CHAIRPERSON: Good morning, we want to start the proceedings. It is for the record, Thursday, the 2nd of September 1999 and we are continuing with the amnesty applications of Vermeulen and Nofomela in respect of Chesterville. Ms Patel, if my memory serves me correctly, you were still busy questioning Mr Vermeulen?

NICOLAAS VERMEULEN: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: Please be seated. Yes, Ms Patel.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS PATEL: (cont)

Thank you Honourable Chairperson. Mr Vermeulen, are you ready?

MR VERMEULEN: Yes.

MS PATEL: Fine, thank you. Just to recap on yesterday, if I understand your testimony correctly, you and the rest of the members from Vlakplaas came up to Durban to assist with the unrest in the area. You and Nortje, Willie Nortje, at some stage went to the police station or the army base as you say, to meet Mr Hunter, Lt Hunter, who pointed out Chesterville as the area in which there was trouble and that a possible, you know that that was one of the areas that you could concentrate on and based on that information, you then went with Mr Nortje, Mr Bosch, Mr McCarter, Mr Radebe together with some of the other askaris, you went to the graveyard first. Is that correct so far, am I right so far in my summary of what had happened?

MR VERMEULEN: Yes Mr Chairman, that is how I recall it.

MS PATEL: Okay, then you went to the graveyard, Radebe and the askaris were given instructions to go and infiltrate, they went in, came back some time later and requested an AK47 which was then handed to them. They then left. You then moved off to the bridge which was meant to be the second meeting point. Whilst you were there, you heard some gunshots going off. Mr Radebe and company came back, reported that there was a shoot-out or a "skermutseling" as it was stated and you all went off to C R Swart police station where Mr Nortje then went and made a report to Mr de Kock about the incident.

MR VERMEULEN: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MS PATEL: Okay. Now let me start off with Mr Nortje's statement, I have managed to trace the statement that was made Honourable Chairperson, it is in fact before you, it is headed "Willem Albertus Nortje, SAP Pretoria" and it is dated the 27th of June 1986.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, we've got that.

MS PATEL: All right.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you want that to be marked?

MS PATEL: Exhibit B.

CHAIRPERSON: Exhibit B?

MS PATEL: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well.

MS PATEL: All right, thank you Honourable Chairperson. Mr Vermeulen, if I can just take you through the information that is contained in the statement and ask for your comment on that in so far as it relates to the testimony that you have already given us. Mr Nortje says that on the 15th of June 1986 they already received information and as a result of that information, they then went to Durban. The purpose of going to Durban as he states in the first paragraph of the statement was -

What is your comment on that, can you recall that this information was available to you before you in fact went to Durban?

MR VERMEULEN: I, myself, cannot recall it because at that stage, I was not a Section Leader, Mr Nortje was the Section Leader and most of the information would have been given to him. He would have come back to us on a later stage, Mr Chairman.

MS PATEL: Okay. He also states further that Lt van Dyk, I would imagine that would be Paul van Dyk?

MR VERMEULEN: That is correct Mr Chair.

MS PATEL: Was in charge of the operation. Did you bear any knowledge of this?

MR VERMEULEN: He could have been there, I won't dispute it, but he wouldn't have been in charge, because Col de Kock was in charge of the unit.

MS PATEL: No, not of the unit, of this operation? Is it possible?

MR VERMEULEN: It is possible, yes Mr Chairman.

MS PATEL: Okay fine, and he says that Lt van Dyk gave him certain information and then told him to get in touch with Lt Hunter who was in fact the person who gave further information?

MR VERMEULEN: That is correct.

MS PATEL: Okay. He then says that they gathered the men, he gives a list of the group that was with, and then you first went to Chesterville at about eleven o'clock that evening, and then stopped at the bridge or as he says "under the bridge", that the askaris were left there, it is only Mr Radebe and the white members who then went from there to meet Lt Hunter?

MR VERMEULEN: Yes, that is correct. I think I stated that in my testimony yesterday Mr Chair.

MS PATEL: If I recall your testimony correctly, and as I have summarised it to you this morning, that it was only after the meeting with Lt Hunter that you then all moved off to Chesterville, whereas Lt Nortje says here that you first went to Chesterville, dropped off the men and then went to meet Lt Hunter?

MR VERMEULEN: That is correct, we first went - what I stated yesterday, we first went to Chesterville, to that army base camp to get the information about Chesterville and then we went back, it was just the whites and one black, Radebe, Mr Chair.

ADV DE JAGER: Hunter was in fact in Chesterville?

MR VERMEULEN: That is correct Mr Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but if I understood your evidence correctly, you testified that it was on the basis of the discussions at the police station or the army base that it was decided that you had to infiltrate Chesterville, in other words you said that was how it happened. If the information was to this regard, you could have started at another point, the information you obtained during the discussions ...

MR VERMEULEN: If I brought the Committee under a wrong impression, I beg your pardon, but I am certain I said that we first went to this army base or the police station, there we looked at the map, they indicated that Chesterville was a flash point, we returned and from there the members were posted.

CHAIRPERSON: In other words based on the briefing you received at the army base or police station whatever, you decided on Chesterville?

MR VERMEULEN: Yes, but on the information that Lt Hunter gave to us, we moved to Chesterville.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, sorry Ms Patel.

MS PATEL: Thank you Honourable Chairperson. In that regard, let me refer you to Lt Hunter's statement, Honourable Chairperson, that is also in front of you, can we mark that Exhibit C, I think? He says the contrary, if you look at paragraph 3 of his statement, well, let's start with paragraph 2, he says a group of you came to him and he says -

Right, and then in paragraph 3 he states that Nortje, well, he doesn't mention Nortje's name specifically in paragraph 3, but he says the group, meaning you, you in the plural, having come there, requested information from him specifically on a certain Charles Ngcobo. It is not the other way around, it is not a question of Hamilton having provided information generally about the unrest and sending you to Chesterville, it is about your group coming there, requesting specific information about a specific person. What is your comment on that?

MR VERMEULEN: Mr Chair, that information could have come from Willie, that he got it from Mr van Dyk or wherever, but he didn't discuss it with us. I will say that was still his own information that he had.

MS PATEL: But you were present with him during the discussion with Lt Hunter, not so?

MR VERMEULEN: That is correct.

MS PATEL: According to you, those discussions revolved primarily around Lt Hunter explaining to you that Chesterville was a hot-spot in terms of unrest, and not the other way around?

MR VERMEULEN: That is correct, that is why we went to the army base camp, Mr Chair, to find out which place would be a hot-spot.

MS PATEL: Furthermore, well, it is also confirmed in the statements that the certain Charles was in fact a leader of the comrades group at the time and the information was that he was in possession of an AK47 as well as handgrenades? Do you recall this?

MR VERMEULEN: It could have been, I won't dispute it Mr Chair.

MS PATEL: Okay. The weapon, the AK47, it is Mr Nortje who made an application for that to be issued, not so?

MR VERMEULEN: As far as I know, yes Mr Chair.

MS PATEL: Okay, to confirm this Honourable Chairperson, there is in fact another Exhibit before you, that would be Exhibit D, it is an application by Sgt Nortje to the Commander of C-Section.

CHAIRPERSON: Is it a hand-written document?

MS PATEL: It is a hand-written document, it is dated the 03-06-1986.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, we've got that one. Will that be Exhibit D?

MS PATEL: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well.

MS PATEL: Okay, it is an application for the issue of an AK47 and in motivation of this application, Sgt Nortje states in paragraph 2 of the application -

It appears from this paragraph, you will agree with me, that the question of an infiltration had already been decided as early as the 3rd of that month?

MR VERMEULEN: Yes, that could have been, otherwise we wouldn't have come here. The infiltration could have been any place. That is actually why I think we came down to Durban area, Mr Chair.

MS PATEL: All right, and furthermore just to highlight the fact that he notes that it is the infiltration of a group, it seems to me that the only reasonable inference that one can draw from that is that there was information about a specific group that was to be infiltrated.

MR VERMEULEN: I cannot comment on that Mr Chair, it might have been information that Willie had before the time, when he applied for the weapon.

MS PATEL: You will agree thought that it ties in with Lt Hunter's version that it is in fact the group that requested information about a specific person, from him, rather than him providing general information about Chesterville at the time?

MR VERMEULEN: It can be so, yes, Mr Chair.

MS PATEL: Okay.

MR SIBANYONI: Maybe before you move from that Ms Patel, when one reads paragraph 2, one gets also the information that this AK47 was supposed to be used to convince the group about the trustworthiness of the people who had infiltrated them, do you agree?

MR VERMEULEN: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR SIBANYONI: In other words as early as the 3rd of June 1986, it was decided that the AK47 was going to be used to convince the UDF members that the people who were infiltrating them, were comrades as well?

MR VERMEULEN: That is correct Mr Chair.

MR SIBANYONI: That will contradict what we heard yesterday that only when the askaris and Radebe started talking to the UDF members, they suspected that they were not comrades and at that stage, Radebe had to go out, ask for an AK47 from you people to go and pretend that he is a comrade, do you agree?

MR VERMEULEN: I agree Mr Chairman.

MR SIBANYONI: So that will also support Mr Nofomela's evidence that the AK47 was obtained in Pretoria?

MR VERMEULEN: Pretoria at Headquarters, yes, Mr Chairman.

MR SIBANYONI: Okay, thank you Mr Vermeulen.

MS PATEL: Thank you Honourable Chairperson. Just to confirm now that we have the affidavit in front of us, Sgt Nortje says that it is in fact a Shey 77 weapon or firearm, which he says looks like or is similar to an AK47 that was handed over to Sgt Radebe?

MR VERMEULEN: Can I just comment there Mr Chair, this Shey I think there is a spelling fault there, what actually must be just there is a CH77 which means the weapon was made under licence in Czechoslovakia, but it looks exactly the same as an AK47, it shoots the same bullet, it looks exactly the same, there is actually very few discrepancies on the weapon itself, I just think that was a small fault there.

MS PATEL: Oh, okay.

CHAIRPERSON: Where is that?

MS PATEL: It is page 2 of Nortje's statement, paragraph ...

CHAIRPERSON: Which Exhibit?

MS PATEL: B.

CHAIRPERSON: Was it Exhibit B?

MS PATEL: B, sorry.

CHAIRPERSON: And on the second page you say?

MS PATEL: The second page, paragraph 6, Honourable Chairperson, the last line.

CHAIRPERSON: From the top?

MS PATEL: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Number six?

MS PATEL: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Oh, yes. Sorry, yes, we've got that thank you.

MS PATEL: All right, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Vermeulen, you are saying that this weapon is similar to an AK47?

MR VERMEULEN: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: This CH77, is that the reference for that weapon?

MR VERMEULEN: That is correct Mr Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well, sorry Ms Patel.

MS PATEL: Thank you Honourable Chairperson. Are you certain that Sgt Nortje reported to Mr de Kock after the incident?

MR VERMEULEN: Yes Mr Chairman.

MS PATEL: Were you present during the report back?

MR VERMEULEN: Yes Mr Chairman.

MS PATEL: He doesn't say, Sgt Nortje doesn't mention this at all in his statement, in Exhibit B, all he says is that he then made a report to Lt Hunter and then after that, he made a report to Lt van Dyk?

MR VERMEULEN: That is correct Mr Chairman, Mr van Dyk and Col de Kock slept in the same room, so when they came in, both of them woke up and Col de Kock automatically heard what was going on as being the Chief of the unit.

MS PATEL: So are you saying that Mr de Kock just, no - I think I misunderstood your information, correct me if I am wrong, are you saying that Mr de Kock just by the way happened to be in the room where the report back was made to Lt van Dyk?

MR VERMEULEN: He was in his sleeping quarters at the Officers' Mes at C R Swart.

MS PATEL: Who is he now, are you referring to Mr de Kock?

MR VERMEULEN: Mr de Kock.

MS PATEL: Okay.

MR VERMEULEN: And Mr de Kock and Mr van Dyk shared the same room at C R Swart and that is where the report was made to Mr de Kock, Mr Chairman.

MS PATEL: And as far as you are concerned, Lt van Dyk just happened to be in the same sleeping quarters?

MR VERMEULEN: No, they booked in at the same room, it wasn't by chance.

MS PATEL: No, but the intention wasn't to report back to Lt van Dyk, is that what you are saying?

MR VERMEULEN: Yes, that is what I mean.

MS PATEL: All right.

CHAIRPERSON: To whom was the report actually made?

MR VERMEULEN: According to me it was reported to Col de Kock.

CHAIRPERSON: Nortje spoke to Mr de Kock?

MR VERMEULEN: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Where was van Dyk?

MR VERMEULEN: Van Dyk was in the same room, they were together in the same room.

CHAIRPERSON: Was van Dyk sleeping?

MR VERMEULEN: As far as I can remember, it is difficult to say now, but at that stage he was sleeping, they shared the same room.

CHAIRPERSON: Did they wake Mr de Kock up?

MR VERMEULEN: Yes, we first woke up Mr de Kock.

CHAIRPERSON: So you woke up Mr de Kock, not van Dyk?

MR VERMEULEN: Not van Dyk.

CHAIRPERSON: Was van Dyk still sleeping?

MR VERMEULEN: I cannot remember that Mr van Dyk was there when we told Mr de Kock about the shooting, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Ms Patel, sorry.

MS PATEL: Thank you Honourable Chairperson. Sorry, if you will just grant me a moment, I just need to double check something, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MS PATEL: Mr Vermeulen, can you recall whether Sgt Nortje took the weapons away from the askaris after the incident?

MR VERMEULEN: No Mr Chairman, I cannot recall that.

MS PATEL: Okay. From what you can recall, immediately after the incident, the shooting had taken place, you were all under the bridge and you say that Sgt Radebe then came and reported to Nortje that a shooting had taken place and he wasn't certain whether anybody was injured or not and then you all moved off to C R Swart from there, is that correct?

MR VERMEULEN: That is how I recall it, yes Mr Chairman.

MS PATEL: Okay. If I can take you to Nortje's application to us, it is part of the Bundle, it is page 23, paragraph 11, he states here that they, and he is obviously referring to Radebe and the rest -

Now if the shooting had taken place from outside of this room or the shack that it was, and the members had left immediately, how would they have known that five people were shot at, without ...

MR VERMEULEN: I cannot comment on that Mr Chairman, because I wasn't at that stage there.

MS PATEL: But you are certain that all that Radebe said to Mr Nortje was that there was a shoot-out and they don't know?

MR VERMEULEN: As far as I can recall, yes, those were the words Mr Chairman.

MS PATEL: All right, and just, you don't know, you don't have any recollection of Charles Ndaba?

MR VERMEULEN: No Mr Chairman, only when it came up was when I discussed it with Willie the day before yesterday, before we came down, it is the first time that the name came up.

MS PATEL: Because it appears that the Charles Ndaba that he refers to, that Willie refers to in his application to us, is quite possibly a mistake and that it is meant to be Charles Ngcobo, which is the person who is referred to by almost everybody else in the papers before us?

MR VERMEULEN: That can be so Mr Chairman.

MS PATEL: Do you recall whether there was ever a discussion, sometime after this incident, about Aubrey Mogadi having become nervous during the operation and he let his Uzi firearm go off by mistake and that is what started the skirmish?

MR VERMEULEN: No Mr Chairman, not that I can recall.

MS PATEL: Do you recall whether Aubrey Mogadi would have had an Uzi weapon with him?

MR VERMEULEN: No Mr Chairman, I cannot say.

MS PATEL: Sorry, you cannot say whether he would or wouldn't have?

MR VERMEULEN: No, I cannot say which weapon he had at that stage when the shooting commenced.

MS PATEL: Okay. Would askaris generally be issued with Uzi weapons, from your knowledge?

MR VERMEULEN: It all depends on what type of operation - they could have been issued with anything. But Aubrey wasn't an askari, he was a member of the Force.

MS PATEL: Oh, all right, okay. Would the normal member of the Force, would he have been issued with an Uzi weapon?

MR VERMEULEN: Yes Mr Chairman.

MS PATEL: As part of his normal duties?

MR VERMEULEN: No, not normal duties, but it is normal practice in our unit that every vehicle gets a certain weaponry for certain operations, because we did urban terrorism and also out in the "platteland", so each bus would have been issued a certain type of weapons to comply with the operation that is on the go, Mr Chairman.

MS PATEL: Where would these weapons come from, would it have been brought with from Vlakplaas or would you have gotten them in Durban?

MR VERMEULEN: That would have been a Vlakplaas issue, Mr Chairman.

MS PATEL: And who would have arranged that, to whom would an application have to be made for the issue of those other weapons?

MR VERMEULEN: No, there was no application to be made because that was a standard issue to every bus, Mr Chairman.

MS PATEL: By every bus, you mean every vehicle that departs?

MR VERMEULEN: Every kombi.

MS PATEL: Every kombi that departs?

MR VERMEULEN: Yes, the driver would have been responsible for the weapons and ammunition, Mr Chairman.

MS PATEL: Okay. Just generally, what other types of weapons would have been issued?

MR VERMEULEN: It could have been a shotgun, it could have been Uzi's, it could have been grenades, it could have been smoke-grenades, it could have been teargas.

MS PATEL: And would that type of weaponry be taken with if the intention is just an infiltration?

MR VERMEULEN: It would always be in the vehicle Mr Chairman.

MS PATEL: Oh, regardless of the nature of the operation, that is standard issue that you take with when you leave Vlakplaas, is that what you are saying?

MR VERMEULEN: That is correct, yes Mr Chairman.

MS PATEL: Would those weapons be kept in the vehicle at all times?

MR VERMEULEN: Yes Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: An Uzi, is this a so-called terrorist weapon?

MR VERMEULEN: No Mr Chairman, it is a South African standard issue weapon, it is a standard issue at the police and the army, it is a 9mm weapon.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Ms Patel?

MS PATEL: Thank you Honourable Chairperson. You don't know what weapons the rest of the group that went into the infiltration, what weapons they had in their possession?

MR VERMEULEN: If I may speculate, it will be their own ...

MS PATEL: No, I don't want you to speculate.

MR VERMEULEN: The weapons that they would have had with them, would have been their issued SAP weapons, Mr Chairman.

MS PATEL: Okay. And the standard issue would be what, a 9mm?

MR VERMEULEN: A 9mm Baretta or a 9mm P38.

MS PATEL: P38?

MR VERMEULEN: That is correct, Walter P38.

MS PATEL: Okay, can I - in this operation, who would have been in control of the weapons for the van that you were in at the bridge? Would it be Willie?

MR VERMEULEN: Willie Nortje, yes Mr Chairman.

MS PATEL: Okay, and the other van, or the other - there were two other vehicles?

MR VERMEULEN: The kombi would have been Simon Radebe.

MS PATEL: Would he have been in charge?

MR VERMEULEN: Because his vehicle, he was in charge of his vehicle and he would have been in charge of the weapons as well.

MS PATEL: Okay, and there was one more vehicle on the scene. You said there were three vehicles that departed?

MR VERMEULEN: The third one is, I have been thinking Mr Chairman, I can't place it properly. I cannot recall exactly what happened to that vehicle.

MS PATEL: Are you saying it might not have been there at all?

MR VERMEULEN: I would actually rather, yes, because I have been thinking and I can only recall one vehicle.

MS PATEL: Okay. This operation took place in the early hours of the morning?

MR VERMEULEN: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MS PATEL: You were given instructions by, your group was given instructions to leave the Durban area that very day?

MR VERMEULEN: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MS PATEL: Did Willie and Sgt Radebe depart with you?

MR VERMEULEN: I cannot recall that Mr Chairman.

MS PATEL: Do you know whether they departed at all?

MR VERMEULEN: I am quite sure they departed, but they did not depart with me, I think I left in a different vehicle, Mr Chairman.

MS PATEL: As far as you can recall, was there any reason given for your departure?

MR VERMEULEN: Not as far as I can recall Mr Chairman.

MS PATEL: Did you not find it strange that you came there to assist in tracing persons who had killed policemen and here after a very short stay, after one aborted infiltration, you are asked to leave the area, did you not find that strange?

MR VERMEULEN: No, it is not strange Mr Chairman, that happened on a regular basis.

CHAIRPERSON: Also where the members acted in self-defence?

MR VERMEULEN: I don't think that would have been the case, but as I have been asked, it was not strange that you were only deployed for one day and then you were removed right to the other side of the earth, that was not strange at that time.

CHAIRPERSON: But that was a flash point, Chesterville was a flash point according to all indications, the members infiltrated, they act in self-defence, that is legitimate and justified, and then that was the end of the operation and then you just give up on Chesterville, you don't even try to find out anything more at Chesterville, who was responsible for this flash point? Was that a normal procedure?

MR VERMEULEN: This was nothing extraordinary. I think a week or two weeks before the time, we were also in Durban and we also stayed for a day or two and we returned, that was not strange at all.

CHAIRPERSON: So you weren't worried about the shooting?

MR VERMEULEN: No Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: That was ordinary practice to go in, and then you returned home?

MR VERMEULEN: The next day we went to a different place, I think some people went to the border of Swaziland the next day, if I can remember correctly.

CHAIRPERSON: There was no attempt to get away from the shooting incident, to keep your members out of trouble?

MR VERMEULEN: No, there was no problems experienced in that regard.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Ms Patel?

MS PATEL: If it in fact was the case that there was a need to get your members out of the area, perhaps because or possibly because the operation had gone wrong and there wasn't in fact a question of self-defence, would you in your position in your rank at Vlakplaas, during this operation, have been informed that this is why we need to leave the area or would that have gone to, would Willie Nortje and Paul van Dyk have been informed of that, would you just have been given instructions to leave and not known why?

MR VERMEULEN: Yes, I think that will be like it would have been.

MS PATEL: Okay and then just finally one aspect, you say that Sgt Radebe would have been in control of the weapons in that vehicle, why would he then have to come to Willie Nortje for a weapon to prove his legend, would he not have had his own arsenal of weapons that he could have used?

MR VERMEULEN: Not like AK47s, no Mr Chairman.

MS PATEL: All right, thank you Honourable Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Ms Patel. Mr Vermeulen, in the light of the fact that the members acted in self-defence, did you then immediately return to Chesterville and try and arrest the person who had attacked the members?

MR VERMEULEN: No Mr Chairperson, we did not go back there.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Does the panel have any questions?

MR SIBANYONI: Mr Vermeulen, initially I was under the impression that apart from the car in which you were travelling, there was the kombi which was driven by Nofomela as well as another car or two additional cars, was that not the case?

MR VERMEULEN: No Mr Chairman. It was just our vehicle that Willie Nortje was in charge of and then the other vehicle of Sgt Radebe. That is as far as I can recall.

MR SIBANYONI: You were travelling in the vehicle in which Nortje was in charge?

MR VERMEULEN: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR SIBANYONI: Was Nortje the driver?

MR VERMEULEN: I think so yes, because I think he knew the area better, yes, so he was the driver Mr Chairman.

MR SIBANYONI: Who else was in that vehicle?

MR VERMEULEN: It was my, myself, McCarter and Bosch.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Sibanyoni. Mr Cornelius, any re-examination?

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR CORNELIUS: Thank you Mr Chairperson. Mr Vermeulen, if I can refer you to Exhibit B, Nortje's statement then we notice that just after the shooting he says that -

MR VERMEULEN: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: So just after the shooting, this incident had been reported to the police?

MR VERMEULEN: This is correct Mr Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: And the normal investigation then followed?

MR VERMEULEN: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: And the police could then affect arrests on the people who had committed these offences if they deemed it necessary?

MR VERMEULEN: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: I want to refer you to Exhibit D that is today for the first time come under our attention, if one looks at Exhibit D, it would appear as if proper authorisation had been asked for this AK47 rifle?

MR VERMEULEN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: And at sight value it would appear as if you did not necessarily, were in illegal possession of a firearm?

MR VERMEULEN: This is correct Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: This document, Exhibit D, is very interesting in this aspect that it is a request that was made by W A. Nortje to Security Headquarters in Pretoria, so this weapon was not drawn at Vlakplaas? If one looks at the top it says "C-Section Security Headquarters, Pretoria"?

MR VERMEULEN: This is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: And if one goes through the document, then in two paragraphs, paragraph 1 says -

MR VERMEULEN: This is correct Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: And then this also supports the period of the infiltration being 3 June to the 30th of June?

MR VERMEULEN: This is correct Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: So on sight value of this document, this AK was then drawn for a period and not necessarily for one operation or one specific date?

MR VERMEULEN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: And this document also supports that it was a show-piece, something for credibility?

MR VERMEULEN: This is correct Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: And interestingly I note that it was approved by a certain Brig Schoon, this had to be Brig Schoon who was at that stage in control of Security in Pretoria?

MR VERMEULEN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: So this AK47 was legitimately drawn from the police stores?

MR VERMEULEN: This is correct Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: If a clandestine, covert operation had happened, would you imagine that such documentation would be available, would you expect it to be available and that approval would be sought from Headquarters?

MR VERMEULEN: No Mr Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: And then one would rather expect that the weapon would be drawn from Vlakplaas' stores where there would be no record and no documents?

MR VERMEULEN: This is correct Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: And this document, handed in by Ms Patel this morning, this comes from the police dockets, is that correct?

MR VERMEULEN: I think so yes Mr Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: In other words this document if one looks at Cato Manor, CR27/6/86, then this was probably handed in at the inquest?

MR VERMEULEN: It could be the case Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: So if there was anything irregular concerning this AK, then we would have had some action since 1986?

MR VERMEULEN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: And then questions had been asked about the reasons why Vlakplaas had gotten involved? It is normal that a request be made by Security at Durban for instance for Vlakplaas' assistance?

MR VERMEULEN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: According to your knowledge, this was to infiltrate, to get information and then I would assume that this information would be conveyed to Col de Kock and also the overhead operator and also the Security Branch?

MR VERMEULEN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: I will now refer you to the Supplementary Bundle - Eugene de Kock and this had been decided Mr Chairperson, that this background study of Vlakplaas would be at your disposal along with the amnesty hearings and this is Exhibit N, this was a Bundle compiled by my learned friend, Mr Schalk Hugo, who handed it in with Justice Wilson.

ADV DE JAGER: Would this be the same one that C had been at the previous hearing?

MR CORNELIUS: This is correct Chairperson. This had been Exhibit C in the previous occasion, I just refer you to two passages. If you can just allow me a moment, from the report of Gen Coetzee, it appears and I will read on page 9 Chairperson, paragraph 2.1.6 -

That this is so appears from a follow up directive in January 1982, where the Commanders of the specific Security Branches who had to accept responsibility and also the actions of this unit and also for the area in which they were in command, were asked not to use junior officials and the statement I want to make to you Mr Vermeulen is, is it correct that this Unit Commander of these Security Units who asked for Vlakplaas' services, were responsible for actions in their area?

MR VERMEULEN: This is correct Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: Would they then have expected that the information coming from this infiltration, would be discussed with the Security Commander?

MR VERMEULEN: This is correct Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: I think I have put it in your evidence-in-chief, you worked on a need to know basis, is that correct?

MR VERMEULEN: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: Thank you Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Cornelius. Mr Vermeulen, thank you, you are excused.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Cornelius?

MR CORNELIUS: Thank you Mr Chairperson, I have no further witnesses that I want to call, this would then be the application of Mr Vermeulen. I would then argue about what I am applying for exactly, in the light of Exhibit D, that has just come under our attention, thank you Chairperson.

ADV DE JAGER: Could you please tell us what you are applying for?

MR CORNELIUS: I really do not have a base any more, because in this document it is clear that this was a legitimate possession of this weapon, with the approval of Security Headquarters and this took the illegality of it away.

ADV DE JAGER: Do you want us to issue a licence for it now?

MR CORNELIUS: No, thank you. I understand that this is the basis of my application, that we were in irregular possession, but this document denies it.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you say that you want to argue this? Mr Hugo, do you have any witnesses?

MR HUGO: Yes, thank you Mr Chairperson. With your permission I will call Mr Eugene Alexander de Kock as a witness. May I ask that he be sworn in.

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, please be seated. Mr Hugo?

EXAMINATION BY MR HUGO: Thank you Mr Chairperson. Mr Chairperson, an aspect that I would just first like to clear up is the document that I referred to yesterday, this would be Exhibit

A, is the statement of Mr Dlamini and you will recall this is the person who had said that they had arrived there with a kombi. I was a little bit unreasonable with Mr Nofomela in this aspect that I just accepted that it was the case, when this incident took place, when the people were shot and Mr Dlamini does say on page 3, I saw that this morning -

and then he continues and he tells the story. But from this document it would appear that he just got the date wrong, but the rest of the incident, he describes exactly as it happened and I just was a little bit unreasonable with Mr Nofomela yesterday. I don't think it makes any difference to the point that is addressed here, but I want to please put this on record just for completeness sake.

CHAIRPERSON: We will note it like this.

MR HUGO: Mr de Kock, you have heard the evidence and you have also had insight into some of the documents, can we please start at the beginning, you at the stage when this incident happened, you were Commander of Vlakplaas for about one year, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HUGO: You had received information or you had a request that your contingency, the Vlakplaas contingency, should be sent down to Durban, could you please tell us how it happened that Vlakplaas got involved with an operation or operations in Durban during the period that we are talking about now?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, before this occasion, on several occasions we had been working in Durban, basically on a monthly basis and we also sent a group of people here. With this specific incident with our deploying, I received an order from Brig Schoon one morning very early, that the whole unit without exception white and black, had to go to Durban as soon as possible, immediately, and it was as a result of a further two black Security policemen I think, both of them were Warrant Officers, and the Counter-Terrorism section of Taylor, who had been killed, and I think in a question of seven to fourteen days, three of his people had been killed or shot dead in two separate incidents.

MR HUGO: Can I please refer you, maybe this will help us to move through the evidence quicker, could you please look at Exhibit D?

MR DE KOCK: I have it Chairperson.

MR HUGO: You will see that this is an application that had been made for the issuing of an AK47 rifle, this was done by Nortje and it was approved by Brig Schoon, is this more or less the date on which you had received the request to come down to Durban?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson.

MR HUGO: And did you have knowledge of the application for this AK47 rifle?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, Mr Nortje made a proposal to me that if we want to infiltrate someone, that we have to prepare for this and be prepared for this and that we had to get an AK47 to take along, that he can take along. As a result of the hurry that we were in, it wasn't typed out, I said write out an application. I went along with him to Brig Schoon, Brig Schoon approved it and myself and Sgt Nortje went down to Capt Drury at Security Headquarters on the 6th floor and he was in command of the stores and an AK47 had been drawn there, from Security Headquarters' weapon store where there was about 150 to 200 AKs with magazines and ammunition.

MR HUGO: Very well, the weapon had then been gotten hold of, and was it put in your vehicle or was it left in the possession of Mr Nortje?

MR DE KOCK: It was left in the possession of Mr Nortje.

MR HUGO: I accept that the largest part or everyone at Vlakplaas, shortly afterwards departed to Durban?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, they departed as soon as they were ready and they had gotten their stuff together.

MR HUGO: At what stage did you depart yourself?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I departed later on in that day, I drove on my own, because I had to finish all the administration, the people had to be booked out, reports had to be kept up to date and I departed later. Quite a lot later, I think I only arrived here that evening late.

MR HUGO: You heard Mr Nofomela's evidence and he said that he had been your driver, and that he drove down with you to Durban, what do you say about this?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no, on occasion I did drive on my own and in this case I cannot remember at all that Mr Nofomela had been with me. I had to get as many as possible black members down specifically because the white people could not go into the black areas, they do not speak the language, they are white.

MR HUGO: Very well, and when you arrived in Durban, did you then go and report at the sleeping quarters at the C R Swart police station?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, I did. I made a request that they had to organise a place for me, I cannot remember who I got of my people, they told me that a room had been organised for me in the Officers' quarters and I cannot remember, I did contact Lt van Dyk or I think so, and at a stage, some of the people had already been deployed. As they arrived here, they were deployed and others were being deployed at that stage.

MR HUGO: Can I just ask you, if we just quickly look at Exhibit D again, the date of the request for this AK47 was the 3rd of June, if you have to put a date on the time of arrival in Durban, when more or less do you think, did you arrive in Durban?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I cannot say. I have no independent memory of this. I really cannot tell you.

MR HUGO: Nevertheless you had then arrived in Durban and did you then occupy yourself with the organising and the division of certain askari groups and also other members of Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, when I arrived here, some of the members had already been deployed, they apparently just loaded their stuff off, they had already been deployed and others were being deployed as far as I can remember.

MR HUGO: What was your function?

MR DE KOCK: Can you please repeat?

MR HUGO: What was your function when you arrived here and you found that the deployment had already been done?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I was the Overall Commander. Lt van Dyk was in command up to that point, I was the Overall Commander and naturally this would be a management function.

MR HUGO: What was your interpretation of the mandate that had been given to the different groups? The mandate that they had to execute and the functions that they had to execute?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, there was an unknown terrorist and as was mentioned, an ANC terrorist group that was operating, they were unknown. There were no particulars at that point that was available about them that I had received at that point. They had to be searched for. There were no specific information that could pinpoint them in a specific area or a house or a suburb.

MR HUGO: Is it then correct that a whole lot of discretion had been left over to the groups to decide for themselves where these flashpoints would be and then to try to almost on a haphazard way, try and obtain information?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, yes, because we did not come from this area, proposals would have come from the Durban Security Branch, specifically from Col Taylor who was part of Counter-Terrorism. This was as a result of I can almost say looking for a needle in a haystack. There as I said, was not a specific area that had been pinpointed and this would have been a case of information handled as you received the information on the ground and then the people who were in command there, would then decide how would be continue from here.

MR HUGO: If we accept that the application for the AK47 was done on the 3rd of June, and this incident had taken place on the 20th of June, do you have any recollection of what happened in this time? This would be between the 3rd of June and the 20th of June?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the people would have continued their search. I believe that we continued to search until we got information. You do not stop, you continue, you keep on deploying people in different areas, you do roadblocks, moving roadblocks, you cover the train stations, the bus stations, the taxi stands, you go on recruiting sources and you attempt to gain the necessary information to find the people that you were there for.

MR HUGO: We have heard lots of evidence about the ways in which the askaris had been deployed, is it correct that the askaris served under a group leader, normally this would be a black police officer or a black member of the Force, that would then have a couple of askaris under him and that they would then be operating in teams in different areas?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, this is correct.

MR HUGO: Would you please tell us with which weaponry were the askaris issued and also the group leader who was a member of the Force, in the normal course of events.

MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairperson, if I can put it this way, your askari or your former ANC or PAC member had his service pistol which was a P38, it was a 9mm revolver or a Baretta 9mm. The female staff, or the female staff in the Force would have been white or black, was issued with a .32 Walter pistol because of the fact that their hands were smaller and they had a smaller handgrip and then your group leaders and some of the askaris, of your senior people, were issued with an Uzi or HMK, a sub-machine gun. Every vehicle that the group leader was responsible for, had a bag, a sail bag and normally this had two R1s with two magazines, two Browning rifles and SSG ammunition and then Uzi's had also been given to them, two Uzi's with four or five magazines each, two sets of handcuffs, between three and four feetcuffs, smoke teargas grenades had been given to them and then also flares and then we also gave them smoke grenades of different colours, if it would be necessary to call in the helicopter. This bag with all this equipment in , the section leader was in charge of it, if he came back to Vlakplaas, then the weapons would be cleaned and it would be locked up in his personal safe that was issued to him at Vlakplaas.

MR HUGO: And this would then be so that every group leader had the use of mostly a kombi or one of these mini-buses?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HUGO: The evening of this incident and we know that, it is common cause that it was the 20th of June, did you know that Messrs Nortje and his team were departing to execute an operation?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I accept it that I knew. I cannot remember this far back, but I accept that I knew.

MR HUGO: What had your perception been of the aim of this operation?

MR DE KOCK: They went in to go and look for terrorists Chairperson.

MR HUGO: Were there other groups during this evening that had also departed to go and look for terrorists themselves?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HUGO: You remained at C R Swart in the Officers' quarters?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HUGO: At some stage, did you go to sleep?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I did.

MR HUGO: What happened then?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the morning early I was woken up, I cannot remember what the time was, it was early in the morning. Nortje was there, Vermeulen was there and van Dyk was with them. Nortje told me that our people had been involved in a shooting, people had been killed, not of my people but other people had been shot. I cannot remember if he gave me a number, he couldn't tell me how many people had been wounded and that it was in the Chesterville area.

MR HUGO: What was your reaction?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I put on my clothes and I am not sure whether I first went to Chesterville or went into that area or if I went to the nearest police station there, but I did contact Col Taylor because he, on his turn, had to report to the Division Head at Durban of the Security Branch. I think, I am not sure of this, I think I found him at the police station from where Nortje and them had received the information. We did wait because they had to send people for us, I think some of the service men of the army had gone with us to go and secure the area. Chesterville at that point was also referred to as a sort of liberated area, that belonged to the comrades. I think that a group of the local Investigation Branch had also come along.

MR HUGO: And eventually you visited the scene yourself?

MR DE KOCK: This is correct.

MR HUGO: And you also did enquiries with the men regarding exactly what happened?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, after I had visited the scene, I did do enquiries with them and I was given explanations, but I did not pursue this, the local branch, Inspectors' Branch cordoned off the area and they investigated and the investigation went its normal way.

MR HUGO: I don't want you to explain to us what they told you, but you were satisfied from the explanations that you found and that you got, that this was a legitimate operation and that you could leave it in the hands of the police to investigate it further?

MR DE KOCK: This is correct Chairperson.

MR HUGO: In this way, after this incident happened, an inquest was also held where extensive evidence had been led and a finding had been made that your people could not be held responsible for this event having happened?

MR DE KOCK: This is correct Chairperson.

MR HUGO: Did you, yourself, testify in this inquest?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson.

MR HUGO: And the evidence was the same as you are giving today?

MR DE KOCK: This is correct Chairperson.

MR HUGO: Mr de Kock, then it is also so that you have applied for many incidents, you applied for amnesty for many incidents, indeed your amnesty application encompasses about more than 1000 pages, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HUGO: And in this way, you were consulted with for hours by me with the eye on setting up this amnesty application?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HUGO: And both myself and you had been properly aware of the Chesterville incident and certain rumours that were being spread?

MR DE KOCK: This is correct Chairperson.

MR HUGO: And it is also correct that we had spent hours going through documents and that you of your own accord, have decided not to apply for amnesty for this incident, is this correct?

MR DE KOCK: This is correct Chairperson.

MR HUGO: And for one very simple reason and this is that you had been convinced of it that you had not committed an offence?

MR DE KOCK: This is correct Chairperson.

MR HUGO: If you had any doubt that an offence had been committed, then it would have been the easiest thing for you in the world, to just add this to your amnesty application?

MR DE KOCK: It would have been no problem at all Chairperson.

MR HUGO: One last aspect, after this event had happened, how quickly afterwards were Vlakplaas asked or requested to leave the Durban area?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I think this would have been a day or two afterwards. It was not a question of us running away from the area. I think I still stayed behind for I think a week with a small group of askaris and the rest of the people deployed in the area of Piet Retief, against the North-Natal/Swaziland border and also at the Paulpietersburg/Vryburg area where they were working. I have a vague recollection of this, but I think this is what happened. I had still been here for about a week with about six to eight people, as I said.

MR HUGO: And then just to return to the beginning, if one hypothetically speaking accepts that Vlakplaas had already decided in Pretoria to come and kill people, then it would have been the easiest thing for you to take one of the illegal weapons that were in your possession at Vlakplaas or one or more of these weapons, to take this along to the operation and no one would have known about that?

MR DE KOCK: We could have brought ten AKs, we could have used all the ammunition, we could have withdrawn from the area and could have gone to another place and it wouldn't have been a problem.

MR HUGO: Would you then get an AK on a legitimate basis just because you wanted to use it as a show-piece?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, this AK was the property of Security Headquarters, it came from their stores.

MR HUGO: Thank you Chairperson, we have no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Hugo. Mr Ramawele, have you got any questions?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR RAMAWELE: Yes Mr Chairman, I do have questions. I am going to start to refer the hearing to the Supplementary Bundle - Eugene de Kock, it is the Bundle which was referred to by Mr Cornelius, thank you. I refer to page 14. Mr de Kock, here in your affidavit you say, you can just confirm if this is true, you say -

MR DE KOCK: Yes Mr Chairman.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, yes.

MR RAMAWELE: Furthermore you say -

MR DE KOCK: That is correct yes.

MR RAMAWELE: Then further on you say -

Later on you say -

Is that so?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR RAMAWELE: You heard yesterday, it was suggested to Nofomela that you could have, you might have been wishing to protect him when you said that, or you may have wanted to protect him, you know, such a suggestion was made, did you hear that?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, that is correct.

MR RAMAWELE: In the light of what I have just read to you and also - in the light of what I have just read to you, do you think really that a member of C1, of Vlakplaas, would be protected in the sense that you would say he should not get into a situation where he has to fight the so-called terrorists?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, certain people had to be used for certain tasks. Certain people were more suitable for specific tasks, some people were not suited for cross-border operations for example and then you would have used people who were more suited.

MR RAMAWELE: In this instance I am talking about Mr Nofomela, would you say that Mr Nofomela was not, was a person who had to be protected from getting into Chesterville?

MR DE KOCK: No, he was not protected.

MR RAMAWELE: In other words what you are saying is that Mr Nofomela was quite able and - was quite able to get into Chesterville and carry out the instructions if he was instructed?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, I mean - Nofomela when I arrived in Vlakplaas in 1983, had already been a murderer.

MR RAMAWELE: Why do you say that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, when I arrived there in 1983, they had already told me about the Griffiths Mxenge situation and he was also involved in the shooting at Swaziland.

MR RAMAWELE: Okay. Now, why did you go to Durban?

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Ramawele, I assume you are moving to another point now? I am going to take the adjournment and then you can deal with the new point when we come back.

MR RAMAWELE: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: We will reconvene at half past eleven.

ON RESUMPTION:

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Ramawele?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR RAMAWELE: (continued) Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr de Kock, was it the whole of Vlakplaas that went to Durban on this particular mission?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Mr Chairman.

MR RAMAWELE: Why was it the whole of Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: Because that was the instruction from Brig Schoon.

MR RAMAWELE: Did he tell you why was the whole of Vlakplaas supposed to go to Durban?

MR DE KOCK: Because we had to trace these terrorists which killed the policemen.

MR RAMAWELE: So are you telling the hearing that the purpose of your visit to Durban was to trace the people who killed the police officers?

MR DE KOCK: That was to trace the terrorists, to arrest these people.

MR RAMAWELE: After tracing them, you would then arrest them?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson.

MR RAMAWELE: Are you saying after arresting them, obviously then they have to appear in court?

MR DE KOCK: Not necessarily Chairperson, to arrest could also mean to kill them and it did not necessarily mean that they would appear in court, as a lot of the askaris, they decided after some time to turn to the police and provided a service to the police. That was the situation ... (no interpretation)

MR RAMAWELE: How long were you based at Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: From 1983 Chairperson.

MR RAMAWELE: Until when?

MR DE KOCK: Until 1993 Chairperson.

MR RAMAWELE: Have you ever appeared in court to testify about whatever you have done in respect of the activities at Vlakplaas, I mean at the time when you were still in charge of Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, I appeared in court at various instances.

MR RAMAWELE: I see. Now, the sole purpose of going to Durban, was to trace the so-called terrorists who killed police officers?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR RAMAWELE: You were in charge of the operation? You were in charge of the operation?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR RAMAWELE: And no one else?

MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairman, yes, I had other officers, I worked under the control of the Divisional Commander of Port Natal, I am not sure, but I think it was Brig Coetzee.

MR RAMAWELE: Before you went to Durban, were there any weapons issued to the members of Vlakplaas who went to Durban?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, every member had his own weapon, he was responsible for his own weapon, it was a permanent issue. In certain circumstances, with certain askaris, we take their weapons back when they return and we issue it again when they go out again.

MR RAMAWELE: So most of these weapons were weapons which were actually police weapons, which were in the possession of the members of Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: Those were official issues, yes.

MR RAMAWELE: Is it further correct that you went to Durban also to do an infiltration into the activities of the UDF?

MR DE KOCK: No Mr Chairman.

MR RAMAWELE: Are you telling the hearing that you did not go to Durban to infiltrate the comrades or the UDF, you never went there to make any infiltration?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, we came back to trace the terrorists. If it seemed later that we had to infiltrate an area or organisation, or a specific group, or a specific instance, based on the information on grassroots level, we would have done that.

MR RAMAWELE: But when you left for Durban, your primary aim was actually to trace down the so-called terrorists who killed two police officers?

MR DE KOCK: The purpose was to trace these people, that was not the primary purpose, it was a purpose.

MR RAMAWELE: What was the primary purpose of going to Durban?

MR DE KOCK: The objective was to trace terrorists who were responsible for killing the policemen.

MR RAMAWELE: As a result of that then your group went to Durban and you came later on?

MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairman, yes, if I can remember correctly, I can be wrong, but as far as I can recollect, I arrived there the same day, but later that day.

MR RAMAWELE: And you say you were alone?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson.

MR RAMAWELE: In your evidence-in-chief you said that as far as your recollection goes, Mr Nofomela was not with you?

MR DE KOCK: No Mr Chairperson.

MR RAMAWELE: In other words you are not saying it, you are not very certain that Mr Nofomela was not with you, you are actually saying that as far as you can recollect, he was not with you, he could have been with you?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I am not going to dispute that, but I doubt that, I cannot recollect that whatsoever. I could just as well have said somebody else was with me, but as far as I can remember, I was all alone.

MR RAMAWELE: And then when you arrived at Durban, you say that some of the members, some of the members had already been deployed at various places?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, these people had already been deployed.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr Ramawele, Mr de Kock, did Mr Nofomela act as a driver for you?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, when I was not the Commanding Officer, he acted as my driver, between 1983 and 1985, before I became Commanding Officer, he and other people were my drivers.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Sorry Mr Ramawele.

MR RAMAWELE: Thank you Mr Chairman. You say that you agree that this AK47 weapon was actually a weapon that was lawfully obtained from Head Office?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, yes.

MR RAMAWELE: Is it true that at Vlakplaas, there were various AK47 assault rifles?

MR DE KOCK: There were various types of weapons amongst others, AK47s.

MR RAMAWELE: You could have taken one of them to go to Durban?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson.

MR RAMAWELE: What I mean is, if you wanted to take one of them, you could have done so?

MR DE KOCK: If it was a clandestine operation Mr Chairman, I could have taken weapons from Vlakplaas. This was not a clandestine operation and we asked for an AK47 from Headquarters.

MR RAMAWELE: Why do you say this was not a clandestine operation?

MR DE KOCK: This is not an operation where we drive down, shoot people and disappear as happened at various instances, I refer to Botswana, Swaziland, Lesotho, the handgrenades in kwaThema etc.

MR RAMAWELE: So this was an operation where you were looking for the murderous people who had committed an offence and you were just going to trace them and arrest them and come back?

MR DE KOCK: Not necessarily that we would return, there could have been information to follow up.

MR RAMAWELE: Because at that time, the Durban area, they mentioned Chesterville areas, were actually very, very flashpoints at the time?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Mr Chairman, those were areas where there was a struggle between the police and the comrades.

MR RAMAWELE: If you say that although you were looking, you were going to trace the killers of the police officers, you could at the same time have followed some other information, that means if you got some other information, you could also further on infiltrate you know, the comrades?

MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairman, yes, if there was such information or the Security Branch at Durban had such information, and they requested us for this information or if it was beneficial to follow up the information immediately, I think we could have done that.

MR RAMAWELE: And as a Commander of Vlakplaas, you had to be at all times ready to undertake any operation like for instance if you follow up any information, you have to be in a position to do that, you have to be prepared to do that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, yes, as long as you were able to do it.

MR RAMAWELE: According to your testimony you say that the weapons that were in the possession of the members, were the police weapons, there were no illegal weapons in the possession of the members?

MR DE KOCK: No Mr Chairman.

MR RAMAWELE: Now, if there was, if a situation arose where you had to follow information and infiltrate, you wouldn't have been able to do so because you didn't have you know, you didn't have illegal weapons which could have convinced the comrades that you are you know, some of your members, either UDF or the ANC members?

MR DE KOCK: We only had the AK and the askaris themselves, based on their background and their training, they could speak the language, that was the language which was used by ANC members in camps and they knew the descriptions of the camps, they knew certain members, their families, etc.

MR RAMAWELE: The police officers who went to Durban, did they all have their identity cards, police identity cards?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Mr Chairperson.

MR RAMAWELE: Did they carry their identity cards with them in their body, in their possession?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Mr Chairman.

MR RAMAWELE: How many kombis, how many Vlakplaas kombis were used by the members to go to Durban?

MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairman, all the kombis we had there and all which were allocated to group leaders, came down to Durban, and all motor cars and other vehicles which we had.

MR RAMAWELE: How many kombis were there?

MR DE KOCK: I cannot remember.

MR RAMAWELE: Is it not something which was quite well known among the UDF activists and the ANC activists, that the police, the Security Police are fond of using the kombis?

MR DE KOCK: I don't know Mr Chairman.

MR RAMAWELE: The informers never told you that?

MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairman, there were many more taxi's which were used as kombis.

MR RAMAWELE: You arrived in Durban and when you arrived in Durban, the decision to go to Chesterville, you were not involved in that?

MR DE KOCK: I can't remember that.

MR RAMAWELE: What do you remember about when you arrived in Durban, what do you remember about something that you had to do about the flashpoints and the killing of the police officers, what do you remember which you had to do, because you cannot all the time have been sleeping?

MR DE KOCK: No Mr Chairman, I did not sleep all the time, one has to sleep at some or other stage. The information which we obtained came from the Security Branch, I cannot remember exactly what that was. I cannot remember, the deployment would have been based on their demand of the Security Police, they asked Headquarters to send the whole contingent from Vlakplaas, and from there, they would take the initiative.

MR RAMAWELE: What I am referring to is after your arrival in Durban, already there were other members who were there, after you had arrived in Durban, now you are there, it is a flashpoint, Security Police officers have been killed, what do you remember which you had to do about this incident, what do you remember which you had to do about the killing of the police officers or the giving of instructions to any of those people, to go anywhere, what do you remember after arriving in Durban, they are there, they are deployed, what do you remember?

MR DE KOCK: We were looking for ANC terrorists, we were busy with counter-insurgents.

MR RAMAWELE: Did you instruct any group to go anywhere and search for the killers?

MR DE KOCK: I could have, yes.

MR RAMAWELE: Did you instruct any group to go and infiltrate the local activists?

MR DE KOCK: That is possible, yes.

MR RAMAWELE: Does it mean that this could actually also include the Chesterville incident?

MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairman, probably yes, I cannot remember that however. That request would have come from the Security Branch themselves, as they gather information and spread the information.

MR RAMAWELE: If you say the Security Branch, which one are you referring to?

MR DE KOCK: The Security Branch at the C R Swart.

MR RAMAWELE: You see Vermeulen say that they actually got information from the army about the flashpoints? Does it make sense to you?

MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairman, no, I was listening to him and if I understood him correctly, that was after they went had gone to the police station, they got the information there, the army did not approach us at C R Swart.

MR RAMAWELE: Which police station are you talking about?

MR DE KOCK: C R Swart.

MR RAMAWELE: You are saying that they must have spoken to the Security Police at C R Swart?

MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairman, yes, those were the people who requested us and the instructions would have come from them.

MR RAMAWELE: But you are not able to say that as a fact, that indeed the Security Police at C R Swart told us about you know, which places are the flashpoints, you yourself, you cannot say that they said so?

MR DE KOCK: No Mr Chairman, but they would have done that, we are not familiar with Durban and they would have had specific requests or objectives, things they wanted to achieve.

MR RAMAWELE: But as the Overall Commander of the operation, is it not that very strange that you are not able to say that the Security Police at C R Swart told us that the flashpoints are at X, Y, Z?

MR DE KOCK: I said that they could have done that, I can't remember that. I accept that they did that.

MR RAMAWELE: You also are saying that you were satisfied that in fact the Radebe's group were acting in self-defence?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Mr Chairperson.

MR RAMAWELE: And after how long after the shooting did the Vlakplaas contingent go back to Pretoria?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I don't know, I don't think that we went back to Pretoria immediately. I remained there a week longer, myself and some askaris. Some of the others, and I have already said, as far as I can remember, I can vaguely remember that we deployed to the Pongola/Piet Retief/Vryheid/Paulpietersburg, etc. I think it was about two or three days after this incident.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr de Kock, these askaris and the members involved in the shooting incident, what was their situation? Were those the people who left or did they remain behind with you?

MR DE KOCK: No Mr Chairman, I have the idea that they also remained behind in Durban.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr Ramawele.

MR RAMAWELE: Thank you Mr Chairman. The killers of the police officers, did you know their names?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, they could have provided us with the names, I am not sure. I cannot remember whether they gave us the names.

MR RAMAWELE: But Mr de Kock, the whole contingent of Vlakplaas goes to Durban to look for the killers of the police officers and you are telling this hearing that you don't remember whether you had the names?

MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairman, I cannot remember back so far, it was possible that they had given us the names. If they did not know exactly who had shot them, they could have given us the names of suspects.

MR RAMAWELE: Do you remember whether you had the, you know the probable place where you could find these killers, do you remember whether you had some lead where these people could be found who killed the police officers?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Mr Chairman.

MR RAMAWELE: Now any of the members of Vlakplaas, did - when these people were deployed, were they looking for these people who killed the police officers?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Mr Chairman.

MR RAMAWELE: Did they find them?

MR DE KOCK: Not as far as I know.

MR RAMAWELE: After the incident where in some members, some activists were killed, at that stage the police killers were not yet found?

MR DE KOCK: No Mr Chairman.

MR RAMAWELE: Even after a week, the police officers were not yet found, when you left for Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: When the police officers were not found?

MR RAMAWELE: I mean the killers of the police officers were not found when you left for Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: Not as far as I know, we did not succeed in arresting the murderers.

MR RAMAWELE: Approximately how many police officers from Vlakplaas went to Durban?

MR DE KOCK: It was our whole group, I am not sure how many we were, it could have been 40 or 50, it could have been 60.

MR RAMAWELE: And approximately how many left, you know the first group that went to Pretoria, to Vlakplaas, approximately how many of them left for Vlakplaas when you remained behind?

MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairman, as I have said some of them were re-deployed in the direction of Piet Retief, if I can remember correctly, and I think it was about 40 people. I am speculating, it could be more or less.

MR RAMAWELE: You see, I get the impression that you know, immediately after the shooting of these activists, all of a sudden, an interest was lost by you Security Police officers to be in Chesterville or in Durban?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, it is not so. If I can remember correctly, at that stage it was a question that after the shooting, it will be futile to attempt again to enter these areas because of the chaotic situation there, it was not governable, there would have been problems if you went there again, and it was necessary to leave.

MR RAMAWELE: Are you saying that your men were also not so trained that they could handle that kind of situation?

MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairman, they were trained yes, but we were a Counter-Insurgency Unit, we were not an unrest unit, we only used sharp ammunition and explosives and we were not an unrest unit.

MR RAMAWELE: You see, that is precisely the point because I am surprised why, if Chesterville was a flashpoint, etc, etc, why were the Unrest Unit not called to Chesterville to come and quell the disturbances there, why particularly Vlakplaas had to come to Chesterville, why Vlakplaas, why not the Unrest Unit?

MR DE KOCK: We did not go to Durban to control unrest, the people who went to Chesterville did not attempt to control unrest.

MR RAMAWELE: So the whole plus minus 50 people were just looking for the killers of two police officers?

MR DE KOCK: As far as I know there were three policemen killed, the murderers could have been a larger group, it could have been 10, it could have been a whole cell. The search you had to keep as broad as possible.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr Ramawele, please whose answering that cellphone, is it outside? It is really very disturbing you know, and distractive, sorry Mr Ramawele.

MR RAMAWELE: Thank you Mr Chairman. You know after this shooting, this shooting incident, you know they reported to you and some members later on went back to Pretoria and you are not longer, you think the situation is no longer okay for your members to be around the area so you decided the tracing of the killers was no longer a priority at that stage?

MR DE KOCK: No Mr Chairman, the people who were deployed in the direction of Swaziland against the eastern border, was used to determine whether MK members were infiltrating and I kept some members with me also.

MR RAMAWELE: Did you visit the scene of the shooting?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Mr Chairman.

MR RAMAWELE: According to you, did the police also arrive at the scene?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I can vaguely remember that when I arrived there, there were already people on the scene. Policemen were on the scene and I think the area was sealed off by conscripts, if I can remember correctly.

MR RAMAWELE: How many people according to you, died in this incident?

MR DE KOCK: As I can remember, four people were killed and three were wounded. I have this number at the back of my head, I think that three people were wounded.

MR RAMAWELE: And how many police officers were there, according to you were there from Vlakplaas who were also there in the shooting, how many police officers were there?

MR DE KOCK: I think there were six or eight.

MR RAMAWELE: None of the six police officers were injured or killed?

MR DE KOCK: No Mr Chairman.

MR RAMAWELE: These police officers say that they were acting in self-defence?

MR DE KOCK: This is how I understood it, yes.

MR RAMAWELE: Now doesn't that leave an impression really that these police officers, they must have been ready when they got to this particular place, their guns must have been ready. How come all of them survived, all of them are not injured?

MR HUGO: Sorry Mr Chairman, I have to object here, my learned friend expects Mr de Kock to speculate now, it is common cause that he was not there on the scene, I do think it is an unfair question.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes perhaps Mr Ramawele wants to put to Mr de Kock what would be an argument on the probabilities and perhaps wants to elicit Mr de Kock's response. Mr de Kock, let me put it to you to make it short, the point that Mr Nofomela's legal representative is making is that it is strange or improbable that if there was an attack on the police, that six of them were not injured and many of the other people were killed and wounded. You can comment on that.

MR DE KOCK: I believe that my members knew that they were in a dangerous area, they were looking for MK members, they knew there were terrorists and they were ready. I had personally been in fights when we were 24 and the opposition 80, we walked into the ambush and none of us were injured and eight or nine of the enemy were killed.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Ramawele, thank you.

MR RAMAWELE: Thank you Mr Chairman. You say that Willie Nortje reported to you about the shooting?

MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairman, it was he and van Dyk, I know Vermeulen was there also.

MR RAMAWELE: But did van Dyk also report to you about the incident?

MR DE KOCK: Well, Willie Nortje explained to me and van Dyk was with him. Van Dyk was not on the scene, so he could not report back to me, but as far as I know Nortje and van Dyk approached me.

MR RAMAWELE: Were you not with van Dyk already at the time when Nortje came to you to report?

MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairman, the Officers' quarters where we were had a type of unique situation where, because you were an officer, you had to be private. There was a shower which was used by people in two rooms, every person had his own sleeping quarters and shared a shower.

MR RAMAWELE: What I want to know is, at that specific moment when Mr Nortje reported to you, were you not already with Mr van Dyk at that time?

MR DE KOCK: Van Dyk was there yes, van Dyk was not with me in my room. They woke me up and then I saw van Dyk.

MR RAMAWELE: Was Jeff Bosigo one of the people, he was obviously in Durban also, Jeff Bosigo?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Mr Chairman.

MR RAMAWELE: Almond Nofomela was also in Durban, is that so?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Mr Chairman.

MR RAMAWELE: Do you know whether Nofomela and Bosigo were involved in this particular shooting or were involved, were there at the shooting or had something to do with this shooting?

MR DE KOCK: I received no such report Mr Chairman.

MR RAMAWELE: What you are saying is you are now saying that the black police officers went into Chesterville, you are satisfied that you know, they were given instructions to go there by Nortje?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR RAMAWELE: Now, is it so that the only other black police officers who were not in Chesterville, who did not go to Chesterville according to the information which is now available, was Nofomela and Bosigo?

MR DE KOCK: No Mr Chairman, they could have been part of other groups, working in other areas.

MR RAMAWELE: Yes, I am referring to the fact that these two black police officers were not the ones who, they were not involved in this, according to the information that you now have, they were not involved in the Chesterville incident according to you?

MR DE KOCK: According to the information I obtained at that stage from Nortje, they were not involved.

MR RAMAWELE: Do you know what Bosigo and Nofomela were doing at the time of this incident?

MR DE KOCK: I think they were part of other groups at that stage.

MR RAMAWELE: You are not sure?

MR DE KOCK: No Mr Chairman, I can't remember that exactly.

CHAIRPERSON: Is it possible that they could have been on the scene, but not part of the infiltration group which moved into the area?

MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairman, then their names would have been on the list as part of this incident, and they had to make statements.

CHAIRPERSON: Even if Nofomela was only the driver of the vehicle or was on the periphery of Chesterville waiting for the people who had to do the actual job?

MR DE KOCK: Nothing was covered up here, nothing was changed, no cartridges were changed, we did not know the Detectives, there was nothing to cover up here or to hide. If Nofomela's name did not appear on the list, he was not there.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well, sorry Mr Ramawele.

MR RAMAWELE: Thank you Mr Chairman. Among the black police officers at Vlakplaas, who was the most senior in experience and rank at that time?

MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairman, there was Lt Mose and Lt Lesatse.

MR RAMAWELE: Were they also in Durban?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR RAMAWELE: And at the time of this incident, where were they?

MR DE KOCK: They would have been deployed.

MR RAMAWELE: But you are just speculating?

MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairman, I cannot remember, they definitely wouldn't have been sitting around at the police station, they would have been deployed, working.

MR RAMAWELE: The reason why I am asking this is because Mr Nofomela says to me that you actually told him that he shouldn't get involved in the, he shouldn't have got involved in this incident because you had another mission for him?

MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairman, we had no other tasks except to find these ANC members, there were no other covert tasks or clandestine tasks that we had to execute.

MR RAMAWELE: And you then also told him that those people were going to be shot at in Chesterville, that is what he says?

MR DE KOCK: No Mr Chairman.

MR RAMAWELE: Mr de Kock, is it true that if Mr Nofomela had another task to undertake in Chesterville or Lamontville or whatever place, it would have been dangerous, it would have been foolhardy for him to get involved in another incident because he could be identified? His cover could be blown?

MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairman, I don't know, I cannot answer that. There was no other task. As far as I know he was not involved in this shooting, if his name does not appear on the list, then he was not there ... (no interpretation)

MR RAMAWELE: Which list are you talking about?

MR DE KOCK: This is the list that the people's names appear that were at the shooting Chairperson.

MR RAMAWELE: I see, you say this was not a clandestine operation?

MR DE KOCK: No Mr Chairman, it was not clandestine.

MR RAMAWELE: The people, I presume that you must have been worried that some people in Chesterville shot or attempted to shoot at your members?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, this is the reports that had been made to me and that they then reacted, on the fire.

MR RAMAWELE: Now did, because they were acting in self-defence, did they make a statement to the police to say that they were attacked by other people so that those people should be arrested, who attacked, who wanted to attack the police officers?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, they did make statements, naturally I cannot give evidence to this regard and I cannot remember what they said.

MR RAMAWELE: Were the people actually arrested, the people who attempted to shoot them, some of the survivors, were they actually arrested?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I do not know, I do not remember.

MR RAMAWELE: So this matter was never given, you were never serious about apprehending these people who attacked the Vlakplaas members, those who survived?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, that would have depended on the Investigating Officers and what their evidence would have been.

MR RAMAWELE: But Mr de Kock you were based in Vlakplaas, you were the Commander there and you had the power, you had the power to see to it that your members had to be protected, they had to be protected, they were doing a very good job? Why just leave it to an Investigating Officer whom you did not even know?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, counter-insurgency is a high risk job and to be shot at, was nothing strange to us. It is very unpleasant, it is unpleasant every time, but it is nothing strange.

MR RAMAWELE: Do you agree that the people who, if they attempted to attack your members, they could have been linked to the UDF, ANC local activists?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, possibly, the Security Branch would have investigated this part. We were a Counter-Insurgency Unit and we would have not kept ourselves busy with the investigation.

MR RAMAWELE: But you came to Durban to look for, do you agree that you came to Durban to look for the, to actually do a job which could have been done by local Detectives, just to look for the killers, just to look for three killers, the local CIDs could have done that, not so?

MR DE KOCK: The local Detective Branch did not have the capability to identify trained MK members Chairperson, Vlakplaas did have this capability.

MR RAMAWELE: But Mr de Kock, if there is a lead as to the name or the whereabouts of a killer of a police officer, you don't need to be attached to Koevoet or Vlakplaas to be able to trace that person, a CID member can do that, it is just a simple investigative work?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, yes, but murders of Security Policemen as far as I know, were seen as deeds of terrorists and they were investigated by the Security Branches.

MR RAMAWELE: You see the point I am trying to make is three police officers were killed and if they were killed, what you were looking for, you were looking for those killers only, that is what you were looking for. If you were just looking for the killers, you were not looking for people associated with the killers, you were just looking for the killers, why can't the CID just do that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, terrorism was the primary function of the Security Police and the countering of terrorism and the detecting of terrorism. The Detective Branch did not have the ability to identify a person at face value and I believe that there had been a connection between the Detective Branch and the Security Branch.

MR RAMAWELE: I go back to my question, when you went to Durban, do you have knowledge as to the killers, what kind of information did you have about the killers of the police officers?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, as far as I can remember, it was that it was members, it was terrorists and if I can remember correctly, it was members of MK and that these people had to be looked for. This was given high priority.

MR RAMAWELE: Now did you have perhaps the address where these killers were living?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, then the Branch would not have asked us, they would have gone to arrest the people themselves.

MR RAMAWELE: If you didn't have the name, you didn't have the address of the killers, what you had to do is you had to infiltrate the local activists and find out who killed the police officers, not so?

MR DE KOCK: If it had been necessary or the Security Branch saw it as necessary, but on the other side, you are covering all possible transport methods like trains and taxi's to see if you can't identify the people at face value and we were quite successful with this, and by means of this, the cell or the group could be caught or broken up.

MR RAMAWELE: Mr de Kock, I don't think you understand what I am saying, what I am saying is you went to Durban to look for the killers of two or three police officers, not so?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR RAMAWELE: You didn't have the names of the killers of the police officers?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, not that I can remember.

MR RAMAWELE: You didn't have the addresses of the killers of the police officers?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson.

MR RAMAWELE: Now, the only information that you had was that they were MK people?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR RAMAWELE: But your purpose to go there was to track down and arrest the killers of these police officers, that was why you had to go to Durban?

MR DE KOCK: To search for these terrorists that had killed these Security Branch police officers, Chairperson.

MR RAMAWELE: Now obviously if you walk around the bus stops, the trains, etc, you - even if you meet an MK person, you cannot say that is the person who killed the police officers?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, but we would arrest him if he was a trained MK member, we would take him to C R Swart where he would be interrogated by the local C R Swart branch.

MR RAMAWELE: Did you arrest a single, do you arrest a single activist or MK member at the time when you went to Durban?

MR DE KOCK: I cannot remember at that stage Chairperson, on previous occasions we had caught various MK members at Durban station.

MR RAMAWELE: You had a lot of askaris when you came to Durban?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, I wouldn't say we had enough, but we did have.

MR RAMAWELE: And these are the people you say who would help in the identifying of the members of MK, etc?

MR DE KOCK: This is correct.

MR RAMAWELE: These askaris who were at Vlakplaas, did some of them have a good knowledge about Durban and the people around who were involved in local politics in Durban?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I do not know. I do not know how many of them had come from Durban. Your MK members weren't necessarily area bound, you for instance did not get a Zulu from Umtata. MK deployed their people as they thought it fit.

MR RAMAWELE: Okay, I put it to you that when you left for Durban, your reason for going to Durban was simply to go to Durban and go to Chesterville and eliminate those activists, that is why you went to Durban?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, not true.

MR RAMAWELE: Because according to your testimony, despite the fact that you had a large contingent of Vlakplaas members, you were very unsuccessful.

ADV DE JAGER: Sorry, could you kindly just tell me if he came to Durban to eliminate activists, do you suggest that he had the names and the identities of certain activists which he could target?

MR RAMAWELE: What I am putting to him is that at the shooting itself, that was a target which they had, it was a target which they had to eliminate.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you mean it was an identified target at that point?

MR RAMAWELE: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: And the sole purpose of the operation was to eliminate them?

MR RAMAWELE: Was to eliminate them, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: That seem to have been the testimony of your client?

MR RAMAWELE: Yes, that is what I am saying.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that what you are putting to Mr de Kock?

MR RAMAWELE: That is what I am putting to him, yes.

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, this is not true.

MR RAMAWELE: And I further put it to you that Almond Nofomela was actually involved in this operation in the sense that he drove the members up to a bridge, but did not get into Chesterville itself?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, this is his statement.

MR RAMAWELE: And I also put it to you that you said to him that Nofomela and Bosigo should not get involved, because you had another mission where he had to, which he had to undertake?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson.

MR RAMAWELE: And that the sole purpose, and that further on that you told him that the people in Chesterville were going to get shot?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson.

MR RAMAWELE: I've got no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Ramawele. Mr Cornelius, any questions?

MR CORNELIUS: No questions, thank you Mr Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Cornelius. Mr Shezi, have you got any questions?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR SHEZI: Just a few Mr Chairman, thank you. Mr de Kock, you said the whole trip to come together was not a clandestine one, in other words it was legitimate within that particular context, what do you say?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, it just like all our other deployments, we were looking for terrorists.

MR SHEZI: And that would have involved some planning as to the methods that you were going to employ in trying to locate, to identify the terrorists?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the use of askaris or the members here locally would have been at the request of the Durban Security Branch who knew how they wanted to work, where they wanted to go to.

MR SHEZI: My question is on your part, on your carrying out your mandate or in complying with the request, there would have been some planning on your part as to the method that was going to be used?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson yes, we came down to Durban, we deployed, on request of the Durban Security Branch, we do what they want us to do and then you follow the information from there.

CHAIRPERSON: But beforehand you also prepared yourself for a possible infiltration and this is why Nortje had made the suggestion that an AK47 had to be gotten hold of?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, as far as I am concerned, this was good initiative.

CHAIRPERSON: So over and above your normal modus operandi to deploy the askaris, to identify MK members and to arrest them, you also foresaw as part of the modus operandi in this case, that you would or that you had to infiltrate?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well, sorry Mr Shezi.

MR SHEZI: Thank you Mr Chairman. You said earlier on when it was put to you by Mr Ramawele, that you had no investigative skills or anything like that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, let me put it this way, it is not that one doesn't know where to look or how the one aspect would then lead into the other one, I did not investigate files, but I did not investigate cases for the court. We were a quick reaction or deployment unit and basically a fighting unit.

MR SHEZI: If you say you did not investigate for the courts, ultimately what would have become of these terrorists, just to use your phrase, had you found them?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the members that we had caught of MK or of APLA would then be handed over to the local Security Branch, they would do the questioning, they would do the identifying and they either recruit them or they would look at court cases and if it is not maybe related to other case.

MR SHEZI: The instructions to go to Chesterville to try and infiltrate, how would that have got to Sgt Radebe for instance, the one who led the group who eventually went into the scene?

MR DE KOCK: Could you repeat that please.

MR SHEZI: All right, okay, the instructions to go to Chesterville in particular with the group what was led by Sgt Radebe, how would that have got to Sgt Radebe, who would have told him to do so?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson I believe that it would have been at the initiative of Nortje, it could be that he received information from the Branch or that information had been spread to him by another means. But here it is testing and searching that is involved.

MR SHEZI: Nortje would have done this out of his own, on his own initiative, without consultation with you, without you giving an authorisation for him to do that as the Commander of the whole Vlakplaas, C10 Unit which had come for this purpose?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson yes, he can use his own initiative. He could already quite possibly have been already with the station, he could have covered that with the last trains, he could have possibly already have checked the last taxi stands and then decided let's go and look at another place. But this all speculation, this is left over to the member's initiative.

MR SHEZI: As a matter of protocol, as a person who was a Commander, I am sorry who was the Commander, what would have been the procedure, wouldn't you have been told about this?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the mandate is to look for terrorists. I would not limit the members about where they could search for terrorists, they know where to find me, I am at a central point, we have five or six groups operating and I was at a central position, where I found myself.

MR SHEZI: No, my question is, shouldn't you sanction any operation of any particular sort?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, if he was in Umlazi first and then decided to go to Chesterville, that is his initiative.

MR SHEZI: Are you suggesting that the members that you came down with here in Durban, it was just free for all, they could go wherever they wanted to go, employ whatever methods they wanted to employ, is that what you are saying?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, this is not a question that there had been no control, they would go or they would act on information or suggestions from the Security Branch and over and above the fact that we report and investigate information, that the Security Branch listen to telephone calls, they have their own informers and they have their own sources and then they could possibly channel these people in a certain direction.

MR SHEZI: The Chesterville incident for instance, at some stage it used, what was involved was the use of an AK47 which had been properly obtained, where permission was sought, application was made, it was fetched within a particular context properly, are you saying the use of an AK in that operation could have been done by Willie Nortje on his own initiative, with his own discretion, is that what you are saying?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, let me put it to you broadly, as the rest of the people deploy in the country, if we employed in a week and it is for a period of a month, then I possibly spent another week in Pretoria, the other people would possibly be one group n Cape Town, one group in Natal and the other group in Piet Retief, and the Division Leader would then go to the Security Branch and they would work under the command of the Security Branch and then they would gather information and from there onwards they would use their own initiative to try to capture these terrorists.

MR SHEZI: Sorry, can we just focus on the Chesterville incident, you said this was not a clandestine operation, as a result the obtaining of an AK was done in terms of a certain particular procedure which Vlakplaas operated, is that so?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, this was not a clandestine operation, then we could have just shot the people and disappeared, this is clandestine. The way in which they had used the AK is a question of going in in a covered way, the people took responsibility for the shooting, they did not run away from this, it was not a clandestine operation.

MR SHEZI: What I am talking about was that the AK that was eventually used to convince those people in Chesterville - sorry can I finish - had initially been obtained by yourself and Nortje from Schoon in Vlakplaas in a certain, particular, proper way, isn't that so?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, if a situation had developed where it would have been necessary for these people to confirm their bona fides and they could have used the AK for this purpose, not specifically just Nortje, if another group had information and they felt that they could possibly infiltrate a cell or they could gain someone's confidence by showing an AK, then the same AK would have been given to another group to treat it in this way.

MR SHEZI: If I may ask you, how did the Nortje group obtain that AK in order to take it with them and eventually ending up in Chesterville with it?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the AK was drawn from Security Headquarters and Nortje handled the weapon from there.

MR SHEZI: So are you saying the use and control of this AK47 was solely within the discretion and exclusive use of Nortje, you knew nothing about it?

MR DE KOCK: No, this is not what I said Chairperson. I said that I had gone along with Nortje to Brig Schoon who had written this thing out, we went down to Capt Drury and we went to draw the weapon there and Nortje handled the weapon from there, only later on that day, I went.

MR SHEZI: What I am trying to find out is, the use and control of that AK, was it under your supervision as a Unit Commander?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I would overall be in command of that weapon Chairperson, it is not a question that I disassociate myself with the weapon.

MR SHEZI: And that weapon was taken and eventually used in Chesterville, are you saying at that stage and with regard to that particular incident, you knew nothing about it, Nortje just used his own initiative and discretion?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it is not that Nortje was acting recklessly, they acted in the face of information that they had gained at Joint Management System that had existed, they went to go and test this information and to go and do a search operation, and this at the end of the day, was the result of this.

MR SHEZI: I am not talking about the culpability of Nortje, let's talk about the Management System that was in place at that time, that includes you as the Unit Commander, isn't it?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson - sorry, could you please repeat.

MR SHEZI: All right, let's talk about the Management System that you say was there and within which ...

MR DE KOCK: Please start again, I am sorry.

MR SHEZI: Let's go back and talk about the Management System which was in place at the time and within which Nortje operated.

MR DE KOCK: Please continue.

MR SHEZI: That Management System consisted of you as a Unit Commander, isn't it?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, that is correct.

MR SHEZI: And there is an AK involved of which you had overseen its use and control, isn't it?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR SHEZI: That is not being used recklessly, isn't it?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR SHEZI: So if Nortje was to take that AK to go wherever that he was going to, he should have got your permission or you should have known about it at least?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, not necessarily. He uses his initiative as a Commander on the ground.

MR SHEZI: Now I am confused, I am talking about the AK which you have admitted that you were in control of, that you had to give, I am asking did you have to give sanction - you were in control as to the use and control of that weapon?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR SHEZI: My question is if that weapon was going to be taken and be used elsewhere be it Chesterville or kwaMashu, you had to give sanction to it, because you had control?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, it is already in possession of a person who quite probably if the necessity had developed or the possible use of that had developed, then he could have used this weapon for this and this is why the weapon was drawn.

MR SHEZI: So when it comes to Nortje's taking of this weapon to Chesterville, you are no longer in control of it, you are not in charge, you are not part of the Management System at that time?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, it is a question of delegation. It is not that the weapon had been given to someone who may not have been in possession of this weapon, it was delegated authorisation and if he believed that he could achieve success by gaining information or at least gaining someone's confidence, that he could have used this weapon for this purpose.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr de Kock, this weapon was gotten with the aim of convincing people or at least mislead people that the person showing the weapon to them, had also been part of the liberation movements?

MR DE KOCK: This is true Chairperson.

ADV DE JAGER: You would have, if you had this weapon in your possession, you had to go and show this weapon to these people, would this have shown any purpose?

MR DE KOCK: Not myself as a white person Chairperson.

ADV DE JAGER: So you gave this weapon with the aim of it being used by people who could convince these people that they were fellow members of the same movement?

MR DE KOCK: This is true Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And then just to follow the line right through, if we accept that the weapon had been in Chesterville on this specific incident, then the indications are very strong that an attempted infiltration must have been made?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson. I was not at the scene, but I will speculate now if it had been done on request of Radebe and if he lodged this request to Nortje, then he must have believed that they would attempt to infiltrate.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr Shezi.

MR SHEZI: Thank you Mr Chair. The killing of this three Security Policemen, do you know as to how was it concluded that those who might have killed them, were comrades or ANC activists?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I think that naturally the weapons that had been used, this would have led to the belief that they were MK members. We would not have come to look for comrades.

MR SHEZI: But did you double check that, whether the weapons which were used, were suggestive of that which is ANC activists might have killed those Security Policemen?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I believe at that stage when we came here, that information had been given to us. The Head of Security Branch at that stage, or the Division Head, was experienced Security Police officers, Col Taylor was seen as an expert in his area, they wouldn't have misled us.

MR SHEZI: You said after you had received the report about that there was a shooting in Chesterville, you got up and dressed and then you went to the scene?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I wouldn't say that I went to the scene, I think we first went to the police station, I am not sure which one this was, and I think, I think I met Col Taylor there.

MR SHEZI: Who went with you to the police station?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I know about Nortje, I cannot recall van Dyk to my memory, but I know that myself and Nortje went to the police station.

MR SHEZI: This AK, do you know if it was used during the shooting?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I heard this later on.

MR SHEZI: What did you hear later on?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I cannot give evidence to this effect, but I think Magage told me that when the shooting took place, he used the AK to defend himself. It was something in this line, I cannot testify on his behalf.

MR SHEZI: The attack on the police officers, in other words, Radebe's group and the askaris, the incident in question, wouldn't this have been more of an incentive or rather an encouragement for your group to stick around in Durban to further seek to infiltrate ANC activists, because clearly this should have established a trend that there is really the killing of policemen around here?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, as I said if I can remember correctly, I stayed here for a while and I held eight or nine of the askaris with me. We also received orders then. If Durban felt that for some or other reason it would have been better for us to go and work on the border to prevent exfiltration, then I would have gone to do this work.

MR SHEZI: But wouldn't you say the Chesterville incident established that there is really a trend of killing police officers?

MR DE KOCK: I cannot say that Chairperson. In any case broadly speaking on a national basis, it had been practice that police officers, especially black police officers had been murdered.

MR SHEZI: Do you have any idea as to why after the shooting, your members just left the scene without calling for reinforcements?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, that area as it was also mentioned back then, was a liberated area. The comrades were in full control of this area. The people could possibly have stayed there and if 400 or 500 of a crowd had come down on them, and they shot another 100 people, then the next question would have been don't we have to withdraw now. For this reason, when I went to the police station that morning, we waited there for reinforcements, we went in a group, we did not go there as individuals to the scene.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr de Kock, this is precisely one of the questions here, evidence before us is that they had withdrawn in a hurry, immediately if I remember correctly, they had withdrawn immediately from the scene. Reference had been made to Nortje's statement that says that he went to Chesterville, but the effect of all these actions were that they had gone from Chesterville to C R Swart, they don't know the distance, we will hear the distance later on, that they had withdrawn. Based on all indications before us, there were no immediate steps done to go and look for these attackers, it could possibly have been the people that your members were looking for?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I will not be able to answer on behalf of the members that had been on the scene, I am just trying to help us to sort this out, and this is why I am telling you that it could be that askaris had attacked the people, maybe there weren't enough of them. Maybe we will have to ask the members who were there.

CHAIRPERSON: I do realise this.

MR DE KOCK: What made them decide to get away, what made Nortje decide to say let's first go back, there has to be reasons for this.

CHAIRPERSON: But you see there is also a suggestion and it is possibly taken further, I am not sure, that one of the police officers had lost his head and then he started shooting with his uzi and then a shooting started? You know, this is a whole other tint on this incident itself, but you naturally cannot comment on this. But let's suppose this is what had happened, let's suppose that someone had lost his head and started shooting and then the shooting broke out and that this is how the whole thing took place, now we get the situation where the whole group withdraws immediately from the scene, there is no immediate attempt made to arrest the attackers, and this is the type of questions that do arise. You say that you naturally cannot give comment on the immediate situation at the scene, we understand that.

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, the Commander at the scene would do this according to his circumstances.

CHAIRPERSON: This is the point that is made here.

MR DE KOCK: I've got no problem with this Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr Shezi.

MR SHEZI: Thank you Mr Chairman. By that time you had known Nofomela for quite some time, or let's say you have known him very well?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson.

MR SHEZI: At that time, is he a person you knew him to be okay upstairs, was he mentally sound?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson.

MR SHEZI: He is not somebody who would see things that other people don't see?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, not that I know of.

MR SHEZI: Why would he say you were around in the local vicinity at that time and he saw you there and then you are saying you were not there?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I would probably have said the same if I had waited like him and if I tried to get a stay of execution. I could believe that this possibly could be the reason for this and I don't blame him for this.

MR SHEZI: Thank you Mr Chairman, that will be all.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Shezi. Ms Patel?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS PATEL: Thank you Honourable Chairperson. Mr de Kock, can you just tell us the askaris who came to Durban, what type of weapons would they have been issued with?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, they would have had their service pistols, 9mm pistols and in the case of the ladies, .32 pistols and then some of them had Uzi's or HMKs.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Uzi's and what else?

MR DE KOCK: It HMK, that is the Walter hand-machine gun.

MS PATEL: Can you give me an indication if I were to shoot with a 9mm pistol, how far away from the point where I shot, would the cartridge fall?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, this would depend from weapon to weapon, I cannot give you the distances now, but it would have to be close to the shooter.

CHAIRPERSON: This is regarding a Baretta and the P38, I think that is one of the others that you mentioned?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, some of the weapons throw it out to the left or to the right and other slightly to the back, it depends from fabrication to fabrication. I am not an expert.

CHAIRPERSON: But you say that you would not expect that if one of those weapons had to be fired, that the cartridge would end up very far away from the point where the shot had been fired?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, it would be in the vicinity of the person doing the shooting.

ADV DE JAGER: Would you say within a radius of two steps, three steps or five steps from the person doing the shooting?

MR DE KOCK: I would say to be safe between one step and four steps, Chairperson.

MS PATEL: Okay, and sorry, a .76 cartridge, 7.65 cartridge, sorry, from what kind of firearm would that cartridge come?

MR DE KOCK: It comes from a .32 calibre Chairperson, there are hundreds of makes of .32 calibre, but the police use the Walter PPK and this was issued to female members and this was a .32 calibre, this is 7.65 mm's.

MS PATEL: All right, and 6.35 cartridge?

MR DE KOCK: 6.?

MS PATEL: Sorry, 6.35 cartridge?

MR DE KOCK: That is a .25 pistol Chairperson. This would be the ones that women normally carry around in their purses, it is very small, actually it is useless although it could be deadly at times, but it was not issues to the police and it was not a standard issue.

CHAIRPERSON: Is this a little bit more effective than the self-defence spray?

MR DE KOCK: I would rather use the self-defence spray Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Ms Patel.

MS PATEL: All right, thank you. Tell me, a 9mm bullet shell that is copper, how does that differ, would that come from a different type of firearm as opposed to the Baretta, the standard Baretta issue or not, does that make a difference?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, you get certain different types of cartridges, but the type issues to the SAP and the Army was bronze, not necessarily bronze, but let's say copper, a copper shell. Your calibre is 9mm parabellum, this would be 9 x 19mm's, both the P38 and also the Baretta uses the same cartridge.

MS PATEL: All right, and a 9mm lead bullet head?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, not used by the police and also not issues Chairperson, not in your machine pistol like the Uzi or the HMK and also not in the pistol, because this could lead to jamming, to a weapon jamming or not feeding properly, and the point is soft.

MS PATEL: All right, thank you for that. Can I just move on to a different point. When you arrived in Durban, your function to a large extent would have been that of a co-ordinator of the various groups, not so?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson.

MS PATEL: Who would you have liaised with the Durban Security Branch, who would your contact person have been in order to manage this co-ordination?

MR DE KOCK: We worked under command and this would have been Col Taylor and then the Commander of the Durban Security Branch.

MS PATEL: Okay, so your contact person would have been Col Taylor, would Lt Hunter have fallen under the command of Col Taylor?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson.

MS PATEL: No, he wouldn't?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson.

MS PATEL: Okay. And then as part of your explanation that this operation wasn't clandestine or couldn't have been clandestine, it is because there wasn't just a shooting and people disappeared, that is correct?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MS PATEL: But we have heard evidence in other cases where operations were clandestine or where things had gone wrong, where subsequent to that, in a sense the sweeper would be called in who would do various things, amongst others, would co-ordinate the giving of statements, would co-ordinate the version that is then given at the trial or the inquest, not so?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MS PATEL: Thank you Honourable Chairperson, I have no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Ms Patel.

MR SIBANYONI: Mr de Kock, maybe an immediate follow up on that, assuming that this was supposed to have been a clandestine operation and unfortunately some of the people who were attacked, survived and would possibly give evidence, was it not normal that a sweeper would come in and prepare the statements for an inquest and everything in that fashion, is such a situation not what usually used to happen in the past?

MR DE KOCK: If it had been a clandestine operation, yes Chairperson, then something like this could happen, but this was not a clandestine operation.

MR SIBANYONI: If one looks at Exhibit D which is hand-written and under normal circumstances if it was a request like we had a request or an Intelligence note which was done before an operation, we saw an Intelligence note in the Nelspruit incident, that was thoroughly prepared, it was typed, if one looks at this one, would it not fit to a sort of cover-up, "dekstorie", which was done after the incident, the letter being hand-written, maybe backdated to the 6th of June and written in hand instead of being typed properly?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, this was definitely not one of those cases, and I want to give you the assurance that nothing that one is proud of, but if this was a clandestine operation, then there would have been no survivors, not at all. I can give you that assurance. As we had gone in Swaziland and all the other cases, Ms Patel had led evidence there too, if we had gone there, we kill everyone, you make sure that everyone is dead, this was not a clandestine operation.

MR SIBANYONI: We have seen Mr Nofomela being adamant, insisting that you were there and you deny that you were not at the bridge and in other words you didn't practically participate in the operation, is it not perhaps so that when Nofomela started talking about these things, even when he appeared before the Harms Commission, he didn't talk about Chesterville, maybe as a result of that, you didn't apply for amnesty for the Chesterville event and as a result, you don't want to put yourself into the picture?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, no. If there was something wrong here, I would have applied for amnesty in this case. I was not at the bridge, I give you that assurance. I have not once hesitated to take responsibility for myself or on behalf of my people for any shooting incident, and I would not have done it in this case either. I can give you that assurance.

MR SIBANYONI: During the Nelspruit 4 incident, we heard that there was the death of a white woman in Witbank who died in a robbery and that 15 askaris were sent there, was Simon Radebe and Nofomela one of the people who accompanied the askaris to Witbank, can you remember?

MR DE KOCK: I have no memory about who went, some of the askaris did go and I also said that I had sent some of the Koevoet members in case a tracking had to be done. It was on request of I think Gen Engelbrecht had asked us and it was on request of that Murder and Robbery Unit and that Security Branch.

MR SIBANYONI: During the inspection in loco which we attended at Vlakplaas, you gave us the impression that you were sort of a person who always fought for a transformation, I remember a specific incident that you changed the situation how the black members were treated in Vlakplaas in the sense that at the end, you were treated equally, everybody was treated equally, but we have just heard from Nofomela that the way you operated, there was a difference between how white people were treated from how black people were treated, more specifically that they as the black members were never in other words, there were no operation where a white person was killed? What is your comment about that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, no, there is more than one answer, or there is more than one question in the first place. I could make changes in Vlakplaas, because I was the Commanding Officer, I could not do this beforehand. I did make these changes and black members could start driving the same vehicles as the white members, the canteen had been opened up and various changes had been made. I started the first black Parachute Unit, I did this because I felt that we needed a black Parachute Unit and where it was in my ability, I brought these black people, black members on an equal footing, I knew that the black members could not get housing and they could not get housing subsidies. I here refer to unmarried people and in this regard, I did what I could. Unfortunately I could not usurp the government and bring them in, but where it was in my ability, I did what I could possibly do.

MR SIBANYONI: Finally ...

MR DE KOCK: There was also another part, it was two questions, regarding white people being killed Chairperson. There are now millions of white people saying that they had fought for the ANC and that they had supported the ANC, this is not the case. Where myself and my people fought, we found black MKs and black people, but in 1985 in December, a white woman had died in Lesotho in a skirmish, where she died in cross-fire, she was the wife of the senior MK member in Lesotho, the Commander of MK in Lesotho. I know that we were looking for Damian de Lange who was an MK member in Swaziland, on occasion we just missed him, we were drunk that evening, we just missed him, we would have shot him if we had found him and we also looked for Mr Kasrils on occasion where we received information that he was there. I smuggled some of the askaris through to Swaziland and we went to go and look for him, so the white people that we could reach, who were MK members, we did try and get to them. There weren't really white people who were fighting for MK Chairperson, although as I say now all of a sudden there are two million white people who fought for MK.

MR SIBANYONI: Finally, the impression I got after listening to Nofomela is that when he was in trouble after he had killed a white person at Britz, he expected either you or people from Vlakplaas to come to his assistance, but the message you sent to him was sort of a racial tone to say because he has killed a white person, he would have to carry the pain.

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, this is not true. Of the Vlakplaas members, black and white, visited him on a regular basis. The person who told him that he would just have to take the pain, was not me, it was a Captain or a Lieutenant Snyders at that time. The warder who was there at Correctional Services where Snyders told this to Nofomela that he, Snyders, was saying this, this warder is available, I will get his name for you just now. He was then a Warrant Officer when Capt Freddie Khoza and Lt Snyders came to visit there, it is a person, Warrant Officer Steynberg, he was present when Snyders told him that. This was not a message from me, Chairperson.

MR SIBANYONI: Maybe the real final question will be, if Nofomela didn't participate in the Chesterville incident, have driven the people to the bridge there, why do you think is he applying for amnesty for this incident?

MR DE KOCK: I do not know Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: In other words why does he put himself on the scene, this is the question that my colleague is asking?

MR DE KOCK: I understand Chairperson, and I do not know.

CHAIRPERSON: We will take the lunch adjournment and reconvene at two o'clock.

MS PATEL: Honourable Chairperson, sorry, just one minute before ...

CHAIRPERSON: You can do it when we come back.

ON RESUMPTION:

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: Please be seated. Are there any other questions from the panel? Oh yes, you wanted to say something?

MS PATEL: Yes, thank you Honourable Chairperson, just for the record, Mr de Kock, following on the questions by the Honourable Mr Sibanyoni, referred to a clandestine operation which if an operation of that nature was carried out, it would be, they would make sure that everybody was killed and he referred to the Swaziland incident in which I was the Leader of Evidence, I just want to place on record that that was in fact the Nyanda McFadden matter in which there was in fact a survivor. That is all, thank you.

MR SIBANYONI: Mr de Kock ...

ADV DE JAGER: Was the survivor not an informer who was arranged beforehand that he could get away?

MS PATEL: No, Honourable Chairperson, in fact that was the one bone of contention in that matter, in that the name of the informer, nobody would give to us. There was no indication that the person who survived, was in fact the informer. In fact, if one looked at the testimony of Cronje regarding that specific person, I do recall saying that it wasn't Vlakplaas' modus operandi to kill women and that is in fact why she was left behind, not that there was any allegation of her being the informer.

ADV DE JAGER: I am referring to the person who escaped and who was wounded in the foot, not the other one.

MR SIBANYONI: Mr de Kock, maybe finally on my side, Simon Radebe was part and parcel of the operation, yet he didn't apply for amnesty, do you know the reason why?

MR DE KOCK: No Mr Chairman.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Hugo, have you got any re-examination?

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR HUGO: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr de Kock, one of the main State witnesses in your criminal trail, was Willie Nortje?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, yes.

MR HUGO: And Mr Willie Nortje was a confidante of yours once upon a time?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HUGO: And at a certain stage he was turned, he walked over and he provided information to the Goldstone Commission?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct yes.

MR HUGO: Would you agree with me to say that Mr Willie Nortje's evidence against you, figuratively broke your back in the criminal trial?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct yes.

MR HUGO: And that there is no love lost between you and Mr Willie Nortje?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson.

MR HUGO: And in all his affidavits he made very detrimental remarks against you as a person and he went out of his way to incriminate or do injustice to you and during the criminal trial we also found out that Mr Nortje was stationed in Denmark before he testified in your trial, for days on end he made statements against you in the presence of the Attorney General?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HUGO: And you have no doubt that if there is one person who wants to incriminate you in all possible things, that is Mr Willie Nortje?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct yes.

MR HUGO: And then we find that Mr Willie Nortje in his statement said you were not on the scene and you had nothing to do with this operation?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HUGO: And then regarding Mr Steve Bosch, he also testified against you in the criminal trial?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HUGO: He also gave evidence which hurt you in the sense that you were convicted on the strength of his evidence in the Bheki Mhlangeni matter?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

MR HUGO: He also said that you were not on that scene, you had nothing to do with that operation?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR HUGO: And then one other aspect, it was suggested to you that in Pretoria already you had decided to go to Chesterville and to kill that group of people, have you ever been to Chesterville before this operation?

MR DE KOCK: No Mr Chairman.

MR HUGO: Did you for example know whether there was an army camp in Chesterville?

MR DE KOCK: No, I did not know it then.

MR HUGO: Have you ever before heard of a person called Hunter, who was stationed in this army camp in Chesterville?

MR DE KOCK: No Mr Chairman.

MR HUGO: Mr Hunter says amongst others, he says that the members of Vlakplaas arrived there and amongst others they enquired about the existence of a certain Charles Ngcobo, have you ever heard of such a person?

MR DE KOCK: No, never, only during the trial in the Regional Court, that was a name that was mentioned after the shooting incident.

MR HUGO: The names of the deceased, have you ever heard before of these people?

MR DE KOCK: No Mr Chairman.

MR HUGO: Then it was also mentioned that the people who were involved in the operation, disappeared as quickly as possible from the scene. Is there any way according your knowledge, and according to the experience you had, why - how the people could have remained on the scene of the shooting after the incident and how they had to see that the people could be arrested?

MR DE KOCK: Mr Chairman, they could have done that, but to the detriment of their own lives.

MR HUGO: The only people who had authority to arrest somebody, was Mr Radebe?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Mr Chairman, there were two or three other people.

MR HUGO: And if they had remained on the scene and arrested people, let me put it to you in this way, would it not have led that the identity of the askaris would have been made known?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HUGO: And they would have endangered their lives?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HUGO: Mr de Kock it was also stated to you that Vlakplaas by implication was involved in killing the black members of the population and they avoided killing white members or society and especially black members of Vlakplaas would not be used in operations where white people had to be killed, can you remember that?

MR DE KOCK: That was what was said Mr Chairman.

MR HUGO: Can you remember the incident of Dirk Coetzee?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HUGO: You have applied for that?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HUGO: And shortly the planning was that Mr Dirk Coetzee had to be killed in a gruesome way, on an explosive device which had to be sent to him in Lusaka where he was busy providing information to the ANC?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HUGO: And that caused a problem with you and many of the people at Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR HUGO: And also with the black members at Vlakplaas, you had a problem with this?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HUGO: Mr Radebe who is going to testify in a while, is an applicant in this matter, in the sense that he was involved in taking this parcel-bomb to the post office and this had the objective in mind to take Mr Coetzee's life?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HUGO: I have no further questions, thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Hugo. Mr de Kock, thank you very much, you are excused.

MR DE KOCK: Thank you Mr Chairman.

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Hugo, do you oppose Mr Nofomela's application?

MR HUGO: No Mr Chairman, we don't oppose Mr Nofomela's application. The only reason why we are here is that Mr Nofomela's version that Mr de Kock gave him instructions and that Mr de Kock was the important point around which that whole operation centred.

ADV DE JAGER: But any finding that we make, whether Mr de Kock was there or not, would not be a problem?

MR HUGO: Not at all.

ADV DE JAGER: And we don't make findings whether an implicated person is guilty or not, because our finding is not going to help in any case, so I just want to see that we limit it as far as possible to the relevant facts.

MR HUGO: I agree with you Mr Chairman. While we are talking about this, you will remember that I said in chambers, Mr Radebe is available for the matter which is being discussed down here and the planning was not that he would be a witness in this matter, but I have told you that it is our approach that if we can assist to clear up things which are not clear in this whole probe process, we will assist you as far as possible. Mr Radebe is here, if you want to listen to his evidence, we will help as far as possible on one condition that Mr Radebe will start testifying in his own application tomorrow morning and if he is not in a position to continue with his application tomorrow morning, this will mean that that hearing will have to be postponed.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, we take note of that. Mr Ramawele, what is your client's position in regard to Mr Radebe? Has he got any particular view on whether Mr Radebe's evidence is relevant or not?

MR RAMAWELE: Mr Chairman, the position of my client is that Mr Radebe went into Chesterville on foot with the other members and that he was at the bridge, and therefore his position is that Mr Nofomela was at the bridge with Bosigo and other members and therefore he will still continue to maintain that Radebe went in there on foot and whilst he was waiting at the bridge with other members, including Mr de Kock.

CHAIRPERSON: What is the submission, is the submission that Mr Radebe's evidence would be relevant to the application or not?

MR RAMAWELE: I think from the evidence that has been adduced at this point in time, it appears to me that it is relevant because he was there and, he was there and he probably knows who are the members who were at the bridge and I think it is relevant.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Mr Cornelius, have you got any submissions?

MR CORNELIUS: I've got no submissions, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Shezi, is the evidence of Mr Radebe relevant for your purposes?

MR SHEZI: That is so Mr Chairperson, that is so.

CHAIRPERSON: Ms Patel?

MS PATEL: My submission is that I think to come to a clear understanding of exactly what took place there, Mr Radebe's testimony would in fact be relevant.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Hugo, won't you please call Mr Radebe? Mr Radebe, please switch on the microphone in front of you and please will you stand, I want to administer the oath to you. Can you give your full names for the record?

MR RADEBE: Magopa Simon Radebe.

MAGOPA SIMON RADEBE: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, you may be seated. Mr Hugo, would you please present his evidence?

EXAMINATION BY MR HUGO: Thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR HUGO: Mr Radebe, you have already been told that you are an implicated party in this amnesty application, is that correct?

MR RADEBE: That is correct.

MR HUGO: Mr Radebe, regarding your own application, you did not apply for amnesty?

MR RADEBE: That is correct.

MR HUGO: And you have consulted with your legal representative regarding your amnesty application and on your insistence and as well as obtaining legal advice, it was decided that you did not commit an offence and did not need to apply for amnesty?

MR RADEBE: That is correct.

MR HUGO: But you have applied for amnesty regarding many more incidents?

MR RADEBE: That is correct.

MR HUGO: Mr Radebe, do you want to look at the documents placed in front of you, that is Bundle 2, from page 19 up to page 21, do you have it in front of you?

MR RADEBE: That is correct, I have it with me.

MR HUGO: In the affidavit and this has been handed in, during the inquest which was held after this incident, which became known as the Chesterville incident?

MR RADEBE: That is correct.

MR HUGO: You went through this with your legal representative, is that correct?

MR RADEBE: That is correct.

MR HUGO: You are satisfied that this is a true version of the facts as it happened?

MR RADEBE: That is correct.

MR HUGO: And you are still standing by what is contained in this document?

MR RADEBE: That is correct.

MR HUGO: One other aspect that you did not address is when this incident happened and you went back to the C R Swart building, did you report back to anybody else or did you go back to the sleeping quarters?

MR RADEBE: I went to report to someone.

MR HUGO: Thank you Mr Chairman, that is the evidence.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Hugo.

ADV DE JAGER: To whom did he report back?

MR HUGO: To whom did you report back, the interpretation did not come through properly, I am sorry. Can you tell me to whom you reported back?

MR RADEBE: I reported back to Sgt Willie Nortje.

MR HUGO: Thank you Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Thank you Mr Hugo. Mr Ramawele, questions?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR RAMAWELE: Mr Chairman, can I just borrow one of these statements of Mr Radebe.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, it is in the Supplementary Bundle, haven't you got that?

MR RAMAWELE: No.

CHAIRPERSON: Have you got one now?

MR RAMAWELE: Yes, I've got, thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well.

MR RAMAWELE: Mr Radebe, you were also part of the group that came to Durban, is that so?

MR RADEBE: That is correct Chairperson.

MR RAMAWELE: With whom did you come to Durban?

MR RADEBE: The whole of Vlakplaas came down.

MR RAMAWELE: Upon your arrival here in Durban, what was the first thing that you did?

MR RADEBE: We went to drop our goods at the base where we would be accommodated.

MR RAMAWELE: So from Vlakplaas you went directly to the army base?

MR RADEBE: No, I said at the C R Swart base where we were accommodated. You asked me the first thing I did when I arrived in Durban, I am telling you exactly what happened when I arrived here.

MR RAMAWELE: Okay. And did you bring along the vehicle that you normally used?

MR RADEBE: That is correct Chairperson.

MR RAMAWELE: Was that a kombi?

MR RADEBE: That is correct Chairperson.

MR RAMAWELE: In respect of this particular incident, were you in charge of any people at any stage in respect of this incident?

MR RADEBE: That is correct Chairperson.

MR RAMAWELE: Who gave you the instruction?

MR RADEBE: It was Sgt Willie Nortje, Chairperson.

MR RAMAWELE: What precisely, what instruction did he give you?

MR RADEBE: Which instructions are you talking about sir, about the people who were supposed to be in the kombi or the trip to Chesterville, what are you referring to?

MR RAMAWELE: I am referring to the going to Chesterville.

MR RADEBE: Yes, he gave me instructions. He said I should go with Sgt Monyoa, Sgt Mogadi, myself Sgt M.S. Radebe, Cons M.A. Seleka, Cons Chris Magopa who was an askari, Thabo Magagi who was also an askari and a female Cons Shosha.

MR RAMAWELE: So you, all these people were they travelling in the kombi in which you were the driver?

MR RADEBE: That is correct Chairperson.

MR RAMAWELE: When you left for Chesterville, were you the only people from Vlakplaas who went to Chesterville in that kombi?

MR RADEBE: Yes, in the kombi, yes.

MR RAMAWELE: There were no other members from Vlakplaas following you?

MR RADEBE: There were white members who were following us, Warrant Officer Vermeulen, Warrant Officer Frank McCarter, Sgt Nortje, Sgt Steve Bosch, if I still remember quite well. If there was another car, I did not see it, I only remember the ones that I have just mentioned.

MR RAMAWELE: At the time when Sgt Nortje gave you the instruction to get into Chesterville, where was Mr de Kock?

MR RADEBE: Mr de Kock was not with us, he was at the barracks at C R Swart.

MR RAMAWELE: And then what precisely, what was the instruction about precisely, what were you supposed to do in Chesterville?

MR RADEBE: We were supposed to infiltrate the comrades.

MR RAMAWELE: After infiltrating them, what were your further instructions?

MR RADEBE: There was a certain guy, I have just forgotten his name, he was wanted for a murder, it was alleged that he belonged to a group that killed the municipal policemen.

MR RAMAWELE: Now, the members who were with you, were they all armed?

MR RADEBE: That is correct.

MR RAMAWELE: They were armed with police pistols, police firearms?

MR RADEBE: That is correct Chairperson.

MR RAMAWELE: Did they have police identity cards?

MR RADEBE: I had mine, I do not know whether the others had their cards, but we supposed at all times, to have those cards.

MR RAMAWELE: And, but at the same time you were going to infiltrate, the instruction was that you should go and infiltrate those people in Chesterville?

MR RADEBE: That is correct Chairperson.

MR RAMAWELE: How long have you been, how long at that time had you been a Security Police officer, at that time?

MR RADEBE: Since 1977, it was 10 years, ten or nine years, just around there, but that was from 1977.

MR RAMAWELE: The operation that you were involved in was a very dangerous operation in the sense that when you are going to infiltrate, anything can happen? You know, it can go wrong, is that correct?

MR RADEBE: That is correct.

MR RAMAWELE: And obviously when you go to infiltrate, and persuade and convince people that you are part of them, it is also possible that they could want to assure themselves that you are indeed so, it could even involve people searching you?

MR RADEBE: I do not recall any operation where we were searched, I do not foresee a situation where we would be searched. We tried by all means not to carry anything that would link us to be policemen.

MR RAMAWELE: If in your experience, if you are, if you meet ANC operatives and you pretend to be, or the UDF and you pretend to be them and they discover you are a Security Police officer, what would have happened to you, in your experience?

MR RADEBE: They would kill us or there would be a fight.

MR RAMAWELE: So that is something that you knew even before you went to Durban, that it is always a possibility that you could be killed if you are discovered?

MR RADEBE: Can you repeat your question.

MR RAMAWELE: Before you went to Durban?

MR RADEBE: Aren't you talking about Chesterville?

MR RAMAWELE: Just answer my question.

MR RADEBE: I am asking, I am responding to your question, you are telling me that would it not be possible for them to search us at Chesterville, then you are now talking of Durban, I have to get your question clear, so that I respond properly.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Radebe, the question is even before you departed from Vlakplaas for Durban, you were aware of this possibility that if people that you are trying to infiltrate, find out that you are actually a member of the Security Police, you could be killed, you can get involved in a fight, that is the question?

MR RAMAWELE: Thank you Mr Chairman.

MR RADEBE: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Mr Ramawele?

MR RAMAWELE: Thank you Mr Chairman. And yet, and yet all the police officers carried firearms which identified them with the police and they are going to infiltrate an opponent, is that possible?

MR RADEBE: Chairperson, if I understood you well, you did not ask me which guns did we carry when we got into, had you put your question that way, I would have responded to it properly Chairperson.

MR RAMAWELE: Let's go back to the question, the members that were with you, had firearms with them, is that not so?

MR RADEBE: Yes, we had guns.

MR RAMAWELE: And these arms, these firearms were firearms which were South African firearms, they were firearms which could, they were the standard South African Police Service firearms?

MR RADEBE: Yes, they had something like a, let me call it a stamp, it was something printed on the gun, you would not wipe it off.

MR RAMAWELE: So the members of the police went to infiltrate whilst carrying firearms which clearly identified them with the police, is that what you are saying?

MR RADEBE: That is not what I am saying to you, what I am telling you is that they had their guns, but when they were infiltrating, they left the guns in the kombi with me. They went inside with nothing.

MR RAMAWELE: I see, so all the members had no firearms when they entered into that particular premises?

MR RADEBE: That is correct, three of them got in without guns.

MR RAMAWELE: Was that to try to protect themselves so that they shouldn't be identified?

MR RADEBE: I want to go back to your other question, what if they were searched and identification cards or SAP guns were found, we were supposed to have guns on our way, but to get into, the guns were supposed to be left behind.

MR RAMAWELE: In short you are saying that they left the guns in the kombi?

MR RADEBE: They left the guns with me in the kombi, that is correct Chairperson.

MR RAMAWELE: Did you go with them or did you stay behind in the kombi?

MR RADEBE: Myself, Sgt Monyoa, Chris Magopa and Magadi, we were left behind in the kombi. Cons Seleka, Cons Magagi and Female Cons Shosha went inside.

MR RAMAWELE: Where was the kombi parked in relation to, or let me put it this way, the members who went to infiltrate, did they go into a house?

MR RADEBE: That is correct.

MR RAMAWELE: Where was the kombi parked in relation to the house?

MR RADEBE: Between 20 to 25 metres from the house.

MR RAMAWELE: So the people from the house, they knew that there was a kombi and there were also other people in the kombi?

MR RADEBE: That is correct Chairperson.

MR RAMAWELE: So even if a person wanted to go into the kombi to search the kombi to see that these are truly comrades, you would have done so, because the kombi was just not far from the scene?

MR RADEBE: Yes, that is correct Chairperson.

MR RAMAWELE: Did you see the shooting itself?

MR RADEBE: That is correct Chairperson.

MR RAMAWELE: What were you doing when you saw the shooting?

MR RADEBE: Can I first explain to you what happened before the shooting started, because there is something that you left out. Is it not important for you to know why they went inside without guns?

MR RAMAWELE: I am just asking, somebody else might ask you, I am just asking you what were you doing when you saw the shooting?

MR RADEBE: I shot as well.

MR RAMAWELE: And you also saw the shooting?

MR RADEBE: It was dark, I just shot.

MR RAMAWELE: How did the shooting start?

MR RADEBE: I took out an order, I said let us arrest them and a bullet came from the house and we returned fire.

MR RAMAWELE: Was it the very first, was it at the very first occasion when you went into that house that the shooting started, you never went to the house twice or thrice?

MR RADEBE: That is correct.

MR RAMAWELE: So you went to Chesterville, some members got into the house and later on there was a shooting?

MR RADEBE: That is not correct, you did not ask me these questions before. That is not how you put it sir.

MR RAMAWELE: All I want to know is at the time when the shooting occurred, was it on the only occasion that you visited that particular house, that is what I want to know.

MR RADEBE: That is correct.

MR RAMAWELE: Okay, now can you explain to us how the shooting started again.

MR RADEBE: We were outside the house, I spoke in Zulu, I said "let us arrest them", let me put it in Sotho, I actually put it in Zulu so that everyone could understand what I was saying.

MR RAMAWELE: Can I just put it this way, can you just explain to the hearing from the moment when you arrived until the shooting started, can you just explain that?

ADV DE JAGER: He is asking you to tell us the first, when you first came at that house, from that moment,, what happened, until the shooting started?

MR RADEBE: When we arrived, Norma Shosha spoke to one comrade, they said they wanted to see our proof. We said our AK47s are hidden in the cemetery, Norma Shosha and an unknown man went into the house, we went to Willie, we said these people want a proof, Willie gave us an AK47, we went back. Norma Shosha then said is somewhere in Chesterville, it was at the hill, only to find that it was a wrong house. After 15 or 20 minutes, if I remember well, I sent Brown and Chris Magopa to go and look for them, because it had been a long time since they left. On their way, they met them and they told them that it was a wrong house, now they went back to the same house and we began to suspect that these people were not telling the truth, they were trying to protect Charles because we did not know his face.

MR RAMAWELE: Can you just stop there, because I am getting confused. You know, on the first occasion you went into a house and people, some members went into the house and the inmates were not satisfied about the bona fides of those people, then you went back to fetch an AK47, is that so?

MR RADEBE: Yes.

MR RAMAWELE: Then you came back?

MR RADEBE: That is correct.

MR RAMAWELE: Did you then go to the very same house where the inmates were not satisfied about your bona fides?

MR RADEBE: We did not get into the house, we just parked. I think they heard when the kombi approached to bring them an AK47. They went into the house with the AK47, without bullets, without a magazine. Later on I gave Norma Shosha and Magagi, I told them to be very careful not to put the magazine inside the AK47, because they can request to see whether the gun was functioning and anything could happen.

MR RAMAWELE: So you are in the kombi, you are outside?

MR RADEBE: Myself, Chris Magopa, Brown, Solomon Monyoa and Aubrey Mogadi, we were inside the kombi.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr Ramawele, it is yourself, Chris Magopa and who else?

MR RADEBE: Solomon Monyoa, he is now late.

CHAIRPERSON: Just a minute, Solomon who?

MR RADEBE: Monyoa.

CHAIRPERSON: And who else?

MR RADEBE: Aubrey Mogadi.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, and who else?

MR RADEBE: The others were inside the house.

CHAIRPERSON: So you were in the kombi outside, parked outside in the street?

MR RADEBE: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: You were four, were you four in the kombi?

MR RADEBE: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Is this now when you came back with the AK47?

MR RADEBE: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: All right, now just step back a little bit, when you went to fetch the AK47, which of your people were in the house?

MR RADEBE: M.A. Seleka.

CHAIRPERSON: Just go slow. M.A. Seleka, who else?

MR RADEBE: Thabo Magagi.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR RADEBE: And female Const Shosha.

CHAIRPERSON: Female Const Shosha?

MR RADEBE: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: So you left the three of them inside the house when you went to fetch the AK47 rifle, is that right?

MR RADEBE: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, now then you go back to the same house, is that correct?

MR RADEBE: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: You parked your kombi in the street?

MR RADEBE: That is correct Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: How far from this house?

MR RADEBE: Between 20 and 25 metres, if I recall well Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, all right, now you parked again, you've got the AK47, the four of you are in the kombi. Tell us now what happened from there onwards?

MR RADEBE: Norma Shosha came with the first person, unknown to me. I gave them an empty AK47, they then said they were leaving for the uphill houses to check for another comrade. Norma Shosha then ...

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, did you give them the AK47 without a magazine and without ammunition?

MR RADEBE: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Who did you give it to?

MR RADEBE: I gave it to Female Const Shosha.

CHAIRPERSON: All right, it is Female Const Shosha and this unknown person and they tell you now they are going uphill to look for another comrade, is that right?

MR RADEBE: No, they first go back to the house to show the others.

CHAIRPERSON: So they take this AK47 and they go back inside the house?

MR RADEBE: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: All right, now you are still sitting in the kombi, now what happens then?

MR RADEBE: They came back to tell us that they were going up the hill and I gave, in fact Norma Shosha asked me whether I was not going to give them a magazine. She said maybe they will request from us to see the magazine and the bullets, I gave it to her and I said "please don't put this in the magazine. What you can do Norma Shosha, you can give it to Thabo", because Thabo was heavily built.

CHAIRPERSON: All right, now you say that they came, who are they that came out of the house now with Cons Shosha as you ...

MR RADEBE: It was Norma Shosha and Seleka, I remember well.

CHAIRPERSON: And who else?

MR RADEBE: The two of them.

CHAIRPERSON: The two of them came out of the house, the two of them came out of the house and they came to the kombi?

MR RADEBE: Yes, they came to the kombi to tell us that they were going, Magagi and the rest were in the house.

CHAIRPERSON: And Shosha spoke to you about the magazines and you gave it to her and then, what did they do, Seleka and ...

MR RADEBE: They went back to the house, they were actually going to tell us that they were leaving the house so that we don't get surprised.

CHAIRPERSON: But they went back inside the house, is that right?

MR RADEBE: Yes, I think they were telling them that they were ready to leave.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, no, no, it is all right, don't tell us things that you don't know, don't speculate, it makes the story even more complicated. They went back into the house, Shosha and Seleka, then you are still sitting in the kombi the four of you, what happens then?

MR RADEBE: They left Chairperson, for quite a while.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you see them coming out of the house again?

MR RADEBE: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Who did you see coming out of the house?

MR RADEBE: I saw people getting out of the house, I could not see who each one of them was because it was dark.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you see any of them, did you identify any of them, of these people?

MR RADEBE: No.

CHAIRPERSON: So you don't know who was it that came out of the house?

MR RADEBE: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And what happened to these people that came out of the house?

MR RADEBE: They were away for 20 to 25 minutes if I recall well because Solomon Monyoa and Chris Magoba went out and I was left behind with Mogadi. On the way they met and they told us that, they told the two that the house that they had been to was a wrong house, then they all came back.

CHAIRPERSON: Just a minute Mr Radebe, did you hear all this? Did you hear what was said here, that you are telling us now about, were you not sitting in the kombi?

MR RADEBE: I was in the kombi, I sent people to go and look for them.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but did you hear what those people that you sent, said to these other people? Were you not sitting in the kombi?

MR RADEBE: I think me and Mogadi went to fetch them with the kombi, if I recall well.

CHAIRPERSON: We only want to hear about things that you actually heard with your own ears or you saw with your own eyes. Do you follow that?

MR RADEBE: I follow that Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: You must just tell us that, don't tell us anything else. You sent two people out to go and look for these other people?

MR RADEBE: Yes. The whole group came back, I do not remember, but I heard with my ears because they said this was a lie, the house that we had been to was a wrong house.

CHAIRPERSON: So you now hear that it was a lie and they had gone to a wrong house, what happens then?

MR RADEBE: We went to the first house.

CHAIRPERSON: All of you?

MR RADEBE: Chairperson, please bear with me, this incident happened a while ago, if I recall well, they did not drive with us in the kombi, because there was a shortcut between the two houses to go to the first house.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. All right, Mr Ramawele, I was hoping that I could get to the shooting bit, perhaps you can do a bit better.

MR RAMAWELE: I see, Mr Chairman, thank you Mr Chairman. The, when you say they reported that they went to the wrong house, what does that mean?

MR RADEBE: They met on the way, Solomon Monyoa and Magoba met with Norma Shosha on their way back and they told them that "we had been to the wrong house". I will repeat it again Chairperson, I don't know whether we fetched them with the kombi or they walked back, I do not recall.

MR RAMAWELE: Okay, but nevertheless you all then came back to the first house, the original house?

MR RADEBE: That is correct Chairperson.

MR RAMAWELE: You were driving the kombi?

MR RADEBE: That is correct.

MR RAMAWELE: Did you park the kombi and get into the house or what is the position?

MR RADEBE: They got into the house again while the rest of us were in the car, Norma Shosha came to the car to tell us, let me put it this way, she said to us these people were actually playing games, if we arrest them, they will - and get out of this area, then we would be in a position to ask them questions because we had been warned before that there is one exit and one entrance into Chesterville at that time.

MR RAMAWELE: And so what happened?

MR RADEBE: I said to her "go back to the house, the rest of us will follow."

MR RAMAWELE: Did you follow?

MR RADEBE: If I recall, yes.

MR RAMAWELE: You went into the house?

MR RADEBE: Myself, M.S. Radebe, S. Monyoa, Aubrey Mogadi and Chris Magoba, we do not know the inside of the house. I said to Norma Shosha there is an AK inside, just come up with a plan and come out and get your guns so that if anything happens, we can defend ourselves, so the three of them came out. I don't know what reason did they leave behind for them to leave all at the same time, but they left the AK without the magazine and the ammunition. I don't know the reason for that, maybe it was to show that they trusted them.

MR RAMAWELE: Just hang on, they left the police AK47 inside the house?

MR RADEBE: That is correct Chairperson, it did not have a magazine and rounds, if I recall.

MR RAMAWELE: And then they came back to the kombi?

MR RADEBE: That is correct Chairperson.

MR RAMAWELE: All the other unknown persons inside the house?

MR RADEBE: They were still inside the house.

MR RAMAWELE: So when the other police officers left the AK47 and went to the kombi, the other members just remained inside the house? Is that so?

MR RADEBE: That is correct.

MR RAMAWELE: And then, what happened?

MR RADEBE: They quickly came to fetch their guns and they went back into the house. If I remember well, Norma Shosha came to, we knew that we were supposed to arrest them, but we did not know their plan inside, she came out, she said "Simon, there is nothing that we can do, except to arrest these people". I said "well, let us also get out of the car", all of us then went out of the car and we surrounded the house and we stood at the windows so that each one, when one was trying to escape through the window, we would be in a position to arrest him or her.

MR RAMAWELE: Just hang on, the - what was the reason that the AK47 was left inside the house?

MR RADEBE: To prove to them that they trusted them Chairperson. It was empty, it did not have a magazine and it did not have ammunition. Yes, this was negligence, but if it was the way to win their trust, so was it done.

MR RAMAWELE: Now, a decision now is taken that the people have to be arrested, is that what you are saying?

MR RADEBE: That is correct.

MR RAMAWELE: Why should they be arrested?

MR RADEBE: Because they pointed, they gave us a wrong house. We wanted Charles whose surname I did not know and whose appearance I do not know.

MR SIBANYONI: Charles Ngcobo?

MR RADEBE: I do not want to lie, up to today I only know him as Charles.

CHAIRPERSON: Okay, Mr Ramawele.

MR RAMAWELE: Thank you Mr Chairman. So now you take a decision to arrest the inmates because they gave a wrong number of a house?

MR RADEBE: They were asked about Charles, whether they know him and they provided us with a wrong address, now we thought that Charles was around, they were trying to hide him, now by arresting them, they would be in a position to reveal his whereabouts.

MR RAMAWELE: Tell the hearing, your purpose to go there was to infiltrate them, after infiltrating them, what was your next instruction to be?

MR RADEBE: The infiltration plan was to arrest them. Had they gone with us into the kombi, if I do not remember the whites were left behind, we would be in a position to take them with and go and join our colleagues, now all of them were going to be arrested, an ambush kind of a thing.

MR RAMAWELE: You see, you are talking about an ambush and arrest, tell me, when going there you knew that you were going to arrest the inhabitants of that particular house, not so?

MR RADEBE: We were going to infiltrate them and if ever it goes according to our plans, if they were co-operative, we were going to pretend as if all of us were getting arrested. We would not arrive there and say to our colleagues "arrest them", the plan was that we would be arrested, all of us. But we knew that we would be released at some point.

MR RAMAWELE: So really your purpose to go there, really you really wanted to go and arrest, take these people, ambush these people, that is what you were supposed to do?

MR RADEBE: We were not supposed to do that.

MR RAMAWELE: You were supposed just to infiltrate only?

MR RADEBE: We were supposed to infiltrate them. If they were willing to go with us, we were going to drive passed where our colleagues would be waiting for us, and we would give them a sign. That is called ambush, it would have been an arrest because we told them that we were the comrades and all of us were going somewhere.

MR RAMAWELE: What did you want from them?

MR RADEBE: Sgt Nortje received information that Charles was responsible for the killing of municipal police and the South African Police in Chesterville. Maybe the policemen around this area were known to this people and they did not know us.

MR RAMAWELE: Mr de Kock spoke about the killing of two or three Security Police officers in Durban, are you talking about the police officers who were killed, are you referring to the same police officers, are they one and the same people?

MR RADEBE: I do not know whether me and Mr de Kock are talking about one incident.

MR RAMAWELE: The difference now is that you are talking about municipal police and a policeman.

MR RADEBE: Yes, that is why I am saying I do not know whether me and Mr de Kock are on the same par, but that is how Willie told me.

MR RAMAWELE: I see. Now you have now taken the decision now to arrest the people who were inside, you have surrounded the house and they are inside, was it dark outside?

MR RADEBE: That is correct Chair.

MR RAMAWELE: Was it very dark, that you couldn't see?

MR RADEBE: Yes, it was at nine, past ten to eleven.

MR RAMAWELE: And the light inside the house, was it on or was it off?

MR RADEBE: The lights were on, but the globe seemed to be dark.

MR RAMAWELE: From outside, could you see inside, could you see people inside or were you not in a position to see any person from inside?

MR RADEBE: There were closed curtains, I would not be in a position to see inside.

MR RAMAWELE: Did any of the police officers report to you prior to your surrounding the house, that the people inside the house had firearms? In other words whether they were armed or not?

MR RADEBE: Nobody told us, we did not know anything.

MR RAMAWELE: So at that stage whilst you surrounded the house, you did not have information that the people inside were armed?

MR RADEBE: Those who were inside knew, but they did not tell me anything.

MR RAMAWELE: Now, yes, then what happened, you surrounded the house, it is dark, what happened?

MR RADEBE: I told Norma Shosha that we must arrest them, I said to her it would be appropriate those who were inside the house that we are arresting them, I do not recall who was outside and I gave an instruction in Zulu, I said "let us arrest them" and there was fire coming out of the house and we fired back. Because there were two shacks next to each other, we decided to go to the kombi and we went to C R Swart and we started taking the statements about what happened in Chesterville.

MR RAMAWELE: You are saying, you said that now "let us arrest them" and at that time you said shots began to be fired from the inside?

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr Ramawele, please just translate what the witness said. I didn't hear what the witness said about a single shot? What? Did you translate that?

INTERPRETER: Chairperson, the Interpreter's microphone was not on, the Interpreters have requested Mr Radebe to repeat the response.

CHAIRPERSON: Oh, okay, thank you.

MR RADEBE: When I said "let us arrest them", there was one fire coming from outside, from inside, we then returned fire. I don't know whether it was our fire with their fire, but there was gunfire.

MR RAMAWELE: Was it just a single shot that you heard coming from the inside?

MR RADEBE: Yes, the first time, yes, that is correct.

MR RAMAWELE: Was it a shanty dwelling or what was it wherein the shot came from?

MR RADEBE: It came through the window and the glasses were shattered.

MR RAMAWELE: Who was standing next to the window wherein the shot came from?

MR RADEBE: There was no one, you would stand next to the window, but not in front of the window, because you would not know what would follow thereafter.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Radebe, when that first single shot rang out, were there some of your people still inside the house?

MR RADEBE: They were outside Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: All of your people?

MR RADEBE: If I recall well, yes. It was dark, but if I recall well, they were all outside.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr Ramawele.

MR RAMAWELE: Thank you Mr Chairman. You say outside that window where in the shot came from, there was no police officer who was standing just next to that window, there was no person standing next to that window?

MR RADEBE: There was no person in front of the window, but at the front and at the back, there were people.

MR RAMAWELE: And then all police officers returned fire?

MR RADEBE: That is correct Chairperson.

MR RAMAWELE: How many of you returned fire?

MR RADEBE: Myself, Solomon Monyoa, Sgt Aubrey Mogadi, Const Andries Seleka, Const Magagi, Const Chris Magopa and Female Const Shosha.

MR RAMAWELE: And each one of you fired more than once?

MR RADEBE: That is correct Chairperson.

MR RAMAWELE: After a shot had come out just once?

MR RADEBE: That is correct.

MR RAMAWELE: And that is how you acted in self-defence?

MR RADEBE: That is how I see it.

MR RAMAWELE: Now, after shooting, after shooting, did you immediately, did you ran away from the scene or what did you do?

MR RADEBE: We did not run away, we left. The road was not well, so we drove, we left just okay, we went into the kombi and we drove off and we went to report to Sgt Nortje and we went to C R Swart the next day. I think it was after a day or two we gave in our statements.

MR RAMAWELE: You did not rush away from the scene?

MR RADEBE: We did not rush away, I told you already that the road was not well, we were going to get an accident and there would be injuries.

MR RAMAWELE: You also did not run away from the scene?

MR RADEBE: We wanted to be as quick as possible, but we were very careful, we did not know if one of them had a handgrenade and threw it at us, we would all die, so everything was done quickly, but very carefully.

MR RAMAWELE: When you went away, was there any shot that was fired at you?

MR RADEBE: I do not recall, I don't recall having heard that.

MR RAMAWELE: So you were also not chased out of that particular premises?

MR RADEBE: That is correct.

MR RAMAWELE: Now why didn't you go into the house to inspect what happened? You wanted those people and they shot at you, you shot back, they are not retaliating, why didn't you go back and check because you might find a survivor and he might be of importance to you because you want those people?

MR RADEBE: I want to repeat this Chairperson, and say it was possible for them to throw a handgrenade to us, so we had to leave because we were told that there is only one entrance into and one exit out of the area. We knew exactly which route to follow, that is why we did not get into the house, we tried by all means. We did not leave in a hush, no, we reported this.

MR RAMAWELE: Mr Radebe, please just understand my question, you have been an operator of Vlakplaas for a long time, and you are not a coward when it comes to the Security operations, you were not, were you?

MR RADEBE: I am trying to respond.

MR RAMAWELE: Just listen to my question, my question to you is when you left, after the shooting, there were no retaliation from the inmates of the house, is that true?

MR RADEBE: That is correct.

MR RAMAWELE: And you were never fired at?

MR RADEBE: That is correct.

MR RAMAWELE: And you were not in a hurry to leave the place, you just went to your kombi and you went away?

MR RADEBE: That is correct. We did not have bullets, we had used our magazines. Had other people come to join in the fight, how were we going to protect ourselves? We were supposed to leave then to go and report to our white seniors, there was a military camp and a police station.

MR RAMAWELE: Just confine yourself to what I am asking you, I am just asking you, when you left the scene, there was quietness, there was no retaliation, nothing, you went into the kombi, you went away, that is what I am asking you, not so?

MR RADEBE: That is correct.

MR RAMAWELE: I am saying to you again that those people inside the house, you wanted them because they had to give certain information about Charles, you wanted them, not so?

MR RADEBE: That is correct.

MR RAMAWELE: That is why I am asking you, these people shot at you, they are in the house, it is quiet, they are not retaliating, you are police officers, you've got your firearms, you are police officers, why didn't you get inside the house to check these people and abduct a survivor?

MR RADEBE: Our magazines were empty, our guns could only carry eight bullets, we had been told before that this area is dangerous, it was then necessary to leave quickly to report to the superiors so that the right people in this area could go and check. I think I am responding properly to your question.

MR RAMAWELE: You emptied your magazines after a single shot was fired at you?

MR RADEBE: Yes, we did not know what would follow thereafter. If you hear gunfire, you don't know what to expect.

MR RAMAWELE: I put it to you that the reason why you emptied you know your ammunition was simply because that was an identified target that you had to eliminate, as simple as that?

MR RADEBE: That is not so. Had it been so, it would not be necessary for us to get an AK47 and show it to them. We were doing that to win their confidence.

MR RAMAWELE: And furthermore that you were actually travelling on foot and you went, you rushed off from the scene, to the bridge, where Nofomela and others then went over to the police station?

MR RADEBE: Repeat your question, we left in a hurry to the kombi at the bridge?

MR RAMAWELE: I am putting to you that you then after the shooting, you then rushed and got your transport from the bridge where Mr Nofomela was waiting for you and the other police officers, including Mr de Kock.

MR HUGO: Maybe my learned friend should just repeat the question properly in the sense that he put it to them that they left on foot and I don't think Mr Radebe has had time to respond to that, or the opportunity to respond to that.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, will you include that Mr Ramawele and perhaps give it in short bits.

MR RAMAWELE: Thank you Mr Chairman. I put it to you that from the scene of the shooting, you left on foot because you also came on foot to the bridge? What do you say to that?

MR RADEBE: That is sheer lie.

MR RAMAWELE: You say Nofomela is lying?

MR RADEBE: That is correct.

MR RAMAWELE: Why would he lie?

MR RADEBE: Because I was the driver of the kombi, let him tell you what he wants, but I was the driver of the kombi. I am not telling a hearsay, I am telling you what I was doing. I remember, if I recall well, there was another kombi, that we left on foot Chairperson, that is a lie.

MR RAMAWELE: According to you the people at the bridge, they knew precisely where you had gone to?

MR RADEBE: That is correct, because when before - on our way to the camp to get the information, we were with Sgt Willie Nortje, Sgt Steve Bosch.

MR RAMAWELE: I just wish to inform you that Mr Vermeulen testified that they wouldn't have been in a position to assist you guys if you were in trouble, because they did not know where you had gone to and they had absolutely no idea where you had gone to.

MR RADEBE: Yes, they only followed the map, that is correct.

MR RAMAWELE: But according to him, let me put it this way then, why were they waiting at the bridge?

MR RADEBE: It was during the violent times in Chesterville, we also took a risk by getting into that area.

MR RAMAWELE: Is it true that you know, one of the ways in which Security Police officers operated was that they you know, in order to avoid being suspected, they would just use a taxi to go to a particular place, then people would not easily suspect? You as a Security Police officer just get into a taxi, go to a particular place where you want to infiltrate other people, is it possible that that was done?

MR RADEBE: It never occurred where I was involved to be given a taxi fair or to tell someone to get a taxi. I only heard about it, I have never experienced it.

MR RAMAWELE: Have you heard about a situation where the Commander or the person in control will drop you off at a particular point and then you will walk to a particular place where you will then try and make your contacts on foot?

MR RADEBE: Yes.

MR RAMAWELE: I put it to you that on this particular day, that was the similar situation on this particular day.

MR RADEBE: That is not correct. I want to repeat that is not correct. Chairperson, I am telling you what is the truth, I was the driver of the kombi. I can give you the telephone numbers of one of them who is still alive today, or just call anybody who was involved in this, ask him under whose name was that kombi, he will tell you.

CHAIRPERSON: Under whose name was it? Under whose name was the kombi?

MR RADEBE: It was in my name, it was in my name, sir. I was in charge of that kombi.

CHAIRPERSON: Oh do you mean that it was allocated to you by Mr de Kock?

MR RADEBE: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And what number plates did it have?

MR RADEBE: It had many registration numbers, but I have just forgotten the real SAP number.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Mr Ramawele?

MR RAMAWELE: Thank you Mr Chairman. You are saying also that Mr de Kock was not there at the bridge?

MR RADEBE: He was at the barracks, at the C R Swart.

MR RAMAWELE: How do you know that?

MR RADEBE: Willie told me that they were going to the C R Swart to tell de Kock what happened, he said we can go and sleep.

MR RAMAWELE: Where was Jeff Bosigo?

MR RADEBE: The people I saw, I gave your their names already, if there were any other people, I did not see them because I went to sleep.

MR RAMAWELE: I put it to you further on that Mr Nofomela actually drove with you guys to the bridge where he dropped you off and you came back and you, and you came back from Chesterville and boarded his kombi and went back to C R Swart police station?

MR RADEBE: I want to repeat, he is lying.

MR RAMAWELE: And lastly I put it to you also that at the time when you were shooting, you were not acting in self-defence? You were eliminating those people as instructed?

MR RADEBE: Nobody instructed us to eliminate them, it was only when we heard a bullet coming out of the window, that we returned fire, nobody gave us permission to eliminate.

MR RAMAWELE: I've got no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Ramawele. Mr Cornelius, any questions?

MR CORNELIUS: I don't have any questions Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Cornelius. Mr Shezi, questions?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR SHEZI: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Radebe, what were your instructions from Willie Nortje in terms of going to Chesterville, the specific instructions?

MR RADEBE: We were told to infiltrate the comrades and if they were co-operative, we would be in a position to know who Charles was, and Charles was the person to be arrested.

MR SHEZI: And if they were not co-operative, what was the alternative?

MR RADEBE: We were going to arrest them all, all who were present.

MR SHEZI: Were you told which house to go to, you spoke about being shown the wrong house, which house specifically were you told to go to?

MR RADEBE: I think there is a number somewhere in the statement, but the second house that I referred to as being the wrong house, is the house we were told that Charles was there.

MR SHEZI: You said you had forgotten the house number?

MR RADEBE: That is correct.

MR SHEZI: In your evidence you said you when Shosha had come to collect the AK47, you emptied the magazine and then she took it without any magazine, you just left it there in the kombi, is that so?

MR RADEBE: That is according to the instructions, yes.

ADV DE JAGER: Sorry, you said he emptied the magazine, didn't they take out the magazine and kept it apart from the gun, I don't know whether they in fact emptied, they spoke about bullets separately from the magazine, but I don't know whether they emptied the magazine or whether they had bullets apart from those in the magazine, I am not sure.

MR SHEZI: Mr Chairman, from what I believe he said is that he - the AK was without bullets.

ADV DE JAGER: Yes, that is right.

MR SHEZI: To the point that ...

ADV DE JAGER: Yes, you are quite correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you want to clarify that perhaps if you want to, with him precisely what they did?

MR SHEZI: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Radebe, the AK that was given to Shosha, the bullets, you took them out and they remained with you in the car, sorry can I finish, so at the time she left with it to show to the comrades as it were, it was empty?

MR RADEBE: Yes, it did not have the magazine and the bullets, but the bullets were still inside the magazine.

MR SHEZI: But that all remained with you in the car?

MR RADEBE: That is correct Chairperson.

MR SHEZI: So if one of the members that went to the house might have said in his statement that the magazine and bullets were in the AK and that he emptied those, that would be far from the truth?

MR RADEBE: Yes, that would not be the truth.

MR SHEZI: And if there is a witness who might have been in the house at that time to say the AK was emptied in my presence, or the bullets and magazine were emptied in my presence, that would also be far from the truth?

MR RADEBE: That would not be the truth.

MR SHEZI: On the Bundle of documents, the Supplementary Bundle where there are statements of all the operatives on page 8, I wonder if you have that in front of you? On page 8 is a statement by Mohai (indistinct) Seleka.

MR RADEBE: I think I mentioned that there was a time they came back to take the magazine, I think I mentioned that that they came back to fetch the magazine. I just mentioned that they came to fetch the magazine, I did not mention that they came to fetch bullets and the magazine, the magazine had bullets.

MR SHEZI: Are you adding that now, because you did not say that earlier on?

MR HUGO: No Mr Chairman, with due respect he did say that. Just after the comrades came back, they did come to fetch the magazine.

CHAIRPERSON: I think what Mr Shezi says is that you haven't said it earlier on, he said that you haven't said it when he, Mr Shezi, was asking him, that is the point.

MR HUGO: Oh.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR SHEZI: Thank you Mr Chairman. Also when you were being cross-examined by Mr Ramawele you said you arrested these persons or rather you intended to arrest them or rather you made that decision purely on the basis that they had shown you the wrong house?

MR RADEBE: Yes, when they came back from the house that I said was up the hill, after Shosha came to tell me that they were playing games I said "yes, they must be arrested."

MR SHEZI: So in other words you are confirming that the decision to arrest them was purely on the basis that they were sending you on a wild goose chase as it were, if I could use that phrase?

MR RADEBE: In our decision we suspected that we do not know Charles' appearance, facial appearance, he might be among them, we did not even know if at all.

MR SHEZI: Among those which were in the house, was there any description that fitted Charles according to the report which was made to you?

MR RADEBE: I did not get into the house.

MR SHEZI: This is why I have said according to the report that was made to you?

MR RADEBE: We did not have a photo to compare. We did not have a photo to compare and see how Charles looks like.

MR SHEZI: So on what basis did you have this suspicion that Charles might be among them, hence you suspected that they were playing games if you did not even have the foggiest idea of what he looked like?

MR RADEBE: We suspected that Charles was among them, arresting them would be a solution, we would arrest them and their fingerprints would be taken. The fingerprints would tell who was who. Because he was wanted by the police in Chesterville, they would be in a position to identify him, we did not know him.

MR SHEZI: Had they been asked about Charles?

MR RADEBE: The reason to go up the hill was to go and find Charles.

MR SHEZI: All right, on the bundle of documents which I referred to earlier on, on page 14 is a statement by Xolela (indistinct) and Nompulela Shosha. On page 16, I draw your attention specifically to page 16, the last paragraph, line 8, I will read it out to you, she says -

Sorry, let me just start at the beginning of the paragraph.

She goes on to say -

Was this report made to you as Const Shosha is saying here, this is what she said she told you?

MR RADEBE: I do not recall her telling me about a handgrenade, maybe she did report to me, but I do not recall, that is why that is not included in my statement. I do not recall her telling me about that, she might have told me, I have forgotten.

MR SHEZI: She might have told you that there was Charles among them, the guy that you were looking for?

MR RADEBE: No, she did not.

MR SHEZI: I will proceed on page 17, at the beginning of that paragraph.

Do you remember that episode?

MR RADEBE: I recall saying that we should arrest them, the kombi was nearby, there was no necessity to pull it closer. The kombi was about 20 to 25 metres from the house and to get to the house, one would have to go up the stairs.

MR SHEZI: So you said "arrest them", for what? I mean did you tell Shosha, Seleka and Magagi why should they arrest them, or what was the reason for that?

MR RADEBE: I did not give them any reason, I said "let us arrest them", that was after I have told Shosha that the best thing would be to arrest them, because we have been told before about the situation in this area and I said the policemen of this area will tell us whether Charles is among the people, because they had been also looking for him. Surely the district police would know him, they always knew their victims.

MR SHEZI: If Mr Chairman could bear with me. Thank you Mr Chairman. Your group, Shosha, Seleka and Magagi, they had established a rapport with the occupants of the shack, hence they went back to collect the AK and later to collect the magazine, some good relationship had been established, a relationship of trust if one could use the word?

MR RADEBE: It is only Shosha who came out, Magagi and Seleka were left behind. It was Shosha and one comrade who was inside the house, who came out and I think I mentioned that.

MR SHEZI: I am now saying at the time of the incident at the shack where the shooting took place, prior to the shooting, at some point was there a relationship established, a good relationship or a relationship of trust between that group and the operatives where they began to trust them because they had shown them an AK?

MR RADEBE: Shosha and a comrade came to me, came to us and I said "Shosha, you know that the firearms are hidden at the cemetery."

ADV DE JAGER: Mr Radebe, it is a simple question. He is asking you whether after the AK had been shown to them, they trusted your people? Do you know, after it had been shown to them, whether they trusted your people or not?

MR RADEBE: It seems so, Chairperson.

MR SHEZI: Mr Radebe, my instructions are that kind of relationship having been established whereby the occupants in a shack had told them their difficulties in the township, Seleka and Magagi all went out, ostensibly to fetch firearms, more firearms for them and all that followed thereafter was just shooting. Are you in a position to deny that?

MR RADEBE: I deny that.

MR SHEZI: On what basis are you denying that?

MR RADEBE: We actually approached to the house to tell them that they must come out of the house, I - that is the basis along which I disagree.

MR SHEZI: Sorry, would you repeat your answer again, sorry, I missed out something.

MR RADEBE: I disagree because these people went first into the house, before there was a shoot-out, then they had to come out. I spoke in Zulu, I said "let us arrest them", there was then fire from inside and the window panes shattered and we returned fire.

MR SHEZI: So you told your operatives, they were all together when you said "let's arrest them", they were all together at the same time?

MR RADEBE: We were all outside at the windows. If I am not mistaken, there were two windows and a door.

MR SHEZI: So if somebody was to say Seleka and Magagi were left inside the shack when Shosha had gone out, she came back and she whispered something to them, they then went out with her, seconds later, then there was firing, what would you say to that? There wasn't a point in time when the occupants were left alone in a shack, they were always under guard if one could use that phrase?

MR RADEBE: I would not agree with that.

MR SHEZI: You are saying that if somebody would come and testify before this Commission to that, they would not be telling the truth?

ADV DE JAGER: As I understand correctly, at a time she went in, whispered to them and they all came out, and that was just before the shooting. At that time, at the point of shooting, they were all outside?

MR SHEZI: Yes Mr Chairman.

ADV DE JAGER: Yes. And you put it to him that they were never left alone, but at that very moment, they were left alone?

MR SHEZI: Oh yes, Mr Chairman.

ADV DE JAGER: Is that correct that she called them outside and thereafter the shooting followed?

MR RADEBE: She called them outside and I issued out an order "let us arrest them" and there was shooting. The shooting did not take place immediately.

MR SIBANYONI: When you came to give the instruction that they must be arrested, did you come and immediately take positions and then tell them or you told them "let's arrest them", then you took positions, what happened, can you just explain that scenario?

MR RADEBE: We were not in positions.

MR SIBANYONI: If you intended to arrest them, there was no need for Shosha to call the two members outside, it was supposed for you to get inside and start arresting them, what do you say to that?

MR RADEBE: We must remember that we were risking, I did not want others, some of us to survive and others to be trapped, I wanted this action to take place all at the same time so that if they were nine and we were six, the three could leave and run away, we wanted to arrest them all.

MR SIBANYONI: By Shosha calling them outside, it would appear you were getting those members out of the trouble so that you can start shooting, what do you say to that?

MR RADEBE: I do not agree to that.

MR SIBANYONI: And at the time your members were called out, there was no indication that any of the comrades were armed, is that so?

MR RADEBE: Nobody told me or indicated to me that they were armed, I did not know anything about them.

MR SIBANYONI: At what stage was the AK47 removed from the shack?

MR RADEBE: Const Magagi came out of the shack in possession of an AK47, I think I did explain Chairperson, because I mentioned earlier on that he was heavily built.

MR SIBANYONI: And Seleka came out with the magazines?

MR RADEBE: I do not know what happened thereafter.

MR SIBANYONI: When you were emptying your guns, were you shooting through the windows, the door or throughout the shack?

MR RADEBE: We were shooting even the walls because the house was built of mud.

MR SIBANYONI: Did anyone of you use the AK47 in the shooting at the house?

MR RADEBE: I think Magagi used an AK47.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you Mr Shezi, you can continue.

MR SHEZI: Thank you Mr Chairman. Didn't you know the number of the people who were inside that shack, as to how many of them were they?

MR RADEBE: No Chairperson.

MR SHEZI: So are you saying Shosha never told you that there are so many occupants in the house?

MR RADEBE: She did not tell me.

MR SHEZI: So when you gave the order that they must be arrested, you didn't - sorry, can I finish - you didn't know how many people you were going to arrest?

MR RADEBE: I did not know, you are quite correct.

MR SHEZI: How many doors did that shack have, was it only one door where they were coming in and out or was there another one elsewhere?

MR RADEBE: There was one door and two windows if I recall well.

MR SHEZI: There was a question which was asked by members of the panel why was it necessary for you to call these other members out, why wouldn't you have just gone inside and say "you are under arrest" and arrest them?

MR RADEBE: I said we were infiltrating and infiltration differs from an arrest. Arrest would be totally different, if we arrive, we would be told that the person that we want is not present. Infiltration is different from arrest.

ADV DE JAGER: Yes, we understand that, but now you have infiltrated them, you have gained certain information and at a stage you decide to arrest, why was it necessary to bring your people out of the shack before you arrest, why couldn't you go in and say "hands up" or whatever or go to them and arrest them?

MR RADEBE: Those of us who were outside, did not know the inside of the house, we did not know the positions of each inside the house.

ADV DE JAGER: Yes, but you had three members inside the house who knew all about, or knew the positions of the house at that stage. Why was it necessary to bring them out?

MR RADEBE: They did not tell us how many people were inside, we did not know how many people were inside. Each time when you arrest, you have to know whether there is a sitting room, a dining room, we did not know whether house was a kitchen or something else. We wanted them to come out and there were others around, guarding the windows.

ADV DE JAGER: What would better your position, if you are all outside now, you still don't know whether there is a kitchen, whether there is a bathroom, whether there are how many rooms, you have brought out the only people who would know and they don't tell you?

MR RADEBE: Chairperson, that is why we even spoke in Zulu "let us arrest them", we did not speak the language unknown to them. Had we not mentioned that in Zulu, I think the bullet issue would not have taken place.

CHAIRPERSON: What does that have to do with the question? How does it explain the question that my colleague had asked you? Shosha who was inside the house, who had close contact with these people, were actually outside with you, not so?

MR RADEBE: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Now the question that was raised was, why was it necessary to get the other two out, why didn't you just go in, you are five outside, two of your people are inside, why didn't you just go inside and arrest these people if that is what you wanted to do?

MR RADEBE: Chairperson, that was our modus operandi, what if the person we were looking for, would get out of the door and run away from us and remain with the rest of the group in the house? That is the reason we called them out, was that we should as soon as possible finish with the arrest.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but I mean how were you going to arrest them if you don't go into the house? How do you arrest them if you take all your people out of the house? Are you not supposed to, well, I don't know unless you say that is how you operated, I don't know how you do arrests, but I am a lay person, I don't know. How do you do arrests if you go out of the place where the people are in that you want to arrest? That is the question.

MR RADEBE: Chairperson, we knew that we were going to arrest all of them if our members were outside. What if we call everybody outside and one of the people is Charles and he runs away, now if our people are outside, all of them are outside, obviously the ones remaining inside, will be arrested.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, perhaps. Sorry, Mr Shezi.

MR SHEZI: Sorry Mr Chairman. Mr Radebe, you know about house penetration?

MR RADEBE: I think so.

MR SHEZI: You have conducted such an operation?

MR RADEBE: Yes Chairperson.

MR SHEZI: That would mean that some of you would remain at the windows, maybe others at the door and there would be people who can come in and that is called house penetration?

MR RADEBE: That is correct Chairperson.

MR SHEZI: I am saying, was it not the best thing or wouldn't you agree that it was going to be better to conduct a house penetration in that Shosha was in a better position to come in and outside of the house, she would have just whispered to the other members of your team to say that now you are going to conduct a house penetration and you could have easily arrested these people without anyone, possibly Charles, running away, what is your comment?

MR RADEBE: I do not agree to your statement Chairperson, we did not know what was happening inside the house. The problem would be inside, if Shosha gets into the house and whispers to the other two people, what would be the impression created out of that? They would ask themselves why does she not speak openly, I don't know whether I am responding to your question.

MR SIBANYONI: But she did whisper to them because they were able to come out of the house, is that so?

MR RADEBE: I called them, I don't know whether she whispered anything to them.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you Mr Shezi.

CHAIRPERSON: If you had done this operation that my colleague refers to as house penetration, you were seven in your contingent, not so?

MR RADEBE: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And there were two windows?

MR RADEBE: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And you were five outside? So if you put two people at the windows, you are three left, is that right?

MR RADEBE: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Then you still have two people inside? Is that right?

MR RADEBE: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And you have outside with you Shosha, who has been involved in this thing, she could give you any information that you wanted, not so? She could have told you there was a kitchen and a sitting room and there are five people inside, or whatever the case might be, not so?

MR RADEBE: That is correct Chairperson. Chairperson, if someone inside had an AK47 and we get into the house, and they start shooting, that would be a risk.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but you would take the risk, you wanted to arrest them, that is neither here nor there, unless I misunderstand it. The point I am trying to ask you to respond to is then you would have had two people at the two windows where people could possibly go out, you've got five people that could go inside the house and do the arrest, because you would be able to cover the doors as well, what was the problem?

MR RADEBE: The problem is we did not trust them at all, because they had lied already, telling us someone is at a house up the hill. We had been to the house up the hill, it was a wrong house, there was no trust at all.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

ADV DE JAGER: Well, could you tell us, suppose there wasn't a shooting, what would have happened, how would you have arrested the people if you were all standing outside and they were inside? What would the next step be?

MR RADEBE: Two people would be at the window and the rest would guard the door, but just after finishing with our plan, there was gunfire.

ADV DE JAGER: But tell me, how would you carry out the arrest if you people are standing outside and they inside and there is no gunshots now being fired, what would you do, how would you get hold of them?

MR RADEBE: We were going to kick the door open and arrest them inside because we would know that no one of our members is inside the house.

CHAIRPERSON: So you would take the two out, to just take them back in again? You would take the two out and just to take them back in again, to arrest these people?

MR RADEBE: There were no positions given to each one at that time, people just placed themselves at the windows.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but I mean on what actually happened there, the two of your members that were still inside when Shosha was outside with you, all you basically was then going to do, all that you were going to do was to take them out, right, you called them out, Shosha whispered there to them and they go out and then you all go in again and then you arrest these people, or you leave two at the window or whatever you were going to do. We don't understand how people affect an arrest, I have never arrested anybody in my life. I am just trying to understand how the arrest would work and that is why we have been asking you to explain so that we can also understand. Mr Shezi?

MR SHEZI: Thank you Mr Chairman, maybe just one more question, on page 20 of that document, last paragraph, can you have a look at that. It says, this is your statement by the way, just to tell you, it says you -

Why did you take up position outside the shack?

MR RADEBE: Shosha had told us already that we must arrest them.

MR SHEZI: So now it is Shosha who told you to arrest them?

MR RADEBE: No, she came to the kombi and said these people are lying, can we arrest them and I said "let us arrest them", but I said that in Zulu.

MR SHEZI: Where did you tell Shosha this, at the kombi or when she came to tell you, where?

MR RADEBE: Telling me what sir?

MR SHEZI: You said Shosha came to say to you at the kombi that "these people are lying to us, I think we should arrest them", now, Shosha was telling you this at the kombi?

MR RADEBE: That is correct.

MR SHEZI: So when you came, you came and you took up positions?

MR RADEBE: We did not know the position of the house, we walked up to the house.

MR SHEZI: I am talking about the shack now which is outside the house, a shack, just one-room shack.

MR RADEBE: I am referring to that as well. Those of us who were in a kombi, did not know the house, the structure of the house. We went out to approach the house.

MR SHEZI: Just two issues to put to you, I put it to you that there was never any decision to arrest these people, all that was devised was a scam to group together as many comrades as you could in one spot and then shoot them? Can you comment on that?

MR RADEBE: That is not so, they were already there. Had we had a meeting with them before, it would have been another issue, we did not, we find them already at that spot.

MR SHEZI: The taking up of positions which is referred to in your statement was part of the plan that you were about to start shooting?

MR RADEBE: It was not. If it was our plan, they would not start by shooting.

MR SHEZI: The decision to tell Shosha to call out some of the members, was because you were about to start and you did not want to shoot with your members inside?

MR RADEBE: That is not correct Chairperson.

MR SHEZI: Thank you Mr Chairman, that will be all.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Shezi. Ms Patel, any questions?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS PATEL: Just clarity Honourable Chairperson. Mr Radebe, do you know that two of the deceased were shot and killed, were shot in the back and died as a result of those bullet wounds?

MR RADEBE: I do not know that chairperson, I only heard that people died.

MS PATEL: And the police officer who had arrived on the scene, Mr van Rooyen, had described the position of the bodies, the positions in which he found the bodies at the scene and he states that the one person was found halfway under the bed and the other person was laying on the bed, on his stomach?

MR RADEBE: I did not get into the house after the shooting, I did not get into the house to check.

MS PATEL: And he also states further that two bodies were found laying next to each other at the entrance near the door, with their heads facing the door? It would appear as if they were trying to get out at least, not so?

MR RADEBE: I do not know, I mentioned that after the shooting we left, I did not check. I am now talking on my behalf, I do not know what happened. I told them "let's go and report."

MS PATEL: None of your members went into the house to shoot, not so?

MR RADEBE: We all left. I would not disagree with that, but all of us withdrew and all of us told each other that our magazines were empty.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, we hear that but the question is did some of your people go into the house and shot, fired shots inside the house?

MR RADEBE: I do not know.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes. Ms Patel?

MS PATEL: Okay, and the only shot that came from inside of the house, was the one shot you heard, not so?

MR RADEBE: Yes, that is the bullet that led us to returning fire.

MS PATEL: You cannot dispute that at least 20 spent cartridges were found inside the house?

MR RADEBE: I would not disagree with you, I do not know how many cartridges were found.

MS PATEL: Thank you Honourable Chairperson, I have no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Ms Patel. Does the panel have any questions?

MR SIBANYONI: I've got no questions Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Hugo, have you got anything else?

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR HUGO: Yes, thank you Mr Chairperson. Mr Radebe, did any of the policemen and or the askaris fire shots from within the shack?

MR RADEBE: No policemen, no askari, shot from inside the shack.

MR HUGO: Did you, before the other two or three were also asked to come out of the shack, were you suspicious at that stage that the occupants inside the shack, might be armed?

MR RADEBE: After they directed us to a wrong house, we suspected that they were armed or there were other comrades nearby.

MR HUGO: Is that one of the reasons why it ...

MR RADEBE: That is correct.

MR HUGO: Why it was arranged for these three to also get out of the house or the shack?

MR RADEBE: That is correct.

MR HUGO: Thank you Mr Chairman, I've got no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Hugo. Mr Radebe, thank you very much, you are excused.

MR RADEBE: Thank you Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: We have come to the end of the day. Mr Hugo, have you got any other witnesses that you intend to call?

MR HUGO: I don't have any further witnesses Mr Chairman. May I also ask to be excused from tomorrow onwards if it is at all possible.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, very well. Mr Radebe, you are excused, that thing seems to have a negative effect on you? We suspect that there isn't very much left in this matter, so we would like to finish it off as quickly as we can, we would ask your co-operation if we can start the proceedings slightly earlier tomorrow than we have been starting up to now. For that reason, we would adjourn the proceedings and reconvene here tomorrow morning at nine o'clock and hopefully get through with the proceedings at a decent hour. We are adjourned.