--------------------------------------------------------------------------CHAIRPERSON: ... with the amnesty hearing arising from the kidnapping and murder of Brian Ngqulunga on the 19th of July 1990. The Committee remains the same. Will those appearing please place themselves on record.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you Mr Chairman, P A Hattingh, instructed by Mr Hugo, appearing on behalf of Mr de Kock and Mr Simon Radebe.

MR BOTHA: Thank you Mr Chairman, Kobus Booyens on behalf of the applicants Bellingan and Baker, instructed by van der Merwe and Bester and on behalf of the applicant Botha, instructed by Strydom Britz.

MR LAMEY: Thank you Chairperson, Lamey of the firm Rooth and Wessels. I appear on behalf of Mr Nortje.

MR WAGENER: Mr Chairman, Jan Wagener, I appear on behalf of Gen I J Engelbrecht.

MR VAN DER WALT: Thank you Mr Chairman, for the family Ngqulunga, N van der Walt, instructed by de Wet and Fourie Attorneys.

ADV STEENKAMP: Steenkamp, Mr Chairman, I will be the Evidence Leader, thank you sir.

CHAIRPERSON: I understand Mr Steenkamp that all the implicated parties who are available, have been notified?

ADV STEENKAMP: Mr Chairman, indeed that is my contention and I submit that all reasonable steps relating to Section 19(4) were taken and all implicated people were duly notified. Thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Gentlemen, have you decided the order that you are going to start in?

MR HATTINGH: We will start with Mr de Kock, Mr Chairman.

ADV STEENKAMP: Mr Chairman, if I may be so rude as to interrupt, I suggest it is maybe a good time now just to refer to a document which I received from one of the implicated parties. It is my contention, I am sure that the applicants will all be referring to this document, the statement of Mr van Rensburg which was made available to yourselves together with correspondence of his Attorneys, Goldberg and Vick. Sorry Mr Chairman, I would beg leave to hand the document in Mr Chairman, it was also made available to the victims' Attorneys, may it be marked as Exhibit A.

CHAIRPERSON: And to the applicants' Attorneys?

ADV STEENKAMP: And to the applicants' Attorneys, thank you Mr Chairman.

MR LAMEY: Chairperson, I have not received a copy, may I just have one.

CHAIRPERSON: That may have something to do with the fact, I gather, that you were not here, Mr Lamey earlier.

MR LAMEY: I apologise for that Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: I tried to read their letter, apparently dated, this was received on the 10th of September 1999, the second paragraph thereof -

What is that second document that they say they have annexed, which I haven't got annexed to my copy?

ADV STEENKAMP: Mr Chairman, maybe if I can help there, I think the difficulty arose when we received the first statement, the signed one, it was very unclear and unreadable and we have requested for a more clear copy, which is the second document which is just a duplication of the first statement. Unfortunately that one was not signed, I think the correspondence was referring to that.

CHAIRPERSON: (Microphone not on)

ADV STEENKAMP: Indeed, Mr Chairman, so the second statement, although unsigned is actually a copy of the first statement, thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: It is slightly better, but not much. We didn't in the last hearing and I don't know if there is much purpose in me dealing with this sort of document, give it an exhibit number, which would be easily identified as the affidavit of Gen van Rensburg, I don't think there is need to give exhibit numbers to such documents.

MR SIBANYONI: Mr de Kock, for purposes of the record, your full names please?

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: (sworn states)

MR SIBANYONI: Please be seated. Sworn in Chairperson.

EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr de Kock, you are an amnesty applicant with regard to this incident, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Your application appears in the bundle beginning on page 2 and ending on page 11, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: Do you confirm the correctness of the allegations embodied therein?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And then for the purposes of the record, with regard to this incident, will you once again confirm that you made an additional or supplementary affidavit regarding Vlakplaas which during the first two or three days of the hearing of the first cluster, was submitted?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: Do you confirm the correctness of the allegations contained therein?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: Very well, Mr de Kock ...

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, can we clarify a couple of things now. I want to make it clear, I do not expect the whole of Mr de Kock's application to be affixed to each Bundle, but can we just place on record Mr de Kock, this portion that you have been referred to, page 2 to 11, that was originally part of your application, which you swore to, wasn't it?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, because there is nothing on these papers which show that it was part of the affidavit. And the other thing I would like to place on record at this stage is that your, I think, no, it is not - is the second affidavit part of this Bundle?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: No Mr Chairperson, are you referring to the Vlakplaas, the supplementary affidavit? It does not form part of the Bundle. There is another statement in the Bundle by Mr de Kock, which is virtually a repeat of what he says in the statement...

CHAIRPERSON: Oh, there, I had read it, yes, I just wanted to get the page reference, it is page 146.

MR HATTINGH: That is right, yes Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: It is almost word for word the original?

MR HATTINGH: Indeed, yes Mr Chairman. Mr de Kock, the deceased, Mr Brian Ngqulunga, was initially an askari who was connected to Vlakplaas, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And later he became a member of the South African Police?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Mr Ngqulunga was among others involved in the killing of Mr Griffiths Mxenge, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And it was one of the incidents which was investigated by the Harms Commission?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: When the Harms Commission heard evidence regarding Mr Griffiths Mxenge's death, Mr Ngqulunga was still employed at Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And was he later transferred to Head Office?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: Now Mr de Kock, what was Mr Ngqulunga's attitude before he gave evidence before the Harms Commission?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, he was a very tense person and at times he went out of control and I am referring as far back as 1993, or rather 1983, when I worked with Ngqulunga for the first time at Empangeni, where he wanted to commit suicide one evening and I removed his weapons. I was relatively new, I did not know why and one of the other askaris informed me that it had to do with a murder which had taken place in Durban in which Brian had been present and the person had been killed.

MR HATTINGH: Was this the death of Mr Mxenge?

MR DE KOCK: That was the death of Mr Mxenge.

MR HATTINGH: Was he prepared, was he consulted with in your presence for the purposes of his testimony before the Harms Commission?

MR DE KOCK: Yes. The evidence was orchestrated, it correlated and then there was also the situation if I might put it this way, where lessons were given as such, where Devil's Advocate was played with the persons who would give evidence, persons such as Mr Ngqulunga, myself and Mr Mamasela in order to equip us to deal with trick questions.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. And did Mr Ngqulunga give evidence in front of the Harms Commission?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: Was it after that that he was transferred to Head Office?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, I must just mention that at that stage, Ngqulunga, van Dyk, Bosigo, two other persons and myself were on special leave where we had to report to Head Office every day.

MR HATTINGH: When you refer to special leave, what was the reason for this so-called special leave?

MR DE KOCK: As a result of pressure from the public and then also the media, there wasn't any such special leave according to police regulations.

MR HATTINGH: Did it all boil down to a practical suspension?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: A suspension with paid salary?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And as a result of this pressure due to Mr Nofomela and Mr Coetzee's revelations?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: But you were still obliged to report to the Pretoria Head Office on a daily basis?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And how did Mr Ngqulunga's evidence before the Commission go according to your knowledge?

MR DE KOCK: As far as I know, it went successfully. I never read it, but it was sufficient for the purposes of the Harms Commission.

MR HATTINGH: And after that, was he transferred to Head Office?

MR DE KOCK: Yes. I cannot give you exact times, but he spent a short while at Vlakplaas and after that he went to Head Office.

MR HATTINGH: What was your contact with him after he had been transferred to Head Office?

MR DE KOCK: I saw him upon occasions at Head Office, but it was very infrequent.

MR HATTINGH: In which division was he involved when he was at Head Office?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, he was in the post section, the postal section. Let me just make that clear, it wasn't just a question of people fetching post or posting letters, it was an inter-Head Office function by which they would transfer top secret documents between the offices, even postal items which I didn't have clearance to read, for your eyes only type of documents which would go to the Generals.

MR HATTINGH: When you refer to the postal section, of which Unit was this?

MR DE KOCK: It was a Head Office Unit, I don't know if it was C-Unit or G-Unit, but there was a specific section.

MR HATTINGH: Did he deal with post which had to do with the Security Police?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, on a national basis throughout the country.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. Mr de Kock, after he had left you, apart from running into him every now and then, did you have any other dealings with him, did you have anything further to do with him in an official capacity?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And regarding you, was he a member who had been transferred from Vlakplaas and was no longer under your command?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Was there any information that you received while he was no longer at Vlakplaas which indicated that he was considering a change in allegiance?

MR DE KOCK: No.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. At a stage you were at Head Office where you became involved in a discussion with who?

MR DE KOCK: With Gen Nick van Rensburg and Gen Engelbrecht who was then a Brigadier and also the Head of the Investigating Unit for the Harms Commission.

MR HATTINGH: In whose office did this discussion take place?

MR DE KOCK: It took place in the offices of Nick van Rensburg on the 7th floor.

MR HATTINGH: And what was the topic of discussion during this occasion?

MR DE KOCK: The topic consisted of two aspects, the first being an attack on a PAC facility in Botswana namely the Chand residence where the Chands had been presented as double-agents.

MR HATTINGH: This is the incident which has already been heard by the Committee and has been finalised?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And then the second aspect was Brian Ngqulunga who had to be silenced, there was uncertainty regarding his loyalties. There was a level of dissatisfaction with his situation of confidence. Brian Ngqulunga's loyalty had diminished in the eyes of these two Generals.

MR HATTINGH: Who told you that he had to be eliminated?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it was Gen Nick van Rensburg personally and he was supported by Gen Krappies Engelbrecht.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. And at that stage, did you give execution to this order specifically with regard to Mr Ngqulunga?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson. I ignored it, however I began to attend to the Chand situation. I had no information surrounding the Ngqulunga situation, but I began to attend to the Chand incident.

MR HATTINGH: When you say that you didn't have any information, do you mean by that that this has to do with the information that he could be considering a change in loyalties, was that the information that you received from Engelbrecht and van Rensburg?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: You didn't have such information yourself at that stage?

MR DE KOCK: No.

MR HATTINGH: So therefore you were attending to the Chand incident, you were doing the planning and you executed the operation as we have already heard?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Were you approached once again with regard to Mr Ngqulunga?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I was approached again. Gen Nick van Rensburg requested of me in his office, that we make a concerted attempt to silence Brian Ngqulunga and the silencing was not a question of us speaking to him and saying "look from now on, please keep your mouth shut". Silencing in this context meant very clearly according to the lines of the discussion, that he had to be killed, that he had to be silenced for ever.

MR HATTINGH: Once again upon this occasion, were any reasons furnished to you for the necessity of this action?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Gen van Rensburg made it very clear to me that Brian Ngqulunga had began putting out feelers towards the ANC, that contact had been established with the ANC. He did not elaborate on the nature of that contact. The statement was that sources within the ANC who were working for either the military or the police, had provided that sort of information, as well as our own sources at Head Office. However, I was not familiar with these sources, I can only say that one of the sources for example involved the tapping of telephone discussions from Head Office where a specific office had been established and there was something like 80 telephones which were being tapped simultaneously.

MR HATTINGH: Very well, as was anything said to you regarding his relationship with his wife upon this occasion?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, this occasion or this discussion with Gen Nick van Rensburg occurred after Brian had shot his wife, Brian Ngqulunga shot his wife.

MR HATTINGH: He wounded her, she wasn't killed?

MR DE KOCK: No, but she was in the advanced stages of pregnancy, he shot her with an R1, a heavy calibre weapon, he shot her in the stomach, among others if I recall correctly, there was also an attempt to murder and a charge of aiming and firing a weapon.

MR HATTINGH: Did this have anything to do with a request that Gen Nick van Rensburg directed at you?

MR DE KOCK: No. I believed that the matter could be dealt with possibly as with all other assaults or shooting incidents, that control could be exercised, that there could be damage control. The situation deployed after the shooting, after the case was brought against him and this is when the situation ensued of him putting feelers out towards the ANC.

MR HATTINGH: Was this upon the information of Gen van Rensburg?

MR DE KOCK: That was told to me verbatim, by Gen van Rensburg.

MR HATTINGH: Was any mention made of the Griffiths Mxenge incident during this discussion?

MR DE KOCK: Not that I can recall immediately, but it was very clear because this is also what Brian gave evidence about. It would have brought the entire Harms Commission to a state of collapse along with the police.

MR HATTINGH: Yes. Please look at page 5 of your application, at the top you say -

Is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: Was this put to you or said to you?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, I believe that it was said to me. I have also mentioned it here.

MR HATTINGH: Did you regard this as an exact order?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, because it did not only affect the SAP, it affected the entire Vlakplaas set-up and covert operations, along with the Harms Commission and the government.

MR HATTINGH: Did you accept the correctness and reliability of the information that Gen van Rensburg gave you?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And how did you yourself feel in the light of having accepted these facts?

MR DE KOCK: I felt that we would have to execute this operation. I did not feel personally that I felt like killing Brian, but we did not really have any other choice in that matter.

MR HATTINGH: Did you give an order for plans to be formulated for his elimination?

MR DE KOCK: Yes. I liaised with Capt Baker who was second in command at that stage and discussed the matter with him, upon which he displayed the same opinion as me, that we couldn't follow any other option. I requested him to select a group of people to execute this task and I then gave all the assistance that I could, from my side.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. Who was instructed to assist with this matter eventually?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, Capt Baker and I involved Wouter Mentz, Pieter Botha, Riaan Bellingan and Mr Nortje.

MR HATTINGH: Mr Baker?

MR DE KOCK: Mr Baker himself, yes and then Mr Chate.

MR HATTINGH: And were you involved in the planning of this operation?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I was.

MR HATTINGH: And the plan was then put into action?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And without going into too much detail, because it appears in your application, the plan was that Mr Simon Radebe would then take Mr Ngqulunga to a certain place under some form of pretence?

MR DE KOCK: Yes. We handled Mr Radebe or involved him in a situation which was based on the absolute need to know principle. He knew the absolute minimum. He was handled on a peripheral basis so that there wouldn't be a reason later on which would lead to him becoming a danger.

MR HATTINGH: He didn't know why he was supposed to take Mr Ngqulunga to this certain place where the other members would meet him?

MR DE KOCK: No.

MR HATTINGH: And he took him to this certain place and the other members met Mr Ngqulunga and took him to a place in Botswana where he was killed?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: Where were you during the events of this evening?

MR DE KOCK: Just to explain, we rented two vehicles from Avis, one was a kombi, a Volkswagen kombi and then we also rented a Mercedes. Then we took along a third vehicle, a Jetta vehicle, which had secret compartments. The Jetta vehicle also had a blue light, just in case my members who were executing the operation in Bophuthatswana picked up problems, we could act as an SAP vehicle and assist them. The other vehicle was hired in the event of the kombi breaking down and if there were any problems on ground level, either one of those two vehicles could be used to tow the other vehicle away. We had towing cables in the vehicles and we had radio contact with one another. I waited at Wonderpark with these two vehicles not very far away from the Bophuthatswana area.

MR HATTINGH: Was radio report given to you regarding the progress with the Ngqulunga matter?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And after that you met at a hotel here in Pretoria?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, we moved into the Holiday Inn, we left the two Avis vehicles there and locked them and then with our Secret Fund or State vehicles, we drove through to Johannesburg where we booked in at the Doornfontein Hotel for the purposes of investigation in Johannesburg. I have a very vague recollection, I may be incorrect, but somewhere we directed an Intelligence note that there was information about arms smuggling in Johannesburg which we had to attend to. This was merely to cover up.

MR HATTINGH: Yes, and the next day you returned?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, the following day we returned and this situation took place over a weekend. I think it was the Friday evening that we found Brian and during the following week, upon the first opportunity to contacting Gen van Rensburg, I think it was the Monday, I am not sure, Capt Baker and I personally went to Gen van Rensburg and I reported back in so far as it affected the execution and method of the operation and Capt Baker then informed Mr van Rensburg regarding what had taken place at the scene of the incident, because I hadn't been present at the scene itself.

The reason for that is because there had to be confirmation that the operation was clean, that there had been no problems which could elicit any suspicion of the police. It was for security reasons.

MR HATTINGH: Very well, and then after that, arrangements had to be made for the funeral of Mr Ngqulunga?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, that is correct. Those arrangements were indeed made. If I have it correctly Capt Baker made the arrangements.

MR HATTINGH: And there were problems at the cemetery itself, there were youths who attacked those attending the funeral with stones, they did not want a person who they regarded as a traitor, to be buried in that cemetery?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, there was a messenger from the Civics Association who was there and the comrades were also there and they indicated that we could bury him there if we wanted to, but that they would exhume his body and burn his body afterwards.

MR HATTINGH: Was there any arrangement for Mr Ngqulunga to be buried on Vlakplaas itself?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, we made those arrangements, we blew a grave open with explosives because it was very stony ground and we buried him there in a ceremony.

MR HATTINGH: Did you attend the funeral ceremony?

MR DE KOCK: I was on the farm, but I did not attend the ceremony, I waited in my office.

MR HATTINGH: Is there any particular reason why you didn't attend the ceremony?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I knew Brian since 1983 and I personally didn't have the courage to go to the funeral, that may sound strange.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. This morning we received an affidavit from Gen van Rensburg which I have dealt with you briefly and there in he denies any knowledge. He denies that he gave you an order to kill Mr Ngqulunga and he says indeed that you entered his office on a certain morning and told him that you had bad news and that Brian had been taken out?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, that is false. Gen Nick van Rensburg is not telling the truth.

MR HATTINGH: He states further that he asked you who you suspected of having done this and you said that it was probably the MK members because the body indicated having been fired 30 to 40 times with AK rounds.

MR DE KOCK: No, that sort of information would have been conveyed by Capt Baker. In this case the truth is a stranger to Nick van Rensburg.

MR HATTINGH: Did you direct any requests at Gen van Rensburg with regard to the investigation of the death of Mr Ngqulunga when you reported to him that he had indeed been killed?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I requested that he attempt to organise or contact with the Pretoria Murder and Robbery Unit for them to send members to investigate the incident, because it would be strange if our own Murder and Robbery Division did not lodge an inquiry into the death. Vlakplaas could not investigate the matter because we were involved. As a result of the gravity of the matter, the situation was created to make it appear that the ANC had killed him and as far as I know, a member or two were deployed to liaise with the Bophuthatswana police's Murder and Robbery Unit so that any evidence which pointed at us or the SAP, could be dealt with.

MR HATTINGH: Did he comply with that request?

MR DE KOCK: As far as I know, he did.

MR HATTINGH: Do you know whether the investigation had any positive results?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, it did not.

MR HATTINGH: Would you bear with me a moment please, Mr Chairman. Just to clear this up, at page 5 at the bottom of the page, the last sentence, the paragraph there you say -

Was this corrected later in the further statement which you had made? On page 148 at the top there you say -

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, this would be a typing fault.

CHAIRPERSON: You read it before you signed it, didn't you?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, that is so.

MR HATTINGH: Mr de Kock, following on the question that the Chairperson put to you, may I ask you to look at your application which had been heard previously and your application was drawn up in haste and under pressure and your whole application embodies a few volumes and what is now before me, is your whole application?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Did you have the opportunity to study this document carefully?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Did you have to read it in detention?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And until what time do you have light to read?

MR DE KOCK: Sometimes eight o'clock, sometimes nine o'clock in the evening.

MR HATTINGH: And this was completed at a very late stage, the whole application?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And then there were mistakes which we have picked up at other occasions?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And later, when you made the other statement, was it a statement which you made to the Attorney-General's Investigative Team?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And there you corrected this mistake?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you Mr Chairman, we have no further questions.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr de Kock, I see according to the extract from the evidence in the Harms Commission that Ngqulunga gave evidence in June 1990, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Times and dates are something that provide problems on occasion, but my clients say that Ngqulunga had already in 1986, had he left Vlakplaas for Head Office, is that possible?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, he periodically at times went from Vlakplaas to Head Office and after a time, when it seemed that his nerves had calmed, he came back to Vlakplaas.

MR BOOYENS: So in other words you don't dispute the statement that from 1986 he had at least worked periodically at Head Office?

MR DE KOCK: No.

MR BOOYENS: Very well, now I know you touched on the postal system, but I think we might have to complete the picture here. Actually the whole security surrounding the manner in which the postal items were dealt with or handled, was not of the best I understand. I understand how it would work was that for example as you have said, even an "for your eyes only" or top secret document would usually be placed into a pigeon hole and then people at the postal section where Mr Ngqulunga worked, for example it would go to Gen X or Brig A, it would be in his pigeon hole and the document which is in that pigeon hole, would be taken to the Brigadier or the General. I understand that is how it operated?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, I can also mention that at many occasions I saw that a person, young person, black or white, and most of the time it would be in the lift, where you see that this person reads a top secret document and the cover page of the document, there is an annexure on the front of such a document which gives a list of names which only the document must read, every person who reads the document has to sign next to his name, and at times you see that there are only three names on the document, for example only Gen Smit and his Staff Officer and another General, and these people walk around the halls and they read it openly, just as they pleased.

MR BOOYENS: So there can be no doubt that if anybody who had worked in the postal division had a notion for example to read these confidential documents, that it could be done very easily?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it would have been unnatural if they were not curious.

MR BOOYENS: Especially if he was curious with a reason, not just curiosity, but if he sympathised with the opposition, it was a golden opportunity to obtain information?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, there were rules laid down and in every exam from Constable to Lieutenant the question is asked about the handling of security information which has to be sealed in a doubt envelope and a pink coloured form is attached to it, the person who receives it, has to sign it and that document has to be given back to the person who delivers the message. This was not applicable here.

MR BOOYENS: It seems the people who had to be the most aware of security, were the least aware of security?

MR DE KOCK: That was my opinion Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Mr de Kock, if you do not know then you can tell the Commission, but we do not hear any medical evidence in these matters and I think it may be important because I saw at a previous occasion when Mr Mentz gave evidence, that I think Commissioner de Jager made mention of the fact, something which emanated from the post-mortem that the person's tongue was missing and Mr de Jager wanted to know how that happened and I just tell you by means of background and in your career you had come across and seen what the affect of assault weapons when someone is shot at from a short distance, what the affect would be, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR BOOYENS: As far as you can recall, Mr de Kock, if you cannot recall please say so, what is the firing tempo of an AK on automatic?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, between 2 300 and 2 400 feet per second.

MR BOOYENS: Is that the velocity?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, if it fires on automatic.

MR BOOYENS: How many rounds per minute?

MR DE KOCK: Between 10 to 15 rounds a minute, between 650 and 800 rounds a minute.

MR BOOYENS: Mr de Kock, if someone would be shot at very close range with an AK47, would there be serious damage to the person?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, yes, from a close range and I speak of between three to ten paces, with bursts of shots you could expect disintegration.

MR BOOYENS: So from your own experience and I know you are not an expert on this terrain, but you have practical experience, do you find anything sinister for example if the man's tongue was missing, do you find anything sinister about it?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson. I had a personal occasion where a member of SWAPO aimed his firearm at me and I had an AK47, we then carried AK47's and I fired first and I hit him in between his head and his throat with a full magazine, we were approximately eight paces from each other and his head disintegrated.

MR BOOYENS: Mr de Kock, I would just like to return to the instructions which you received, or may I just mention something else, you recall you gave evidence with regard to the Chand matter in Botswana, that you had hurt your leg there?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: At the time of this incident, my clients tell me that you still had trouble with your leg?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I was walking on a crutch but the plaster of paris had been removed.

MR BOOYENS: So would it be correct that although you did not want to become personally involved, but it would not have been practical either?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, if it was not for the leg, then I would have probably been at the scene.

MR BOOYENS: Let us return to the instructions which you received from Gen van Rensburg now. You were continually when you received specific instructions from senior officers, I think you have testified to this previously in incidents where I was involved for other parties, you were cautious to the extent that you wanted to know why, I speak specifically of instructions where you had to act illegally, you would want to know why, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: And it is because of this that Gen van Rensburg asked you why Brian, what did he do or did he tell you that? I would just like - please tell us as much as you can about this.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I just asked him why because Brian had already given evidence and he mentioned to me that he had tried to reach out to the ANC and he had made contact.

MR BOOYENS: The words putting feelers out in Afrikaans, if you use the word feelers, then he did not commit himself completely already, but it seems that the information was that he had already conveyed information to those people?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I would concede that because he has to have a product to sell in order for the other side to accept him. It is a century old rule, if you do not have access and you do not have anything to offer, then they do not need you.

MR BOOYENS: And speaking more broadly, during that time period in 1990, police officers were still targets of attacks although there had been political negotiations, there had not been peace in the country, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Definitely not Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: I am entirely open to accept when you say that you cannot recall what Gen van Rensburg told you, but I will now ask you by means of deduction, from the fact that he was at Head Office and I understand that at some stage a document was sent around with regard to the protection of black members, that all officers were asked or all regions were asked with regard to particulars about their black members so that arrangements could be made for their security and if this arrived in the mail, it would arguably be something that Mr Ngqulunga could have studied if he was in the postal section at that time?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Mr Chairperson, it is possible.

MR BOOYENS: Because it has to be distributed.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it has to be distributed.

MR BOOYENS: Is it possible that Gen van Rensburg may have told you on this occasion that this type of information which Mr Ngqulunga was giving out, could endanger police officers' lives, it could possibly lead to it that police officers had been killed or that other askaris' lives are endangered, all those types of information?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson. I don't have an independent recollection of it, but that possibility did exist. My concentration was on the task itself, which was put to me.

MR BOOYENS: I will ask you why, I will tell you why I asked that, I know you are under pressure, did you for example study Mr Baker, Bellingan and Botha's statements or did you not have time?

MR DE KOCK: I paged through it Chairperson, but I did not study it as in like studied every word.

MR BOOYENS: Because their recollection is that you along with the team, that would include Baker, Bellingan and Botha, they are not certain whether Charlie Chate was there, he may have been there, but - and Wouter Mentz, that you went to a place by the name of the House of Coffees and apparently this place was known as upstairs in the House of Coffees, where you basically had a briefing or a motivation for the operation. Could there have been such a meeting?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Because they all three tell me and I mean Mr de Kock, these people, the people's memories may not be so good, but what they recall of this is that you told them, or what you told them in essence, we do not speak of the exact words here, but it was to the effect that Ngqulunga had walked over to the opposition or he was in the process of walking over or had supplied information to the opposition, and that this information could possibly have led or have led to police officers, specifically on the East Rand that had been murdered, and that some of the askaris were in danger, as well. In general, without alleging that those are the exact words that were used, could you have possibly conveyed that information to them?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it is possible Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Mr de Kock, they tell me I took up this matter with Baker and Bellingan and they say that you did not feel so well about this operation because as them, you accepted that it was an operation which in the light of what was said to you, had to be executed but you did not feel good about this, because the man was a former colleague, is that correct, is that how you experienced it?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, as I have said, Brian had already given evidence and the Harms Commission did not earmark him as an incredulous witness and I believed at that stage, or a credible witness, and I believed at that stage that there was a matter of damage control, but with the knowledge that Gen van Rensburg had, he would not have directed that request lightly.

MR BOOYENS: I think it is clear, and we will not spend much time on this, if Gen van Rensburg would tell you Ngqulunga who now works at Head Office is a spy for the other side, did you or the whole Vlakplaas have any Intelligence capacity to research this type of think or were you dependent on Intelligence which were supplied to you by other people? I am not referring to Intelligence of Vlakplaas, but in this instance, the man was not working with you any more?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, in that case, what came to Head Office, would have come from Intelligence Units from right across the country and from the ANC offices itself, where we also had our sources, and more probably by tapping devices.

MR BOOYENS: So you yourself could not verify, you had to depend on the correctness and accepting the correctness of what was conveyed to you?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: And this was a senior officer, you trusted in him and you trusted in what he told you, was really what was going on?

MR DE KOCK: I think that whoever gave him the information would not disclose their sources to me, because those sources were too sensitive. Nick van Rensburg would have known who the sources were, but he would not have conveyed that to me.

MR BOOYENS: Just a further aspect which I need to clear up, or there are still two aspects, when Griffiths Mxenge was murdered in 1991, you were still in South-West Africa?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: So you had nothing to do with that?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: That was Dirk Coetzee's story?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Then another statement which was made in the affidavit of Gen van Rensburg which was handed up, you have already before this same Presiding Officer, you gave evidence in the Zero detonation incident?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Is it true that the Zero detonation, once again it was the Security Branch East Rand's operation which was authorised at the highest level, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: You did not play a leading part in this? You were only involved, if I recall correctly, in the transport of the handgrenades and you helped here and there, but you were, Vlakplaas itself, you and Jack Cronje were not involved with the exception of Joe Mamasela?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: And as far as you know, was Ngqulunga involved with the Zero detonation story?

MR DE KOCK: Not at all Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: So the Zero detonations could not as it was suggested by Gen van Rensburg in his affidavit, could not have been the reason why the person had been killed?

MR DE KOCK: No, not at all Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: If the Committee would just bear with me, Mr Chairman. I have no further questions, thank you Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Can I just deal with one matter while I remember it, it does not arise from this application, it arises from another one where you gave evidence to the effect that you did not like using telephones at Head Office, even the General's telephone, because they were all tapped? Is that so?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: Thank you Chairperson, Lamey on behalf of Mr Nortje. Mr de Kock I would - Mr Booyens put questions to you about it and with regard to the context of that time, with regard to the Harms Commission, in the Nelspruit incident you will recall that evidence was given about this, after the unbanning of the ANC nothing had changed from the viewpoint of the Security Police and Vlakplaas with regard to the struggle as it reigned at that time?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: I am multiplying that statement and I would just summarise it in a nutshell, the unbanning of the ANC during that time caused the struggle to get even heavier with regard to the influx of banned persons, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: The Harms Commission caused great tension in the circles of the police, specifically Security Police?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: And I think you have previously mentioned that, or gave evidence about it that at a high level, damage control had to be applied after the revelations of Nofomela and Coetzee?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And by implication and logically following, one could think that if any credibility could be given or attached to the evidence of Nofomela and Coetzee, it would have a devastating affect on the Security Police and then seen in the broader sense, the government's armed wing to oppose the struggle of the ANC and the PAC?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: Brig Engelbrecht was appointed as the Chief Investigator with the Harms Commission?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: Do you know whether he continually monitored the evidence and events and persons who gave evidence during the Harms Commission?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR LAMEY: So we can accept that he also did the same in the case of Ngqulunga?

MR DE KOCK: Can you repeat that?

MR DE KOCK: Can we accept that he was an observed in Ngqulunga's evidence?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, definitely Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: We already have the picture that Ngqulunga had previously had been a man who was troubled by his nerves?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: And then furthermore as another factor, he was involved with a shooting incident with his wife?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And we have a further factor that there was the risk of prosecution with regard to this incident?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: And at that stage, in the back of one's mind, I ask the question by means of implication which one could assume would have been in the minds of van Rensburg and Engelbrecht, by means of logical deduction, that Nofomela made his revelations because of prosecutions, it was before he was to be executed?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: So, if one summarises all of this, then one would not be wrong to say that there was a great fear that Ngqulunga could be a second Nofomela, specifically because he was involved with the Griffiths Mxenge matter?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: Did you also accept that despite the fact that Ngqulunga had given evidence and that he had denied his involvement and the damage control with regard to his evidence went well, that Gen Engelbrecht who was an observer of his testimony had reason for concern because of his nerves or Brig van Rensburg and that this person created a risk?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, yes, I cannot give evidence on their behalf, but I believe that they could have felt that way, we would have to hear from them.

MR LAMEY: I ask by means of inferences under the circumstances then.

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, it is possible.

MR LAMEY: And then the further information was as you have said, that he had already leaked information and put out feelers to the ANC and this was after his evidence?

MR DE KOCK: That was the information from Gen van Rensburg, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: Was the information also that the evidence that he had given, regardless of the fact that it went rather well, had been an additional aggravating factor when it came to his mental state of mind?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, among others he abused alcohol to such an extent that he wrote off a State vehicle for example, which I had given him to travel with and a second vehicle that was given to him, was also involved in an accident caused by him, and these privileges were then taken from him and I think all of these things had an effect on him.

MR LAMEY: Very well Mr de Kock, your own hesitation and discomfort with the execution of this order was due to the fact that Brian Ngqulunga was also close to you as a colleague, but the order if I may put it as such, within that context and that time, still made sense to you and that is why you continued with the planning and the execution of the order and the issuing of instructions to your members?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: Then just with regard to your evidence regarding Mr Radebe, isn't it correct that Mr Radebe had been given the order to move closer to Mr Ngqulunga and to take him into his confidence and to make friends with him a short while before the actual execution of the order?

MR DE KOCK: It is possible, but I knew that they had always enjoyed good liaison with each other.

MR LAMEY: This is my instruction from Mr Nortje that this was indeed the case, that he was supposed to get closer to Ngqulunga because Radebe would have to drop him off ultimately and the members who were to execute the operation, would then at that point, abduct him, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: I don't have an independent recollection of Mr Radebe's order, but it would have been in line with such an approach for the execution of such a task, so I would concede to it.

MR LAMEY: Very well. Mr de Kock, I don't wish to belabour you with all the detail in Mr Nortje's statement, have you had the opportunity to study his affidavit?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I have scanned it, so to speak.

MR LAMEY: Very well. Let me just determine whether or not there is anything else that I may have omitted. Very well, I don't know whether you dispute this or not, but I just want to know from you, Mr Nortje's recollection is that because you did not want to commit the act yourself and Mr Nortje confirms that you were not very pleased with any personal involvement in the matter and that is why you decided to involve other members such as Mr Baker and Mr Bellingan?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson. It is a question of trust.

MR LAMEY: Yes, but one of the reasons why you specifically involved Mr Baker was because he had not previously been involved in such a form of elimination?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, all the members who were selected with this matter, was seasoned operatives and had drawn blood if I may put it as such.

MR LAMEY: Yes, in other operations, but this one was different in some respects?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, the nature of the execution was precisely the same whether you shot Brian or somebody else with an AK, it was one and the same thing.

CHAIRPERSON: Didn't it matter that this was someone who had been an askari, someone who had worked at Vlakplaas, didn't that make any difference to you, it was just one and the same thing, was it? I thought that you had said that you did not want to take part because it did make a difference?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, what I meant Chairperson, and I perhaps stated it beyond context or misunderstood the question was that there may have been various reasons why one would execute an operation, but the execution, the physical deed itself, would remain the same. One would use a bomb or a weapon and the results would usually be the same. I may have been misunderstood when I made that statement.

MR LAMEY: I just want to ask you, had Vlakplaas been divided at that stage?

MR DE KOCK: No.

MR LAMEY: Were you still at Vlakplaas? I don't have a recollection of what my instructions are with regard to this?

MR DE KOCK: It is correct.

MR LAMEY: Chairperson, I just want to ensure that there are no further instructions. I have no further questions, thank you Chairperson.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR WAGENER: Jan Wagener, Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, my client, Gen Engelbrecht does not formally oppose the application of Mr de Kock or any of the other applicants here. He does however put in dispute parts of the evidence, specifically the evidence pertaining to himself and therefore I have been instructed Mr Chairman, that with your leave, that I do ask certain questions from the present witness as well. If I may proceed, thank you. Mr de Kock, you have previously given evidence that the members of the Security Branch were a very closed group, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: And that you strictly adhered to the need to know principle?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR WAGENER: In fact Mr de Kock, it has previously been your evidence that within the Security Branch itself, you did not necessarily speak to each other openly?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it occurred as such.

MR WAGENER: I can recall that you gave evidence here during the Chand matter for example, that your second in command, Mr Baker, had not been previously informed by you regarding the operation in Bophuthatswana, do you know about that?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR WAGENER: What would you say Mr de Kock, what was the reason why the group in which you moved, clung so desperately to this need to know principle and in so doing, restricted knowledge to a minimum of persons?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, so that it would not endanger one's operation so that when one arrived at the point of execution of actions, it would not already be known to the opposition. Then it was also about certainty in general.

MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, wasn't it also about protecting yourself in certain cases?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, not only ourselves, but the Generals and the Ministers as well.

MR WAGENER: We know now Mr de Kock that you and your men committed various crimes during your period of service, and from that comes your amnesty application which runs into almost 1 000 pages?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, for the State.

MR WAGENER: That is why I ask once again, was part of the motivation for the application of the need to know principle that knowledge of such crimes committed by you and your men be restricted to a minimum of people?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR WAGENER: For example Mr de Kock, if you had committed such a crime which in the normal course of policing would then lead to a police investigation, one would normally have expected the Detective Branch or the Detectives to investigate the matter?

MR DE KOCK: No, not normally, also the Security Branch if it appeared to be an act of terrorism which was committed in such a fashion that it pointed in the direction of the ANC or the PAC. I refer among others to COSATU House and Khotso House for example.

MR WAGENER: Yes, I understand your answer, but in some cases, one could have expected the Detective Branch to undertake the investigations?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that possibility existed.

MR WAGENER: Now, in such a case Mr de Kock, the Investigating Officer would be a Detective with regard to the example that I have just mentioned, would you then go to the Investigating Officer and say "Mr so and so, or Detective so and so, I am Mr de Kock from the Security Branch and I committed this act" and would you then inform him thoroughly of the where, the how and then when and request to be a member of the cover up of further investigation?

MR DE KOCK: No.

MR WAGENER: In fact that would have been extremely foolish, wouldn't it?

MR DE KOCK: If one went to the Investigating Officer, he would have had to arrest one.

MR WAGENER: Exactly. So in that sense Mr de Kock, a division such as the Detective Branch was basically almost an opponent as such?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: An opponent in the sense that you committed a crime, you and your men, the Detective Branch was investigating the matter and you had to ensure that the Detective Branch would not determine the true facts, because then you would be arrested and charged?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson, but here we had the Head of the Detective Branch who was correlating the evidence of the Harms Commission, who was keeping us up to date with questions and answers, he would not have been the Investigating Officer in the Ngqulunga matter for example, he would have been able to control it from his position of authority.

MR WAGENER: Yes, but we all know that you wish to tackle the Generals and that is why you are running ahead to my client. We will get to that. The questions that I am asking you now have absolutely nothing to do with Gen Engelbrecht and you will have ample opportunity to attempt to tackle him as you have so often done. My questions are not about him specifically, about general facts.

MR DE KOCK: Well then in general I could mention the Motherwell bomb incident. Somewhere there the Detective Branch wanted to enter the investigation and there was some or other negotiation from the Security Police's side, I am not precisely sure what it was, but it was a similar situation.

MR WAGENER: Now we know already Mr de Kock, that Gen Engelbrecht was a Detective from 1969 if I recall correctly, he had been a Detective for longer than 20 years at the time of this incident.

MR DE KOCK: I suspect so, I cannot give evidence about that.

MR WAGENER: Yes, and we have already studied affidavits given by him in which he states that up to and including October 1989, he had very little contact with the Security Branch, do you recall that?

MR DE KOCK: Is that what he says?

MR WAGENER: Yes, that is what he says, those are my instructions.

MR DE KOCK: He will have to give evidence himself Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: Can you dispute it?

MR DE KOCK: No, I don't dispute it.

MR WAGENER: My instructions are that before that date, October 1989, I refer to October 1989 because that is when Nofomela's revelations ensued and various developments took place, so when I refer to October 1989, you are with me, before that date, he recalls only one occasion that he met you at Vlakplaas and that he had enjoyed no further contact with your or any other members at Vlakplaas, would you agree with that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, there may have been more occasions, but the Vlakplaas aspect was when he investigated the Khotso House bomb and he wanted to know from me who had been there, but Security Branch members were with him, Warrant Officer Mostert among others. At first I did not want to allow him at Vlakplaas, but later Mr Schoon said that we could speak to the man. I gave my name, but refused to divulge the names of the others. This was all part of a cover up action and the Shirley Gunn situation, which he had to submit information about it to the Ministry and there was someone at John Vorster Square who was his point of liaison at that point.

MR WAGENER: So therefore the short answer is that you cannot dispute it?

MR DE KOCK: I cannot dispute it that he was at Vlakplaas for those reasons.

MR WAGENER: And that he had had no other contact with you before then?

MR DE KOCK: I don't have an independent recollection.

MR WAGENER: Perhaps I should just ask you now because once again you have thrown in the word "cover up action" here, that is your favourite word when you speak of Gen Engelbrecht, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, I have given evidence or mentioned the facts and I don't see anything about that incident in our clusters here, but Gen Engelbrecht also arranged his own murder at a stage and I am prepared to divulge the details of that if you would ask me anything about that.

MR WAGENER: We will get to that Mr de Kock. Did I hear you correctly that you have just said that before or that this visit that Engelbrecht paid to Vlakplaas, was part of a cover up action?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR WAGENER: Or that you recall it being a cover up action?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, because I told him that I had blown up Khotso House and he didn't arrest me and he was at Vlakplaas where I had initially refused him entry and I told him that I had blown up Khotso House and he didn't arrest me. Neither did the Security Policemen who accompanied him and then on a later occasion, he arrived there and he was investigating Khanya House and he arrived there with two identikits saying that one looked like Bellingan and we said that that wasn't so and I told him that I had burnt Khanya House down, and he still didn't arrest me.

MR WAGENER: Are you saying that he visited Vlakplaas twice not once?

MR DE KOCK: Well, Khotso House and Khanya House took place some time apart and he visited Vlakplaas after Khanya House had been burnt down.

MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock my instructions are the he visited Vlakplaas only once and it didn't have anything to do with Khotso House.

MR DE KOCK: I think Mr Engelbrecht is misleading his legal representative.

MR WAGENER: Would you agree that Gen Engelbrecht in 1989 was a Brigadier in the Detective Branch?

MR DE KOCK: That may be so Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: Would you concede to that?

MR DE KOCK: It is possible Chairperson, perhaps Gen Engelbrecht will be able to testify about that, I cannot give evidence about that.

MR WAGENER: He was not a Security Policeman?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, but every day he was in Gen Nick van Rensburg's office from where he managed the Harms Commission's situation.

MR WAGENER: So he wasn't a member of the Security Police?

MR DE KOCK: No, he was not.

MR WAGENER: Furthermore my instructions are that he was not the Investigating Officer of the Harms Commission?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, he was there every day, he and Col du Plessis were the two main persons along with Nick van Rensburg, who formed the team who dealt with the investigation of this Commission.

MR WAGENER: According to the Commission it was van der Westhuizen and Wright?

MR DE KOCK: No, I did not see Brig Wright once, later he left his position due to personal problems. I did not see him at all. Brig van der Westhuizen or Gen van der Westhuizen, I think I saw him once, I flew down to Cape Town with him once, but we did not discuss this. The two Generals that we saw were Alwyn Conradie and Joubert.

MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock is it your evidence today that Gen Engelbrecht at the time of the Harms Commission, during 1990, which is basically the same time regarding which this Ngqulunga incident is about, are you saying that he knew about all your crimes?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, because they had to see where they could cover things up, or remove pieces of evidence, and so also he flew to London to assist there and to investigate.

MR WAGENER: Who would have told him about all these things according to you?

MR DE KOCK: Well Chairperson, we who had been initially involved and had to make affidavits.

MR WAGENER: Are you saying that you involved Mr Engelbrecht or informed Mr Engelbrecht regarding all your crimes in 1990, is that what you are saying?

MR DE KOCK: No, this was before the time.

MR WAGENER: When was that?

MR DE KOCK: I don't have a fixed date, but he was involved, he was informed about it. I know among others, it didn't necessarily have to do with me, but there was a situation during which Mamasela and the others had been identified at a border post and these details had to be covered up.

MR WAGENER: No, but the question is, did you inform Engelbrecht about any of the crimes that you had been involved in, yes or no?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I did, among others the Maponya incident.

MR WAGENER: Are you serious when you give that answer, Mr de Kock?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: I sat here in this very same venue, a month ago when you gave evidence under oath and said that you never told him the truth, do you recall that?

MR DE KOCK> Chairperson, as far as I know I told him the truth.

MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, I asked you a question during the Japie Maponya matter, I asked you whether you told Gen Engelbrecht the truth or not and you conceded that you had never told him the truth and that you had deceived him. Are you changing your evidence?

MR DE KOCK: No the deception took place with the Harms Commission, that aspect was misleading. Those affidavits were misleading, but he knew the truth.

MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, you have evidence here under oath and stated that you never told Mr Engelbrecht the true facts surrounding Japie Maponya, now my question to you is, are you changing your evidence?

MR DE KOCK: No, I will stand by my evidence.

MR WAGENER: Very well ...

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, before you go on, could you supply us at a later stage or during the adjournment, could you supply the Leader of Evidence with the details so that he can make arrangements if necessary, to obtain a transcript if it is not already available.

MR WAGENER: I will do so Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you going onto something else now?

MR WAGENER: Not necessarily Mr Chairman, but I will be a while yet, so maybe this is a convenient moment.

ON RESUMPTION:

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: (s.u.o.)

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR WAGENER: (continued) Thank you Mr Chairman, during the tea break, Mr Steenkamp has indicated that he has requested the part of the Japie Maponya record that I have referred to. Unfortunately I don't have it myself, so I have been told ...

CHAIRPERSON: When it does come, I trust that it will be made available to you and to Mr Hattingh.

MR HATTINGH: Mr Chairman, I don't think it was the cross-examination that Mr Wagener has referred to, was done during the Maponya hearing, I think it was done during the hearing of the Vlakplaas.

ADV SANDI: That is my recollection as well, Mr Hattingh, the first week when we started here, about two months ago?

MR WAGENER: Any way Mr Chairman, I will see to that and I will bring it to your attention the moment I can. Mr de Kock, before the adjournment I asked you whether during 1990 you had sat down and told Gen Engelbrecht about all the crimes that you had committed and if I recall correctly, you said that you told him about Japie Maponya, and that is more or less where we stopped at the point of the adjournment?

MR DE KOCK: As far as I recall, yes Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: Now I would like to ask you further on the same point, did you tell him about any of your other deeds?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, we referred to Khotso and COSATU and Khanya House, were referred to the shooting of Zwelibanzi Nyanda in Swaziland. This was one of the aspects which Nofomela revealed and which had to be addressed and there was a variety of others.

MR WAGENER: When you say we, do you mean you or when you say we, do you mean you and other persons, or other persons, who are you referring to?

MR DE KOCK: These would be the other persons who were also involved, who had been mentioned by Dirk Coetzee and Nofomela.

MR WAGENER: Now to which incidents did you refer to, you, Mr de Kock?

MR DE KOCK: I believe that there would have been various, a number. I don't have an independent recollection of precisely which cases or in what sequence, but I have just mentioned some of these cases.

MR WAGENER: Can you recall what you said to Gen Engelbrecht?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, this is ten years ago, it would hardly be possible to recall precisely what I said to him.

MR WAGENER: Are you sitting here and saying to yourself "I think I said this to him", but you don't really know?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, I informed Gen Engelbrecht upon various occasions where statements had to be rewritten, and supplements had to be made, so he was informed.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, do I understand, I am getting a little confused by this, that this was all in response to what had been made public by Coetzee and Nofomela, that after that was public, you went and explained to Gen van Rensburg what had happened in those incidents?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it was Gen Engelbrecht or then Brig Engelbrecht. The run up of this investigation or these inquiries leads to confusion, because Schoon was then in charge of C1. First Mr McNally entered and Alwyn Conradie and I think a month or two later, Brig Schoon went on pension and Gen Nick van Rensburg took over, and there was then a replacement from the Detective Branch's side because Daantjie van Wyk came in and he left and then Engelbrecht came in. This leaves it open for confusion.

MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, yes, I don't want any misunderstandings about this, is it your evidence that you, Mr de Kock during 1990 sat down and told Gen Engelbrecht about the crimes that you had committed at Vlakplaas, in the hope that he would then cover it up? Is that your evidence here today?

MR DE KOCK: Not with the hope that he would cover it up, that was his job.

MR WAGENER: But you didn't know, you could have said to the man "I committed a murder" and he could have seen to it that you were arrested immediately?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, but that was not Gen Engelbrecht's function. His function was damage control, the protection of the police and particularly the Security Police and then also the Unit.

MR WAGENER: Who issued this function to Engelbrecht?

MR DE KOCK: I can only accept that this came from higher authority, from the Commissioner, the Chief of Security, this was not something that he could do on his own volition.

MR WAGENER: Did you have this order?

MR DE KOCK: No, I was lower down.

MR WAGENER: Aren't you speculating Mr de Kock?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, because the then Brig Engelbrecht could not appoint himself to deal with these aspects.

MR WAGENER: No, but you are saying that his function was to cover things up, so I am asking you from where this order came, who issued the order to him, where did you ever see this order?

MR DE KOCK: It could only have come from a higher authority, there is no other way in which this order would have been issued.

MR WAGENER: So you don't know?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, I don't have specific names.

MR WAGENER: I put it to you that there was never such an order to Engelbrecht, there was no such cover up order and this is just a very convenient excuse for you as you are sitting here?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, it is not excuse.

MR WAGENER: How many meetings or occasions occurred during which the death of Ngqulunga was discussed and now I refer to the time before his death, when his death was discussed, during which Engelbrecht was present?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I know about the occasion upon which Gen van Rensburg spoke to me and that was the one which included the Chand situation. I have a vague recollection but I don't wish to rely upon it, that there was another occasion upon which Engelbrecht encountered me in the passage on the 6th floor, but as I have said, I don't wish to rely upon this recollection, because it is very vague.

MR WAGENER: Therefore there were two occasions?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, according to my recollection.

MR WAGENER: Wasn't there a prior occasion before the first occasion to which you have referred, during which the Chand incident was discussed?

MR DE KOCK: Well I know about the Chand case when Brian's name was mentioned, if there was another case, it is something that I cannot recall.

MR WAGENER: Can you recall that during your criminal trial you gave evidence about one such further case?

MR DE KOCK: I mentioned a situation Chairperson, as I have said I have a vague recollection of it and during this time I encountered Engelbrecht in the passage and this situation once again emerged.

MR WAGENER: No perhaps I have been unclear Mr de Kock, during your criminal trial you gave evidence of a previous occasion upon which six or seven persons were present and you discussed the killing of Mr Ngqulunga, and among others Gen Engelbrecht was also present there. What occasion was that?

MR DE KOCK: I don't have an independent recollection of that, I think Joe Mamasela gave evidence to that effect.

MR WAGENER: Yes, and you confirmed it under oath, that such an occasion had indeed existed.

MR DE KOCK: As far as I can recall, I cannot remember that Brian's death had been discussed at that point already.

MR WAGENER: So when you testified to this, Chairperson, that is page 13055 of the criminal record, when you testified to this, you were not telling the truth, is that what you are saying?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, that is not what I am saying, what I am saying is that that was my recollection at that stage.

MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, perhaps I should assist you, you gave evidence upon this occasion to which I have referred you to, that you discussed the death or the killing of Mr Ngqulunga, are you saying that that never happened?

MR DE KOCK: No, I am not saying that, I am saying that I don't have an independent recollection thereof, but that it is indeed possible.

MR WAGENER: Who were these six or seven persons who were in attendance upon that occasion that you gave evidence about?

MR DE KOCK: I cannot remember.

MR WAGENER: Was Mr Paul van Dyk present?

MR DE KOCK: It is possible.

MR WAGENER: Perhaps I should just put this clearly once again, was there ever such an occasion?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, there was a myriad of occasions upon which we convened in various groups who were involved in certain incidents and when discussions were held which took on the form of a workshop so to speak.

MR WAGENER: So you are saying that it is possible that such an occasion did occur upon which Engelbrecht and other members were involved, approximately six or seven of you and during this time, you discussed the killing of Brian Ngqulunga?

MR DE KOCK: It is possible Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: Then why didn't you say so in your amnesty application, or are you not certain?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, there were many cases that I had to mention, and the cases which are mentioned here have to do with grave human rights violations, and there are many other cases which do not have to do with human right violations, which still had to be set up. Therefore it might be a question of incompleteness.

MR WAGENER: In 1990, during the time of the Harms Commission, you were probably involved in many discussions during which many other people were often present?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR WAGENER: And today it is impossible for you to recall all those individual discussions, including those who were present there and what exactly was discussed?

MR DE KOCK: As I have said, this took place approximately 10 years ago, but there were a great deal of these discussions.

MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, my instructions are that there never was such an occasion that you gave evidence about this morning, during which Gen Engelbrecht was present, when Gen van Rensburg would have said to you "make a plan with Brian Ngqulunga", are you not mistaken in that regard?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, because that was when Gen Engelbrecht mentioned among others that he wanted to go along with this operation to the Chand residence.

MR WAGENER: And we all know that that was an absurd proposition, if that had ever been the case?

MR DE KOCK: No, it is not correct.

MR WAGENER: You gave evidence this morning Mr de Kock, among others that Gen Engelbrecht would have begun to doubt the loyalty of Brian Ngqulunga?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: And what do you base that evidence upon, why do you say that?

MR DE KOCK: Gen van Rensburg would have informed him about the same aspects that he informed me about with regard to such a request.

MR WAGENER: So do you know or are you guessing?

MR DE KOCK: I cannot give independent evidence about it, it would be an inference.

MR WAGENER: Well, then the short answer is that you don't know what Gen Engelbrecht knew and what he did not know because you did not tell him?

MR DE KOCK: No, I did not tell him.

MR WAGENER: Where you refer to this conversation in the elevator, are you sure that there was such a discussion with Mr Engelbrecht?

MR DE KOCK: It is possible.

CHAIRPERSON: The passage I think, it was, Mr Wagener. The passage on the 6th floor, I think it was, Mr de Kock said.

MR DE KOCK: Correct Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: I beg your pardon, it was in the passage on the way to the lifts, that is the evidence that you gave during your criminal trial?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR WAGENER: Are you sure about this?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I have a recollection there of. As I have told you, it is vague, but I do have a recollection of it.

MR WAGENER: What would the General have told you there, in the passage?

MR DE KOCK: It was a confirmation of Gen van Rensburg's request that there was a problem with Ngqulunga.

MR WAGENER: And that you had to kill Ngqulunga?

MR DE KOCK: Well Chairperson, that had already been discussed when van Rensburg and Engelbrecht were in the office. It would not have been a reference to anything else essentially.

MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, wasn't it a tremendous risk on the part of Gen van Rensburg to issue such an order to you in the presence of an outsider?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, because van Rensburg and Engelbrecht at that stage, or at least Gen Engelbrecht wasn't really an outsider, he was in the office on a daily basis and in either event, this was a case during it was the word of a Lieutenant-Colonel against the word of a Brigadier and a General, and we all worked on that need to know principle, so here we had two senior managerial managers.

MR WAGENER: Exactly the need to know basis, as I understand it, it was that you did not convey information to anyone unless it was absolutely vital, that is how I understood the principle?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct, but the Brigadier would have to support the General and say that the Colonel is lying.

MR WAGENER: May I just ask you Mr de Kock, please tell me once again, why Brian Ngqulunga had to be killed, according to you?

MR DE KOCK: Well Chairperson, that was the request or the order from Gen van Rensburg, that he had already put out feelers to the ANC, that there had been contact, that it would jeopardise the Harms Commission and by nature of the situation then, the entire Security Police and C1.

MR WAGENER: And we all know that Gen van Rensburg denies this order?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR WAGENER: And we all know that Gen van Rensburg has applied for amnesty, did not apply for amnesty in this case?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR WAGENER: He did request amnesty for a number of deeds which include various murders, if I have it correctly?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR WAGENER: Can you think of one good reason why then, if your evidence is correct, he would not have requested amnesty for this case?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I think that we should measure this in terms of the Motherwell bomb incident during which van Rensburg also denied that he knew anything about it, that he went as far as committing perjury with an interdict in the Cape Magistrate's Court for his person not to be involved in the incident, and then ultimately he applied for amnesty for the Motherwell bomb after the convictions had been made of certain policemen. So for Gen van Rensburg to commit perjury, is a daily dish.

MR WAGENER: Well, I must tell you Mr de Kock, I hear what you are saying, but I don't think I really understand your answer. Mr de Kock, my instructions are as they have been on previous occasions, that Gen Engelbrecht was a Detective during July 1990, would you agree?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR WAGENER: He was an outsider regarding the Security Branch, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That is Mr Engelbrecht's evidence.

MR WAGENER: That he didn't know about this series of crimes which had been committed by you and your Vlakplaas members and that in no way whatsoever was he involved in any order or suggestion that Brian Ngqulunga had to be murdered by you and your Unit. And that if you had received an order from van Rensburg, then Engelbrecht has no knowledge of it. That is my instruction. I assume that you will stand by your version?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: Thank you Mr Chairperson.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VAN DER WALT: Thank you Mr Chairman, van der Walt, for the Ngqulunga family. Mr de Kock, is it correct that the incident during which Mr Ngqulunga was to have wounded his wife, really took place in January 1990?

MR DE KOCK: It is possible, I don't have a precise date for that.

MR VAN DER WALT: My instructions are that it was indeed during January 1990?

MR DE KOCK: Then I will not dispute it.

MR VAN DER WALT: You mention this incident if I understand it correctly, in order to indicate that it is indicative of the instability of the deceased, Mr Ngqulunga, at that stage of his life?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, well, it would be according to my lay opinion.

MR VAN DER WALT: So at the stage during June 1990, when he gave evidence before the Harms Commission, these inherent risks already existed for the Security Police, his instability and the fact that he was going to be examined regarding the Mxenge murder?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR VAN DER WALT: And despite that from the perspective of the Security Police, he was a satisfactory witness?

MR DE KOCK: Well Chairperson, that is my opinion, I cannot express an opinion about what Gen Engelbrecht or Gen van Rensburg thought, it is my opinion.

MR VAN DER WALT: And if I understand your evidence correctly, the reason why he was murdered can be ascribed to the fact that he had put out feelers to the ANC?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct, that is the information that I received.

MR VAN DER WALT: The ANC would then be an organisation which at that stage, had already been unbanned?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR VAN DER WALT: Mr Ngqulunga was a colleague of yours, and you have already given evidence that you were somewhat reticent about this order, that you didn't really adopt this order with eagerness?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR VAN DER WALT: Did you attempt to gain information which would indicate precisely how he would have put out feelers to the ANC, what exactly his offence would have been?

MR DE KOCK: No, I had no doubt in Gen van Rensburg's judgement regarding the development of his information which he had received, or his management of such information, the inferences that he drew and the detail that he possessed.

MR VAN DER WALT: Despite the fact that this was a colleague that you had worked with, you did not feel the necessity to obtain further information?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, coming from Gen van Rensburg, I did not take it any further.

MR VAN DER WALT: This decision with regard to the method in which Mr Ngqulunga would be killed, who took the decision?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I took the decision.

MR VAN DER WALT: I beg your pardon, please continue. Did you also take the decision regarding the amount of ammunition for example which would be used?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, but I left it on ground level, if I recall correctly, it had to be appear to be an ANC revenge attack, because he was a defector and a collaborator and I also accept responsibility for what the operatives on ground level did.

MR VAN DER WALT: Is it correct that approximately 30 to 40 rounds were fired on the deceased, according to the information that you gathered after the incident?

E KOCK: I don't think they told me how much ammunition had been used, I also didn't count the ammunition afterwards, because we destroyed the weapons and so forth, but I would accept that to be the amount of shells which were found.

MR VAN DER WALT: That which you wanted to achieve through the method in which the deceased was killed, could have been achieved in another method, isn't that correct?

MR DE KOCK: There were many other methods, but if I recall correctly it had to appear to be an ANC revenge attack, among others, just for the sake of completion I would like to mention that during the Harms Commission, an ANC document was submitted. This document was a pamphlet which was distributed throughout the Republic in which the faces of six or eight askaris had been printed, with their names and their real names and then on the back in English and in four black languages I think, mention was also made that these persons whose photo's and names appeared on the pamphlet, were impimpis who were working with the Boere, who were prolonging the struggle or leading to further loss of life of MK members. Also based upon that, it would have appeared that the ANC in this regard, had taken action against Mr Ngqulunga.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that part of this Bundle?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I didn't find it when I paged through the Bundle. I am not certain, but I think that during my criminal trial, such a document was submitted, somewhere during my criminal trial the document was submitted.

MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, I think I can get hold of it, in Mr Bellingan's total application, his big application, I seem to recall that document was there.

CHAIRPERSON: I seem to recall it is in one of the applications that we are going to hear, if it is not in this one, in one of the applications that we are going to hear the week after next. I recall there pages with photographs on them.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, there was such documentation.

MR VAN DER WALT: Mr de Kock, if we accept this to be the case, the point remains that the objective could have been achieved through other methods, for example by firing a single shot with an Eastern Block handgun, which would also have led people to believe that the ANC was involved, why was it necessary to fire 30 or 40 shots at the deceased?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, in many shooting incidents during which ANC members had been involved, they fired automatic rounds. I refer for example to the attacks on police stations among others, there was no such thing as a single shot, it was about flattening a target and a magazine containing 30 to 40 rounds, would be empty within three seconds.

MR VAN DER WALT: You are talking about targets which were buildings, such as police stations, I am talking about a target that was one person.

MR DE KOCK: I am referring to an askari who initially had been a policeman in the Transkei, when he fled the Holomisa regime and joined us. I think that 35 shots were fired at him in his car, they would usually open up full automatic, we tried to stay in line with that modus operandi which was used by the ANC.

MR VAN DER WALT: Mr de Kock, earlier you were examined about the content of the post-mortem report, and I know that it does not necessarily fall within the framework of this Committee, but I do have specific instructions to examine you about it. After the death of Mr Ngqulunga, did you see his body?

MR DE KOCK: No.

MR VAN DER WALT: You cannot say pertinently that the fact that his tongue was missing can be ascribed to a shot or shots which were fired in the face?

MR DE KOCK: I cannot give expert evidence about it, but I can testify according to personal experience from 1968 onwards when I performed my first border duty, that sometimes with a single shot, one would remove one half of someone's face or head. That is just one case, I am surprised that anything of his upper body remained if he was shot at in the upper body because I didn't see the photo's.

MR VAN DER WALT: With this in mind, was this method not a particularly brutal method of getting rid of the deceased?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, any method of killing is brutal. If it is violent, then any method is brutal, whether it is by means of a knife, a panga or a bullet, all of them are equally gruesome.

MR VAN DER WALT: Mr de Kock, with regard to this incident, you were found guilty and sentenced in the High Court, specifically with regard to this case, what were you sentenced to?

MR DE KOCK: 20 years, Chairperson.

MR VAN DER WALT: Just a final aspect, do you have knowledge of where Mrs Ngqulunga was injured by the deceased, do you know about that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I don't know who dealt with it, I think one of my members addressed it. I think it might be Capt van Dyk, but I speak under correction, I do not want to depend on that.

MR VAN DER WALT: Without going into the detail there, I have specific instructions to put it to you that Mrs Ngqulunga was not wounded with an R1 or a semi-automatic weapon, but with a pistol, a hand weapon?

MR DE KOCK: I would concede that Chairperson.

MR VAN DER WALT: I thank you Mr Chairman, I have nothing further.

MR VAN DER WALT: I have nothing further, Mr Chairman.

ADV STEENKAMP: No questions, thank you Mr Chairman.

MR SIBANYONI: Mr de Kock, I refer you to page 149 of the Bundle, paragraph 5, in the middle of the paragraph, this is a statement by Joseph Tsepo Mamasela, known as Joe Mamasela, he says -

In other words he says it is you who came up with the suggestion that Brian should be eliminated?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, Joe Mamasela himself had on occasion had the idea that he was afraid that Brian would not last, and I on the contrary used some of my calming tablets which I used, I gave it to Brian, I gave him two strips with Lexotan, that is what the Doctor prescribed for my nerves. I requested of Brian not to use it in conjunction with any liquor, but there was nowhere a situation where Joe Mamasela was present when something like that was discussed.

MR SIBANYONI: Another issue, Joe Mamasela makes the statement saying that he attended a meeting which took place in the office of Gen Krappies Engelbrecht and then where Brian Ngqulunga, where there was concern about Brian Ngqulunga, do you recall any such meeting?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, something like that could have happened, I don't have an independent recollection thereof, I cannot say that it did not happen.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you Mr Chairperson, no further questions.

ADV SANDI: Thank you. Mr de Kock, I am afraid I think I must ask you to say exactly what Mr van Rensburg said to you about Ngqulunga, did he say Ngqulunga had actually approached the ANC or did he say he was, it is not very clear to me what your evidence is, or did he say he was making an attempt to contact the ANC, which of the two did he say?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, when one puts out feelers to an organisation, then you make contact. It is not a matter of being in the process of wanting to make contact, one makes contact with somebody there, you try to find the right person with whom you can liaise eventually.

ADV SANDI: Did he tell you who that person was?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson.

ADV SANDI: Did he specify as to whether whoever had been approached by Ngqulunga was inside the country or outside the country?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, he did not. What I would like to mention for the sake of completion is that all three South African Intelligence Services had sources in Shell House at that stage.

ADV SANDI: Did he tell you what the reaction of the ANC would have been to his approaches?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, he did not.

ADV SANDI: Did it appear that whoever from the ANC was approached by Ngqulunga, believed that he was being honest and that he should be trusted, what was the reaction from the ANC? You cannot tell us about that?

MR DE KOCK: Unfortunately not, Chairperson.

ADV SANDI: Yes, but if Mr Ngqulunga was involved in any mischievous scheme with the ANC, is it not a bit odd that when he testified at the Harms Commission, he did not use that opportunity to spill the beans and talk about all these things he had been involved in at Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, not as easily. I also gave evidence here and the control from above, and if I refer to above, I refer to the higher hierarchy and particularly Gens van Rensburg and Engelbrecht, it was particularly strict. We were handled very well, if I may put it as such.

ADV SANDI: Before this incident, was there any, before your discussions with Mr van Rensburg, was there any operation in which you had been involved with Ngqulunga?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, Mr Ngqulunga did not have knowledge or if he knew of my operations, it was just speculation. He did not undertake any operation along with me, which could have created a problem for me.

ADV SANDI: In other words, you personally were not in a position of fear or concern that there were certain things pertaining to you personally, which he could expose?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, not at all, under no circumstances.

ADV SANDI: Thank you Mr de Kock, thank you Chair.

MR SIBANYONI: If the operation was for the State, defending the State, why would you keep it a secret to Gen Engelbrecht, why would you lie about the operations to Gen Engelbrecht?

MR DE KOCK: I don't understand Chairperson, if you could repeat.

MR SIBANYONI: Let me maybe repeat it again, you are saying what Vlakplaas was doing, was for the benefit of the State?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR SIBANYONI: My question is, arising from the statement of Gen van Rensburg and also arising from cross-examination from Mr Wagener that they deny any knowledge about the Brian Ngqulunga incident, if this Brian Ngqulunga incident was done for the benefit of the State, to protect the State, the police, etc, why would you as Mr de Kock, not have told them the truth about this incident?

MR DE KOCK: But I did tell them the truth Chairperson, Capt Baker and I directly reported back to Gen Nick van Rensburg himself. There was no beating about the bush, it was a reporting back about the death of Brian Ngqulunga and the detail surrounding it. There was no lie about that.

MR SIBANYONI: Can you think of any reason why they are now denying knowledge of it?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it works on the same principle as in the Harms Commission when we denied everything from Dirk Coetzee's time, including Griffiths Mxenge. The whole system in Intelligence Service is one of deniability. There it is denial, they make it impossible for one to implicate anybody, evidence is destroyed, later there is disassociation, there is more denial, so it is part of that system.

MR SIBANYONI: But today we have got an Act in terms of which if you tell the truth about what happened, then you get amnesty for that. Why do you think they don't take that opportunity?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I have my own theory about this, it is absolutely my own theory, but I might be entirely wrong. I think it may have emanated from 1994, or even before that, but I may be wrong, that there is some or other, there was a situation where it was said that up until 1989 there would be amnesty, but not afterwards. There was some speculation to that, and I personally attach it to that. I don't understand why they do not use it, it is beyond my comprehension because we had a situation like in the Motherwell bomb where three policemen and an askari were killed, also on the instruction of Gen Nick van Rensburg, and he did not apply for amnesty for that, and in the end he was forced to apply for amnesty, after the sentencing of Nieuwoudt and other members. So he then used the amnesty in the Motherwell incident, because he could not escape that situation.

MR SIBANYONI: Lastly, initially when I read all the statements in here, the application, I was under the impression that you put the emphasis for the reasons for the killing of Brian Ngqulunga on his emotional state, in other words that he was emotional, as a result he was a great risk to disclose, whereas on the other hand, the other applicants put the emphasis on the fact that he was putting out feelers, he was sending feelers to the ANC.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I may have had that extra information because I was involved personally with the Harms Commission and the other members not. And I would have regarded it as one of the reasons why he would have put out his feelers, we had an unbanning of the movement, and one would not know what his real motives were, that he became afraid and wanted to turn back. That is just a matter of my perception.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you Mr Chairperson, no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: One point, I don't know if I've got it down wrong, there is one point I would like to clarify if clarify is the right word. I think you said Mr de Kock, that after you had been approached, you discussed the matter with Capt Baker and he agreed that you would have to proceed?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And you then said according to my note -

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Because you see in your application, you mentioned that you discussed it with Baker and that he would be satisfied with the help of Bellingan, Mentz and Botha. This is page 5, and in your supplementary affidavit, at page 147, you again said that you asked Baker if he would be satisfied with the help of Bellingan, Mentz and Piet Botha. At neither of those places do you mention Nortje or Chate, are you sure about them, that they were part of this?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, because Nortje was my driver, because I had trouble with my leg at that time, he was my driver, and he also made the arrangements for the vehicles from Avis. Chate, I had a vague recollection of Chairperson, and I did not want to involve people here and in reading the other people's statements, it jolted my memory and I cannot dispute that Chate was there.

CHAIRPERSON: But you did not remember it when you made your own application or your own affidavit?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson, because I knew there was another person because Nortje and I drove in one vehicle. There was a second vehicle and I did not just want to implicate people here, I did not want to just mention a name and then it is not so.

CHAIRPERSON: And Nortje in his says at page 263 -

Is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: No Chairperson, with regard to the scene of the shooting, Nortje was not, but Nortje also hired a Mercedes Benz vehicle which he and I first reconnoitred the area. I think it is the road between the Marula Sun and Letlhabile and we drove out on that road as well. So right from the start, he was part of this operation.

CHAIRPERSON: If you will bear with me for one moment.

MR LAMEY: Chairperson, may I just, sorry Chairperson, I just want to come in here. We, Mr Nortje, would also testify to that, that he did know of the plans, but what he intended to convey was he wasn't part of the actual execution of the killing plan, I think he will elaborate further on that he was involved in hiring the vehicles, also the Mercedes Benz, I think he said in his initial statement also that he was involved with the kombi and the Mercedes Benz at Avis, and as far as Mr de Kock testifies that they also did some observation, he will also testify to that, it is not disputed. As it pleases you Chairperson.

MR SIBANYONI: Mr de Kock, do you know at what time did this incident take place, the killing?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, if I have to judge, Chairperson, I would say it was between eight and eleven in the evening, but I say that with uncertainty, I think it was between eight and eleven or seven and eleven, somewhere around there. Actually not only the killing, but the abduction of Brian Ngqulunga, the execution of his murder and their return, somewhere in that vicinity.

CHAIRPERSON: Is this person Chate, Charlie Tait?

MR DE KOCK: No, he is Chate, C-h-a-t-e. The one you are thinking of is John Tait, Mr Chairman, like ...

CHAIRPERSON: The one I am thinking of is Charlie Tait, at page 29 who was waiting at Wonderpark to get the weapons after the operation.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, we waited with him there Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: So he was driving the other vehicle?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, the one with the blue light if we needed it.

CHAIRPERSON: That is Charlie Tait?

MR DE KOCK: Charlie Chate.

CHAIRPERSON: Charlie Chate?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson, Charles Chate.

CHAIRPERSON: At various places in this Bundle, he is apparently spelt as Tait.

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr de Kock, just singular aspects. You have mentioned that you were uncertain with regard to names and that you did not want to involve other persons is you were not certain whether they were involved or not, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: In your supplementary application with regard to Vlakplaas from page 1 thereof, you deal with this problem that you experienced, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And you say there that as time has run its course and you have read in the media and what other people testified and as you had opportunity to discuss with the applicants, your memory was joggled with regard to certain incidents and events?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And you were also asked with regard to Vlakplaas' task after the unbanning of the ANC and with regard to the Nelspruit, we addressed that in its completion, but for purposes of this Committee's knowledge, I would like to refer you to page 72 of the same document, there under the heading Vlakplaas After the Unbanning of Certain Political Organisations, you completely describe there what Vlakplaas' task was after the unbanning of the ANC?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: You mentioned a set of photo's of askaris which were circulated by the ANC, do you know whether Mr Ngqulunga was amongst those photo's?

MR DE KOCK: Yes Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Mr Chairman, I would also like to check the record of what was, what Mr de Kock testified under cross-examination by Mr Wagener, my Attorney and I have had a discussion about it, our recollection was, it now is that that cross-examination took place during the hearing of the Chand incident. I don't know if the record of those proceedings is available.

CHAIRPERSON: We are getting the one record, let's check that one first, if it is not there, then Mr Wagener may have to find it somewhere else. At the moment he has put it to Mr de Kock and he says it comes from a certain record which we will hopefully have later this afternoon, or certainly by tomorrow morning.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: You can reserve any questioning on that.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, then I have no further questions, Mr Chairman.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I would just like to mention finally, as I have done right from the start, that I take full responsibility for my own actions and what flowed from there, and I also want to take responsibility for the members under my command, black or white, for the actions which they have executed under my command, despite the fact that these instructions came from the General. I do not take responsibility for higher up, but I take responsibility for all the members under me, as it becomes an officer, thank you Mr Chairman.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------MR BOOYENS: I call Mr Baker, Mr Chairman, page 117.

MR SIBANYONI: For record purposes your full names, Mr Baker?

MR BAKER: Adrian David Baker.

ADRIAN DAVID BAKER: (sworn states)

MR SIBANYONI: You may be seated, thank you. Sworn in Mr Chairperson.

EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, I am instructed by my Attorney that once again as on a previous occasion, the schedule that is in your possession, was - ended up in the hands of the Witness Protection people, but my learned friend apparently has been given the one that contains the corrections and he said he would put it in front of the Commission.

ADV STEENKAMP: Mr Chairman, those are the documents which I received last week, and those were handed to you as well, we did make copies available.

MR BOOYENS: There is no substantial difference, if necessary we can look for it Mr Chairman, we can basically stick to what is in the schedule. Mr Baker, you've got in front of you your amnesty application, appearing at page 117 of the record in this matter, is that correct?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: And you have already testified on the same introduction to your applications in other matters, and you confirm the correctness of what is written here in, is that correct?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Very well, let's deal with the specific incident relating to the death of the late Mr Brian Ngqulunga on the 19th of July 1990. Is it correct that at that stage you were the second in command of Vlakplaas?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: And before this incident, you state that during July you were approached by Col de Kock, the then OC of Vlakplaas?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: And what did Mr de Kock at that stage inform you, what did he want you to do, this is now only the two of you at this stage?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, at that stage Mr de Kock informed me that a former member of the ANC who had joined us, the deceased, Brian Ngqulunga, had rejoined the ANC and that he was acting as a double-agent.

MR BOOYENS: If you use the word rejoined the ANC, are you, it is not a question of formally joining or resigning or something like that, he shifted his loyalties, his loyalties have shifted back?

MR BAKER: He shifted his allegiance back to the ANC, Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Very well. Now, did you know Mr Ngqulunga?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Were you aware that he was working in the postal section of Security Head Quarters?

MR BAKER: Yes Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: You heard the evidence given by Mr de Kock about the rather surprisingly lack security in connection with highly confidential documents and secret documents that seemed to have existed inside the building where the Security Police had its Head Office, can you confirm that that was the case, from personal knowledge?

MR BAKER: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: From personal knowledge?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Now, you made a statement, you make the statement at page 134, the third paragraph, about the death of policemen or the possible death of policemen, can you just elaborate on that?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, at that stage a number of policemen had been the subject of attacks, murders, their homes have been burnt, etc, and especially in the East Rand and that information passed out by this person, could possibly have led to some of these attacks.

MR BOOYENS: Now, you then deal at page 135 just with the methods used, I do not think, I think this Commission has heard enough about the method used from the other side to kill these people, you just ask that this be incorporated, is that correct?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Now, a further risk with a former askari talking, was of course the fact that there were still askaris in the service of the police, is that correct?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: And these askaris, you make the statement that the identification of askaris, led to the exposure of covert operations and they had reason to fear exposure of themselves which was a certain death warrant. Was there an uneasiness or rumours anything of that nature, relating to the deceased at an earlier stage or what is the position in so far as the askaris and their fears, are concerned?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, at an earlier stage and at that stage I don't think that Mr Ngqulunga was trusted by the askaris any longer.

MR BOOYENS: He had been, you heard ...

CHAIRPERSON: Can I ask you something before we go on, we have heard about the fact that there were negotiations taking place, the ANC was unbanned?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Would that have made the askaris feel any safer, or would it in fact have made them feel more at risk?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, they would have felt more uneasy about what was going on at that stage.

MR BOOYENS: The reason, because dealing on what His Lordship has asked you, the attitude of the askaris were that they were working for the government and they were perceived to be traitors by the people that were now unbanned and who were probably going to be the next government?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Now, then Mr - let's get back to the operation itself, at page 136, the second paragraph, you said, refer there to the fact that Col de Kock suggested a team to you?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Chate and Nortje, they were not, never members of the actual operational team, is that correct?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Do you confirm as you referred to in here, that the meeting took place at the House of Coffees?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: And can you remember, you mention that you were told to call certain members and tell them to come to the house of Coffees, can you remember whether they were all there?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, as far as I can recall, they were. I am not absolutely sure on that point, if everybody was there at that stage.

MR BOOYENS: But these were the names that were mentioned there?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Now, did you people then meet at the House of Coffees?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Did Mr de Kock then explain the why's and the fact that it was an order from above and so on, of the operation?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: We have heard the evidence that Mr de Kock was injured at that stage, is that correct?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Were you to take charge of this operation?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Mr Baker, you then deal with the arrangements with Mr Simon Radebe about how you were going to meet Mr Brian Ngqulunga, is that correct?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Take it from there, what was the arrangement with Mr Simon Radebe?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, as far as I can remember, when I spoke to Mr Radebe on the Friday that the elimination took place, I told him where to meet me, which was on the Skurweberg Road near Vlakplaas and that he should inform the deceased that they were going to visit a few women that evening, so that the deceased would accompany him.

MR BOOYENS: I see. Did you also, what was the further arrangement then, if he gets the deceased into his motor vehicle, he was to go to the Skurweberg Road and then what would happen?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, he was to meet us after dusk on that road and I informed him that I would meet him there and that after handing the deceased to me, he should leave the Pretoria area for a couple of days and go and see informers which he was handling in the Mafikeng area to provide himself with an alibi.

MR BOOYENS: I see. You people made use of a motor vehicle that was rented by Willie Nortje?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, we used the Volkswagen kombi which Mr Nortje had hired from Avis, which we got at the Holiday Inn at Pretoria.

MR BOOYENS: Did Nortje hire this under his own name or under an assumed name?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, as far as I am aware, it was under an assumed name.

MR BOOYENS: Were you people all provided through contacts of the Security Branch, inside the Department of Internal Affairs, with false passports, ID's, everything?

MR BAKER: A number of us were, Mr Chairman, not all of us.

MR BOOYENS: Yes. Okay, was the registration plates on this kombi changed?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: That is a detail that you haven't put in here, but I don't think it is really material. Did you and Messrs Bellingan, Botha and Mentz then get into the kombi?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Did you go to the Skurweberg Road?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: And at the Skurweberg Road, just tell the Committee what happened there?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, Mr Radebe was parked on the road, I drove up behind them with my lights on full, when I stopped behind them, the other members of the team, jumped out of the kombi and went to the passenger door of Mr Radebe's vehicle. I went to Mr Radebe's door and quickly spoke to him and confirmed that he was going to leave the area.

MR BOOYENS: The other members, were they, was anything done in an effort to mask their identity or anything of that nature?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, the members were all wearing dark clothing, gloves and balaclavas, full-face balaclavas.

MR BOOYENS: I see. The reason for that being?

MR BAKER: So that their identities would not be known to Mr Radebe.

MR BOOYENS: You, yourself, he knew he was going to meet you, so you were not masked, is that correct?

MR BAKER: I had a balaclava on, but he knew it was Mr, Mr Chairman, because I went and spoke to him.

MR BOOYENS: Yes. When the members took the deceased out of the motor vehicle, was there a scuffle to get him out of there?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, as far as I can recall, there was quite a scuffle and the members had a hard time bringing him under control.

MR BOOYENS: To your knowledge, were some blows struck, people fell down, etc, etc?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: And was he then forced into the kombi?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: And you people then left?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, I was driving the kombi, I went back and got into the kombi. At that stage, Mr Ngqulunga was already in the kombi.

MR BOOYENS: Who was sitting in front, next to you?

MR BAKER: Mr Bellingan was with me in the front, Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: So Messrs Mentz and Botha would have been on the back seat then with the deceased?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Do you know whether at that stage or at any stage during the journey, there were further assaults perpetrated on the deceased in order to silence him?

MR BAKER: Yes Mr Chairman, he had started screaming at the back of the kombi and he was silenced by blows from a cosh.

MR BOOYENS: Do you know, I see you make the statement that Mr Botha hit him with ...

MR BAKER: That is my recollection, Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: I see. You then drove to the Oskraal district, is that correct?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: And Mentz and Botha according to you, carried the deceased out of the kombi, is that correct?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: What happened then?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, he was placed in a slight depression next to the road and Mr Bellingan then shot him with an AK47 in the head, on automatic fire, Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: I see you make the statement that Mr Botha also fired shots?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, when Mr Bellingan had finished, Mr Botha then also fired a number of shots into the deceased.

MR BOOYENS: You then contacted Col de Kock by radio and informed him that the operation was successful?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: And you proceeded to a place called Wonderpark?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Where is that?

MR BAKER: It is a shopping centre in Pretoria North, with a big parking area on both sides of it.

MR BOOYENS: And there you met with Mr de Kock, Nortje and Charlie Chate?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Chate was driving one of your Vlakplaas vehicles that had compartments in it and the arms that you people used, were put inside this vehicle, is that right?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman, and as far as I can recall, as well as the clothing that we had used.

MR BOOYENS: I see. You then proceeded to the Holiday Inn in Pretoria as you describe here, and handed the keys of the Volkswagen back to Willie Nortje and thereafter you proceeded to the Braamfontein Hotel?

MR BAKER: That is my recollection Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: I see. My learned friend, appearing on behalf of the relatives, have asked some question about the fact that so many shots were fired on the deceased. What were your instructions, what was this killing supposed to look like?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, it was supposed to have looked as if the ANC had eliminated him and the method used was that commonly used by them in eliminations.

MR BOOYENS: In other words, that many shots would be fired?

MR BAKER: Yes, that the weapon would be used on full automatic.

MR BOOYENS: Now, Mr Baker, the Committee has heard it but I don't think all the legal representatives here present, have heard it, Vlakplaas was basically an operational unit, is that correct?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Apart from what was going on at Vlakplaas itself, did you have any Intelligence gathering capacity yourselves?

MR BAKER: No Mr Chairman, this was done by specialised units within the Security Branch.

MR BOOYENS: I see. The instructions that you received to do an operation, would that be based on information obtained from other sources?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Did you have any, when Col de Kock told you as to how, the how and the why as far as Mr Ngqulunga was concerned and the fact that he received instructions, did he tell you where the instructions came from?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, I assumed that the instructions came from above, because he told me he had received instructions at Head Office.

MR BOOYENS: I see and when he told you that the man had to be eliminated, did you have any reason to doubt Mr de Kock?

MR BAKER: No Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Did you have any reason or was it possible for you or for that matter, any of the members under your direct command, I am talking about more specifically Mr Bellingan and Mr Botha, to check, verify, the information on which you were acting?

MR BAKER: No Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: How long before were you told?

MR BAKER: About the operation Mr Chairman?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, as far as my recollection, it was either a week, a week to ten days.

MR BOOYENS: And in so far as you said you believed the information that the man was in fact a double-agent, in the world and in the war that you people were involved in and in the risk that he posed in the circumstances, did you think that in the circumstances prevailing, his elimination was justified?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Not legal, not legal, but justified?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: I see. You then deal at page 138 and further with the roles you played, by yourself, etc, etc. Would you confirm that and ask that that be read as forming part hereof, up to page 145?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Thank you. If the Court would just bear with me. Perhaps, my Attorney has just pointed something out to me, and that has been my mistake, the seats in the kombi, apart from the two front seats, were there seats in the kombi?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: And how was the deceased kept in the kombi, was he sitting upright or what was the position?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, as far as I can recall the deceased was on the floor and the persons, Botha and Mentz, were restraining him on the floor between the seats.

MR BOOYENS: How were they doing that, or don't you know?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, I couldn't see that, it was dark in the vehicle, it was already dark outside, I couldn't see exactly what they were doing as I was busy driving at that stage.

MR BOOYENS: I see. Okay, thank you Mr Chairman, I've got no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR BOOYENS

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Hattingh on record, Mr Chairman, thank you. Mr Baker, have you had an opportunity to read through the statement, the application of Mr Simon Radebe?

MR BAKER: Yes Mr Chairman.

MR HATTINGH: He states on page 41 that he was approached by one Douw Willemse and Mr Willie Nortje and that they requested him to go and fetch Mr Ngqulunga?

MR BAKER: No Mr Chairman, I cannot comment on that, all I know is what I did on the afternoon, where I requested him to meet me at a specific point.

MR HATTINGH: He states further in paragraph 13 -

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, as far as I am aware, the place where he should meet us, was given to him by me, not by Mr Nortje.

MR HATTINGH: And then he proceeds as follows, he says -

Did you tell him to tell Mr Ngqulunga that he was required to go to Vlakplaas?

MR BAKER: No Mr Chairman.

MR HATTINGH: On page 42 he says -

Was he in hospital at the time when you spoke to him?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, no, when I spoke to him, I spoke to him on the day outside Headquarters, in the street.

MR HATTINGH: Because back on page 41, paragraph 12 he says -

That is according to his version, that is where he was when he was approached by Willemse and Nortje?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, I cannot dispute that, I do know that he was hospitalised at some or other stage, I do not know, I think Mr Nortje would be able to elaborate on that. I am not sure of that statement, Mr Chairman.

MR HATTINGH: Are you aware of the fact that he is being treated for PTSD?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR HATTINGH: And that he is undergoing psychiatric treatment and has been undergoing treatment for that condition for quite some years?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR HATTINGH: Are you also aware of the fact that he suffers from very high blood-sugar and that it affects his memory?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR HATTINGH: You do confirm his version however, to the effect that he was unaware of the purpose for which he had to take Mr Ngqulunga to the meeting place?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR HATTINGH: And that he only found out the next day that Mr Ngqulunga had been killed?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, as far as I am aware, he wasn't in the vicinity at that stage, I think he was away for the whole weekend.

MR HATTINGH: Well, at paragraph 7 ...

MR BAKER: But that he could have found out, yes.

MR HATTINGH: Paragraph 17, page 43 of his statement he says-

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, I don't dispute that he heard the following day, but as I say, as far as my recollection is, he was in the Mafikeng area at that stage, he could have heard it on the news.

MR HATTINGH: Well, you testified that those were your instructions, so can you state for certain that he actually carried out those instructions, that he did in fact leave the area and went to the Mafikeng area?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, I cannot state that for certain, I have no supporting documents.

MR HATTINGH: As far as the killing of Mr Ngqulunga is concerned, I am not sure but you testified about this in your evidence-in-chief, that you heard Mr de Kock's evidence that he went and reported to Gen van Rensburg the outcome of the operation?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR HATTINGH: And that you accompanied him?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR HATTINGH: Do you confirm that that is correct?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR HATTINGH: And his evidence was that he told the General what he knew of the carrying out of this operation, and you filled in the gaps where he didn't know?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman, as far as I can recall, I informed him that the operation had been carried out cleanly and that the members were ...

MR HATTINGH: Did you tell him where it was carried out?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, as far as I can remember, I told him it was in Bophuthatswana.

MR HATTINGH: And the method of killing employed by you people?

MR BAKER: That we had shot him.

MR HATTINGH: Shot with an AK? Thank you Mr Chairman, we have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HATTINGH

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Baker, did you know that Mr Radebe some time before he had to take Brian Ngqulunga to the place where you instructed him to take him, that he had instructions to get closer to Brian Ngqulunga?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, as far as I am aware, they were friends, but it is possible that he could have been instructed to, I am not, I cannot dispute that Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Just a moment Mr Chairman, with the Commission's - Mr Baker's got a bit of difficulty in hearing, could we use the microphones please. Thank you Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: Mr Baker, were you with Mr Nortje when the kombi and the Mercedes Benz was hired with the renting company?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, I do not recollect being with him at the time, I think the team that was to be used for the actual elimination, was kept apart from the team that was planning the logistical support.

MR LAMEY: Okay, because it is Mr Nortje's recollection that you actually went with him when this kombi and the Mercedes Benz was hired, it is just one of the smaller aspects that I want to put to you. You have no independent recollection?

MR BAKER: No Mr Chairman.

MR LAMEY: Is it possible that it could have happened?

MR BAKER: It could have happened, it is possible, I don't recollect that.

MR LAMEY: Okay. Mr Willemse, as far as you are concerned, was not entirely involved in this operation?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman, I am not aware of his involvement at all.

MR LAMEY: Because it is also my instructions from Mr Nortje, that he wasn't at all involved in any aspect of this operation as far as he is concerned. Mr Baker, you - you testified that it was approximately 10 days before the incident, that you received your instructions?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, my recollection is a week to ten days.

MR LAMEY: You mentioned also that this happened during a meeting at the House of Coffees, is that correct?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, I just want to be clearer here, Mr de Kock, first discussed it with me, I am not sure if the meeting was held on the day that he discussed it with me for the first time.

MR LAMEY: Okay, so you knew before that meeting at the House of Coffees?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR LAMEY: Are you sure that Mr Nortje was present there at that meeting, or are you not sure?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, as I said, my recollection was that they were there, but it is possible that he might not have been there.

MR LAMEY: Is it possible that you just assumed his presence because he was part of, in some way, of the planning?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR LAMEY: Yes, okay. May I just confirm something? Well, Mr Nortje says that he cannot also exactly recall whether he was present at that particular meeting at the House of Coffees, he is also not sure, but he did know prior to, he was informed by Mr de Kock at a certain stage, some time before the incident of the instructions that Mr de Kock had received from Head Office that Brian Ngqulunga had to be eliminated. Mr Baker, then as far as Mr Radebe is concerned, when he delivered Mr Ngqulunga to you at the place where you instructed him to do so, you told him that he must leave the area for an alibi, and he witnessed also that Ngqulunga was taken by people with balaclavas and so forth, and he recognised your voice, is that correct?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, Mr Radebe knew it was me, I spoke to him. I went and spoke to him while the members were removing Mr Ngqulunga from the vehicle.

MR LAMEY: But is it your evidence that Mr Radebe did not know beforehand what was going to take place?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman, he was aware that he had to give Mr Ngqulunga to me, but not for the purpose Mr Chairman.

MR LAMEY: Okay. But he would have known afterwards what has happened and that Vlakplaas was involved?

MR BAKER: I assume so, Mr Chairman.

MR LAMEY: Right, Mr Baker, is it at that specific meeting at the House of Coffees where you were informed of the extent of Brian Ngqulunga's information that he has given and that he has turned to the ANC?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, my recollection is that that is where we were given the reasons, being told that he had become a double-agent and that he was giving information out of Head Office.

MR LAMEY: Was it at that meeting at the House of Coffees?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

ADV SANDI: Sorry Mr Lamey, Mr Baker, when Mr de Kock came to you for the first time about this operation, I understand you were already aware that Mr Ngqulunga was an ANC informer?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, when Mr de Kock came to me for the first time, I was not then aware that he was an informer, I hadn't been informed about that. He informed me that this was the information that they had.

ADV SANDI: I don't think I am looking at a wrong application, at page 136 of the Bundle, the fourth line from the top -

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, yes, this information here was given to me by Col de Kock. The other resources referred to, was the telephone tapping.

ADV SANDI: Sorry, can you repeat that Mr Baker.

MR BAKER: As I said there, the information passed on to me, I received from Col de Kock and he also mentioned other independent sources, which being telephone tapping and that type of thing.

ADV SANDI: It says there -

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, what I meant there is that I was aware that telephone tapping, when I was informed of the telephone taps, was a common practice in Head Office, the other sources would have been telephone tapping.

CHAIRPERSON: That wasn't personal knowledge?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, but my personal knowledge of telephone tapping, I knew there was telephone tapping taking place in Head Office. It is actually put very roughly there.

ADV SANDI: Yes, but did you know anything specifically about the deceased before Mr de Kock came to you?

MR BAKER: No Mr Chairman.

ADV SANDI: Thank you. Sorry Mr Lamey.

MR LAMEY: I just want to put it to you, it is possibly as a result of the fact that Mr Nortje was not at that meeting, because he cannot recall being at that meeting, but Mr Nortje has no recollection of the way that you have put it, the positive way that you put it and as strong as you put it, that he had already joined the ANC and that he was already giving information. What he understood was, from Mr de Kock, that Head Office had information that he wanted to tell his story to the ANC. Is it impossible that this was put in more detailed terms, in stronger terms at that meeting where Mr Nortje wasn't present, because Mr Nortje has no recollection of this exact detail of this motivation?

MR BAKER: That is possible, Mr Chairman.

ADV SANDI: Sorry, can I just interpose for a moment Mr Lamey, at page 139 Mr Baker, you say - you give the impression there that you assumed that Mr de Kock had received an order from the Head Office?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

ADV SANDI: But today your evidence was that Mr de Kock said that he had been given orders from the Head Office, you didn't say that you were assuming?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, that is what he informed us, this in my further application here is that all instructions given to Mr de Kock, came from Head Office.

ADV SANDI: Okay, thank you, maybe you can follow that later.

MR LAMEY: Mr Baker, then when did, can you recall when did Gen Engelbrecht take over the command from Gen van Rensburg?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, as far as I am aware, it was either towards the end of December 1990 or the beginning of January 1991.

CHAIRPERSON: General who was this?

MR BAKER: Gen Engelbrecht, Mr Chairman.

MR LAMEY: Gen Engelbrecht. Can you comment or do you know being the second in command of Vlakplaas at the time, whether that prospect of Gen Engelbrecht, taking over the command from Gen van Rensburg was already discussed or on the cards, as one can put it?

MR BAKER: At what period Mr Chairman?

MR LAMEY: When this instruction came from de Kock, July 1990?

MR BAKER: Not as far as I am aware, Mr Chairman.

MR LAMEY: You are not aware of that, okay?

MR BAKER: No Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: How much longer are you likely to be?

MR LAMEY: Thank you Chairperson, I have no further questions, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: We will take the adjournment at this stage, until what time gentlemen?

MR BOOYENS: I think two o'clock Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Two o'clock, very well, two o'clock.

ON RESUMPTION:

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Steenkamp, my secretary is at the moment in the process of receiving a long fax from Cape Town, addressed to you, I think it is the transcript of the evidence you wanted. I have told her not to make copies of it, until it has been checked by the interested parties and even then, I don't know if we all need a copy. I think if there is just one original, it will be sufficient, do you agree?

ADV STEENKAMP: Thank you Mr Chairman, I have also arranged, there is somebody flying down from Cape Town this moment, with the original document as well.

CHAIRPERSON: All right, shall we continue?

ADRIAN DAVID BAKER: (s.u.o.)

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR WAGENER: Jan Wagener, Mr Chairman. Mr Baker, can you hear me?

MR BAKER: Yes, Mr Chairman.

MR WAGENER: You gave evidence to the effect that this murder was committed on Friday night, is that correct?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman, that was my recollection.

MR WAGENER: I see in the affidavit in the Bundle of the wife of Mr Ngqulunga that apparently he went missing on Friday, the 20th of July 1990? Would that then be the date?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, my recollection, it is a Friday and I was, the date as far as I am aware is the 19th.

MR WAGENER: Mr Chairman, maybe just for the record, my electronic miracle also says that the 20th of July was the Friday, so maybe that is the correct date. I see we all refer to the 19th, it may have been the 20th, for what it is worth. Mr Baker, this killing of Mr Ngqulunga, did you partake in this incident for the benefit of the State of the time?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR WAGENER: Flowing from questions asked earlier by Mr Sibanyoni to Mr de Kock, who did you inform about your involvement herein, afterwards?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, directly after the incident, I informed Mr de Kock per radio, who was my immediate superior at the time and subsequent to that, I was with him on an occasion when he informed then Brig van Rensburg, who was our Section's immediate head.

MR WAGENER: Are those the only persons?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, those are the only persons that I informed.

MR WAGENER: So am I correct that in terms of the need to know principle, you did not inform anyone else?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR WAGENER: You did not inform your local member of Parliament for instance?

MR BAKER: No Mr Chairman.

MR WAGENER: Although this was, as you saw it, for the benefit of the State?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR WAGENER: You did not go to the Commissioner of Police personally and inform him?

MR BAKER: No Mr Chairman.

MR WAGENER: Thank you Mr Chairman.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VAN DER WALT: Thank you Mr Chairman. Mr Baker, before I start, maybe I should just explain to you that the family of the deceased believe that if the requirements for amnesty is met, it should be granted. They are however at this stage not satisfied that there is full disclosure to the Committee, and on that basis, this application of you and the co-applicants is opposed. You just testified that you partook in the killing of the deceased for the benefit of the State, why do you say so?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, the reasons given to us were that this man was a double-agent working for the enemy of the State, who was still trying to overthrow the State by means of violence.

MR VAN DER WALT: Was that the information you gained from Mr de Kock?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, yes, that he had rejoined or was giving information to the ANC of which he had been a member.

MR VAN DER WALT: Did he in fact in so many words tell you that the deceased was a double-agent?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, that he was a spy and that he had gone back to the other side.

MR VAN DER WALT: I understood Mr de Kock's evidence that he was told that the deceased to use his words, had put out feelers to the ANC?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, I cannot comment on what he was told, I was not present at that meeting, I am just saying what he informed us at our meeting.

MR VAN DER WALT: What do you understand by the words he put out feelers?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, that he had made contact.

MR VAN DER WALT: Not that he was a double-agent, actively giving information to the ANC?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, I cannot comment on what Mr de Kock was told, I can only comment on what we were told.

MR VAN DER WALT: Apart from the deceased, at that stage, there were I believe lots of other people actively furthering the aims and objectives of the ANC that you knew of, is that correct?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, it was a full-time job opposing members of the liberation movements who were infiltrating the country and also people who were lending them assistance, at that stage I suppose there were ongoing Intelligence operations conducted against these people, that however was not our task.

MR VAN DER WALT: But at that stage information was available of a lot of people furthering the aims of the ANC, is that correct, and MK?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, I would assume so.

MR VAN DER WALT: Were all these people eliminated?

MR BAKER: Not by us, Mr Chairman.

MR VAN DER WALT: Did you make plans, were you instructed to eliminate all these people?

MR BAKER: No Mr Chairman.

MR VAN DER WALT: Do you know why not?

MR BAKER: No Mr Chairman, I was not in the command structure of the Security Branch.

MR VAN DER WALT: Why was it necessary to eliminate the deceased?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, I acted on an instruction that I received, I was not in a position to query these instructions and to go higher and to find out what was going on.

MR VAN DER WALT: Did you try to confirm the information you gained from Mr de Kock?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, no, I did not. It was not up to us and within our capability to do so.

MR VAN DER WALT: Why not?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, we worked on a very strict command structure, I did not have access to Intelligence provided by other informers and Units. I relied on instructions given to me by my Commander and I acted there on.

MR VAN DER WALT: Did you know the deceased on a personal level, at the time you got instructions to eliminate him?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, yes, I did. I had knowledge of him and I knew him.

MR VAN DER WALT: And him being a colleague, didn't you think it necessary to sort of gain support for the information?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, as I have said, I had no reason to doubt the information passed on, or to query an instruction given to me by my seniors.

MR VAN DER WALT: Mr Baker in regard to how many incidents are you currently applying for amnesty, not this trial, in the whole scheme of things?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, as far as I can recall, I think it is seven or nine.

MR VAN DER WALT: Mr de Kock testified that there were various other methods in which the deceased could have been taken out of the way, do you agree with that?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, it is possible, yes.

MR VAN DER WALT: Can you perhaps name one or two of these methods? Is it at all possible?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, I presume, he could possibly have been transferred elsewhere or whatever, but it wouldn't have stopped him from acting as a double-agent.

MR VAN DER WALT: Was it at all necessary to kill him, in what way whatsoever, any way whatsoever?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, as far as I was concerned, I received an instruction to do so, I did not query the instruction, I carried out the instruction as given to me. I did not query instructions given to me by my seniors.

MR VAN DER WALT: Mr Baker, you must appreciate that there is a bit of a difference in acting on instructions and acting for a political objective, or motive. What did you do, did you act on instructions or with a political motive?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, I acted on instructions and for a political motive as set out in my application.

MR VAN DER WALT: How can you say you acted with a political motive if you did not even try to ascertain the correctness of the information you got from Mr de Kock?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, I believed that the instruction that I got from him, I believed what he said to me.

MR VAN DER WALT: You were not or were you, on the scene where the deceased was actually killed, did you witness the killing?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, I was the driver of the kombi, at the time of the shooting I was sitting in the driver's seat surveying the road if there were any lights coming from other vehicles while it was taking place, I heard the shots, it was very dark, I couldn't see exactly what happened, but I knew what was happening there.

MR VAN DER WALT: Was the deceased at any stage informed what the reason was for his being kidnapped and taken away to the scene where he was eventually shot?

MR BAKER: No Mr Chairman.

MR VAN DER WALT: Was anything said during this whole incident, before he was shot, after he was kidnapped?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, as far as I can recall, within a very short of him being placed in the vehicle, he was rendered unconscious by Mr Botha with the cosh and I don't recall much being said on the way to Oskraal.

MR VAN DER WALT: Where did you go after the deceased was eliminated?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, my recollection is that we drove to Wonderpark in Pretoria North, where the weapons and the clothing were handed over. Thereafter my recollection is that we proceeded to the Holiday Inn in Pretoria and the vehicle was parked there. I also recollect that on the way in, I scraped the side of the vehicle against the box which provides the tickets for the parking area and that controls the boom into the parking area.

MR VAN DER WALT: What was the reason for that, why did you scrape it?

MR BAKER: At that stage, I don't think I took the corner going into it, a bit sharply, I didn't realise the exact length of the vehicle, and drove slightly over the rounded corner, it is not a straight entrance, it is a curved entrance.

MR VAN DER WALT: When you came out of the premises of the Holiday Inn, did you go to any place in particular or did you go straight home?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, no. My recollection is that once in the Holiday Inn, we met, we had a few drinks basically I think to calm our nerves and then my recollection is that we were taken to a restaurant and from there, we proceeded to a hotel in Johannesburg, if I am correct it is the Braamfontein Hotel, and we slept there and the following day, we returned to our homes.

MR VAN DER WALT: So directly after you left the Holiday Inn, you went to a restaurant? One of the other applicants, Mr Botha, refers to it as the Red Ox Spur, that is page 66, paginated page, Mr Chairman. So you joined the group there?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, my recollection is the whole group went together, we didn't split up at that stage, we were all together.

MR VAN DER WALT: Did you have dinner there?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, I cannot recall if I ate or if I had a few more drinks there.

MR VAN DER WALT: The other people in the group, did they have dinner there?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, I am not certain, I cannot recall exactly what happened after, who ate what and ...

MR VAN DER WALT: You see, because that is what Mr Botha says on paginated page 66 at the end of the first paragraph, he says -

You see Mr Baker, it doesn't appear that this whole incident largely unsettled you, would you agree with me, if you had drinks afterwards, you went to have dinner at the Red Ox Spur?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, the purpose of the drinks as I have said, was to settle us. It was actually quite a common practice in the Security Force that after an operation, the members used to get together and drink, that was a form of pressure release. That was the common practice amongst the Security Force.

MR VAN DER WALT: Even if that operation entailed the vicious killing of a colleague, by shooting him up between 30 and 50 rounds with an AK47?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman, each person has to live with what he did, himself and has to work through it, himself.

MR VAN DER WALT: Did you also have drinks before the incident?

MR BAKER: No Mr Chairman, that was one of Col de Kock's rules, our Unit did not drink before operations.

CHAIRPERSON: But we heard last week of continual drinking and drinking in the canteen at Vlakplaas before somebody was killed there.

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, as I have testified in that incident, that is why I did not agree with what was going on there, because we normally did not, before a planned operation, ...(indistinct) liquor.

CHAIRPERSON: Col de Kock was present at the time, wasn't he?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR VAN DER WALT: Mr Baker, is it your evidence that it was Mr de Kock's standing instruction that there had to be no drinking before an operation?

MR BAKER: It was a normal procedure, it wasn't a standard instruction, he did not like people drinking before an operation.

MR VAN DER WALT: Not even if it is necessary to settle the nerves a bit for the operation that has to follow, the killing of a colleague?

MR BAKER: No Mr Chairman.

MR VAN DER WALT: Did you find it strange that the deceased had to be shot with an AK47 rifle 30 to 50 rounds of ammunition?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, as I testified earlier, the reason for that was to make it look like an ANC elimination, that was the methods that they used.

MR VAN DER WALT: Can you think of any other method in killing the deceased to make it look like an ANC assassination without shooting him 50 times with an AK47?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, this was considered the most, the best method to be used under the circumstances.

MR VAN DER WALT: Can you describe the atmosphere in the kombi immediately prior to the killing of the deceased?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, it was very tense, I do not remember anybody saying anything at that stage, tense and I presume an element of nervousness as well.

MR VAN DER WALT: Having regard to the fact that you had drinks afterwards and dinner at the Spur, was it not jovial?

MR BAKER: No Mr Chairman.

MR VAN DER WALT: Mr Baker, at that or in that particular time, were there any other MK members or ANC members that were eliminated in the same manner?

MR BAKER: No Mr Chairman, not by our Unit.

MR VAN DER WALT: Not that you know of?

MR BAKER: Not that I know of, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Had there been before or after that?

MR BAKER: There was an occasion before that Mr Chairman, but I think about a year before that.

MR VAN DER WALT: At that stage, according to your information and knowledge, was he the only sort of double-agent in the police, working for the ANC or did you know of any other people as well?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, I didn't personally know of any other people, no.

MR VAN DER WALT: Have you heard subsequently of other people who were double-agents according to your standards?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, it was suspected that there were a number of double-agents, but I do not know of any particular people that I can identity.

MR VAN DER WALT: It was suspected as was the deceased, he was only suspected to have been a double-agent, is that correct?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, I was working on information that was given to me, it wasn't said it was suspected, it was said he was.

MR VAN DER WALT: And the other people suspected of being double-agents, weren't eliminated in the way the deceased was?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, I cannot comment on that, I was not involved in other eliminations after that.

MR VAN DER WALT: If any other member of your Unit was suspected of being a double-agent and perhaps that person was a white man, would he similarly have been taken out and eliminated?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, if the instruction was given that the person should be eliminated, he would have been eliminated.

MR VAN DER WALT: Sorry Mr Baker, I could not hear your answer.

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, if such a person was identified and there is an instruction that he should be eliminated, he would have been eliminated.

MR VAN DER WALT: Do we understand your evidence correctly that no discussion with the deceased took place in the kombi before he was killed?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, that is so. The deceased was unconscious or rendered unconscious by Mr Botha shortly after being picked up.

MR VAN DER WALT: In your presence, did anybody at any stage question him and ask him "well, listen we have information that you are a double-agent"?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, at the time that he was taken, I was speaking to Mr Radebe. If any discussion took place between the car and the kombi, I am not aware of it, when I got into the kombi, Mr Ngqulunga was screaming and he was rendered unconscious by Mr Botha with a cosh.

MR VAN DER WALT: But Mr Baker, the allegation for which he was killed was that he was a double-agent, isn't it a bit strange that he was not informed of the reason for him being taken away and being killed?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, as I say, he was unconscious.

MR VAN DER WALT: Mr Baker, I put it to you that I will argue that it was totally unnecessary to have killed the deceased in the way he was killed, or at all and that it is doubtful that the motive you had, was a political motive. Do you want to comment on that?

MR BAKER: Sorry, I thought you were just making a statement, sorry Mr Chairman. I stand by my evidence and by my political motive.

MR VAN DER WALT: Thank you Mr Chairman, I have nothing further.

ADV STEENKAMP: No questions, thank you Mr Chairman.

MR SIBANYONI: Mr Baker, you said the deceased was sending feelers to the ANC, but at that stage the ANC was unbanned and the ANC had previously, early in 1990, met the government and came up with some so-called Groote Schuur Minute, so why did you still regard it as an enemy at that stage?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, the ANC at that stage, the political wing was having discussions with the government, but the military wing was still carrying on with its armed operations.

MR SIBANYONI: Is it, was it suspected that he had contact with the military wing or with the ANC above ground?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, as I gave in my evidence, he had with Umkhonto weSizwe, that he had had contact with them, that is the military wing.

MR SIBANYONI: Wouldn't you say with the unbanning of the ANC it was no longer objectionable to communicate with the ANC if indeed he did that, I notice that you are also a member of the National Party, I will say maybe on the same light that you would easily communicate with your organisation, you were a supporter of the National Party?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, I cannot comment on instructions that came from above, all I know is that the instruction was that he had rejoined Umkhonto weSizwe and that he was a double-agent giving information which would be dangerous to the Security establishment, that is the reason that I got for this and the reason that I believed, I didn't have a reason not to believe it, Mr Chairman.

MR SIBANYONI: I understood your evidence to say that you made arrangements with Mr Radebe that you will meet at dusk and that he will hand over Ngqulunga to you and that he then should go to Mafikeng and handle informers, so as to serve as an alibi?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, that is correct, I wanted him to leave the area to go to Mafikeng so that should there be any questions as to his whereabouts, there would be people that could prove that he was not in Pretoria at the time.

MR SIBANYONI: It would appear Radebe then knew that there was something unbecoming or something bad which was going to happen to Ngqulunga, if he must leave the area and create an alibi?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, I did not inform Mr Radebe of what would happen to Mr Ngqulunga, if he made that assumption, that is his assumption, but I did not inform him.

CHAIRPERSON: Mustn't he have made that assumption when two men, dressed in balaclavas pull him out of the car while he is struggling and there you are, standing talking peacefully to him?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: There is only one assumption he can make, isn't there?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR SIBANYONI: At that stage you also repeated the arrangement that he should move immediately, away from the area, in other words it was on two occasions that you requested him to move, it was at the time when you were making arrangements with him and again on the day of the incident?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, the time that I made the arrangements with him, was that afternoon and then again at the spot.

MR SIBANYONI: You said with the unbanning of the ANC, the askaris felt uneasy because they will be regarded as traitors by the people who were unbanned. What was the attitude of Vlakplaas or the police, did the unbanning of the ANC not also create problems for the government, for the police, so as to say what are we going to do with askaris?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, the problem with the askaris, I think was raised on a number of occasions at various discussions between the political wing of the ANC and the government of the day as to what should be done with them, they regarded the askaris as a threat because at that stage a number of MK cadres were still infiltrating illegally into the country and these people were still identifying them and having them arrested. It was an ongoing problem and it was later decided that they should towards the end of 1990, that the whole operation should be aimed at fighting crime, organised crime, and be taken out of the political sphere.

MR SIBANYONI: What generally happened to askaris, we heard that some were taken to the Police College in Pretoria for some crash course or some training and they were appointed as police. What happened to the rest?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, as far as I am aware, all the people referred to as askaris went through some form of training at Hammanskraal Police College I think in 1991, the end of 1991, I am not sure exactly the dates and were also given a Detective course, to teach them the basics of investigations. I am not aware that there could have been others that were not part of this process, as far as I know, all those that were eventually paid of in 1993, were given that course.

MR SIBANYONI: We now know at least that Johannes Mabotha, Moses Ntehelang and Brian Ngqulunga were eliminated by Vlakplaas, how many more were eliminated by Vlakplaas which you know?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, as far as I am aware, I have applied for amnesty for one other case, but it was not a member of Vlakplaas, but it was also a turned person that had been handled by somebody else. That application still has to come up.

MR SIBANYONI: You have applied for amnesty?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR SIBANYONI: Who is the victim in that application?

MR BAKER: I am not sure, Mr Ras referred to him the other day, in last week's hearing. We are not sure of the identity of the person, but I know his body was pointed out and exhumed.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you Mr Chairperson, no further questions.

ADV SANDI: Thank you Chair. Mr Baker, let's talk about the meeting you had at the House of Coffees in Pretorius Street. How did you get there? Did you travel in the same vehicle?

MR BAKER: No Mr Chairman, that House of Coffees in Pretorius Street is just around the corner from Security Branch Headquarters, as far as I am aware the general procedure was that we would often go to Head Office for meetings and I think at one of these meetings, Mr de Kock asked me to inform the other members who were on the farm, that they should come to the House of Coffees so I walked there.

ADV SANDI: Did you all get there on the same time?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, no, not as far as I can remember, I think we were given a time that we should be there, but I think it could have been a few minutes, you know, different in the time.

ADV SANDI: Who was there when you came?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, as far as I am aware, I think Col de Kock and myself went there together. The other members arrived shortly thereafter.

ADV SANDI: I suppose this meeting would have taken some time, how long did this meeting take?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, I cannot recall, but I don't think you know, it was all that long, I cannot recall the details of what exactly happened at the meeting and who discussed what.

ADV SANDI: Did any drinking take place at this meeting?

MR BAKER: Only coffee, Mr Chairman.

ADV SANDI: When I read your statement at page 136, I get the impression that Mr de Kock was the only person who was doing the talking at the meeting. He addressed you, he told you what he had to say and what had to be done. What was the reaction of the other members when they heard that this gentleman had made contact with the ANC?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, I think at that stage, when we received the information that he was a double-agent, it was with a fair amount of shock.

ADV SANDI: Is it the position here that the deceased was killed without any question having been asked to ascertain who he had been in contact with in the ANC and to what extent he had been involved with the ANC, no such questions were asked?

MR BAKER: No Mr Chairman, not by us, no.

ADV SANDI: Could anyone, in your knowledge, could anyone have asked such questions from him to try and establish to what extent he had put the Security Police and Vlakplaas in danger by making contact with the ANC?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, as far as I am aware, the information around this incident, had been gathered by other organs and not us, so I am not sure the details of the contact and so on, it was not given to us.

ADV SANDI: Thank you, thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: He had, I gather, been in a state of nerves for some time?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, that is what I understand from what was said.

CHAIRPERSON: And he shot his wife, I am not certain of the date, I think it was agreed it was January 1990, it was changed from earlier?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman, I am aware of that incident.

CHAIRPERSON: You were aware of that?

MR BAKER: That he had shot his wife, yes Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Did any of you go and seek to obtain information from his wife?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, as far as I can recall, I went to see his wife and I think, I am speaking under correction, it could have been Brig van Rensburg himself, I know, I think we went to see her in hospital.

CHAIRPERSON: And did anybody ask her about her husband's behaviour?

MR BAKER: Well, when we spoke to her about it and asked her what had happened and why he had shot her, you know, she made it out to be an internal matter in the family and that it could have been an accident.

CHAIRPERSON: Were you still in Vlakplaas in January 1991?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, in January 1991 and towards February 1991, I took over Vlakplaas as the Commander of the Vlakplaas Unit.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you know of the killing of Goodwill Coleen Sikhakane?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, I have heard about it with the amnesty application and so on.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, a group went from Vlakplaas to take part of it, on the 29th of January 1991?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, I was not aware of the group and who was involved in the group, I was not part of that operation.

CHAIRPERSON: But you had taken charge of Vlakplaas then, hadn't you?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, as I say it was either January/February 1991 when the Unit was split, then Mr de Kock had a Unit in Pretoria and I had a Unit that stayed at the farm. My Unit was not involved in this operation Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Britz?

MR BAKER: Not part of my Unit.

CHAIRPERSON: Swart?

MR BAKER: Also not Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Nortje?

MR BAKER: No Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Radebe?

MR BAKER: No Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Because that was the killing of another askari, seven months later and that arose out of the killing of Ndaba and Shabalala, didn't it?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, I was not involved in that. I have heard with the amnesty application and so on, the details thereof.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Re-examination?

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS: Yes, thank you Mr Chairman. Dealing with those names His Lordship mentioned to

you, you said that Vlakplaas split up, those names that His Lordship just mentioned to you, were they - Vlakplaas split up in two Units, the one going to a place called Daisy, is that correct?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, there is a Pretoria Unit, they had, I think initially they went to Daisy and then they went to another facility in Pretoria.

MR BOOYENS: And these people, did they stay behind at your Vlakplaas to put it like that, or did they go somewhere else?

MR BAKER: No, they weren't with me, Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: They weren't with you?

MR BAKER: No Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Now, was the first time that you heard about that operation, after it became public knowledge in the amnesty applications?

MR BAKER: Yes Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Now in so far as the questions by Mr Sibanyoni is concerned, of the ANC being unbanned and so on, to your knowledge, was by July of 1990, that is approximately six months after the ANC had been unbanned, had the ANC abandoned the armed struggle or the armed wing at least, have the ANC abandoned the armed struggle yet?

MR BAKER: No Mr Chairman, I think they still carried on until 1993.

MR BOOYENS: Were you aware of any, did your askaris still identify people, former cadres or former comrades of theirs and were people still arrested coming into the country illegally?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: In other words, did peace settle on the country just when, after the ban on the ANC had lifted?

MR BAKER: No Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Have you heard of an exercise called Operation Vula?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Was that before or after the ANC was unbanned?

MR BAKER: It was after they were unbanned, Mr Chairman.

If you go back to the last two lines on page 138, in what context did you make that statement that I have just read to you?

MR BAKER: All instructions given to us at the farm, by our Commanders, I considered to have come from higher authority, I did not consider it to be an ad hoc command from the Colonel himself.

MR BOOYENS: And were you talking about, I see you use the plural here, operations, both covert defensive and offensive, is that statement applicable in general to these operations?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: I see. Thank you Mr Chairman, I've got no further re-examination. Mr Chairman, perhaps, my Attorney has just, with the Commission's permission, I just want to clarify one thing about Simon Radebe. Radebe wasn't told beforehand that there was, before you met him at the Skurweberg Road, that there was an intention to kill this man, is that correct?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: But as the Chairman pointed out, he must have realised that something was drastically wrong the moment the man was forcibly abducted?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, I have just been given a transcript of some evidence, I don't know if gentlemen wants to deal with it now or if we should let it stand over till tomorrow.

ADV STEENKAMP: Mr Chairman, if I may just, if I can just indicate by the document, Mr Chairman, that was a document being requested this morning, a lot of pages were actually obtained, but as far as I am concerned, I am under correction that those sections are actually relevant pieces of the evidence. It was handed to Mr Wagener, he requested me that these ones now, to obtain the full record of this specific evidence, which I will also obtain and as soon as possible hand over to him, but as far as my knowledge goes Mr Chairman, those are the relevant pieces of the evidence, thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, we told Mr Wagener we would get the evidence, you have arranged for it I gather, it is already on the way? We might as well let it stand over until it arrives.

MR WAGENER: Mr Chairman, Wagener on record, if I may add, I wish to add Mr Steenkamp for this document, and on the part that he has just given us Mr Chairman, specifically pages 338 and then 341 over to 342, is exactly what I put to Mr de Kock namely Mr Chairman, that he conceded that he misled Gen Engelbrecht, therefore that he conceded that he lied even in his amnesty application in that incident, in-chief, and that was all that I put to him.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------MR BOOYENS: I call Mr Bellingan, Mr Chairman.

MR SIBANYONI: Your full names for the purposes of the record, please.

MR BELLINGAN: Wilhelm Riaan Bellingan.

WILHELM RIAAN BELLINGAN: (sworn states)

MR SIBANYONI: Please be seated, thank you. Sworn in Chairperson.

EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS: Mr Bellingan, please page to page 12 of the Bundle. This is the section of your amnesty application up to page 27 which you have already given evidence about on various occasions and also referred to, is that correct?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, that is correct Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Do you confirm this as correct for the sake of the general background and general political motivation for your involvement?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Please turn to page 28. You are applying for any offence or delict relating to the death of the deceased in this matter, Mr Brian Ngqulunga, is that correct?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: And we have just heard from my learned friend, Mr Wagener, that apparently you are incorrect when you say that it was the 19th of July, perhaps it should be the 20th of July, is it also your recollection that this was on a Friday?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Chairperson, may I please request that amendment, I will accept the word of my learned friend. Now in July 1990, you were a Warrant Officer?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Before the time you received an order from Col Baker that you were to meet Mr de Kock at the House of Coffees, is that correct?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: According to your recollection, how long was this before the date upon which the deceased died?

MR BELLINGAN: It may have been a few days, a week, perhaps 10 days, I cannot say with one hundred percent certainty.

MR BOOYENS: But it wasn't a protracted length of time?

MR BELLINGAN: No, it wasn't.

MR BOOYENS: And it wasn't also on the same day or two days before?

MR BELLINGAN: No, it was not.

MR BOOYENS: Did you then go to the House of Coffees?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Who can you recall being there, it was you, Mr de Kock and Mr Baker?

MR BELLINGAN: I accept.

MR BOOYENS: Who else was there?

MR BELLINGAN: Chairperson, later I heard that Piet Botha had been there, Wouter Mentz was also there, I cannot recall everybody who was there, but I believe that all of them were present.

MR BOOYENS: So you cannot recall specific persons?

MR BELLINGAN: No.

MR BOOYENS: Did a discussion ensue regarding the deceased there in the House of Coffees?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Who did the talking basically?

MR BELLINGAN: It was Col de Kock.

MR BOOYENS: What did he tell you?

MR BELLINGAN: Col de Kock in so many words told us that Brian was busy turning back again and that the big guys wanted us to make a plan with him.

MR BOOYENS: Back to what?

MR BELLINGAN: Back to the ANC.

MR BOOYENS: What about the ANC, the military wing or the political wing?

MR BELLINGAN: Chairperson, I don't think at that stage there was civil and military, I think everything was military. They had their underground movements. The word ANC MK may have emerged, but I cannot say with clarity.

MR BOOYENS: You knew Mr Ngqulunga, is that correct?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, that is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Previously you had worked together?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, he was at Vlakplaas.

MR BOOYENS: What is your recollection, you said that Mr de Kock said he was away from Vlakplaas on and off and then he went to Head Office, would you agree with that?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: And from when did this thing begin that he would be gone and then back again and so forth?

MR BELLINGAN: I cannot say with clarity, but it would have been in the late 1980's, early 1990's, I cannot recall the precise dates, but he would be at Head Office and then return to the farm.

MR BOOYENS: And after that he worked full-time at Head Office?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: And upon this occasion, was this the time when he worked in the postal section?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: And you have heard the evidence of the access that those people working in the postal section had to sensitive documents?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: According to your own knowledge, would that description be correct?

MR BELLINGAN: It is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Very well. You make the statement on page 28 that according to Col de Kock he also had information about the police activities, which he had given to his comrades, which had led to the death of policemen, according to de Kock, there was a suspicion that he had already lured police officers into traps during which some of them had been killed, can you elaborate on that?

MR BELLINGAN: Well, this the inference that I drew from my discussion with Mr de Kock, so I cannot say according to my recollection that this is one hundred and ten percent correct.

MR BOOYENS: And then you say that his involvement with the ANC created a perception of fear with those in the Security Forces and at Vlakplaas and this had to do with police officers who had been shot dead on the East Rand, could you elaborate please?

MR BELLINGAN: I would not say that this is my precise recollection, but this could have been some of the black members who came forward and said "what is going on with Brian, sometimes he does this and sometimes he does that", there were rumours, we didn't know exactly what the rumours were, but they were in existence.

MR BOOYENS: We have heard evidence that the askaris didn't really trust each other either?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: This is the background that was given to you?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Did you have any reason to doubt the correctness of the sources or the correctness of the information which was conveyed?

MR BELLINGAN: I believed one hundred percent that if Mr de Kock came to me with a suggestion or an order, I believed what he was telling me, I wouldn't have doubted it, because he would never have made anything up. Therefore I believed what he said completely.

MR BOOYENS: And so you then believed that there was information such as the information pertaining to the involvement of Mr Ngqulunga?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Was an order then issued that a plan should be formulated to eliminate him?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Who gave the order?

MR BELLINGAN: Col Baker spoke to us and told us that we should view a site where we could eliminate him.

MR BOOYENS: The question is who gave the order for him to be eliminated?

MR BELLINGAN: Sorry, it was Col de Kock.

MR BOOYENS: And then Col Baker who would basically be in command on ground level, gave instructions with regard to the planning of the operation?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: We have already heard other evidence that the attack was coloured in such a way that it would appear to be an ANC attack, is that correct?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: Where did this idea come from, that it should appear as such?

MR BELLINGAN: If I recall correctly, it was Col de Kock or Col Baker's idea that we should orchestrate it to appear to be an ANC attack because other policemen had been killed in such attacks.

MR BOOYENS: According to your recollection, was it the practice to open fire with a machine gun on people in that fashion?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: And was the planning then undertaken that Simon Radebe would take Mr Ngqulunga to a certain point at which you would pick him up?

MR BELLINGAN: That is what I heard from Col Baker.

MR BOOYENS: You had nothing to do with the practical arrangements as such?

MR BELLINGAN: No.

MR BOOYENS: And later that night, you went in the Volkswagen kombi to the Skurweberg Road?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Please tell the Committee what happened there?

MR BELLINGAN: When we stopped behind Simon's vehicle, I think his lights were on bright, we climbed out and I opened the door and grabbed Brian by the neck and I slipped and told Pieter Botha to take over, and that is when Brian said to us "but I am one of you, I am a comrade" or something like that. That is what it boiled down to. He made some statement, I cannot recall his precise words, it appeared that he thought it was ANC people who were taking him. We then loaded him into the kombi and drove with him to the Brits vicinity.

MR BOOYENS: The statement that you make about Mr Radebe that he would have been away for a few days to serve as an alibi, is something that you made up?

MR BELLINGAN: Later I heard that that was the alibi which was created for him.

MR BOOYENS: So you wouldn't be able to say whether he really went away or whether he went home?

MR BELLINGAN: No.

MR BOOYENS: You had two AK's with you?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: And in every AK there were two magazines?

MR BELLINGAN: I think there were two magazines each.

MR BOOYENS: Where did you get this?

MR BELLINGAN: If I recall correctly, Col de Kock gave it to us on the farm or at a place near the road, I am not entirely certain where we obtained the arms and ammunition.

MR BOOYENS: But the point is that you had two AK's with you?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: How were you dressed?

MR BELLINGAN: We were dressed in very dark clothing with gloves and dark, woollen balaclavas.

MR BOOYENS: You say that you grabbed the deceased by the neck where he was seated on the passenger seat and he said something about comrades, what happened then?

MR BELLINGAN: I pulled him out of the vehicle, it was me, I slipped and then I asked Mr Botha to take over, it happened very quickly, they must have seen that I was slipping and then they moved in and took over.

MR BOOYENS: So the persons on the side of the deceased were you, Botha and Mentz?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: And where was Baker?

MR BELLINGAN: The last time I remember seeing him was in the vehicle, later I heard that he was talking to Simon.

MR BOOYENS: But you were not aware of it at that stage?

MR BELLINGAN: No.

MR BOOYENS: Very well, what happened then, you had him out of the vehicle, what next?

MR BELLINGAN: He was screaming and I think that Mr Botha hit him over the head and he was loaded into the kombi. There was a further struggle, I climbed in on the left front side and we immediately pulled away. I heard that there was an altercation in the back, it could have been that one of us said "just shut him up, he is making a noise" and then we drove in the direction of the place.

MR BOOYENS: Was the man silenced later in some or other way?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, later I heard that he was no longer making a noise.

MR BOOYENS: Did you hear any blows being delivered?

MR BELLINGAN: I must have heard such sounds, I just cannot remember now, but I must have heard it.

MR BOOYENS: How was the deceased transported in the back of the vehicle?

MR BELLINGAN: Later I heard from Mr Botha ...

MR BOOYENS: You didn't look?

MR BELLINGAN: No, I didn't look, it was very dark in the vehicle as well.

MR BOOYENS: Then you arrived at a certain point, is that correct?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: And what happened there, please tell us in your own words.

MR BELLINGAN: I think that is where Mr Baker made a U-turn and we were facing the Pretoria side once again, the door was opened, Pieter Botha and Wouter Mentz carried him out and when they put him down, I fired a full magazine into him from the back. It was very dark and then I emptied the magazine on him.

MR BOOYENS: How many shots would an AK magazine contain, about 30?

MR BELLINGAN: I think so.

MR BOOYENS: My learned friend has already asked some of your colleagues why it was necessary to fire 30 shots at a man?

MR BELLINGAN: Chairperson, the order as we interpreted it correctly was to make it appear to be a revenge attack from MK, that it was supposed to look like another murder of one of the askaris.

MR BOOYENS: Very well, and after you emptied the magazine, did you fire single shots or automatic?

MR BELLINGAN: I think it was automatic. That is when I said to Mr Botha he should check that I had fired all the shots at him and that is when he came closer and fired more shots, we climbed back into the vehicle and drove away.

MR BOOYENS: In the final paragraph, on page 30, you make the same statement as your colleague with regard to the questioning of orders from Mr de Kock, whether it be defensive or offensive operations. With regard to you, as the footsoldiers of Vlakplaas, an operation such as this, did you think that it was something that Mr de Kock would make up or initiate by himself?

MR BELLINGAN: No, I couldn't see how Brian had a hold on Mr de Kock and I believed that if he came with such a request or an order rather, I would have believed it. As I have said in previous evidence, I did not doubt the word of Mr de Kock.

MR BOOYENS: Did Col de Kock tell you from who specifically the order came?

MR BELLINGAN: Chairperson, I cannot say precisely. He said it came from above, I believed it to have been Gen van Rensburg, but it would definitely have come from that higher level.

MR BOOYENS: It would definitely have come through him because he was the Head of C-Section at that stage?

MR BELLINGAN: One hundred percent, Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Did you or Mr Baker or any of the others at any stage have anything to do with the overall principle planning of operations, in other words "go and attack Botswana" or "eliminate Brian Ngqulunga" or "do this or do that"?

MR BELLINGAN: No Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Did you simply act as order takers?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: Questions were also put to the colleague pertaining to whether or not there were any manner that you as a Warrant Officer for example could determine whether or not the information which was relied upon, was correct, this information pertaining to Mr Ngqulunga.

MR BELLINGAN: No, I would not have made any inquiries at Head Office, because it just did not work that way.

MR BOOYENS: Did you believe that if the information came from someone in Head Office, that that information would have been correct and verified?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct, yes.

MR BOOYENS: Mr Bellingan, just to summarise, after you had shot the man, you travelled back to Pretoria, is that correct?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes.

MR BOOYENS: In a kombi? You have heard the evidence of Mr Baker and you have heard the journey that you undertook and that you slept in Johannesburg that night?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, I concur one hundred percent with the evidence of Mr Baker.

MR BOOYENS: You also use the word double-agent on page 32. What do you mean when you refer to double-agent?

MR BELLINGAN: Chairperson, a double-agent is someone who sits on both sides of the fence, and I think that there were many of those during that time who were in the Security Forces, someone who was uncertain and would work for the liberation movements and still remain in the police, or the converse being someone who was in the liberation movements, yet working for the State at the same time, that would be a double-agent.

MR BOOYENS: And could such a double-agent have been to the detriment of the Security Forces?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, because he had access to information and covert operations and he knew about incidents during the past, the apartheid past, so a double-agent would be a source of concern for anyone.

MR BOOYENS: The ANC was unbanned early in February 1990, is that correct?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, the 2nd of February 1990.

MR BOOYENS: Yes, and what was the position according to your knowledge as a Security Policeman working in the field, did you still send askaris out?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes Chairperson, we still went to the airport, we were sent to the airport with the askaris and then we would let the askaris sit there on the balcony to watch people, seeing them come in and then they had to identify ANC members who were coming past, we were still allowed to operate in Johannesburg streets where the ANC had established themselves. I remember during one of the last incidents, where we caught a freedom fighter, this was in Checkers in Hillbrow, we were still permitted to continue with our activities, we had not yet been placed in the field of organised crime.

MR BOOYENS: Allowed or instructed to continue?

MR BELLINGAN: Instructed to continue.

MR BOOYENS: So with regard to your superiors, the struggle was not over?

MR BELLINGAN: We were very prepared, but we were also very uncertain, it was a very uncertain time for everyone in the Security Forces.

MR BOOYENS: What was the position regarding actions taken by MK members and so forth, did they simply make peace at that stage, what was the case?

MR BELLINGAN: Even though Operation Vula had been exposed, the Security Policemen at Vlakplaas was still trying to decipher the computer system and all of this was taking place during the 1990's.

MR BOOYENS: What was the position with regard to onslaughts on policemen, once again after the unbanning, did it continue or did it cease, what was the position?

MR BELLINGAN: No, it continued Chairperson, there were still train murders and a lot of faction and ethnic fighting. It was almost as if there was more violence than during the apartheid era.

MR BOOYENS: Especially in certain parts of the country, yes. Very well, is there anything further? Thank you Chairperson.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Thank you Mr Chairman, Hattingh on record. Mr Bellingan, we have already surmised last week that you were a founding member of Vlakplaas, C1 at Vlakplaas, is that correct?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Did you later hear of the involvement of Vlakplaas in the murder of Griffiths Mxenge?

MR BELLINGAN: That was general knowledge amongst Vlakplaas members Chairperson, although I was not involved there. I heard that there were people involved in the murder.

CHAIRPERSON: The murder of whom?

MR HATTINGH: Griffiths Mxenge.

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: ... amongst you before Mr Nofomela made his revelations, so you knew then?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And were you aware that Mr Ngqulunga had also been involved in the murder of Mr Mxenge?

MR BELLINGAN: According to the information I knew Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And when you met in the House of Coffees with Mr de Kock, you can probably not recall everything that he told you there?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Is it possible that the murder of Mr Mxenge also was addressed there and that there was a fear that Mr Ngqulunga would go and speak about his part in this murder and in such a manner, support Mr Nofomela's revelations?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: After Mr Ngqulunga had left Vlakplaas, you did not have any further dealings with him?

MR BELLINGAN: No Chairperson, I may have met him in the hall, but I did not have any further personal dealings with him.

MR HATTINGH: And you say as far as you know, Mr de Kock had no reason why he wanted to get rid of Mr Ngqulunga?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And up until the time that you heard from him about the information that Head Office had, you did not know that Mr Ngqulunga had considered walking over to the ANC or never had information about that?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And consequently, there was no reason to act against him?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: You had no information to that extent until Mr de Kock told you what he heard at Head Office?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, that is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: You have been questioned or Mr Baker was questioned if it was necessary to murder him in such a brutal manner and to fire so many rounds into him, what was the traditional method in which the ANC would have killed him?

MR BELLINGAN: Well Chairperson, if they didn't shoot him like we shot him, they would have killed him by means of the necklace method.

MR HATTINGH: Yes.

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, and the necklace method would be much more brutal because here he was killed instantly.

MR HATTINGH: And with regards to Mr Mxenge, he was stabbed with knives?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, he was stabbed with knives like he was slaughtered like a bull.

MR HATTINGH: With regard to the instruction to Vlakplaas after the unbanning of the ANC, did you study the part in Mr de Kock's supplementary affidavit with regard to Vlakplaas after the unbanning of the ANC?

MR BELLINGAN: I believe I have studied it, but not recently.

MR HATTINGH: Where he deals with Vlakplaas after the unbanning and where he says that he recommended to Gen Engelbrecht that the Unit be closed down because of the negotiations and the General said that the negotiations might not be successful and then you had to be prepared?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, we knew we had to continue and we had to work on organised crime, and if anything happened with the negotiations, we would be prepared.

MR HATTINGH: And you have already said now, you continued arresting political persons who had been banned, who had returned into the country?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And you were also involved in other operations of a political nature as you had been before the unbanning of the ANC?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, that is correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you Mr Chairman, no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: You were asked about the killing of Griffiths Mxenge, do you know this, it was said by certain people that the reason for committing this murder was to safeguard the reputations of senior police officers who might have been involved in the murder of Griffiths Mxenge?

MR BELLINGAN: I heard that later Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: Thank you Mr Chairperson. Mr Bellingan, at that stage in 1990, what was your rank?

MR BELLINGAN: I was a Warrant Officer Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: Do you know which senior officers were implicated in the murder of Griffiths Mxenge?

MR BELLINGAN: Chairperson, I read about it in newspapers but it was never pertinently put to me that A, B and C had been involved, but I did not pay much attention to it.

MR LAMEY: Do you know who was the Overall Commander of Vlakplaas at that stage?

MR BELLINGAN: It was in 1981 and I believe it would have been Col Willem Schoon at that stage. It was the time when Dirk Coetzee started with the farm and before he left.

MR LAMEY: Did you understand according to the information, from Col de Kock that there had been a break in security or that there would be a break in security at Head Office?

MR BELLINGAN: I understood Chairperson, that it had already taken place and that that was the concern.

MR LAMEY: Let us suppose that he had made contact with the ANC or let us suppose that he would make contact with the ANC, is it correct that this would go further with regard to an additional person who will come around with a revelation with regard to incidents in the past of which he has knowledge and where Vlakplaas was involved with?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, that is correct Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: Amongst others the Griffiths Mxenge incident?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, that is correct Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: You have given evidence that you as a junior officer had no reason to question or to doubt the accuracy of information that came from Head Office and which was conveyed to you by Col de Kock, is that correct?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: May I ask you as follows, was it also the position of your colleagues, the junior colleagues, that they never had, they would never question something like that during that time?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: And if they had questions, eye-brows would be lifted with regard to that person himself?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: Is it also correct that Mr de Kock was since he took over command of Vlakplaas, particularly a very strong leader, he had very strong leadership qualities and according to which his members at Vlakplaas believed in him and trusted him?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, that is correct Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: And Mr Bellingan, if I have a look at it, Mr Ngqulunga had already left Vlakplaas at the stage when he was eliminated, he was stationed at Head Office, he, it would seem, did not hold any threat for any of the members of Vlakplaas personally or according to the knowledge of the members of Vlakplaas?

MR BELLINGAN: No Chairperson, but he lived amongst them in Soshanguve and I believed that he was close to many of the members from Vlakplaas.

MR LAMEY: But what I mean is according to your knowledge, before this information came about, there was no mention that he was a threat to the members of Vlakplaas, apart from the fact that he had trouble with his nerves and the incident with his wife?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: You must have heard by means of hearsay of the Motherwell incident or do you not know of it?

MR BELLINGAN: I knew of it Chairperson, it was just talk in the halls and one does not ask questions if it was not pertinently stated to you.

MR LAMEY: If I may just put it to you that it was a matter where a break in security had taken place with regard to police members and askaris in the Eastern Cape and where Vlakplaas was requested to act there, and we also find it would seem to me it was more of a security breach at Head Office and Vlakplaas was asked to act?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: If we study the Sikhakane matter which will be heard in the future, it is an askari from Natal and Vlakplaas was asked to act?

MR BELLINGAN: I don't know about that matter Chairperson, but I drew the same inference there.

MR LAMEY: So with the exception of Mr Ntehelang where there was previous approval with regard to members who were under suspicion or with regard to where a security breach was possible, Vlakplaas had to do the work?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: And you had been a long-standing member of Vlakplaas, one does not know why Vlakplaas was used and why other members could not do it, but the obvious reason would be that Vlakplaas was the operational arm?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, that is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Other places were used for other operations, weren't they?

MR BELLINGAN: If I understand the Chairperson correctly, other Units were used for their own operations?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Vlakplaas from what we have heard, appears to have been the Unit that was called in where some unpleasant secretive operation had to be conducted?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct Chairperson, maybe other Units did this on their own as well. In many instances Vlakplaas was called in to sort out other persons' problems.

MR LAMEY: Yes, that is what Mr Nortje says in his application, he says in hindsight it seems that Vlakplaas was only used to do other people's dirty work.

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct Chairperson, we were just the useful idiots.

MR LAMEY: Thank you Chairperson, I don't have any further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: If I could just clarify something that really hasn't got much to do with your evidence, you said that he lived amongst the askaris at Soshanguve?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Did the askaris not live at Vlakplaas?

MR BELLINGAN: The unmarried members lived there Chairperson, and the married members had houses for which they had a subsidy in Soshanguve, Mabopane, Letlhabile, Atteridgeville, Mamelodi and all those places Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: They didn't all live as Gen van Rensburg says, in one block?

MR BELLINGAN: No Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: They were scattered around, that is the married ones?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR WAGENER: Jan Wagener, Mr Chairperson. Mr Bellingan, you say that you were a founding member of Vlakplaas?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: So from which year, up to which year were you there?

MR BELLINGAN: Chairperson, let me put it as follows, I think the 4th of August 1981 as I have testified previously, Dirk Coetzee got staff members together along with Brig Jan du Preez and officially started Vlakplaas. Before that Vlakplaas existed since the Rhodesian war where some of the former Commanders were there, there were askaris and Dirk Coetzee was there, but officially they said that a structured Vlakplaas had to be established where rules and regulations could be laid down and how the people would go about their work. It was the 1st or the 3rd or the 4th of August 1981 and I was there up till 1984 when I went to the Research Desk for a while and then I went to South-West Africa for border duty and then Col de Kock requested me to return. I left on the 6th of March 1993.

MR WAGENER: So except for a small or a brief interruption, you were there for approximately 12 years it would seem?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: And during that time, Mr Bellingan, were you involved in many operations of Vlakplaas?

MR BELLINGAN: Chairperson, I would not say many, many legal operations under apartheid, the combating of terrorism, the arrest of terrorists and if one could call those operations, but those were not all operations like cross-border operations, abductions and so on.

MR WAGENER: I understand your answer, but maybe my question was not so clear. In so far as you referred to legal operations, are you aware of a single such legal operation where the instructions came to Vlakplaas from outside the Security Branch?

MR BELLINGAN: Are you saying from outside the Security Branch?

MR WAGENER: Yes.

MR BELLINGAN: I think the army may have come with some requests to Brig Schoon, I cannot comment on that.

MR WAGENER: Let me put it more clear, did you at Vlakplaas ever receive instructions to launch operations from seniors, from officers, from Commanders not attached to the Security Branch?

MR BELLINGAN: No Chairperson, he would have come through the line of command.

MR WAGENER: And then I accept that you refer to legal operations and then I must accept that we could refer to illegal operations, would the same be applicable there?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: No further questions, thank you Chairperson.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VAN DER WALT: Thank you Mr Chairperson, van der Walt for the record. Mr Bellingan, what was your own political affiliation during 1990?

MR BELLINGAN: Chairperson, I was not a listed member of the National Party, but I voted for them.

MR VAN DER WALT: Were you an enlisted member of any political party?

MR BELLINGAN: No, but I registered every year.

MR VAN DER WALT: You were not a member of the Inkatha Freedom Party per chance?

MR BELLINGAN: No Chairperson.

MR VAN DER WALT: Do you know of Mr de Kock's political affiliations?

MR BELLINGAN: Chairperson, I heard later through media that he was an Inkatha member, but he was very apolitical, he believed in the government of the day, but he was not a person who would support a leftist party or a rightist party.

MR VAN DER WALT: But you say you indeed had heard in the media that he was a member of the Inkatha?

MR BELLINGAN: I think I might have read it somewhere, I cannot say with certainty.

MR VAN DER WALT: Also not the government of the day, was he a double-agent?

MR BELLINGAN: No Chairperson, I cannot comment to that.

MR VAN DER WALT: You refer to the deceased as Brian, did you know him on a personal level?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, I knew him very well. When I arrived at the farm in 1981, I think Brian was already there. Yes, he was there because we deployed in Lady Grey in the Eastern Cape and Brian was along and there was snow and it was winter.

MR VAN DER WALT: And this would not cause you to hesitate, to empty a magazine of an AK47 in him?

MR BELLINGAN: Today Chairperson, when I look back, I think differently, but then I believed that a person who betrayed one, we had a saying you could face a thousand men, but you could not deal with somebody who stabbed you in the back. If I received the instruction from Col de Kock, I would have executed it again.

MR VAN DER WALT: During Mr Ngqulunga's evidence before the Harms Commission, you were aware of the concern which was about with regard to what may be revealed about his evidence?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, there were some rumours that he was telling lies to the Harms Commission and if it was ever revealed, it would be an embarrassment for the government.

MR VAN DER WALT: Was there a concern about his testimony before the Harms Commission?

MR BELLINGAN: Nobody discussed it with me, but it was just a feeling that there was some concern.

MR VAN DER WALT: So you are aware that from the viewpoint of the Security Branch, there was no detrimental testimony given by him to the Harms Commission?

MR BELLINGAN: Not with regard to Mr Ngqulunga, no.

MR VAN DER WALT: You have followed the proceedings here today and you have heard that Mr de Kock had testified that the information which he received, was that the deceased was trying to reach the ANC, I believe that was his evidence?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VAN DER WALT: If I understand you correctly and if we have a look at your application, your statement, it would be on page 28 and the information which came from Mr de Kock, went much further, and I refer you to the last paragraph, you say there amongst others in the first instance, the fourth sentence that the information which you received from Mr de Kock was that he had indeed returned to MK, the military wing of the ANC, not only back to the ANC?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VAN DER WALT: And you state further that he was busying himself with identifying East Rand police officers and their homes for the ANC?

MR BELLINGAN: That is how I understood the information, it was generally put to us and that is how I interpreted it.

MR VAN DER WALT: And you also put further if we continue with the statement that there was concern with regard to his work in the postal section where there was sensitive information and that according to information, he was disclosing this Intelligence to the ANC?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VAN DER WALT: And you also say the second last sentence, according to Col de Kock, he also had information with regard to police actions and members which he supplied to his comrades which led to the death of police officials, was this information that you received from Col de Kock?

MR BELLINGAN: This is how I understood it Chairperson, it is put very strongly here, but this is how I understood it.

MR VAN DER WALT: Were any police officials' names mentioned?

MR BELLINGAN: Not that I can recall Chairperson.

MR VAN DER WALT: And furthermore that he had been luring police officials into traps where some of them had been killed, was this from Mr de Kock?

MR BELLINGAN: This was the information, this is the inference I drew from the information Chairperson.

MR VAN DER WALT: You see Mr Bellingan, I find it very strange that Mr de Kock would have only testified during these proceedings that the deceased had according to information, wanted to contact the ANC, if that had been the detail?

MR BELLINGAN: Chairperson, I consulted with Mr de Kock, he told me if this is the inferences which I drew, then he will accord with it.

MR VAN DER WALT: Do I understand your evidence correct if we look at page 29 - I beg your pardon, I would just like to correct that question, page 29 is not relevant, but were there fears about the other askaris or just about the deceased?

MR BELLINGAN: I think it was about the majority of the askaris because this was an uncertain time, we had fetched them, we turned them and now they were on our side and now the ANC comes, it must have been a very uncertain time for them. For us it was also uncertain, because possibly there might have been more of them who wanted to go back to the ANC.

MR VAN DER WALT: Were names mentioned of the other askaris who wanted to return to the ANC?

MR BELLINGAN: Not that I can recall right now Chairperson.

MR VAN DER WALT: Can you recall that there were pertinently allegations that there were other askaris who wanted to return?

MR BELLINGAN: I don't think it was only the askaris, there were some of the white members as well, there was a concern with regard to the white members too.

MR VAN DER WALT: But still Mr Ngqulunga was the only askari who was murdered because of these reasons and of these fears and the other askaris whom you referred to, were not murdered?

MR BELLINGAN: There are other cases where Mr Baker said that he was involved, where askaris were murdered, so there are other cases where askaris were also murdered.

MR VAN DER WALT: Did you try to verify this information, you have already told the Committee that you were a personal friend of the deceased?

MR BELLINGAN: I would have met him and talked to him, one got on well with all the people on the farm, but you could not ask questions. If there was a leakage, then your head would be on the block. What Mr de Kock said was accepted and we left it at that.

MR VAN DER WALT: So you acted more under instruction other than the furtherance of a political objective?

MR BELLINGAN: Yes, but I still had a political objective and it was still my objective to protect the government of the day.

MR VAN DER WALT: But Mr Ngqulunga had the ideal opportunity before the Harms Commission to do great damage to the government of that day?

MR BELLINGAN: I do not want to comment on that, but he did not do any damage at that stage.

MR VAN DER WALT: I beg your pardon, if the Committee would just grant me a moment. The killing of the deceased, you must comprehend that there are some questions from the family which they came here to have answered. Before the deceased were shot, was he undressed, what was the situation?

MR BELLINGAN: Chairperson, not that I can recall, he was taken as we had picked him up and I put him on the ground and I shot him, I don't believe that any of my colleagues removed his clothing Chairperson.

MR VAN DER WALT: Did you shoot him all over his body?

MR BELLINGAN: It was very dark Chairperson, I would have had to feel with my foot and I pressed the gun against him and I shot him.

MR VAN DER WALT: Because the deceased's spouse says at the stage when she had to identify him, he was clothed in clothing where there were no bullet holes and there was no damage to the clothing that he had been wearing and her impression was that he had been undressed when he was murdered?

MR BELLINGAN: Definitely not Chairperson, this was a matter of seconds, there was no ritual, we did not undress him or anything like that.

MR VAN DER WALT: Somewhere along the line, it must have been somebody else, it was definitely not us.

MR VAN DER WALT: The deceased at that stage, had an attaché case with him at that stage?

MR BELLINGAN: No Chairperson, not that I can recall.

MR VAN DER WALT: Because that is one of the questions that the family has, what happened to his personal belongings?

MR BELLINGAN: Chairperson, when we fetched him from the vehicle, it was all unclear, I did not see any attaché case.

MR VAN DER WALT: Mr Bellingan, after you had emptied the magazine of, the one magazine into the deceased, why was it necessary for Mr Botha to also fire shots at the deceased?

MR BELLINGAN: I called him Chairperson, and I told him "make sure that the person is dead". I don't believe that I might have misfired in the dark, but we just wanted to make hundred percent sure. We were professional at that time. We could not come back and report to Mr de Kock that the person was dead and then the following morning, the man was in hospital with multiple wounds.

MR VAN DER WALT: If I understood your evidence earlier, you made sure that you had the rifle behind the back of the man's head?

MR BELLINGAN: I believe so Chairperson.

MR VAN DER WALT: Did you have a reason with regard to the nature of the weapon to suspect that he might still be alive

MR BELLINGAN: Chairperson, it was just instinct, I wanted to make sure, I called Mr Botha and told him "make sure."

CHAIRPERSON: Is the position Mr Bellingan, when you start firing with an AK47, it kicks around?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VAN DER WALT: Mr Bellingan, I would like to put it to you that the idea with regard to the manner in which the deceased was killed and the amount of shots fired, and the suspicion emanates that this man was killed in a moment of lust to murder?

MR BELLINGAN: Chairperson, I don't think any of us were psychopaths, all of us came from war situations where we performed border duties. It was not pleasant to shoot but we were in a time of war and I would not recommend for anybody to become involved in such a thing, it is very difficult to go through all these things. There was no blood lust or anything like that.

MR VAN DER WALT: You are saying that you were in a war situation, had the ANC not been unbanned at that stage?

MR BELLINGAN: Operation Vula had not been disclosed at that stage Chairperson, the struggle was continuing at that stage. We know the history there, I don't think we want to go into the history there. There was not just peace and a white flag was hoisted and everybody stopped, it was a very uncertain stage and it is amazing that everything went so well that we can still live here peacefully today.

MR VAN DER WALT: Did you return to the Red Ox Spur with the rest of the group afterwards?

MR BELLINGAN: I believe so Chairperson, I was there.

MR VAN DER WALT: No sir, you don't believe so, you know or you don't know.

MR BELLINGAN: I believe I was there, we were all there.

MR VAN DER WALT: The previous incident did not do anything to your appetite?

MR BELLINGAN: No, it did not Chairperson.

MR VAN DER WALT: When did you drink for the first time on that day?

MR BELLINGAN: When we arrived at the Holiday Inn and we met Col de Kock there, we enjoyed a drink or two there in the bar.

MR VAN DER WALT: Mr Bellingan, I would like to put it to you that the manner of action which was followed in killing the deceased, was totally unnecessary.

MR BELLINGAN: Chairperson, it was my instruction to carry it out on that basis, we could have necklaced him or we could have placed him on a chair and blew him up, but that specific instruction was that it had to appear as if the liberation fighters had killed him.

MR VAN DER WALT: And I want to put it to you that it would be argued on behalf of the family that the action was entirely disproportional with regard to the possible suggestion or fears that the deceased had been involved with the ANC.

MR BELLINGAN: I cannot comment to that Chairperson.

MR VAN DER WALT: I thank you Chairperson, I have no further questions.

ADV STEENKAMP: No questions, Mr Chairperson.

MR SIBANYONI: Mr Bellingan, you said you were at Oshakati, that is in South-West Africa?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct.

MR SIBANYONI: Can you maybe clarify for me, were you serving as Battalion 32 or as Koevoet or is it one and the same thing?

MR BELLINGAN: No Chairperson, it is not the same. I was not with Koevoet at that stage, I was with the Security Branch. There were two different parts, there was the covert part of the Security Police, Koevoet, and the usual Security Branch, and I was at that office in Oshakati.

MR SIBANYONI: So there were Security Police who were deployed by South Africa to go and assist in South-West Africa?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR SIBANYONI: And then you said you were recruited to Vlakplaas, was it by Mr de Kock?

MR BELLINGAN: No Chairperson, I was firstly approached by a colleague du Preez, and after I had yellow jaundice, and later in 1984 when I left Vlakplaas, Col de Kock approached me when he took over and he asked me to return.

MR SIBANYONI: When he was the Commander, he asked you to return?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR SIBANYONI: But there were also a number of you, of other officers who had been to South-West Africa who were recruited to come to Vlakplaas when Mr de Kock was the Commander?

MR BELLINGAN: I believe so Chairperson, I think Mr Nortje was also amongst them, and Mr Baker was also one who was recruited from Oshakati.

MR SIBANYONI: How many more do you know who were from South-West Africa?

MR BELLINGAN: I don't have a list, but there were a reasonable amount of Koevoet members who were there, who were later stationed there.

MR SIBANYONI: Would it be fair to say that Vlakplaas, at the time of Mr de Kock's reign consisted mostly of people who had been at South-West Africa?

MR BELLINGAN: I think the experience played a part Chairperson, because I don't think he would have recruited somebody who was in an administrative post at Head Office, but whether it be experienced picked up in Rhodesia or Zimbabwe and the other place, was then Namibia or South-West Africa.

MR SIBANYONI: Was the fact that de Kock was the Commander, was it the fact that de Kock was the Commander, which influenced ex-South-West African police to come to participate at Vlakplaas? Did they come because de Kock was the Commander?

MR BELLINGAN: I believe that they definitely came there because he was there, because he was a very intelligent leader and one whom one could look up to, he was not just a normal police officer, he was somebody to look up to.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you Mr Chairperson.

ADV SANDI: Just one question from me, Mr Chairman. Mr Bellingan, can you just repeat what you said about the deceased having set up a trap for the police to be shot?

MR BELLINGAN: Chairperson, that is the inference that I drew from several discussions at the House of Coffees or afterwards, that he had possibly been involved in such traps and that is the recollection that I had that I put down on paper when I consulted with the legal representative, Chairperson. But I cannot recall any specific traps.

ADV SANDI: If I understand you correctly, during the course of those discussions, no specific person had specifically said the deceased had set up some traps for the police to be shot?

MR BELLINGAN: Maybe not at the House of Coffees, that was a suspicion, I may have discussed it later with Col de Kock and it may have come out that something like that was possible.

ADV SANDI: What were you basing that suspicion on?

MR BELLINGAN: That he had leaked information from Head Office, there was for example an instruction that all police officers from the Security Branch had to send in their addresses and they would have bullet-proof or film pasted or fitted before their windows, so that handgrenades or petrol bombs could not be thrown in and it was a dangerous thing that had been done, because the information had been leaked and the addresses of some of these people landed up in the wrong hands, these were inferences that we drew.

ADV SANDI: Thank you, thank you Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: I am going to ask you a question that I should have asked the previous witnesses and not you, but it may help to clear up something that was said a little earlier. I am not sure how many of them, but I think at least two of the previous applicants have given evidence that when you got to Wonderpark, you handed over your weapons and clothing to Charlie Chate?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Was that the operational clothing that you had been using?

MR BELLINGAN: That is correct Chairperson. What we usually did was to take the balaclava and the gloves and place everything in a bag, the shoes and the jacket would be burnt so that no one would keep something at their home which could be discovered and forensically tested.

CHAIRPERSON: So it is not the deceased's clothing?

MR BELLINGAN: No Chairperson.

MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, with the Commission's permission, I would just like to recall Mr Baker, just to identify the document appearing at page 94. I think it is relevant because it shows, this is a document he prepared for a meeting on the 24th of October 1990, it contains certain statistics that you will see at page 97 as to what they did from the 2nd of October, the statistics relates specifically from the 2nd of February 1990. If I may just recall the witness for that limited purpose.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you recalling Baker?

ADRIAN DAVID BAKER: (s.u.o.)

FURTHER EXAMINATION BY MR BOOYENS: Mr Baker, just take the document appearing at page 94 in front of you. Do you recognise that document?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: At page 99, the statement appears "Compiled by Capt A D Baker", is that correct?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: And first of all, it sets out this meeting was to be held on the 24th of October 1990, is that correct?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: And are you the author of this document?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Did you obtain this information yourself from statistics that were available?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: And you also in 6.2 deal with what the Unit was used for and in paragraph 8 you deal with what the arrest that still took place in both, by C10 in Natal and also dealing with East London and the Free State, is that correct?

MR BAKER: That is correct.

MR BOOYENS: The arrest of what were termed terrorists and people assisting terrorists, etc, is that correct?

MR BAKER: That is correct Mr Chairman.

MR BOOYENS: Was this meeting held, what meeting was this?

MR BAKER: Mr Chairman, as far as I can recollect it was a planning meeting held by Security Branch Headquarters as to the various Units under their command and as to their future utilisation.

MR BOOYENS: Thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Does anybody have any questions they wish to ask? I am quite sure if you look at it overnight and feel you have any questions tomorrow morning, Mr Booyens will not object.

MR BOOYENS: Mr Chairman, there is just one more aspect and unfortunately the author of this document is not available, my attention has been very kindly drawn to this by Mr Wagener, and that is just some statistics given by Staedtler in his book "The Other Side of the Story", and I would suggest that it may be of assistance to the Committee to look at it. The significant part being that from 1 September 1984 to 14 April 1992, the year 1990 in fact had the highest number of persons killed and injured in unrest related incidents and if I judge it correctly, 1985 and 1990, both scored well into the 16 000, nearly 18 000, as far as unrest related incidents are concerned and those were also the two highest statistics for that period. I will ...

CHAIRPERSON: Page?

MR BOOYENS: It is at page 183 Mr Chairman, I don't know if this publication is available to the Committee, otherwise I will ask your kind secretary to make a copy.

CHAIRPERSON: It will be available to me after the weekend.

ADV STEENKAMP: Mr Chairman, that whole document was handed into the Committee during the so-called ANC amnesty hearing, so that the whole document is already before the Amnesty Committee, if I can just add that, the full document.

MR BOOYENS: I think just for the other members, I will ask to make it available.

CHAIRPERSON: For those who have not read it, it should be placed on record, that that was a fairly prominent member of the Police Force.

MR BOOYENS: ... tomorrow at half past nine, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Half past nine?

MR BOOYENS: Yes, I noticed this morning that my learned friend, Mr Hattingh's client seemed to have problems. He is not in control of his own destiny.

CHAIRPERSON: I think we have had that experience for quite some time. Pretoria seems to be a long way away. I think rather make it half past nine. Right, we will now adjourn till half past nine tomorrow morning.