--------------------------------------------------------------------------CHAIRPERSON: For the purpose of the record, I am Judge Pillay. I am going to ask my colleagues to announce themselves for the same reasons, and thereafter the respective representatives.

MR MALAN: Wynand Malan.

ADV SIGODI: Adv Sigodi from the Amnesty Committee.

ADV STEENKAMP: André Steenkamp, the Evidence Leader, thank you.

MR KOOPEDI: My name is Brian Koopedi, I appear here for the family of Nkadimeng.

MR VISSER: May it please you Chairperson and Members of the Committee. My name is Louis Visser, I am instructed by Wagener Miller to act for various applicants, Chairperson. Would you find it more convenient that I announce the applicants for whom we appear at the time when their cases are called?

CHAIRPERSON: You appear for both applicants in this matter?

MR VISSER: Chairperson, are you referring to the Rogers Nkadimeng matter?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VISSER: Yes, indeed. Can I continue?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman and Members of the Committee, on your roll for this week a few matters have been placed consisting of six incidents and it is, I think proper for me to give you some kind of short introduction in order to attempt to make your bird's eye view of the matters as a whole, a little easier.

Chairperson, of the six matters, the Krugersdorp arms cache and the Lengene matter are the only two matters in which members of the Security Police actually acted in the incident itself. In the other four matters, their contribution to the incidents and why they are before you here, is that they gave information to Special Forces for Special Forces to use in order to either eliminate persons in Botswana or to destroy property.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, would that, that information I suppose depends on the quality of that information, exactly what the information was, it would either bring them into stark confrontation with murder allegations as opposed to what they call in Afrikaans, conspiracy in some cases?

MR VISSER: Yes, indeed Chairperson, yes. It will be my submission that it matters not whether it is the one or the other because what we are here for is to ask for amnesty for all offences, omissions, offences and delicts committed due to their conduct, in a particular incident. We have argued this before, and we say again Chairperson, that that is really what the Act is about, is the granting in terms of the words of Section 20 of amnesty for all offences and delicts in regard to their conduct pertaining to a particular incident.

We will certainly not require you to specify what offence you believe that they may or may not have committed.

CHAIRPERSON: Perhaps I can just tell you that you may apply your mind to the problem that we would have in that event, the decision of the Cape Division of the High Court in respect of the ANC Application, what is known as the ANC Application that was reversed, where that decision clearly states that as in some of these cases, I imagine it would be, that you have this blanket amnesty for things you don't know actually happened.

I am not saying that you are wrong, I am saying that at the appropriate time you may be faced with that kind of question.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, I will deal with it immediately, in fact. There is a vast difference between the cases that are going to serve before you here and the so-called 37 applicants in the ANC application, because there they were not in a position to identify the incidents. Here, we are in a position to identify the incidents, so that point does not come up for consideration at all.

CHAIRPERSON: There is an identifiable incident? Okay?

MR VISSER: Oh yes. For example, you have an incident that affected Mr Rogers Nkadimeng, Mr Serache, Mr Naledi and we will give you pretty accurate dates which we have been able to find out from our research Chairperson. All, except for the matter of Johannes Mnisi, where we were not able to give you an exact date, but for the rest, we've got exact dates, Chairperson.

You will run no risk if you granted amnesty for all offences, omissions or delicts concerning that particular incident, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: If we can identify the dates and the offences, then there is no need to give an effective blanket, then we can mention the offences?

MR VISSER: Certainly. We will not ask for a blanket, for a blanket amnesty. The only point that I am making, and perhaps I am confusing you by having said this, is that it is not, it has never been necessary in our submission, although the Amnesty Committees have done so, to specify what offences particularly, amnesty has been granted for. We say that is not what the Act requires of you and certainly that is not what a Court of law will require if the Attorney-General later decides that he wishes to prosecute any of the persons for whom you have given amnesty, and we will sort out that problem when the time comes, if it ever comes.

Chairperson, all the matters that are before you, have directly something to do with the activities of the ANC and particularly their armed wing, Umkhonto weSizwe in Botswana during the relevant periods of time.

You would have noticed that Peter Lengene's matter was in 1982, the exact date was the 6th of February 1982 and Chairperson, apart from that incident, we submit that the arms cache was in 1988. Those are the only two dates that are out of sync if I may put it that way. The others are all in 1985. The ones that you will be hearing, except for the arms cache, which I am told, we were asked to do tomorrow morning.

The arms cache was on the 28th of March 1988, if you want to make a note of that, but we will certainly repeat that to you. Because Chairperson, all these matters relate to Botswana, we thought that it might be convenient just to refer you at the beginning then, and as a basis for all these applications and in order to save time, to two exhibits.

The one is the well known Exhibit A, "General Background to Amnesty Applications", (transcriber's own interpretation) which you now know - sorry Mr Chairman, I haven't got my military brain (microphone not on)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, subject to what Mr Koopedi has to say, we are of the view that we have heard that bits of evidence so many times before, we have even made findings on it already, it is not necessary to lead it, unless Mr Koopedi is going to dispute anything about the history and background relating to the political aspect of what the applicants have done.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, that would be most helpful, and Mr Koopedi can then decide at the appropriate time to inform you whether he does or does not.

CHAIRPERSON: I want to propose, if nobody has any complaints, that we accept it as read and if Mr Koopedi wants to ask questions about it, he is so entitled to do.

MR VISSER: Thank you Chairperson, that is an eminently reasonable ruling.

Chairperson, may I then refer you just to the pages in Exhibit A, the general background, which we have again placed before you, at page 14. There is a very brief summary, starting from 1977 with Mr Marius Schoon and it runs to ...

MR KOOPEDI: If I could, if I could interrupt you, Mr Visser, I would Chairperson, greatly benefit, if I would be afforded an opportunity of looking at the exhibit.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, it has been handed in at the pre-trial conference, I wasn't aware that Mr Koopedi hasn't got a copy.

CHAIRPERSON: Have you not got the Bundle?

MR KOOPEDI: I have the Bundle, and I do not have Exhibit A.

MR VISSER: May I, Mr Chairperson, we will certainly attempt to find a copy somewhere for Mr Koopedi, and he can go through it, it is one and a half pages, which he can go through in his own time. As you have already indicated, we will not go through it now.

Chairperson, and then something which you have not seen before, by way of an exhibit, is a document which is included in the Naledi Bundle. In the Naledi Bundle, Brig Willem Loots attached to his application at page 14 of that, I am told it is 13, sorry, oh okay, my page 13 isn't here, it starts at page 13, Wikus Johannes Loots, and let me just explain to you what this purports to be. In 1988 I believe it was, Chairperson, he was instructed by Head Office to set out in a document, the problems which the Security Police had with authorities in Botswana in order to attempt to curb invasions from Botswana of people as well as infiltration of arms and ammunition.

I see the document is not, it is dated, it is dated the 21st of October 1988. What we have done Chairperson, because we will certainly ask all our applicants whether they agree with the contents of that document or not, and what we have done is, we have reproduced from the Naledi Bundle that document of Brig Loots and we would ask you to accept that as Exhibit B and we have made copies. It is just for easier reference Chairperson, that we don't have to yank out the Naledi Bundle every time we want to refer to it.

Those are the two exhibits Chairperson, there is a wealth of other information concerning Botswana with which we will not, we will not confuse the record. We will settle for those.

Mr Chairman, as I have been given to understand by Mr Steenkamp, he wishes us to start with Vernon Nkadimeng, in that matter there are two applicants, Steyn and Crause. We appear for both of them Chairperson, and we would call Gen Steyn to give evidence first. He is available to take the oath. He would like to speak in Afrikaans.

J A STEYN: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Please be seated.

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Steyn, you are an applicant in this case and it is about, or it is in the way in which you describe it on page 17 in the Bundle, incident 4 - "conspiracy to the elimination of ANC MK members Rogers Nkadimeng and Jackie Molefe", is that correct?

MR STEYN: That is.

MR VISSER: You yourself, did not take part in the action as such, is that correct?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Who executed this action?

MR STEYN: It was the South African Defence Force.

MR VISSER: What Section of the Defence Force?

MR STEYN: The Special Section of the Defence Force.

MR VISSER: Can we refer to them as Special Forces?

MR STEYN: Yes, it was the Special Forces.

MR VISSER: Under whose command was the Special Forces during 1985 as far as you can remember?

MR STEYN: The people who we negotiated with was Com Charl Naude.

MR VISSER: There was also a Com Verster?

MR STEYN: That is correct yes.

MR VISSER: You do not know what his role was in this situation?

MR STEYN: In this specific incident, no.

MR VISSER: Very well. Your application appears on pages 14 to 22 of the Bundle. Did you have the opportunity to read through it again?

MR STEYN: That is correct yes.

MR VISSER: Do you confirm that it is still correct and according to you, the truth, the way in which you put it out in your application?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Do you then ask the Committee to amongst others, accept the political objectives as it appears in your application?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: You also have seen Exhibit A before, is that correct?

MR STEYN: Yes.

MR VISSER: That is the General Background to Amnesty Applications?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Is there any section of that document that you are not able to confirm?

MR STEYN: I can confirm it Mr Chairperson. There may be a few corrections where I do not carry personal knowledge of, but that I do know after I have read it.

MR VISSER: Is it generally speaking that information correlates with the information that you had in the Western Transvaal?

MR STEYN: Yes, that was in the period while I was in the Western Transvaal.

MR VISSER: Have you seen Exhibit B, that is the document of Brig Loots?

MR STEYN: That is correct Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Were you personally involved in negotiations with the Head of the Special Police in Botswana, during that period that was covered from 1984 to 1988?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Do you agree that it was frustrating for you because from the side of the Botswana authorities, nothing was done?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: This frustration that we have just referred to, Brig Steyn, did this lead to something, did it build up to something?

MR STEYN: That is correct yes, it built up in the sense that more and more incidents that was initiated from Botswana, took place, or occurred in the Republic, and it was our task to by means of information, to analyse the situation in Botswana, to find out where and when the onslaught will be executed.

MR VISSER: Did you then decide to act and that Special Forces would act on that?

MR STEYN: Yes.

MR VISSER: We understand, page 1 of the Bundle, Chairperson, there is a summary made by the Investigation Unit it seems, we understand that the incident in which Mr Nkadimeng was killed, took place on the 14th of May 1985. Can you accept that date?

MR STEYN: Yes, I will accept that.

MR VISSER: There is also a reference at page 43 Chairperson, which supports that contention and that is by Mr Reginald Nkadimeng, so it appears to be reasonably safe to assume that that date is the correct date.

What was your knowledge of Mr Nkadimeng, or what was your knowledge concerning his activities.

MR STEYN: Mr Nkadimeng was a trained MK Member who was residing in Botswana, especially in Gaberone.

MR VISSER: Did he work with somebody?

MR STEYN: Yes, he worked with amongst others Jackie Molefe.

MR VISSER: Was that a woman?

MR STEYN: Yes, she was also a trained MK member.

MR VISSER: Was she also a target for the Security Branch?

MR STEYN: That is correct yes.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, may I refer you to the May presentation of the ANC, May 1997 of the ANC to the TRC, where at page 49 you will find a reference to Mr Rogers Nkadimeng (killed in a car bomb in Gaberone 1985) and he is described as a military representative.

Did you as time passed, gather information on both these members?

MR STEYN: Yes.

MR VISSER: What did you do with this information?

MR STEYN: Mr Chairperson, over a time we gathered information concerning their activities concerning the infiltration into South Africa and the idea was to commit acts of terror in South Africa.

MR VISSER: What did you do with this information?

MR STEYN: We used this information, or some of the members of Zeerust from the Security Branch, conveyed this information to members of the Special Forces and more specifically Charl Naude.

MR VISSER: Was this information, was this conveyed by yourself or was it conveyed by members under you?

MR STEYN: I did not convey it personally in this instance, but I was aware of it. I was aware that the Security Branch at Zeerust, by names Rudi Crause, conveyed this information.

MR VISSER: Did you hear anything concerning this information that you conveyed at a later stage?

MR STEYN: Yes.

MR VISSER: What did you hear?

MR STEYN: At a later stage I heard that the, that a vehicle, a motor car which Mr Nkadimeng used, exploded and that he was incident in the incident.

MR VISSER: You say he wanted to? In your application on page 18 you have said "the vehicle which Mr Nkadimeng wanted to use" and he was then killed?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Did you personally carry knowledge if he wanted to drive in this vehicle or that he was driving while it happened?

MR STEYN: No, I have no personal knowledge of that.

MR VISSER: And apart from that, did you hear anything from the Defence Force?

MR STEYN: Yes, at a later stage I was informed, or let me put it this way, I heard on the news and also saw in the media, that Mr Nkadimeng was killed in that incident.

MR VISSER: Who did you say was responsible for that action?

MR STEYN: It was the Special Forces of the Defence Force.

MR VISSER: And you did not carry any other knowledge about this incident and that you can convey to this Committee?

MR STEYN: No Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I must refer you also to page 93 of the August 1996 ANC presentation to the TRC.

At page 93 there is a reference from the previous page "Botswana assassinations, bombs and raids" under that heading, number 16 refers to Vernon Nkadimeng and that is the same person Chairperson. It is described car bomb and they give the date there as the 21st of May 1985.

We submit Chairperson, not much turns on it, but we submit that that is probably a mistake, it should be the 14th of May. When you handed over this information or conveyed it to the Defence Force, what did you think will happen with that information, what would they do with it?

MR STEYN: I was of the opinion that they would use that information to attack the people.

MR VISSER: And to eliminate them in the end?

MR STEYN: Yes.

MR VISSER: So you knew that the information that you conveyed to them, would be used to kill people?

MR STEYN: Yes.

MR VISSER: Thank you Chairman, that is the evidence.

CHAIRPERSON: About Mr Nkadimeng, did you know that when you conveyed the information to the Defence Force, that he was a target?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And you knew what was going to happen?

MR STEYN: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And the only reason why you and the Police were aware of this, and the only reason why you didn't do it yourselves, was that the Defence Force conducted cross-border operations as a rule?

MR STEYN: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And in that regard, there was a relationship between the Police and the Defence Force?

MR STEYN: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And the information was part of that relationship?

MR STEYN: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: In this particular case, the information which you had at your disposal, was to identify Mr Nkadimeng and Ms Molefe as targets?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, Mr Koopedi?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR KOOPEDI: Thank you Chairperson and honourable Committee members. Mr Steyn, who is Charl Naude?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, Commandant Charl Naude was a member of Special Forces of the South African Defence Force at that time.

MR KOOPEDI: What ...

CHAIRPERSON: Was he Head of the Special Forces?

MR STEYN: No Chairperson, there were senior officers above him.

CHAIRPERSON: But he was high up in the rank structure?

MR STEYN: Yes, he was a Commandant.

MR KOOPEDI: Now, do you know what happened to him, where is he now?

MR STEYN: No Chairperson, I am not certain what happened to him.

MR KOOPEDI: Do you know if he has applied for amnesty in this matter?

MR STEYN: I do not know whether or not he applied for amnesty.

MR KOOPEDI: Now, from the time that this information or the instruction that was given to Special Forces as you call them, how long thereafter was this operation executed? When was, how long after was Mr Nkadimeng killed?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, I have thought much about this, I have also attempted to make enquiries about it, but I cannot recall. In my opinion it may have been a week or a number or weeks approximately. But I could not establish a date.

CHAIRPERSON: What would have been the most time that would have elapsed?

MR STEYN: It may have been over a month, Chairperson.

MR KOOPEDI: Now, do you know what type of an explosive was used here?

MR STEYN: No Chairperson, I don't know.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you know at all how the man would be killed?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, what I heard later?

CHAIRPERSON: No, when you gave the information?

MR STEYN: I did not know Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Or at any point before the incident?

MR STEYN: No Chairperson.

MR KOOPEDI: After the incident then, did anyone report to you that the operation was, had been carried out?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, as I have stated, I read about it in the press and I heard about it in the radio, if I recall correctly. If I recall correctly, I think Col Crause later confirmed it to me that the operation had indeed been executed.

CHAIRPERSON: Did he provide any other particulars?

MR STEYN: No Chairperson, not that I can recall at present.

CHAIRPERSON: Didn't you ask him?

MR STEYN: It may be Chairperson, it may be that I enquired for further particulars from him, I cannot recall precisely what the details of the operation were.

At that stage it was already known that an explosion had occurred.

MR KOOPEDI: Now, if I understand your testimony correctly, together read with your application form, would I be correct to say that you actually do not know when, how and by whom in particular, was Mr Nkadimeng killed?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, no, I am of the opinion that I could be satisfied if I were to say that it was indeed Special Forces of the Defence Force, based upon what we heard. But once again, I cannot fix a time or a date.

CHAIRPERSON: I don't think that is the question. I think the question is, who exactly, which person or persons planted the bomb and ensured that Mr Nkadimeng would be killed?

MR STEYN: Yes, I understand, I wouldn't know that. I wouldn't be able to say whether Com Naude was personally involved, or any of his members were personally involved. I wouldn't be able to respond to that question.

MR KOOPEDI: Now, supposing somebody was to come to this hearing, somebody not attached to Special Forces or even the Security Police at that stage, and say that he or they actually killed Mr Nkadimeng, would you dispute that?

MR STEYN: No, I would not be in a position to dispute it, Chairperson. But it would be contradictory to the information which I had.

MR KOOPEDI: Well, if your information is anything to go by, it is what is called hearsay information, you heard from not even a person who acted in the matter, but somebody who might have heard from someone that the operation was carried out by Special Forces, is that not correct?

MR STEYN: Yes, it was hearsay evidence, Chairperson.

MR KOOPEDI: I then put it to you Mr Steyn, that you actually do not know who killed Mr Nkadimeng and therefore you actually cannot apply for amnesty for the murder of Mr Nkadimeng, because you do not have any knowledge as to who, where and by whom was he killed. What is your response?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, I gave authorisation to my members at Zeerust, including Col Crause, to provide information to Special Forces knowing that in all probability an attack would be launched. Later in press reports, and in radio reports, I came to hear that an explosion had indeed occurred, and that it was a logical inference for me to draw, that it had indeed been executed by them.

CHAIRPERSON: The only chain between the information that you provided by means of which Mr Nkadimeng was identified as a target, and the explosion during which he died, would be the report that you received from somebody else?

MR STEYN: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well. Upon various previous occasions, I have heard evidence from members of the former Police as well as the former Defence Force that sometimes, or actually quite often, the wrong information was conveyed to certain members. Would you be able to say that this was not the case?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, I cannot say that it wasn't so, but I think it is somewhat improbable.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I accept that in this case, that it was improbable.

MR STEYN: Yes, I think it was improbable.

CHAIRPERSON: The person who reported to you that the man was dead or that the man had been killed, and who wanted to link up this chain between the information and the actual incident, who is that person?

MR STEYN: Col Crause upon occasion told me that this operation had indeed been executed by the South African Defence Force.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that your co-applicant?

MR STEYN: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: You did not question him about where he obtained the information?

MR STEYN: It may be so, but I cannot recall the particulars thereof.

MR KOOPEDI: Now, did you - perhaps let me first ask, how long after you had read in the newspapers that there was this explosion, did Crause come and report to you?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, I cannot recall. I really cannot say at which stage this took place, it is really not possible for me.

MR KOOPEDI: But could it have been a year, two years, two days? How long thereafter, just an estimation?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, my estimation would be a chance that I would have to take, it may have been days, weeks or a month thereafter.

CHAIRPERSON: You were asked ...

MR STEYN: I beg your pardon Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: You were asked to make such an estimation, I comprehend that quite some time has elapsed since then, and I am sure that Mr Koopedi will understand this.

MR STEYN: As I have said Chairperson, it may have been a week, a month or even longer, I cannot say with absolute certainty.

MR KOOPEDI: When he gave you this report that Mr Nkadimeng had been murdered, what did you say to him?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, it is impossible for me to say today, what I said to him on that day in 1985. I don't know what the further development of the conversation was, it is impossible for me to say today.

MR MALAN: Mr Koopedi, just for my information, do you have evidence that Mr Nkadimeng was not killed by Special Forces?

MR KOOPEDI: No, not at this stage. Not at this stage.

Now because you had two targets, and only one was killed, did you not raise this matter up with Crause, to find out why the other person was not killed, or why was there no follow up operation?

MR STEYN: No, I did not Chairperson. As far as I can recall, the Defence Force would have had to decide whether or not they wanted to take further action or launch any further operations.

MR KOOPEDI: What you are saying is it wasn't important to you or perhaps the second person was no more an important target, whether she was eliminated or not, it didn't really bother you, your Security Department?

MR VISSER: I object to that Chairperson, that is not what the witness said at all. He said it wasn't his decision.

MR KOOPEDI: My question is ...

CHAIRPERSON: Let me put it as such, it was your decision to inform them that Ms Molefe was a target and so doing, you made the decision for her to be killed, because you knew what would happen once you had conveyed the information?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, I don't know if I have explained it properly, but this matter in my opinion, originated with the Defence Force, that Col Crause was requested by the Defence Force to provide this information, because Special Forces wanted to take action against the targets.

We provided this information, if I say we, then I refer to the Security Branch under my command, the information was provided for an operation which would be executed by Special Forces of the Defence Force.

CHAIRPERSON: Then listen carefully. You decided that that information could be conveyed to the Defence Force, and you testified that you knew what would happen?

MR STEYN: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And in so doing, you knew that these persons would be killed?

MR STEYN: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And consequently you decided for them to be killed, otherwise you wouldn't have provided their names?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, it was an operation that was planned by the Defence Force, I associated myself, once I had provided the information, it was about the elimination of persons.

CHAIRPERSON: But Mr Steyn, the Police itself would have done it if it hadn't been for the rule that the Defence Force committed cross-border operations, according to your evidence, isn't that correct, that was the basic rule?

MR STEYN: If I recall correctly, I stated that I associated myself with the action taken by the Defence Force. We could not have acted on a cross-border basis, therefore I could not have committed the deed myself physically.

CHAIRPERSON: Otherwise if it wasn't for that rule, the Police would have done so itself?

MR STEYN: I don't know if the Police themselves would have been able to do so.

CHAIRPERSON: Then I have misunderstood you. But anyway...

MR STEYN: Just to be clear, Chairperson, we couldn't take that action and when I provided the information, I knew what it was about and I associated myself with the act.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well. And there was a relationship between you and the Defence Force?

MR STEYN: Yes, with the Defence Force, that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And these people became targets because they had established the route from outside to inside South Africa?

MR STEYN: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And when those persons who were not welcome in South Africa, entered the country, they were your responsibility?

MR STEYN: That is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And that is why the entire incident was partially the responsibility of the Police and partially that of the Defence Force?

MR STEYN: That is correct, internally for us, and externally for them.

CHAIRPERSON: Particularly in light of the rule that the Defence Force could only act beyond the borders of the country and attack such people, isn't that so?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: In light of this relationship between you, if you had identified somebody for the Defence Force, if you had identified somebody as a target, then it wasn't only an association with the incident, you were part of the incident?

MR STEYN: I was part of the planning in as far as information was conveyed, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR STEYN: Knowing full well what the consequences would be.

CHAIRPERSON: Then we arrive at the question which Mr Koopedi has put. You identified two names, you identified two persons for the Defence Force. One of them was murdered, the question is did you find out anything about the other target, did you make any enquiries and if you didn't do so, why not?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, our first information was that only Mr Nkadimeng had died during the incident, so it was clear from the very beginning that only one of the targets had died during the incident.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, we are aware of that. The question is aimed at determining whether or not you made any enquiries of your source, regarding what happened to Ms Molefe, she was also a target?

MR STEYN: What I know is that she was not struck during that operation, and that the Security Forces continued to collect information about her and various other persons.

CHAIRPERSON: I think it is common cause that she was not affected by the operation.

MR STEYN: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: But the question is did you enquire about her position and whether or not you enquired about any further attempts on her life, because she had been identified as a target?

MR STEYN: No Chairperson, I cannot recall whether or not I went into her specific history. What I can state as a fact is that the intelligence network which we had in Botswana, would continue to collect information about her and others in as far as it affected their activities, or the Defence Force, if the Defence Force had any further plans they may have come back to us, it is possible but I don't know whether or not they had any other plans. I did not issue any further orders pertaining to this matter, subsequently.

MR MALAN: Just for my own clarity, if I have understood you correctly, the Defence Force was not the agent of the Security Police, they took their own decisions and you provided the information?

MR STEYN: Yes.

MR MALAN: Therefore you provided all security information to them, but they decided where and when they would strike?

MR STEYN: That is one hundred percent correct.

MR MALAN: And in that sense, because previously I understood you to say that it was a Special Forces operation, when you provided the information to them, you knew that they would strike somewhere, but you didn't know precisely what the plan was?

MR STEYN: No, I wouldn't be aware of the finer details of the plan.

MR MALAN: Then just to return to Ms Molefe, when you heard that Nkadimeng had died during the bomb explosion, can you recall whether or not you linked Ms Molefe to the information and the subsequent action?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, the information that we had, was that she had not been killed, that she wasn't in the vehicle which was detonated. And that was as far as my information went at that point.

MR MALAN: Was there any relationship or any co-operative relationship between her and Nkadimeng which led you to think that the two of them would constitute a target together, or would you have viewed them as separate targets?

MR STEYN: If I recall correctly, they would have been viewed as a collective target, because according to the information, they were working together.

If I were to speculate further, they lived together at a certain address.

MR MALAN: Were they married?

MR STEYN: No, I cannot recall, I wouldn't be able to say.

MR MALAN: Thank you Mr Koopedi.

MR KOOPEDI: Just one thing finally and I am not sure if the translation was correct or I heard correctly, did you say that the Defence Force asked for information from Crause?

MR STEYN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR KOOPEDI: Now, if they are the ones who asked for information, whose decision was it that the two must be eliminated, would it have been a decision by your Branch, the Security Police or a decision by the Defence Force?

MR STEYN: It was definitely an SADF decision, it was definite a Defence Force decision, but we provided the information to assist them regarding movements and addresses and so forth.

MR KOOPEDI: Now, if I understand this correctly, this therefore means that the elimination of Mr Nkadimeng and perhaps the attempt on his wife, Chairperson, the person referred to as Ms Molefe, was married to the deceased and they lived together. What I am saying is if in fact this was a request by the SADF, it therefore means to me, unless I am corrected, that it was a Defence Force decision to eliminate the two and not a decision of the Security Police? Your role was simply to give information? Is that correct?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Steyn, did the Defence Force come to you and say "look here, we have decided to kill Nkadimeng and Molefe, where can we find them" and this is the information that you provided, or did they come to you and asked "in the light of our decision to eliminate ANC members in Botswana, tell us who we should eliminate"? What is the correct version?

MR STEYN: As I understood it from Col Crause, the Defence Force had already concentrated on certain targets at that stage, and that these were simply more of their targets, consequently they approached us in order to see whether or not we could provide any finer particulars to them.

CHAIRPERSON: Such as?

MR STEYN: Movements, addresses, vehicle registrations.

CHAIRPERSON: So they brought you names and said "give us certain information regarding these two persons or these four persons, whatever the case may have been"? So they already had decided that these two persons would be killed?

MR STEYN: That was my inference.

MR KOOPEDI: At the risk of being repetitive, I just need to have this cleared, you did not order the killing on Mr Nkadimeng and his wife, is that correct, you only ordered Crause to supply information?

MR STEYN: Completely correct Chairperson.

MR KOOPEDI: Chairperson, I have no further questions for this witness.

ADV STEENKAMP: No questions, Mr Chairman.

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Chairperson, perhaps I should just elucidate something. The Defence Force, did they have their own Intelligence component?

MR STEYN: That is correct yes.

MR VISSER: What was that called?

MR STEYN: Military Intelligence.

MR VISSER: Were they active in Botswana?

MR STEYN: Yes.

MR VISSER: Were there other intelligence agencies working there?

MR STEYN: Yes.

MR VISSER: Who were they?

MR STEYN: National Intelligence.

MR VISSER: And there were meetings in which intelligence was exchanged between the Defence Force, Police and the National Intelligence, is that correct?

MR STEYN: Yes.

MR VISSER: So in other words it was not strange, you wouldn't find it strange if the Defence Force had said that "we are going to concentrate on Mr Nkadimeng and Molefe"?

MR STEYN: No, I wouldn't have found it strange.

MR VISSER: Just a last aspect. Could you give instructions to another Section, for example Special Forces?

MR STEYN: No, I couldn't.

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman.

ADV SIGODI: Tell me, did you personally have information on Mr Nkadimeng?

MR STEYN: That is correct yes.

ADV SIGODI: What information did you have on him?

MR STEYN: The different information components, especially the Zeerust Branch who had to provide me with the information, so I got all my information from them. This information indicated that these people were trained MK members and they were responsible for sending MK members into South Africa to commit acts of terror.

ADV SIGODI: What else had Mr Nkadimeng done as far as you knew, besides being responsible for sending trained MK members into the country? What else had he done?

MR STEYN: From his residence he, it was the activation point from where people infiltrated the country.

ADV SIGODI: Did you have somebody observing him from the Security Branch, his movements, what type of car he drove, when he would leave the home and so on?

MR STEYN: That is correct yes, by means of informants that we had in Botswana.

ADV SIGODI: Did you supply that information to the members of the Defence Force?

MR STEYN: That is correct yes.

CHAIRPERSON: What type of information did you hand over concerning Molefe?

MR STEYN: Mr Chairperson, if I can remember correctly, it was the same information from Nkadimeng. It was the same information for both of them.

MR VISSER: The next witness Chairperson, is the other applicant, Mr P.R. Crause. His application you will find at page 2 through to page 13 and he deals with the incident at page 9 of the Bundle. He is ready to take the oath and he wishes to address you in Afrikaans.

P R CRAUSE: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Please be seated.

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Crause, you are also an applicant in the same incident?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct yes.

MR VISSER: This occurred in 1985 and Mr Steyn was then your Commander in the Western Transvaal?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: What was your rank?

MR CRAUSE: I was a captain and at that stage, the Commander of the Security Branch Zeerust.

MR VISSER: Did you, yourself, handle informants who brought information from Botswana?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct yes.

MR VISSER: Did you have your finger on the pulse as far as it concerned informants and the activities of MK members amongst others, in Botswana?

MR CRAUSE: Yes. That was also the instructions to my personnel or staff.

MR VISSER: Was it also your task to exchange information with the rest of the intelligence community as far as it had to do with them?

MR CRAUSE: Yes, I only did it with the authority of my Commanders.

MR VISSER: You saw Exhibit A, which is the general background. Are there sections that you do not know or that you cannot confirm?

MR CRAUSE: I do confirm. I did read the whole section on Botswana.

MR VISSER: Was that Exhibit A?

MR CRAUSE: Yes.

MR VISSER: Did you also look at Exhibit B, the document concerning Brig Loots?

MR CRAUSE: Yes.

MR VISSER: Does that correlate with the information that you had and your experience in that time?

MR CRAUSE: Yes.

MR VISSER: Your application we know appears in the record, and can you confirm the contents thereof with the possible changes that you would want to make on it?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Do you also accept that this incident did take place on the 14th of May 1985?

MR CRAUSE: Yes, I do accept the date.

MR VISSER: Can you just tell the Committee exactly what your knowledge was concerning this incident and if there is anything that you can add to the testimony of Gen Steyn?

MR CRAUSE: During the gathering of information and after interrogation of arrested MK members in the Republic, I found at that Rogers Nkadimeng and Jackie Molefe were covertly active in Botswana and involved with the infiltration of MK members into South Africa. Their residence and their address and also the vehicle information was obtained with the authority of Col Steyn and this information was conveyed to the Special Forces for possible action against them.

MR VISSER: Who conveyed this information?

MR CRAUSE: I personally conveyed this information to Commandant Naude.

MR VISSER: Where did this happen?

MR CRAUSE: This happened in my office in Zeerust.

MR VISSER: Did he come to visit you there?

MR CRAUSE: Yes, he did.

MR VISSER: Did he ask you for information on these two people?

MR CRAUSE: It was Commandant Charl Naude, yes.

MR VISSER: Did he specifically ask you about information concerning the two?

MR CRAUSE: Yes, he wanted to know from me if I had the address or further details about where we could find them in Botswana.

MR VISSER: Did you know what he was going to do with the information?

MR CRAUSE: I suspected that they will be acted against.

MR VISSER: And at any stage, did you hear anything else concerning the two?

MR CRAUSE: After a period of time, I think it was approximately three weeks later.

MR VISSER: What did you think will happen to them?

MR CRAUSE: No, I knew that if Special Forces is going to act, they will kill the people, or they will attack the house or do something to the vehicle.

MR VISSER: Very well. You were busy, you said that approximately three weeks later you heard something, what did you hear then?

MR CRAUSE: I heard that a vehicle exploded in Botswana and that Rogers Nkadimeng was killed in this explosion.

MR VISSER: Did you bring the two together then?

MR CRAUSE: Yes, I did, but I also approximately three weeks later hear from Charl Naude that this operation concerning Rogers, was successful.

MR VISSER: Did you make any enquiries about the position of Molefe?

MR CRAUSE: I didn't, but if I am correct, we did receive information that immediately after the explosion, she left Botswana.

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR KOOPEDI: Thank you Mr Chairperson. Mr Crause, you say that you gathered your information from amongst others, informers in Botswana, is that correct?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct yes.

MR KOOPEDI: Who were these informers?

MR CRAUSE: I am not prepared to make known their names.

MR KOOPEDI: Would you be prepared to say whether they were South African or Botswana citizens?

MR CRAUSE: It was both of the countries.

MR KOOPEDI: Okay, would you confirm what Mr Steyn said.

CHAIRPERSON: Why are you not willing to give their names?

MR CRAUSE: I am not willing, they were in a position of trust and I believe it is just polite and correct not to make known their names. I believe nobody will do it.

CHAIRPERSON: I am not worried about whose names will be made known, but I just worry about the fact that if they were involved in the committing of crimes, how can they then be protected?

MR CRAUSE: These people only provided us with information concerning individuals. They were never involved or drawn into the elimination of people.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you saying that they did not know why they are providing information?

MR CRAUSE: Information was about the monitoring and to be aware of possible infiltration and what the actions and activities of the people were, but we never explained to them that we are gathering information to eliminate people.

CHAIRPERSON: But you say it is your decision not to make known their names?

MR CRAUSE: Yes, I am not willing to do that.

MR KOOPEDI: The information that you gave to Charl Naude, do you remember what information was that?

MR CRAUSE: I gave them their addresses as well as the registration number of the vehicle.

MR KOOPEDI: Do you remember the address that you gave to him?

MR CRAUSE: It was flat number, I cannot remember the address, I think the street name was Zebra Way and the vehicle, I cannot remember the registration number, but I think it was a blue or a green not a Cressida, a Nissan. I am not quite sure, but I am speaking under correction.

MR KOOPEDI: Now in the bundle of documents on page 32, there is a picture of a vehicle. Could this be the vehicle?

MR CRAUSE: Page 32? As far as I can remember it was not a Peugeot. I cannot remember. But I would think it was a Nissan.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I must come in here to explain to you that these annexures which you have from page 23 onwards, 22 onwards, no 23 onwards, have been bound in together with Mr Steyn's application, but incorrectly so. They and if you compare the Naledi Bundle and Exhibit B, they form part of Mr Wikus Loots' document, they should never have been here.

If that is of any assistance to my learned friend, I just needed to clarify that. That's got nothing to do with Steyn's application, although he refers to Exhibit B, but these are only the annexures to Annexure B.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, the point of the question is to establish what type of motor vehicle this witness thought that the proposed target drove.

MR VISSER: I have no problem with that, I am just pointing out that this is not the vehicle.

MR KOOPEDI: Thank you Chairperson. When Charl Naude came to your office in Zeerust, did he tell you that at their level or in their unit, they had already decided to eliminate the two people or did he just ask for information without saying what steps they wanted to take?

MR CRAUSE: No, he just asked for information and he talked about possible actions.

MR KOOPEDI: So he did not tell you that in fact there is a decision to eliminate the two?

MR CRAUSE: I understood that through his actions, it will entail elimination.

MR KOOPEDI: But he didn't say it, he just asked for information?

MR CRAUSE: He only asked for information.

MR KOOPEDI: Chairperson, I have no further questions for this witness.

MR VISSER: I have no re-examination Chairperson.

ADV SIGODI: Tell me, do you know where Mr Naude is today?

MR CRAUSE: I do not know at all.

ADV SIGODI: When was the last time you saw him?

MR CRAUSE: Last year in April in the amnesty application hearing in Pretoria.

ADV SIGODI: Do you know if he is still working?

MR CRAUSE: I do not know at all what happened to him, we never had contact.

ADV SIGODI: You never spoke to him, you never found out what he is doing after you had been doing things together?

MR CRAUSE: We never had contact, the only contact that I had with him, was when I saw him last year in April, at an amnesty hearing. Then he told me that he was busy somewhere, but we did not have a good relationship in the Defence Force with each other, at that stage.

ADV SIGODI: At which amnesty hearing, whose amnesty hearing?

MR CRAUSE: It was the Nietverdiendt 10.

CHAIRPERSON: Naude came to you after the incident?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: What did he say to you?

MR CRAUSE: He just said to me that the operation concerning Nkadimeng was executed, and that it was successful. I then mentioned that I saw it in the newspaper and he confirmed that it was the work of Special Forces.

CHAIRPERSON: When you provided him with the information approximately six weeks before the incident, did you know it was an operation?

MR CRAUSE: I suspected it yes, but it was never confirmed to me.

CHAIRPERSON: That is why I am asking, why did Naude come back to you and then give a report and say that the operation was successful?

MR CRAUSE: Well, he said that they executed an operation and that it was successful, concerning Nkadimeng.

CHAIRPERSON: You do not know if he was present at the actual operation?

MR CRAUSE: No, that I cannot say. How it was planned, who was involved, I do not know.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. You may be excused.

MR CRAUSE: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, are there any other evidence?

MR VISSER: No Chairperson, we have no further evidence. That is the case for the applicants.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Koopedi?

MR KOOPEDI: Thank you Chairperson. Chairperson, we will not lead any evidence, it might be important for me to at this point mention that the deceased's wife or ex-wife is here. The mother and father of the deceased, the brothers and sisters of the deceased are also here, but we will not lead any evidence Chairperson, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Is there opposition to the application?

MR KOOPEDI: Yes, there is on the basis that no full disclosure has been given.

CHAIRPERSON: Please extend on that argument.

MR KOOPEDI: Well, I was hoping I would do that in my argument, and perhaps this is time for my formal submission, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: I just want to ask Mr Steenkamp if any witnesses are going to be called?

ADV STEENKAMP: Mr Chairman, those are the witnesses for - no further evidence will be led, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Koopedi, I think maybe you must argue first.

MR KOOPEDI IN ARGUMENT: Thank you Chairperson. Like I said, the next-of-kin, the relatives of the deceased are opposed to the granting of amnesty to the two applicants because it appeared from the applicants, the two applicants' application forms, that they were not complying with the requirement of full disclosure, in that the very relevant facts, the very truth that the family wants to learn about and hear, was not disclosed in the application form, which is ...

CHAIRPERSON: Which is it? Yes, let's hear.

MR KOOPEDI: I was going to go to that, Chairperson, which is who planted the bomb, who is the person who went and planted the bomb; where on the vehicle was this bomb planted; on what day was this bomb planted; when did the bomb planter expect the explosion? There were supposed to be two targets here, so there must have been a certain type of reconnaissance in terms of saying when would both be in the car, what type of an explosive was it, was it - how was it detonated? Was this electronically done, by remote control? Would this have happened when the car was started? All those facts were clearly not on the application forms and it was the immediate feeling that full disclosure is not being meted out.

CHAIRPERSON: I can understand that feeling, based on your argument, but now having had the benefit of the evidence, and having heard what they said, what is your view?

MR KOOPEDI: Here is my view now Chairperson, moving from the first part which would have been my instructions.

My view currently is that we have two applicants who strictly speaking only gave information to some other agents. These two applicants did not at any stage come up with the idea that the two people should be eliminated. They did not, at any stage, give anyone any order to eliminate the two.

They only passed out information which the Defence Force would have gotten any way. My submission is therefore that the two applicants did not conspire, did not commit the act, they did not conspire with anyone that the two people should be eliminated, they are therefore not proper applicants before you.

CHAIRPERSON: This is probably what is going to be their argument, that within the ranks of the Special Security Branch at least, everybody there knew what the activities of Special Forces were and when Special Forces representatives come to ask for certain information, there is an inherent suspicion, justifiable they would argue, that the people mentioned and in respect of whom information is being sought, are likely to be killed, because that is the job of Special Ops?

They themselves, both of them say that they had relatively good suspicion that this was going to happen. Don't you think that in that was the conspiracy, at least?

MR KOOPEDI: I respectfully differ from that, Chairperson. The last witness here told you that when Charl Naude came to his office, he merely asked for information. A specific question was asked as to whether "were you told of a decision to eliminate the two", there was a clear answer to that, that they were not told of a decision.

The fact that Special Forces do kill people, does not necessarily mean that by giving information to them, you therefore collude or conspire with them to murder someone.

They came and asked for information, this information may and I would underline that, may have been used to specifically find the two people and execute their operation.

CHAIRPERSON: A known robber comes to Mr X and asks Mr X how much money is in that bank, he comes to someone who obviously knows that, who has that information, is that person who has that information and possibly gives it to the known robber not entitled to think "this guy is preparing to rob the bank"?

MR KOOPEDI: I believe Chairperson, the distinction should be drawn between thinking that a person could do X and actual intentional conspiring to do something. When people sit, talk and agree that it is proper to eliminate this person, I would believe that that is conspiracy, but if I sit and think "he kills people outside, he might kill this person", with respect Chairperson, my submission is that I was not party to colluding to kill this person. A decision was made elsewhere that ...

CHAIRPERSON: (Microphone not on)

MR KOOPEDI: Excuse me?

CHAIRPERSON: What is your liability if you facilitate the killing of that person by giving addresses and type of car driven by the prospective target, etc? Is that not being party to the whole operation?

MR KOOPEDI: I submit Chairperson, we most probably are getting into common purpose.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR KOOPEDI: And which would mean that you have to take an intentional decision that "I am associating myself with this particular act". At the stage when Charl Naude goes to the last witness' office, there is no act of murder that has been spoken about. As far as the Security Police are concerned, no one has made a decision that this person is to be killed, only information is being sought from them.

I submit Chairperson, this information could have been used for a variety of things, not necessarily killing people. Yes, it could have been used for a variety of things.

CHAIRPERSON: ... Special Ops do?

MR KOOPEDI: Chairperson, I don't know, I wouldn't say Special Ops did this, because I believe till today people still wants to know what did Special Ops do.

But be that as it may Chairperson, even if Special Ops is the responsible unit, even if Special Ops is known or was known to be the killers, my submission is that mere knowledge of that fact, does not make you a conspirator, Chairperson. You are not told that these people are going to kill anyone. They only want information from you, you don't ask any question, questions that would lead you to know that actually a proper action is going to be taken.

It is my submission that the reason why, from the Security Police, the reason why the second target was not followed was simply that, Chairperson, they were not party to the decision. They were not concerned as to whether the second target is killed or not.

CHAIRPERSON: ... would have asked about it?

MR KOOPEDI: My submission is they would have wanted to know, if they were party to the conspiracy, they would have wanted to know why not the second target, why don't you take further action.

CHAIRPERSON: ... agreement, is that what you are saying? Had they been party to it, they would have enquired about the second part of the arrangement?

MR KOOPEDI: That is what I am saying Chairperson, and because they were never told that there was going to be a murder or there was going to be a particular action against the two, they were not bothered whether one person was killed, whether it took three weeks to accomplish the mission, why did it take three weeks, that was not their baby.

And my submission is therefore that they are not proper applicants before you, because they are not guilty of any offence, thank you Chairperson.

MR MALAN: May I just ask of you Mr Koopedi, is the evidence not that something between "we knew that planned action would lead to an attack or an elimination, the knew was, we had a very strong suspicion" and I think both applicants at some stage, used the words "we knew that there would be actions although it wasn't said to us".

If you then, under those circumstances, having the suspicion that something is probably going to happen, and you nonetheless disclose certain information which makes it possible for the person to commit that crime, aren't you then at least on the basis of dolus eventualis linked into that action, carry on regardless, you have the strong suspicion to put it mildly, and you nonetheless assist in making it possible?

MR KOOPEDI: Chairperson, we do not have any evidence whatsoever that the information given assisted the Special Forces in the operation. More than anything else, we sit here and surmise, we think that because Special Forces went to the Security Police, asked for information, it might therefore be that this information was used for the killing.

CHAIRPERSON: ... that what went through their minds in any case? Wasn't that their intention, to facilitate what they thought was eventually going to happen?

MR KOOPEDI: Well, I don't know about that Chairperson, however ...

CHAIRPERSON: I am asking you about it.

MR KOOPEDI: My answer is I don't know about that, but what I am saying is if there was no word said to applicant Crause by Charl Naude, if Charl Naude did not say to Crause "we are going to kill these people, or we are going to do X to them", therefore there was no conspiracy to do anything, and my submission is that the giving of that information does not necessarily mean that it is this information that led to the killing of the two people.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct), the requirements for common purpose are set out, especially in the event where there was no prior agreement, one of the aspects as defined there is that you would be guilty on the basis of common purpose of any eventual crime if you physically or ...(indistinct) assist in the commission of that crime. Here, in their minds, both of them said "we had a suspicion that a crime was going to be committed in that Mr Nkadimeng and Ms Molefe were going to be assassinated. We were asked for information as to where these two individuals could be found", an essential part of the commission of the crime or crimes. And they provided, are they not party to a crime, never mind what the crime may be, we can talk about that later?

Are they not guilty of a crime? Even if it is not the Special Ops that committed that crime?

MR KOOPEDI: My submission is still not, Chairperson. If I understand properly the requirements of common purpose, it is that if you physically or in your mind, or one way or the other, assist in the commission of the offence, then you are guilty of the offence. At this stage Chairperson, we do not know if this information led to the killing. There is no evidence towards that.

Further Chairperson, no indication was given to the Security Police that "this is what we are going to do" and my submission Chairperson is that the information may or may not have been used. It is a known fact that Special Forces also had their own intelligence agency, all sorts of things could have happened, that information could have been used for going into a data base, this information could have been used to send other people, you know, who would have been termed as MK members, to the two people if indeed their job was to infiltrate people into the country.

What I am saying Chairperson is that, if Charl Naude does not say to Crause that we want to eliminate these people, it is not for us now to come to the conclusion that in fact the two people conspired to commit the action. There was clearly no conspiracy, there was clearly no mention of the fact that the two people could be eliminated. Chairperson, I do not wish to believe at one moment that in all matters where Special Operations or Special Forces was involved in, this meant killing? We might not know exactly what is it that they did, but the mere asking of particulars or personal details of some people, does not necessarily mean that any person who gives this information, is therefore a conspirator.

ADV SIGODI: Are you then drawing an analogy between the situation of the applicants as being the same as that of the informers in Botswana who supplied information to the Security Branch in that they did not commit any crime or offence, they merely supplied information?

Are you saying that the applicants merely supplied information to the Defence Force and therefore are not guilty of any crime, because in their minds they did not come up with the idea of eliminating these people, did not agree that these people should be eliminated, were not part to any such agreement, were merely supplying information?

MR KOOPEDI: That is exactly my point, that applicant Crause went to applicant Steyn, Steyn gave authority not to kill, but authority that information can be passed. Steyn did not know how, where, by whom will this operation be carried, so didn't Crause. None of them at any stage, was concerned with why one target, why not the other, why do we hear after three weeks after the operation, they had no interest in the matter, and my submission is that they did not collude to the killing.

ADV SIGODI: In other words, if they fail to supply the name of the informer, can we then say the informers there in Botswana who gave them the information, were also part to the crime, because they knew that the information that they supplied to the Security Branch would be used one way or the other?

MR KOOPEDI: That would be so, if I was convinced that the applicants colluded or were consciously taking part in the planning of the killing, I would therefore critically want to get to the informants, the people, both who we were told, were both from South Africa and Botswana, who gave information on the two, but we could not be given information as to who these people are, and perhaps it is simply because these people did not know what this information was for, and of course, if anyone gives information to Security Branch members, clearly this would be something that the informer would know that it has something to do with the Security Police and the people against who I am informing.

But as to what is going to be done to this person, the people I am informing on, whether these people will die, this poor informer does not know. My submission is that the two applicants had no knowledge as to what exactly would happen.

MR MALAN: Mr Koopedi, I am now faced with a bit of a conundrum. We are agreed that the evidence at least was that they were approached for information on the basis of Special Forces planning some action in Botswana. Evidence was that in their minds, the planning of action means either an attack on a facility or an attack on an individual.

Now, when you were asked for your position and to argue with us, your first argument was that they should not be granted amnesty on the basis of there being no full disclosure. Now that argument presupposes the existence of some act which constitutes an offence, otherwise there is no obligation to disclose. Then the Chairperson asked you about their evidence and their obvious lack of knowledge as to how this operation was carried out and then your second argument becomes, they shouldn't qualify because they have not disclosed any act which constitutes an offence, if I understand you correctly.

Now, is your argument indeed that on what they have put before us, no competent Court could make any finding as to the applicants having committed any offence whatsoever, on the fact that they brought before the panel, is that your argument?

MR KOOPEDI: The answer is yes, and I am happy that you actually summarised the two stances very clearly. My first response was to explain what my instructions are, the basis on which I told the Committee that my clients opposes the granting of amnesty here, and I was asked for reasons, and of course at that stage, my advice to them, and what they would say to me would be based strictly on what is in the application forms, because we didn't have any testimony.

I was then asked that now that we have given this testimony, what is my view, and the second part now, that is my view that they are not properly before the Committee, because they were not party to the colluding. That is my stance.

MR MALAN: Well, not only colluding necessarily, but any offence. You see, because the qualification for amnesty in order to qualify for amnesty, an applicant must admit of an act which constitutes an offence or a delict.

MR KOOPEDI: Yes.

MR MALAN: And your argument is clearly and that would then, to take it to its logical consequences, your advice to a Prosecutor would be on this evidence, don't prosecute, because these two applicants have not committed any offence whatsoever?

MR KOOPEDI: That is very clear.

MR MALAN: That is what you would say to a Prosecutor?

MR KOOPEDI: They committed no offence and I do not believe that any charge would stick, the charge wouldn't stand.

MR MALAN: The I understand your position clearly, thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct)

MR KOOPEDI: No, not at this stage Chairperson, if there is, I will ask the Committee to allow me to.

MR VISSER IN ARGUMENT: Mr Chairman, I am not sure if and if so, to what extent I must get involved in an argument regarding the issue of the offence.

There are of course two issues here. The one is the question of common purpose who only came really to its full right in Safatsa's case, before that and Mr Malan, Commissioner Malan mentioned this before, the issue of dolus eventualis and that was, that was a decision which was given in the Witwatersrand Local Division by the late Justice Dowling in the case of S v Pillay, I am not sure whether that was a relation.

CHAIRPERSON: No, no, criminals in my family.

MR VISSER: But the facts there were interesting in the sense of how I would submit, they are relevant to the present case. In that case, Mr Erin Mendelow, my colleague, appeared for Mr Pillay who was charged together with three African gentlemen who all hailed from Kliptown and the African gentlemen went to Mr Pillay and obtained from him a firearm with which they told him, they were going to rob a filling station in Vereeniging.

They set off and of course what happened is that they shot the poor filling station attendant and he died, and they were all charged with murder. I had the privilege of being in court during the hearing in 1963, it might have been 1964 when Justice Dowling asked Mr Erin whether his client had ever heard of the qui facit per alium facit per se and Mr Mendelow immediately retorting, "My Lord, I can assure you in Kliptown they speak of little else", but in that case, that case was the locus classicus if I may say Chairperson, where as in this case, information was given to the perpetrators. There a firearm was given. There is no difference in the two situations.

It is more, it is more dramatic in the case of the firearm, because the firearm was used to shoot, but here, it is exactly the same thing. The information is used to direct Special Forces to the person and they kill him. With great respect Chairperson, I started off by saying this morning that it is not for you to analyse and dissect the evidence to the extent of what precise offence or delict had been committed.

If one only thinks of delicts, of all the hundreds of delicts that we have today and even with the advent of the new Constitution, it is a matter of almost impossibility to put actions into pigeon holes, Chairperson.

The point is both these applicants, as was pointed out to my learned friend, gave very clear evidence that they suspected very strongly what was going to happen and as you put it yourself, Mr Chairman, what else did Special Forces do? I certainly don't know of anything else they did. They went and they clobbered what they considered to be their enemy and their installations.

Now, at least we know that at the very least, there was a defeating of the ends of justice, that is clear. Because they certainly never went public with their knowledge that it was Special Forces who did it, and in that sense obviously they committed that offence.

Chairperson, the evidence of Crause went a little further than what my learned friend said. He said Naude told him that they are considering acting against these people, that was his evidence. We don't believe with respect, that it makes any difference whether he said so or not. Whilst it is in the mind and part of the mens rea of the applicants, that there is going to be a killing or a destruction of property and I assist by giving information, I have little doubt that an Attorney-General is not going to pay too much attention to my learned friend, Mr Koopedi, when he tells him not to prosecute.

Chairperson, as far as Mr Naude is concerned, Mr Naude together with Mr Joe Verster, Gen Joep Joubert and I believe there were one or two others, were in fact applicants for amnesty in the Nietverdiendt matter. In that case, there were 10 people from Mamelodi who had given an indication to Mr Joe Mamasela that they wanted to go out of the country to receive military training. Joe Mamasela took them all in a Volkswagen kombi and of course alerted the Security Branch in Pretoria who alerted Western Transvaal Security Branch and I believe it was Mr Jack Cronje who alerted Special Forces, Mr Charl Naude, and what happened with those unfortunate gentlemen is that near Nietverdiendt, their kombi, they were first drugged and I think they were injected with a drug, to make them sleep, unconscious and they were then placed back in the kombi, pushed down into a ditch and the kombi was blown up.

The reason why Special Forces applied for amnesty in that case, was because they had obtained a written opinion from one of my colleagues, right at the outset of the amnesty process, and they were advised, rightly or wrongly, and I make no judgement on the matter, that when they acted over the borders, in a foreign country, their actions fell within the prescribes of the Defence Act and that they therefore did nothing wrong.

On that basis, they decided not to make application for amnesty in any of the events where they acted over the borders. The Nietverdiendt one was the exception, because that took place in the Transvaal, and that is why they then all applied for amnesty and that is basically the background as to Charl Naude's position, for what it is worth.

Chairperson, you have heard the applicants. Any Security man in 1985 ...

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr Visser, I thought that the Trojan Horse concept was founded in Italy and later, like last week in New Zealand ...

MR VISSER: Chairperson, the evidence of the witnesses you have heard, and it is simply my submission that any Security Policeman who could have thought that Special Forces wanted information for any other reason, wouldn't have been worth his salt. He would he known and there is no question that they knew when they gave this information ...

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, let's for the benefit of Mr Koopedi say that that information did not play a part in the commission of any offence if it did occur. The point of the matter is that they conspired there to what they thought would eventually turn out to be a murder?

MR VISSER: Absolutely, both on the basis of common purpose and the purpose of dolus eventualis, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: It doesn't matter if Special Ops committed this offence or not?

MR VISSER: Yes, of course you also have the offence of attempt, you don't have to have a completed offence, a completed act of the murder taking place in fact. As we know, it didn't take place in the case of Ms Molefe, but they are just as guilty of an offence in regard to her as they are in regard to ...

CHAIRPERSON: ... is the offence of conspiracy to commit a murder, a lesser offence than attempt to murder or vice versa? I don't want to get into moot cases ...

MR VISSER: Chairperson, I must tell you that there has been so many arguments about that, and it really only comes to play when the Judge has to consider his sentence. Frankly, I would not like to go on record as to say the one is more serious than the other.

CHAIRPERSON: ... particular finding assuming that we find there is liability or there would be liability on the part of your client. I am just trying to fathom out which direction I must go.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, the moment you speak of a conspiracy, it is to commit murder and nothing else. Whether the murder takes place or not, that is not the point. That is what he is going to be charged with and the Judge will as a competent finding, in terms of the Criminal Procedure Act be able to say "well, on the facts of this case, I think there was an attempt" which if I am really pressed, I would say would be the more serious of the two.

There was an attempt, or there was simply a conspiracy which came to nothing. But really you don't, I don't believe, have to decide on which of the two is the more serious.

CHAIRPERSON: Is there anything else that you wish to ...

MR VISSER: ... there is just the question also of Mr Charl Naude, you will find at page 1 of your Bundle, that there is a reference to an Adv Alex Bosman, that is really an Attorney Alex Bosman, he is the Attorney for Mr Charl Naude, him being the person who is implicated here, and there is his telephone number, so if there is anything you want to know about Mr Charl Naude, his Attorney is on record.

Chairperson, the only other point that I feel I perhaps need to address, is the issue raised by Adv Sigodi that they were in the same position as the informers. Well, really Chairperson ...

CHAIRPERSON: I think she was asking the question of Mr Koopedi, in terms of his argument?

MR VISSER: Well, there is clearly a difference in the situation, and frankly, if they knew that the information that they were given, was definitely going to lead to attacks, well, then obviously they would be socius criminis, but that's got nothing to do with the application before you today.

And of course Chairperson, throughout all of this, we must not forget that we are also speaking of delictual liability.

CHAIRPERSON: My view, and I don't speak for anybody else, my view is that if there is amnesty, it goes together.

MR VISSER: Yes, Chairperson, we would therefore ask you to favourably consider to grant the applicants amnesty for any act or offence or omission and or delict committed in regard to this particular incident, which we have fully described, took place on the 14th of May 1985 and concern Mr Nkadimeng and Ms Molefe. Thank you Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Steenkamp, have you got anything to add?

ADV STEENKAMP: I've got no further submissions, thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Have you got anything to add?

MR KOOPEDI IN REPLY: A brief reply to what counsel had referred to as ...

CHAIRPERSON: Only new aspects, please. I have heard what you have said in the first place, and I have heard what he's got to say. If you want to add new aspects, then be my guest.

MR KOOPEDI: Chairperson, I am replying to what he said, so it is definitely not anything new. I am only confining myself to the Pillay case that was cited. In that case, the three robbers went to Pillay and told him that "give us a gun, we are going to rob", and he gave them the gun which was the instrument.

In this instance, the Security Police were approached to give the Special Forces information but they were not told what that information is for, and I believe that is where the thin line exists, Chairperson. Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you. We are going to reserve our decision on this matter, we will deliver it in due course. We will adjourn until two o'clock.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, Visser on record. The next matter that we intend to proceed with is the incident concerning Mr Nat Serache. In that matter, I appear for all the applicants, they are Crause, Loots, Schoon, Steyn, Smit and Schutte.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, can you direct us to the application in respect of this incident of Mr Schutte please?

MR VISSER: Yes, Chairperson, if you look at your so-called Botswana Bundle ...

CHAIRPERSON: ... 14 June 1995?

MR VISSER: Yes, but this application has incorrectly been included in that Bundle at page 224 to 232.

CHAIRPERSON: So what you are saying is that Schutte should not be an applicant in the Bundle that you refer to now, but should actually be in the Bundle that we are busy with now?

MR VISSER: Correct Chairperson. I was going to address you briefly on that, he is not an applicant in the Botswana raid matter, he is only an applicant in the Nat Serache application.

CHAIRPERSON: In any case, I am happy to go with that, except, can you just show us where the application in regard to this Nut Serache incident, where that appears in Schutte's application?

MR VISSER: Well Chairperson, to start with, it is the only incident for which he applies for amnesty. I will immediately concede that the incident hasn't been properly been identified by him. The name of Serache is not mentioned but there are other pointers.

CHAIRPERSON: Let's deal with that and let's establish whether he is a proper applicant first.

MR VISSER: You could take it as read that this is the only application for which he applies for amnesty, so there can be no issue of any confusion with any other application.

CHAIRPERSON: Were would I find his application?

MR VISSER: Chairperson, it is to be found at page 226 and he refers, to start with, Chairperson, at the bottom of that page to the applications of Steyn, Loots, du Preez Smit and then Chairperson, as we go along, you will see that he refers to a meeting that took place over two days and all the other witnesses, or the other witnesses will tell you of a meeting that took place over two days at Ottoshoop and Schutte will testify that he couldn't make it on the first day, he only arrived on the second day and there are two witnesses that I can recall off hand, who confirm that as well.

It is clearly this particular incident that he refers to.

MR MALAN: Mr Visser, I also see that he refers to the application of Smit, who is not an applicant in the Botswana raid?

MR VISSER: Yes, correct, yes. Chairperson, I don't know whether my learned friend wants to place him on record, and then we can kick off.

MR KOOPEDI: Well, if I am allowed to Chairperson, I will put my name on the record. My name is Brian Koopedi, I appear here on behalf of the two victims in the matter, Mr Nat Serache who is not here, and Mr William Moadira, who is here.

MR VISSER: Sorry Chairperson, I didn't realise that there was another victim. Who is the other victim and what is his status?

MR KOOPEDI: Mr Moadira, the gentleman sitting next to me. (Microphone not on) I was saying his name appears on the first page of the bundle, where you have a brief summary of the incident. Perhaps Chairperson, whilst I am still on the floor, I should mention that we were able to track down the other victim, who is Mr Serache. You might remember this morning we had a problem in finding him, and that is why we didn't begin with this matter. The agreement I have had with him, and his colleague here, is that we will listen to the evidence, having looked at the application forms and spoken to my learned friends on the other side, we would not put any questions, we have no problem with the matter being finalised, but we would like to be given an opportunity to, when we have the transcript, sit with the other victim and be able then to write a proper submission at that stage, if any submission should be coming from us.

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman, we call the first witness, Gen Steyn.

J A STEYN: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Steyn, you are an applicant in this matter?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: This matter deals with an attack which was executed on the residence or the place where Mr Nat Serache resided, and there are indications that injuries were incurred by Mr Serache and another person.

MR STEYN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You have already confirmed Exhibits A and B?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And you refer in your application on page 100 to an annexure JAS1?

MR STEYN: Yes.

MR VISSER: What documents are that?

MR STEYN: It is Exhibit B.

MR VISSER: Yes, it is identical to Exhibit B, isn't that so?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And you also confirm with regard to this incident, the contents of your affidavit which you submitted with your amnesty application?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: What is your knowledge of the incident regarding Mr Nat Serache's residence?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, the information regarding Mr Serache's home was that it was a transit facility which was used for ANC members, armed ANC members who would infiltrate the RSA via this house, and their aim was to commit acts of terrorism.

MR VISSER: As such he was surveilled by members of the Western Transvaal Security Branch?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And also by means of informers and reconnoitres?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Was he regarded by you as a target during the struggle of the past?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Previously, during a previous application, you testified regarding the co-operation which existed between among others, the Security Branch and Special Forces regarding the exchange of information?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: You also testified that that information, according to your knowledge and your suspicion and expectation, would have been applied by Special Forces?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: In order to destroy facilities?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Can you just tell us, in this case, was any planning meeting or session conducted?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct, there was a planning meeting near Ottoshoop in the North West province.

MR VISSER: This Ottoshoop, precisely where is this place situated?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, it is between Zeerust and Mafikeng.

MR VISSER: And what will one find at this place?

MR STEYN: It was a safehouse which was used by the Security Branch.

MR VISSER: Is this in a town or on a farm?

MR STEYN: It is a farm.

MR VISSER: And you say that a meeting was held there?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: When was this?

MR STEYN: I beg your pardon Chair?

CHAIRPERSON: What was the date of that meeting?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, upon the compilation of my document, I wasn't certain of the date. Later I determined that it was during February 1985.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, I do beg your pardon, I should have started there. We established the date from a book entitled June 14 Raid, written by Lebero Nyelele and Ellen Drake and in that book, on page 5 of that book, reference is made to this incident and it is specified to have occurred on the 13th of February.

CHAIRPERSON: Does that sound right to you?

MR STEYN: I would be prepared to accept that, yes Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: I am not asking whether or not you are prepared to accept it, does it sound correct according to your recollection?

MR STEYN: Yes, it may be so.

MR VISSER: You say that prior to the incident, there was a meeting at Ottoshoop at your safehouse?

MR STEYN: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Can you recall approximately and if you cannot, please say so, how long before the occurrence of the incident itself, before the explosion or the bombing of this safehouse, would the meeting have occurred?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, when I submitted my application, I really wasn't certain, however later I attempted to refresh my recollection among others, through discussions with my former colleagues, and it would appear that it may have been either the day before or on the very same day of the incident which took place that evening.

MR VISSER: So you recall that the meeting took place and that the action was executed shortly thereafter?

MR STEYN: Yes, very shortly thereafter.

MR VISSER: Very well. And during this meeting, who can you recall having been present there?

CHAIRPERSON: Were any of your fellow applicants present?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: All of them or some of them?

MR STEYN: All of them, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Do you recall them, or are you relying on their allegations?

MR STEYN: No, I recall the applicants.

MR MALAN: Thank you.

MR STEYN: There was Gen Erasmus, Brig Schoon, Brig A. Oosthuizen, Commandant Charl Naude and I do not want to exclude that there were more persons whom I cannot recall.

MR VISSER: You also state that a Mr McPherson was present?

MR STEYN: Yes, I beg your pardon, I recall Mr McPherson as well.

MR VISSER: Who was he?

MR STEYN: He was from the Pretoria Security Branch Head Office.

MR VISSER: Was he a policeman?

MR STEYN: Yes, he was a policeman.

MR VISSER: What was his rank?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, I would have to guess, I think he was a lieutenant at that stage.

CHAIRPERSON: Naude, what was his rank?

MR STEYN: He was a commandant.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well.

MR VISSER: Your recollection, if you could just assist us, if you were to think back, approximately how many persons were present during this meeting? Was it a meeting involving only these persons or were there any other persons whose names you cannot recall?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, I would like to say that there were more persons. I don't think that there were many more persons.

MR VISSER: Could you give us an estimate?

MR STEYN: There may have been four or five others who were also present.

CHAIRPERSON: Who was in the room when the meeting took place? How many were there, 10, 20, 15, 30?

MR STEYN: If I study my affidavit, I would be referring to approximately eight, it could have been 15 to 20.

CHAIRPERSON: Between 15 and 20?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: The point, Mr Steyn, is that it wasn't a very small meeting?

MR STEYN: No, it wasn't a small meeting.

MR VISSER: And could members of Special Forces also have been present, but that you cannot recall them?

MR STEYN: That is possible.

MR VISSER: How long did the meeting last?

CHAIRPERSON: Wasn't Naude from that Division?

MR VISSER: Yes, but I was referring to other members, apart from Naude. How long did the meeting last, this planning session?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, if I recall correctly, it began during the late afternoon and preceded until about ten o'clock or eleven o'clock that night.

MR VISSER: And then did you go home?

MR STEYN: No, we stayed over.

MR VISSER: What happened the next day?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, the following morning, this was before midday, Gen Liebenberg from the South African Defence Force ...

CHAIRPERSON: In other words by ten or eleven o'clock the previous evening, nothing relevant had taken place?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, we were waiting for Gen Liebenberg from the South African Defence Force as well as Gen Schutte from the South African Police.

MR VISSER: That would be Kat Liebenberg?

MR STEYN: Yes, that would Gen Kat Liebenberg.

CHAIRPERSON: What were their ranks?

MR STEYN: I beg your pardon?

CHAIRPERSON: What were their ranks?

MR STEYN: One was a General, that was Gen Kat Liebenberg and Lt-Gen Schutte.

MR VISSER: Gen Schutte, is he one of your fellow applicants?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: What was his position in 1985?

MR STEYN: If I recall correctly, he was the Head of the Security Branch of the South African Police.

MR VISSER: Schutte?

MR STEYN: Yes, Gen Schutte.

MR VISSER: And Kat Liebenberg?

MR STEYN: I think he was the Head of Special Forces in the South African Defence Force, yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: What did you discuss during this planning session, can you recall in general terms?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, ideas were exchanged with a view on the facility of Nat Serache, information was shared among those present regarding his position and his factual involvement and everything that involved him with a view on handling him as a target.

MR VISSER: What made this action so urgent, you say that the action followed quite shortly after the meeting. What made this action so urgent?

MR STEYN: Among others Chairperson, there was information at that particular stage, that there were trained MK members who were on the verge of infiltrating South Africa.

MR VISSER: And was the idea then to prevent them from entering the country?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Now, if I understand your evidence, Mr Steyn, there was actually a group of persons that were targeted, and that is what the planning was about?

MR STEYN: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Among others, Mr Nat Serache?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And were any decisions taken on that first evening, before the two Generals arrived?

MR STEYN: That is correct. The decision was taken that the premises and by implication then, the habitation thereof, would be attacked by the South African Defence Force.

MR VISSER: And what you knew thereof subsequently, you told me that you were at the border post when the Special Forces went in?

MR STEYN: Yes, Chairperson, that is entirely correct. The particular evening of the attack, I was with Commandant Charl Naude approximately 15 to 20 kilometres away from the border, there was a premises from where the planning was conducted. I beg your pardon, not the planning, but from where the attack would be launched.

Chairperson, I was present with Commandant Naude when...

MR VISSER: Could you repeat?

MR STEYN: When he sent four of his members in from there, to go and launch the attack.

MR VISSER: Can you recall who they were and what their names were?

MR STEYN: Unfortunately I cannot recall the names of these persons.

MR VISSER: Were they known to you?

MR STEYN: I don't think that I had known them at any stage prior, to my best knowledge I saw them for the first time that evening.

MR VISSER: And did you wait there until they returned?

MR STEYN: Yes, I waited there Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And when did they return?

MR STEYN: They returned the following morning, as it was becoming light.

CHAIRPERSON: Was this the second day or when was this?

MR STEYN: Chairperson, they went in that night and on the same morning ...

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but with regard to the planning session, when did they leave, when did they receive the order?

MR STEYN: Sorry, I didn't really understand that?

CHAIRPERSON: You have mentioned a meeting which lasted over two days, and in relation to the meeting, when was the instruction given to these four persons?

MR STEYN: Commandant Charl Naude handled them, but I think that that same evening, after ...

CHAIRPERSON: Were you present when they gave the instructions?

MR STEYN: What I am saying Mr Chairperson, is that I was there when they were sent in to Botswana.

CHAIRPERSON: When did this happen in relation to the meeting?

MR STEYN: I think it was the same evening.

CHAIRPERSON: Was it the second day of the meeting?

MR STEYN: Yes.

MR MALAN: I just want to make sure, you say that you think it was the same evening, or the evening after that?

MR STEYN: It was very quickly, yes.

MR VISSER: Did the four persons come back?

MR STEYN: Yes, all four of them came back.

MR VISSER: Did they make a report?

MR STEYN: Yes, they did.

MR VISSER: Do you know what the contents of that report was?

MR STEYN: The report was that the house of Serache was destroyed.

MR VISSER: Did they say anything about people who were injured or killed?

MR STEYN: They couldn't say if somebody was killed or injured.

MR VISSER: On page 102 of your written application you say that as far as you know nobody was injured in the attack or the explosion?

MR STEYN: Yes, that was our information.

MR VISSER: And is that still your knowledge?

MR STEYN: Yes, up until the present I haven't had any other information.

MR VISSER: But now apparently the Investigative Unit says that Mr Serache and Moadira were injured in this attack. Did you know anything about this?

MR STEYN: No, I truly did not know anything about this.

MR VISSER: But you did foresee that people could be injured or killed?

MR STEYN: Yes, definitely.

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman. You then apply for amnesty for you part in this action and it will then include - I am sorry there is just some other point which we have forgotten and that would then include conspiracy to murder, damage to property and defeating the ends of justice, is that correct?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is.

MR VISSER: He wasn't in control of it Chairperson, it is really a bit of a moot question, he wasn't in control ever of the ...

CHAIRPERSON: What was the last aspect?

MR VISSER: Defeating the ends of justice. That would also apply to the crossing of the border Chairperson. We have had this argument before, and ...

CHAIRPERSON: Whoever, I am prepared to grant it, if a suitable case is made out, I am happy to grant amnesty.

MR VISSER: Yes, but if we believe that it is a border line case where he should also ask for amnesty for illegal crossing and illegal transportation of firearms, we will alert you to that Chairperson, but in this particular case, it is not, it is not applicable. He didn't, no, he didn't.

Mr Steyn, there is one thing that I forgot and my Attorney pointed it out to me, afterwards you heard that as you said, some of the people who reported back that the facility was damaged or destroyed, did you get information from the Botswana authority?

MR STEYN: Yes, that is correct. I had regular contact with people from the Special Branch in Botswana and I heard from them, that in the clearing up of the property, they found AK47's.

MR VISSER: Can you remember who told you this?

MR STEYN: Mr Chairperson, I am not quite sure, but with my liaison with the Special Branch in Botswana, it was Mr Hershveld and Mogadi.

MR VISSER: Was it one of them?

MR STEYN: Yes, it could have been one of them.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, in an attempt to be of assistance, we went through the list provided by the ANC and there does not seem to be any reference in the structures during the relevant period, in Botswana, to Mr Nat Serache.

And obviously he won't be included in the list of people deceased, because he didn't die. They just make no reference to him. Thank you Chairperson. That is the evidence from this witness, thank you Chairperson.

MR KOOPEDI: As indicated Chairperson, we won't put any questions to the applicant, thank you.

ADV STEENKAMP: No questions, Mr Chairman.

ADV SIGODI: These people who crossed the border, do you know how they crossed the border, were they using a private motor vehicle or not?

MR STEYN: Mr Chairperson, how they physically crossed the border, I do not know, but from where we were or from where they left, they left on foot.

ADV SIGODI: So you do not know if they went through the border gate or if they used some other means of getting across, into the country? You wouldn't know that?

MR STEYN: That is correct Chair, I was not physically there when they crossed the border.

ADV SIGODI: And the weapons which they carried, did you see them?

MR STEYN: They did have weapons with them, yes.

ADV SIGODI: How were they carried?

MR STEYN: Some of the weapons they hid on them.

ADV SIGODI: If they went on foot, I just want some more information as to how they crossed the border with all those weapons and not being detected by the people at the border gate and how possible it could be for them to cross the border like that? Did they not report back to you as to how they crossed the border?

MR STEYN: No Mr Chairperson, I do not know how they crossed the border, as I have said, and the weapons that they had was normal weapons, that is easy to carry. They went with it and they came back with it. I cannot say how they crossed the border between South Africa and Botswana.

MR MALAN: I am not quite sure that I understood you correctly, you said the place from where they launched their attack, do you think was about 18 to 20 kilometres from the border or is my recollection wrong? You said 15 to 20 kilometres from the border, that is from where they launched the attack?

MR STEYN: Yes Mr Chairperson, on the side of the Republic. Yes, that is where the four members were sent from, that is correct.

MR MALAN: And from there you said that they left on foot?

MR STEYN: Yes.

MR MALAN: Where did they leave you on foot, was it from the room or from the farm or from that building?

MR STEYN: Yes, from the building.

MR MALAN: Did you presume then that they would walk 15 to 20 kilometres?

MR STEYN: Yes, they had to walk from us to the border and then to Serache.

MR MALAN: Or they had to have a vehicle to get to the border?

MR STEYN: Yes, that I do not know of.

MR MALAN: Yes, but do you think it is possible for them to walk 30 to 40 kilometres the evening and then be back the next day to launch the attack and to carry explosives, etc, they had to use a vehicle somewhere?

MR STEYN: It is possible, but I would just like to say that the people who were used for that job, were very fit. It wasn't that long a distance for them.

MR MALAN: Even though they had explosives with t hem?

MR STEYN: I didn't see any explosives with them.

MR MALAN: Very well, but you didn't see them making use of a vehicle?

MR STEYN: No, I didn't.

MR MALAN: Thank you very much. Sorry, can I also just ask the following, then it is also not likely that they would have gone through the border post, if you talk about that type of soldier or person?

MR STEYN: Yes, definitely, they wouldn't have. I would accept that.

MR MALAN: Thank you.

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Perhaps if I may just be allowed to ask the General just two questions, just to, for possible clarity. When you refer to the 15 to 20 kilometres, are you referring to the border or the border post?

MR STEYN: No, I am referring to the closest border.

MR VISSER: So they would have moved 15 kilometres from where you were, towards the border?

MR STEYN: Yes.

MR VISSER: And then to add to Mr Malan's question, this departure of them, was it during the day or the evening?

MR STEYN: No, it was the evening.

MR VISSER: Was that after the border post was closed?

MR STEYN: Yes, I assume it would have been.

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman.

MR VISSER: The next witness is Mr Loots, Brig Loots. Chairperson, his evidence, his application is to be found at page 26 to 47. He deals with this matter at page 29 of the Bundle.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------WIKUS JOHANNES LOOTS: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Please be seated.

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Loots, you are also an applicant in this matter, concerning the matter that occurred, or where the facility of Mr Serache was blown up?

MR LOOTS: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: You have your application in front of you, do you confirm the contents of your application as you submitted it?

MR LOOTS: That is correct Chair.

MR VISSER: You also have Exhibit A, the general background in front of you. Is there a section in that that you cannot confirm?

MR LOOTS: As far as it concerns Botswana, I can confirm everything.

MR VISSER: Do you then say that you are excluding Lesotho and Swaziland?

MR LOOTS: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And you then ask that those sections must be incorporated into your evidence?

MR LOOTS: Yes.

MR VISSER: Exhibit B is a document that carries your name, Wikus Johannes Loots. Can you just tell the Committee how it happened that this document came to life?

MR LOOTS: Mr Chairperson, if I remember correctly Botswana was after the signing of the Umkomati manifest. The infiltration of ANC members into South Africa, escalated and on the 14th of June this led to the attack in Gaberone, and this also led to Exhibit B, and I did this on the instructions of Head Office for use in a meeting that was held in December 1988 in Botswana and Pretoria.

MR VISSER: That was a background document?

MR LOOTS: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: What was the purpose of that document, what did you want to explain in that?

MR LOOTS: The Department of Foreign Affairs wanted to liaise with Botswana directly.

MR VISSER: Just to summarise it, if I can put it this way, this document contains a reference to attacks that were orchestrated from Botswana and attempts to curb these attacks with the help or assistance of the Botswana government. Were you assisted by Gen Steyn in this?

MR LOOTS: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Gen Steyn was your Head in the Western Transvaal, at that stage?

MR LOOTS: Yes.

MR VISSER: The document that you submitted, is it this document that I have in my hand?

MR LOOTS: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And this contains far more information than is contained in Exhibit B?

MR LOOTS: It contains information about Natal, Eastern Cape, Free State and the Far North, concerning ANC infiltrations from Botswana into the various areas.

MR VISSER: Very well. Can you just tell the Committee, you have heard the evidence of Gen Steyn, Mr Loots, do you agree with his evidence?

MR LOOTS: Yes, I do agree with it.

MR VISSER: You also referred to his application in your application and you asked that it will be incorporated into yours?

MR LOOTS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: What can you remember about this incident?

MR LOOTS: It was so that we were approximately 20 or 25 people who came together.

MR VISSER: Was this at Ottoshoop?

MR LOOTS: Yes. And as far as I can remember, the purpose of that meeting was amongst other things to and I am referring to sections or divisions, Soweto, the Free State, Johannesburg, Pretoria Head Office, Special Forces, where we all came together with the purpose to in a sensible way, exchange ideas about various individuals, to exchange addresses, safehouses used by MK members.

MR VISSER: Was the case of Mr Serache pertinently discussed?

MR LOOTS: Yes.

MR VISSER: What was your impression of the purpose or the plan of the Special Forces, concerning Mr Serache?

MR LOOTS: That in the light of information, that he was involved in the infiltration of weapons and that Special Forces will be tasked to attack the house, and to take the necessary steps.

MR VISSER: Can you remember if there was a sense of urgency concerning Mr Serache during this meeting?

MR LOOTS: Mr Chairperson, once again with the help of some of the information, and I was a Commander in Potchefstroom, I was in charge of the co-ordination of information concerning MK activities in Botswana, it was very clear that he played a leading role, concerning infiltrations of weaponry, etc.

MR VISSER: How long did this meeting take?

MR LOOTS: Well, it went till very late that evening. I can name an example, we received reports from Soweto where a source said that he left Clocwen to Dukwe, which is approximately 300 kilometres from the border, and within half an hour or 40 minutes, he would be back and he would report back to his handler and there, during that information, this meeting, that they must try and be careful to listen to informants or sources who do not tell the truth.

MR VISSER: How long did this meeting take?

MR LOOTS: It was up until eleven o'clock that evening, or maybe even later.

MR VISSER: What happened then, did you go home?

MR LOOTS: No, we stayed over. The next morning, we discussed in groups and waited for Gen Schutte and Kat Liebenberg.

MR VISSER: Did they arrive?

MR LOOTS: Yes, they arrived.

MR VISSER: What happened then?

MR LOOTS: As far as I can remember, we then went our ways, individual ways. The suggestion concerning Serache was then accepted by the Generals.

MR VISSER: You already mentioned that you understood that Special Forces would act?

MR LOOTS: Yes.

MR VISSER: With Gen Kat Liebenberg, did you also believe that it was an authorised operation?

MR LOOTS: Yes, definitely.

MR VISSER: You also said that your participation and the people who worked underneath you, was that you had to provide information to the Special Forces?

MR LOOTS: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Who did you provide this information to?

MR LOOTS: Personally the people that I liaised with, was Charl Naude and then Col Joe Verster.

MR VISSER: From Special Forces?

MR LOOTS: Yes. And sometimes Joep Joubert as well as Gen Kat Liebenberg personally.

MR VISSER: Was anything done then because of the discussions on Mr Serache and his facility?

MR LOOTS: I heard Mr Chairperson, it was covered in the media and also in Botswana, over the radio, that was the normal radio in Botswana and we had to monitor it. I cannot remember it in detail, I was not part of the team that Gen Steyn is referring to, the team that left the next day to Botswana, I went back to Potchefstroom, but I did later hear with liaison with people in Zeerust that there was an explosion in Gaberone.

MR VISSER: When you conveyed this information to Special Forces, what did you think will happen with this information?

MR LOOTS: That they will definitely act to kill.

MR VISSER: Thank you Mr Chairman, that is the evidence.

MR LOOTS: I can may just add this Mr Chairperson, with the assistance of sources, I heard and it is confirmation of Gen Steyn that weapons were found and that Morupe was with Serache in the house when this incident occurred, and not one of them were seriously injured.

MR VISSER: This Morupe that you are now talking about, could it be the same person, Moadira?

MR LOOTS: I do not know.

MR VISSER: Thank you.

MR KOOPEDI: The same position chairperson, no questions for this witness.

ADV STEENKAMP: No questions, Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, at random, we will pick on Mr Rudi Crause to give evidence next. His evidence is to be found at page 2 - 25 of the Bundle. Chairperson, he deals with the incident on page 8.

RUDI CRAUSE: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Please be seated.

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Crause, you are also an applicant in this incident. Do you once again confirm for the record Exhibit A and B?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And do you ask that it must be read with your application?

MR CRAUSE: Yes.

MR VISSER: You have already confirmed your application this morning, do you also confirm it concerning this incident?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: At that stage you have already told us that you were the Commander at Zeerust Branch?

MR CRAUSE: Yes.

MR VISSER: And you were under the command of Gen Steyn, at that stage a Colonel, and Brig Loots and that stage Lt-Col Loots?

MR CRAUSE: Yes.

MR VISSER: That does not really matter, but it is correct that you were under their command and you executed their commands?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And you said that part of those instructions were that you have to provide information to Special Forces for them to act upon?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: What can you remember from this specific incident?

MR CRAUSE: I was present during the planning meeting when authorisation was given to Special Forces on a house in Gaberone.

MR VISSER: Who gave the authorisation?

MR CRAUSE: I assumed that it was Kat Liebenberg because he was the most senior person there.

MR VISSER: You yourself did not act?

MR CRAUSE: No, I did not.

MR VISSER: So that authorisation will then be the authorisation to the Special Forces?

MR CRAUSE: Yes.

MR VISSER: Was there any of your senior officers from the Security Branch?

MR CRAUSE: Yes. The people who were present there, that I can remember were Gen Liebenberg, Gen Erasmus, Gen Schutte, Gen Steyn, Brig Loots, Brig Oosthuizen, Commandant Naude, Capt du Preez Smit.

MR VISSER: Yes, he is a co-applicant?

MR CRAUSE: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And did you see it as an authorised action?

MR CRAUSE: Yes.

MR VISSER: What can you remember today, what did you know about the activities of Mr Serache in Botswana?

MR CRAUSE: Information that was known to us was that he was involved in providing housing to people who was involved in the transportation of vehicles, and the infiltration of MK members into the Republic.

MR VISSER: Did you know anything about his military training?

MR CRAUSE: No, I didn't know anything about that.

MR VISSER: Did actions follow after the meeting?

MR CRAUSE: Yes.

MR VISSER: Who launched this action?

MR CRAUSE: It was launched by the Special Forces of the Defence Force.

MR VISSER: According to your knowledge, did you know if people were injured or killed in that incident?

MR CRAUSE: After the incident I heard that the house was destroyed, but that nobody was injured or killed.

MR VISSER: And is that the reason why ...

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, did you say that nobody was injured or killed?

MR CRAUSE: Yes, that was the information that I had at that stage.

MR VISSER: Do you accept the information as it was provided by the Investigation Unit of the TRC on Mr Serache and Mr Moadira?

MR CRAUSE: I will accept it today, yes.

MR VISSER: And do you accept that the date of the incident was the 13th of February 1985?

MR CRAUSE: Yes.

MR VISSER: And you then ask for amnesty for any act or delict that occurred?

MR CRAUSE: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, wouldn't it be the same as what you highlighted in terms of Mr Steyn's evidence?

MR VISSER: Yes, they will all be the same, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: The same with Loots?

MR VISSER: Yes. Their role was the same. Thank you Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Koopedi?

MR KOOPEDI: No questions for this witness, thank you Mr Chair.

ADV STEENKAMP: No questions, thank you Mr Chair.

MR CRAUSE: Thank you Mr Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairperson, I next call Mr du Preez Smit. His application is to be found at page 108 to 119 and he deals with this incident at page 112. He is available, he has no objection to taking the oath and he wishes to address you in Afrikaans.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------CHAIRPERSON: Is your surname du Preez Smit or just Smit?

MR SMIT: Just Smit.

C J DU PREEZ SMIT: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Please be seated.

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Smit, you are also an applicant in this incident concerning Mr Serache?

MR SMIT: That is correct yes.

MR VISSER: On page 112 of your application, your written application you followed the method in that a certain period, you were involved in certain incidents concerning Botswana and then you mentioned certain incidents during that period, is that correct?

MR SMIT: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: And you mentioned or dealt with it as incident 1, the attack in Gaberone, is that the Serache incident?

MR SMIT: Yes.

MR VISSER: You studied Exhibit A and B?

MR SMIT: Yes.

MR VISSER: Concerning the section on Botswana, do you confirm that?

MR SMIT: Yes.

MR VISSER: Is this in line with your experience and knowledge?

MR SMIT: Yes.

MR VISSER: Do you confirm also the contents of the amnesty application?

MR SMIT: That is correct yes.

MR VISSER: Can you just tell the Committee what your knowledge and recollection is concerning the facts and circumstances of this attack on the facility of Mr Serache?

MR SMIT: Mr Chairperson, I was at the meeting, I mentioned it was in Zeerust, but it was between Zeerust and Ottosdal. Everybody that was mentioned that was present there, I can confirm that. There was also a Muller, he was a General, he is deceased.

At this meeting we made the decision that the facility of Serache must be attacked by the Defence Force and that the people would be killed.

MR VISSER: Could we just get some more information concerning this. What was your rank and position in 1985?

MR SMIT: I was a Lieutenant and I worked under the command of Gen Crause. I was a field worker, and I was involved in the collection of information from Botswana.

MR VISSER: And the high command, was that Gen Steyn?

MR SMIT: Yes.

MR VISSER: This Mr Muller who you have just referred to, where did he come from?

MR SMIT: If I can remember correctly, he was the Security Branch Commander of Soweto.

MR VISSER: I think it was Gen Steyn who referred to it that Soweto or Brig Loots has referred to that they were also represented there?

MR SMIT: That is correct.

MR VISSER: The information that you could convey, did you have any role in that?

MR SMIT: Yes.

MR VISSER: Where did you get this information from?

MR SMIT: It came from my informants.

MR VISSER: Very well. Did you handle only informants or did you get your information from other sources?

MR SMIT: The informants played both roles.

MR VISSER: You heard what Gen Steyn and Brig Loots said concerning the type of information that was available concerning Mr Serache?

MR SMIT: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Do you agree with that?

MR SMIT: I agree with it, yes.

MR VISSER: Was there an urgency ...

CHAIRPERSON: Everybody had information about Mr Serache?

MR SMIT: Chairperson, our office in Zeerust had various members who had different informers operating in Botswana.

CHAIRPERSON: So there were different handlers?

MR SMIT: Yes, handlers.

CHAIRPERSON: And you in the office, or wherever brought it together?

MR SMIT: Yes, we brought everything together.

CHAIRPERSON: Did the Defence Force also have information at their disposal?

MR SMIT: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And would the information then be co-ordinated at the planning session?

MR SMIT: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: So that you had all the information together?

MR SMIT: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Did you have any knowledge of persons who were killed or injured during the attack?

MR SMIT: No Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Do you accept from the Investigating Team from the TRC that there were two people who were injured?

MR SMIT: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And that the date was the 13th of February 1985, that was the date of this attack?

MR SMIT: Yes, that could be correct, I accept it as such.

MR VISSER: Then you request amnesty also in the same regard as Gen Steyn for your share in this incident?

MR SMIT: That is correct.

MR VISSER: That is the evidence, thank you Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you know whether these people from the Defence Force have applied for amnesty?

MR SMIT: No Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you not know?

MR SMIT: No, I do not know.

MR KOOPEDI: There are no questions for this witness.

ADV STEENKAMP: I can maybe just assist, I have checked the records, and we haven't received any application for people that was indicated in these applications, except one person, Mr Kat Liebenberg, he is deceased. There is no reference to this specific incident in his application.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, I am not sure whether I made myself quite clear, but you will not find apart from as my learned friend, Mr Steenkamp points out, Mr Kat Liebenberg, he was the only member of the Defence Force who applied for amnesty for cross border raids, none of the others have applied, due to the legal opinion which they have received.

Those are the facts.

MR MALAN: Sorry, just before you proceed Mr Visser, but Kat Liebenberg didn't apply for this incident?

MR VISSER: I don't think he applied for this incident, but I remember that he was castigated because he was the only one that did apply.

MR MALAN: That is right.

MR VISSER: Initially, and I think there may have been one, it was also a general request yes, but he applied for the Nietverdiendt one specifically. Not as far as my knowledge is concerned, for this one.

I call Gen Schutte Chairperson, he is ready to take the oath, he has no objection to taking the oath and he wishes to address you in Afrikaans.

S H SCHUTTE: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Please be seated.

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Chairperson, just to remind you, you must now look at the Botswana Bundle at page 224 to 232, where this applicant's amnesty application appears. He deals with the incident at page 226.

Mr Schutte, you have made a written application for amnesty, and it has been submitted, is that correct?

MR SCHUTTE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: In your amnesty application, you sketched your lengthy career in the Police which stretched from the 4th of February 1947 to your retirement with pension on the 31st of October 1988?

MR SCHUTTE: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: The content of your amnesty application, do you confirm this to the best of your knowledge as being true and correct?

MR SCHUTTE: Yes, that is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: What was your position in - I beg your pardon, before I come to that. You have also studied Exhibit A, that is the general background document?

MR SCHUTTE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Do you confirm according to your knowledge and information, that this is in line with your experience and knowledge of the struggle of the past?

MR SCHUTTE: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: Similar to this, Exhibit B?

MR SCHUTTE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: I would like to begin in 1964. What was your position in 1964?

MR SCHUTTE: I was a member of the Security Police.

MR VISSER: And in 1964, did you already have information regarding MK activities in Botswana?

MR SCHUTTE: That is correct.

MR VISSER: How did this come about?

MR SCHUTTE: We had an information source in Francistown who reported information to us at intervals.

MR VISSER: And your awareness was still going on till 1985 regarding reports, regarding what was going on in Botswana?

MR SCHUTTE: That is correct.

MR MALAN: I beg your pardon, Mr Schutte, Mr Visser, I apologise for interrupting you. Mr Schutte, you say that in 1964 you already had information regarding MK activities in Botswana?

MR SCHUTTE: Yes, that is correct.

MR MALAN: According to your application, in 1964 you were Mr Vorster's bodyguard?

MR SCHUTTE: Yes, I think that those dates are not entirely correct Chairperson. You will recall that Dr Verwoerd was murdered and a year later, after Dr Verwoerd's murder, I took over with Mr Vorster, so that date cannot be correct.

MR MALAN: Where were you in 1964 when you had this information regarding Botswana?

MR SCHUTTE: I was attached to the Security Branch.

MR MALAN: You see, Mr Visser, perhaps you should just elaborate for us because this is somewhat confusing. It states that you joined Graaff-Reinet and then you went to Pilgrims Rest and then in 1964 you were the bodyguard of Mr Vorster, where was your Security Branch involved?

MR SCHUTTE: In approximately 1958 I was in command of security on the Goldfields and from that point onwards, I went to Johannesburg and the following date ...

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Schutte, in 1985, were you involved with the Security Police?

MR SCHUTTE: Yes, that is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you know anything about the meeting to which the other witnesses have referred?

MR SCHUTTE: Yes, I know about it.

CHAIRPERSON: Let us discuss that.

MR SCHUTTE: I will explain to you how my knowledge came about. I was contacted by Kat Liebenberg, he said that he was coming to the meeting, and he wanted to know whether or not I wanted to accompany him. I said that it would be completely impossible for me at that day. The following day he contacted me again, I told him that it was in order, that I could accompany him, and I did so.

I went with him to Ottoshoop. We travelled by helicopter.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well. Mr Visser, can we proceed from that point?

MR VISSER: Who and what were you in 1985?

MR SCHUTTE: I was the Head of Security.

MR VISSER: And were you informed by someone at Ottoshoop?

MR SCHUTTE: Gen Steyn and Brig Loots informed me.

MR VISSER: What were you told?

MR SCHUTTE: Please repeat?

CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct)

MR SCHUTTE: I beg your pardon?

CHAIRPERSON: In 1985 you were stationed in Pretoria?

MR SCHUTTE: Yes, I was in Pretoria, that is correct.

MR VISSER: What were you informed of?

MR SCHUTTE: Brig Steyn told me that the Defence Force had an operation that they were preparing for, that would take place in Botswana.

MR VISSER: Did he say what was expected?

MR SCHUTTE: Chairperson, I told Gen Steyn that with the exception of what was expected of them, they would not act on a cross border level.

MR VISSER: But you approved the fact that they had provided information?

MR SCHUTTE: Yes, I approved the fact that they had provided information which was available regarding this matter, to the Special Forces.

MR VISSER: Did you later become aware that there had indeed been an action?

MR SCHUTTE: Chairperson, it is difficult for me to answer that precisely because I was not specifically informed by Gen Steyn because they had crossed the border and it was a reconnaissance action, they did not inform me because it wasn't a Police matter.

MR VISSER: Would you accept then that the facility was exploded and that two persons were injured?

MR SCHUTTE: After the evidence that I have heard here, I doubt within myself precisely what happened there.

MR VISSER: And that it took place on the 13th of February?

MR SCHUTTE: Yes, that is more or less as my thoughts lead me, but I cannot give you the precise date.

MR VISSER: Very well, and do you confirm the political motivations that played a role in your mind when you took the decision?

MR SCHUTTE: That is correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Thank you Chair.

MR KOOPEDI: No questions for this witness, thank you.

ADV STEENKAMP: No questions Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, you are excused.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I have a difficulty today in the sense that Brig Willem Schoon, who is the last witness of the six witnesses, of the six applicants, is ill in bed today, and apparently had to consult with his doctor.

He telephoned my Attorney early this morning and my Attorney in turn telephoned me and we said to each other, well, if that is the case, that is the case, there is nothing we can do about it. The problem is Chairperson, that he is not here to give his evidence today. We are hopeful that he will be here tomorrow morning. He also is involved in the arms cache matter, so Chairperson, we have one of two possibilities, at the moment.

It is not unknown that Amnesty Committees have said in the past "well, there is nothing he can contribute, it is not necessary to call his evidence", either that or we can call him tomorrow morning, first thing, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: What is your attitude, Mr Koopedi?

MR KOOPEDI: I was not prepared on this Chairperson, I must say it comes as a shock to me. My knee-jerk response to it would be to ask you to strike off his application.

CHAIRPERSON: I do have his application, I cannot strike it off. One of two things happen, my immediate reaction also, and I haven't thought it through is either I grant it or I don't grant it, or the panel grants it or it doesn't grant it. I don't think there is a question of striking it off.

The issue here is that if he is unable to testify, what should, or what is your attitude?

MR KOOPEDI: I still think ...

CHAIRPERSON: ... quite fair to you, I have in the past ruled that in such circumstances, and I have gone into the Act, where it involves a gross human rights violation, the Act demands that an applicant testifies in public, failure to do that, I have ruled in the past, is fatal to the application. It is not a question of striking it off the rule, but refuse it, because he hasn't complied with one of the formalities of the Act. Do you follow what I am saying?

MR KOOPEDI: I follow what you say Chairperson, and perhaps just to add on it, I, unless my learned friend would indicate otherwise, I do not see him changing the evidence. I do not see him giving a different type of evidence to the evidence that we have been given. I see him coming, that is if he does, to tell us that he was present at the plannery meeting and that is it.

But I would leave it in the hands of the, the capable hands of this honourable Committee to make a decision on that fact.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, I think it would be better for everybody if I adjourn this matter till tomorrow morning, even if his evidence is going to have a mundane effect, at least he would have complied with the formalities of the Act.

MR VISSER: Two things Chairperson, the one thing is if you look at page 83 of his, I am not batting that he mustn't give evidence, but all he says is he has looked at Steyn's application, and he confirms it as far as he is concerned, that is what he is going to come and tell you tomorrow. But be that as it may Chairperson, may I respectfully disagree with you on one issue. There is nowhere in the Act which places any obligation on an applicant to give evidence. There must just be a full disclosure.

If that full disclosure comes from the evidence of others, as it often does with the footsoldiers who come to this amnesty applications ...

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, like I say, whether you agree with the previous ruling or not, is irrelevant to me, the fact of the matter is that there is a precedent for it, that I have created. I think it would be best suited for everybody that we rather adjourn till tomorrow and that he can come and say what he wants to say.

MR VISSER: I don't disagree with that ruling at all Chairperson, not at all. In fact, we accept that.

CHAIRPERSON: Is it possible for us to finish another matter that would have taken an hour or so?

MR VISSER: There is one matter, the matter of Naledi in which there is only one applicant, Brig Loots.

If you don't mind, Chairperson, to interpose that matter, we could deal with that matter now. I am not sure what the position with victims and so on is.

CHAIRPERSON: What is the possibility, Mr Steenkamp?

ADV STEENKAMP: Chairperson, Adv Makhubele was here earlier today and she will be appearing for one of the victims.

CHAIRPERSON: She is not here any more?

ADV STEENKAMP: Mr Chairman, I am sorry, no, she left a bit earlier, she was waiting to see what was going to happen with this matter, she was outside, doing consultations. I think she was under the impression that this matter would probably be rolled for tomorrow morning early.

CHAIRPERSON: There is no other matter involving any of the applicants present, where there are no victims?

ADV STEENKAMP: Mr Chairman, there is the position of the Mnisi matter. I just need some confirmation quickly, it will take me a minute probably or two. Certain of the applicants are here present, but I think there are two of them who are not present here.

I had already just briefly mentioned to Mr Wagener, but that matter can surely be rolled, I just want to confirm whether or not we have received any feedback from our notices, then we can proceed.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, there is no other matter, except Naledi with which we, that is the short answer, with which we can proceed now.

CHAIRPERSON: Well, then I suppose we've got no choice then, if we are not able to proceed with the matter. We will adjourn till tomorrow, half past nine, but I would like to see the representatives in chambers now.