DATE: 20TH SEPTEMBER 1999

--------------------------------------------------------------------------CHAIRPERSON: Gentlemen, the forecast today is 31, if you want to take your jackets off, please do so.

Gentlemen, I see in front of us two documents, one from Mr Steyn and one from Mr Engelbrecht.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, may it please you and the Honourable Members of the Committee. My name is Louis Visser, I act on behalf of Gen Steyn, instructed by Wagener and Muller of Pretoria, Chairperson. May I come shortly to the documents handed up to you.

MR HATTINGH: P A Hattingh, Mr Chairman, instructed by Mr Schalk Hugo, and we appear for Mr de Kock.

MR WAGENER: Jan Wagener, Mr Chairman, I appear for Gen Engelbrecht.

CHAIRPERSON: I've glanced at his affidavit and I see reference in it to some previous affidavit. I have one before me, dated the 3rd of June 1999, which has an annexure A and which is a statement by him. Is that the one referred to?

MR WAGENER: Mr Chairman, that is one of the previous affidavits, one of the three previous affidavits. Mr Chairman, while I'm at the word, I've taken the liberty of putting before you the present affidavit by Gen Engelbrecht.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR WAGENER: I thought it wise to do it this way in order not to overburden the papers before you but merely to refer to previous affidavits.

CHAIRPERSON: I just wanted to make sure that I've got the previous ones that you're referring us to.

MR WAGENER: Mr Chairman, I will check during the tea interval with your secretary.

CHAIRPERSON: Right, thank you. We revert to you, Mr Hattingh.

MR LAMEY: Chairperson, I think I must place myself on record, it's Lamey of the firm Rooth and Wessels, Pretoria, representing applicant W A Nortje.

MR NEL: Thank you, Mr Chairman, my name is Christo Nel, I represent applicant number 5, Lawrence John Hanton and I also act for the estate of the late Andrew Russel Cavel Taylor. Thank you, Sir.

MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chairman, my surname is Cornelius, I act on behalf of the second applicant, Duiwel Britz and the third applicant, Johannes Swart.

MR SCHOLTZ: As it pleases, Mr Chairman, my names is Johan Scholtz from the Pietermaritzburg Bar, I represent the family of the deceased, in particular Les Petersen, who is the mother of the two minor children of the deceased.

ADV STEENKAMP: Thank you, Mr Chairman, my surname is Steenkamp, I'm the Evidence Leader in this matter. Thank you, Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: Have you gentlemen decided what order we're going to hear evidence in?

MR HATTINGH: Yes, Mr Chairman, we've decided Mr Visser will commence.

MR VISSER: May it please you, Mr Chairman. Mr Chairman, if you will allow me just a few references before we start. May we request, Chairperson, that the Exhibit A which we're handing in to the Committee, the general background to amnesty applications, can serve again in this amnesty application as Exhibit A. Chairperson, as far as that exhibit is concerned, you will recall that the previous amnesty hearings which you attended in Durban, there were two other exhibits added, Exhibits B and C, dealing solely with Operation Vula. We don't believe, Chairperson, that they are materially relevant to the present application, but obliquely as they may be relevant, they may also be taken into account obviously. We don't believe also, Mr Chairman with respect, that it's necessary to mark them exhibit numbers again, so that this whole bundle might perhaps serve before you as Exhibit A.

Then perhaps Chairperson, the statement by Gen Steyn which has been handed up to you, could possibly be marked Exhibit B, Chairperson, and perhaps for the sake of good housekeeping you might wish to mark the affidavit handed in by Mr Wagener of Gen Engelbrecht, as Exhibit C and that would I think, mark all the exhibits which are presently placed before you.

Chairperson, then we have two bundles, the one is the original bundle and then there's a supplementary bundle. May I enquire whether you wish to mark them bundles 1 and 2 or just leave them as they are.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

MR VISSER: The one is headed "Index" and it contains the extracts of the applications of the applicants, Chairperson, it's the thickish one. Perhaps that could be marked bundle 1. Then there is a supplementary bundle containing as it does, only the evidence of Mrs Petersen, Chairperson, the evidence given by her in the de Kock trial. She was the customary wife of the deceased in this matter.

And then perhaps, Mr Chairman, as far as bundle 2 is concerned, may I just draw your attention to one single matter and that concerns the identification of the deceased, Mr Goodwill Sikhakhane. In the TRC bundle he is described as Goodwill Colleen, spelt C-o-l-l-e-e-n Sikhakhane, whilst at bundle 2, page 1, Mrs Petersen gives various names for this gentleman, but the important thing, Chairperson, that I want to draw your attention to is the fact that she refers to him as Collin, C-o-l-l-i-n and not Colleen. I don't believe that there's any issue or dispute about the identification, Chairperson, but it might just be noted that he is referred to both as Collin as well as Colleen.

Then Chairperson, in the ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I don't know about the rest of you, but certainly in the bundle 2 that I have been given, it is almost impossible to read the last three lines on each page. But I don't think it really affects matters, but if anybody is going to refer to a passage from those, perhaps we'd better try to make an effort to get that printed more clearly.

MR VISSER: Yes. Chairperson, we will not refer to that bundle, but we hear what you say.

Chairperson, and then there appears to be some pages missing in bundle 1. Perhaps I can draw your attention to the fact that pages 203 to page 208 inclusive, are not included. We don't know what they say.

CHAIRPERSON: 204 says: "Doodsregister", it goes on on 205, 206 is a post-mortem diagram of the - if you want to get copies made I have them, we have them.

MR VISSER: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: I don't know why they have seen fit to exclude those pages in other bundles.

MR VISSER: Well in any event we'll have a look and see whether that's important, Chairperson.

Mr Chairman, may I then beg leave to call Gen Steyn to give evidence?

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, you said pages what are missing?

MR VISSER: 203 to 208 inclusive, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Well 207 and 208 is a statement by Mr de Kock, referring to Gen Steyn. So it might be a matter that you wish to see.

MR VISSER: Yes, well perhaps - Mr Chairman, I don't wish to delay the procedure, perhaps I should go on with the evidence and look at it later.

MR LAMEY: Chairperson, may I just come on record here. I've just discovered that I have not received the supplementary bundle relating to this hearing, I wonder if the Evidence Leader perhaps has another copy. And then perhaps just through you, Chairperson, to Mr Wagener, if he has an additional copy available of the general background. I was not part of the previous hearing where that was perhaps introduced as an exhibit.

MR VISSER: We'll sort that out, Chairperson. I didn't think that there was anybody that hasn't got one yet, but if - my learned friend has one now. May I call Gen Steyn, Chairperson?

ADV STEENKAMP: Mr Chairman, I've noticed those pages are missing, I do apologise for that. I have already made arrangements for those pages to be copied and handed to Mr Wagener and the rest of the legal representatives who are missing those documents' pages. Thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: My attention has been drawn to the fact that the Panel has changed since last week, so we should put on record the Panel. I am the Chairman of the Panel, Judge Wilson, and sitting with me are Mr Sibanyoni, who has been on the previous Panel and Mr Lax, who is joining the Panel today.

MR LAX: Thank you, General. Your full names for the record please.

JOHANN ALBERTUS STEYN: (sworn states)

MR LAX: Please be seated.

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: General Steyn, you have given evidence previously before various Amnesty Committees, is that correct?

GEN STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And you have also confirmed Exhibit A previously, as being of application to you.

GEN STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And you have requested that your previous evidence as well as that which is embodied with Exhibit A be incorporated in your evidence, is that correct?

GEN STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And you also request that today.

GEN STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: You are applying for amnesty with regard to the death of one, Collin Goodwill Sikhakhane, and your application can be found in bundle 1, from pages 153 to 194 and where the incident is discussed by you on page 162 to 172, is that correct?

GEN STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Do you also confirm the correctness of your amnesty application subject to the evidence that you will give today?

GEN STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Would you please address the Committee from page 2, with regard to the background of the command structure at the time of this incident and then the facts with regard to the matter itself please.

GEN STEYN: Chairperson, in January 1987 I became the Divisional Commander of the Security Branch Port Natal. At all relevant times there was a Terrorism Unit in Durban, which among others consisted of three sections, namely the Investigative Unit, the Intelligence Unit, under command of Col Botha and the Terrorist Detection Unit, under command of Col Andy Taylor.

As such Taylor was in command of a number of askaris who were stationed at an operational centre on a farm near Camperdown, Pietermaritzburg, but he was also the overall commander of the entire Terrorism Unit.

Chairperson, in my amnesty application I have referred to the date of the death of Sikhakhane as approximately the end of 1990, beginning 1991. I have noted that the TRC on a cover page of a bundle which has been prepared by them, places the date at the 29th of January 1991, and I accept it as such.

By approximately October/November 1990, Col Taylor from the Security Branch Durban, informed me that he was experiencing problems with the behaviour and conduct of Goodwill Sikhakhane. Col Taylor referred to the drinking problem which Sikhakhane had and that at times he had been absent without leave from the centre, and that he had received complaints that Sikhakhane was assaulting his wife and not maintaining her appropriately. Col Taylor was of the opinion that if Sikhakhane's unacceptable behaviour were to continue as such, despite numerous warnings, he may become a security risk.

As a result of this information I requested Taylor to speak to Sikhakhane in order to save the situation. Indeed, I myself went to speak to Sikhakhane at Camperdown, regarding his problems. I addressed him very seriously and warned him against repetition of such behaviour. Furthermore, I indicated to him that with this unacceptable behaviour and particularly the excessive use of strong liquor, he ran the risk of exposing secret operations which were being planned or were planned, as well as the identities of informers and this could hold very grave consequences. His own life and the lives of his colleagues were also jeopardised.

With the exception of the aforementioned, there was also the risk that Sikhakhane could expose his knowledge of the arrest of an activist, Charles Ndaba. The latter mentioned was murdered by Security Branch members under my command. This particular deed has been the subject of another amnesty application forum, about which I've already given evidence.

MR VISSER: Just a moment please, General. Mr Chairman, my learned friend, Mr Hattingh, has no knowledge of the other amnesty application and I undertook to give a very, very brief accord of what occurred there, with your leave Chairperson, in a few sentences if I may.

Chairman, it transpired that Mr Charles Ndaba was alleged to have been an informer of Col Hentie Botha since 1988. He was arrested in July of 1990, by Mr Ninela and as it turned out later, also by Mr Goodwill Sikhakhane. Thereafter, Chairperson, one issue led to another and Mr Mbuso Shabalala was also arrested. That took place around the 7th of July. And because of various circumstances and considerations, both Mr Ndaba and Mr Shabalala were eliminated by Col Botha and some of the members of the Durban Security Branch under his orders.

And I believe, Mr Chairman, that my learned friend wouldn't need much more than that as a background to the present application, with respect.

Now you refer to Charles Ndaba, this is the same Charles Ndaba that I have just referred to, is that correct?

GEN STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And he was eliminated, as you have stated in your statement, with your approval and under your orders.

GEN STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Very well, please proceed. You state that there was a risk that Sikhakhane could expose his knowledge of the arrest of an activist, Charles Ndaba, what do you mean by that?

GEN STEYN: Chairperson, if Goodwill were to expose his knowledge with regard to this, it could lead to an investigation which could lead to the procurement of new facts or further information regarding the matter.

MR VISSER: The information that he had been arrested and then afterwards never was seen again?

GEN STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Furthermore, you state in paragraph 8 - proceed.

GEN STEYN: If this were to happen, it would necessarily lead to a full-scale official investigation with the accompanying risks for me and certain other members under my command. And as I have already stated, if this were to be made public, the negotiations at that stage and the interests of the government at that stage, would have been affected.

MR VISSER: Now the negotiations to which you refer, are these the negotiations regarding negotiations and the later negotiations at Codesa, among the various political groupings in the country?

GEN STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Very well, continue.

GEN STEYN: I also addressed him regarding his periodic absence without leave from the centre and particularly because he, if he was confronted, could not provide an acceptable explanation and was indeed vague regarding his movements.

Information that during such an absence he was noticed in Swaziland could also not be explained by him at a later stage. Indeed he denied it.

After a few days I was informed by Col Taylor that the warnings issued by me and Col Taylor had not produced the desired effect, seeing as he had once again left the centre without leave. Consequently, I issued the order to Col Taylor to monitor his movements.

After this, Col Taylor once again visited me and expressed his concern that Sikhakhane's behaviour, as reported to him, created the fear that he may be performing a double role. As a result of this, Col Taylor gave Sikhakhane disinformation.

MR VISSER: Can you recall what precisely this disinformation was?

GEN STEYN: No, I cannot recall what it was. I don't believe he ever told me what it was.

MR VISSER: Very well, proceed.

GEN STEYN: This disinformation was apparently given by Sikhakhane to the ANC in Swaziland, because it was confirmed by means of the Security Branch's information network in Swaziland. We then knew that Sikhakhane was a double-agent.

In the light of this I requested Col Vorster to inform me regarding the circumstances under which Sikhakhane had defected to Security Branch at that stage.

MR VISSER: Now just for those who don't know, Col Vorster was stationed here in Pietermaritzburg?

GEN STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And what was his task here in Pietermaritzburg?

GEN STEYN: Chairperson, he was also involved in detection.

MR VISSER: And was he also connected to the Security Branch?

GEN STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And this might not be clear from your statement, but was Sikhakhane initially an informer of Vorster?

GEN STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Please proceed.

GEN STEYN: He informed me and added that Sikhakhane, after his defection, had not provided any noteworthy information to Vorster's unit. An affidavit by Col Vorster can be found in the bundle of documents, pages 191 to 193.

MR VISSER: And in that affidavit, General, Col Vorster briefly summarises what you have just stated, is that correct?

GEN STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Page 191 to 193 of bundle 3, Chairperson.

Proceed.

CHAIRPERSON: Bundle 3? Bundle 1.

MR VISSER: Bundle 1, 191 to 193.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, what you said was 191 to 193 of bundle 3.

MR VISSER: No, bundle 1.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, that's what I'm correcting, a slip of the tongue and you said 3.

MR VISSER: I'm sorry, Chairperson.

Please proceed.

GEN STEYN: What was of concern at that stage was the fact that it was already known to the Security Branch that the ANC had agents in the Security Branch in Durban, during a time when acts of terrorism, including AK47 guns and handgrenades were still prevalent. The suspicion of moles or informers in the Durban Security Branch, was then also confirmed by Mr Mac Maharaj during cross-examination in the Ndaba and Shabalala amnesty application.

MR VISSER: If I may interrupt you once again. During a previous amnesty hearing which was heard under the Chairpersonship of the current Chairperson, during November last year, a document was submitted and this document was a collation of acts of terrorism which was maintained by Col Taylor and members of the Security Branch in Durban, is that correct?

GEN STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, you will recall it was the document that was retyped, with Col Taylor's incidents which he kept note of. It was an informal diary and that served as Exhibit A at the last hearing, Chairperson.

The reason why ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I don't know what you mean by the "last hearing".

MR VISSER: In November 1998 ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, that was not the last hearing by any means.

MR VISSER: Yes. No. I'm referring to the amnesty applications which you heard in November 1998, when this document was handed up. Chairperson, I don't want to burden the record in the present application with that, save merely to refer you to the fact that there was an index that was handed up. Now this we will make copies of if there is a facility available, merely to show, Chairperson, that the incidents did not diminish in 1990, but in fact increased.

CHAIRPERSON: Wasn't that handed in last week?

MR VISSER: Pardon, Chairperson?

CHAIRPERSON: At the back there were - in the bundle last week, there were these diagrams - no, they came from, yes, they came from the book and we were referred to it.

MR VISSER: Yes, indeed, that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: We in fact made a note that the original is in two colours, but the copy we got was only in one.

MR VISSER: I must apologise, Chairperson, I wasn't present last week, so I wouldn't be aware of that. My attorney tells me it's not the same thing. But Mr Chairman, we will make a copy of this index and it will show that, if I may quickly read through them -

So it seemed to have been escalating.

MR LAX: Sorry, Mr Visser, just for my benefit. I've not actually seen this document originally, other than it having been referred to peripherally, and what incidents of violence are these that are being referred to? Where the use of AK47s and handgrenades are involved or ...?

MR VISSER: Yes.

MR LAX: Is that it?

MR VISSER: Yes, they're general incidents of violence. There is a tendency in the mid-'80s, Chairperson, to reply to the question, where there were a lot of bombings and towards the end of 1998/beginning of '89, the tendency had changed somewhat to attacks on people with firearms and with handgrenades. There were less bombings. In fact, we heard that evidence already at the last hearing where Commissioner Lax was also involved, Chairman.

MR LAX: No, I'm just puzzled, are these incidents that were recorded by Taylor and his men?

MR VISSER: Yes.

MR LAX: Because of course the actual incidents of violence exceeded those enormously, there were 20 000 incidents of violence per year in some cases.

MR VISSER: That is correct, Chairperson, but these were restricted to the Durban area with which Taylor and the Terrorist Unit had something to do with.

MR LAX: Ja, no these are obviously very selective records, which don't really give a big picture at all.

MR VISSER: Definitely not, no, I certainly don't want to create the impression. As Commissioner Lax has pointed out quite correctly, there were many, many, many more than that.

MR LAX: No, that's all I was just wanting to clarify.

CHAIRPERSON: But the point of this and the point of what we had last week, was to show that in 1990 there was a large increase, that peace hadn't come yet.

MR VISSER: That's the only point I wish to make, Chairperson. And that of course is the, I think, what you referred us to in the "Other Side of the Story", at page 183, Chairperson, that is what that indicates.

General, to cut a long story short, if anyone were to suggest that the struggle of the past was over by 1990, what would your reaction have been?

GEN STEYN: I would have said that it was not that way.

MR VISSER: Very well, please proceed.

GEN STEYN: Chairperson, in light of the aforementioned, the behaviour and conduct of Sikhakhane posed such a serious threat and danger, that the lives of certain Security Branch members and the lives of certain informers would also be jeopardised.

MR VISSER: And were there still informers in 1990, who were being protected?

GEN STEYN: That is correct.

Chairperson, in support of the ANC/SACP's attitude and the steps which they took against persons who were identified as informers or persons who were suspected of collaborating with the police, the following is provided: ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, with your leave, I'm not going to ask the witness to read through it, it speaks for itself, it is merely to accentuate the danger in which people who were regarded as informers found themselves during that time, Chairperson. And with your leave, I would like to skip that and leave that for you to read for yourself if you wish to do so, and go on with paragraph 18, at page 6.

MR LAX: Mr Visser, we've read all this already, it's in Gen Steyn's application.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Chairperson, yes.

Would you then proceed with paragraph 18, please.

GEN STEYN: Chairperson, the information regarding the arrest of Ndaba, which Sikhakhane knew of, if it were to be provided to the ANC, would have held extensive consequences for the involved members, the SAP, the government and the National Party.

After thorough consideration further discussions with Col Taylor and in protection of aforementioned interests, I decided that Sikhakhane had to be eliminated and I stated it as such to Taylor. I also stated that external aid would have to be used in order to accomplish this.

MR VISSER: Why did you say that?

GEN STEYN: Chairperson, if something were to go wrong, then it would be easier if someone from the outside had done it, instead of someone from one's own premises. This was with the objective of security.

MR VISSER: In other words, it would have been better to bring someone else in?

GEN STEYN: Yes.

MR VISSER: Later Col Taylor reported back to me that the action had been completed, in other words that Sikhakhane had indeed been eliminated.

With the exception of what has been stated above with regard to the murder of Sikhakhane and my involvement therein, I did not report these events in terms of the legal requirements. It was not done for obviously reason, and as such I have made myself guilty of defeating the ends of justice.

I have read the amnesty application and an affidavit of Col de Kock, dated the 6th November 1996, as well as the evidence given by Col de Kock in mitigation of sentence during his criminal trial. Col de Kock refers to a discussion that he had with me in the Security Head Office, Pretoria, during which the elimination of Sikhakhane was discussed.

I can recall that on many occasions I had discussions with Mr de Kock regarding work matters, when I visited Security Head Office and found him there. I confirm his evidence, that he and I have always maintained a favourable relationship with each other. Consequently, it is possible that a conversation took place between us regarding Sikhakhane, although I cannot recall the particular occasion and the precise content of the discussion. However, I do not know about the allegation that Sikhakhane had problems in being appointed as a member of the SAP.

Furthermore, during such a discussion I would have mentioned that Sikhakhane, according to your knowledge, had already performed a double role and that this was the primary reason for his planned elimination.

Chairperson, it may also be that he requested, and that is Mr de Kock, that he requested me to clear the action with the Head of C-Section, that would be Brig van Rensburg or Gen Engelbrecht. What I can say with conviction is that I would not have done that. In not one single incident during which I issued orders for illegal action, did I ever request the approval of Security Head Office. And as such, I never reported back to the Security Head Office after such action. I also have no recollection of the telephone calls to which Col de Kock has referred, consequently I cannot deny it either.

In explanation of my political motivations for my action, I submit with respect that at all times I acted in the execution of my duties in the service of the SAP. My action was aimed at protecting the government and the National Party. I truly believed that such action was expected of me and that my action fell within the scope of my express or implied authorisation, especially due to the pressure which was placed on us in the Security Branch, by the political leadership of the time to use all means at our disposal in order to combat the revolutionary onslaught.

Although serious negotiations were already underway between the government and the political groupings within the country and despite the statement made by the ANC that it had suspended the armed struggle, all signs still indicated that supporters of the ANC were continuing with the armed struggle.

Furthermore, I regarded the successful completion of the government in the negotiation process, as part of the struggle and I wanted to place the government and the National Party in the strongest possible position of negotiation in order to enable them to negotiate from a position of strength.

I was not benefitted in any way as reward for the action and I drew no personal advantage from it.

MR VISSER: You then request amnesty for the murder of Mr Sikhakhane, as well as any minor offence which may emanate from the facts and circumstances, such as conspiracy, aiding and accessory, defeating the ends of justice or any other offence or inappropriate deed which may lead from this, is that correct?

GEN STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I see I've gone three minutes over the hour, I don't know whether you wish to take the tea adjournment now.

CHAIRPERSON: Well last week we were asked to do it at eleven, I don't know what the time arrangements are here, but it might be a convenient stage. I would remind all of you gentlemen that we would like a detailed list of the applications for amnesty when you address us at the end of the hearing.

MR VISSER: A list of the offences?

CHAIRPERSON: Offences or delicts you are asking amnesty for. We'll now adjourn.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, thank you, that is the evidence of Gen Coetzee - Gen Steyn, I'm sorry, Mr Chairman.

JOHANNES ALBERTUS STEYN: (s.u.o.)

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Mr Chairman, I think I will go first. Hattingh on record, on behalf of de Kock.

General Steyn, may I just take you back to page 2, paragraph 2 of Exhibit B. There you say:

It's specifically about last-named which I would like to talk to you about. This was a unit similar to the one at Vlakplaas, is that so?

GEN STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And which also used so-called askaris to be of assistance with the identification and detection and the rest, of so-called terrorists, is that correct?

GEN STEYN: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And they were actually an operational unit of the Security Police in Durban, is that correct? Here in Natal.

GEN STEYN: That is so, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: You have given us statistics of incidents, so-called incidents of a terrorist nature, where security police had been involved in here in Natal. You recall the numbers you have given us?

GEN STEYN: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And according to that, would you - just for my own clarity, were these incidents where Col Taylor's unit was involved with?

GEN STEYN: Chairperson, I do not understand the question, will you please tell me what you mean.

MR HATTINGH: You say for example, in 1990 there were 32 incident, in 1991 there were 35 and in 1992, 52 incidents, do you recall that?

GEN STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: So please tell us what type of incidents were these.

GEN STEYN: Chairperson, these were handgrenade incidents, AK47 incidents. It was various types of handgrenade incidents on houses, on persons, individuals, police officers.

MR HATTINGH: And was Col Taylor, the deceased Col Taylor, was his unit involved with the investigation of these incidents?

GEN STEYN: Yes, he would also have used his members to gather information in this regard, whether there be another investigative units or not.

MR HATTINGH: Yes. And these incidents, these attacks, were they of a political nature?

GEN STEYN: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: So it is clear then that even after the ANC and other political organisations on the 2nd of February 1990, had been unbanned, your Security Police in ...(end of side A of tape)

GEN STEYN: ... Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. Then I would like to arrive at the issue of Mr Ndaba and Mr Shabalala. You have to keep in mind that I was not involved with the applications for amnesty for those incidents, and I thank Mr Visser for the short summary he gave us about that, but these two gentlemen, Mr Shabalala and Ndaba were killed after they were arrested, is that correct?

GEN STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And may I just clarify the dates? This went rather quickly, but it sounded as if Mr Ndaba was arrested in July 1990.

GEN STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And Mr Shabalala at approximately the 7th of July 1990.

GEN STEYN: It was the same day, if I recall correctly.

MR HATTINGH: So once again here we have a case where so-called political activists attached to the ANC, had been arrested after the unbanning of the ANC, is that correctc?

GEN STEYN: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And the two gentlemen were then also killed by the members of the Durban Security Branch?

GEN STEYN: That's correct.

MR HATTINGH: And amnesty applications have been lodged for those murders.

GEN STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Now the disappearance of these two gentlemen caused quite an uproar in the media, is that correct?

GEN STEYN: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Not only in the media, but there were also official inqueries from the ANC and those enquiries were directed at the Security Police.

GEN STEYN: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And there was a strong suspicion with the ANC then, that the Security Police were responsible for the disappearance of the two gentlemen.

GEN STEYN: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And is it not true that the Security Police had spread disinformation with regard to this incident and that they published reports that the two gentlemen had been seen in other places

GEN STEYN: It may be so, I suspect that it was indeed so.

MR HATTINGH: Positive steps were taken to create the impression that the two gentlemen were still alive and that they had been seen alive elsewhere.

GEN STEYN: I am not entirely certain of both, but I suspect that the impression was created or it was tried to create the impression that that was the case with regard to Mr Ndaba.

MR HATTINGH: And these enquiries about Messrs Shabalala and Ndaba did not continue for a short while, it lasted for quite some time, not so, a matter of months enquiries were made.

GEN STEYN: Yes, Chairperson. Shortly after the disappearance of the two there were enquiries, I cannot recall how long afterwards there were still enquiries, but definitely there were enquiries.

MR HATTINGH: And if it came to light that the two gentlemen had been arrested by the Security Police and had been killed afterwards, it, as you have mentioned, would have created much uproar with dire consequences for the South African Police.

GEN STEYN: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And also for the government.

GEN STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: General, are you aware that shortly after the establishment of Unit-C1 at Vlakplaas, written directives were sent out by head office to all Security Branches in the country with regard to the application of this unit.

GEN STEYN: Would you please repeat, shortly after ...?

MR HATTINGH: After this unit was established, C1 at Vlakplaas, directives were sent out to Security Branches of the Security Police, in which the commanders of those branches were told how to go about when they wanted to use this new unit.

GEN STEYN: Yes, Chairperson, there were directives sent out.

MR HATTINGH: And a copy - and unfortunately I do not have one available here, but a copy of it was submitted by Gen le Roux to a Committee who investigated the death of Mr Maponya, and it formed part of those documents there. I would just like to put it to you that in one of those directives it was clearly stated that liaison should not be made directly with Vlakplaas, but that the commander of the branch who needed C1's services, had to contact head office to make arrangements in this regard.

GEN STEYN: Yes, that may be so, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Was it then not necessary for you while you wanted to use C1's services at Vlakplaas, to inform their overhead commander at head office?

GEN STEYN: Chairperson, in this regard I gave the instruction to Taylor, I did not inform anybody at head office.

MR HATTINGH: But would it not be your or Taylor's task to clear this with head office? You could not go directly to Mr de Kock and say "Come and kill someone for me in Natal".

GEN STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson, but that is indeed what had happened. Despite the prescriptions, that is what happened.

MR HATTINGH: Because you see, Mr de Kock's recollection is that - and you say you cannot dispute it, that he had indeed asked you to liaise with Gen Engelbrecht, and you say it is possible that he asked this of you.

GEN STEYN: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And then you continue and you say you did not do so.

GEN STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Are you aware, and I assume you are aware because you have read Mr de Kock's application, that he had indeed after Mr Sikhakhane had been killed, had reported to Gen Engelbrecht and had expressly informed him that the man had been eliminated?

GEN STEYN: I have read that evidence of Col de Kock.

MR HATTINGH: And were you ever aware of it, did Gen Engelbrecht ever discuss this with you?

GEN STEYN: No.

MR HATTINGH: Was there any reason why Gen Engelbrecht in this regard, had been kept in the dark? Because now he was no longer attached to Murder and Robbery Unit, he was now the commander of the C-Section, he was now in the inner circles of the Security Police. Was there any reason why you could not trust him and inform him in this regard?

GEN STEYN: Chairperson, the various incidents in which I have been involved for which I request amnesty, I think it is more than 14, and in all these acts where I acted illegally, I never enquired about permission beforehand and I never informed head office afterwards either.

MR HATTINGH: There is somewhat of a difference between the incidents for which you apply for amnesty and this incident. You must assist me, I do not have knowledge of the other incidents for which you apply for amnesty, but my impression is that the other for which you apply for amnesty are acts with which your own security division had been involved with.

GEN STEYN: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Where you did not make use of the services of an outside unit, if I may call it that.

GEN STEYN: No, in some of my acts I used other security members.

MR HATTINGH: But not C1?

GEN STEYN: That's correct. If I recall correctly it was only this instance.

MR HATTINGH: And while there was a written directive that if C1's services were to be used, you had to inform head office. Is there any reason why you did not inform Gen Engelbrecht?

GEN STEYN: There's no reason why I could not trust him, but it was not in my nature to ask for permission or to report back afterwards.

MR HATTINGH: Are you also aware that the same written directive to which I have referred also determined that when C1's services are used by a specific branch of the Security Police, the men who had to execute this operation had to resort, for purposes of that operation, under the command of the branch who requested their services?

GEN STEYN: That is so, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: So the gentlemen whom Mr de Kock sent to kill Mr Sikhakhane in Greytown, were for all practical reasons under your command and under the command of the deceased, Col Taylor?

GEN STEYN: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Will you please tell us again why you did not want to use your own people, why did you call in Vlakplaas?

GEN STEYN: Chairperson, I actually told Col Taylor to get some outside assistance and for that purpose he could also use Vlakplaas.

MR HATTINGH: Yes, but why did you want to use outside people?

GEN STEYN: Chairperson, as I have said earlier, to take the blame away from your own people to someone else. One can for example, place your people on another scene on that evening while somebody else commits the deed.

MR HATTINGH: Was there a reason for that objective why you, or why Col Taylor had Mr Hanton participate in the elimination of Mr Sikhakhane?

GEN STEYN: I don't know why the deceased, Col Taylor, had handled the matter with Hanton, but that is how it had happened. He did use Hanton for it, yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: You say that you can also not dispute the fact that Col de Kock had been telephonically in contact with you after you had had a discussion with him at head office, is that correct?

GEN STEYN: That is so, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Now General, just more aspect. You say in your evidence as it is embodied in this Exhibit B, you say on page 7, from paragraph 22 onwards and more in particular paragraph 24. You say:

I assume that you cannot recall in detail all these discussions?

GEN STEYN: That is so, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And those discussions that you had held were also not limited to one specific subject?

GEN STEYN: No, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: So during a particular discussion you might have discussed more than one subject with him?

GEN STEYN: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And that the discussion would have been quite comprehensive? You see, what I'm getting at is, Mr de Kock, what he recalls about the conversation that you had with him is the danger that Mr Sikhakhane posed because of the fact that he could testify about Mr Ndaba and Mr Shabalala. This is what comes to the fore in his memory. He does not have such a vivid recollection thereof that there was mention made of the fact that Mr Sikhakhane had become a so-called double-agent. Do you have a clear recollection that you did discuss this with him?

GEN STEYN: With regard to ...?

MR HATTINGH: That you said to him that you had information that Mr Sikhakhane had now fulfilled a double role, that he was working for you but he was also working for the ANC.

GEN STEYN: As I've said Chairperson, I cannot place the conversation and I've already said that it is possible that I may have discussed this with Col de Kock. What I had furthermore said was that if I had discussed it with him and I cannot recall it, then I would have probably referred him to the double-agent story, if I understand the question correctly.

MR HATTINGH: He will not dispute it, but he does not have such a clear recollection that you told him about the double-agent, he could recall that it was very important that Goodwill Sikhakhane could supply information with regard to Mr Shabalala and Ndaba, and that you definitely told him.

GEN STEYN: Chairperson?

MR HATTINGH: You definitely told him that Mr Sikhakhane could supply information with regard to the disappearance of Messrs Shabalala and Ndaba.

GEN STEYN: No, Chairperson, I did not say that, I said I cannot recall the conversation, but I conceded that it is possible that I may have discussed it with him.

MR HATTINGH: I'm sorry, are you done?

GEN STEYN: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: Let us just place it on a hypothetical basis. If you did discuss it with him and the subject of the discussion was Mr Sikhakhane, then it would be very probable that you have told him about the danger that existed that Mr Sikhakhane could supply information with regard to the disappearance of Messrs Shabalala and Ndaba.

GEN STEYN: Amongst others, I would have said it, yes.

MR HATTINGH: Were you aware then that Mr Sikhakhane was involved in the arrest of one or both of these gentlemen, Ndaba and Shabalala or one of the two?

GEN STEYN: Chairperson, only at a later stage did I become aware of it and I cannot recall when it was when Mr Sikhakhane also became involved, because for quite some time we were only aware, or only I was aware - I'm not saying my members under me, but I was aware that Mr Ninela had executed the arrest.

MR HATTINGH: I did not read your evidence in the criminal matter, but my recollection is that Mr Sikhakhane and Ninela were together when one or both these gentlemen were arrested.

GEN STEYN: That's correct. When Ndaba was arrested I later surmised. Initially I knew that Ninela was involved in the arrest, but only at a later stage did I become aware that Goodwill Sikhakhane had also been involved.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. Did you ever have the opportunity of reading Mr de Kock's supplementary affidavit, which was dealt with in the very first cluster and which deals with Vlakplaas, did you have an opportunity to read that document?

GEN STEYN: Chairperson, I am not entirely certain.

MR HATTINGH: It is quite a hefty document, it is the one before me and in there he deals in general with the establishment of Vlakplaas and the purpose for which it was applied, and he deals with askaris and so forth. And he reaches the conclusion there that Vlakplaas was a sort of para-military operational unit of the Security Branch. Would you accord with that?

GEN STEYN: Yes, I would.

MR HATTINGH: And was that the reason why you decided to make use of their services when you decided that outside assistance was needed?

GEN STEYN: I accept that, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman, we have no further questions.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: General, you have testified that you only later became aware that Sikhakhane was involved in the arrest. Did Col Taylor know that he was involved with that arrest, the arrest of Charles Ndaba?

GEN STEYN: That may be so.

MR LAMEY: Over what period of time did the problems with Sikhakhane take place, problems with his conduct and so forth?

GEN STEYN: Chairperson, I would say it was the last part of 1990.

MR LAMEY: May I just ask you as follows, would he not have gone the normal route that many of the askaris went, that eventually they could expect a more permanent appointment in the Force, and that this conduct, these problems were an obstacle for this course?

GEN STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: Because that is what Mr Nortje recalls. His recollection is that at a stage it was mentioned that he wanted an appointment and that Security Branch was not willing to give him an appointment and that he had threatened that he would disclose his knowledge with regard to the disappearance of MK members who had been involved with Operation Vula.

GEN STEYN: Chairperson, I was not aware of the problem which Mr Sikhakhane had had, because according to the evidence that I heard later, he could not receive a permanent appointment, I was not really aware of it.

MR LAMEY: Would it have been within the knowledge of Col de Taylor?

GEN STEYN: Definitely, but personally I did not have that knowledge at that stage.

MR LAMEY: Very well. Col Taylor also met the members from Vlakplaas - he was not involved in the operation itself, but he did meet them with Mr Hanton. Do you know about that?

GEN STEYN: If I recall correctly, I am not entirely certain at which occasion this was.

MR LAMEY: And General, according to you as you have said in your application, you had no doubt that the problems which he had caused and with his knowledge of the arrest, that he was in a position to, he who was Sikhakhane could draw the conclusion that the Durban Security Branch had eliminated those two persons and that was a great security risk for the Security Branch in general and the members who had been involved there, as you have said, and then even in the broader sense, the government who was in a very sensitive stage busy with negotiations?

GEN STEYN: That's correct.

MR LAMEY: And because of the embarrassment it could have caused if it had come to light?

GEN STEYN: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR LAMEY: Thank you, Chairperson, no further questions.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY BY MR NEL: General, if I may refer you to Mr Taylor's application, which we will find in the bundle on page 143 and further, it would seem that the problem we have that Col Taylor discussed with you with regard to Sikhakhane was the fact that he was a double-agent ...(intervention)

MR LAX: Just one second, there's a problem with the sound, it's gone off for some reason or other. I'm not sure if someone has clicked the wrong switch off, but I can't hear anything in my earphones. It's back now, thank you.

ADV STEENKAMP: Mr Lax, do you want me to repeat that?

MR LAX: Please do so. You were referring to page 143, following and then it cut off.

ADV STEENKAMP: That's correct.

Yes General as I have said, on page 143 of the bundle and on page 144, Col Taylor in his application sets out one, the Sikhakhane incident, and if I refer you to those pages it will seem that from his application that his problem with Sikhakhane was the fact that he was a double-agent.

GEN STEYN: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR NEL: And nowhere in his application he mentions the fact that this man had been involved with the incident of Charles Ndaba and Mbuso Shabalala.

GEN STEYN: No, Chairperson, I think he does mention it somewhere in his application. I suspect that I have read it, that he mentions it. And the only thing that he mentions about it is that he names Sikhakhane as a person who was involved with the arrest of Ndaba.

MR NEL: That is what I mean, yes. What I would like to ask you with regard to Hanton, were you aware that Mr Hanton, before he resorted under the command of Col Taylor, he had been a member of Vlakplaas?

GEN STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR NEL: And would that be a reason why Taylor asked him to assist the members from Vlakplaas?

GEN STEYN: That's possible, Chairperson, I am not entirely certain.

MR NEL: Thank you, Chairperson.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

General Steyn, - Cornelius for the second and the third applicant, Mr Chairman.

General, it is so that C10 had been the operational wing of the police.

GEN STEYN: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: And this directive which my learned colleague Mr Hattingh had referred to after the establishment of Vlakplaas which was sent to all the Heads of Security, also determined that these particular Heads of Security had to take responsibility for the actions of Vlakplaas in their areas.

GEN STEYN: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: The point I'm trying to make is that the political decision that Vlakplaas had to act, was taken by seniors before Vlakplaas had received the instruction. So the Head of Security in the area, as in your case, took the decision.

GEN STEYN: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: So we can accept that the footsoldiers, as far as C-Section is concerned, had no doubt what the higher decision was that was taken?

GEN STEYN: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: And they also had not reason to doubt the instruction?

GEN STEYN: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: Would you agree, according to your knowledge, that for the members of Vlakplaas medals were given for their actions?

GEN STEYN: That's how I understood it, Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: I understand SOE medals were given to members who were involved in the London bomb.

GEN STEYN: That's correct.

MR CORNELIUS: And there were also visits by the Ministers to thank them for their actions.

GEN STEYN: I heard about that, Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: And furthermore, logistical assistance was given for the actions of Vlakplaas.

GEN STEYN: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: And then finally, you would agree that if the information had been disclosed by an askari, for example the names and identities of askaris, their addresses, registration numbers of their vehicles, that could endanger Vlakplaas.

GEN STEYN: That's true, Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Any re-examination? Oh sorry.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR SCHOLTZ: General, is it correct that Goodwill, during his period of tenure at the centre, would spend weekends at the home of his parents?

GEN STEYN: Chairperson, I read it somewhere in one of the statements.

MR SCHOLTZ: And that he was usually fetched on Mondays and brought back on Fridays?

GEN STEYN: Would you repeat that please.

MR SCHOLTZ: Is it correct that he was fetched from his parents' home on Mondays and brought back to his parents' home on Fridays?

GEN STEYN: I don't know precisely what the movements on the farm were.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I don't want to interfere, but the facts are not stated correctly. The whole of bundle 2 contains evidence by Mrs Petersen, to show that at the time when Sikhakhane disappeared they were living together in a flat, they were not living with the parents. I don't know whether anything turns on that, I just wanted to draw my learned friend's attention to that fact. She said, initially when they came from Swaziland, they stayed with Sikhakhane's mother, then they stayed for a few months with Sikhakhane's father, then they went to stay in a house and thereafter they went to live in a flat. That is what the evidence shows from page 1 right to the end of bundle 2, Chairperson.

MR SCHOLTZ: Mr Chairman, the point that I'm trying to make is that Sikhakhane did not stay at the operational centre during weekends.

CHAIRPERSON: I don't think Mr Visser is disputing that, what he disputing is that it appears from the statement, and that was my recollection, that he was living with Mrs or Ms Petersen, not at his parents.

MR SCHOLTZ: Yes, at one stage, my instructions are that he was living with his parents, Mr Chairman.

MR LAX: Sorry, Mr Scholtz, these averments are also contained in the various statements attached in bundle 1.

MR SCHOLTZ: That is correct, that is correct.

MR LAX: I think perhaps if the question could be rephrased with a little bit more particularity as to which time frame you're referring to, we may clear up the problem.

MR SCHOLTZ: Yes.

General, I refer to the period when Goodwill allegedly did not conduct himself appropriately and abused alcohol. At that stage, is it correct that he did not spend weekends at the centre?

GEN STEYN: I would not be able to say with certainty.

MR SCHOLTZ: Could you perhaps clarify to us with regard to the centre itself, whether or not there was any access control at the centre?

GEN STEYN: Chairperson, I think there was a measure of control. I visited the place on one occasion when I went to speak to Mr Sikhakhane, if I recall correctly. I cannot say with certainty what the access control was like, especially if you want to refer to whether or not they would allow a person. I cannot place the premises properly, I'm unclear about that.

MR SCHOLTZ: Could you say how far away it was from a constructed area?

GEN STEYN: If I had to estimate, it would be foolish.

CHAIRPERSON: It was a farmhouse, wasn't it?

GEN STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And I imagine that a great deal of care was taken not to draw too much attention to it.

GEN STEYN: I accept that that was the case.

CHAIRPERSON: So it wouldn't have had barbed wire all round it and a gate with a sentry on duty or anything of that nature?

GEN STEYN: No, I cannot recall that it was like that, but I believe that the people who were placed there would have maintained a level of secrecy or security to the best of their abilities.

MR SCHOLTZ: Can you tell us whether the members or the askaris had access to personal vehicles? Could they have driven away from there themselves and returned, with the assistance of a vehicle?

GEN STEYN: Chairperson, I don't believe - if I recall correctly, I think that they were always accompanied by a permanent member. That is if my memory serves me correctly.

MR SCHOLTZ: Did you have any particulars regarding the times when Sikhakhane was allegedly absent, with the exception of the vague information which was given by Taylor?

GEN STEYN: No.

MR SCHOLTZ: Was it your information that he went to Swaziland only on one occasion?

GEN STEYN: Chairperson, I'm not certain, but I think that it was upon more than one occasion. I think it was definitely more than one occasion that he had been away. In fact, I think it may have been three occasions.

MR SCHOLTZ: Did you have any specific information or dates with regard to this absence when he was in Swaziland?

GEN STEYN: No, I have no specific dates.

MR SCHOLTZ: How many interviews did you conduct with him?

GEN STEYN: If I recall correctly, it was the one occasion when I went to see him and speak to him privately on the farm.

MR SCHOLTZ: Did he tell you what gave rise to his abusive alcohol?

GEN STEYN: No, I cannot recall that he offered any specific reasons for it.

MR SCHOLTZ: Did you attempt to determine what the reason was?

GEN STEYN: Probably, I cannot recall. Possibly I may have or I may not have.

MR SCHOLTZ: You see, my instructions are that during this period of time when he went home on weekends, he regularly reported when he was fetched on Monday mornings and that there were no instances of him being absent. Can you dispute this?

GEN STEYN: I was not personally involved.

MR SCHOLTZ: Furthermore, my instructions are that at no stage after he had originally come from Swaziland, even returned.

GEN STEYN: According to the information which Col Taylor conveyed to me, it was indeed the case.

MR SCHOLTZ: Thank you, Mr Chairman, no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Was there another police farm in Greytown?

GEN STEYN: I am not aware of a police farm in Greytown.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you know if Sikhakhane was ever transferred to Greytown, whether he ever worked there as an askari?

GEN STEYN: Chairperson, I suspect that he worked all over Natal, but I am referring to this in the periodic sense, upon occasion.

CHAIRPERSON: I merely say this because Mrs Petersen says that he was fetched on Monday and taken to Greytown and brought back on Fridays.

GEN STEYN: I understand what you have said, but at the moment I'm not aware of a farm which was there which was employed by the Security Branch, I really cannot recall anything like that.

CHAIRPERSON: You don't know of him being week after week in Greytown? - and staying there.

GEN STEYN: No, I cannot say that.

ADV STEENKAMP: No questions, thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: I'll try again. Re-examination, Mr Visser?

MR VISSER: I have no questions, thank you, Mr Chairman.

MR LAX: Thank you, Chairperson.

General Steyn, from the statements of Ms Petersen, it seems clear that other askaris were also living in the same block of flats that she was living in, people who had - these were people who were also meant to be on the very same farm with Sikhakhane. She mentions them by name. It's not relevant for the present purposes, but the fact is that these people lived in the same block of flats that she did, she saw them regularly. You wouldn't know about that?

GEN STEYN: Chairperson, I read about that, yes.

MR LAX: You see the impression that's created is that these askaris were not necessarily permanently residing on that farm, and that's a very different impression to the one created by yourself and by the papers in this matter, by some of the applicants at any rate. Do you get me?

GEN STEYN: Chairperson, I wouldn't be able to testify honestly that these askaris were not temporarily accommodated at other places with the objective of an operation. I would not be able to deny it.

MR LAX: You see this is subtly, or not even subtly, it's a totally different impression that one has got here. These people rented accommodation in a block of flats where they stayed regularly, so much so that Ms Petersen saw them on a regular basis and they were sort of neighbours. The implication of that is that the people were definitely not permanently on the farm in Camperdown.

GEN STEYN: I would accept it as such, Chairperson.

MR LAX: And she goes further and says that Sikhakhane was staying there from time to time with her. She also says that yes, he did get fetched on some weeks and other weeks he was away in Greytown and sometimes he was taken off to the farm and so on. So the impression one gets is that these people weren't specifically barracked on that operational farm, as one would want to draw from, necessarily how you might be putting it, or the information that you might have been informed by Taylor or others.

GEN STEYN: Chairperson, if I may respond as such, the intention was that everyone who worked with Taylor would operate from that centre and that they stayed there. Once again, if on occasion they spent a certain period of time being accommodated somewhere else, I would not be able to stand in for it, I would not be able to deny it or confirm it.

MR LAX: The other thing about Sikhakhane is that he was in Greytown long enough to apparently have formed another relationship with another woman who lived in Greytown.

GEN STEYN: I read about it.

CHAIRPERSON: You see it also appears from Ms Petersen's statement, that while he was living with her in the flat in Pietermaritzburg, on occasions she went to see Col Taylor to complain that he'd been assaulting her and Col Taylor took his firearm away from him for a few days. So it wasn't a question of him sneaking away, according to this Col Taylor must have known that he was living with Ms Petersen.

GEN STEYN: I accept it as such.

MR LAX: Now if one looks at Mr Taylor's application, there's one interesting aspect here. I'm referring to page 144, just over halfway down that portion on there he says:

Do you see that?

GEN STEYN: That is correct.

MR LAX: Did you in fact give him those instructions to do that?

GEN STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson, I gave the order for the elimination.

MR LAX: You see, if one reads Taylor's version here he says that he then contacted Eugene de Kock at Vlakplaas and conveyed the request to him. The implication to be drawn from this is that Taylor contacted de Kock, not you. Taylor was the one who made the arrangements for everybody to come down, because he then says:

He then meets them, as we've heard, at Mooi River and then at Van der Merwe's Pub, which is at Mposhene.

GEN STEYN: That is so according to his evidence.

MR LAX: He doesn't know that you may have spoken to de Kock yourself or had any discussions whatsoever. And in fact if one reads this version in this application, and granted it's quite short, but the inference one draws from it is that you had nothing to do with getting hold of Vlakplaas here.

GEN STEYN: Chamrperson, I would not be able to exonerate myself here, because the order for Sikhakhane to be eliminated came from me and under no circumstances would I be able to exonerate myself.

MR LAX: I'm not suggesting that you should be blameless in the matter. The impression that is created in Taylor's version, as contained in these pages, is that he made the arrangements to contact de Kock, you merely told him to eliminate Sikhakhane, he did the necessary after you gave him the order. In other words on his version, he seems to bear no knowledge that you may have spoken to de Kock or made any arrangements yourself.

GEN STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR LAX: Just one last aspect, General, and that is - this was in early 1991, we understand, end of January 1991?

GEN STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR LAX: And the Ndaba incident happened in July 1990.

GEN STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR LAX: In the interim there had been a huge inquiry under du Toit, not du Toit, I may have got the name confused.

GEN STEYN: Zen de Beer.

MR LAX: Zen de Beer. I beg your pardon, it was de Beer, that's right.

GEN STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR LAX: A huge national inquiry.

GEN STEYN: That is correct.

MR LAX: Which included the disappearance of these two. Because that was a matter that was complained of during the negotiations by the ANC, it would have formed part of de Beer's brief, not so?

GEN STEYN: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR LAX: And just to add to that, you yourself knew that nobody would ever be prosecuted as a consequence of that inquiry.

GEN STEYN: That is correct.

MR LAX: Now you'd also made whatever counter-intelligence manoeuvres that were required, to say that these people were seen elsewhere and so on and although you may not have borne full knowledge of that, as you've indicated in your testimoney, you certainly knew that at least one of the people, there was some misinformation in relation to that. If I understood your evidence correctly, you said you weren't sure about Shabalala but you were sure that Ndaba in fact, there had been misinformation in relation to his whereabouts.

GEN STEYN: Chairperson, I recall that something may possibly have happened, but I'm not completely certain.

MR LAX: You see, what I'm getting at is that surely this business of Sikhakhane talking about the rest and so one, wasn't as huge a threat as you're making it out to be.

GEN STEYN: No, I think it was important in the light of what I have stated.

MR LAX: Sorry, Chair, if you'll just bear with me, I've just lost my train of thought. Maybe my colleague can continue, if he has any questions and then I'll pick up on this issue.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you, Mr Chairperson.

General, you said you never requested approval from Security Head Offices, because you knew that the execution of your duties was what was expected from you, did I understand you correclty?

GEN STEYN: I never requested authorisation from head office. I could not request the authorisation to kill someone.

MR SIBANYONI: Yes, that was my next question, to say, were you referring specifically to the elimination of opponents? Let me put it that way. You never requested approval from head office?

GEN STEYN: No, I did not, Chairperson.

MR SIBANYONI: Now after the unbanning of political organisations, after the 2nd of February 1990, did you merely continue with those activities without checking with head office whether your mandate has changed?

GEN STEYN: No, Chairperson, at that stage due to the situation which still reigned in the country, I simply continued.

MR SIBANYONI: Until what period, until what time?

GEN STEYN: Chairperson, I cannot recall, but I suspect that this was probably the last incident in which I was involved, if I recall correctly.

MR SIBANYONI: In one of the hearings we were told that there was a directive from government, from head office, that the duties of the operational units should change from doing political activities, it should change to doing the combatting of crime. Did your unit or your operational unit here in Natal also receive such instructions?

GEN STEYN: I can recall that.

MR SIBANYONI: Did you then change from what was done before, before 1990, to do the combatting of crime?

GEN STEYN: Indeed so, but also the current threat which still reigned at that stage, it was still attended to.

MR SIBANYONI: If one listens to your evidence it would appear that the operational unit here was functioning almost in a similar way as Vlakplaas, am I correct?

GEN STEYN: To a certain extent, yes.

MR SIBANYONI: In other words, you had your own askaris which identified, infiltrated and arrested cadres of the PAC and the ANC?

GEN STEYN: That is correct.

MR SIBANYONI: And whenever outside help was requested, it was just to protect the identity of your unit here, is that also correct?

GEN STEYN: Among others, yes.

MR SIBANYONI: Was there any stage where maybe you wanted the outside help without any intention of, let's say, eliminating people or killing people, but merely to come and assist in the identification, infiltration and arrest of the opponents?

GEN STEYN: That is correct, there were various occasions.

MR SIBANYONI: Is there any which you can think of at the moment?

GEN STEYN: Chairperson, I would think of cases during which information had existed, indicating the presence of a trained MK member and then due to the limited number of askaris which we had, we would then call in other persons who probably would know more about that specific person, that person about whom we had the information. In such a case we would then have requested assistance, among others.

MR SIBANYONI: In your unit, did you have any people who had been serving in the former South West Africa?

GEN STEYN: I cannot recall that, I doubt it whether in my unit there was someone like that.

MR SIBANYONI: Mr Hanton previously worked at Vlakplaas before coming to your unit?

GEN STEYN: That is correct.

MR SIBANYONI: Do you know whether he had been to South West Africa before joining Vlakplaas?

GEN STEYN: I cannot recall.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you, Mr Chairperson, no further questions.

MR LAX: Thanks, Chairperson.

General, the question that I wanted to ask was in connection with asakris who applied to become properly appointed in the South African Police, and this appears to be one of the basees why Sikhakhane was dissatisfied. I'd say that's the basis upon which I'm asking you in connection with that. You say you don't know anything about his request to be appointed as a member of the police?

GEN STEYN: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR LAX: Would you not as commanding officer, had some consultation in that respect?

GEN STEYN: Chairperson, it worked as follows. Col Taylor or another member would consider such a person and he recommends him, it would have come to my desk and maybe that is the reason why I did not hear of it. And that is probably the reason why I did not know about it.

MR LAX: You see - do you remember any others at that time, other people whose applications were in fact approved?

GEN STEYN: I cannot specifically recall any names, Chairperson.

MR LAX: You see - I'll just find the names for you, if you'll just bear with me for one moment. There were two colleagues of Sikhakhane, who are referred to as David and Vusi - not Vusi, that would have been somebody else, one was David, I'm just trying to pick up on the other one. I can't pick it up at the moment, if it comes to mind later you can maybe reply to it. But the question is that there were definintely two others, they were both of the people who were living in the block of flats with Petersen and Sikhakhane and both their matter were in fact approved and they did become members of, as I understand it, the police, were duly appointed. You don't recall those applications crossing your desk?

GEN STEYN: I cannot recall any exact applications, it's not possible.

MR LAX: The simple point was, was it usual that, or would askaris have in fact subsequently been appointed members of the police?

GEN STEYN: Some of them were appointed as members of the police, Chairperson.

MR LAX: Was there any specific reason why they wouldn't become members of the police?

GEN STEYN: Chairperson, no, I cannot recall. I think some members, if I have to comment on it quickly, probably had to remain in the underground structures and had to infiltrate some networks, which would facilitate it if it would be one of the members of the Forces. I cannot place any specific reasons.

MR LAX: Surely the fact that a person was appointed a member of the Force, would not have prevented them working under cover or, in all sorts of other ways, that would have nothing to do with it, surely?

GEN STEYN: Not necessarily, Chairperson, I agree.

MR LAX: You've indicated that one of the reasons why you called in Vlakplaas in this particular instance was because of the paramilitary nature of that institution, but is it not correct that in fact your unit was perfectly able to carry out this sort of elimination and in fact had done it itself by this time, on a number of occasions.

GEN STEYN: That's correct, Chairperson, my own people did do this.

MR LAX: There was in fact no need whatsoever for somebody from the outside to get involved at all, you had effectively eliminated a number of people by this time, hidden the bodies, disposed of the bodies and nobody knew a thing about it.

GEN STEYN: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR LAX: Again, just to ask this question, can you even remember why you called Vlakplaas in?

GEN STEYN: Not for this specific instance, I cannot say why I did so.

MR LAX: Thanks, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: You see it seems to me that if something had gone wrong and it had become known Sikhakhane had been killed, it would not only have caused great problems, but if they had discovered about Vlakplaas at the same time, that would have caused you even greater problems, wouldn't it?

GEN STEYN: It would have created a problem for both of us, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: For the police as a whole. If it became known that there was a hitsquad operating from a place called Vlakplaas, which was called in all over the country to eliminate people, it would have cause a great stir, wouldn't it?

GEN STEYN: Yes, it would have, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: One matter arising from questions from the bench, as it were, Chairperson, with your leave.

General Steyn, let us not lose one thing out of the mind. In this instance you would have acted against one of your own askaris, is that correct?

GEN STEYN: Please repeat that.

MR VISSER: Sikhakhane was an askari, the action here was not directed against any member of the ANC, it was directed at an askari.

GEN STEYN: That's correct.

MR VISSER: Who was in the service of the Security Branch here in Durban.

GEN STEYN: That's correct.

MR VISSER: And you say that it would have been better to receive assistance from outside to take the attention away from yourselves.

GEN STEYN: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Now your evidence is that you did not give instruction that Vlakplaas had been asked, but that assistance from outside be acquired.

GEN STEYN: Yes, Chairperson, that is my evidence.

MR VISSER: And then, who else could Taylor have asked to assist?

GEN STEYN: Usually it would have been Vlakplaas.

MR VISSER: But in reality, was there another unit whom he would have requested?

GEN STEYN: Not a specific unit, Chairperson, but he would have used his own initiative, he could have done so himself. He could have acquired people from other divisions ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: For example, Vorster from Pietermaritzburg?

GEN STEYN: Yes, that's correct, or maybe from Newcastle.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: May the General be excused, Chairperson?

--------------------------------------------------------------------------MR LAX: Mr de Kock, your full names please.

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: (sworn states)

MR LAX: Sworn in, Chairperson.

EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman, Hattingh on record.

Mr de Kock, you are an applicant with regard to this incident, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And your application appears in bundle 1, from page 1 up to page 9, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: You were charged with regard to the murder of Mr Sikhakhane, is that correct.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And found guilty.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And sentenced to 20 years imprisonment.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Will you briefly tell the Committee how it came about that you became involved in the elimination of Mr Sikhakhane.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, briefly, Goodwill Sikhakhane was recruited by Vlakplaas from Swaziland by I think his cousin, Godfrey Radebe, who was an askari at Vlakplaas and with his defection which he chose, this is now Goodwill Sikhakhane, I was not present, I was busy in Vienna recruiting a senior member of the ANC. Col Baker was in command in that regard. We had to inform Division Eastern Transvaal that a member of the ANC would be brought out, because Swaziland was their area of responsibility and Goodwill Sikhakhane was taken from Col Baker when my people brought him through the border, and he was sent to Natal.

Before Goodwill Sikhakhane's death I per occasion had discussion with Gen Steyn at head office. I met him in the corridor or the seventh floor of Wagthuis and Gen Steyn mentioned to me that an askari who was involved in the tracing of Charles Ndaba, had threatened to defect to the ANC because he experienced problems in being appointed as a permanent member of the Police Force. At that stage I had already been aware that Charles Ndaba had disappeared and I knew that he and another member of the ANC, who was not known to me, had been killed by Capt Hentie Botha.

MR HATTINGH: May I interpose, Mr de Kock. Did you have personal knowledge of Mr Sikhakhane's dissatisfaction with the unit to which he was attached?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, it was not only he, it was a group of them, it was the whole unit at that stage. And the reason why I say that was initially three members from Natal askaris arrived at Vlakplaas. I would not say that they went AWOL, I would say that they defected back to Vlakplaas and four askaris were on their way to Vlakplaas.

MR HATTINGH: Was Mr Sikhakhane one of the three?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I cannot recall, I think he was in the second group who also wanted to come back to Vlakplaas. Col Taylor came through to Vlakplaas and a day afterwards Gen Steyn came through so that we could discuss this matter with the askaris from Vlakplaas. It was because they were not appointed members of the Force, so they did not enjoy the same benefits as the members of the Force. As far as I know the problem was not Col Taylor.

After General Steyn was on Vlakplaas and we spoke to the askaris who had already defected, they went back to Natal and the others who were on the verge of departing for Vlakplaas remained where they were.

MR HATTINGH: Now you were telling the Committee of the discussion you had with Gen Steyn at head office and you say this was in regard to Mr Sikhakhane's dissatisfaction because he was not appointed as a permanent member of the Force.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, and among others it was also mentioned that he was involved in the tracing of Charles Ndaba. I already knew that these persons were deceased and that there was real danger that he would defect. There was such a threat.

MR HATTINGH: Who told you that there was such a threat?

MR DE KOCK: It was Gen Steyn, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And did you see the implications of such a step?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I did, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Was any request directed to you by Gen Steyn at that stage?

MR DE KOCK: "Voorsitter, dit was - ja, hy't gesê laat ons iets aan hierdie situasie moet doen. Die aanduidings was baie duidelik, die implikasie daarvan. Kan ek maar sê, die polisie taal was dat ons hierdie persone uit daardie posisie moet verlos. Met ander woorde, ons moet hom doodmaak".

MR HATTINGH: And what was your reaction to that?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I had no problem with it, it was not a new request to me, although I did ask Gen Steyn to clear it with Gen Engelbrecht who was then our Head, the Head of C-Section, and I left it there. I accepted that he would clear it and from there I would receive my instructions.

MR HATTINGH: Now you have heard what I put to Gen Steyn with regard to the directive which was sent from head office to other Security Branch of the Security Police, do you confirm the allegations which I have made to him there?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I do, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: That if the services of Vlakplaas was needed, they had to apply to the commander of C1 at head office, Pretoria Head Office, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And that if you received such an instruction to be of assistance, then for the duration of that operation you would resort under the commander who requested you.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And that he would be responsible for your actions.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Now you have already accepted that he would clear it with Gen Engelbrecht. He was then your commander, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: He was the overhead commander of C1, C2 and C3, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And it was security division of the South African Police, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And did you then receive instructions in this regard, Mr de Kock?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. A while after this discussion, one morning early I arrived at Gen Engelbrecht's office, it was usually in the mornings when we held discussions, any time from 7 o'clock, and he mentioned to me that Gen Steyn was urgently looking for me and I knew what it was about.

MR HATTINGH: Is that how he put it to you?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Did you know what it was about?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Yes?

MR DE KOCK: Gen Engelbrecht told me that I could use his telephone immediately, I may call him from his office. I told him that I will contact him from my work premises. At that stage we worked from Waterkloof. And I indeed called Gen Steyn from there. The reason why I did not want to use Gen Engelbrecht's telephone line was because tape recorders were attached to his line. There was nothing sinister about it, most of the security commanders had it, it was because of threats. It was so that things could be on record for further investigation and enquiries.

MR HATTINGH: Did you the contact Gen Steyn?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I did contact him in Durban and he asked me to urgently send someone down to make a plan with Goodwill Sikhakhane.

MR HATTINGH: And once again you understood what he meant by "making a plan"?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, there was no doubt. The death of Sikhakhane had already been established, it was just a matter of the time and this was the time.

MR HATTINGH: Very well.

MR DE KOCK: Gen Steyn then, among others, told me that I had to liaise with Col Taylor and contact him with regard to further arrangements, which I then did. This was in regard to whom I would send and where we would meet. I think I contacted Col Taylor on two occasions and conveyed the information about where we would meet and who would be there to my members and then sent W/O Nortje, Britz and Swart to Natal and then I instructed them to see to it that Sikhakhane be killed.

MR HATTINGH: Very well. Did you hand over any cash to them for any reason?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I gave an amount of between R5 000 and R7 000 to W/O Nortje, so that he could carry all costs, not only of us but of the Natal Security Branch or that group as well, so that credit cards not be used.

MR HATTINGH: Could you send people from Pretoria to a place like Greytown to kill people without informing your immediate commanders in this regard?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: If there was an accident on the way there and someone was killed, you had to account to your commander?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: You then appointed the three gentlemen and told them where they had to contact the Natal people and they then departed.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Were any firearms supplied to them?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I cannot recall, but I think Nortje had already had a pistol with a silencer, a Russian pistol. I don't have an independent recollection whether I gave him the firearm or whether the firearm was supplied here, but he had indeed possessed a firearm with a silencer. It was a Makarov that had never been used beforehand.

MR HATTINGH: At the trial he testified that he shot Mr Sikhakhane with an AK47 that was fitted with a silencer.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Did you have such weapons at Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And is it possible that you could have given this firearm to him?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And after the gentlemen departed they returned after two or three days, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson. Nortje reported to me that the askari had been killed and that he had shot him. And after Nortje reported to me, I on my part reported to Gen Engelbrecht.

MR HATTINGH: Did you report this to him?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: In detail?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I just told him that the problem had been solved.

MR HATTINGH: And did you refer to which task this was? Did he know what you were talking about?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I told him it was the situation in Natal, Gen Steyn's problem and it has his approval. I think his reaction was "Is it clean?". In other words, there are no comebacks.

MR HATTINGH: In his application Mr Nortje says that you paid an amount of money to him, I think he refers to an amount of R2 000.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I don't have a memory that I gave him R2 000 as payment because otherwise I would have given Britz and Swart as well. He came to me, there was some money left of the money that I gave him to take to Natal, it was money that was written off, and I told him to keep it. He may have regarded it as such, but it was not a salary or a payment.

MR HATTINGH: And you say you also did not pay money to Swart or Britz.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And Mr Nortje also beforehand did not know that he would receive any payment?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I did not know that any money would be left over.

MR HATTINGH: Would you briefly tell the Committee what your political objective was with the elimination of Mr Sikhakhane.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, firstly, the disclosure that Ndaba and another person were dead would have placed the Security Police in serious embarrassment, it would have brought the government of the day to a fall and the Security Branch in Natal, which was one of the two most sensitive points in the country and the other one was the Port Elizabeth/East London area, and this would have exposed Vlakplaas even more because Vlakplaas had recruited Sikhakhane. His cousin who worked with us, the identity of his cousin would have been endangered as well as his family and the askari group of Natal would have been exposed as well. So here was a situation which was extremely sensitive and among others, the political situation and negotiations at that stage, which was ongoing at that stage.

MR HATTINGH: The information which was supplied to you from Gen Steyn with regard to the risks which existed, did you regard it as reliable?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, I did, Chairperson. I did the same work as Col Taylor, I knew what the risks were.

MR HATTINGH: Did you receive any reward for your participation in this operation?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: You had no malicious intentions or vengeful intentions towards Mr Sikhakhane?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Just one point as I remember it. You said Mr Sikhakhane had been recruited by Vlakplaas.

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: That was by his cousin at Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: So he, from the beginning, knew all about Vlakplaas, where it was and what was done there?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson no, Sikhakhane was still in Swaziland, but from that, from the telephone discussion with his cousin he would have known that such a unit existed because his cousin approached him and told him "You can come and work with us, you will become a policeman" and so forth.

CHAIRPERSON: Gentlemen, this may be a convenient stage. I don't know how long we need. Do you think we can be ready before two or should we say 2 o'clock? 2 o'clock. We've now adjourning till 2 o'clock.

EUGENE ALEXANDER DE KOCK: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: Are you finished?

MR HATTINGH: Yes, thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Carry on with cross-examination.

MR WAGENER: Mr Chairman, Jan Wagener on record. As an implicated party, my client, I think it's proper that I go after the co-applicants.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman. If I may proceed with my few questions.

Mr de Kock, I didn't know, you said that Sikhakhane was recruited by Vlakplaas by means of his cousin, Radebe, for an askari with the Security Police.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Can you recall when this took place?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson no, I don't have a fixed date.

MR VISSER: Would it have been before 1988?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I am not certain, I would have to fix it to the time when we went to Austria and I cannot recall that date. That is when we recruited a senior source who was handed over to the DCC.

MR VISSER: One of the interesting things, and perhaps you are aware of this, is that Charles Ndaba was among others, his commander in Swaziland. Were you aware of that?

MR DE KOCK: Would you repeat it please.

MR VISSER: That Charles Ndaba was his commander in Swaziland, while he was still an MK member.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, it may be so. I did not undertake his interrogation and I didn't have a problem with the fact, but it may be so.

MR VISSER: You say that he was transferred to Natal. Would it be correct to say that he was transferred to Pietermaritzburg initially?

MR DE KOCK: Yes. Actually he was taken by Col Baker, but there was no dispute and he went to Natal.

MR VISSER: I just want to ask you or put it to you that Mr Sikhakhane was also involved in the one other incident at least, during which someone was eliminated, that was the case of Dion Cele. Do you know anything about that?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: I just want to put it on record that it is not only that he was aware or may have become aware of the elimination Ndaba and Shabalala, but that he also possessed other information which could have damaged the Security Branch if he had exposed it. Would you accept that?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, if he had that information it would have been pure dynamite.

MR VISSER: I'm not certain what you wanted to say. You stated that three of the askaris from Natal arrived at Vlakplaas and then thereafter a further four and that they were dissatisfied. I'm not certain what you wanted to convey with this evidence.

MR DE KOCK: No, it was just to supplement my application as it was written and among others, this was a discussion which took place between me and General Steyn. There is no form of prejudice or any other such thing that I attempted to achieve, it was just for the sake of completion.

MR VISSER: Very well. The question of the appointment of Sikhakhane, and please forgive me, I want to put it on record through you, Gen Steyn who was the Divisional Commander, says that he doesn't know about it or that he cannot recall it. However there is evidence in bundle 2, Chairperson, on page 7. Mrs Petersen gave evidence at the bottom of the page, and this is in response to questions put during cross-examination by my learned friend, Mr Hattingh, during your criminal trial, Mr de Kock. And at the bottom of page 7 to page 8 she stated:

And so it continues, and she lay charges with Col Taylor. And then on page 15 there is a section to which the Chairperson referred at approximately line 8, according to her evidence it appeared that Col Taylor had upon numerous occasions removed Sikhakhane's firearm when he had used it to threaten Mrs Petersen. And she stated in the middle of page 15, where 8041 appears:

And then finally I want to put it to you that on page 44 of bundle 2 we get the question of his dissatisfaction and there she gave evidence in Court before Justice van der Merwe. Chairperson, about the sixth line from the top:

And she says:

And so it continues, and then my learned friend, Mr Hattingh asks her why she thinks he did not become a policeman. And in line 20 - she refers somewhat earlier to his identification and then in line 20 she states:

That would be those who were appointed.

So it would appear, according to the evidence given by Mrs Petersen, would you agree, Mr de Kock, that there were problems beyond Sikhakhane's behaviour, which prevented his appointment? If one studies the documents which have been placed before the Committee.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I had the same experience at Vlakplaas with some of the askaris, the overwhelming majority, not all of them. The experience that I had built up over the years in South West or Namibia with SWAPO and the handling of defectors and traitors there and the experience here in South Africa with defectors and traitors, was that firstly these persons had been trained in the military, they were aggressive.

And secondly, with regard to their defection they had developed a sense of guilt and a feeling of inferiority. And mostly they expected some form of utopia with their new master and if they did not receive that, behavioural problems would ensue and one would attempt to address such problems to the bets of one's ability.

MR VISSER: Yes, well you have somewhat answered my following question. Would it be correct to say that not all askaris who were ever appointed as askaris, later were appointed as policemen?

MR DE KOCK: No, some of them did not become policemen.

MR VISSER: Very well. Now I just want to ask you, this aspect regarding the message which you received from Gen Engelbrecht, which stated that you had to contact Gen Steyn, that he was urgently seeking you, do you recall this?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR VISSER: Didn't he ask you what it was about?

MR DE KOCK: No, the impression that I had, and this may probably have been from what he said, I cannot recall everything precisely, it is that he knew about the problem.

MR VISSER: But he told you "Steyn's looking for you and you'll know what it's about"?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And that was the end of the conversation?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Now the evidence of both Gen Steyn and the deceased, Col Taylor, regarding the problems that they experienced with Sikhakhane, I understand your evidence that you deny it.

MR DE KOCK: No, I don't deny it.

MR VISSER: That you cannot recall, it would appear to me, you cannot recall that it was specifically said by anyone that he was a double-agent, that is the aspect that you cannot recall, or have I misunderstood you?

MR DE KOCK: It is possible, but I don't have any independent recollection thereof.

MR VISSER: I just want to fix your attention on it, that you to an extent stated the same thing when you said that you were informed that they were afraid that he would defect to the ANC. That would boil down to the same thing basically.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it boiled down to the same thing. In other words, that there had already been some form of approach to this.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Chairperson, no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER

FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Perhaps for clarity's sake, Chairperson, I think Mr de Kock did give the evidence, but just to make absolutely certain, if I may just ask one last question.

I also don't understand your evidence to say that Col Taylor never contacted you. I understand that you say that this was quite a long time ago and that you cannot recall, but Taylor did speak to you at a certain point, regarding Sikhakhane?

MR DE KOCK: Yes. I'm not certain when. After I had contacted or telephoned Gen Steyn, I telephonically contacted Taylor.

MR VISSER: Well it is possible that Taylor may have spoken to you before the time?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it is possible.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Chairperson.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: Thank you, Chairperson.

Mr de Kock, did you also regard the case of Sikhakhane as the case of an askari who from his perspective, cherished reasonable expectations with regard to an appointment and that he had been disillusioned and for this reason wanted to defect to the ANC, or least may have exposed the deeds that he knew of and used this as a weapon against the Security Branch of Durban?

MR DE KOCK: Yes. It's a long question, but just to summarise, and perhaps I should state this today to give you some kind of an impression of what the problems were for divisional commanders as such. Sikhakhane must have thought that he could use this situation to obtain leverage. What he didn't realise is that the government didn't hold hostages. Those who would be held hostages in figurative speaking, would be the commanders of units because any officer could say to a General "Do you remember what happened last week?" And I think that this was some kind of situation like that.

MR LAMEY: You accepted and believed that the request from Gen Steyn had been cleared with Gen Engelbrecht, you believed it as such?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR LAMEY: Is that why you reported back to Engelbrecht?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And when you reported back to Engelbrecht, did he sound surprised in any way?

MR DE KOCK: No.

MR LAMEY: Or did he admit that this was something unexpected that you were telling him and that you had surprised him with it?

MR DE KOCK: No, it was a question of "Did it all go well". It wasn't a problem for him.

MR LAMEY: According to Mr Nortje, you also told him that the order had come from head office.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, usually I would inform the members from where an order came.

MR LAMEY: And that the Durban Security Branch had approached Gen Krappies Engelbrecht in this regard.

MR DE KOCK: Would you repeat.

MR LAMEY: That the Durban Security Branch had approached Gen Engelbrecht with regard to this. That is what you told Mr Nortje.

MR LAMEY: It may be so, I don't have an independent recollection, but I would have informed him because if not he could have asked me on whose authority because we were moving beyond our ward.

MR LAMEY: And you yourself, according to the admission which was made to you from the Durban Security Branch, also regarded the Sikhakhane case in a very serious light from a security perspective, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR LAMEY: And you also sketched the gravity of the situation to your subordinates, among others, Nortje.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: In your evidence-in-chief you have already conceded to the possibility that you may have given the AK47 with the silencer to Mr Nortje and indeed it will be Mr Nortje's evidence that he obtained this from you.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: And then with regard to the funds that you referred to, it is correct that the official false credit card existed, and what I mean by that is that it was a credit card which was issued under a false name, which was used by the members for the purposes of obtaining funds which were paid into this account from the Secret Account for use during operations and so forth, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: It was a covert financial source or document.

MR LAMEY: Very well. And in this case, Mr Nortje also had such a card which he used to cover expenses, such as the rental for the car and so forth.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And then, my instructions from Mr Nortje are that after the completion of the operation, after you had reported to him, you authorised for him to withdraw R2 000 for himself and he regarded this as a bonus allocation for the purposes of his participation in the operation.

MR DE KOCK: I believe that he may have regarded it as such. We already have a record of such actions with regard to exceptional actions or exceptional situations, but in this case I believe that it was the remaining money which I told him to take.

MR LAMEY: I'm sorry, I didn't hear your last words. You said that he could take it?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And you have already touched upon this, you said that there wasn't any prior expectation which was created with Mr Nortje, that he could demand or receive such a bonus due to his participation in the operation.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And the just one further aspect. My instructions from him are that you told him that Col Taylor and Mr Hanton would meet him at a place and that he would receive further instructions from them regarding the detailed aspects of the execution of the operation.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: Then just one minor aspect. My attention has been fixed on the fact that you gave evidence that at the stage when you received the order you were near the Waterkloof agricultural premises.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: Mr Nortje's instructions are that you were at Vlakplaas and that you went to a building in Watermeyer Street and then much later, according to my instructions, you went to the Waterkloof agricultural premises. "Maar nog nie op hierdie stadium, in Januarie 1991 was julle al reeds daar nie. Kan u moontlik daar verkeerd wees?

MR DE KOCK: In what year did Sikhakhane die?

MR LAMEY: January 1991.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, it may be so.

MR LAMEY: Thank you, Chairperson, I have no further questions.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR NEL: Mr de Kock, you have already this with Mr Visser, regarding the question of the telephonic contact with Mr Taylor. Regarding Mr Hanton, is it correct if I say that at a certain stage before Mr Hanton came to Durban, he was under your command at Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, he worked under my command and before this, Mr Hanton served in the Special Task Force with Koevoet and he was one of the first instructors who lay the foundations for the Koevoet combat unit.

MR NEL: And I just want to know from you what is your perspective regarding Mr Hanton's execution of orders whenever he was issued with an order.

MR DE KOCK: He would have carried it out to the letter.

MR NEL: Thank you, Chairperson, nothing further.

MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr de Kock, Wim Cornelius on record, I'm appearing on behalf of Messrs Britz and Swart. You could label them as footsoldiers within this setting, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, in all aspects.

MR CORNELIUS: And you would agree that the stage when you issued the order to them to kill Mr Sikhakhane, it was clear to them that the orders had come from a higher authority.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: So in the minds of the footsoldiers, it was determined with them that there were various superior officers who were taking these decisions?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: Would they have doubted in any way that they were acting against the enemy at that stage?

MR DE KOCK: No.

MR CORNELIUS: So they would have had no reason to doubt your bona fide motive for the operation?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: And as Gen van der Merwe gave evidence during the hearing for the Cosatu House bombing incident, the life of a policeman who would not execute such an order would have been extremely difficult.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: He also had no reason to doubt the order from Gen Steyn or Gen Engelbrecht?

MR DE KOCK: No.

MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Chairperson.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR WAGENER: Jan Wagener, Chairperson.

Mr de Kock, you heard when Mr Hattingh referred earlier today to certain head office directives regarding the application of Vlakplaas.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR WAGENER: I do not have those directives before me now, but it is my recollection that the one was dated in 1980 and the other in 1981. I accept that we are referring to the same directives which Mr Hattingh has referred to?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR WAGENER: Now those directives, it is my recollection that they were issued by Security Head Office and circulated to all security divisions in the country. Do you recall it as such?

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR WAGENER: And these directives were about an introduction so to speak, of a new unit which was defined within those letters as a Terrorist Detection Unit, which had been established in Pretoria, which could be applied by the various divisions.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR WAGENER: Furthermore, it is my recollection Mr de Kock, that those directives referred to the applications and the possibility of the application of Vlakplaas within legal action regarding the detection and identification of terrorists.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct.

MR WAGENER: To put it bluntly, what I mean is that those directives did not tell security divisions, if you want to have people killed, please make use of the services of Vlakplaas and do so in the following manner.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, it would have been more from mouth to ear, at meetings or functions.

MR WAGENER: Very well, that is entirely correct. Now I also do not have your complete amnesty application before me, but it is my recollection that you are applying for amnesty for just over 100 different incidents, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes.

MR WAGENER: And some of those incidents, according to my calculation there were 25 to 30, if I calculated it correctly, where you acted without instructions from seniors, where you acted on your own initiative upon the requests of colleagues and so forth, is that correct?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I'm not certain of that. We had a mandate and Vlakplaas had an alternative agenda, as it is already well known, with the exception of the proposed documentary circulars, I could also take such decisions if it had to boil down to that.

MR WAGENER: Very well. In these cases where you acted on your own initiative, if I might put it that way, meaning that you did not have instructions from your immediate superiors, in such cases if the members under your command would have asked you what authorisation is there for such an operation, what would you have said?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, one would have motivated it by dealing with the circumstances on ground level which were immediate and threatening, and this would have been in conjunction with the work mandate and as such one would have taken the decision and constituted the motivation from this.

MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, didn't you tell your subordinates in all cases that there was sufficient authorisation from above, even if there wasn't?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, because in certain cases I told them who had issued the instruction or where it had come from and why, because I also required motivation and many such orders came from a higher authority and one had to report back after the completion of such an order.

MR WAGENER: Yes, that would be when you actually had an order as such from above, but there are cases when we are aware that you did not have any such orders and those are the cases that I am referring to.

MR DE KOCK: But then this situation on ground level would dictate.

MR WAGENER: This discussion that you had with Gen Steyn, according to you at the Security Head Office, in the statement which is contained within the bundle, not the amnesty but the other statement, you state that this discussion took place approximately at the end of 1990. Can you attach a closer date as that to this?

MR DE KOCK: No, because there were too many incidents. Even with an exceptional incident, such as the bomb in London at the ANC Head Offices, I had to make enquiries to determine the exact date because I couldn't even remember the year.

MR WAGENER: Did this discussion take place in 1990?

MR DE KOCK: I wouldn't be able to say.

MR WAGENER: Is it possible that it may have taken place during 1990?

MR DE KOCK: I don't know.

MR WAGENER: Who was your commander during 1990?

MR DE KOCK: I think at a certain stage it was van Rensburg and after that it was Engelbrecht.

MR WAGENER: Isn't it correct that Gen Engelbrecht only became your commander on the 1st of January 1991?

MR DE KOCK: I don't know. There was a period of transition and if the one General wasn't there, such as Steyn for example, we would then go to Engelbrecht.

MR WAGENER: The reason why I've asked you is because if this discussion took place during 1990 and you had taken it up with your own commander, it would have been van Rensburg, isn't that correct?

MR DE KOCK: But then I would have said so. I can recall specifically the situation regarding the telephone.

MR WAGENER: Mr de Kock, if it is correct that Security Head Office had authorised this operation by means of Gen Engelbrecht or any other person, could you surmise any reason why Gen Steyn wouldn't simply have stated that? Because it would have made his life considerably easier.

MR DE KOCK: I cannot speculate on other people's motives.

MR WAGENER: You have heard Gen Engelbrecht's version, it is embodied in Exhibit C, the statement of this morning, where he denies that he had been involved in any manner in this incident before the time or after the time.

MR DE KOCK: I saw that, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: On your own version here today you have to concede Mr de Kock, that he did not know before the time necessarily, but that it was just the impression as you have testified, correct?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I was convinced of it and that is why I mentioned it as such.

MR WAGENER: But that was only your impression?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: And afterwards, on your own version, you did not just report to him that the problem had been solved in Natal.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I told him that Gen Steyn's problem has been solved and the reference was clear that it was Sikhakhane.

MR WAGENER: Did you in the process mention Sikhakhane's name?

MR DE KOCK: I could have, Chairperson, but I do not have an independent recollection.

MR WAGENER: But you are not sure?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR WAGENER: I have no further questions, Mr Chairman.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR SCHOLTZ: Thank you, Chairperson.

Mr de Kock, at this stage when Gen Steyn approached you the first time with regard to the Sikhakhane problem, there was only a threat according to your information, that he would defect to the ANC.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, it was not just a threat, it had already been a threat as I understood it.

MR SCHOLTZ: But according to your information he did not defect at that stage?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I did not have the intimate knowledge, for example the counter-intelligence factor which had been reported back from Swaziland, I only heard about that today and I don't believe the would have just told me and exposed their own lines in such a manner.

MR SCHOLTZ: But according to you personally it was just a threat.

MR DE KOCK: It was not only a threat, it was a threat which could be executed and as I understood it, it was a clear and present danger in that regard, Chairperson.

MR SCHOLTZ: Did Gen Steyn at any stage tell you that Sikhakhane was planning to use the death of Charles Ndaba as leverage?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, he did not refer to it as leverage, and that one can understand. It was not about if he was not appointed then he will talk, the aspect was that he will talk about the Ndaba situation.

MR SCHOLTZ: And according to your own personal opinion, despite the instructions which you received, was this sufficient reason for you to eliminate him?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, I had already known that Captain Botha had killed Ndaba and the other person and if this was disclosed - and we had already seen they were being looked for, it was not a matter that the people had escaped, people were looking for them, the ANC was also looking for them and this would have led to a disclosure.

MR SCHOLTZ: Why was it necessary for you to refer to General Engelbrecht for instructions?

MR DE KOCK: No, that was a matter of clearing it, Chairperson, because I asked Gen Steyn to liaise with Gen Engelbrecht and to clear it with him.

MR SCHOLTZ: Can you recall how much time had elapsed between the first discussion that you had with Gen Steyn with regard to this incident and the stage when you gave the instructions to your men?

MR DE KOCK: Unfortunately not, Chairperson.

MR SCHOLTZ: Was it a matter of a week or a month or a year?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I would not want to speculate here, Chairperson, there were too many instances. I was not undertaking one operation at a time, at times we had seven or nine projects running at the same time. So it would be difficult for me to put a time period to it.

MR SCHOLTZ: Did you - after the operation had been completed, did you determine whether any methods of payment were used except for cash?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, I accepted that there would be no problem with regard to any trail, and I see in my trial that charts had been used. I can also mention that one started experiencing problems by booking in with cash into hotels and hiring vehicles, because those institutions do not have a documentary record of your financial background. I enquired about persons who work at hotels and they said they choose cards, or they prefer cards because people book in and then they steal things from the institution and that is why they insist sometimes on credit cards and so forth.

MR SCHOLTZ: Thank you, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Well why did you give him all this money?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, because the askari does not have the script of what we will do and this could have lasted for 10 days or it could have lasted longer and we did not want to pay money into one place where it would be paid out at another place. At short notice I could have sent them money, but I did not know how urgent it would be.

CHAIRPERSON: But if they had their credit cards, they could pay with them, couldn't they?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson, but the whole idea was not to leave any paper trail at all, that was the whole idea.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, I understood what you were just telling us is that you knew they did use credit cards because it was a better thing to do when you checked into hotels.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, in my criminal trial I heard and I saw the documentary proof of the credit cards and it was the idea that the credit cards should not be used. What I told you was that unfortunately one does have that problem that some institutions require the use of a credit card.

CHAIRPERSON: Well did you ever ask him when he came back, how much money he'd spent?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: If you gave him R5-R7 000, he comes back three days later and you say oh, keep the change. Is that what you're telling us?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, yes. I would just like to qualify it. It is that he does not carry the expense of C1 only, he carries the expenses of the other Security Branch as well, so that there will not be a shortage for them as well.

CHAIRPERSON: What were the other Security Branch going to be doing, there was only one contact they were going to make and C1 was going to carry out the operation, wasn't it?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that is correct. We could not foresee whether we had to hire more than one vehicle. There could have been a variety of problems. They may have had to hire or rent a second premises other than the one that they used. So there are several situations which they had to prepare for.

MR LAX: If I may, Chair, while we're on this thing because unfortunately if I let someone go away from this point, it's going to be difficult to come back to it again later.

Mr de Kock, in your application at page 4 of the first bundle you make the following statement and say this in paragraph, it's the fourth paragraph on that page, the one that commences:

The second sentence of that paragraph you say:

And you repeat this statement in later statements in the bundle. Now the point I wish to ask you about is, surely he would have known that that was an undesirable thing to use his credit card and that's why you'd given him the money in the first place.

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson, that is so.

MR LAX: You see, that's why I don't understand why he then used his credit card to hire the vehicle, which was the most obvious link to this whole murder because anybody might have seen that vehicle, particularly at the place where it stopped and they committed the offence and so on.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, Mr Nortje was in possession of not only false credit cards but of a passport and an ID document in the same names and I think a cheque book as well, just like I did. It is unfortunately so that there is no other way and then one has to use a credit card. We experienced the same problem in Swaziland.

MR LAX: So have you maybe just overstated the precautionary aspects here in this paragraph?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, on the one hand I wanted to sketch to you what one wanted from a covert point of view and on the other hand I wanted to tell you that it is not always possible to reach that objective.

MR LAX: The point that I don't understand is he still had at least on your version, R2 000 left over.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I think so, I did not receive the money back or count it.

MR LAX: He talks about an amount of R2 000-odd rand been given to him by yourself and in relation to that amount you say well that was the money that must have been left over at the end, because you wouldn't have drawn it from any other source.

MR DE KOCK: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR LAX: So the point I'm making is, why use the credit card if you've still got the cash on you? It just doesn't make sense, especially if as we've now inferred, your instructions would have been try not to use the credit cards if it's at all feasible. That would have been his last resort.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson yes, as I've told you I myself had booked in into places and if you pay in cash they will tell you "Give us a card". And if you rent a vehicle you cannot get the vehicles without using a credit card or giving a credit card reference. That is a given. And I think in this instance it was the same situation.

MR LAX: You see then I would have expected that in your application and in your subsequent statements and so on, you would have at least not have said what you've said here, you would have said that yes, in some cases credit cards would have had to be used for the very reasons you've just given.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, those covert cards and cheque books and ID documents were issued to give the covertness and additional foundation, but one cannot get away with it always, sometimes one is in such a situation that you have to use it.

MR LAX: Yes, what I'm trying to understand is why you didn't say so in your papers. Because the impression you create here is that that's absolutely the last resort, that you wouldn't want to use your credit cards. In fact, the impression one gets from reading this paragraph is that you almost instructed them not to use their credit cards.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, that was the aspect or situation which one wants in this type of work, and as I have said it's not always possible.

MR LAX: I won't labour the point any further. Thanks, Chair.

ADV STEENKAMP: No questions, thank you, Mr Chairman.

MR SIBANYONI: Mr de Kock, I just want to find out, this excessive use of money at Vlakplaas, did that not in a way encourage your former South West Africa colleagues to come and join you at Vlakplaas?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, they came because of patriotism, purely because of patriotism.

MR SIBANYONI: The easy access to money and the, I will call it a sort of luxurious way of life, in that to carry out an operation like the one we are talking about, a person is given something like R7 000, he hires cards, maybe he books at hotels and the likelihood to keep change and after the operation maybe to have a braai and drinks thereafter, would you not say in one way or another prompted or motivated people to easily agree to executing those instructions?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, definitely not. On the one hand money was not so easily accessible, this money is obtained through an unconventional manner and in a dishonest manner, there are controls over this and no person lays his life on the line, to be shot or to be caught in a neighbouring State, because he thinks he will be rewarded financially. This was purely from patriotism.

CHAIRPERSON: But there were no controls over Nortje at all, he was given R5-7 000, you didn't ask him how he spent it, you just said "Keep the change".

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, in this type of work one does not ask for receipts.

CHAIRPERSON: That is I think, what my colleague here is suggesting. You go out on these expeditions and you come back with a pocket full of money and you don't have to provide receipts.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, because we did not have a waiting list for operations which had to be executed, these situations may arise at any time and it could be called off at any time. So there were no expectations of any nature.

MR SIBANYONI: The operations were too frequent, sometimes one after another. You have said at one stage you may have nine or ten, you call them "projects".

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson, but not all of them involved an operation of this nature, not all of them were cross-border operations.

MR SIBANYONI: When you said you were having like nine to ten projects, were you referring only to cross-border operations or even ...?

MR DE KOCK: No, these are internal, Chairperson, where one does infiltrations and you do recruitments and you do identifications. So you have various groups who work at any given stage. One may have one group like in this instance, Nortje came to Natal and I would have one group who would go to Swaziland, who had to look at a potential recruitment, another group will go to Johannesburg for an infiltration in the weapons smuggling network. So it did not always deal with money.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you, Mr Chairperson.

MR LAX: Sorry, Chairperson, there's just one aspect that I omitted to discuss with the witness.

You've said that Sikhakhane was recruited by Col Baker, I think was his rank at the time.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, he was recruited by Simon Radebe. Simon Radebe was - W/O Simon Radebe was the person who did the handling, the recruitment was done by Godfrey Radebe, who was a cousin to Sikhakhane, or what I understood to be a kin to him.

MR LAX: Interestingly enough, Col Vorster says that he was busy, through his own sources, with the recruitment of Sikhakhane and he had arranged this through - if one looks at page 191 of bundle 1, he'd arranged this through Sikhakhane's sister.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, that would not be strange because in two instances where I recruited people from the ANC and spoke to them in Swaziland, they later informed me that they had already been recruited and then they gave the names of their Security Police handlers to me and I drew the files at head office and saw that they were on a monthly salary. So it is not impossible that one institution - for example even the Military and National Intelligence, would target one person for recruitment.

MR LAX: Yes. What Vorster in fact says is that he coincidentally met Baker at the border and realised that they were both there for the same purpose.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, as far as I can recall we did not inform Vorster, we did inform the Eastern Transvaal Security Branch.

MR LAX: But you'll concede that's one incredible coincidence?

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson, I believe what happened, when we informed Eastern Transvaal they would have informed Natal because Natal also had to go through Eastern Transvaal to Swaziland, so that the Eastern Transvaal source system would not be prejudiced.

MR LAX: You see he was immediately handed to Vorster, and we know all about his debriefing by Vorster and others that took place in this vicinity, but all I'm suggesting is that this is one incredible coincidence, that while Baker and Radebe and company are busy with one attempted recruitment and the removal of this man from Swaziland, at the very same time on the very same day a unit from Pietermaritzburg were also involved in the same operation. I might add that this was a few days after Dion Cele was taken out of Swaziland.

MR DE KOCK: Chairperson yes, the Dion Cele matter I don't about, but this part I know of. It was not strange even in Botswana with regard to PAC members. When I started recruiting, Zeerust informed me that they had already recruited all those people and had even given them salary structures.

MR LAX: I just wondered if you had any direct knowledge of that, but clearly you don't.

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Chairperson.

Mr de Kock, just to join up with the questions which were put to you with regard to Vorster by the learned Committee Member. I would just like to say it clearly that in paragraph 5 of his application he says:

And he continues, he says:

Does this accord with your version?

MR DE KOCK: Yes, Chairperson. On the contrary, as far as I know Radebe was a - Warrant Officer Radebe was already in Swaziland to pick him up there.

MR HATTINGH: And then he continues, in paragraph 6 he says that:

So once again your people?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And thereafter Baker handed him over to Vorster?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And singular other aspects which I want to clear up. For this operation, did you pay any monies to Swart?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Did you pay Britz any money?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And they were both involved in the killing of Mr Sikhakhane?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And did you pay Hanton any money?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: And you have said at times you were busy with more than one operation, were these all operations outside the scope of the law or were some of them legitimate operations?

MR DE KOCK: No, Chairperson, at the same time one would have operations outside the scope of the law and within the scope of the law.

MR HATTINGH: So not in all instances did you act outside the law?

MR DE KOCK: That's correct Chairperson.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman, we have no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible - no microphone)

MR HATTINGH: No, thank you, we do not intend to call witnesses on behalf of Mr de Kock, Mr Chairman.

MR LAMEY: Chairperson, the next applicant is Mr Nortje. I suggest that Mr Wagener perhaps just change seats.

WILLEM ALBERTUS NORTJE: (sworn states)

MR LAX: Sworn in, Chairperson.

EXAMINATION BY MR LAMEY: Mr Nortje, we have already placed on record before at least two of the members of this Panel, the way that your application was submitted, that there was an initial statement that you signed, in which your particulars have been incorporated, which includes extracts from a statement that you made at the time of the Goldstone Commission when you were in Denmark.

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And after you obtained legal representation a supplementary document was prepared, which can also be found in the bundle from page 58 to page 76, is that correct?

MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAMEY: Mr Nortje, do you still confirm to the best of your knowledge, what you stated in both your initial and supplementary applications, and do you also confirm that this is to the best of your knowledge true and correct?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: Then with regard to the amnesty application for your involvement in the death of Goodwill Sikhakhane, which you describe as the Greytown incident, you have stated that in January or February 1992, you know that that is incorrect, you know that the date is actually January 1990.

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: In this case you received your instructions from Mr de Kock, who sketched to you that the Durban Security Branch had an askaris in Greytown who was handled by the Security Branch and that he had begun to present problems to them, being the Durban Security Branch, because he was aware of murders which had been committed by the branch against ANC members when Operation Vula was launched.

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And you understood this from Mr de Kock?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: Mr de Kock has also confirmed this, and you state in your affidavit that - Chairperson, I apologise, I'm at page 56, you state that Mr de Kock told you that the order came from Durban and that they had approached Gen Krappies Engelbrecht in this regard.

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And you also describe this as a secret or so-called covert operation.

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And according to you it was clear that the person had to be eliminated because if he were to speak out, it would emerge that the ANC members had been murdered by the Security Branch.

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And that certain senior members in the Durban Security Branch would have to bear the consequences.

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: You also made this statement at that time and according to your independent recollection and knowledge, as you had it at that stage and also with regard to your supplementary application.

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: You have also heard the evidence of Gen Steyn, indicating that one of the factors was also that Sikhakhane would easily know that the Durban Security Branch was involved in the death of Charles Ndaba and Mr Shabalala. Do you recall the name Charles Ndaba of that time?

MR NORTJE: No.

MR LAMEY: So basically, you knew that it was about MK members who had been arrested and then eliminated?

MR NORTJE: No, at that stage when he told me that it was Charles Ndaba, I had not yet known that it was him.

MR LAMEY: Did you understand that this was in the interests of the protection of the security risk that you were given the order?

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR LAMEY: And that the member could expose the involvement of the Security Police in the death of those persons and that at that stage in 1990, within the context of those times, ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Are you leading the witness or are you leading him from his statement? Earlier you were taking him through his statement, but I think now you're just putting the words into his mouth, aren't you?

MR LAMEY: Chairperson, I'm actually just on this point, focusing on the political objective. I will come back later also to what he stated. As it pleases you, Mr Chairman, I'll proceed. I ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Let's hear what the witness has to say, the applicant has to say.

MR LAMEY: As it pleases you, Mr Chairman.

Very well. Let me put it to you as such. In your statement you say that Mr de Kock sketched the situation in a very serious light to you.

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: How did you regard it at that time, if the particular member were to expose the involvement of the Durban Security Branch?

MR NORTJE: I didn't have all the details. Based upon what Mr de Kock told me I realised that it was a very serious situation. If this person were to speak out about what he knew it would create problems for the branch and I realised the gravity of the situation, that is why I continued with the action.

MR LAMEY: Did you know the particular askari?

MR NORTJE: I didn't know him but I knew about him.

MR LAMEY: Who would have accompanied you under the order of Mr de Kock to execute this operation?

MR NORTJE: It was approximately three days before the time when Mr de Kock approached me if I recall correctly, and mentioned to me that I had to contact Col Andy Taylor to make arrangements with him for us to travel down to Durban, that there was an askari there who had to be eliminated. He then informed me that I had to take two additional members with, I think he mentioned Mr Britz' name and then we also decided to take Mr Swart along.

MR LAMEY: Very well. And did you then depart from Vlakplaas?

MR NORTJE: I then spoke to Col Andy, I cannot recall whether I called him, but we made an arrangement for a rendezvous point which would have been at Mooi Rivier on a certain day, approximately 12 o'clock that afternoon, perhaps somewhat later. But before our departure, Mr de Kock gave me money and he gave me the AK which was fitted with a silencer. I recall that we had a Makarov with a silencer which we also took with, Britz had it on him. But that was basically what we took along. And our further instructions we would have received from Col Taylor when we met him.

With regard to the money, I used my credit card at that stage ...(intervention)

MR LAMEY: Please explain to the Committee about this credit card.

MR NORTJE: I had a credit card which was issued under a false name ...(intervention)

MR LAMEY: A credit card issued under a false name?

MR NORTJE: Yes. And I had a limit of R10 000 on it, which I never used. I never basically went into the red, I always paid in money. As I recall, I took the money that Mr de Kock gave me and paid it into the credit card account. He speaks of an amount between R5-7 000 and I cannot recall it being that much.

MR LAMEY: Was there already an existing level of funds on that account?

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR LAMEY: What I mean is credit card funds on the card when you received it.

MR NORTJE: Yes, I used the card in emergencies. If for example we needed money quickly, it wouldn't have been necessary for me to go to head office first and then draw money. So I always kept an amount on that credit card account and the money Mr de Kock gave me I paid in because at that stage it wasn't my idea that we were going to hire a car. As I've said, the planning took place there at the hotel with Col Taylor, but we made provision for any such eventuality.

MR LAMEY: And then the credit card would be used in such a situation?

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR LAMEY: Let us just return. Did you then meet Col Taylor and Mr Hanton somewhere, and where was it?

MR NORTJE: We drove down to Mooi River, I think we met them at the Post Office. They were driving a BMW vehicle. And from that point on we went to the Leeupark Hotel between Durban and Pietermaritzburg.

MR LAMEY: Would you stay there?

MR NORTJE: Yes, it was the plan for us to stay over there. We then booked in and I paid cash as far as I can recall.

MR LAMEY: Could you also draw cash with your credit card?

MR NORTJE: Yes. I'm not certain whether I paid in all the money or whether I retained an amount. I would have retained an amount on me for the purposes of fuel and so forth. I don't believe that I paid the whole amount into the credit card account, for the reason that I needed to have cash on me for the purposes of petrol and so forth.

We booked in for two days preliminarily and that is where we spoke to Col Taylor and it emerged that we would be requiring another vehicle. I then told him that I would be able to hire the vehicle because I could use my false credit card and he then said that Hanton would arrange the appointment or meeting with Sikhakhane, and we then planned to do it the next evening.

MR LAMEY: Do you know where Sikhakhane was at that stage?

MR NORTJE: He was in Greytown.

MR LAMEY: So Hanton would arrange a meeting with him?

MR NORTJE: Yes, Hanton would deal with that aspect of the situation because he was his handler as far as I understood the case to be.

MR LAMEY: And what happened further?

MR NORTJE: We didn't stay there very long. Col Andy then drove back to Durban. I'm not certain whether Hanton accompanied him, but on the following day we planned to go to Greytown to see how the place looked.

MR LAMEY: Did you go to the place beforehand to see where you were going to commit the deed?

MR NORTJE: The following morning we drove through and we identified the place where we would leave the body.

MR LAMEY: Where was this? Could you perhaps give us a closer indication.

MR NORTJE: It was approximately five kilometres on the Kranskop Road, if I recall correctly, just outside Greytown.

MR LAMEY: So you found a suitable place there?

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR LAMEY: How did the environment look?

MR NORTJE: There were plantations and Hanton told me specifically that it wouldn't be a problem to leave the body there because there were not many people in the area and a possibility existed that wild animals would destroy the body ultimately.

MR LAMEY: What other preparations did you undertake with regard to the vehicle and so forth?

MR NORTJE: After we had seen the place where we would do it, we went back to Pietermaritzburg and we went to rent the vehicle from, either Avis or Budget, I cannot recall which one. We returned to the hotel where we left the other vehicle. This was late afternoon already.

MR LAMEY: One of the applicants, I think it is Mr Britz, states that practise shots were fired with the AK47, can you recall this?

MR NORTJE: Yes, I think it was during the morning that we drove to a place near Camperdown. There was a quarry there and that is where we tested the weapon, just to see that it was in good working order.

MR LAMEY: Very well. I interrupted you, you then returned to the hotel at the Lion Park Inn.

MR NORTJE: That is correct. We left the other vehicles there, but I am not certain whether we travelled in two vehicles. I do think that we travelled only in the kombi to a village between Pietermaritzburg and Greytown. I think it is called New Hanover. There is a hotel there where we stopped and we waited there because we were quite early. And according to what I understood from Hanton, he had arranged to see Sikhakhane at approximately 9 o'clock or 10 o'clock that evening. So we had quite a lot of time that we had to spend in-between.

MR LAMEY: So you waited there at the hotel?

MR NORTJE: Yes. At a stage Hanton drove in to phone and he came back and the final arrangements had been made.

MR LAMEY: And while you waited there, did you have any drinks?

MR NORTJE: Yes, we had a few drinks but we didn't drink excessively.

MR LAMEY: So you didn't drink to such an extent that you were under the influence or inebriated, you simply had a few drinks?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: What happened further?

MR NORTJE: When we departed from there it was beginning to darken. We stopped and switched the numberplates, if I recall correctly, we put false numberplates on the kombi.

MR LAMEY: Were these false numberplates which came from Vlakplaas?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: Very well.

MR NORTJE: We then drove. It also rained that evening. We arrived at the rubbish dumps at a certain point, where they undertook the waste disposal. We stopped there and the plan was that Britz and I would be at the back of the kombi and that when Sikhakhane climbed in we would grab him. Swart sat in front. Sikhakhane came walking along and climbed in and closed the door and when Hanton started driving we seized him.

MR LAMEY: Who drove the vehicle at that stage?

MR NORTJE: I recall it was Hanton. He then began to struggle and we pressed him down on the floor. I hit him once on the head with a baton ...(intervention)

MR LAMEY: When you say that you managed to get him under control, who are you referring to?

MR NORTJE: Me and Britz. We pressed him down and cuffed his hands behind his back and we then drove to the place where we had decided earlier on during the day. There were no other vehicles on the road, it was very quiet. We climbed out. I brought the weapon out. Hanton and Britz took him and I helped. We took him over an embankment on the side of the road, then we pressed him down onto the ground. It was Britz and Hanton who held him down, if I recall correctly. I then held the AK against his head and fired two shots to his head. He died instantly.

Swart then returned to the kombi, or returned with the kombi. We climbed in and we drove away. We drove to Greytown, or rather the Lion Park Hotel.

From that point on, Hanton returned to Durban and on the following day I noticed that there was blood in the kombi. I first obtained cleaning detergents to clean the kombi with and then at approximately 10 o'clock or 11 o'clock that morning we returned the kombi and drove back to Pretoria. I cannot recall on which day this was, but I do know that I reported back to Mr de Kock that it had been done and that everything had been successful, and we never again spoke about it.

MR LAMEY: So you reported back to Mr de Kock?

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR LAMEY: Do you know whether at any stage he mentioned anything to you about something which had been reported back?

MR NORTJE: At a certain stage he told me that he had told Gen Krappies about it and he basically said - I don't know if he said we'd done good work, but he stated that he was satisfied with the work that we had done. Gen Engelbrecht never spoke to me directly regarding the incident.

MR LAMEY: Very well. Do you know what happened to the AK47?

MR NORTJE: As far as I know it was destroyed later.

MR LAMEY: This AK47, what sort of weapon was it, do you know?

MR NORTJE: It was a fold-up butt AK. We had approximately 10 of them at a certain stage, which were fitted with silencers, which we used in covert operations abroad.

MR LAMEY: Do you know if this was a legally registered weapon which would have been registered according to the regular procedure?

MR NORTJE: No, it wasn't.

MR LAMEY: After you had reported back to Mr de Kock, and with regard to the money which he had given you and the money which was in the credit card account and the bonus that you received, can you tell us what you recall about this.

MR NORTJE: I recall that Mr de Kock gave me the money after the time, but what the circumstances were is not certain to me, I simply assumed that it was for that.

MR LAMEY: For your participation in the action?

MR NORTJE: Yes, I assumed that that is what it was for.

MR LAMEY: And that is why you mention it as such in your amnesty application?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: What is your recollection? Mr de Kock states that he recalls that there was money remaining in the credit card account and he told you that you could keep the change. Could there have been ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: He didn't say anything about credit card account. De Kock did not mention money in the credit card account.

MR LAMEY: Sorry, I'm then totally wrong, Chairperson, I apologise.

MR LAX: What Mr de Kock did say was that as far as he could remember, as far as he could remember, this amount of R2 000, and he wasn't sure of the exact figure, but if it was R2 000, then it would have been the money left over from the cash he'd been given.

MR LAMEY: Of the cash that he gave.

MR LAX: Correct.

MR LAMEY: I beg your pardon, I misunderstood it.

What is your recollection in this regard, Mr Nortje?

MR NORTJE: I always had a certain amount of money in my credit card account, which I used for emergency situations when I did not have cash readily available. I didn't simply take the money and put it in my own pocket for my private use, I kept it in the account. I kept that credit card specifically for the eventuality of me requiring money. I recall that I received the R2 000 separately, but I cannot recall specifically. It was already in my credit card account and I cannot recall using it from that point onwards.

MR LAMEY: But what you do remember is that an amount of R2 000 was allocated to you by Mr de Kock with regard to your participation in this action?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: Before this operation and before any other operation in which you participated and for which you request amnesty, did you ever have any expectation or was anything ever promised to you with regard to additional remuneration which would be paid out to you?

MR NORTJE: No. As I've stated before, we were never told that if we participated in a specific operation we would receive a specific amount of money, that was never the motivation. I think that Mr de Kock gave us the money to compensate for the inconvenience that we endured.

CHAIRPERSON: So he did it more than once, did he?

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR LAMEY: But can you recall with regard to specific operations, can you recall whether under normal service conditions money was paid out to members?

MR NORTJE: Yes, but this was not the prior motivation for participation in an action.

MR LAMEY: And Mr Nortje, you have applied for amnesty for various incidents.

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: How many incidents can you recall for which you received an additional amount of cash for your participation?

MR NORTJE: I cannot recall specifically at the moment.

MR LAMEY: Can you think of any other incident?

MR NORTJE: Yes, there was, but I cannot recall it. I think I may have given evidence about it previously.

MR LAMEY: But what I want to ask you is that it wasn't like that with each and every operation?

MR NORTJE: No. As I've said, it was not the practice that if we participated in an operation we would receive money.

MR LAMEY: With regard to you yourself and you participation in this operation, were you encouraged or motivated in any way, in your mind, with regard to an expectation of additional bonus which you may receive? Was that your consideration?

MR NORTJE: No.

MR LAMEY: Initially, when you compiled your statement in Denmark, you stated that at that stage according to your knowledge, the body of Mr Sikhakhane had not yet been found.

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: And in the supplementary affidavit you stated that it came to your knowledge later that it had been found. You also gave evidence about this case during Mr de Kock's criminal trial.

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR LAMEY: And if I recall correctly you received indemnity in terms of Section 204 of the Criminal Procedure Act.

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR LAMEY: Were you also present during any identifications before the de Kock trial, with regard to places which you pointed out and so forth?

MR NORTJE: I identified the place for the investigating team and after that we made enquiries and traced the body in the cemetery in Greytown.

MR LAMEY: Very well. Now with regard to the political motivation, you have summarised it from page 75 to 76. Also with regard to the order and from whom you received it and what you understood, you state that you understood that this came from Gen Krappies Engelbrecht, who was the overall commander of Vlakplaas.

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR LAMEY: And according to your best knowledge of how you saw the political motivation at that time?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAMEY: Thank you, Chairperson, I have nothing further.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR LAMEY

CHAIRPERSON: Before we go onto anyone else. When was it, can you remember at all, that you found the body in the cemetery at Greytown? Would that have been in 1994?

MR NORTJE: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: I put that date to you because that is the date of the post-mortem examination, which would have been after you had found the body I take it.

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Hattingh?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman, Hattingh on record.

Mr Nortje, for how long were you connected to Vlakplaas?

MR NORTJE: I arrived there during June/July 1984 until it closed in 1993.

MR HATTINGH: So it was approximately nine years?

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And when you were asked by your attorney regarding other incidents that you can recall receiving a reward for, you could not recall these incidents from the top of your head.

MR NORTJE: No, the weapons were also a considerable factor.

MR HATTINGH: Isn't it simply the case that the receipt of such monies was not a regular occurrence?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And that over a period of nine years you were involved in numerous operations?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And that many of them extended beyond the parameters of the law?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: So an expectation was never created in your mind that you would receive a reward for every operation that you participated in?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Then just with regard to one or two other aspects. You have already mentioned that you possessed false registration plates.

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And last week when we dealt with the Ngqulunga matter you also gave evidence that you made use of false registration numbers during that incident.

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: It was a custom?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And the false registration plates were put on vehicles that you hired?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: You heard Mr de Kock's evidence that particularly when it came to the rental of vehicles, it wasn't always possible for you to do so in cash, you had to use a credit card.

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR HATTINGH: And the false credit cards, the false identity documents and passports and possibly also false chequebooks were issued to you with the express purpose of disguising your involvement in such incidents as a policeman?

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And if it hadn't been for the fact that you and others had provided information to the A-G, the death of Mr Goodwill Sikhakhane would probably still not have been cleared up at this point?

MR NORTJE: It is possible.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, before we - can I just go back a little bit. Were you given false identification documents and passports?

MR NORTJE: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And then did you open an account in that false name? I take it that the chequebook that you used was a genuine chequebook, but it was chequebook issued in a false name?

MR NORTJE: I can only tell you that I did not have a chequebook, I only had a credit card.

CHAIRPERSON: Oh. I understood - it was put to you earlier that you had a chequebook and I thought you'd agreed. You didn't have a chequebook?

MR NORTJE: No.

CHAIRPERSON: You just got a credit card in the false name?

MR NORTJE: That is correct.

MR LAX: Sorry, while we're on this point, did you apply for that chequebook - that credit card yourself, in the false name, using the false ID documents or was it arranged for you?

MR NORTJE: It was arranged for me.

MR LAX: And just while we're on this point, if you'll allow me Mr Hattingh, to interpose. I'm sorry, better do it now while the issue is alive.

MR HATTINGH: Certainly.

MR LAX: You said something about you used to put money into that credit card.

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR LAX: Why would you do a thing like that?

MR NORTJE: Often when we went out for extended periods of time and we received money, I would pay the money into the credit card account so that I wouldn't have to walk around with cash and I could simply withdraw money from an ATM.

MR LAX: But wouldn't that defeat the purpose of having cash on you?

MR NORTJE: Yes, we also carried cash, but the cards were used more for hotel payments, accommodation, cars which were hired and that sort of thing.

MR LAX: What I don't understand is this, you're given cash for the purpose of paying your expenses in cash. Mr de Kock made it clear that the cards were only for those cases where people insisted on cards, the rest of the time you didn't want to leave a paper trail behind. That was the whole object of having cash.

MR NORTJE: Yes, but it wasn't only for illegal use, I used the card as a normal credit card.

MR LAX: You used your covert card in non-covert matters? Is that what you're saying?

MR NORTJE: I cannot recall specifically, but I did not only use it specifically for illegal operations. For example, if we went to Swaziland or wherever, I would pay with that card, depending upon the passports that we would use when leaving the country. When I was in the country we would sometimes stay in Johannesburg and use our false names in the hotels. I know that at a stage I stayed in the Madison Hotel with my credit card and my false ID book.

MR LAX: But you weren't on a covert operation at that time?

MR NORTJE: I think that we were investigating smuggling.

MR LAX: My point is a simple one, why use your covert identity and everything connected with it in a non-covert situation?

MR NORTJE: Well these are just things that happened.

MR LAX: Well isn't that an abuse of your covert identity?

MR NORTJE: Sometimes yes, perhaps, if you want to put it in that light.

MR LAX: I understand the explanation given by Mr de Kock that you used a card in a situation where it was absolutely necessary, or in an emergency where you'd run out of cash, fair enough. You illustrate a completely different modus operandi here, you say that you took the cash that was given to you because you didn't like carrying cash on you and you deposited it into your covert card account and then you drew and used your card for everything, except where you had paid a few small things by cash.

MR NORTJE: Yes, I did it as such.

MR LAX: But that defeats the whole purpose, it's totally contrary to your instructions. It just doesn't make sense to me at all.

MR NORTJE: Well that is how I did it.

MR LAX: Well maybe it's not that surprising that d'Olivera was after you then I suppose. But anyway, let's move on.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr Nortje, still on this aspect, is it not correct that it was preferable to - with regard to running expenses in illegal aspects, to pay in cash?

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR HATTINGH: And indeed so that no evidence could be built up against you?

MR NORTJE: Yes, that is correct.

MR HATTINGH: Because the credit card receipts which you received were used as evidence in Mr de Kock's trial.

MR NORTJE: That's correct.

MR HATTINGH: As well as payment for the vehicles which you rented and credit card receipts which were used to those transactions?

MR NORTJE: That's correct.

MR HATTINGH: And Mr de Kock's evidence is that money had remained, he cannot say how much it was, and it seems to me that you also do not know how much, but on page 76 of your application, paragraph 10(c) you say:

Is it correct?

MR NORTJE: That's correct, yes.

MR HATTINGH: Is it not possible that not all the money was paid into your credit card and that you retained an amount which was rather substantial and that Mr de Kock told you to keep that?

MR NORTJE: It is possible because the R2 000 stuck in my mind from the day that I started talking about these things. It may have been a little less, it may have been a little more, but the R2 000 remained with me.

MR HATTINGH: Thank you, Mr Chairman, we have no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HATTINGH

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, Visser on record. I have no questions to this witness, thank you.

NO QUESTIONS BY MR VISSER

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR NEL: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr Nortje, I would just like to put a few statements to you. My instructions from Mr Hanton are that - and if we may proceed where you testified that practise shots were fired to see if the weapon was in working order, my instructions from Mr Hanton are that he does not have any recollection of practise shots which were fired.

MR NORTJE: No, I recall we went to a place close to Camperdown, where there was a quarry and we fired two or three shots there, or probably four, just to surmise if it was in working order and we still drove in that BMW. That is how I recall it.

MR NEL: And then furthermore, my instructions are that Mr Hanton will say when he testifies that at no stage on the day of the incident did he drive the vehicle, but that the vehicle was drive by Mr Blackie Swart.

MR NORTJE: It is possible. At a stage I place him behind the steering wheel, I just do not know at which stage it was.

MR NEL: And why he recalls it so well is because you would not have allowed him to drive because ...(intervention)

MR LAX: Sorry Mr Nel, you're referring to the kombi I take it?

MR NEL: Yes, Sir.

MR LAX: Because there were other vehicles involved.

MR NEL: I'm referring to the kombi, yes Mr Lax.

And Mr Hanton will also state that it is indeed so that he and Mr Swart left you and Mr Britz at the small town which you call New Hanover, and he doesn't recall the name, that he and Swart did not make calls, but that they met Sikhakhane personally that afternoon and it was still daylight and that he told Mr Sikhakhane that they would return that evening for a second meeting.

MR NORTJE: Yes, that is probably what happened. Although I thought that they called, it is possible that they went to see him personally.

MR NEL: And then a further instruction from Mr Hanton is that although he was on the embankment with Mr Britz and yourself, he did not hold down Mr Sikhakhane but that he was just standing around there while Mr Britz held Mr Sikhakhane down.

MR NORTJE: That is entirely possible. I recall that Mr Britz tramped on him. I know Mr Hanton was also standing there, but I cannot specifically recall what he did just before I shot him. It is possible that he was just standing there.

MR NEL: And then finally, Mr Hanton says that as far as he can recall only two shots were fired. Not that he makes an issue of this, but he cannot recall three shots as far as he can recall there were only two shots. You would probably know better than he does.

MR NORTJE: No, I want to recall that there were three shots.

MR NEL: Thank you, Chairperson, we have no further questions.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chairman, Cornelius for Britz and Swart.

Mr Nortje, I would just like to clear up one aspect which is a little unclear. If we look at the application of Britz and yourself it would seem that de Kock gave you the instruction and to Britz.

MR NORTJE: It would seem so.

MR CORNELIUS: Because it would seem that there is some confusion as to who was the leader.

MR NORTJE: Well I thought he approached me first and I was under the impression that I was.

MR CORNELIUS: I see. And there was no doubt in your mind that you acted bona fide against a political opponent with the authorisation of your employer?

MR NORTJE: No.

MR CORNELIUS: And the same idea was embellished with Britz and Swart.

MR NORTJE: That is correct, yes.

MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR CORNELIUS

MR SIBANYONI: In fact at that stage were you second-in-command at Vlakplaas? - to Mr de Kock.

MR NORTJE: No, I was not second-in-command.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you, Mr Chairperson.

CROSS-EXAMINATION MR WAGENER: Jan Wagener, Mr Chairman, only a few questions.

Mr Nortje, on page 76 of the bundle you say that you committed this murder under the overhead command of Gen Engelbrecht. Do you see that on page 76?

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR WAGENER: For this statement you rely only on what your allege that Mr Engelbrecht told you - I beg your pardon, what Mr de Kock told you?

MR NORTJE: That's correct.

MR WAGENER: You don't have knowledge yourself whether it had indeed come from Gen Engelbrecht?

MR NORTJE: No, he did not say it in my presence and I just deduced it from what Mr de Kock told me, and that's how I believed.

MR WAGENER: And then Mr Nortje, on page 75 you say after you returned to Pretoria, Mr de Kock reported back to Gen Engelbrecht. Were you present?

MR NORTJE: No, he told me.

MR WAGENER: So once again you don't have any direct knowledge?

MR NORTJE: No.

MR WAGENER: You heard Gen Engelbrecht's version that he had no participation whatsoever in this instance, can you deny it?

MR NORTJE: No, but I believe he did know. And it is his right to say that he did not know.

MR WAGENER: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR SCHOLTZ: Thank you, Chairperson.

I refer you to page 75 of the application where in paragraph 10(b) you say that in this regard you executed the instruction give to you by your commander, Mr de Kock, and you continue to explain what was sketched to you. Was this sketch done by Mr de Kock?

MR NORTJE: Yes, it was with regard to the fact that he wanted to speak about the Vula incident. He mentioned if offhandedly to me and the fact about the permanent appointment I knew about, because Hanton told me at a stage. I cannot recall whether it was the day at the hotel, but I know they many times came to Pretoria to sort out his documents and at a stage Hanton told me that this man wants to be appointed but they do not want to appoint him for some or other reason. It is something that he mentioned to me, so I was aware that they were experiencing problems and that he wanted to be appointed permanently, but I did not go into any detail.

MR SCHOLTZ: In other words before Mr de Kock gave these instructions to you, you had discussed this askari with Hanton?

MR NORTJE: Yes, but I did not know that it was the same person at that stage. I knew many times he came to Pretoria with documentation because I know they had a problem with his wife's identity to make her a citizen of the country and so forth and during that time he mentioned it to me that they experienced some problem.

MR LAX: Mr Scholtz, if I can just interpose here, I'm just puzzled, I don't know whose documents we're talking about.

May you can help me, Mr Nortje. You spoke about Hanton coming up to Pretoria to sort out his documents, were they Sikhakhane's documents that he was coming up to sort out? Because I thought that's what you were saying?

MR NORTJE: Yes, as I understood it, it was his and his wife's documentation, to try and appoint her as a citizen of the country.

MR LAX: And when you asked Hanton why he was there, he explained that to you, do I understand that correctly?

MR NORTJE: No, I did not specifically ask him why he was there, it was information which came out of discussions and I would say it was towards the end that he mentioned it to me.

MR LAX: You see I'm just trying to understand how you got this information and that you remembered that it was to do with Sikhakhane.

MR NORTJE: Afterwards - I did not know Sikhakhane personally but I knew of him as I have stated, and that is how I knew that they were speaking of this person, but there was no talk that they wanted to kill him at that stage. That only came about later.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you hear this in Pretoria? You said "towards the end I heard this", towards the end of what?

MR NORTJE: I would say before we received the instruction to kill him. It was during the time before the thing came that he came up a few times to sort out the documentation and to try and work on his appointment. I did not go into so much detail, but I knew that ...(indistinct) was it about and I did not ask any detail. And up ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Did you see him when he came up there?

MR NORTJE: Hanton?

CHAIRPERSON: Hanton, ja.

MR NORTJE: Yes, I did.

CHAIRPERSON: And just let me get my things clear. You gathered that he was up there trying to help some askari, but you didn't know who the askari was at the time, you hadn't met him?

MR NORTJE: No, I was not interested, I just knew he had a problem with an askari's appointment ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: And it was only later, after you'd been told you had to kill him, that you realised this is the man that he had a problem with before, about documentation?

MR NORTJE: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR LAX: Sorry, Mr Scholtz, just to clear this up.

The reason the problems existed were to do with citizenship and his wife's citizenship, that's what you understood?

MR NORTJE: The citizenship of his wife, yes. He had already had citizenship, but as I understood it he experienced problems with his wife's citizenship.

MR LAX: I just want to be clear that I understood you correctly.

MR SCHOLTZ: So at that stage when he was experiencing trouble with the citizenship and the documents, he did not mention to you that Sikhakhane was threatening to defect to the ANC?

MR NORTJE: No, not that I can recall.

MR SCHOLTZ: Now who told you that Sikhakhane, this threat that he would disclose Vula Operation, that he wanted to use it as leverage to gain permanent appointment?

MR NORTJE: Mr de Kock - this is how I understood the thing. Mr de Kock explained to me, he explained to me it was about the Vula thing and the appointment was a problem. If I speak of a lever, that is how I explained it and that is how I understood it, that he wanted to be appointed and if he was not appointed he would talk. That is how I understood it.

MR SCHOLTZ: But where did you receive this information from, Mr de Kock or from Hanton or from whom?

MR NORTJE: Definitely Mr de Kock spoke to me about the Vula story and I think when I arrived at Hanton they once again mentioned it to me. But as I say, I did not ask for so much detail.

MR SCHOLTZ: How many times did you shoot Mr Sikhakhane?

MR NORTJE: Thrice.

MR SCHOLTZ: And where exactly on his body?

MR NORTJE: One shot was in his head and two in his chest, as I recall. I know at a stage I had it mixed up ...(intervention)

MR SCHOLTZ: Yes, that is what I wanted to ask you. On page 75 of bundle 1 you say that you fired three shots, two through the head and one through the chest.

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR SCHOLTZ: Why is that?

MR NORTJE: I was somewhat confused as to how it happened and I think at the post-mortem inquest it showed that there was one shot fired through his head.

MR SCHOLTZ: Yes, that is correct. Thank you, Mr Chairman, I have no further questions.

ADV STEENKAMP: No questions, thank you, Mr Chairman.

MR LAX: Just one little aspect and it's to do with what happened in the vehicle. You said that you hit him on the head.

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR LAX: Why was that necessary?

MR NORTJE: To bring him under control, because he was struggling fiercely. I only delivered one blow. I may have struck him more than that, but I struck him one blow and then calmed down and then we held him down. It was in the kombi and it was dark and I think at some stage I struck Britz by accident, but I would not say that we seriously assaulted him, the idea was to hold him down. And later we had on the floor and cuffed him.

MR LAX: You see, what did you hit him with?

MR NORTJE: A baton as far as I can recall. A wooden baton.

MR LAX: A wooden baton?

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR LAX: And you hit him hard enough for blood to be all over the kombi you said, because you noticed the blood the next morning.

MR NORTJE: But it was not a large wound, it was a small wound because there was not much blood. It did not splatter the whole place, there was just a little on the seat as he rubbed his head against the fabric.

MR LAX: And you say you hit Britz by accident?

MR NORTJE: I beg your pardon?

MR LAX: Did you hit Britz by accident?

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR LAX: Now at the point you took him out of the vehicle, he was handcuffed I take it?

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR LAX: And who held him and who moved him up to the place where you eventually shot him, on the other side of that wall?

MR NORTJE: I recall all three of us took him. Britz took him by one arm, Hanton took him by the other arm and I had the rifle with me and I helped him up and we went over the embankment and on the other side Britz tramped him down. But it happened very quickly, it was a process that happened very quickly.

MR LAX: I mean he must have known that you were going to kill him at that point.

MR NORTJE: That's why we wanted to complete it as quickly as possible.

MR LAX: Well he must have seen the AK47 in your hand?

MR NORTJE: I did not openly carry it, I had it half hidden behind me, I don't believe he saw it.

MR LAX: You see what I'm puzzled about is, he didn't struggle with you, he didn't try and run away. The way you illustrate it he just went carefully and you somehow got him over the wall ...

MR NORTJE: No, that is not how it happened, it is not how you are describing now. We took him out of the kombi, Britz and Hanton took him and I fetched the rifle, we pushed him over the wall. It was basically in one move. We pressed him down and I shot him. He was not a large person, he did not offer much resistance, or I didn't see him offering much resistance in ...(intervention)

MR LAX: This place where you shot him, how far is it from the road?

MR NORTJE: Approximately 30 paces.

MR LAX: It was up a slope, wasn't it?

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR LAX: And at the top of the slope there's a sort of a wall.

MR NORTJE: Yes, and then there's an embankment down to the plantation.

MR LAX: The point I'm just trying to understand is, surely you then had yourself and Hanton and who was the other person, Britz?

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR LAX: They must have held him on either side and dragged him up the hillside over the wall, because you didn't participate in that.

MR NORTJE: No, I know I pushed him at some stage when he went over the wall and then I went along and pressed him down ...(intervention)

MR LAX: But you didn't hold him down, you were going to shoot him, how could you hold him down and shoot him at the same time?

MR NORTJE: No, Britz was holding him down.

MR LAX: And then your recollection, Hanton held him down as well. That's what you said initially in ...(indistinct).

MR NORTJE: Yes, I want to recall that Hanton was there. He must have been assisting. I cannot recall exactly what his part was. He says he stood to one side, but definitely at a stage he helped with pushing him over the wall.

MR LAX: You see I'm just trying to understand why you so readily conceded that Hanton didn't play a role in this, he just merely observed, when that was your initial version.

MR NORTJE: No, Hanton assisted when we took him over the wall, but the moment when I shot him I don't know whether he was tramping on him, but I know Britz was tramping him down.

MR LAX: And as far as you recall, Hanton drove the kombi to that point?

MR NORTJE: I would recall he drove, yes, but I may be mistaken, but I recall he drove because he knew the place. That is the only inference I draw, that I recall that he drove, because I cannot recall when he climbed over or if he had indeed climbed over. But I want to recall that when Goodwill climbed into the vehicle, Hanton was behind the steering wheel.

MR LAX: It was yourself and Britz that jumped out of the back and pacified him?

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR LAX: Where was Swart when this was happening? - in the vehicle.

MR NORTJE: He must have been left in front.

MR LAX: And then at some point Swart takes over the driving of the vehicle?

MR NORTJE: Well he must have taken over at some stage because - and I would recall that when we stopped, Swart took over, at the scene where we shot him.

MR LAX: Did Swart drive away?

MR NORTJE: Yes, he drove away some ways and later came back again.

MR LAX: Did you have a signal that you should be able to indicate to him when he should come back?

MR NORTJE: No, it was very quiet there, we would have stopped him and I would shouted for him or whatever. But at that stage we did not have an agreement as to whether there would be any signals.

MR LAX: And he was away for long enough for you to have completed the job and to waiting at the side of the road?

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR LAX: Thanks, Chairperson.

MR SIBANYONI: The way in which this operation was carried out is almost similar to the way in which the incident during the killing of Brain Ngqulunga was done.

MR NORTJE: Yes.

MR SIBANYONI: Was it known amongst the security branches, like Durban would know that you were able to execute such an operation, that Vlakplaas was able to execute such an operation?

MR NORTJE: I believe it may have come out in discussions, people talk, and I think they knew.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

MR NEL: Mr Chairman, if I may just be allowed.

CHAIRPERSON: Oh sorry.

FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR NEL: Sorry, Mr Chairman, I'd just like if I may, to ask two questions following from a question my learned colleague, Mr Scholtz asked, if I may.

Mr Nortje, I have quickly taken instructions from Mr Hanton while you gave evidence with regard to the documentation in Pretoria. Mr Hanton will testify if necessary that he cannot recall that he ever went to Pretoria to sort out documentation for Sikhakhane or his wife or had discussed it with you. Could you be mistaken about that? What is your recollection?

MR NORTJE: No, that is how I recall it. I know specifically his wife experienced some trouble with documentation. That is how I recall it.

MR NEL: And the other aspect which I would like to make a statement about is the fact that Mr Hanton says that he spoke to you at Lion Park about the reason as to why Sikhakhane had to be murdered, but his recollection is clear that it came from Taylor that this man was a double-agent. And as far as Hanton knows or can recall, it had nothing to do with Charles Ndaba, but the instruction from Taylor came that this man had to die because he was a double-agent for the ANC, while he was also working for the Security Branch.

MR NORTJE: He may have said so, but I cannot recall.

MR NEL: Thank you, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct) re-examination?

MR LAMEY: No re-examination, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: I think we'll now take the adjournment. What time tomorrow morning, gentlemen? Nine thirty?

MR VISSER: Nine thirty is in order for us yes, thank you, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well, we'll now adjourn till nine thirty tomorrow morning.