. He prefers to give his evidence in Afrikaans. He is ready to be sworn in. He had no objection to taking the oath.
H J P BOTHA: (sworn states)
EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Botha.
Mr Botha, you are an applicant for amnesty in the application with regard to the abduction and killing of Mr Dion Cele. He is also known as Mr Mbova, M-B-O-V-A Mzimela, M-Z-I-M-E-L-A. His MK name as Charles and he had an alias, Dion Cele. Is that correct?
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: Your amnesty application can be found in the Cele bundle, from page 19 to 34. Do you confirm the content and the correctness, with the exception of any amendments or adjustments that you wish to bring to the evidence of your official amnesty application?
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, the incident is at page 29 of the bundle. You will probably not find it necessary to refer to that bundle, in view of Exhibit D.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes.
MR VISSER: But that is where it is - where it resides in that bundle.
CHAIRPERSON: Very well.
MR VISSER: You have also compiled a statement along with your legal representatives, in which you according to your current recollection have summarised the facts of the matter, and that can be found in Exhibit D.
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: Do you also confirm the content and correctness of Exhibit D?
MR BOTHA: Yes, I do.
MR VISSER: In Exhibit D you refer to Exhibit A, that is the general background, and do you have personal knowledge of the matters with regard to annexure A, insofar as they refer to Lesotho and Botswana?
MR BOTHA: No, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Now with the exception of those two aspects, do you confirm according to your knowledge and insight, the correctness of Exhibit A?
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: If we could then page through Exhibit A, I would like you to go to page 20 of Exhibit A, actually page 21. And then when I ask you to submit to the Committee the circumstances as you understood them with regard to Swaziland and Natal. Would you be able to do so please?
MR BOTHA: Certainly.
"Chairperson, during a summit which was held at Simonstown approximately at the end of 1980 or the beginning of 1981, during which all the members of the Security Committee were involved, among others a decision was made that the information collection and actions in Swaziland, even though they were situated outside the borders of the RSA, fell below the auspices of the Security Branch of South Africa for the purposes of the collection of information and the execution of duties."
MR VISSER: We are not really certain of the definition of operations in those circumstances.
MR BOTHA: No.
MR VISSER: Please continue.
MR BOTHA:
"Because the South African Police had no statutory powers to act in an independent neighbouring country, it meant that actions in Swaziland would be illegal.
However, an agreement was made with the Swaziland authorities two years before the Umkomati Accord, which made provision for actions in Swaziland prima facie."
MR VISSER: I see that we did not add this. The Umkomati Accord was signed in 1984?
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: And that means that the Swazi Accord would have been in 1982?
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: Very well.
CHAIRPERSON: This is the agreement with the Swaziland Government?
MR VISSER: Yes, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: 1982?
MR VISSER: Yes, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
MR VISSER: Please continue.
MR BOTHA:
"It was the knowledge of the members of the Security Branch that intermittently from Mozambique through and in Swaziland, an active role was fulfilled by high profile MK members in the planning and execution of violent actions in the RSA. That weapons of war were smuggled by and through Swaziland to the RSA. That a great deal of terrorists had left the RSA and after they had completed their military training, had returned to the RSA via Swaziland. That there was an extensive network of safehouses and other facilities with which terrorists were supported. That financial and logistical support was provided to such persons in Swaziland.
Due to the geographical proximity of Natal to Swaziland, the activities of the liberation movements in Swaziland became known to Natal. The Security Branch Eastern Transvaal was naturally also affected by this. Due to their intelligence capacity, the Security Branch was kept up to date very well with activities and personalities and their activities in Swaziland.
The Security Branch was up to date regarding who the ANC operatives were and what their intentions were. By means of well-placed informers they regularly received information regarding the terrorists and weaponry that would enter the RSA, as well as the routes along which they would travel, as well as the situation of the DLBs and safehouses. The DLBs actually refer to weapon stockpiling location and not necessarily points of information. They also had knowledge about safehouses, contact persons and so forth, which placed them in a capacity to act in future.
Swaziland also played an important role in the execution of the ANC/SACP alliance's Operation Butterfly and Operation Vula. In Swaziland certain structures had been established by the ANC/SACP alliance and had been operated as such. There was an RPMC, a Regional Politico Military Committee under which the so-called political committee and a military committee functioned."
MR VISSER: Yes, and for the convenience of the Committee two quotes have been taken from the Further Submissions of the ANC to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of the 12th of May 1997. The first deals with the period from 1983 to 1985, and that refers to page 48 and 49 of that document. And the second refers to the period from 1985 to 1990, and that is from page 53 of that document. And that basically deals with the committees and the personalities involved in those activities.
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: Now with Natal itself, could you submit to the Committee from page 25, paragraph 79. Chairperson, I'm going a bit quickly ...
CHAIRPERSON: That's quite alright.
MR VISSER: I suppose you understand what I'm referring to.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes.
MR VISSER: I'm referring to the Further Submissions and Responses by the African National Congress to questions raised by the Commission for Truth and Reconciliation of 12 May 1997.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes.
MR VISSER: Please do stop me if ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: No, you carry on.
MR VISSER: Thank you.
Please continue, paragraph 79 from Exhibit A.
MR BOTHA:
"Chairperson, with regard to the province of Natal and with the exception of somewhat uncoordinated commission of violence which was experienced across the country, Natal suffered the consequences of two highly organised structures of the ANC/SACP alliance, namely Operations Butterfly and then Operation Vula.
Operation Vula which was established in the final phases of 1985 and went to 1990, but which was actually aimed at lasting much longer ..."
...(intervention)
MR VISSER: It was a five year plan, isn't that so?
MR BOTHA: Yes. And it had to lead to the unleashing of a civil war.
"During the five years an infrastructure would be established within the country and weapons would be stockpiled within the country. And according to the plan the masses would be politicised to such an extent that they would spontaneously rise up if there would be a spark to the so-called flame.
By these means the Vula operatives did not commit violence ..."
...(intervention)
MR VISSER: They were busy with preparations.
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: And we will hear later what the spark or one of the sparks at least were.
MR BOTHA: Yes.
MR VISSER: Please continue.
MR BOTHA:
"Operation Butterfly was a structure of MK. In other words it was a purely military structure within the ANC, or at least a purely military operation within the ANC.
While those members shared very much the same objectives as Operation Vula, they were more violently oriented and committed acts of violence. Operation Vula in contrast was an operation of the SACP.
Initially, during the '80s, Natal was into three security divisions within the SAP, namely Division Natal with the head office in Pietermaritzburg, Division Port Natal, with the head office being Durban and Division Northern Natal, with the headquarters being Newcastle.
It is important to mention this due to the fact that over the period of the 1980s, initiatives were brought in from the three divisions which later became one, Division Natal."
MR VISSER: And in which year did this take place, can you recall?
MR BOTHA: I cannot recall the precise year, but I would think that it was in 1988 or '89.
MR VISSER: Very well. That is when there was only one Division Natal.
MR BOTHA: That is correct.
MR VISSER: Very well. In the following paragraph, 83, you have given a background of how your staff was numbered, with specific reference to Durban.
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: And you have also given the position of Col Andy Taylor. And if we look at the bottom of page 26, where Mr Botha gives evidence, you say - and you refer here to the evidence that you gave in the Ndwandwe amnesty application.
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: You say:
"Mainly in command was Col Andy Taylor with an investigation unit directly under his command."
Now his unit was actually a unit that dealt with research regarding terrorism.
MR BOTHA: Yes, it was a terrorist unit.
MR VISSER: It was a terrorist unit. And furthermore you say in your evidence before Judge Wilson and the Committee Members:
"And there was an MK Intelligence Unit, which was under my command."
That is below you.
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: And then we speak of manpower and you say:
"Chairperson, in total at the Security Branch (and you refer to Durban) we were about 200 members."
Does that refer only to Durban?
MR BOTHA: Yes, that refers only to Durban.
MR VISSER:
"C-Section as our unit was known, under the command of Taylor existed out of 18 persons in total."
MR BOTHA: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR VISSER:
"It was an investigation component, administrative one and the intelligence component, the investigators, I'd estimate there were about six to eight of them."
And then you how many there were in the administrative component. And furthermore you say:
"Some of the members in the intelligence component, who are also applicants in this case, was Maj du Preez, W/O Wasserman and Sgt van der Westhuizen."
And that is still the same situation, not so?
MR BOTHA: Yes, the situation remains the same, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Well the situation here, Mr Botha, is that you weren't really a lot of people who could address the problem of the struggle of the past here in Natal, is that correct?
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: Please continue then, paragraph 84.
MR BOTHA:
"Chairperson, Natal was a boiling pot of violence, especially from 1985 the violence escalated. Col Andy Taylor kept an informal record of incidents in which he kept record of the acts of terrorist as they manifested themselves. A copy of this was handed over to the TRC's Investigative Unit in Durban in 1997 and also served as an annexure or an exhibit in the Ndwandwe amnesty application."
MR VISSER: And there you refer to Exhibit A. Mr Chairman, this was a document written in manuscript, which we retyped at the time. We can hand it to you so that you can get the feel of the document. Mr Chairman, what it deals with is it deals with the dates, the places where violence took place, it gives a reference number, it gives a description of the type of violence and where there was a result it gives you that. We are not going to formally hand this in as an exhibit, but we will make this available to you to page through to get the general feeling of it.
CHAIRPERSON: If we require it we will do so.
MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, if you find that you would like that as an exhibit, then clearly we will reproduce it for you and we will hand it in.
CHAIRPERSON: Very well. So in paragraph 85, the Exhibit A is this document here ...(intervention)
MR VISSER: That's the one that I've just handed to you.
CHAIRPERSON: ... that's the informal record kept by Taylor.
MR VISSER: Yes, that's the one I've just handed to you.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
MR VISSER: Now we must just understand one thing, that that document isn't necessarily complete, it does not give everything necessarily.
CHAIRPERSON: Very well.
MR VISSER: But it gives a running commentary on the violence as it were, in Natal. Then Mr Chairman also in the Ndwandwe amnesty hearing, in the record at page 568 and following, that document is discussed and summarised in the evidence of Mr Botha. And we've given you that reference at page 27 of Exhibit A.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you.
MR VISSER: Now one of the things which took place here in Natal was the so-called Operation Butterfly.
MR BOTHA: That is correct.
MR VISSER: And that is the one which fell below Umkhonto weSizwe, is that correct?
MR BOTHA: Yes.
MR VISSER: Could you inform the Committee with regard to the brief summary that we have compiled regarding Operation Butterfly please.
MR BOTHA: Chairperson - or before I continue, let me just explain to you that in the past MK operatives or trained terrorists would infiltrate the country, carry out an order which had been given to them, either in Zambia or in Swaziland, and then they would withdraw again. Either that, or in other circumstances they would be arrested, prosecuted and sentenced.
Now in the case of Operation Butterfly there was a shift of emphasis from the usual to an establishment of a high profile infrastructure within the RSA, consisting of trained MK operatives or terrorists, who wen they had established themselves within the country would be supported or were supported by local members of MK.
CHAIRPERSON: That's within the country?
MR BOTHA: That was within the country.
MR VISSER: Very well.
MR BOTHA:
"During the investigation of Operation Butterfly and the activities of these persons and during the investigation and the trial of a case which was STATE vs DUDU BUTHELEZI AND OTHERS, case number 70/86, Pietermaritzburg Supreme Court, this case being known as Ramlakan case, the existence of the first APMC, which Area Politico Military Committee and their activities under the operational name Butterfly, was exposed within the RSA. And this was the first time that such an operation had been identified within the RSA.
These activities included the infiltration of terrorists to Natal, the smuggling of weaponry, ammunition and explosives, the establishment and extension of structures, the training of terrorists internally, as well as acts of terror which were committed in Natal. In other words, he was recruited here, trained here, provided with weapons here and he immediately went over to commit acts of terror.
Now the Amanzimtoti limpet mine explosion on the 23rd of December 1985 was one of the more prominent examples of terror which were committed by this particular group."
MR VISSER: I'm told that we're going a bit too quickly, Chairperson.
Could you please proceed somewhat slower. It might just be a good idea to pause for second at the end of a sentence, so that the interpreters can catch up with your speech.
MR BOTHA: Very well.
The Amanzimtoti limpet mine explosion on the 23rd of December 1985 was an example of this. A person by the name of Andrew Zondo was found guilty regarding the placement of this bomb and later he received the death sentence for this.
The members of the so-called APMC consisted among others, of medical students who were connected to the University of Natal, under the leadership of one, Dr Ramlakan."
MR VISSER: Yes. And just to avoid confusion, APMC is also referred to DPMC from time to time, isn't that so? But it is the same thing.
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct, and I will explain what DPMC stands for. It is Durban Politico Military Committee, because that was the area in which they were actively involved.
"And they were compiled from two groupings, namely externally trained terrorists, among others, Andrew Zondo and Robert Ndlanzi ..."
...(intervention)
MR VISSER: N-L-A-N-Z-I. Very well.
MR BOTHA: Alias George Fakude. They were not the only ones, but they were just two of the more prominent members.
"The second grouping was the internal ANC/SACP supporters among others, including Dr Ramlakan and his spouse, Sandi Africa."
MR VISSER: ... it doesn't matter. Continue with the other names. Lulamela ...
MR BOTHA:
"Lulamela Caute, Portia Ndwandwe, Percy Nlati, Pumezo Ncgweni, Dudu Buthelezi, Nokosipo Stanly Biela."
MR VISSER: Now Ndwandwe and Ngweni and Biela were also mentioned during the amnesty applications which have previously been heard before the Amnesty Committee right here in this very same hall in November 1998.
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: This was before Judge Wilson.
MR BOTHA: That is so.
MR VISSER: Please continue.
MR BOTHA:
"Also involved in the DPMC or the APMC as it was known, were the following persons: Raymond Lala, alias MK Brazo ..."
...(intervention)
MR VISSER: And he is a victim in one of the incidents during which you have applied for amnesty for assault?
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: Then there's also Sandi Africa, Dr Ramlakan himself. Who was Kevin Qoboshiyane? Perhaps I should just spell that for the record; Q-O-B-O-S-H-I-Y-A-N-E. Who was he?
MR BOTHA: Kevin Qoboshiyane was also one of the trained ANC terrorists who came from the outside and became involved within the RSA.
MR VISSER: Then there's Mo Shaik and his two brothers, as well as his father.
MR BOTHA: That is correct.
MR VISSER: And one Molana. I beg your pardon, did you want to say something with regard to Mo Shaik?
MR BOTHA: Yes, with regard to Mo Shaik's involvement it was a continuation of an activity in which they had been involved a year previously regarding the infiltration of a high profile ANC personality, Ebrahim Ismail, and they were involved with the DPMC. Information had been conveyed to the DPMC, which could be used by them in the establishment and accommodation of infiltrating terrorists.
MR VISSER: Very well.
MR BOTHA:
"Directly after the Amanzimtoti bomb on the 24th and the 25th of December 1985, within 48 hours 52 persons who were connected to the DPMC were arrested. Among others, Ndwandwe, Pumezo and Biela. Approximately half of the arrested persons were later charged in the Ramlakan matter, including the latter-mentioned three persons."
MR VISSER: Very well, and in '93 you say that Robert Ndlanzi, alias George Fakude who we have referred to previously, had been in Natal for a week or so from Swaziland when these arrests took place and he was also arrested.
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: And he was also found guilty and sentenced with his involvement in Operation Butterfly.
MR BOTHA: Yes.
MR VISSER: And with regard to Ndwandwe, Pumezo and Biela, who were charged as you have stated in the Ramlakan matter, they along with a fourth person were discharged before the completion of the matter.
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: And in paragraph 95 it is stated that Ndwandwe had managed to recruit the remaining members who had managed to escape and created new units under her control, with which she continued to commit acts of terror within the Republic.
MR BOTHA: That is correct.
MR VISSER: And that she left the Republic in 1987 and went somewhere overseas where she obtained military training. Is that correct?
MR BOTHA: Yes.
MR VISSER: And that after Tommy Zulu and Charles Ndaba had been transferred from Swaziland, she became the de facto commander of MK in Swaziland and she was also in control of the Natal operations of MK.
MR BOTHA: That is correct.
CHAIRPERSON: I haven't been able to catch up. What is Ndwandwe's first name?
MR VISSER: Phila.
CHAIRPERSON: How do you spell that?
MR VISSER: P-H-I-L-A. Now it's either Porta or Portia. I think it's P-O-R-T-I-A. Commissioner Lax agrees with that.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I think it should be.
MR VISSER: And Ndwandwe is N-D-W-A-N-D-W-E.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you I have that. Thank you.
MR VISSER: And then you refer to the evidence that you have given in this regard, with reference to the Ndwandwe matter, volume 3 page 466 to 467. Could you then briefly address us regarding Operation Vula, on page 30, paragraph 97 and following.
MR BOTHA: Yes.
"Operation Vula, and as it appeared from the document which was compiled by Ronnie Kasrils "Politics on the Armed Struggle - the Revolutionary Army, appeared to have the following ideas as its basis. Kasrils' idea was that the internal bases of power had to be established by advanced attachments of MK.
'The development of the armed struggle is dependent on its being rooted among the people. Our MK combatants and organisers must therefore base themselves amongst the people in order to involve the masses in a people's war.'
Trained MK cadres had to activate the masses politically:
'The armed struggle must compliment mass struggle and we seek to combine all forms of struggle, violent and non-violent, legal and illegal.'
The underlying strategy was:
'Political and strategy determines military strategy and our combatants and organisers must be imbued with political theories and ideas, must understand politics guides the gun.'
The central concept for the operation was that a power basis had to be established within the borders of South Africa, which would replace the necessity to leave the country to obtain training and swallows the necessity of receiving orders from outside the country.
Kasrils' idea of a basis of power within the country was accepted by the ANC/SACP alliance, but the viewpoint was that it was ANC leaders and not MK cadres who would have create the basis of power and politicise the masses. There would have to be an abbreviation of the communication from the front of the struggle to the head office in Lusaka.
The operation would have three corner stones, namely: a) political combat work, military combat work and the intelligence work, specifically aimed at the SAP, the South African Defence Force and National Intelligence Services, as well as other targets which would be identified.
Vula was launched during December 1986 and would be a five year operation. The ultimate objective was a violent revolution. Vula's origin was preceded by a preparation phase which had already been initiated in 1984/1985. Legends were created for the prominent members who were involved in Operation Vula, namely Mac Maharaj played the key role in Operation Vula. He would have cancer and would have to be treated for five years in Russia."
MR VISSER: Yes. There are various deviations or other perspectives which have been offered by other persons. For example, that he would have had kidney problems or whatever the case may be. The fact of the matter remains that the legend that was created for him would have indicated that he needed five years of medical treatment in Russia.
MR BOTHA: That's correct. "Dit sou verduidelik sy afwesigheid binne die strukture van die ANC in Lusaka". ...(no English interpretation)
MR VISSER: Very well.
MR BOTHA:
"Siphiwe Nyanda as his cover, would have to obtain five years training in Russia and other legends were also created."
MR VISSER: Now this information can be found in an issue of the British MI5. We don't have that document available to us. Is that correct?
MR BOTHA: No, we don't.
MR VISSER: Very well, continue.
MR BOTHA:
"High profile ANC/SACP members had to operate covertly in the RSA and establish an infrastructure for the establishment of underground structures, DLBs, once again for the purpose of weapons stockpiling, safehouses, transit facilities, as well as a communications network. The plan was that the armed struggle would fall under the direct internal command of the MK commanders who were present in the country.
Within the ANC itself it was a secret movement. It was only in selected groups. Only selected groups were aware of it and acted supportively for this. The initiative for this came from the SACP. And one could draw the golden thread from the involvement of individuals within operation Vula, that all of them were registered members of the SACP and/or that they were considered for action within the SACP."
MR VISSER: I wonder if we could just pause there and just refer to Exhibit C, where on page 4 reference is made to the secrecy - in paragraph 3, from the top of the page.
"The authorisation for implementing Operation Vula was a "Top Secret" NEC resolution, taken in 1986, working out of the ANC headquarters in the Lusaka. The operation was placed under the President's project, chaired by ANC President, Oliver Tambo and included Joe Slovo as principal planner, Mac Maharaj as principal recruiter and in-country commander, Siphiwe "Kebusa" Nyanda, as deputy in-country commander, Ivan Pillay as administrator responsible for project co-ordination and a few others."
Would you agree with that summary of Exhibit C?
MR BOTHA: Yes, it is correct.
MR VISSER: Very well, proceed.
MR BOTHA:
"Initially these persons were applied within the country. They acted under the Durban Political and Military Committee. And here I must just qualify that this is not the same Durban Political and Military Committee which was referred to in Operation Butterfly. Durban, in the establishment of Operation Vula, was divided into districts and zones for the politicisation of the masses as well as the identification of individuals for training."
MR VISSER: Yes, and here you refer to Chapter 17, which is Exhibit B, isn't that so? Mr Chairman, if you could perhaps turn to paragraph 6 you will find what the witness is now referring to.
CHAIRPERSON: Just hold on.
MR VISSER: It's at page 112. We should have re-paginated it. But dealing with the page numbers as they appear now, page 112 paragraph 6. And there reference is made to the ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Are you talking about paragraph 6 of Exhibit D?
MR VISSER: No, no, of Exhibit B for bravo.
CHAIRPERSON: I'm sorry.
MR VISSER: I'm sorry, Chairperson. B for bravo.
CHAIRPERSON: Hold it.
MR VISSER: And it's paragraph 6, that is at page 112. And we're not going to read it, but that is what the witness is referring to, the zones and areas and zonal and area commanders etc., Chairperson. So that should just be noted alongside paragraph 105 of Exhibit A.
Very well, please proceed.
MR BOTHA:
"Their activities included the recruitment of agents in the Security Forces, the pressure and circulation of political literature in order to politicise persons regarding problems or problematic issues within the country, as well as the mass import of weaponry from abroad into stockpiling points in the RSA."
MR VISSER: Before you proceed. Chairperson, I hope I'm not confusing you, I'm just trying to be helpful to give you the cross-references. If at page - at paragraph 105, at the end of that, you can refer again to Exhibit C, page 2 of Exhibit C, the third paragraph. And I will read it to you. Exhibit C says this: - if you have it before you, Chairperson, that's the Gail Wannenberg document.
"The major objectives of Operation Vula were ..."
...(intervention)
MS THABETHE: Sorry, Mr Chair.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes?
MS THABETHE: Can my learned friend please repeat the page numbers.
CHAIRPERSON: This is page 2 ...(intervention)
MR VISSER: Of Exhibit C.
CHAIRPERSON: ... of Exhibit C, paragraph 3.
MR VISSER: It's the third paragraph from the top. They're not numbered.
CHAIRPERSON: They're not numbered, yes.
MR VISSER: Has Ms Thabethe found it?
MS THABETHE: Yes, thanks.
MR VISSER: I read it.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, do carry on.
MR VISSER:
"The major objectives of Operation Vula were to relocate senior and middle-level leaders from the ANC external leadership into South Africa to create a nation-wide underground network to co-ordinate and support a general insurrection against the apartheid State and to penetrate the South African governmental and security structures for the purposes of intelligence collection and covert disruption. But for Vula to succeed it had to create an underground organisation far more sophisticated, secure and secretive than the ANC and its military wing, Umkhonto weSizwe had been able to achieve to that point in the armed struggle. In addition, it had to create or obtain a secure means of real time communication between the external leadership at the ANC headquarters in Lusaka (Zambia) and the Vula operational command inside the country.
Its existing communications system with internal underground operatives, consisted of a combination of one-time inscription pads, air flight couriers, cross-border smuggling messages etc."
Now Mr Chairman, if you will allow me to confuse you even a little further, from the Internet there is a document available, which can be down-loaded. It is called "Talking to Vula" and it is by a Mr Tim Jenkin. He was a gentleman who lived in England and who developed and perfected this one-time encryptic pads and the communication system which evolved through telephone modems talking to computers, which allowed instant same time access, both from South African, Lusaka and England.
Now it's an instructive document to show how it evolved. And if you are at all interested, Chairperson, it is available on the Internet as I stated, under the heading "Talking to Vula". We have a copy thereof, which again we can make available to you. We don't believe it really is more than of interest value to you, but of course it is available if you want it.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thanks very much. I mean these are technical developments that speed up communication.
MR VISSER: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: Well we don't have to be educated on that.
MR VISSER: I think you don't need to know anything beyond that, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: For present purposes. Yes, do carry on.
MR VISSER: Very well, would you proceed.
MR BOTHA: Thank you.
MR VISSER: Exhibit A.
MR BOTHA:
"Role players in Operation Vula included Oliver Tambo, as already mentioned, Alfred Nzo, Joe Slovo, Mac Maharaj, Ronnie Kasrils, Archie Abrahams, Siphiwe Nyanda, Raymond Lala, Jeanette Love, Pravine Gordon, Ivan Pillay and others.
Sometimes Vula also co-opted MK operatives who were successful to the Vula structure. And here is an example of Paul Gotesemang. Within the Vula structures he was known as Rexal, R-E-X-A-L and he was the brother of Mbuso Shabalala."
MR VISSER: And that is the subject of the amnesty application which is served before this Amnesty Committee?
MR BOTHA: That is correct.
MR VISSER: Proceed with paragraph 108.
MR BOTHA:
"Maharaj, Kasrils and Nyanda were sent in first to the RSA, in order to establish Operation Vula and their mission was to create an infrastructure. By June 1990, after two years of the establishment of the infrastructures, there were already three established infrastructures, namely in Natal itself, the PWV area and Cape Town.
As I have already said, Natal was divided into a so-called central, southern, northern and western zones and districts. When the first official negotiations began between the SA Government and the liberation movements, Mac Maharaj and Ronnie Kasrils and Joe Slovo ..."
And here I just want to qualify. Siphiwe Nyanda, Mac Maharaj, Ronnie Kasrils and Joe Slovo is incorrect here ...(intervention)
MR VISSER: Joe Slovo was not in the country?
MR BOTHA: That is correct. The other three that I have mentioned were already in the country.
MR VISSER: So you are saying that Joe Slovo must be replaced by Siphiwe Nyanda?
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: Please continue. So they were already in the country. What year are we referring to?
MR BOTHA: We are referring from 1988 to approximately 1990.
"At times they had to leave the country in order to participate in the ANC's negotiations team, then they would re-enter the country and conduct negotiations after which they would again leave the country legally and then re-enter illegally to continue with Operation Vula."
MR VISSER: Now this legal and illegal, this has to do with the legislation which at that stage came to the statute which gave indemnity or exemption from prosecution in order to grant the leaders of the ANC and the SACP and other liberation movements the opportunity to enter the country and participate in the negotiations.
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: Please continue.
MR BOTHA:
"During February 1990, Mr Nelson Mandela was released. Documents indicate that during the remaining two years of the five year plan of Operation Vula, Mr Nelson Mandela's death was identified as the trigger of the insurrection, the spark which would ignite the civil war."
MR VISSER: Yes. Mr Chairman, if we may refer you to Exhibit B for bravo, at the page which is marked 117, paragraph 10.
CHAIRPERSON: Just hold it.
MR VISSER: Paragraph 10 reads - a particular aspect, which is of the most significant importance is the content of a particular paragraph which appeared in an encoded message sent from Mac Maharaj in Johannesburg, to Siphiwe Nyanda in Durban on 24 June 1990, a mere 13 days before the arrest of the Vula operatives commenced. The said paragraph reads as follows. Yes, my attorney has a computer printout, but it's unfortunately not here, but this appears to be a correct quotation from that encrypted message. The said paragraph reads as follows:
"In the meantime we have had word from Cleo, codename for London, that Donald, codename for Chris Dlamini, will be coming into the country round the end of June 1990. Besides the equipment you already have, it appears that Ntabo's outfit, codename for Jacob Zuma, also a member of the NEC, is currently required to store two pieces, codename for firearms, which were in the hands of the enemy group planning Madiba's assassination. From the description that Ntabo gave me, one of the pieces seems to have an optical sight and given the internesent (there's a comment to say, it should probably mean internecine) struggle within the enemy camp I am attracted to borrowing one of those pieces if it is suitable for use by us, even if on a temporary basis."
And Chairperson, further down the document it appears that when Mr Nyanda was arrested secretive compartments were found in his car. At the bottom of page 118 there is a reference to that. It was a Toyota Cressida and in one of the compartments was found a 45mm submachine gun, serial number so-and-so and an optical night-sight for that weapon.
Chairperson, in the other side of the story the little booklet that was given out by Gen Herman Stadler, on the very last page you will find photographs of that car and the weapon which we've just referred to.
Now just in conclusion with regard to the general background - and I now refer you to Exhibit C, Chairperson. The first paragraph "Discovery of Vula", Dr Henderson says in Exhibit C:
"On the weekend of 6 July 1990, the South African Security Police picked up two suspected African National Congress underground operatives in Durban. Mbuso Shabalala and Charles Ndaba were in fact part of a major ANC underground operation to create the political and military structures necessary for launching a general insurrection - a people's war - within South Africa, a covert operation which had been running for two years unknown to the South African Security Forces."
And that refers to the person, Ndaba and Shabalala, who are also the subject of another amnesty application in the current session before the Amnesty Committee here.
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: And do you find yourself in concurrence with the summary that I have just read to you?
MR BOTHA: Yes, I do agree with it.
MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, thank you for allowing us to deal with those. If we may now return to the incident, with the following comment. After this moment, Chairperson, we will not deal, unless you specifically require us to do so, with any political or general background any longer. We believe that we have placed what is necessary before you and this will form the basis of all the amnesty applications in regard to all the incidents mutatis mutandis, Mr Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much. Yes, I think Mr Visser, you may proceed.
MR VISSER: Thank you, Chairperson. But if I may just add one thing. If any questions do arise from your reading of Exhibit A as has now been supplemented or any of the other documents, this witness will be available for the duration, Chairperson, and he can be recalled quite conveniently at your request. He can answer any of those questions which may arise in your mind.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much.
MR VISSER: Mr Botha, can we go to Exhibit D. You have referred to Exhibit A and we have heard the aspects of that document that you know about. In Exhibit A, reference is also made to evidence, both written and oral, which was given and you ask that this evidence be incorporated in your amnesty application, is that correct?
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: And you have just - I think there are A's on the first place, I think it should actually be a B. But at the second paragraph regarding relevant evidence, you have also referred to your evidence in the Portia Ndwandwe, the Zandile case, which you have also referred to in your evidence this morning, is that correct?
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: If we can then page to page 2. Could you inform the Committee regarding your share and knowledge in this incident please.
MR BOTHA: Chairperson, the abduction and elimination of Dion Cele took place approximately during July 1988 in Swaziland and ...(intervention)
MR VISSER: And the incident came to an end in Pietermaritzburg itself.
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.
I refer to the amnesty application of Lt-Col J A Vorster with regard to this incident and concur with it insofar as it is of application to me.
My further share in the incident was the following. I confirm that we had information which indicated that Cele would be willing to co-operate with us as an interpreter(?).
MR VISSER: Now the complete background is given by Col Vorster and among others reference is made to this information which was supposed to have come from an informer. Now usually it would not have been expected of you to expose the identity of an informer, but with regard to this specific case I understand there can be no prejudice should the name of the informer be made known.
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: Now can you tell us who the informer was who made this information available to the Security Branch?
CHAIRPERSON: What are we talking about, the information that Dion Cele is prepared to work for the government?
MR VISSER: Yes, Chairperson. And this particular person is also involved in the kidnapping, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: I beg your pardon ...(intervention)
MR VISSER: And in this particular case, we are satisfied that there can be no harm if we disclose the name to you.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, do carry on.
MR BOTHA: The informer which was handled by Col Vorster and the others in Pietermaritzburg was one, Neville, also known as Goodwill Sikhakane.
MR VISSER: Chairperson, I don't know whether you have the document - no, my attorney tells me you don't have it, but Goodwill Sikhakane is also the subject of another incident for which amnesty will be asked, but not before you during this session.
CHAIRPERSON: I see. Anyway, just carry on.
MR VISSER: Very well, proceed.
MR BOTHA: Thank you, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Were you informed by this man, Neville? He was the informer?
MR BOTHA: That's correct.
CHAIRPERSON: And who did he inform?
MR BOTHA: Neville was handled by Col Vorster in Pietermaritzburg and at that stage the divisions Natal and Port Natal and Northern Natal still functioned separately from one another, but due to our success in Port Natal and the recruitment of infiltrated ANC terrorists, which we could redeploy into the structure of MK, Col Vorster liaised with Taylor here in Durban and asked for assistance in this recruitment attempt of Dion Cele. Now this attempted recruitment would mean that we would have to abduct Cele from Swaziland and that here within the borders of the RSA, he would be persuaded to co-operate. And the information which Vorster gave Taylor and me was that Cele had declared himself willing or had given an indication of willingness to come out to the informer, in other words, out of Swaziland to work with us.
Col Vorster will provide more detail to you regarding how the informer, Neville himself, came out of Swaziland. ...(transcriber's own interpretation) It was due to his position that he identified Cele.
MR VISSER: I see that there is a gap here in Exhibit D. Could you just inform the Committee what the arrangement was and how the arrangements were launched. You were in Durban, what happened then?
MR BOTHA: Yes, Col Taylor came to speak to us, at least he contacted me and requested my presence when Vorster came to visit him with the request that we assist in the recruitment of Cele.
MR VISSER: Yes. Colonel Taylor was Col Andy Taylor?
MR BOTHA: Yes.
MR VISSER: And he has since then passed away?
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: Very well. Now you had this order and what did you do?
MR BOTHA: We began with the preparations.
MR VISSER: Who is the "we"?
MR BOTHA: That was Col Andy Taylor, Col Vorster, myself, Laurie Wasserman. From Pietermaritzburg there were persons by the name of Jerry Brooks - I cannot recall his rank anymore and ...(intervention)
MR VISSER: I beg your pardon. Please continue.
MR BOTHA: ... and then Col Taylor also called Frans Labuschagne from Middelburg, as well as a Sgt Verwey to assist, due to their knowledge of the road network in Swaziland.
The planning was that we would enter Swaziland illegally via a border post and that we would meet the informer Neville in Manzini and that he would point out to us the college where Cele took night classes. We did not know him physically, we just knew his name.
And then after the informer had lured him to a vehicle we would take him illegally over the border fence to the RSA, and for that purpose Labuschagne and Verwey would be of value to us because if we experienced a problem within the Swaziland territory according to our knowledge, they knew the dirt roads which led to the fence where we would then cross the border illegally.
MR VISSER: Very well. And as far as you can recall, Sam du Preez was one of the members who went with you from Durban?
MR BOTHA: No.
MR VISSER: Because Mr Verwey stated in his amnesty application that Mr du Preez indeed accompanied you, but you say that this is not the case?
MR BOTHA: No, that is incorrect. Chairperson, it then also came to be that during July 1988 we travelled to a place which belonged to the Department of Forestry and was situated between Nerston and Amsterdam, where we spent the night.
CHAIRPERSON: Just give me the name of the place again, where?
MR BOTHA: N-E-R-S-T-O-N, Nerston. It's a border post, Chairperson and the town is Amsterdam, as in the Dutch Amsterdam.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
MR VISSER: What did you travel with?
MR BOTHA: We travelled a hired Volkswagen kombi.
MR VISSER: Where was the vehicle hired?
MR BOTHA: It was hired in Durban, from Avis.
MR VISSER: And who went with you in the kombi to Swaziland?
MR BOTHA: With me in the kombi there was Laurie Wasserman, Andy Taylor and Vorster, as well as Jerry Brooks, who drove with a vehicle and Verwey and Labuschagne joined us later. I don't know whether this was at Amsterdam at the place that belonged to the Department of Forestry or at a later point.
MR VISSER: You say that Taylor and Vorster travelled with you. In the kombi?
MR BOTHA: No, they travelled in their own vehicle. We travelled in three vehicles.
MR VISSER: Brooks in the one, Taylor and Vorster in the other and you and Wasserman in the kombi?
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: Now let us go to the point where you arrived in Swaziland. You and Wasserman then went through the border post into Swaziland?
MR BOTHA: Yes.
MR VISSER: Legally?
MR BOTHA: Yes, legally. Just to supplement that, before the night of the seizure action or the abduction we legally entered Swaziland via the Nerston border post with our passports, we met our informer at the George Hotel, he identified the college to us, he identified Dion Cele to us and according to that we could undertake planning in terms of where we would seize him.
MR VISSER: And who had to be placed where in order to undertake the reconnaissance surrounding this entire operation so that it would run safely?
MR BOTHA: The following evening we went in three vehicles to the Nerston border post and crossed into Swaziland.
MR VISSER: Were you and Wasserman still in the kombi?
MR BOTHA: Yes, Sgt Wasserman and I were in the kombi. Sgt Verwey was in a vehicle and Col Vorster and Mr Labuschagne were together in a vehicle.
MR VISSER: Where was Col Taylor?
MR BOTHA: Col Taylor and Sgt Brooks remained behind at the Nerston border post ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Can I just stop you there. I got the impression that you were already in Swaziland and you say now the following you were back in Nerston. That's in South Africa. So you legally entered Swaziland and did you come back again into South Africa?
MR BOTHA: Chairperson, I will explain. I said that the entry to Swaziland did not take place upon one occasion only, the night of the abduction was preceded by a reconnaissance trip to Swaziland during which we followed the entire procedure of picking up the informer at the hotel. He showed the college to us, he identified Dion to us and surrounding that we understood our planning for the abduction operation. We returned to Nerston and then the following evening we re-entered Swaziland.
MR VISSER: So there were two occasions, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Well this time, did you enter legally again?
MR BOTHA: Legally again.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, do carry on.
MR VISSER: You were in a kombi with Wasserman and you have already told us who manned the other two vehicles. I think that would bring us to paragraph 4 of Exhibit D, but before we get to that, did you meet Neville again in Swaziland?
MR BOTHA: Yes, we met him again at the George Hotel.
MR VISSER: Did you pick him up there?
MR BOTHA: Yes, we picked him up and a small distance from the George Hotel, Neville then took over the driving of the kombi while Wasserman and I concealed ourselves in large cardboard boxes which had been placed in the back of the kombi.
He drove to the college and parked diagonally opposite the gate. Sgt Verwey and his vehicle stopped some distance ahead of us, and behind us were Vorster and Labuschagne. They would be our backup should something go wrong. The informer met Dion after he had finished his classes at the college and accompanied him to the kombi.
For the purpose of the abduction we damaged the left front door of the kombi so that it could not open. We wanted him to enter the kombi by means of the sliding door. After he had climbed into the kombi he sat down on the seat directly in front of us.
MR VISSER: That would be next to the driver?
MR BOTHA: No, directly behind the driver.
MR VISSER: I beg your pardon, perhaps we are misunderstanding each other. Mr Cele climbed in by the sliding door.
MR BOTHA: Yes, and sat down on the seat.
MR VISSER: Which seat are you referring to?
MR BOTHA: The kombi had double seats behind the driver's seat.
MR VISSER: So he sat in the second row of seating on that bench.
MR BOTHA: Yes.
MR VISSER: Very well.
MR BOTHA: And I just want to explain. Because a kombi usually had double bench seating, the first seat next to the sliding door had been removed so that we had more room in the kombi. In other words, there were two seats in the front of the kombi, one for the driver and the passenger and then one bench seat which was adjacent to the engine and adjacent to the section containing the boxes in which we were concealed.
CHAIRPERSON: Is all this detail necessary?
MR VISSER: Not really, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Well you must try and control it.
MR VISSER: Very well, please proceed. Cele then climbed into the kombi, and did you move away?
MR BOTHA: Yes, the vehicle drove away and while it was in transit, Wasserman and I seized Cele and kept him under control.
MR VISSER: Did he scream?
MR BOTHA: Yes, he screamed and shouted. We gagged him so that he could not make any noise.
MR VISSER: Very well.
MR BOTHA: On the way we stopped near the border post so that the driver, who was the informer, could climb out and stay in Swaziland. I took over the driving of the kombi while Wasserman remained with Cele and we drove up to the border.
At some point we left the usual road and followed a dirt road, according to which we crossed the border into South Africa illegally after the fence had been pressed down to ground.
MR VISSER: Please pause there. Wasserman will tell the Committee that he hit Cele a few times with the first in order to bring him under control. Did you see that?
MR BOTHA: Yes, that was in the process of controlling him and making sure that he was quiet.
MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, if I may interrupt. Would you perhaps give an indication whether you would take the tea adjournment at quarter to eleven or at 11 o'clock. I know some of the judges prefer to take it at quarter to eleven and others at 11 o'clock.
CHAIRPERSON: Well now there's no hard and fast rule about that. I was under the impression we'd finish. If he hasn't very much more to say on this aspect of the matter, we'll adjourn at 11 o'clock if you don't mind.
MR VISSER: Yes, he's virtually through, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes.
MR VISSER: Thank you.
Now after you had left Swaziland, where did you go then?
MR BOTHA: We went back to the house belonging to Forestry in Amsterdam, where Vorster and I began to speak to Cele that night under the leadership of Taylor. This whole exercise was aimed at winning his co-operation as an informer. And the other reason why I was there was to correlate and confirm any information as correct, should he give any information.
MR VISSER: Was there a chief interrogator of Mr Cele?
MR BOTHA: No, the interrogation was jointly undertaken by me, Taylor and Vorster.
MR VISSER: So it is actually incorrect when you say that Cele was interrogated by Taylor, he was actually interrogated by you, Taylor and Vorster?
MR BOTHA: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: What was his attitude?
MR BOTHA: Initially Cele responded to that which was known to us, because we had to put leading questions and consequently he would be able to respond to what we wanted to know. But I was under the impression that after he had crossed the border he would very willingly offer his services to work as an informer.
Now during the interrogation I received the impression that he was not very favourably inclined to do so and upon occasion it was said 'This guy isn't going to work with us'.
MR VISSER: Did it become clear to you the evening after the abduction there at Amsterdam already?
MR BOTHA: Yes, one would have a feeling that when one was involved in such a seizure action and attempting to replace him into a structure, there would be feeling whether it was going to work or not. Sometimes there would just be an immediate summation of the person's attitude, sometimes one's impression would only be garnered after a few weeks of dealing with the subject.
MR VISSER: The fact is that he was abducted and he wasn't willing to co-operate, so what would the repercussions of that have been?
MR BOTHA: We had to take him back from Amsterdam to Pietermaritzburg or to a safe place where we could work with him further. Now he knew that Sikhakane was instrumental in his abduction, that he had in fact lured him to the point of abduction. We could not leave him there immediately and say go back to Swaziland ...(intervention)
MR VISSER: Are you referring to Cele?
MR BOTHA: Yes.
MR VISSER: What would he then do?
MR BOTHA: He would immediately convey the identity of Neville as an informer to the ANC, and that is why it was decided to take him to Pietermaritzburg. And the following day we then indeed transported him to Pietermaritzburg and all the members and their vehicles returned to Pietermaritzburg with the exception of Verwey and Labuschagne, who had already returned to Middelburg the previous evening after they had finished their task that we had brought them out for.
MR VISSER: Where was Wasserman? Did Wasserman return with you to Durban or did he remain on the farm?
MR BOTHA: No, Wasserman remained on the farm with the rest of the people. I brought the kombi back to Durban in order to return it to Avis, because there was a limited time for which we had hired the vehicle.
MR VISSER: Very well. And then in paragraph 11 you say that the following day you heard that Cele had been eliminated. Who told you this?
MR BOTHA: I'm of the opinion that it was Col Taylor who told me this, because I made enquiries regarding Cele to determine whether or not there had been any progress.
MR VISSER: Yes. And the reason was that he had not wanted to co-operate as an informer.
MR BOTHA: That is correct.
MR VISSER: You then say in paragraph 12, that for obvious reasons you did not make the matter known and you made yourself guilty of defeating the ends of justice. The evidence will then be placed here before the Committee, the evidence of Vorster and Wasserman regarding what exactly took place on the farm after you had departed from there. Perhaps I can just ask you the following ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Where was this elimination of Cele, was that in Pietermaritzburg or was it still while he was still on the farm?
MR VISSER: Chairperson, the evidence will be that it is a farm in the Elandskop area, in the district of Pietermaritzburg.
CHAIRPERSON: Oh, I see.
MR VISSER: It was used as a safehouse - to use that expression, and that as the same farm on which Ndwandwe as well as Tekere were also assassinated. Cele of course also, but you'll obtain more detail from the other witnesses later on.
CHAIRPERSON: I understand, yes.
MR VISSER: Perhaps I could just ask you this. On that evening when you came out with Cele from Swaziland and he didn't want to co-operate and you then foresaw that he could possibly be eliminated.
MR BOTHA: It wasn't specifically discussed, but I foresaw that, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: And the one reason was because if you had released him he would be able to expose the identity of the informer, which then would be the end of the informer. Was there any other reason that emerged within you indicating why nothing else could be done with him other than elimination?
MR BOTHA: What also became known to me after my first meeting with the Swaziland informer, is that he did not operate alone in Swaziland, but that there was an entire family network within Swaziland, because he lived there and that it was not only his own life but the lives of his family which would be jeopardised.
MR VISSER: And then from paragraph 13 onwards, would you just conclude.
MR BOTHA: I cannot recall who said this to me, how he was eliminated and who precisely had eliminated him. It wasn't necessary because I didn't ask for those details.
MR VISSER: And what do you say about your conduct in the abduction as well as you emission to make the matter known?
MR BOTHA: Chairperson, I did this. It was aimed at protecting the State and the National Party, as well as maintaining the government. I was not benefited in any way or rewarded for the action. I did not draw any personal advantage from this. I did this because I believe it was right for the country and it was part of my duties. It was necessary that if the decision was taken to eliminate Cele, this would be the right decision.
MR VISSER: Would you please turn to page 1 of Exhibit D. Your application involves an abduction or illegal arrest. That would be the chief offence, abduction or illegal arrest of Dion
Cele, the transgression of border control regulations when you brought him out.
MR BOTHA: That is correct.
MR VISSER: His illegal detention or depravation of his freedom, defeating the ends of justice, which you have already informed us about and any other offence or illegal deed which may emanate from evidence. Is that correct?
MR BOTHA: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Chairperson, thank you, that is the evidence-in-chief which we wish to place before you.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much. We'll take the adjournment at this stage and resume at a quarter past eleven.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
ON RESUMPTION
H J P BOTHA: (s.u.o.)
CHAIRPERSON: You have no further questions to put to Mr Botha in-chief?
MR VISSER: Thank you, no Mr Chairman, save for drawing your attention to one further aspect, and that is that in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report, volume 3, at page 205 there is reference to this incident of Mr Dion Cele. I just draw your attention to it. Perhaps I can read to you quickly.
CHAIRPERSON: I'll save you the trouble.
MR VISSER: Thank you, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
MR VISSER: But it does not - it's not at variance at all with the evidence which you're about to hear.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much. Do you have any questions to put?
MR NEL: I have no questions, thank you Mr Chairman.
NO QUESTIONS BY MR NEL
CHAIRPERSON: Do you have any questions to put on behalf of the victims?
MS THABETHE: I do, Mr Chair, thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: Will you please do so.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS THABETHE: Thank you.
Mr Botha, when it was reported that Cele would be willing to co-operate, were you there? Were you present?
MR BOTHA: That's correct, I was present, Chairperson.
MS THABETHE: Were you told on what basis he would be willing to co-operate? Or rather just to rephrase the question, did Mr Sikhakane tell you on what basis he reached the decision that Mr Cele would be willing to co-operate?
MR BOTHA: Chairperson, Col Vorster informed us that Sikhakane told him that Cele was willing to be recruited as an informer. I was not personally informed by Mr Sikhakane.
MS THABETHE: So what you are saying in other words, is that you don't know the basis upon which Sikhakane reached the decision that Cele would be willing to co-operate. Is that your evidence?
MR BOTHA: That is correct, Chairperson.
MS THABETHE: Would you know when Mr Sikhakane actually informed Mr Vorster? In terms of time, when did he inform him?
MR BOTHA: No, I would not know exactly when he informed him.
MS THABETHE: When were you informed that there was such a possibility?
MR BOTHA: A few days before our departure for Amsterdam to execute the abduction.
MS THABETHE: Was it two days, three days, a day before?
MR BOTHA: I would say it was less than a week, within a seven day period.
MS THABETHE: Would you know whether the information, whatever information was given by Mr Sikhakane to Mr Vorster was verified? About Dion Cele.
MR BOTHA: Yes, if I understand the question correctly, the information which Col Vorster had via Sikhakane, he verified it with me on the grounds of information that I had which we received from Swaziland that Cele was responsible for border work. And we confirmed that he was responsible for border work.
MR LAX: I think the question you're being asked is a subtly different one. She's saying, was the information that the deceased would co-operate with you verified? In other words, was the information Sikhakane gave you that led to the abduction of the deceased, was that information that he'd be likely to become an informer or a worker with you, was that verified? That's what she's asking you.
MR BOTHA: No, that information was not verified by me.
MR LAX: Was it verified by anyone else as far as you know?
MR BOTHA: Not as far as I know, Chairperson.
MS THABETHE: Now you've also indicated that Mr Vorster informed you or requested you to come and join them for this operation of the abduction of Mr Cele. Do you know why specifically you were called to come and join them for this operation?
MR BOTHA: Chairperson, I said that at that stage Col Vorster was at the Division Natal and we were the Division Port Natal and right up to that stage we had much success with out actions against terrorists in the Division Port Natal. We had a very thorough network of informers in Swaziland. This was the first operation for Col Vorster and Pietermaritzburg and that is why they needed our expertise in terms of what our information network was, and that is why we were asked to accompany and work with them.
MS THABETHE: When you were requested to become part of the operation, what was going to be your role in the whole operation?
MR BOTHA: At that stage I worked with MK Intelligence, I was responsible for the analysis of this information. And consequently if Cele conveyed information I would be able to verify it on the basis of what was already known to us. And in the whole process I would play a part in his abduction and it would be an active role.
MS THABETHE: You have also indicated that when you went to Swaziland you first went for the reconnaissance and then you went back to the borders. You've also indicated that Mr - you went to a hotel where Mr Sikhakane pointed out Mr Cele. Would I be correct to say so?
MR BOTHA: No. We found Mr Sikhakane at the George Hotel and from there we went to the college where he identified the college to us, and he met with Mr Cele that evening so we could identify Mr Cele as to what he looks like. And that was the purpose of the reconnaissance that evening.
CHAIRPERSON: Do I understand that to mean that when Mr Sikhakane was talking to Cele, you watched that from a distance, or were you part of the conversation between the two of them?
MR BOTHA: No, Chairperson, this took place over some distance. Mr Cele attended classes at the college in Manzini and when classes ceased at approximately eight in the evening he would come out and Mr Sikhakane would meet him at the gate so that he could identify him to us. And this was done over a distance by means of observation.
MS THABETHE: Can I proceed, Mr Chairman?
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, please.
MS THABETHE: Thank you.
Before Mr Vorster told you anything about Dion Cele, as a person who was responsible for information analysis, did you know anything at all about Mr Dion Cele before?
MR BOTHA: Yes. I knew he was part of the MK Natal structure in Swaziland, responsible for border work. Border work entailed that he worked in certain areas at the border, he recruited people who assisted them in the insurgence of terrorists into the country and the smuggling of weapons by means of couriers. So his role and activities within the MK structure of the Natal machinery was known to me, yes.
MS THABETHE: So you wanted to recruit him, that's correct isn't it?
MR BOTHA: That's correct.
CHAIRPERSON: When you say it was known to you, you did not know the individual, you knew somebody by that name?
MR BOTHA: That's correct, Chairperson.
MS THABETHE: What I wanted to know is, you had indicated that you had intentions to recruit him, what were you going to use him for?
MR BOTHA: As an informer.
MS THABETHE: Another question with regard to that, that the family asked me to ask you is, would you have recruited him if you had not been informed that he was willing to co-operate? Bearing in mind that you already knew about him before.
MR BOTHA: All persons were targets for recruitment by the Security Branch. The fact that we became aware that he was an easier target is why we specifically focused on him.
MS THABETHE: You have indicated that when you took him into the car, when he was taken into the kombi he screamed. Is that correct?
MR BOTHA: That's correct.
MS THABETHE: Did he say anything else besides screaming?
MR BOTHA: Yes, asked who we were and what were we doing.
MS THABETHE: You've also indicated that from there you took him to Amsterdam where he was questioned.
MR BOTHA: That is correct.
MS THABETHE: And where he furnished you with some information.
MR BOTHA: That is correct.
MS THABETHE: What kind of information was this?
MR BOTHA: It was information with regard to the structure in Swaziland, information which was known to us or which was not known to us, which I could verify.
MS THABETHE: And then you said also that it became clear that he did not want to co-operate with you. On what basis did you reach this decision? Like I want to understand because there was information that he gave to you. Now what made you, or what led you to believe that he's not willing to co-operate with you?
MR BOTHA: The moment one would ask the person "Are you prepared to go back and receive information as to when terrorists would infiltrate? Would you get that information for us with regard to weapons being smuggled in?" And that is what we would want from an informer which is placed back in Swaziland. And when these leading questions are asked with regard to that, there was a refusal and his body language indicated that he was unwilling to concede.
MS THABETHE: You've also indicated that you were not present when Mr Cele was killed, is that correct?
MR BOTHA: That's correct.
MS THABETHE: So you wouldn't know how he was killed would you?
MR BOTHA: No, I don't know.
MS THABETHE: At this stage Mr Chair, thank you, I have no further questions for this witness.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS THABETHE
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
ADV BOSMAN: Thank you, Chairperson.
Mr Botha, I am not hundred percent clear with regard to the reconnaissance that you undertook. You did not mention that in your application or in Exhibit D which is before us. Would you not regard it as very relevant to your application?
MR BOTHA: Yes. During consultation it was not regarded as relevant and in my evidence today I mentioned that the area was not strange and we knew what Cele looked like because he was identified do us. And the point was Skosana was introduced to me for the first time by Vorster in Swaziland - oh, excuse me, Sikhakane. I knew of his existence as an informer, but what he looked like and so forth was not known to me and he was only introduced to me in Swaziland.
ADV BOSMAN: Was it discussed beforehand that you would go back and report back and then you would do the final planning?
MR BOTHA: Yes, I think Col Vorster would be able to give more evidence in detail, but I can just explain it as such. There was no finality with regard to a precise day and date on which he would come out, that is why there was an excursion, there was an arrangement with Vorster and the informer. He confirmed it and a final arrangement was made for the following evening, and the following evening we carried it out. ...(transcriber's own interpretation)
ADV BOSMAN: Thank you, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thanks very much, you are excused for the time being.
WITNESS EXCUSED
NAME: J A VORSTER
APPLICATION NO: AM4390/96
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman. If I may, I will call Vorster to give evidence. He will also give his evidence in Afrikaans, and I believe he also has no objection to taking the oath. We have prepared a document for him summarising his evidence, which we would beg leave to hand in as Exhibit E.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
J A VORSTER: (sworn states)
EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Vorster, you are an applicant in this matter which is in regard with the abduction, detention and elimination of Mr Dion Cele. Am I correct?
MR VORSTER: That's correct, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: And your amnesty application is to be found from pages 35 to 59 in the Cele bundle, and you deal with this specific incident from page 39 to 44. Do you have - have you studied Exhibit A?
MR VORSTER: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Are there any parts thereof which you would have no knowledge of, which you would like to exclude?
MR VORSTER: No, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: Do you confirm according to your knowledge, the correctness of Exhibit A?
MR VORSTER: Yes, I do.
MR VISSER: You have listened to the evidence of Col Botha, with regard to the circumstances which reigned in Swaziland and in Natal.
MR VORSTER: Yes, I have, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: And do you accord with his evidence about that?
MR VORSTER: Yes, I do, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: And you also request that the evidence orally and written to which reference is made in Exhibit A, be incorporated into your amnesty application.
MR VORSTER: I do so, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: You have previously given evidence before the Amnesty Committee, with regard to Ms Ndwandwe.
MR VORSTER: That's correct, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: On page 2, would you please tell us what your knowledge is about this incident.
MR LAX: Just he does that, Mr Visser, should we not just give this an exhibit number?
MR VISSER: I thought I asked for that to be E. If I didn't, I apologise.
CHAIRPERSON: Alright. This will be recorded as Exhibit E.
MR VISSER: Yes. I'm sorry if I neglected to do that.
CHAIRPERSON: No, we were busy trying to swear him in at that time when you were talking.
MR VISSER: Well then I'm doubly sorry, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Carry on.
MR VISSER: Mr Vorster, you should possibly sketch your position in Pietermaritzburg. What was your position there?
MR VORSTER: I was in command of the Terrorist Desk in Pietermaritzburg, the Midlands as it was known.
MR VISSER: Would you please continue at paragraph 1.
MR VORSTER: I do so, Chairperson.
MR VISSER:
"During July of 1988, if I recall correctly, Col Taylor, Col Botha - I visited Col Taylor and Col Botha to share information with them which I received from an informant. And this informant was Goodwill Sikhakane, known as MK Neville. That a certain MK terrorist attached to the Natal Machinery in Swaziland, one Dion Cele, MK Charles, indicated his willingness to Sikhakane to also co-operate with the Security Branch as Sikhakane has done."
MR VISSER: And Ms Thabethe asked Mr Botha on which grounds the inference was drawn that he, that is Cele, would be willing to co-operate with the Security Branch as an informer. On that question, according to the information which you received from Sikhakane, did you ask him about it or what is the position?
MR VORSTER: Chairperson, I did so. Sikhakane's conveyance to me was that Dion Cele at that stage had experienced some problems with the ANC in Swaziland and he indicated his willingness to Sikhakane that he would like to work with the RSA, in the Security Branch.
MR VISSER: In other words, was it expressly said by him?
MR VORSTER: Yes, it was, Chairperson. And on those grounds I approached Taylor and Botha for assistance.
MR VISSER: Please continue.
MR VORSTER:
"Cele was an ANC/MK terrorist who was in Manzini in Swaziland and he was attached to the Natal machinery. His activities - he was attached to border work as it was known to us, which included assistance to insurgence of MK trained terrorists to the RSA, specifically to Natal because he was attached to Natal machinery, and the smuggling of arms and weaponry into the RSA for the commission of acts of terror, as well as the recruitment of ANC persons for internal and external training.
During this period we found several large weapons cache locations in Port Natal, Midlands, Durban and Pietermaritzburg, which were found. And on the basis of above-mentioned knowledge, that Cele would be willing to co-operate with us. The purpose of the planning was to recruit Cele as an informant and to place him back into Swaziland as quickly as possible for his use. It was a method with which we had much success in the past. And that is the reason why we refer to the weapons caches which were found previously."
ADV BOSMAN: Chairperson, may I just intervene here? I note that Neville Sikhakane's name was MK Neville, was he also an ANC/MK terrorist who was recruited? Is he an example of this success which you refer to?
MR VORSTER: I may answer you in the following. He also indicated that he wanted to work with the RSA and I was part of the group who recruited him to bring Neville out of Swaziland and place him back for further use in Swaziland. I was consequently also his handler in this instance.
"This method was applied to combat the onslaught of the ANC in Natal. And in this regard the Committee is referred to the submission of Gen van der Merwe, J V van der Merwe, of the 21st of October 1996, in his amnesty application."
MR VISSER: Yes, we have already made reference to that. Please continue.
MR VORSTER:
"The members who I can recall who were part of the operation were, after the discussion with Col Taylor and Col Botha, Col Taylor - I think they were a Sergeant and Lieutenant, I cannot recall, Labuschagne and Verwey from Middelburg contacted these two by telephone to assist us with the execution of this operation seeing that they were familiar with the area. W/O Wasserman of the Security Branch Durban and then Sgt Brooks from the Security Branch at that stage Pietermaritzburg who served under my command, they all participated in the operation."
MR VISSER: Before we arrive at paragraph 7, was there a meeting? Did you convene at Amsterdam?
MR VORSTER: That's correct, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: And did you then go into Swaziland and if indeed so, in which manner?
MR VORSTER:
"Col Botha and I, the evening before the abduction of Dion Cele, had crossed the Swaziland border legally and we met with Goodwill Sikhakane. I introduced Goodwill to Col Botha because Col Botha did not know him. He knew of him, but he did not know him. We observed - we staked out a place for observation close to the college where Cele attended classes and from where we would plan when to grab him and to abduct him.
And the other reason why we entered Swaziland the previous evening was to ensure that Goodwill Sikhakane would be available and that Cele would indeed be present the following evening, because no specific date and day was established for the execution of this operation and to ensure whether Cele was still willing to assist us. After the observation we left Sikhakane in Swaziland and ..." ...(intervention)
MR VISSER: And you went back to the RSA?
MR VORSTER: That's correct.
MR VISSER: What happened then, the following day?
MR VORSTER:
"The following day, it was late, we legally crossed the Swaziland border. I was in a vehicle with Labuschagne. Botha was in a vehicle with Wasserman, in a minibus and Verwey was in a third vehicle. I cannot recall whether Verwey or Labuschagne was with me, but ..."
...(intervention)
MR VISSER: One of the two.
MR VORSTER: That's how I recall it.
MR VISSER: And where was Col Taylor and Sgt Brooks?
MR VORSTER: The two of them waited a predetermined point at the border on the RSA's side.
MR VISSER: Very well, continue please.
MR VORSTER:
"And with our arrival at the college, Labuschagne and I in the vehicle behind the minibus ..."
...(intervention)
MR VISSER: Refer to it as the kombi, we will know what you are talking about.
MR VORSTER:
".. we were behind the kombi. The kombi stopped close to the college and Verwey was in a vehicle in front of the kombi. Sikhakane climbed out of the kombi and met Cele after he had attended his classes and he led him to the kombi."
MR VISSER: So they climbed into the kombi? You don't know what happened there?
MR VORSTER: I don't know what happened there.
MR VISSER: Did the kombi move away from there?
MR VORSTER: Yes, it did, Verwey with his vehicle in front, the kombi in the middle and Labuschagne and I the last in that row.
"We crossed the border back to the RSA and went to the prearranged point where we found Col Taylor and Sgt Brooks. And from there we travelled to Amsterdam ..."
MR VISSER: Where was Sikhakane?
MR VORSTER: Sikhakane was left behind in Swaziland close to Manzini, just after Cele was grabbed.
MR VISSER: Yes, and you say you went to Amsterdam.
MR VORSTER:
"After we had crossed the border fence and were safely back in the RSA, Verwey and Labuschagne went back to Middelburg. At the house in Amsterdam interrogation took place of Cele, between myself, Col Taylor and Col Botha.
My chief purpose in this regard was to recruit Cele as an informer because this was the reason why he was abducted and the information which was given as such to me by Sikhakane. So I was in the process of recruiting him as an informer."
MR VISSER: Did you assault him?
MR VORSTER: No, I did not assault him, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: So you spoke to him?
MR VORSTER: Yes, I just spoke to him.
MR VISSER: What was his attitude?
MR VORSTER: His attitude initially after he saw that he was in enemy hands, to put it as such, he gave us information which he certainly knew that we had knowledge of because we had Sikhakane as an informer and the information which he gave us we could verify. He gave us that information.
MR VISSER: And was he prepared to be recruited as an informer?
MR VORSTER: No, at that stage he was not prepared to co-operate.
MR VISSER: What did you do then?
MR VORSTER:
"The following day we transferred him to Elandskop, or to a farm near Elandskop which was used by me as a safe premises, where we further interrogated him and attempted to recruit him to be applied as an informer.
Col Botha, after we had arrived on the farm near Elandskop, departed that afternoon approximately 1 or 2 o'clock to return the kombi which was a hired vehicle and Taylor and myself and Wasserman remained on the farm with Cele. Brooks didn't even go to the farm, he went directly to Pietermaritzburg."
MR VISSER: And what did you do there on the farm with Mr Cele?
MR VORSTER: We were still busy trying to obtain his co-operation.
MR VISSER: And what did he say?
MR VORSTER: Cele said when he realised what this was really about, that he would have to betray his cohorts and that his life could be jeopardy. He said that he was not prepared to work with us.
MR VISSER: You say in paragraph 11 that it became clear to you that you had been misled by Sikhakane regarding Cele's alleged willingness.
MR VORSTER: Yes, it true, I was surprised that this is how matters turned out.
MR VISSER: And then you refer to the Cele bundle, page 60 to 64, and that is a reference to the combating of terrorism as well as research into terrorism with regard to Capt Dietrichsen(?). What is your intention with this reference?
MR VORSTER: I'll be with you in a moment, Chairperson. Yes, I have it, page 60. Which paragraph?
MR VISSER: No, I just want to know why you have referred the Committee to that document.
MR VORSTER: These are orders with regard to terrorism, the combating and research of terrorism and that everything had to be applied in order to resist the onslaught.
MR VISSER: And on page 62 there is - or at least, page 61, there is an affirmation of the importance of collection of information from informers.
MR VORSTER: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: And then my attorney has just referred me to page 63, paragraph 3, of the Cele bundle and at the end of that paragraph it says:
"Due to limited numbers it wasn't always possible to favourably evaluate all the divisional requests, therefore the Security Branch had to attempt to deal with terrorists in detention and the recruitment of such persons. Every member of the Security Branch had to attempt to recruit terrorists in detention should circumstances allow this in any way."
So basically you are just emphasising the necessity of informers?
MR VORSTER: That is correct.
MR VISSER: Continue with paragraph 12.
MR VORSTER:
"The same evening that we had arrived on the farm at Elandskop, due to Cele's refusal to co-operate with us in his application as an informer, Col Taylor and W/O Wasserman and I decided on the options that we could consider in dealing with Cele and after the consideration of all possible options, it was decided to eliminate him.
Col Taylor then gave the order that we had to continue with it - or at least before we reached our final decision, we considered the following relevant options and information. Firstly, that Cele was an ANC/MK terrorist, he was involved in terrorist activities in Natal, he was responsible for the insurgency of ANC trained MK terrorists to the RSA, specifically Natal, he was also responsible for the smuggling of weaponry to the RSA, for the commission of acts of terror, he was instrumental in the recruitment of ANC recruits for internal and external training. It was clear that should he be released he would continue with his activities and should he be released he would report Goodwill Sikhakane's co-operation with the SAP to MK and Sikhakane would be in danger, he would be killed. He could not be charged because he had been abducted from Swaziland and thus his detention was unlawful and if this came to light it would cause a great embarrassment for the government."
MR VISSER: So you had a dilemma?
MR VORSTER: Yes, we definitely had a dilemma.
MR VISSER: And Col Taylor then gave the order, and what did you and Wasserman do?
MR VORSTER:
"Wasserman and I dug a grave near the house on the farm. It was approximately 50 to 60 metres away from the house within a pine plantation or at least a section of a plantation."
MR VISSER: Now that place, did you identify this to anybody after the amnesty process was initiated?
MR VORSTER: Yes, I did.
MR VISSER: And was this identified to the Investigative Team of the TRC?
MR VORSTER: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: Well I don't think there can be any dispute about that, Chairperson, but there is reference in the Report to the fact that these were pointed out.
MR LAX: We have a report on the exhumation. That was part of an additional bundle that was handed to us.
MR VISSER: I must confess that I have not had the opportunity - I notice that some bundles were given to us this morning, I have not had the opportunity of perusing it, but thank you, Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, do carry on.
MR VISSER: Yes, thank you, Chairperson.
Very well. You say that you dug the grave in a pine plantation near the house, approximately 60 metres away from the house. What did you do next?
MR VORSTER:
"Col Taylor was still busy in the house attempting to obtain Cele's co-operation, but with no success. After we had dug the grave, Wasserman and I returned to the house. We took Cele outside and placed a material bag over his head ..."
...(intervention)
MR VISSER: You say in paragraph 15 that you bound his hands behind his back. Can you recall whether he was cuffed when you transported him from Amsterdam, or whether you specifically cuffed his hands there on the farm? What was the position?
MR VORSTER: I cannot recall whether his hands were cuffed when we transported him.
MR VISSER: But when you took him out to the place where you had dug the grave, his hands were definitely cuffed behind his back?
MR VORSTER: Yes.
MR VISSER: According to your recollection?
MR VORSTER: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: Very well, what happened there at the grave?
MR VORSTER:
"At the grave Wasserman hit Cele unconscious with one blow to the head by means of a baton. If I recall correctly he hit him on the right-hand side of his head. Cele collapsed on the ground. Wasserman and I then carried him to the grave, where we removed his clothing. As far as I can recall he still had his underpants on and W/O Wasserman shot Cele twice through the head with a silenced pistol, in the left side of his head as he lay in the grave. As far as I can recall, the shells ended up in the grave. That is how I recall it."
MR VISSER: In your application, if I recall correctly, you stated that Wasserman went to fetch the firearm in a vehicle, is that correct? Let me just make one hundred percent certain of that. Yes, at the bottom of page 41 you have stated in your statement that:
"W/O Wasserman (in the final paragraph, Chairperson) then took a silenced firearm which he had fetched from his vehicle."
Can you recall that clearly?
MR VORSTER: No, it is vague to me. The vehicles were parked there and we walked past the vehicles. It was dark. I cannot recall this definitely or precisely.
MR VISSER: Because Wasserman's evidence will be that it is his recollection that he fetched the firearm from Col Taylor.
MR VORSTER: I would not be able to dispute that.
MR VISSER: Very well. Please continue. Paragraph 17.
MR VORSTER:
"After this, as Cele's body lay in the grave we sprinkled lime over the body, which was there on the farm. How it came to be there on the farm is unknown to me ..."
...(intervention)
MR VISSER: What was the purpose with putting lime over the body?
MR VORSTER: The purpose behind that was to keep wild dogs or animals away from the farm so that they would not uncover the grave.
MR VISSER: So it was to disguise the odour?
MR VORSTER: Yes, that is correct.
"After this we burnt Cele's clothing and thereafter we rejoined Col Taylor, who had been in the house all the time. And after we had reported to him that we had eliminated Cele, we departed to our respective homes. And as far as I know, in my presence, Cele was never assaulted or badly treated."
MR VISSER: Yes, Wasserman will give evidence that he at a stage was guarding Cele while he was there on the farm, or at least that he was in his presence and that he assaulted him once, twice or thrice, that he slapped him with an open hand ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Well that's - I think that you shouldn't bother about that actually.
MR VISSER: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: You can't tell him what Wasserman is going to say when he wasn't there.
MR VISSER: Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: You can't ask him to contradict or confirm that.
MR VISSER: No, what I want to ask him is this, Chairperson.
Is it possible that Wasserman was alone with Cele at a stage and that he may have assaulted him when you did not see him do so?
MR VORSTER: Yes.
MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman, that's basically all I wanted.
Please continue, paragraph 20 please.
MR VORSTER:
"The acts and omissions which I committed, I committed in the execution of my official duties, upon the order of a higher officer whose orders I was obliged to execute. I did this as part of the opposition to the struggle and my actions were aimed against supporters of a liberation movement. Whatever I did, I did in order to protect the interests of the government and the National Party and to combat the revolutionary onslaught. As such I believed bona fide that what I did fell within my express or implied authorisation."
MR VISSER: Now you request amnesty - if we could just return to page 1, for the abduction of Dion Cele, for his unlawful arrest, or depravation of his freedom, the murder of Dion Cele, the transgression of border control regulations, as well as any other lesser offence which may emanate from the facts of this case.
MR VORSTER: Yes, that is correct.
MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, that's the evidence. Perhaps - would you bear with me a moment please Mr Chair.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, certainly, certainly.
MR VISSER: Yes, Chairperson, perhaps I should do this by way of a question.
In your application the applicants which are appearing before did not mention the name of Goodwill Sikhakane.
MR VORSTER: That is correct.
MR VISSER: But afterwards it became known that the TRC in its Report, in volume 2, on page 132, paragraph 36, has indeed mentioned this name.
MR VORSTER: Yes.
MR VISSER: And from there then the fact that it is now being mentioned by you and the other witnesses.
MR VORSTER: That is correct.
MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, Commissioner Lax referred to a report of an exhumation in a bundle. It's just been pointed out to me that the only exhumation report that we have is in regard to Tekere, not in regard to Cele. It may be that you may have a bundle which we don't have.
MS THABETHE: Mr Chair, can I respond?
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, please.
MS THABETHE: Yes, it's my mistake. I gave you the same bundle that you have, instead of the bundle of the exhumation report, but I've asked Ms Charmaine to get you the right copy.
MR VISSER: Well as long as it doesn't meant that I have to read that bundle twice, Mr Chairman. I understand ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: I don't know whether it is that relevant at this stage.
MR VISSER: No, thank you, Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct) matters of such detail.
MR VISSER: Yes. That is the evidence which we wish to place before you, Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. You did say it was volume 2, page 132 of the TRC Report is it?
MR VISSER: Yes, indeed and it's at paragraph 369, Chairperson. It reads very briefly:
"Cele was persuaded by a colleague, Mr Goodwill Sikhakane to enter a minibus after leaving night classes in Manzini and then unbeknown to him Sikhakane was at the time an informant ..."
And it goes on to describe his abduction, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Thanks. Have you any questions to ask this applicant?
MR NEL: I have not questions, thank you, Mr Chairman.
NO QUESTIONS BY MR NEL
CHAIRPERSON: Is there any cross-examination?
MS THABETHE: Thank you, Mr Chair, I do.
CHAIRPERSON: Please put your questions.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS THABETHE: Thank you.
Mr Vorster, I must have missed the question. I heard my learned friend asking whether you verified the information that you were given by Mr Sikhakane. Was your response that you did verify it?
MR VORSTER: I did not verify information, the information came from Sikhakane himself.
MS THABETHE: Why didn't you verify it?
MR VORSTER: At that stage - or let me put it this way. In my evidence-in-chief I also said that upon the evening before his abduction, we once again met with Sikhakane in order to determine once again whether Mr Cele would be willing to co-operate. But Mr Sikhakane was the only source of our information at that stage, or at any stage for that matter.
MS THABETHE: If Mr Cele was willing to co-operate with you, as Mr Sikhakane had informed you, why was it necessary for you to go and abduct him? Why didn't you command Mr Sikhakane to go and tell Mr Cele to approach you since he was willing to co-operate with you?
MR VORSTER: It would have exposed Mr Sikhakane's identity that he was already an informer of the SAP, and at that stage Mr Cele could have jeopardised Mr Sikhakane's life. One would not use an informer to recruit another informer.
MS THABETHE: I don't quite understand it because you did go with Mr Sikhakane to abduct Mr Cele, isn't it?
MR VORSTER: Yes, that is correct.
MS THABETHE: So weren't you concerned at that stage that Mr Sikhakane's cover would be blown anyway?
MR VORSTER: Mr Sikhakane was not trained in the methodology of recruitment of informers and I wanted to inform myself that Mr Cele was willing to co-operate.
MS THABETHE: I don't whether it's you or it's Mr Botha's evidence where it became clear that Mr Sikhakane remained in Swaziland.
MR VORSTER: That is correct, after the operation.
CHAIRPERSON: They both said so.
MS THABETHE: Both said so, okay.
Why did he remain in Swaziland, wasn't it dangerous for him to remain in Swaziland?
MR VORSTER: So that he could continue serving as an informer. There was certainly an element of risk or danger for him, but we would only be able to determine the gravity of that after we had obtained Cele's willingness to co-operate with us or not.
MS THABETHE: When you took Mr Cele to Amsterdam for questioning and when you realised that he was not willing to co-operate with you, did you inform Mr Sikhakane or did you enquire from Mr Sikhakane why he had initially said that he was willing to co-operate?
MR VORSTER: Mr Sikhakane was always under the impression that Mr Cele had been recruited as an informer and was working for us as an informer. He was not notified.
MS THABETHE: So are you saying that he didn't even know that he was eventually killed?
MR VORSTER: No, Chairperson, not according to my knowledge.
MS THABETHE: Amongst your team, who was the person who had the highest rank?
MR VORSTER: Col Taylor.
MS THABETHE: And then he was taken to the farm and questioned there, is that correct?
MR VORSTER: Yes, that is correct.
MS THABETHE: At what stage did you decide that you were not going to question him anymore, you were going to kill him?
MR VORSTER: We attempted continuously. Even while Wasserman and I were digging the grave, Col Taylor still attempted to obtain his co-operation.
MS THABETHE: No, what I'm trying to find out is, before you actually dug the grave - because I would assume that you dug the grave in anticipation of putting him in that grave, isn't it so?
MR VORSTER: Yes.
MS THABETHE: What I'm asking, when did you initially decide that look, we will have to kill him?
MR VORSTER: It was late afternoon, it was almost dark, dusk when we arrived at the farm.
MS THABETHE: Did you inform Mr Cele that if he refused to co-operate you're actually going to kill him?
MR VORSTER: No, Chairperson.
MS THABETHE: Why didn't you do so, in an attempt to show him what the consequences were if he refused to co-operate with you?
MR VORSTER: No, we were not prepared to inform him. It also wasn't very pleasant to tell somebody "Look, I'm going to kill you". This just wasn't something that was done.
CHAIRPERSON: He wouldn't be very valuable if he agreed to do it for you just because he was going to try and avoid being killed.
MR VORSTER: That would be the other reason, Chairperson.
MS THABETHE: Didn't you maybe think that if you told him that look, if you refuse to work for us we're going to kill you, didn't you think maybe he might have changed his mind and worked for you?
MR VORSTER: I did not discuss it with him in that way.
MS THABETHE: Was he tied when you took him to the grave, before he was killed? Mr Cele.
MR VORSTER: His hands were bound behind his back with handcuffs as far as I can recall. Was he tyre’d or tied?
MS THABETHE: Tied, ja. Why did you tie him?
MR VORSTER: We told him that we were going to take him to another place. And because he was not willing to co-operate, it would have been the logical thing to cuff him so that he could not escape.
MS THABETHE: You've also indicated that you had options of for example, arresting Mr Cele, but you did not have enough evidence.
MR VORSTER: That is correct.
MS THABETHE: The question I want to ask you in connection with that is, why didn't you frame him in order to arrest him?
MR VORSTER: Chairperson, Mr Cele had been abducted from Swaziland and brought into the RSA unlawfully, so this would have been an embarrassment to the State and the government in the first place. Therefore, that option was not viable.
MS THABETHE: Thank you, Mr Chair. Can you give me - can I please ask for a second, just to ensure that I've covered all the aspects.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, certainly
MS THABETHE: Thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes?
MS THABETHE: Thank you, Mr Chair. Mr Chair, just one question that ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, please carry on.
MS THABETHE: Ja. ... that the client has indicated me to ask you. Would you know where Mr Sikhakane is right now? Is he still alive?
MR VORSTER: He's not alive.
MS THABETHE: Okay. Thank you, Mr Chair, no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS THABETHE
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
MR LAX: Thank you, Chairperson.
When the body was exhumed it was found not to have any cloth or anything attached to it, which means it was in all likelihood naked at the time it was buried. Your recollection is though that the person, the deceased was wearing a pair of underpants.
MR VORSTER: That is correct, Chairperson, and I must add that it was pitch dark. There was no lights, it was a farm. We worked in candle light, so the possibility of him being completely naked is something that I cannot dispute.
MR LAX: Ja, that was going to be my question, you might just be mistaken in that ...
MR VORSTER: That is correct, Chairperson.
MR LAX: And I would assume the same might apply for the "doppies", the shells.
MR VORSTER: Yes, Chairperson.
MS THABETHE: Because no shells were found in any of those graves.
MR VORSTER: I am not aware of that. As far as I can recall it appeared to me that the shells had fallen into the grave when the shots were fired, but it was dark so I cannot dispute this.
MR LAX: Thank you, Chairperson, I have no further questions.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes.
ADV BOSMAN: Thank you, Chairperson.
Mr Vorster, the previous applicant, Mr Both, gave evidence to a question that he had drawn the inference that Cele didn't want to co-operate because his body language indicated this because he appeared to be hesitant. How do you reconcile this with your evidence? You say that Cele indicated his non-willingness with words. I don't understand that apparent contradiction.
MR VORSTER: In my presence he revealed it to me in other words that he was not willing to co-operate.
ADV BOSMAN: Can you recall whether this was the case while Mr Botha was present? Because apparently there were two occasions upon which he was interrogated. Can you just clear this up for us?
MR VORSTER: I cannot recall whether Mr Botha was present when Cele made this known to me.
ADV BOSMAN: And with the initial interrogation, when he was brought over the border, can you recall whether by means of express words, he immediately refused to co-operate or whether initially through his body language and his presence, he indicated that he did not want to work with you?
MR VORSTER: Let me try and put this into perspective. The interrogation at Amsterdam was about information over which Cele knew and we wanted to determine whether Cele in fact knew about this information. The second phase was about the recruitment and the implications of recruitment as an informer. I handled the second phase mostly because Sikhakane was my informer and because I wanted to apply Cele as an informer for them.
ADV BOSMAN: Was Botha present during the second phase?
MR VORSTER: Not as far as I can recall, because I knew that he wasn't at all present when Cele was killed, and he had departed earlier that afternoon already.
ADV BOSMAN: Thank you, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Any re-examination, Mr Visser?
MR VISSER: No, thank you, Mr Chairperson.
NO RE-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER
CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Thank you, you are excused.
MR VORSTER: Thank you, Chair.
WITNESS EXCUSED
NAME: LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN
APPLICATION NO: AM4508/96
--------------------------------------------------------------------------MR VISSER: Chairperson, the last applicant for whom we appear is W/O Lawrence Gerald Wasserman, whom we call to the stand. He will give his evidence in English. We beg leave to hand up to you a summary of his evidence and we would propose that that be marked Exhibit F.
CHAIRPERSON: That will be so marked.
MS THABETHE: Thank you, Mr Chairman. He has no objection to taking the prescribed oath.
LAWRENCE GERALD WASSERMAN: (sworn states)
EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Please take a seat, Mr Wasserman. You're an applicant in this incident, is that correct?
MR WASSERMAN: That's correct, Mr Chairman.
MR VISSER: Have you perused Exhibit A?
MR WASSERMAN: That's correct, Mr Chairman.
MR VISSER: And do you find yourself in agreement or disagreement with the contents of Exhibit A?
MR WASSERMAN: I concur with the contents.
MR VISSER: And you ask that that be incorporated in your evidence, together with references to other evidence which Exhibit A contains, is that correct?
MR WASSERMAN: Correct, Mr Chairman.
MR VISSER: You have previously given evidence before another Amnesty Committee in the application with regard to Ndwandwe, the KwaMashu 3, and Pumezo Ncgweni, is that correct?
MR WASSERMAN: Correct, Mr Chairman.
MR VISSER: If you will please turn to page 2, and will you inform the Committee what your knowledge and participation was in the present incident. You first of all refer to the evidence of Col Vorster. You have also heard the evidence of Col Botha this morning, in regard to the background of the violence in Natal and the situation in Swaziland, is that correct?
MR WASSERMAN: That's correct, Mr Chairman.
MR VISSER: Do you also find yourself in agreement with that?
MR WASSERMAN: I do.
MR VISSER: Would you please continue at page 2, paragraph 2, of Exhibit F.
MR WASSERMAN: Yes, Mr Chairman.
"I was instructed by Col Botha from Durban, to accompany him on an operation to Swaziland. I was informed by him that there was information to hand that an important Umkhonto weSizwe member, Dion Cele, had indicated that he would be willing to work for the Security Branch. And our mission would be to abduct Dion Cele from Swaziland, bring him to the RSA and attempt to turn him and recruit him and place him back."
MR VISSER: Right. What did you know about Cele, what were you told?
MR WASSERMAN:
"We knew that Dion Cele was a member of border work, attached to the Natal machinery. He lived in Manzini and he was undergoing night school at Scot, at a technical college in Manzini in Swaziland.
And as a border worker he was responsible for the infiltration of MK into Natal and the subsequent movement of weapons with those units and responsible for acts of terror within this province."
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, do carry on.
MR WASSERMAN:
"I was informed that there was an informer who was handled by Mr Vorster ..."
...(intervention)
MR VISSER: Goodwill Sikhakane?
MR WASSERMAN: Goodwill Sikhakane. I learnt the name at a later stage.
"... and he would assist in bringing forward Dion Cele."
MR VISSER: Right. You travelled with Botha from Durban in a kombi, is that correct, to Amsterdam?
MR WASSERMAN: That is correct, Mr Chairman.
MR VISSER: Did you go in with Botha and Vorster on the reconnaissance trip?
MR WASSERMAN: No, Mr Chairman.
MR VISSER: Before the abduction was performed?
MR WASSERMAN: No.
MR VISSER: Right. Did you stay behind in Amsterdam?
MR WASSERMAN: That is correct, Mr Chairman.
MR VISSER: Alright. And then on the next occasion when Swaziland was entered, did you then accompany them?
MR WASSERMAN: That's correct, Mr Chairman.
MR VISSER: Can you just tell us about that?
MR WASSERMAN:
"Col Botha and I took the kombi in. We entered legally, proceeded to Manzini to the George Hotel and there linked up with Sikhakane."
MR VISSER: Yes?
MR WASSERMAN: Form there ...(intervention)
MR VISSER: Did he come, get into the kombi with you?
MR WASSERMAN: Yes, Mr Chairman.
MR VISSER: And at one stage, was he asked to take over the driving of the kombi?
MR WASSERMAN: That's correct, Mr Chairman.
"He then drove to a spot near the main gates of the Scot, of the technical training college in Manzini."
MR VISSER: And what did you do, where did you go?
MR WASSERMAN:
"I and Mr Botha then took up hiding places in the rear of the kombi and we were covered by some large cardboard boxes."
MR VISSER: Yes.
MR WASSERMAN:
"Shortly after standing off outside there, Dion Cele came forward and he entered the vehicle by the sliding door."
MR VISSER: Why not through the passenger door?
MR WASSERMAN: He couldn't enter through the left-hand door as we had jimmied that lock to make it useless, thereby enforcing him to use the sliding door, giving us the sign that he was indeed in the vehicle.
MR VISSER: Alright. Now I may have understood this incorrectly, judging from what Mr Botha says. You say in paragraph 6:
"He went to sit on the passenger's seat next to Sikhakane."
Is that the position?
MR WASSERMAN: I think that is correct position, yes.
MR VISSER: So I did understand you correctly. You differ from Mr Botha, who says that he sat on the seat behind the driver.
MR WASSERMAN: I'm not too sure where he was. I do realise - I then pulled him over once we had moved off. Sikhakane drove off. There was no indication from Cele that he was aware of our presence in the vehicle. I then, and Col Botha, then moved the box and grabbed hold of Cele and pulled him over to where I was, to the rear of the vehicle.
MR VISSER: What did he do?
MR WASSERMAN: He shouted and he kicked and he struggled.
MR VISSER: Yes, what did you do?
MR WASSERMAN: I used force. I smacked, I slapped him.
MR VISSER: You say you slapped and punched him a few times.
MR WASSERMAN: Yes, that's correct.
MR VISSER: Would that be correct?
MR WASSERMAN: And spoke and shouted at him.
MR VISSER: Yes.
MR WASSERMAN: And afterwards he became quiet when he realised that - I had told him that we're policemen from South Africa, and upon that he relaxed, he then quietened down.
MR VISSER: Well he became quiet.
MR WASSERMAN: He became quiet.
MR VISSER: Probably didn't relax, but ...
MR WASSERMAN: Well he became quiet.
MR VISSER: Yes. Go on.
MR WASSERMAN:
"We then returned to the Nerston area. Sikhakane stayed behind. Col Botha drove the kombi. I was still with Mr Cele and we drove out illegally, out of Swaziland."
MR VISSER: Yes.
MR WASSERMAN:
"We then continued on to this house next to Amsterdam, where the senior officers made an attempt to - well they started to debrief him and made attempts to recruit him."
MR VISSER: Did you take part in the interrogation or not?
MR WASSERMAN: No, I didn't.
MR VISSER: Alright. So was he willing to be recruited?
CHAIRPERSON: Were you present when there was an attempt to interrogate him or recruit him?
MR WASSERMAN: Not. No, Sir, not in any form.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes.
MR VISSER: Right. Did you the at some point leave Amsterdam and go to a farm in the Elandskop area in the district of Pietermaritzburg?
MR WASSERMAN: That's correct, Sir.
MR VISSER: In paragraph 10 you say after you arrived on the farm, at some point Col Botha left for Durban.
MR WASSERMAN: That is correct, Sir.
MR VISSER: And he was not present during the remainder of the event?
MR WASSERMAN: Correct, Mr Chairman.
MR VISSER: What happened on the farm?
MR WASSERMAN: On the farm Cols Taylor and Vorster continued in length to try and recruit Mr Cele to come over.
MR VISSER: Were you present at that time from time to time?
MR WASSERMAN: From time to time, very irregularly, Mr Chair.
MR VISSER: Did you gain the impression that Mr Cele was willing to co-operate?
MR WASSERMAN: I was informed by both Taylor and Vorster that he was not prepared to co-operate.
MR VISSER: Please carry on with paragraph 12.
MR WASSERMAN:
"Much much later, Col Taylor informed me that it was virtually impossible for this man to co-operate and I then went in and I had a chat with him. He then gave me the impression that he would not co-operate. I slapped him three or four times. It made no difference whatsoever."
MR VISSER: Was this a serious assault?
MR WASSERMAN: No, it was not serious, Mr Chairman.
MR VISSER: Why did you slap him?
MR WASSERMAN: Up to that stage Mr Taylor and Mr Vorster had been "Mr Nice Guy", in one of the techniques that we use, so I was prepared to see if the raucous shouting and few slaps would create a different environment, but it did not work.
MR VISSER: Alright. In paragraph 13 you say that Taylor then spoke to you and Vorster and stated that it's clear that Cele was not recruitable, is that correct?
MR WASSERMAN: That is correct, Mr Chairman.
MR VISSER: Continue there please.
MR WASSERMAN:
"He gave us various reasons. He did state that if Cele were to be released it would be an embarrassment to the South African Government, as he had been abducted illegally in Swaziland and brought out illegally to the Republic. That was one of the major reasons."
MR VISSER: Yes, and could Cele, according to your insight, be released to go back to Swaziland unhindered?
MR WASSERMAN: No, Mr Chairman.
MR VISSER: Why not?
MR WASSERMAN: He could have - he would have continued with his activities. In addition, placed Sikhakane in danger, as he would have realised by now that he was an agent of the Security Police.
MR VISSER: Yes. And you say in paragraph 13, Taylor then ordered Vorster and yourself to see to it that Cele be eliminated?
MR WASSERMAN: That is correct, Mr Chairman.
MR VISSER: Did you associate yourself with that order?
MR WASSERMAN: Yes, I did, Mr Chairman.
MR VISSER: What did you then do, you and Vorster?
MR WASSERMAN: Mr Vorster and I then proceeded to the pine tree plantation where we commenced to dig a grave. And once we had dug that grave we returned to the house where Mr Taylor was still with Mr Cele.
MR VISSER: Yes. You remember something when you entered, is that correct?
MR WASSERMAN: Yes. Once when we'd entered the house, Mr Taylor gave us the sign that Mr Cele was to be now taken outside and to be eliminated and I realised that Mr Cele had not - had decided not to co-operate at all.
MR VISSER: And that you had to proceed.
MR WASSERMAN: And we had to proceed with the operation.
MR VISSER: Yes.
MR WASSERMAN:
"We then informed Mr Cele that he was going to be moved to another safehouse. We blindfolded him so he could not see where he could go. His hands were handcuffed behind his back."
MR VISSER: Now the blindfold you're talking about, Mr Vorster seems to remember a hood made of material of some kind. What is your recollection, if anything, about the blindfold?
MR WASSERMAN: I can't recall if it was a bag or if it was merely a piece of cloth wrapped around the eyes, Mr Chairman.
MR VISSER: Alright. What did you do then?
MR WASSERMAN:
"His hands were cuffed behind his back and we took him outside, outside the house and off the veranda and along the road, he walked along the road to the graveside."
MR VISSER: Did you steer him in the direction which you wanted him to go?
MR WASSERMAN: That's correct, Mr Chairman.
MR VISSER: Yes.
MR WASSERMAN:
"At the spot right next to the grave I had in my possession a police baton. I rendered him unconscious with a heavy blow to the head."
MR VISSER: Why did you do that?
MR WASSERMAN: To render him unconscious, Mr Chairman.
MR VISSER: For what purpose?
MR WASSERMAN: Then I was able to shoot. So he would not know.
MR VISSER: Alright. Please continue.
MR WASSERMAN:
"Once unconscious I shot Mr Cele twice in the head."
MR VISSER: What with?
MR WASSERMAN: With a silenced makarov.
MR VISSER: Was this your firearm?
MR WASSERMAN: No, this makarov had been given to me earlier by Mr Taylor.
MR VISSER: Right.
MR WASSERMAN:
"He was then placed in the grave."
MR VISSER: And the grave was filled in?
MR WASSERMAN: Clothing first removed.
MR VISSER: I'm sorry yes, you removed his clothing.
MR WASSERMAN: Yes.
MR VISSER: Can you remember whether you left any of the clothing on the body or whether you took everything off?
MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, I seem to recall he was completely naked, but I could be wrong.
MR VISSER: Yes, alright. And then you filled in the grave.
MR WASSERMAN: We filled in the grave. After sprinkling some line on the body first, Mr Chairman.
MR VISSER: Yes. Do you agree with Mr Vorster as to the reasons or the purpose of the lime?
MR WASSERMAN: Yes, Mr Chairman, I do.
MR VISSER: Right, and then what did you do?
MR WASSERMAN: We then filled in the grave and then proceeded up to the house with the clothing and burnt the clothing to ashes, to cinders.
MR VISSER: How do you see your participation in this incident as you set it out from paragraph 19 onwards?
MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, in doing what I did I saw as my duties as a policemen ...(indistinct) of the Security Branch, and I saw it as relevant to battling the conflict and the political violence that we were undergoing at the time.
MR VISSER: Go on.
MR WASSERMAN: We were conditioned by speeches of politicians and directions of our senior officers, to do all that was in our power to confront the revolutionary onslaught at all costs. And there were times when in terms of the prevailing legislation of the time, it was not possible to solve all the problems that came our way. And the present case is perhaps an example of such an instance.
In view of the above, I was in the bona fide belief that what I did in the present instance, in order to combat or derail the revolutionary onset and to protect the government and the National Party from political embarrassment, did fall within my express or implied authorities.
I did not participate in these events for any personal gain and was not driven by any personal spite or malice and I received no reward.
MR VISSER: You apply at page 1, for amnesty for the abduction or the man stealing - I notice in the Criminal Procedure Act it's two different offences Chairperson, I wasn't aware of that. I'm not quite certain which is the major offence, although it would appear that abduction might be because under the old Criminal Procedure code, abduction was a capital offence, you could receive the death penalty for that. But be that as it may, you apply for abduction or man stealing of Mr Dion Cele, his unlawful detention or depravation of his liberty, his murder - yes, I've forgotten Chairperson, I do apologise - for the assault on Mr Cele as you have explained, here in Swaziland as well as on the farm and for - and what I've also neglected to put in in your case is any offence in terms of regulations pertaining to movement, border movements. Is that correct? As well as any offence or delict which may be supported by the fact. Is that so?
MR WASSERMAN: That's so, Mr Chairman.
MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman, that is the evidence which we wish to place before you.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER
CHAIRPERSON: It has just occurred to me that we don't know the date on which this man was abducted. Can you tell us when that was?
MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, if my memory serves me well it was the 6th of July 1988. May I just check please, Chairman. Mr Chairman, can we check that, whether we have a specific date during the lunch hour and inform you when we come back?
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, and likewise the date on which he was killed.
MR VISSER: Yes, certainly Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: If you know the date of one, then you'd know without difficulty ...
MR VISSER: Yes, certainly. We will try to establish the exact date if possible.
CHAIRPERSON: And in what language was all this discussion and negotiation with Cele taking place.
MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, when I ever spoke to him it would have been in English, but Mr Taylor spoke in Zulu.
CHAIRPERSON: And did you know that his conversation or his discussion or questioning of Cele was in Zulu?
MR WASSERMAN: Yes, Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: You didn't have the need for an interpreter.
MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, Mr Taylor spoke Zulu fluently, it was - he would have been handling that himself.
CHAIRPERSON: Have you any questions to ask of this witness?
MR NEL: Thank you, Mr Chairman, I've got none.
NO QUESTIONS BY MR NEL
MR VISSER: Perhaps I could answer your question straight away, Chairperson, before Ms Thabethe starts. The TRC Report, in volume 2 at page 131, places the date in July 1988. No closer than that. But we will still see whether we can find a closer date.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, please.
MR VISSER: I seem to recall having read somewhere "6th of July", Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, well you'll let us know. Have you any questions, Ms Thabethe?
MS THABETHE: Just a few, Mr Chair.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, please do.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS THABETHE: Thank you.
Actually, Mr Wasserman it's one question. How do you reconcile the evidence of Mr Botha and Vorster, that at no stage was Mr Cele assaulted and your evidence that he was assaulted by yourself in Swaziland and on the farm?
MR WASSERMAN: Well I never saw either of them ever assault him.
CHAIRPERSON: I think the question clearly is that it seems that they didn't see you assault him. In other words, there was no evidence of any assault as far as they were concerned, and you
have told us that you assaulted. And I think the question is now, are you in a position to reconcile the difference between your evidence and their evidence?
MR WASSERMAN: Oh, now I understand yes, Sir. The assault in Swaziland, I would hardly even say that was an assault, that was a matter of first of all securing the man there. Mr Vorster and Mr Botha weren't present in the farmhouse when I assault Dion Cele in the farmhouse. They were not present, so they would not know, Mr Chairman.
MS THABETHE: Thank you, Mr Chair, I have no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS THABETHE
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
MR LAX: Just for the sake of clarity and for the record, Mr Botha did in fact say in his testimony that he does recall you
assaulting the deceased in the car, in the kombi when you were trying to subdue him at that point. So just for the record, he did say that in fact.
MR WASSERMAN: Yes, Mr Chairman.
MR LAX: Do you know what happened to the shell casings when you shot him?
MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, he would have been in the grave, I would have leant into the grave, I would imagine the "doppies" would have fallen into the grave.
MR LAX: But obviously you've no idea.
MR WASSERMAN: No, I have no idea. Perhaps they were lost in the exhumation, I don't know.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes.
ADV BOSMAN: Thank you, Chairperson.
Mr Wasserman, just on the issue of the interrogation. On a question put to you by the Chairman, you responded that Mr Cele was fluent in Zulu. What interests me was were the other interrogators fluent in Zulu? Did he speak Zulu all the time?
MR WASSERMAN: Mr Chairman, when I ever spoke to him he spoke to me in English. I think when Mr Vorster and Mr Botha spoke to him he spoke in English, but when he spoke with Mr Taylor the entire proceedings would have been in Zulu, and they were in Zulu in my presence.
ADV BOSMAN: Thank you. Thank you, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much, you're excused.
WITNESS EXCUSED
CHAIRPERSON: It's the appropriate time to take the adjournment. Mr Visser, we are going to adjourn for 45 minutes, we'll resume at a quarter to two.
MR NEL: Mr Chairperson, I wonder if I may ask for an indulgence till 2 o'clock, I have a problem that I have to rush back to the office because police headquarters have queried me and they would like an answer from me with regards to the queries of my further appearances on behalf of Col Taylor, before 3 o'clock this afternoon. I'm terribly sorry to put the Committee in this position, but I will be back at 2 o'clock if it is possible.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes. We will not - you understand that you'll be proceeding on behalf of Col Taylor?
MR NEL: Mr Chairperson, the other applications, for instance the Thombi Khubeka matter, was orchestrated by Mr Taylor and in consultation with my learned colleagues here, they have felt and I have - well I have brought it to the police' attention that it might be of assistance if I do appear on his behalf.
CHAIRPERSON: Well we can't deal with an application for amnesty on behalf of somebody who is deceased.
MR NEL: I realise that.
CHAIRPERSON: So I think that should eliminate that problem.
MR NEL: Very well, Mr Chair, I'll be back at quarter to two.
CHAIRPERSON: But you can try, if you can be back at quarter to, we'll resume at a quarter to two.
MR NEL: Thank you, Sir.
CHAIRPERSON: We'll adjourn.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
NAME: A E VERWEY
APPLICATION NO: AM5018/97
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ON RESUMPTION
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Nel?
MR NEL: Thank you, Mr Chairman. The application in front of you is that of Mr Verwey. It is found in the Cele bundle on page 168, and in front of you I've had placed a short summary of the evidence. If we can possibly mark that Exhibit - I think the next on is G.
CHAIRPERSON: G, yes.
MR NEL: Mr Verwey will be testifying in Afrikaans.
A E VERWEY: (sworn states)
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, you may be seated.
EXAMINATION BY MR NEL: Thank you, Mr Chair.
Mr Verwey, you are applying in terms of the Act for amnesty, for your involvement in the abduction of the case that we have heard here, that would be Dion Cele, and any other offence which may emanate therefrom. Is that correct?
MR VERWEY: Yes, that is correct.
MR NEL: You have heard the evidence of the previous applicants who have testified and you have also had the opportunity to peruse Exhibit A, do you confirm the correctness of that exhibit as well as the evidence given by the previous applicants regarding your involvement?
MR VERWEY: Yes, that is correct.
MR NEL: Mr Verwey, during this incident you were stationed in the SAP at Middelburg.
MR VERWEY: That is correct.
MR NEL: You were at the Security Branch, and what was your involvement there?
MR VERWEY: I was a Warrant Officer for the Security Branch.
MR NEL: And am I correct in saying that Col Taylor from the Durban Security Branch during this time contacted you to assist in an operation which would take place in Swaziland?
MR VERWEY: That is correct.
MR NEL: Now why would he have approached you specifically?
MR VERWEY: We worked in Swaziland regularly and we knew the roads and the environment very well.
MR NEL: Now as I've said, you have heard the evidence of the previous applicants and your involvement in this operation was exclusively to offer assistance with a possible, if I may call it, escape route from Swaziland to the RSA.
MR VERWEY: That is correct.
MR NEL: You say, or you summarise the incident on page 172 of your application and that this is correct, with the exception that you mentioned in your application that Sam du Preez was also one of the members who was present during this operation.
MR VERWEY: That is correct.
MR NEL: Am I correct in saying that during consultation and in consultation with Mr du Preez, it appeared clearly that you were mistaken and that he was not involved at all in this operation?
MR VERWEY: That is correct.
MR NEL: Furthermore, you summarise your political objective on page 174 in question 10(a) of your application. Do you confirm the correctness thereof and request that this be incorporated in your application?
MR VERWEY: Yes.
MR NEL: Mr Verwey, do you ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: When you say 174, page 174 ...(intervention)
MR NEL: Of the bundle.
CHAIRPERSON: Of the bundle?
MR NEL: Sorry, Mr Chair.
CHAIRPERSON: And this is question 10(a), which paragraph, paragraph 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, all of them?
MR NEL: All of them, Mr Chairperson. That is the ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
MR NEL: Did you draw any financial benefit or reward from your participation in this operation?
MR VERWEY: No, not at all.
MR NEL: After Cele had been taken from Swaziland, did you participate in any way in the interrogation?
MR VERWEY: No.
MR NEL: And you and Labuschagne then returned to your station?
MR VERWEY: That is correct.
MR NEL: Mr Chairperson, that is the evidence.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR NEL
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Visser, are there any questions you with to put?
MR VISSER: I have no questions, thank you, Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Is there any cross-examination at all?
MS THABETHE: No, Mr Chair, thank you.
NO QUESTIONS BY MS THABETHE
CHAIRPERSON: So the limit of your participation is to get this man out of Swaziland and when you got back into the country that was the end of your participation?
MR VERWEY: That's correct.
MR LAX: Just one question, Chairperson.
Did you have any inkling about what might happen to this man after you left the scene?
MR VERWEY: No.
MR LAX: Thank you, Chairperson.
ADV BOSMAN: I see in paragraph 9 of your application that you have applied for conspiracy to abduct. Where you indeed a member of the planning or were you just told to be there so that you could indicate roads?
MR VERWEY: We were there because we knew the routes and the environment very well.
ADV BOSMAN: But you were aware that this person was going to be abducted?
MR VERWEY: Yes, we knew this before the time.
ADV BOSMAN: Thank you. Thank you, Mr Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you very much.
MR VERWEY: Thank you.
WITNESS EXCUSED
NAME: JERRY J BROOKS
APPLICATION NO: AM4078/90
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MR NEL: Thank you, Mr Chairperson. I call the next applicant, which is Captain Jerry Brooks.
JERRY J BROOKS: (sworn states)
MR NEL: Thank you, Mr Chairperson. Mr Brooks' application is found in the Cele bundle, starting on page 11 and the short summary of his evidence will then be marked, if it may be Exhibit H.
CHAIRPERSON: H. Thank you very much.
EXAMINATION BY MR NEL: Mr Brooks, you are applying for your participation in the abduction of Dion Cele from Swaziland, am I correct?
MR BROOKS: Yes, that is correct.
MR NEL: And during the time of this incident you were stationed in the Security Branch in Pietermaritzburg?
MR BROOKS: Yes, that is correct.
MR NEL: And Col Vorster was your direct Commander?
MR BROOKS: That is correct.
MR NEL: It is also then Col Vorster who tasked you to assist with this operation.
MR BROOKS: That is correct.
MR NEL: You have heard the evidence given by the previous applicants insofar as it affects you, do you confirm the correctness thereof? And you have also had the opportunity to study Annexure A, or Exhibit A. Do you request for this to be incorporated in your application?
MR BROOKS: Yes.
MR NEL: Before we continue with the facts of the matter, is it correct that upon a previous occasion when you did not have legal representation, you were questioned about this particular incident and at that stage you denied any knowledge of the incident?
MR BROOKS: That is correct.
MR NEL: Could you briefly explain to the Committee why this was so.
MR BROOKS: This was in the 16th of November 1996 ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: In what application was that?
MR BROOKS: It was not an application, I was subpoenaed by the TRC to give evidence before them in camera.
MR NEL: Was it also so that you submitted your amnesty application through me?
MR BROOKS: Yes.
MR NEL: Could you explain to the Committee briefly why you did not tell the truth at that stage?
MR BROOKS: Firstly, I was uncertain whether the SAPS would participate in the amnesty process and secondly, at that stage I did not have any legal representation, and that is why I denied it.
MR NEL: But today you are here to tell the truth and you request amnesty for this?
MR BROOKS: That is correct.
MR NEL: Your participation in this particular incident was quite remote. Am I correct in saying that you and Col Taylor did not even enter Swaziland, but that you waited outside the Swaziland border on a farm near Amsterdam, for the group which is already known to us?
MR BROOKS: Yes, we waited at the border post near Nerston.
MR NEL: Were you in any way involved in the interrogation of Dion Cele?
MR BROOKS: No.
MR NEL: Were you involved, or were you on the farm after he had been brought back to Elandskop near Pietermaritzburg?
MR BROOKS: No, not at all.
MR NEL: And at that stage you did not know that Dion Cele had been eliminated, but later you found this out.
MR BROOKS: That is correct.
MR NEL: Was there any reward that you received from anybody for your participation in this operation?
MR BROOKS: None whatsoever.
MR NEL: Your political objectives are contained within your application on page 15 of the Cele bundle, paragraph 10 and further. Do you confirm the correctness thereof?
MR BROOKS: Yes, I confirm this.
MR NEL: Thank you, Mr Chairperson, that is the evidence by Mr Brooks.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR NEL
CHAIRPERSON: What did you do at the border post?
MR BROOKS: Col Taylor and I went to the post, it was part of the operation to see whether everything was safe for the group's return from Swaziland.
CHAIRPERSON: What were you required specifically for?
MR BROOKS: I am not certain, but what I inferred was that I had to accompany Col Taylor so that he would not go on this aspect of the operation by himself.
CHAIRPERSON: Were you told what it was all going to be about?
MR BROOKS: Yes, I was briefed about the purpose behind the operation.
CHAIRPERSON: Did you know that somebody was to be abducted and brought into the country?
MR BROOKS: That is correct, I knew about it.
CHAIRPERSON: Did you know the individual concerned, Dion Cele? Did you know him?
MR BROOKS: I knew him by name, but I did not know him personally.
CHAIRPERSON: Up till the time that you left Nerston with Taylor, had the vehicle bringing Dion Cele into the country, had it arrived?
MR BROOKS: Upon our arrival at Nerston, the vehicle had not yet arrived. Approximately a half an hour later, I cannot recall precisely, the vehicle returned.
CHAIRPERSON: And did you see this man, Dion Cele?
MR BROOKS: Yes, I saw him.
CHAIRPERSON: Did you talk to him?
MR BROOKS: I greeted him but I did not speak to him.
CHAIRPERSON: In what language did you greet him?
MR BROOKS: I always greet them in their own language, so I greeted him in Zulu.
CHAIRPERSON: What else did you do after you greeted him?
MR BROOKS: Well I sat around on the farm for that period of time and returned the next day, I didn't really do anything specific.
CHAIRPERSON: Did you have any contact with him on the farm itself?
MR BROOKS: Not really, except when we went through sometimes I saw him but I didn't really have any contact with the man.
CHAIRPERSON: You were not involved in any questioning of the man?
MR BROOKS: No, not at all.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
MS THABETHE: No questions, Mr Chair.
NO QUESTIONS BY MS THABETHE
MR LAX: Thank you, Chairperson.
You were waiting at the border post I understood from your evidence, is that correct?
MR BROOKS: That's correct.
MR LAX: And this vehicle then arrived at the border post about half an hour after you'd got there.
MR BROOKS: Well I wouldn't say it was half an hour, I would say it was approximately half an hour. It may have taken longer, but it wasn't less than half an hour.
MR LAX: The issue is that it arrived at the border post, the time is not really that material. Is that correct?
MR BROOKS: It didn't arrive at the border post itself, but more a short distance away. Where they had crossed the border illegally, that is where we waited on the dirt road. So we gave them enough time to drive to Manzini and to return, so I would say that our time calculations were rather precise because in terms of the time that it took them to return we didn't really wait that long, we couldn't have waited there longer than an hour.
MR LAX: You see my only worry is this, you waiting at the border post, they've crossed at some other place, on a dirt road where they flattened the fence and gone over, and then how did they arrive at the border post suddenly, where you were waiting? That's what I don't understand.
MR BROOKS: Let me just explain this. The place where they crossed was approximately 200 metres from the border, so we would refer to that as the border post because it was within the immediate vicinity of the border post.
MR LAX: I understood from the earlier testimony that they went and crossed somewhere where they wouldn't be seen, they did it unlawfully, how would they then go and cross about 200 metres right there near the border post, they could be seen. It doesn't make sense to me.
MR BROOKS: I'm saying 200m, but it may be somewhat further. It could definitely not have been a kilometre or further than that. Let me say that it was on the eastern side of the Nerston border post, which was very close as far as I can recall. And I'm referring to this place as the Nerston border post, but it wasn't exactly at the border post, it was approximately 200m away from the border post itself.
MR LAX: No, I hear you, it just leaves some question marks in the back of my head. I'll leave it at that.
ADV BOSMAN: What was your rank at the stage when you participated in the operation?
MR BROOKS: I was a Constable.
ADV BOSMAN: Did you drive the motor vehicle for Col Taylor?
MR BROOKS: No, he drove his own vehicle.
ADV BOSMAN: I still find it strange that you had such a remote share in the matter and that you left without really having done anything. Why did leave before Col Taylor, why did you return before him, and on your own as well?
MR BROOKS: I don't understand the question.
ADV BOSMAN: You see, before the others you returned to your office, did Col Taylor give you the order to return?
MR BROOKS: No, I returned the following day with the others to Pietermaritzburg. We left in one vehicle for Pietermaritzburg.
ADV BOSMAN: In other words, did you return before or after the elimination of Mr Cele?
MR BROOKS: After the abduction we went to the farm in Amsterdam and after that we returned to Pietermaritzburg the following morning, where in Pietermaritzburg we split up, Col Taylor and the others went to Elandskop and I remained in Pietermaritzburg.
ADV BOSMAN: Very well, that explains it then, thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: So in other words, that night you spent at Amsterdam with everybody else?
MR BROOKS: That is correct.
CHAIRPERSON: And during that time in Amsterdam itself, whilst the deceased was still there, you had no contact with him?
MR BROOKS: I don't say I didn't have any contact with, I saw him and so forth, but I never spoke to him continuously or anything like that. I saw him, I knew that he was in our presence. We were very close to one another at that stage.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I mean personally you didn't engage in any conversation with him?
MR BROOKS: No, not at all.
CHAIRPERSON: That's what I mean. Thank you. Arising out of all that, Mr Visser, are there any questions that you wish to put?
MR VISSER: No thank you, Mr Chairman.
NO QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER
CHAIRPERSON: Any re-examination of the man?
MR NEL: No thank you, Mr Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Sorry Thabile, is there anything that you wish to ask arising out of the questions that have been put to him?
MS THABETHE: No, Mr Chair.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Very well, thank you very much, you are excused.
WITNESS EXCUSED
MR NEL: Thank you, Mr Chairperson, that concludes my applicants.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Gentlemen, before we start concluding these proceedings, you will recall that Mr Britz' client has not been heard and the letter I received from him yesterday. I want to try and avoid postponing this hearing until he is heard and I'm going to conclude these hearings and if possible make a convenient day towards the end of this week or early next week just to enable Mr Britz and his client to be here, so that we can conclude his part of the evidence. Mr Visser, if you wish to address us you may please do so.
MR VISSER: Yes. Mr Chairman, there's just one aspect outstanding and that is whether the family - I don't understand them to oppose the applications, but nevertheless they might wish to say something to you.
CHAIRPERSON: No, I've taken that into account. You mean as far as the present application is concerned?
MR VISSER: Yes, Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Well are you likely to lead evidence?
MS THABETHE: Can I ask you to give me a second please, Mr Chair?
CHAIRPERSON: Take your time.
MS THABETHE: Thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: If you require a little more time I am prepared to stand down to enable you to consult the people.
MS THABETHE: I'm indebted to you, Mr Chair, I would appreciate that.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes.
MS THABETHE: Thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: You will call us as soon as you are ready.
MS THABETHE: I will do so, Mr Chair.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. We will adjourn for a short while.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
ON RESUMPTION
CHAIRPERSON: Yes?
MS THABETHE: Mr Chair, I've met with the family. I don't have any further witnesses. I will address whatever needs to be addressed during argument.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Visser?
MR VISSER IN ARGUMENT: Thank you, Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, if we may then go onto the argument in this matter.
We act as we have stated before, for three applicants in this matter, Botha, Vorster and Wasserman, who apply for amnesty in regard to the incident of the abduction, murder and other issues accompanying that incident.
Mr Chairman, you will recall when then amnesty process started we approached argument with great caution and very voluminously. We have been able, Mr Chairman, because of events which have taken place since those early times, to shorten our argument dealing with the conflicts of the past, the political background and position of applicants who were members of the Security Forces. I remember well, Mr Chairman, how you sat not too long ago, I believe it was in the Nietverdiendt 10 matter, listening to us again, where we fully argued - and I believe Mr Lax was a Commissioner in that same hearing, where you listened to us on the background yet again.
Chairperson, in the meantime there have been decisions, some of the original Amnesty Committee and some of other Amnesty Committees which followed subsequently, which have addressed some of the issues which we have mentioned during those past arguments which we presented to you. We have one hitch, if I may call it that, in the present case and that is the introduction of a new Commissioner who has not had the discomfort of having to listen to me addressing her about that background. And we were wondering how to perhaps get around that problem without have to ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: She has in the meanwhile acquainted herself over the past with documents which deal with this kind of matter.
MR VISSER: Yes, Chairperson, but I'm just worried that she might not have had the benefit of hearing what I have to say about it. Chairperson, what has occurred to us ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: I will come to your assistance in that regard, so you needn't worry too much about it.
MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman. But what has occurred to us, Mr Chairman, is that back at the guesthouse I have on computer a summary which is a very abbreviated summary of what the original argument was in this regard, which I can print out and let Commissioner Bosman have tomorrow and perhaps during the course of the hearings where we won't repeat this again, she might put to me if there are any problems which she might have in that regard.
ADV BOSMAN: Yes, I thank counsel for that suggestion, Chairperson.
MR VISSER: It's in fact not terribly much, Mr Chairman, it's about 30 pages.
Mr Chairman, coming then to the issues before you now, we have the situation where Vorster tells you and we know is common cause, that one of the most important aspects of the quest in the conflicts of the past was the question of information. He's referred to the circular in his amnesty application, where the need to recruit informers was specifically mentioned. We know that one of the reasons why the Security Forces were as successful as they were during the conflict of the past, was primarily because of their ability to recruit informers of all sorts and shapes and were able to take pre-emptive action or proactive action and thereby sustain the government of the day.
Mr Chairman, it was no different in the present case, except for one factor and that is that according to the evidence of Mr Vorster, he had received an indication from his informer, Goodwill Sikhakane, that this particular victim, Mr Cele, was interested or was willing to become an informer. As Mr Botha said, well that made it an extra incentive then to approach Mr Cele. The way in which they did it, Mr Chairman, and this we have seen also in the case of Ndwandwe, was where the person was outside the borders of the country he would abducted and attempts would be made to recruit that person to become an informer.
The process, Mr Chairman, of that recruitment has been discussed in previous amnesty applications. We saw fit not to do so again, but in essence it's a matter of common sense. When you recruit a person you have to inform him of contact points, contact persons etc., and in a sense you lay bare your own information network to that person. That in turn implies that before you do so you have to have complete faith as far as it is humanly possible, that the person is genuine when he indicates that he will work with the Security Police, in order not as it were, to blow your own cover.
In the case of Cele this did not happen except to the limited extent of Goodwill. His cover was clearly blown the moment he enticed Cele to get into the kombi and thereafter was abducted and Goodwill was left behind in Swaziland. Clearly if the operation, the attempts to recruit Cele would be unsuccessful, Goodwill's situation would clearly be compromised if Mr Cele would have been released thereafter. Which in turn formed one of the options which was considered at the end of the day by Vorster and Taylor and perhaps to a lesser extent by Wasserman, although he said he associated himself therewith, in deciding that Cele had to be eliminated.
Now Mr Chairman, I'm not going to repeat the evidence, you heard the evidence. What we would like to submit to you is that there appears to be no material conflicts on the evidence, the real question here would turn around perhaps proportionality. As far as the political background in concerned, Mr Chairman, we submit that there can also be very little doubt that these policemen didn't do so because they had nothing else to do, but they did so in order to do their duties, perform their duties as they saw it as policemen, in order to sustain the government.
One can argue about the merits or demerits of the method of wanting to recruit an informer and then going about it in the way in which the applicants did, namely entering Swaziland and abducting that person. Well Mr Chairman, of course in those times people were killed on both sides of the line and you have heard evidence time and time and again on many occasions, of the risky position in which informers found themselves.
Ms Thabethe suggested why instead of abducting him, that is Mr Cele, didn't you simply send Goodwill to go and talk to him and ask him whether he's prepared to work with the police. Well that would have been a crazy suggestion, Mr Chairman, because if Mr Cele - if he had misread Mr Cele, he would have signed his own death warrant by doing so, because he would have exposed himself.
It is also clear, Mr Chairman, that members of the Security Police couldn't go into Swaziland and attempt to recruit him there, they would be off their normal domestic ground, they would not know what situations they would encounter there and by far the safest would be to bring them back to the Republic of South Africa.
This in turn, Mr Chairman, brings up this whole question of the accord which was entered into between the South African Government and the Swazi Government. We hear about this accord, Mr Chairman, but frankly, speaking from our side, we have never heard any evidence presented at any of these hearings that the Swazi Government allowed a free hand to the South African Security Forces in Swaziland.
CHAIRPERSON: I think the information one gathered over the period of time was that there may be a few highly placed individuals in the Swazi Government who may be playing ball with the South African Government, rather than an arrangement between them at a government level.
MR VISSER: Yes. Yes, that certainly is our impression. We may be right, we may be wrong, but it accords with your impression. Certainly from an interstateal agreement point of view there is no evidence which we are aware of that suggests that members of the Security Forces of this country could enter Swaziland and act unhindered, one rather gets the impression as you've just pointed out, that perhaps in government as you've pointed out, but certainly in the Police Force in Swaziland, there were certain people placed in certain positions that were sympathetic to the cause.
And if one had to speculate, Mr Chairman, and I don't want to go too far off the beaten track, but if one had to speculate, one would imagine that if the Swazi Government had a real problem with a person who is incidentally also the enemy of the South African Government, they would have turned a blind eye to any action taken against such person in Swaziland.
But for all practical purposes, Mr Chairman, it's quite clear that the applicants in the present case went into Swaziland. Although they entered legally through the border gate, what they did in Swaziland they did stealthily. It wasn't as if there was a normal arrest, a taking to a police station, a booking of Mr Cele etc., nothing of the kind, he was abducted, it was done stealthily.
Now Mr Chairman, Mr Cele is now taken out of Swaziland and as Vorster said to everyone's surprise, he was not amenable to work with the South African Police. In fact, Vorster says that he thought that he had been misled by Goodwill. Be that as it may, the fact of the matter is that there was - as was exactly the case with Portia Ndwandwe, suddenly a dilemma. The dilemma was twofold in regard to releasing him, and that is the position of Goodwill.
And of course here the Security Branch had a man who was a high-ranking official by all accounts in MK, and which they would not be able to release because the whole point of the war was to eliminate, and I use that in the broader sense of the word, not necessarily killing, but to eliminate people in key positions in order to bring disarray in the organisation of the opposing enemy.
So Mr Chairman, at Amsterdam it doesn't work, Vorster says that the intention was if he would be amenable to be recruited, he would be replaced in Swaziland as soon as possible for him to start operating. Clearly, that makes good sense as well because once a person stays away fro any length of time, some people might start asking for explanations and for reasons. So one can't find fault with that intention expressed by Vorster.
Now at Amsterdam the plan does not come to fruition, he's taken down to Pietermaritzburg, he is by all accounts for the better part of the day, further interrogated and attempts were made to recruit him at the farm near Elandskop without success, Taylor then speaks to Vorster and Wasserman and says "We've got a problem and it seems to me that we're going to have to eliminate this gentleman because he doesn't want to co-operate. We can't release him, we can't charge him and this seems to be the only way out". And that is what then came to pass. We don't need to go into the details, Chairperson, but you heard the somewhat emotional evidence of Mr Wasserman, of how exactly it came about and what happened thereafter.
Mr Chairman, we submit with respect, that bearing in mind the bigger picture of the conflict, the political conflict of the past, and bearing in mind what Mr Cele stood for, not in the sense of his person, but in the sense of his organisation and particularly the fact that it was an MK member, that the act was proportional to the objective that was sought to be achieved, and that was first of all to eliminate him as a key person in the MK machinery and secondly, to protect the identity of Goodwill Sikhakane.
Now Mr Chairman, we are in possession now of certain decisions that have come down. I referred to them earlier. Mr Chairman very briefly, referring to the decision in the Jack Cronje application, 2773/96, we would rely on particularly what was stated from pages 1 to page 4. The original Amnesty Committee of which you are the Chairman, dealt with many of the aspects, Chairperson, which place the actions of members of the Security Forces in perspective. And we don't need to read it to you again, Chairperson, you're very well aware of the decision, having been part of it, other than to say that we rely on - actually it's page 1 to 6, and we would ask you to incorporate the decision there taken also in - as far as the principles are concerned, in our application presently before you.
Now Mr Chairman, there was at one stage some argument before another Amnesty Committee as to the binding effect or otherwise of amnesty decisions which had been handed down. We were the first and we still are the first to concede that a Commission of Inquiry and also this particular Amnesty Committee is not a Court of law, where its judgments have precedence and have to be followed unless clearly wrong. But Mr Chairman, and I'm certain I don't have to convince you of this point, one would expect that in the interests of reasonable administrative action, one would expect - and of course also from a point of view of certainty, one would expect other Amnesty Committees to follow what was stated in decisions of previous decisions.
Mr Chairman, in that vein we refer you to the Khotso House incident amnesty decision for one reason only. You will recall that until very recently we grappled with the problem of the wording of Section 20(2)(b), because on the plain wording it would seem to indicate that the legislature had in mind with its authorisation which it specifies in that sub-section, that the act, omission or offence had to be authorised before it could be stated that it fell within the express or implied mandate of the security member who acted. And you will recall, Mr Chairman, that for a long time in our argument when we addressed this sub-section, we referred you to what appeared to us to be an inherent paradox, because the paradox being that amnesty may only be granted for acts and omissions which are also offences. And certainly as you put it in the Kondile case to General Erasmus, no act existed at the time which authorised any policemen to kill Mr Kondile. Now in the matter of the Khotso House bombing, Mr Chairman, there is a part of the judgment which deals very specifically for the first time, with the wording of sub-section 20(2)(b). I might just tell you how it came about, Mr Chairman. We appeared a week or two before the judgment came out, or perhaps even longer, before this judgment came out, in Johannesburg in other amnesty applications before a Panel of the Amnesty Committee, which inter alia included Adv de Jager and Adv Gcabashe. During that hearing the merits of, and the interpretation of (b) of Section 20(2) was argued, I may add, quite hotly so, and we then asked for permission, for time to prepare a proper argument and we did so and that argument was presented to that Committee. As it turns out, Mr Chairman, it would appear that in the Khotso House matter this argument that was presented in another matter, as I've just explained to you, was included in this decision probably because two of the Commissioners, two of the four Commissioners in the Khotso House incident, were Adv de Jager and Adv Gcabashe.
So Mr Chairman, what we submit to you is that from page 5 of that decision, which you no doubt have, we submit you will find a correct interpretation of sub-section 20(2)(b), starting with authorities such as MKHIZE vs MARTINS in 1914AD referring to British law and running up to 1945AD in FELDMAN'S case, which appeared to us, with respect Mr Chairman, still the existing law in our country. We are not going to repeat it, Chairperson, we merely wish to direct your attention to the fact that we believe that there is now a correct interpretation of that sub-section before you and we would ask you with respect, to follow that interpretation as presented in the Khotso House matter.
If you don't have a copy of the Khotso House decision, Chairperson, we can make one available.
CHAIRPERSON: We will be able to get it.
MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman. It's a very brief decision, it will take no time at all for you to read it. And the relevant part, Mr Chairman, runs from page 5 - sorry - yes from page 5 to page 8.
Mr Chairman, perhaps lastly, we were struck by some similarities between the present case, the facts of the present case and that of the one which you presided in concerning Mr Kondile. You will recall, Mr Chairman, that in Kondile's case he was first arrested when he came across the Swazi border. There was some suggestion under false pretences. He was arrested by the Security Branch in Bloemfontein and then he was placed over to Port Elizabeth. At Port Elizabeth he was assaulted and eventually he ostensibly agreed to become an informer. Du Plessis was the person who dealt with him. And he told you at the time that Mr Kondile indicated that he would become an informer and he, that is du Plessis, believed him, believed that he was genuine and started exposing some contact persons to him and some information routes, after which, on a particular day when du Plessis went to visit Kondile, he sat on his bed and he found a note which was written by Kondile and which was obviously intended to be smuggled out of the prison, in which he informed the ANC that he was assaulted and compelled to agree to become an informer, but that he wasn't going to become such an informer and that he would report to them the moment he is released.
You will recall, Mr Chairman, that a decision was then taken together the then Brig van Rensburg and Gen Erasmus, and it was decided that in the circumstances they couldn't release him, they couldn't charge him and therefore they eliminated him. And that decision, Chairperson, has also come to hand, it is under AC/99/0037, where you as I said before, were the Chairperson and where you were assisted by Judge Pillay and Adv Gcabashe and Adv de Jager.
And we submit, Mr Chairman, that your decision in the Kondile matter finds application to a great extent in the present case, the only difference being that in this case Mr Cele did not indicate that he was prepared to become an informer after he was abducted, but apart from that and apart from the degree of the assault, Mr Chairman, there appears to be very little difference between the two matters. And we would ask you in the light of the decision in Kondile's case, to favourably consider granting the amnesty as prayed for also in the present case.
What was impressive, if I may say so Mr Chairman, about the decision in the Kondile case, is that it showed the insight of the Amnesty Committee in placing the assaults on Mr Kondile in proper perspective vis-à-vis his killing. And that we found very interesting, Mr Chairman. And again we say with respect, that we ask you with respect, to deal with the assault in this case albeit it of a far minor nature, in the same sense, Mr Chairman. Would you grant me a moment please, Mr Chairman?
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, certainly.
MR VISSER: Yes, Mr Chairman, yes, we have presented before yourself and Commissioner Lax, argument in regard to an issue which might arise because of the fact that part of the incident took place in another country where this Commission has no jurisdiction.
You will recall, Mr Chairman, that the submission which we made and which has been accepted, I believe by Justice Miller and his Committee, in the Zero Hand Grenade, if indications which we received from the Committee can be relied upon, that is clearly not the concern of the Committee, of the Amnesty Committee what the value of the amnesty which might be granted to an applicant, will be to him. The Act in fact does give indications that that must be so. The Act speaks of "committed inside or outside the country" etc.
Now clearly, if you granted amnesty in the present case and these applicants went to Swaziland for a weekend to celebrate, they might find themselves being arrested and they won't be able to rely on your amnesty which you granted them. But that must not be held to stand in the way of you doing your duty in terms of the Act, as we submitted before and as we now submit again.
In what we will give Commissioner Bosman tomorrow, there is towards the end a little heading dealing with that issue as well, Mr Chairman. Suffice is it to submit to you that the fact that an incident took place partly within the country and partly outside the country is no - now I'm looking for a word, there's no bar to you granting amnesty. Actually I was hoping Commissioner Bosman was going to give me the latin word.
CHAIRPERSON: She may yet do it.
MR VISSER: She may yet, Mr Chairman.
ADV BOSMAN: Impedimentum is the word, Mr Visser.
MR VISSER: Impedimenta, yes, yes. Impedimenta.
Mr Chairman, we submit that the evidence which you heard from my clients would have struck you as being evidence which was tendered in a spirit of full co-operation. They have attempted to remember all the issues relating to this incident. They have made such concessions as one would expect reasonably of them to have made. And we would submit that there is no reason for you not to believe them. We submit that there is no opposition to the application and therefore ask you to favourably consider granting the applications as we prayed for.
Mr Chairman, I don't believe it will be necessary unless you ask me to do so, to go through what exactly each of the persons is applying for.
CHAIRPERSON: It's set out in the ...(intervention)
MR VISSER: We dealt with it in the evidence and we would accordingly move for such amnesty to be granted. Thank you, Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Yes, Mr Nel?
MR NEL IN ARGUMENT: Thank you, Mr Chairperson. I'm left in the lucky position of having senior counsel arguing the matter before me and there's not much that I can add except to say that the clients that I represented here were part of the group, although their participation in the whole operation was minutes, if I may call it that. I submit also with respect, Mr Chairperson, that their applications, that of Mr Brooks and Mr Verwey complies with the requirements of the Act and that it is associated with a political objective and also in the way that they gave their evidence they made a full disclosure, even though Mr Brooks admitted that at a previous occasion he did not tell the truth about this incident.
And it's in light of that, Mr Chairperson, that I also with respect ask you to consider their application favourable. Thank you, Sir.
CHAIRPERSON: Anything you wish to say?
MS THABETHE IN ARGUMENT: Thank you, Mr Chair.
Mr Chair, with regard to the requirements of the Act, as my learned has indicated we have no opposition, we have nothing to oppose on, more especially because the victims were not there when these things happened and clearly it was done in the context of political conflicts of the past.
However, Mr Chair, I've been requested by the family to raise a few concerns on their behalf. And Mr Chair, I would like to put it on record that I did explain to them the difference between what is factual and what is emotional. However, they have requested me to put this on record, so I would like Mr Chair to allow me to do so.
CHAIRPERSON: May I just interrupt at this stage and say now who of the dependants are present whom you represent?
MS THABETHE: Mr Chair, I've got the brother to Mr Dion Cele and two sisters.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
MS THABETHE: And also an aunt.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Yes, do carry on.
MS THABETHE: Thank you, Mr Chair.
They've raised concerns that its not quite clear to them why it was necessary for the applicants to have used the kind of method they used, especially because it was indicated clearly that Mr Cele showed or indicated a willingness to co-operate. I did put these concerns on the applicants and they were here, they heard what the applicants have to say, Mr Chair.
Secondly, they are also concerned with the violence as they put it - I'm quoting them, the violence that was used in killing him and they also say they don't see why it was really necessary to kill him. They believe the policemen at that time did have a means to frame him, which could have led to his arrest. Also I did put this to the applicants and they responded. The victims were listening.
Thirdly, Mr Chair, they've raised a concern that the applicants don't show any remorse, they believe that they didn't show that they were sorry. I also explained to them the difference between what the Act requires so that someone can get amnesty and the issue of remorse. I did explain that to him, that remorse doesn't form part of the requirements of the Act to get amnesty. Nevertheless, they requested me to raise this, hence I'm raising it.
CHAIRPERSON: Quite alright.
MS THABETHE: The family also said I must raise it that they hope that it will be known not only in this room, but in public as well, especially where they live in KwaMashu, that Mr Dion Cele was not an askari or an informer, because all along they've been harassed by the community they live in because there were those rumours that Mr Dion Cele was an askari and was an informer. And it became clear from the evidence of one of the applicants that probably because Mr Sikhakane was not told that Dion Cele refused to become an informer, that's where the rumours could have stemmed from. Mr Chair, the rest I leave it in your capable hands. Yes.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
MS THABETHE: Thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: The Committee will consider all the evidence and the information placed before us and in due course will make known its decision.
How to accede to one of the requests that has been made by the dependants of the deceased, or rather the family of the deceased, is to me a reasonable request and I do not know how one can accede to that request. We will have to think of some mechanism which would make it known, when Dion Cele died he remained a loyal MK man, a loyal ANC man and that he never became an informer.
Now we will have to think about how that can be done, but if there is any way in which that can be done, steps should be taken to achieve that. You will convey that to your clients.
MS THABETHE: Yes, I think the media can assist us a great deal in that as well, Mr Chair.
CHAIRPERSON: Right you are. That brings us to the end of these proceedings. We will now adjourn and resume at nine thirty tomorrow morning.
MR VISSER: Yes, Mr Chairman, that would be with the application of Mr Tekere - concerning Mr Tekere.
MS THABETHE: Yes, Mr Chairman.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Mr Nel, you're not in that are you?
MR NEL: Mr Chairperson, I - as I've indicated before lunch, do represent the late Col Taylor and the reason why I did not go to my office during lunchtime is because I've had a call from the South African Police informing me that they would - are considering me still carrying on for the late Col Taylor and they will communicate their decision to me in due course.
CHAIRPERSON: Well we've indicated to you what our views on the matter are.
MR NEL: Thank you, Mr Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. We'll adjourn and resume at nine thirty tomorrow morning.
MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, before you rise - I hate to give the impression that I want to be here longer than is necessary, but may I place something before you for your consideration. We've raised this before. The way in which matters are running, Mr Chairman, and we already anticipated this, we'll probably be finished by lunchtime tomorrow with Tekere, then we're going to have a half a day which - and a half a day on Friday, assuming that you will be adjourning at 1 o'clock on Friday as is usual, which makes up a day. If it's possible that the Ninella matter might possibly be moved forward ...(intervention)
CHAIRPERSON: Will you consider that?
MR VISSER: ... to tomorrow ...(intervention)
MS THABETHE: Yes, Mr Chair, coincidentally I had drafted a suggested roll. I was going to discuss it with my learned friends after this.
CHAIRPERSON: Very well. At least you'll make the necessary enquiries and see if it is possible to do so.
MS THABETHE: Thank you, Mr Chair.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS