--------------------------------------------------------------------------MR VISSER: Morning Mr Chairman, Members of the Committee. Chairperson, we are going to call Mr Anton Pretorius. He's available, and he has no objection to taking the prescribed oath. He prefers to address you in Afrikaans.

ANTON PRETORIUS: (sworn states)

CHAIRPERSON: Please be seated.

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Pretorius, you are also an applicant in this application.

MR PRETORIUS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And you request amnesty for offence or delict committed by, with regard to the Botswana Raid of 14 June 1985, is that correct?

MR PRETORIUS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You have timeously handed up an application form that appears in bundle 1, from page 204, do you confirm the contents of that statement as true and correct to the best of your knowledge?

MR PRETORIUS: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Subject to your evidence which you will render today.

MR PRETORIUS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You have studied Exhibit A, the General Background to Amnesty Applications.

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, I have.

MR VISSER: Is there any part of it which you cannot confirm?

MR PRETORIUS: No, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Do you then request that those parts mutatis mutandis be applicable and incorporated with your evidence?

MR PRETORIUS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You deal with this incident in your amnesty application in bundle 1, from page 213, under the heading:

MR PRETORIUS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: I want to ask you to briefly give the Committee a background. Please just tell us first, where were you working during 1985?

MR PRETORIUS: I was attached to the Intelligence Unit at the Soweto Security Branch, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And what was your rank?

MR PRETORIUS: At that stage I was a Lieutenant, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And who was your immediate Commander?

MR PRETORIUS: At that stage it was also Lieut Willem Coetzee, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And above him, who was the Commander?

MR PRETORIUS: I think at that stage, he was a Major at that stage, Major de Jager.

MR VISSER: And under whose general command did you stand?

MR PRETORIUS: That was the late Brig Muller.

MR VISSER: Can you briefly just tell the Committee how Soweto became involved in Botswana during that time.

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, Chairperson. Because of the Intelligence Unit's capacity to generate information surrounding the activities of the onslaught of the ANC, by MK, we were tasked in Soweto, we were tasked in Soweto to place agents and informers in Botswana and we had regular intelligence co-ordinating meetings which we attended at Western Transvaal.

MR VISSER: And what was the revolutionary climate like in 1985?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, at that stage in Soweto, there was a heavy onslaught, specifically with regard to handgrenade attacks. Handgrenade attacks were the order of the day in Soweto, during that time, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Were you successful with your informers and deep cover agents in Botswana?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, Chairperson. I think we succeeded in - if I may start with MK, MK Special Operations, MK Military Intelligence, we infiltrated all those agencies, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: With your application on page 213, you refer to, amongst others, certain names.

MR PRETORIUS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Who were those?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, as I said there, Tim Williams, Patrick Thomas Ricketts, Christian Lungile Pepane, MK Jeff, Riaz Saloojee, alias MK Calvin Khan. Then I have some other additions here.

MR VISSER: Yes, we will get to the other persons who were involved, Mr Pretorius. Will you please briefly tell the Committee, Tim Williams, what was his involvement?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, he was highly active MK Military Intelligence operative in Botswana.

MR VISSER: Was he a target of format for you in the Security Branch, in the sense of someone whom you monitored and whom you watched all the time?

MR PRETORIUS: That's correct, Chairperson, he was a high priority person.

MR VISSER: And Ricketts?

MR PRETORIUS: Patrick Thomas Ricketts ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: When was he described as a high priority?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, if I may answer you, I cannot recall the exact year, but I want to say this was already months before this specific incident. Tim Williams, as well as Patrick Thomas Ricketts and the following person that I mentioned, were high priority, because Ricketts occupied a reasonably senior position in MK in Botswana.

CHAIRPERSON: Was this one of the persons that were killed?

MR PRETORIUS: No, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: So why are we discussing his details?

MR VISSER: Chairperson, you will hear evidence from this witness that they presented their information to the South African Defence Force, and at the end of the day you will see that not all the targets who were affected in this raid, came from the present applicants before you, they must have come from somewhere else, and some of the targets that were mentioned by them, were not affected. And ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I thought that would have been common cause by now. I don't know, Mr Berger. That was always our understanding that what Loots and Steyn had was information from various quarters.

MR BERGER: Chairperson, I'm not sure that that's what Mr Visser is saying.

MR VISSER: Sorry, I didn't hear you.

MR BERGER: No, the Chairperson is saying that Loots and Steyn had information on targets from various quarters, and my understanding is that their target list was a comprehensive target list, but now I think what Mr Visser is saying is that in relation to Soweto, perhaps their targets were different, I'm not sure.

MR VISSER: Well Chairperson, for example, Tim Williams is mentioned in the book of Stiff, as having been a target and we just thought that it wouldn't have hurt for you to get some background as to where it came from.

CHAIRPERSON: It hurts if it's irrelevant. If it's relevant, it's okay.

MR VISSER: It was target one, Bravo, ANC safehouse in Tlokweng, Gaberone East, where Tim Williams had a lucky escape. And that was a target of the SADF, according to ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I think Tim Williams is on the list here, but I'm talking about Ricketts. Tim Williams is number 20 on the list. I don't know how Ricketts fits in here. If you in your judgement think it's necessary, well ...

MR VISSER: Let us then continue, Mr Pretorius.

You confirm in any case your whole statement as part of your evidence.

MR PRETORIUS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Is it the case, and you've already referred to it, that you attended various co-ordinating meetings in Western Transvaal, or with the Western Transvaal Security Branch, is that correct?

MR PRETORIUS: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Was there anything mentioned at any stage about an attack at any of these meetings?

MR PRETORIUS: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Firstly, can you recall when this took place, that this possibility was mentioned?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, if my memory does not fail me, approximately a month before the incident, during a co-ordinating meeting, the possibility of an action against the ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, was this the same meeting that the others ...

MR VISSER: Chairperson, we're talking about a meeting in Western Transvaal ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: You don't have to get upset, I'm just asking, is it the same meeting or not?

MR VISSER: I'm not getting upset, Chairperson. And really, Chairperson, I would like to present the evidence in a comprehensive and reasonable fashion to you, and I'm sorry if you think that this signifies aggression, because it doesn't, it doesn't Chairperson, but there's some background which we believe is necessary for you to know about and we're trying to do this as briefly as we can. If you will bear with us. We won't waste time.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(no microphone) Mr Visser, is not to introduce irrelevant things. That's all I'm saying this morning.

MR VISSER: Mr Pretorius, you said a possibility of an attack was mentioned at a meeting in the Western Transvaal.

MR PRETORIUS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Was it then discussed as to who would launch the attack?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, what I can recall at that meeting, a decision was taking that the option to execute such an attack would be taken to Security Head Office and Military Head Office, in order to get approval whether they can continue with it and how they should go about it and plan it and so forth.

MR VISSER: And do you agree with the evidence of the previous witnesses that said that the Western Transvaal Security Branch was actually the co-ordinator of information with regard to Botswana?

MR PRETORIUS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Was a request directed to you and Coetzee during this meeting?

MR PRETORIUS: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: To do what?

MR PRETORIUS: We had to continue collecting information about high priority activities, persons with whom we were involved in.

MR VISSER: And to give that information through?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes correct, Chairperson, and directly send it to Western Transvaal, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: What happened afterwards, was there anything that happened afterwards?

MR MALAN: Just before you continue. The expression "first copies sent to Western Transvaal", does that mean other copies went to Head Office?

MR PRETORIUS: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Did you send other copies elsewhere?

MR PRETORIUS: If I may explain Chairperson, let us say that we had information saying that Mr Tim Williams came from Johannesburg, that is where he was registered, then a copy would be sent to Johannesburg as well. So that would have been the third copy, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Or the second copy.

MR PRETORIUS: Or the second copy.

MR MALAN: Yes but it's Head Office co-ordination and other interested areas?

MR PRETORIUS: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Thank you.

MR VISSER: You were at the point of telling us that after a meeting had taken place, how it came about.

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, Col de Jager who was the overhead Intelligence Commander, tasked Col Coetzee and myself, as I've said he was also a Lieutenant at that stage, to accompany him to Special Operations Head Office in Pretoria, for a meeting Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Can you recall who was present at this meeting?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, Chairperson. Before I mention the names, can I just tell you that three-quarters of the persons present were military staff, they were from the Navy, the Air Force and the Army itself, Chairperson. And then from the police's side that I can recall, was Gen Steyn, Mr Loots, Maj Craig Williams was present at that meeting and as I've said, it was myself, Col de Jager and Col Coetzee.

MR VISSER: And then various people from, I said from the Defence Force, I should have actually said the Army.

MR PRETORIUS: That's correct.

MR VISSER: Were there any senior officers from the Army there?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes Chairperson, the Commander, Gen Kat Liebenberg. Shortly after the Soweto people came there, he walked into the meeting and he was the most senior officer during the meeting, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: In order to eliminate any confusion, did you ever attend a meeting at Wachthuis, at Security Head Office, with regard to this incident?

MR PRETORIUS: Never, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: So you were not present at the meeting that Gen Steyn testified about?

MR PRETORIUS: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: What were you informed about at this meeting?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, if I can inform you briefly what I saw during this conference, right in front there were these tremendously large boards on which easily - I think in my application I made note of about 30 targets that had already been placed on boards. These were charts with photos of houses and there were photos of persons, individuals that were known to me, that were connected with lines to the houses. There were photos of vehicles and everything. So in other words, it was clear to me that we walked into a presentation, the Army was ready to give a presentation.

MR VISSER: Was it your impression that information had been collected beforehand and that the Army was at the ready to act against targets?

MR PRETORIUS: That's correct, Chairperson, everything was there on the board.

MR VISSER: And were you also told the day at the meeting that such an operation was being considered?

MR PRETORIUS: That's correct, Chairperson. I cannot recall the Defence Force officer who stood in front, he informed everyone there that the purpose of the presentation was to discuss the targets on the board and the Commanding General was to give final clearance as whether they can continue with the operation and whether the targets on the board would be attacked.

MR VISSER: Was there any talk of authorisation from higher up, in that meeting?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, if I recall correctly, the person who did the presentation there said and mentioned that Gen Kat Liebenberg had to go after this meeting and get final approval from higher up for the final approval of the operation.

MR VISSER: Can you try and assist the Committee with regard to more-or-less when this meeting took place at Special Operations Head Office?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, I'm sure it was not sooner than two weeks, but this was about two and a half weeks when this meeting took place.

MR VISSER: Would you also agree with the estimation of other applicants that it was about between two and three weeks before?

MR PRETORIUS: That sounds right to me, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Chairperson, perhaps I'm getting confused, but this witness has just said that he wasn't present at the meeting that Mr Steyn and Loots spoke about two to three weeks before the attack, so I don't know how he can confirm their estimation. Perhaps I missed something in my understanding.

MR PRETORIUS: This was the meeting at Special Operations Head Office. I think the meeting that Mr Steyn and Mr Loots referred to was at Security Head Office. I am referring to the one at Special Forces Head Office.

INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone is not on, Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct)

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, if I may guess, following on the evidence that I have here and that was led here, it would sound as if this meeting was the one after Gen Steyn and Mr Loots were at Security Head Office, but I cannot confirm it. But it sounds as if this meeting was after that meeting.

MR VISSER: But your recollection is that it was two to two and a half weeks afterwards?

MR PRETORIUS: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Who did the target presentation at that meeting?

MR PRETORIUS: As I've already said, Chairperson, this was an Army officer.

MR VISSER: And of this large amounts of targets, what was the decision with regard to this number of targets?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, it is here where I heard for the first time when Gen Kat Liebenberg requested and asked of all the Intelligence officers, which included myself and Soweto staff, he wanted to know which of the targets there on the board were children and women who were not military trained, whether there were children and women who were not military trained at those houses. That was the first.

Let us say they started with number 30 and worked back and they wanted to know from each and every one, was there a woman who was not military trained or who had any direct contact with any military activities and if there were children and if an Intelligence officer put up his hand and said that there were children there, then this target would immediately be removed from the target list. And then there were targets that were removed because of their geographical location.

I can tell you that there was a deep underground MK facility in Mogoditsane that Gen Liebenberg immediately removed because of the distance from Gaberone, they said no, they would not be able to address that target. And then there were definitely at least two targets in Francistown that was higher up, that they also removed immediately because of the distance from Gaberone.

MR VISSER: During that meeting, can you recall how many targets remained?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, in my application I said that I can recall when I left there I mentioned the number, 12, that I can recall.

MR VISSER: What did these targets comprise of?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, the targets cantered around facilities, let us call it the primary targets were the facilities and then connected to the facility was the relevant MK Military Intelligence and Special Operations. Members who were connected to these houses. And the third was the availability of possible documentation or literature in the houses. The fourth point was vehicles and the last one - I don't want to say that that's the sequence, except for the facility. The fifth was possible arms and ammunition at this specific facility.

MR VISSER: What did you leave with at that meeting, did you leave there with further instructions or further requests? What were you supposed to do when you left that meeting?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, the last thing that we were told, that the officers said there, was that officers of the Army would contact certain of us concerning the remaining number of targets because they needed - what I did know they were very interested in was the infrastructure of the inside of the house, was it a one-bedroom, two-bedroom house, was there a bathroom.

The location of certain of these facilities they were not hundred percent sure and it was told to us that certain Intelligence officers would liaise with us and then we would have to assist them with whatever they requested.

MR VISSER: And did you also have to collect on a continual basis?

MR PRETORIUS: And that included that, Chairperson, a requested was directed at everyone to attempt to convey the fresh intelligence with regard to that facility where it was humanly possible.

MR VISSER: The three of you then went back to Soweto, what did you do then?

MR PRETORIUS: Following on this request, Chairperson, I can recall three occasions where Intelligence Officers contacted me. In the one instance I recall that he showed me a set of aerial photos of a facility, where I had to show the photos to the agent and the informer, where he had to indicate which house it was. And then they brought photos of a person, one photo I can recall quite clearly is the one of Riaz Saloojee that I can recall.

I could recall where his vehicle was parked and where the agents identified Riaz Saloojee. And as I've said, there was various other information they wanted: was it a brick house, was the colour of the house blue or pink, and so forth. That was the typical information that was collected during the following week, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: So we can say it was more strategic operational information.

MR PRETORIUS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: What did you and your agents and informers do after this meeting?

MR PRETORIUS: From my side, Chairperson, as well as from Mr Coetzee's side, our agents, informers were possible, they still moved in and out of Botswana and the longest that they could stay inside was from the Friday evening till the Sunday night, maybe Monday morning. We would send them in to certain of these facilities, to go and determine whether certain subjects were still there, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Now in your application you mention a further meeting at Western Transvaal, where further information was given to you.

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, Chairperson. I know you will ask me the time, I would say this is approximately a week before the physical attack. I was delegated by Mr de Jager to go to Western Transvaal, to Mr Loots and Mr Steyn, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: What happened there?

MR PRETORIUS: Except for the intelligence co-ordination that took place there, Mr Steyn and Mr Loots told me that the operation was authorised and the codename for the operation was "Plexy", Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Operation by whom?

MR PRETORIUS: By the Defence Force, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And were you told who authorised it?

MR PRETORIUS: That it came from the top, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: What did you do afterwards?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, I immediately went back to my base after the meeting, where I informed Mr de Jager and Coetzee that the operation was approved and that it would take place.

MR VISSER: And what happened then?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, during that same time, Commandant Charl Naude from Special Forces contacted me personally and asked me whether he could not use a person that would be able to point out one of the targets to the military operatives during the operation, because they had a problem with the identification, they could not find the house. I then said that I would have to clear this up with Col de Jager, because I do not have the authority to do something like that. I cleared it up with Col de Jager and he said fine I can send a person because he was not a member of the Force ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: Who was that?

MR PRETORIUS: That was Sgt Manuel Olifant.

MR VISSER: He's also an applicant?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, he's also an applicant, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: What happened to him then?

MR MALAN: Before you continue, you say he was not a member of the Force then, what was he then?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, he was an R contract worker, he was in-between an informer and a policeman, if I can try and explain it to you in layman's terms. He worked for the police, but he was not a police officer.

INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone is not on.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct)

JUDGE MOTATA: Was he on your books?

MR PRETORIUS: He was on our books, Chairperson. As I say, officially there was a contract signed with him, he received a monthly salary and so forth, but he was not a member of the Force.

MR VISSER: Is it then so that this type of person you referred to was actually earmarked to become a Constable later?

MR PRETORIUS: That's correct.

MR VISSER: And did Mr Olifant join the Force later?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, that is correct.

MR VISSER: But was this after the 14th of June?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, that was after the 14th of June. Chairperson, when I called Commandant Charl Naude back and told him it was fine we had a person that would be able to point out that house, he gave me instructions to take Mr Olifant, I think it was the next day, to take him to Hammanskraal. I see here they refer to 44 Parachute Battalion, in Mr Stiff's book. I had to take him there. I drove Mr Olifant there. I just dropped him off there. They did not want me to be present and I came back to Soweto, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: So Mr Olifant can tell the Committee what happened afterwards to him. Now if we can get to the 13th of June 1985, where were you then, what were your instructions?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, because of Mr Olifant's involvement in the entry into Botswana and then from Soweto we asked to be present because we wanted to look after Mr Olifant's interests, and we received permission to join at Nietverdiendt at tactical headquarters.

MR VISSER: Now with regard to Mr Olifant, the final aspect, it was decided that he would accompany the Defence Force into Botswana.

MR PRETORIUS: That's correct.

MR VISSER: Under whose command would he have acted if he went into Botswana?

MR PRETORIUS: Under the Defence Force's command.

MR VISSER: And you say that you went to Nietverdiendt then.

MR PRETORIUS: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Who accompanied you?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, it was myself, Col de Jager, Col Coetzee and today, Col Jan Meyer.

MR VISSER: And there are all other applicants here?

MR PRETORIUS: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And at Nietverdiendt, were you allowed in the operational centre? What was the position?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, I may only mention that we were told that we should not arrive early at tactical headquarters because they did not want to attract any attention, because this tactical headquarters was quite close to the tar road.

If I should guess, we arrived about half an hour before sundown at Nietverdiendt. We went into this large hall where they had set up a tactical operational room, where Commandant Hills, I think he was a Commandant at that stage, he was very strict, he immediately removed us from tactical operational room. He did not want to have anyone other than his staff there and a person like Gen Steyn and Mr Loots. So we were told that we could not be inside tactical headquarters, or the operational room.

MR VISSER: So you were not allowed in there?

MR PRETORIUS: No, we were not.

MR VISSER: This tactical headquarters or operational centre, was this in contact with the operatives that went into Botswana?

MR PRETORIUS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: How did they have that contact?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, how I know about it is ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: No, what type of contact was it?

MR PRETORIUS: It was radio contact, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Did you listen to any radio communication while the attack was ongoing?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Between the operatives and operational headquarters?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And could you hear what they were telling each other?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Were instructions given from time to time from the operational room?

MR PRETORIUS: What was noticeable, just for your information Chairperson, was that the messages that came from Botswana to tactical headquarters and then went out from tactical headquarters to the operatives on the ground was all in code. In other words, it was not: "we stopped before house number so and so." There I came to the conclusion that each independent team used certain code words to explain certain actions, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And you then went into Botswana and we know there was an attack, and the people came back, is that not so?

MR PRETORIUS: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: If I may just diverge here by asking you, or maybe perhaps I should complete this part of your evidence. After the return of the people, what happened then?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, after the whole attack ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: After the attack, where did you go to?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, I was instructed by Col de Jager, on request of Gen Steyn, that we had to fly back per helicopter by the team leaders of the Defence Force.

MR VISSER: And what happened then?

MR PRETORIUS: Then each team leader or the sections came with a plastic bag, the things with numbered, these were all the things they found in the houses and then team leader 1 would then go and place his contents of his bags at number 1, and that's how they continued, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Were there documents?

MR PRETORIUS: There were many documents there, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Anything else?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, I can recall that at one of the specific targets there were handgrenades, F1 defensive handgrenades, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And you say each section leader brought his loot, so to say, there. Can you recall if some of the senior staff members from the Security Branch were present there?

MR PRETORIUS: That is correct, Chairperson, when we arrived there, Gen Herman Stadler and Maj Craig Williamson were there already there at Special Forces Headquarters.

MR VISSER: And what did you infer, what was their purpose there?

MR PRETORIUS: Sir, amongst others I knew that shortly after the arrival of the teams they prepared for a press

release and it was at that stage when Mr Coetzee and I were very tired and we said that we would withdraw because we did not see any purpose of us being there.

MR VISSER: So that in general deals with the part of the attack and your part therein. Just by the way, after the operation of the 14th of June, was there communication between yourself and Mr Coetzee and certain deep cover agents in Botswana?

MR PRETORIUS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Who were those persons?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, the first was RS282, his name was Freddie Baloyi and then ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: I beg your pardon. Freddie who?

MR PRETORIUS: Freddie Baloyi. And then RS276 ..(intervention)

MR VISSER: Just before you continue, was he a Constable?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, he was a Constable, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And he was infiltrated or penetrated into these MK structures, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: That was RS282?

MR PRETORIUS: RS276, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Who was he?

MR PRETORIUS: Isaac Mazibuku.

MR VISSER: Was he a Constable?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, he was a Constable, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And was he also penetrated?

MR PRETORIUS: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Or he penetrated.

MR PRETORIUS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And what else?

MR PRETORIUS: There was a lady, she was R103, she was also a contract worker Chairperson, and then a Cecilia Maake.

MR VISSER: And was she a Constable?

MR PRETORIUS: No, she was a contract worker like Mr Olifant, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And was there then contact with these three persons after the attack?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: What was the content of this contact?

MR PRETORIUS: Amongst others, these three gave us information that the MK and ANC Special Operations and MK Military Intelligence was in total chaos and that they were fleeing in all earnest, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Where did they have to go?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, Mr Coetzee would be able to tell you about Mazibuku and Maake. I can testify about Baloyi, Baloyi was the person who, amongst others, was connected with Tim Williams. He gave me feedback that his situation was very positive, that Tim Williams did not suspect him at all. As well as Christian Numgile Pepane, alias Jeff, also did not suspect him and that they wanted to take him along to Zambia and he actually asked me what was the status quo, what was he supposed to do, did he have to come back to South Africa or was he supposed to accompany them.

MR VISSER: And what did you tell him then?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, I told him he's at ground level, he can read the situation, he would have to give me an indication and he was satisfied, Chairperson, that the situation was of such a nature that he believed that he was not suspected and that he would go along with Tim Williams and company to Zambia.

MR VISSER: Did you later receive information with regard to what happened to him?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, Chairperson, Freddie Williams - Freddie Baloyi, Chairperson, was immediately shot dead upon his arrival on Lusaka, Zambia.

MR VISSER: Where did you receive that information?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, we had many other agents that monitored and infiltrated the ANC up to the highest level, firstly. Secondly, we had people who in this cleaning up situation of the ANC, were taken hostage and were held at Quatro, who gave us this information, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Can we just speak about targets. Mr Pretorius, did you supply information to the Army for the purposes of their use for this attack in Botswana?

MR PRETORIUS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Was that also the position with regard to Mr Coetzee, under the command of De Jager?

MR PRETORIUS: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Will you please study Exhibit B. This is an extract from the statement of the ANC to the TRC, dated August 1996. On page 93 certain names were indicated, I will just read them to you and then you must just firstly please give the Committee an indication whether you know something about this person. If you say no, then we can discuss later what you know about him. Number 2 ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: I beg your pardon, Mr Visser, give me a reference where you are now.

MR VISSER: It's Exhibit B, it's the extract and it's page 93 thereof, the left-hand top column, Chairperson. Number 2: Geer Achmed Mohammed?

MR PRETORIUS: Never heard about him, Chairperson, only after the attack I became aware of his name, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Number 3: Hamlyn?

MR PRETORIUS: Michael Hamlyn, I also heard of him after the attack, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And then number 4: Kelape, Kesopile Gladys Kelape?

MR PRETORIUS: Never heard of that one, Chairperson, only after the attack.

MR VISSER: Number 5: Kobole Euginia Kakale?

MR PRETORIUS: Also only after the attack, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Number 6: Themba Duke Machobane?

MR PRETORIUS: I've heard about Duke Machobane, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Was he one of the persons that you monitored?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, Duke Machobane was not a subject of Soweto, but during my service period I saw many intelligence reports on Duke Machobane with regard to his connections in MK and so forth.

CHAIRPERSON: But you, did you give any information about Duke Machobane?

MR PRETORIUS: Never, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And then if we could go to number 10: Mofoka, Peter Mohelo?

MR PRETORIUS: Never, Chairperson, only after the attack I heard about this person's name.

MR VISSER: And then if we could go to number 14: Mnyele?

MR PRETORIUS: I knew him very well, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Can you tell us what you knew about him.

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, I know that Mr Mnyele - if I can go as far back as 1979, he fled from Tembisa in 1979, if I recall correctly, Chairperson. He was officially declared and registered as a refugee, where his photo appeared in the terrorist photo album and after that time various reports were generated from various divisions regarding Mr Mnyele's involvement with MK, with the ANC.

But what was prominent with regard to Mr Mnyele, was that his wife Rona Segale, was a highly trained MK operative who had various agents, who had trained various agents and given them crash courses and supplied them with arms and ammunition. As it served before the Committee, it was well known that Mr Mnyele was a very good artist, but I can assure you that Mr Mnyele used his artwork in Botswana as a cover to operate in Botswana. That is so, everybody knew him as the artist. As I have already said that he was a very good artist, but that was his cover. He was involved in these underground structures. He was extremely involved in SACTU, South African Congress of Trade Unions and so forth, and so forth.

MR VISSER: Was he a subject that was monitored by you?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, I wish to say that he was a secondary subject, his wife was the primary subject, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And if you say that Rona Segale trained agents, to which agents do you refer?

MR PRETORIUS: Amongst others, Chairperson, RS282 and RS276, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Received military training from her?

MR PRETORIUS: She gave them military training crash courses. The agents were present where other persons from South Africa received crash courses. Arms were supplied to RS282.

MR VISSER: Number 15: Mtsweni, Dick?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, this was a person that I also knew about. I did not personally work on the late Mr Mtsweni, but I do have knowledge of his involvement, because if intelligence notes which were available to me.

CHAIRPERSON: But you yourself did not have firsthand knowledge?

MR PRETORIUS: No.

CHAIRPERSON: And you were not able to give information about Mtsweni.

MR PRETORIUS: No, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Did you have and convey information to Special Forces about Harry Mnyele and Rona?

MR PRETORIUS: That's correct, Chairperson. If I can just get some clarity here, I think that was the house about which Mr Olifant will testify, that he could not find with the identification. That was the house where Rona Segale lived. That was one of the specific targets that I know that they could not find.

MR VISSER: One of those that was abandoned?

MR PRETORIUS: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Can we then go to number 17, a person by the name of Pahle, Cecil George.

MR PRETORIUS: That is correct, Chairperson. I once again wish to say that this was a person that I have seen many intelligence notes about, and I can recall that Mr Coetzee and I, once or twice, maximum five times, we supplied information about Mr Pahle to Western Transvaal, but I cannot recall - but it was coincidental information, where our agents or informers met with Mr Pahle at other subjects that we were busy with, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Do I understand you correctly, you were not in a position to, during this operation, to give information with regard to him in this operation?

MR PRETORIUS: That's correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

MR PRETORIUS: No, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Number 18: Lindi Pahle?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, once again I had knowledge of her, but I did not generate information about her.

MR VISSER: And then the last person on that list, number 20: Basil Amos Zondi?

MR PRETORIUS: I do not know that person either, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Tim Williams, Mr Berger, is he deceased?

MR BERGER: No, Tim Williams is not dead, he's very much alive.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct - no microphone)

MR BERGER: Well I don't act for him, I don't represent him.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, he's a Commissioner. I think he is one of the four Generals in Pretoria, Commissioner Tim Williams. In the police. I think he's number 4.

INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone is not on.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible) You spoke about him?

MR PRETORIUS: Correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: I would just want to know, did you say anything about him with regard to this incident?

MR PRETORIUS: Well I mentioned him in my report, Chairperson. I think he's first.

CHAIRPERSON: But was he a target"

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, he was.

CHAIRPERSON: Was he attacked?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes Chairperson, I see in the book of Peter Stiff, he says that he was the person who barely

escaped with his life.

CHAIRPERSON: Well except for what this man says in his book, was he a target? Was he attacked?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, Chairperson, he was attacked.

MR VISSER: To state it more correctly Chairperson, he was not in the house that was attacked. At that stage when the house was attacked, he wasn't there. But the house in which he was expected was a target and was attacked.

What were the primary targets, as you inferred it from the Defence Force?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, as I've already said ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: I beg your pardon, you've already said that.

MR PRETORIUS: ... facilities connected to priority suspects.

MR VISSER: It was stated here concerning Mr Hamlyn, that he stayed in Mr Marius Schoon's house, in which Schoon and his family had previously lived. Have you any knowledge about that?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, it sounds to me correct that it was the same house, unfortunately I cannot recall the street address, but the house that was struck was because of a person that lived there Urial Abrahams who lived there, a highly active MK person, Urial Abrahams.

MR VISSER: Was this someone with regard to whom you supplied information?

MR PRETORIUS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And was there somebody else who also lived in that house?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, that's correct, that was the lady, I think Mr Loots referred to her. She was Muff Anderson, she was a reasonably senior person with MK Military Intelligence. Muff Anderson, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And Chairperson, she was also not present at the time when the attack was launched, she was in fact under arrest by the Botswana Police at that time, for possession of weapons or something. It's at page 81 of volume 2.

CHAIRPERSON: Of course South African Military didn't know that at the time?

MR VISSER: Apparently not.

CHAIRPERSON: Lucky for the Botswana prison.

MR VISSER: You have now told us, Mr Pretorius of what your part was before the time. The information that you supplied and the updating of information, did you know that this would be used by the Army for purposes of an attack in Botswana, in which persons would be killed and/or injured?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes.

MR VISSER: And in which buildings would be destroyed or damaged?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Did you also realise that it was possible that innocent persons could be caught in the cross-fire?

MR PRETORIUS: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Did you reconcile yourself with this information?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Afterwards was there any reflection?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, yes.

MR VISSER: I'm not referring to the documents at Special Forces Headquarters, I refer to reflection in general.

MR PRETORIUS: No, there was no general debriefing meeting that I attended, but once again Special Forces gave us copies of photos of certain of the deceased persons that we had to try to identify, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And did you do this then?

MR PRETORIUS: I think I can recall that we could positively identify Mr Mnyele.

MR VISSER: And according to your perception, did the Army there attack so-called innocent targets?

MR PRETORIUS: No, Chairperson, these were facilities that were used by MK Special Operations, MK Military Intelligence. Over a time period of months, they used these facilities for multiple activities.

MR VISSER: And did these facilities appear in security reports that you had studied during that time?

MR PRETORIUS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: I beg your pardon, is this applicable to all of the targets?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Did you got through then one by one?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, the targets that were on the board there ..(intervention)

MR MALAN: No, you misunderstand me. My question is, the targets that were struck, were they all used? Not that were identified.

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And you are satisfied from your own knowledge, that that was so.

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Is it also so that - I think that's self-explanatory from your evidence, but there were other instances that also collected information in Botswana.

MR PRETORIUS: That's correct.

MR VISSER: Who were they?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, in the Army it was Special Forces, they had their own Intelligence Officers and operatives there and then it was DCI, Directorate of Covert Intelligence. They collected intelligence. Then there was the normal intelligence legs that gave their inputs, Chairperson. Then there was National Intelligence, their people also collected information, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And were the targets put together from all the information, according to you?

MR PRETORIUS: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: After the attack that night, while you were at Nietverdiendt and the people came back, did Mr Olifant report to you there?

MR PRETORIUS: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Can you recall today - if you cannot, please indicate so, what did he say?

MR PRETORIUS: What I can recall what he told me was that they could not find the target that he was supposed to identify and that there was chaos in Gaberone itself when the shooting ensued and that some of the military persons at whose section he was, was in contact with people or with vehicles ... (interven-tion)

MR VISSER: What do mean by "in contact"?

MR PRETORIUS: That they had to shoot people or shoot at people who were a threat to them or something. I think there was one specific instance of a vehicle that drove away and some of the Army people shot at this vehicle.

MR VISSER: Was this in essence what he told you?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Chairperson, I believe that is all that I wish present from this witness.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR COETSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr Pretorius, just to assist in clarifying certain aspects, my instructions are, and the evidence reveals that Mr Olifant, before he came to Soweto and fell under your control, in essence, was a Koevoet operative in South West Africa.

MR PRETORIUS: Correct, Chairperson.

MR COETSER: And he, together with a number of these operatives, were transferred to Soweto, under your control. Or your unit's control, to put it that way.

MR PRETORIUS: That's correct.

MR COETSER: I understand that they had the status of so-called Special Constables up there in South West, effectively also under contract to the South African Police Services.

MR PRETORIUS: Correct, Chairperson.

MR COETSER: Is it also correct that with the transfer, these individuals' transfer to your unit, there was a process that was followed whereby they were initially informants and they were required to be assessed for the purposes of determining ultimately, whether they were suitable to become fully-fledged members of the South African Police Services.

MR PRETORIUS: Correct, Chairperson.

MR COETSER: And at the stage of this raid and the months leading up to it, Mr Olifant and some others status had been improved in this evaluation from simply been paid informers, to actually being contracted to the South African Police Serves as permanent employees in the form of so-called agents.

MR PRETORIUS: Correct, Chairperson.

MR COETSER: If I understand the situation correctly, also to a large extent their task as these contract employees, was to do observational work for you in relation to the activities of the ANC, PAC, etcetera.

MR PRETORIUS: Correct.

MR COETSER: They were also used on various operations as well, conducted by the police.

MR PRETORIUS: That's correct.

MR COETSER: Okay. And I take it that these particular individuals were useful also from the point of view that they had had combat experience.

MR PRETORIUS: Definitely, Chairperson.

MR COETSER: Given the fact that Mr Olifant had combat experience before, was that one of the reason why he was considered to be a suitable choice to accompany the military on this particular raid?

MR PRETORIUS: I do not want to say that that was the primary motivation, Chairperson, if my memory serves me correctly, then Mr Olifant at that stage was already aware of the location of that specific house.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Pretorius, was Mr Olifant paid for what he did?

MR PRETORIUS: He received a monthly salary, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: But to do that work?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: That was his work?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: He wasn't a policeman?

MR PRETORIUS: No, each and every month he received a pre-determined salary according to his contract, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: To do this specific type of work?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, if I might be of assistance, I think Mr Coetzee refers - or Olifant himself refers to the fact that he was paid. It will be confirmed by Coetzee.

MR COETSER: I'd just like to clarify one aspect of that. Insofar as these monthly payments are concerned, were these particular contracted agents paid cash on a monthly basis?

MR PRETORIUS: Correct, Chairperson, we paid them in cash.

MR COETSER: Then just another aspect, just to clarify things ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: I beg your pardon, this may become important later. You say you paid them in cash but you also said that he had a contract and if I understand you correctly, as a permanent member of the Force.

MR PRETORIUS: Maybe I expressed myself incorrectly there, Chairperson, but what I meant was that, in other words, let us say that he was supposed to receive R1 000, I could not only give him R900, because then that would be a breach of contract. So what I mean is that he received a set salary each month.

MR MALAN: But you also referred to him as registered, he was registered with you, there was no central register.

MR PRETORIUS: No, he was registered at Security Head Office. This person had to be registered under contract.

MR MALAN: But he would not have been on any salary roll?

MR PRETORIUS: No, Chairperson, he was paid from the Secret Fund.

MR MALAN: My question is, did you see him as a member of the Force, or did you see him as someone who had a contract with the Force?

MR PRETORIUS: Well this is in-between ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I think we want to confirm this, he wasn't a policeman.

MR PRETORIUS: But I handled him as if he was a police officer.

CHAIRPERSON: But he was not a police officer, he was not in the Force and he was contractually paid for what he did.

MR PRETORIUS: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR COETSER: Just one last aspect on this issue. At the time of this particular raid, we know he was under contract, was a process at that time underway for the purposes of in fact incorporating him into the South African Police Serves, as a fully-fledged policeman?

MR PRETORIUS: Correct, Chairperson.

MR COETSER: And he was eventually thereafter appointed as a Constable.

MR PRETORIUS: Correct, Chairperson.

MR COETSER: And Mr Olifant was aware at the time of the raid that this process to have his permanent appointment as a Constable in the South African Police Serves, was under way.

MR PRETORIUS: I think he was very aware of it, Chairperson.

MR COETSER: Moving on, if one has a look at Mr Olifant's statements attached to his application, what he indicates is that it was a Lieut Coetzee that approached him closer to the time of the raid and simply asked him if he could still remember the houses in Botswana that he had observed, and he was then advised that he was going to be taken by yourself to the military, in order to join an operation into Botswana. In essence this is what he says, that was all he was really advised of at that time.

MR PRETORIUS: Correct, Chairperson.

MR COETSER: What I'd like to ask you in connection with this is, was the information provided to Mr Olifant by yourselves at that time, before and when you handed him over to the military, was the information given to him on a basically need-to-know basis?

MR PRETORIUS: Definitely, Chairperson.

MR COETSER: So he was only really advised as to the essence of what he needed to know at the time?

MR PRETORIUS: That's a hundred percent correct, Chairperson.

MR COETSER: Because my instructions from Mr Olifant are that eventually, for the purposes of the raid, the military asked him to point out - this is the day of the raid, we know it took place in the evening, but on that day, he was requested by the military to go and point out five houses in total, for verification purposes. Do you know anything about that?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, no, I do not know about that.

JUDGE MOTATA: If I may come in.

Did he mention when he made a report to you, after the return, that is after the raid, which houses he could not point out?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, he only indicated to me about the specific house that he had to go and identify, it was North-West from The Oasis Hotel, and he could not find the house, he could not lead the people to the house. That's the only thing that he said. He did not tell me whether he pointed out other houses, it's the first time I hear about this today.

JUDGE MOTATA: Thank you Mr Coetser, you may proceed.

MR COETSER: Were yourselves aware of exactly the role that the military intended to use Mr Olifant for, during the course of the raid? What were you told?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, if I recall Mr Naude's words when he told me over the telephone, he said that they had a problem identifying the specific house by means of existing information and aerial photos, and then they wanted to know if we have a person that we can send with the combat team, who would walk in front and identify this house, and I eventually said that yes, we have such a person, and that was Mr Olifant.

MR COETSER: So you understood that that was what his role was going to be?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, he had to go and identify the house for the combat team.

MR COETSER: Then just one other aspect. If one goes through Mr Olifant's two statements that were eventually provided in support of his application, in the one statement, if one reads the two statements together, he mentions two occasions prior to the raid when he went to Botswana under instruction to observe certain houses and the activities going on there. If one looks at page 24, I think it was, of the record, bundle 1, the first paragraph, he says:

and afterwards he came back and gave Willem Coetzee a briefing about what happened. Were you aware, can you remember that specific incident where he was sent to go and observe houses, based upon what Mapule Sekonyela had pointed out?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, if I may say, I think right from the start of 1985, we on a weekly basis, I think not a weekend passed ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: The question is, do you knowledge with regard.

MR PRETORIUS: To this specific incident, Mr Coetzee would be able to ...

CHAIRPERSON: So you don't know about it?

MR PRETORIUS: No, I do not want to say that I recall this specific one.

MR VISSER: My learned friend also asked another question, more than one question rolled into one, Chairperson, and that is that he was sent in twice into Botswana, and I think that's what the witness is trying to respond to.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

MR PRETORIUS: It sounds right, I don't have a problem with it, but I cannot - this specific incident, because I know there was more than one incident, not only two but there were definitely more than two movements by Mr Olifant.

MR MALAN: That you know of, but you cannot connect it to a date?

MR PRETORIUS: Unfortunately not.

MR MALAN: But you aware of it that he was sent in more than once by Coetzee.

MR PRETORIUS: That's correct, ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: Or by yourself.

MR PRETORIUS: Or by myself to go and undertake tactical reconnaissance ...(intervention)

INTERPRETER: The speaker's microphone.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

MR PRETORIUS: You're referring to this global attack?

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

MR PRETORIUS: No, we definitely did send him in.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible) before the incident. Do you have knowledge of this, can you confirm it? It's there in his affidavit, can you confirm it?

MR PRETORIUS: I do not want to confuse you, Chairperson, I beg your pardon if I am doing that. What I can recall is that from the time that we had the first meeting at Potchefstroom that I said was at least a month before the time, in that time, during that time I know that Olifant, let us say was sent in at least twice into Gaberone. I can confirm that but I cannot recall the dates. I do not know ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Well I don't know why the question was asked, but it's clear from what you've explained. Thank you.

MR COETSER: Just to finish off on this aspect. If one reads his other statement at page 17 of the record, bundle 1, paragraph 2 on page 17, or 1 and 2, he indicates on another occasion, this is prior to the raid as well, that he was instructed to enter Botswana in order to verify information provided to the Security Forces concerned. So he went in on another occasion specifically to verify certain information provided to or by, I'm not quite sure, the Security Forces, as such.

MR PRETORIUS: Correct.

MR COETSER: Just one last aspect, perhaps just as background history, I don't know, were you aware that prior to Mr Olifant being involved in Koevoet, he was also employed by the South African Police Services in the Rhodesian war? Did you know about that at all?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, I do not see the relevance, but what I can say is that I do not have proof of this but I heard stories that they were involved with Renamo, and immediately when one mentions Renamo, one mentions Rhodesia.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Coetser, what did you mean by "employed in Rhodesia"?

MR COETSER: I'm sorry?

CHAIRPERSON: What did you mean by the word "employed in Rhodesia"?

MR COETSER: Well employed in the broader sense of the word.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct - no microphone) the infamous Mr Hall?

MR COETSER: If it becomes relevant to go into Mr Olifant's background, military background history, ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: That's why I'm asking what did you mean, because you raised it. I want to understand it when it does become relevant.

MR COETSER: Well my instructions are that as a youngster, together with a great many others, he was under arrest by the South African Government for allegedly being an illegal immigrant. He emanated from a part of Natal very close to the Mozambican border and my instructions are that him, together with many others who were arrested there, were taken to Pretoria and thereafter whilst under arrest, were given the offer ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Do you intend to use that as psychological justification for his participation?

MR COETSER: Absolutely not, it's just a question of, it may be relevant to understand for certain reasons, I don't know where this man comes from and what his background history is. That's all.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Cornelius, have you got any questions?

MR CORNELIUS: For the record, Wim Cornelius for McPherson, I've got no questions, thank you Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Berger, can we start in 15 minutes time?

ANTON PRETORIUS: (s.u.o.)

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BERGER: Thank you, Chairperson.

Mr Pretorius, you say you've read annexure A, Exhibit A, "Algemene Agtergrond".

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Who wrote it?

MR PRETORIUS: It is the general background ...(intervention)

MR BERGER: No, I don't want you to go through it, I want to tell me who wrote it.

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, it is extracts from Gen Johan van der Merwe, amongst others, Brig Cronje. It was drawn up by our legal representatives, Mr Wagener and Mr Visser, next to me, to hand up. So it's a multiple of incidents, judgments, that are in this document.

MR BERGER: And how does that relate to you, to your specific application here today?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, I think the introduction of this document commences by explaining where the political motive emanated from, to at the end of the day, if I can refer to it as political indoctrination, how the red danger, the total onslaught that was directed at South Africa and so forth and so forth.

MR BERGER: As I understand your application in this case, you acted under orders.

MR PRETORIUS: Correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Okay. Now you've confirmed the contents of your application, particularly from pages 213, through to 222 of volume 1, is that correct?

MR PRETORIUS: Correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Okay. Now I want you to go to page 213, please. About two-thirds of the way down you say that you and Lieut-Col Coetzee, used your existing undercover agents to infiltrate the networks, the ANC networks in Botswana. Besides the three undercover agents that you referred to earlier, were there any others?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes many, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: How many were there?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, if I can estimate, I handled a number of 15 to 20 and I think Mr Coetzee had the same number. Unfortunately I cannot say it was 10 or 12, but it was quite a few.

MR BERGER: I'm not going to ask you to give the names of all of them but I'm going to ask you to try and be specific, because you say in the next paragraph, you say that these undercover agents managed to make contact with the following four MK members, and you list them, Tim Williams, Patrick Ricketts, Lungile Pepane and Riaz Saloojee.

MR PRETORIUS: Correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Now which of the undercover agents made contact with these four?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, maybe I should just explain. When I drew up this document I should have used the words "amongst others", these following persons, because there were more persons than just these four persons.

CHAIRPERSON: You misunderstand the question. The question is, who of your agents could have given information about these four persons?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, names that I've mentioned already were RS282 and there were then various others.

MR BERGER: Let's deal with them person by person. Tim Williams, who were the agents who were infiltrating Tim Williams?

MR VISSER ADDRESSES: Chairperson, if my learned friend wants to know the identities of the agents or informers, if that is what his question is about, then Chairperson, I'm going to object to that, for the sake of the safety and for the sake of, and on the basis of the rule in our laws that stands that unless there are certain exceptional circumstances, Chairperson, none of which are, incidentally, present here, the identity of informers must be protected. So Chairperson, with great respect, one fails to see the relevance of what the identity of the informer has to do with the merits of the application. In fact, I have noticed somewhere in the papers before you, that one or more of the family of the victims are very keen to find out who the informers are. Now that's not a basis, Chairperson, with respect.

CHAIRPERSON: I've always wondered about this you know, Mr Visser, we are busy with a very unusual process here and I raised the issue in my own mind and I want to raise it with you now that you've raised this. That in the quest to find out how my son died or how my father died, the process was intended to enlighten people precisely about that. And if it's going to be said that my father was killed because of certain information given by an informer, I would like to know how my father's killers came to that information and how they made that decision, because then it would be putting me in a better position to understand his death. I don't know, I'm not too sure whether our normal rules relating to informers would apply here because of the unusual process that we are busy with.

And like I said, I often wondered about this, because this is not the first time such questions are being objected to, but at the time before when it was objected to, it didn't seem to be relevant and therefore I upheld the objections. I really don't know what the question is asked for now.

MR VISSER: That's why I specifically made my point that I'm not sure in which direction we're moving, but if it is an issue of who the informers were, Chairperson, then I would submit to you, it takes the matter no further, one way or the other, from the applicants' point of view, from the Committee's point of view, or from the victims' point of view, as to who the person was, as long as they know it was a police informer. But if needs be, we can argue that Chairperson, I'm ready to argue it straight away, and to refer you to the authorities in this regard. And I would submit to you that there ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: That's an issue of ... (indistinct - no micro-phone) authorities.

MR VISSER: Oh, yes ... (indistinct - no microphone) Commis-sion of Inquiry.

CHAIRPERSON: Not only a Commission of Inquiry, this specific type of Commission of Inquiry. It's the first time it's held, I understand, in the world.

Mr Berger, what is your attitude here?

MR BERGER ADDRESSES: Chairperson first of all, Mr Pretorius through Mr Visser, opened the door and gave the names of three informers who are now dead, so we are told. That evidence must have been relevant, otherwise it wouldn't have been tendered in the place. Secondly, there's certain information which Mr Pretorius has put before this Committee, in regard to certain targets, people who were killed and people were not killed, but who were nevertheless targets. That information about what people were doing is, by definition, hearsay. The veracity of that evidence can only be tested if we know the identity of the person who passed on that information.

CHAIRPERSON: I understand where you're heading, but before you carry on any further, let me just raise this issue with you, perhaps if you need to deal with it, if you don't agree with my thinking, then please deal with it. That is information that was relied upon by the applicant, whether it was true or not, I'm not too sure that that is a point that's going to take the matter any further or not. If you don't accept that that is so, then please argue the matter, but if you are saying that you need to test the veracity of it, of the information, does it matter, because this witness has indicated that he relied on it? So whether the information that came to him upon which he relied, was the truth or not, is neither here nor there.

MR BERGER: Well Chairperson, how do we know what information this witness got? It's his say-so, there's no documentation, there's nothing to support him, other than his say-so. Now if we know the identity of the person who supposedly gave that information, we can question that person to find out whether that information was passed on in the first place. By questioning the veracity of that information, if that information turns out to be untrue, one can then pose the question, was that information passed on in the first place or not?

So it's not only the veracity of the information, but whether the information was passed on at all. If, for example, Tami Mnyele was not involved in MK activities and one of the informers supposedly infiltrated Tami Mnyele's circle, well we could ask that informer whether he got such information or whether she got such information and whether that information was passed on to Mr Pretorius. It has a direct bearing on the credibility of this witness, as to what information he relied upon.

CHAIRPERSON: Or if it turns out to be untrue, why did that person spread that kind of story?

MR BERGER: But, Chairperson, I'd return to the first point, Mr Visser and Mr Pretorius opened the door by giving us the names of three informers. They were not identified, they were identified by their codenames in this statement, what was the relevance of providing their names now for the Committee? If it was just because they're dead and so therefore we might as well give the names, well then that evidence is, according to my learned friend, now irrelevant evidence. Why was it tendered? I submit it is relevant evidence, just like the names of all the other informers is relevant evidence. And I've limited myself, I've said to the witness, I don't want to know the names of all 15/20 informers, I want to know the names of those people who infiltrated people who subsequently became targets. That's all.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, have you got a reply to that?

MR VISSER IN REPLY: Very briefly, Chairperson. The reason why Mr Pretorius mentioned these persons and why I invited him to give their identities, appear from page 221, because he in his amnesty application stated that he would like to see that the circumstances of the death of these members be investigated by the TRC. That was the reason why it was mentioned. Of course they're dead now, we can't protect them anymore, the law can't protect them anymore, Chairperson, and that is why - and it wasn't a matter that was just easily decided on, but we believe that you're entitled to know who these people are, in order to put a name to the suggestion that they have been murdered here. And from that point of view we thought that, and we believe correctly so, that we should make that known. But we opened no doors, not of people who are still alive ...

CHAIRPERSON: Let the Panel decide whether you opened doors or not. Can you deal with the proposition that Mr Berger submits, that it is important for him to investigate whether this person in fact, this witness, in fact received that information.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, the issue of motivation, be it political or otherwise in any amnesty application, is to be judged on the evidence of the applicant, and as you quite correctly, in my submission, put to Mr Berger, if the man - I'm first dealing with the issue of whether, not whether, but if he did receive the evidence and that evidence might even be false, then the issue is for the Committee to decide whether in the circumstances, he was entitled to act in the bona fide belief of the truthfulness thereof.

On the issue, Chairperson, of whether the information was given in the first place, we submit that on the probabilities and on what you have before you here, it's quite clear that it is extremely probable that this was the type of information which he would have received. In fact, Chairperson, one can hardly appreciate why the police would run a network of informers if it was to be expected that - although it did happen in the past ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: It wasn't a perfect system, Mr Visser.

MR VISSER: It happened, it happened. I immediately hasten to say that it has happened, but that was an exception to the rule, Chairperson. And with great respect, your Committee and yourself will be well able to find that the probabilities are that Pretorius did receive this type of information.

Chairperson, just to refer you to the fact that this matter has come up often before Committees on amnesty, in fact it first came up in February 1997, before the original Amnesty Committee, and a ruling was made and that ruling has never been changed and we've been held to that ruling, Chairperson, throughout. And that ruling is in the Cronje amnesty application of the evidence on page 519 to 520, and I can read it to you. Judge Mall ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: But wasn't that Committee, I say it with the greatest of respect, too quick to rely on traditional practices? Given the unusual circumstances of this process.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, that remains a matter for you to decide. What I'm submitting to you is that certainly on the authorities which we have gathered on this issue and which we have argued, and I believe Mr Malan was part of the Committee in Natal, in the Ndwandwe matter, in which this argument was put forward fully, there is no ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: It has been submitted to me before and I found in its favour, before.

MR VISSER: May I just finish what I'm saying, Chairperson. We attempted to point out that there was no authority that made any exceptions to the rule as far as the process was concerned, in which the issue of the identity of an informer was mentioned. In fact, the authorities deal with identity of informers even outside the scope of litigation, in general. So we would argue and we would urge you, Chairperson, to find that even though this is a singular and a new process, not known anywhere else in the world, that the legal principles are not changed by that fact.

CHAIRPERSON: Well consider this also, that it's not only an unusual process, we must also consider the purpose of the process. And one of the purposes of the process is to put the victims or the survivors of the victims, in a position to appreciate why their loved ones became victims.

MR VISSER: But Chairperson, with respect, not at the risk of placing other people ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: ... crux of the matter. We've got to weigh up the interests and why and where, or at what is the process directed, the Act.

MR VISSER: Well it could never be said that the process would be directed to the benefit of one interested party at the expense of the life and well-being of another.

CHAIRPERSON: Ja, as between applicant and victim. We're not talking about applicants or victims here.

MR VISSER: No, as between victims and informers, former informers. Because we know what happens ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Informers are not a party here. But I don't know if you're correct when you said it can never be said that that is the position, that it can never be weighed up against an informer. The unusual circumstances of this process puts that argument or that balance in another perspective.

MR VISSER: No, no, I didn't submit that it can never be taken into account, I wouldn't make such a submission.

CHAIRPERSON: No, listen to me, Mr Visser, you submitted that when one has to balance the interests of victims, it can never be found or said to be that that balance must be found in favour of the victims to the detriment of informers.

MR VISSER: Yes, that is my submission.

CHAIRPERSON: That's your submission. And I'm saying that that's easier said than done, given the peculiar intentions of the Act.

MR VISSER: Yes Chairperson. Well, ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: Mr Visser, just for the record, you referred to the Ndwandwe, the application regarding the murder of Ndwandwe, the issue there was not whether an informer's name should be released, but whether the informer who happened, on the evidence, to have been also involved as a co-perpetrator, was to be released.

MR VISSER: Yes, but that's even worse, that ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: ...(indistinct) what I'm saying? The issue there and the debate there, it was not asked that an informer's name, as a matter of principle, be released, but an informer who happened to be a co-perpetrator.

MR VISSER: Absolutely, Chairperson. And if I may be so bold as to say that we were of the impression that the Committee had no problem with the issue, if it was just a mere informer, then he would be protected. But the question, as you correctly point out, was now but if that informer is also a co-perpetrator, what is the situation then?

MR MALAN: I'm not referring to the Committee's position, because the Committee still has to come to a decision if my memory serves me well, but the application of the victims legal representatives was on the basis of the informer also being a co-perpetrator.

MR VISSER: Quite correctly so, Chairperson, I didn't want to burden this Committee with that detail, but that was a worse case scenario from the point of view of the objection, the fact that that was the additional factor that came into play.

But Chairperson, I don't want to burden the matter but I'm instructed by the clients that I appear for, that they're not prepared to divulge the names of any of their informers and in fact I was told that they prepared to go to jail for that if they have to.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, what if the information upon which this applicant relied was not true? Doesn't that beg the question as to whether the information was in fact transmitted to the applicant?

MR VISSER: Sorry, Chairperson, would you just please repeat that for me?

CHAIRPERSON: I'm saying, if the information that he says he received and relied upon, was in fact a pack of lies, doesn't that beg the question as to whether the information was in fact transmitted to him? Because it wasn't true. In other words, if it wasn't true, could he not be making up that story?

MR VISSER: Well there are one or two scenarios. The one is that he did get the information, but the information was a pack of lies. The other is that he never got the information and he just made it up. Well Chairperson ...

CHAIRPERSON: In that case, where the information that he says he received is a set of circumstances that is patently wrong and a dishonest set of circumstances ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: Well that's obviously one of the tests.

CHAIRPERSON: ... would there not be any scope to investigate that then? He says: "I got it from an informer", there's reason to believe that what he says he received from the informer is a lie, if he did in fact receive it. But from a legal perspective, an evidence perspective, would that not entitle anyone to then say "look, it is wrong, I question whether this witness in fact did get this information? Where did you get it from, because we want to investigate it from that person you say you received that information, where in heavens name he got it, or whether he in fact gave you this information."

MR VISSER: One would obviously start with what you've just stated, that there must be clear indications that the information was wrong. Now I'm not sure whether this is going to be presented to you at some stage or other, but it certainly doesn't exist at this stage.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct - no microphone)

MR VISSER: But Chairperson, one must not forget that the fact that these applicants and applicants in other amnesty applications feel themselves duty bound not to divulge identities of informers, is something which serves to their prejudice, because it would be the easiest thing in the world to call the informers to come and support your story. They are prepared to run the risks of not doing that, so from an evidential value, they ware already running a risk. So it's not just for refusing for the sake of refusing. That's the first point I want to make.

But Chairperson, we would submit that unless there is a clear indication that the information which the particular witness says he received, could never have been information given to him, the issue won't even fall for consideration. And what we're saying is, there is no such indication before you here today, unless you take the allegations made in cross-examination that none of these persons that were killed had anything to do with MK, at face value and being the truth. But if you don't do that, Chairperson, well then the question really falls away at this stage. It may come up again at a later stage.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, deal with the following issue then also. You argued that there are tons of authority for the proposition that the identity of informers who assist police in solving cases, should not be divulged for various reasons, and most of those reasons I agree with because they are social and helps the system work, to a large extent. Two questions. Where such informers were party to crime, are they still protected? Secondly, if those informers are guilty of a crime, they have not applied for amnesty, and this is the important difference between a normal criminal case in which these practices are employed, and this system.

After this process - I don't know if he's going to do it or not, the prosecuting authority of South Africa is entitled, in terms of the Act, to then investigate the possibilities of prosecuting who he thinks are guilty of crimes. But the accident of being an informer, the identity of a prospective accused, is that identity protected?

MR VISSER: Chairperson, I can deal with it ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct) who are charged with investigating that matter then adopt the same attitude.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, with great respect, how's that relevant here? What indications are there for you or for anyone, that any of these informers committed any offence? I mean how does the question even arise in this case?

CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct - no microphone) please deal with the question that I asked. We're talking about the status of an informer in these proceedings, as opposed to the normal criminal ...(indistinct)

MR VISSER: Well Chairperson, it's my submission and that it's a rule of public policy and it's a rule that applies equally, whether it's before a court of law, whether it's outside a court of law, and I would submit, also before this Committee. Chairperson, and I would rely upon the authorities - I don't know whether you still have available the general written argument which we drew after the meeting of the 6th of February 1999, with Judge Wilson and Mr Malan, in order to shorten proceedings, but at page 51 we deal with exactly these issues, we deal with the authorities Rex v Van Schalkwyk 1938 (AD) 543, which incidentally was the authority relied upon by the original Amnesty Committee on Amnesty, to make the ruling that the identity of informers not be divulged and that no questions be asked in that regard.

JUDGE MOTATA: What worries me is that stemming from what my Brother has said, that we have a very important component within the Act, which says we should also be satisfied in our opinions that full disclosure has been arrived at. And we say if an informer is branded about, shouldn't we go into the relevance of the information they seek to get out of that? Because even applicants say an informer said X, Y, Z, for instance, and it turns out that none of that existed, how would we get closer to full disclosure?

MR VISSER: Yes Chairperson, but one presupposes with that question that one is already at the point where you ask yourself the question, but how could anybody ever have thought so, because the evidence is clear that it wasn't so? And my submission to you is that we don't reach that point in the quest of finding an answer to whether full disclosure has been made before you reach that point. And there's no indication here that these people were that innocent as they are now being held out to be, the victims, and nor is there any indication to suggest that the information which this witness gave evidence about was not in fact given to him and was not in fact correct.

Now Chairperson, I'm making a simple submission to you, in the sense that before you reach the point of looking at the TRC Act, and saying these are the requirements of the TRC Act, and we can't investigate whether this requirement has been fulfilled unless we know the name of the informer, then Chairperson, why go through the exercise, why not wait until you reach that point?

JUDGE MOTATA: No, no, not necessarily, because I'm speaking here for myself, that a question was asked, we don't know, up to now I don't know the relevance of the question, and three, for instance, 282, 276 and R103, supposing the question of Tim Williams, 103 or 276 or 282 gave that information, would it still change the question which Mr Berger intended asking in that respect?

MR VISSER: I'm not certain that I follow the question, Judge Motata.

JUDGE MOTATA: I don't know the question, where it was leading to, he says "but there are these four persons whom you named and in that respect there were these three or four informers who were giving information, among the host which Mr Pretorius and Mr Coetzee deal with. I say, if this question which is intended to be asked would elicit one of the three, would we still fall outside the realm, or we should we still cover the question which is something very important like my Brother has said, that we accept that in any Commission, quasi-judicial or what, the normal rules which we have in court apply. But now we are coming into something which is sui generis on its own and that it also extends, its ramifications are wider in that it says we are going to bring reconciliation, we want people to live as one, we should know what happened in the past and if we are going to say to ourselves, but there's certain information that has got to be swept under the carpet, would we still achieve what we are here for?

MR VISSER: Chairperson, if I may attempt to answer the question raised. The first issue, before one goes anywhere else in regard to full disclosure, is the issue that the Act prescribes that there should be a full disclosure of all relevant evidence. So the first issue for determination is whether the identity of a witness is relevant, and my learned friend argues, "it is relevant in the sense that I want to test the veracity of what this witness says."

Chairperson, we say that without a foundation that points to the fact that this witness could never have received that information and therefore he's lying, the issue doesn't arise. That's the first argument.

On the second issue, Chairperson, that leaves you with merely the knowledge, or not knowing the identity of the information.

Now the authorities which we have been able to find, tell you that informers lives, as a rule, and the lives of their families are in grave danger the moment their identities are made known. One has got to question why do the victims want to know who the informers are, if there is no sound ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Where did you get that from, Mr Visser, that the question has been directed at the witness because the victims want to know it? Mr Berger's indicated to us that he wants to investigate the truthfulness of the allegations.

MR VISSER: That was the basis on which Mr Berger presented it and I've acknowledged that, but I've also stated, Chairperson, that in these documents, and if you want me to, I'll find it, before the Human Rights Violations Committee at least one of these victims family members said they want to know who the informers are. The question is why? For what reason?

CHAIRPERSON: Well I often ask myself as a practitioner, my instructions are X, Y and Z and the State witness who happens to be a police, says it's A, B, C, where did this policeman get it from?

MR VISSER; Or where did your client get it from?

CHAIRPERSON: Ja, possibly, but I assume you've understood it, I had reason to believe my client, because I didn't just believe his say-so.

MR VISSER: Well on that score of course, the Committee is objective position, and in fact in the fortunate objective position, that you only deal with what is presented to you, Chairperson, and thereby the applicant, including this witness, has to stand and fall.

Chairperson, there's a request from the very witness about whom we are now arguing, that he's got to take a short adjournment. Perhaps he could just be excused.

Chairperson, my submission to you is that it's an issue of public policy, the protection of ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct - no microphone) before you read, you can read it, is it public policy, the protection of the identity of an informer? Is that public policy in this instance?

JUDGE MOTATA: Before you answer, is it not overridden by these people coming to confess their sins, in the sense that other people should forgive them for those sins?

MR VISSER: But must they do that at the expense of the almost certain knowledge of the detriment that's going to befall the informers who worked for them during the conflict of the past? In my submission, not Chairperson. That's too much to expect of anybody, to say that "you're obliged to make a full disclosure" and he says "yes, well let me tell you that A, B and C were my informers and I know now that I've mentioned their names, that I've almost certainly sent at least one of them to the gallows, but I'm unburdening myself in order to obtain amnesty." With great respect ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, we have heard many cases where applicants have mentioned the co-perpetrators, aren't they in the same danger?

MR VISSER: Chairperson, a co-perpetrator is not in exactly the same position ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I'm not saying in the same position, I'm saying in the same danger that you say an informer would be.

MR VISSER: No, Chairperson, no. What one must bear in mind here is that there was a political struggle going on, the issue is a political one, that is not necessarily so with co-perpetrators. A co-perpetrator might be in a similar position in certain instances, and one can possibly think of many, but an informer, he's a sell-out. We know what the ANC thought of informers, for example, they encouraged their members and the public to deal with informers in the harshest way. That is the situation in which you find yourselves having to apply the provisions of this Act. And we're still dealing with that very political issue, Chairperson.

JUDGE MOTATA: ...(inaudible - no microphone) situation which prevailed then, that whilst there was this war raging, that is the ANC and the then regime, that they said: "...(indistinct), because our struggle is sold out by the informers, deal harshly with those people." And now we get the two parties coming together and saying "hey, let's correct the past" and to correct the past is that everybody should know what obtained.

CHAIRPERSON: One of the main informers of the South African Police during those days, was two weeks ago forgiven in public by the Port Elizabeth ...(indistinct)

MR VISSER: Well he wasn't an informer, he was simply an operative of Ferdi Barnard.

CHAIRPERSON: I'm not talking about Ferdi Barnard, I'm talking about an informer, Mr Visser, I know what I'm talking about. Mr Hlongwane.

MR VISSER: I see.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

MR VISSER: Yes. Let me read to what ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible) must read it in the context of this Act. I'm asking, in view ...(intervention)

MR VISSER: I'm trying to do that, Chairperson. I'm submitting to you that the context of this Act deals with a political past and I'm not so sure, Chairperson, whether anybody can be as bold as to say that after 1994, informers can now rest assured that they face no retribution from certain quarters if their identities are known. I can give you an example.

CHAIRPERSON: How is it affected by public policy?

MR VISSER: That's the very point of public policy, is the protection of those people because of what they did, Chairperson. That's the very thing. Because of the acceptance by our courts of law, that those people are in dire danger the moment their identities are divulged. It doesn't matter whether it's in a criminal case or whether it's in this case. In fact, also in our situation, because of the political angle.

CHAIRPERSON: But when those policies were developed, it wasn't developed in the background of the intentions and the spirit of this Act.

MR VISSER: I accept that, I'm arguing to you ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: That's why I'm asking you, how does this Act impact on your submission?

MR VISSER: I'm arguing that the circumstances which this Act is supposed to deal with makes it even more important for you to protect the identity of the informant, because of the political implications, because of the political background and because of what we know had occurred in the past. And with respect, we beg to disagree with Judge Motata, if his suggestion is that today everybody has reconciled at Kempton Park and all of this is over and the ANC has won and therefore informers have no problem. We have this problem on a day to day basis, we have situations where, for example, black applicants who were formerly members of the police, come to the Committees on Amnesty and you can see the trauma through which they're going, because they want to make a full disclosure but they can't because they're afraid for their lives. We've had direct evidence.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Visser, do you think Mr Tim Williams doesn't know who pimped on him?

MR VISSER: Doesn't know?

CHAIRPERSON: Do you think Mr Tim Williams doesn't know who informed on him?

MR VISSER: Well I don't know whether he does or whether he doesn't.

CHAIRPERSON: Well what's the probabilities, he's a top ranking officer, by the evidence of your own witness.

MR VISSER: Well Williams isn't part of the issues before you, because Mr Berger doesn't appear for him. But Chairperson, to deal with Mr Tim Williams, the fact that he might know who it is - well look, if the identity of the informer has already been made public, then there's no issue of trying to protect his identity, clearly. If ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I raised the issue because you say these people are in danger of being killed if their identity is divulged.

MR VISSER: Absolutely, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Now I wonder if Mr Tim Williams would have killed anybody now.

MR VISSER: Well Chairperson, I'm not going to suggest that Mr Tim Williams might kill somebody, somebody else might do it on his behalf, I don't know, or off his own bat, I don't know. Why should we speculate when we have a rule of public policy that the identity of informers ought to be protected, unless there are circumstances, and they are set out in the authorities and I can tell you what they are. They are, in the first place, where the identity of an informer, the divulgence of the identity of an informer will serve to either prove the guilt or the innocence of an accused person, then the Court will usually order the identity to be made known. Secondly, Chairperson, where the identi-ty has already become known, because then it becomes pointless trying to protect it. I can't remember offhand, Chairperson, there may be one or two others.

But the point that I'm trying to make is that on the authorities, it all deals with the issue of public policy and the protection of people who were informers. And Chairperson, certainly we submit that it's a very real issue and we would perhaps be wrong to think that this problem has gone away, because we see signs of this all the time in the amnesty applications. You might see here with Mr Olifant, I don't know.

But you were involved in cases where there had been conflicts in the evidence, on the one hand between the blacks and on the other hand, between the white applicants, and you could almost in hundred percent of those cases, put it down to the very fact of their fear of confessing and why they worked with the South African Security Forces. Why? It's because they fear for their lives.

Well Chairperson, I can give you the authorities and I can ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I'm aware of the authorities, Mr Visser, I'm aware of the policy, all I asked you was whether the policy is applicable within the confines of this Act, the spirit of this Act.

MR VISSER: Well Chairperson, if we're concerned here with justice and I submit we are, then let me just read to you an extract from Kalla's case, Kalla v Minister of Safety and Security 1994 (4) 218W, the Myburgh J.

CHAIRPERSON: Just repeat that.

MR VISSER: 1994, volume 4 of the SALR, page 218W, per Myburgh J, and Chairperson, there's an extract at page 233, which says this:

That's with reference to Lord Simon in D v National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children and it continues:

In D v National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, Lord Diplock said:

And a reference is made to Wigmore, which says, paragraph 2374 in the decision:

And on the same basis, ex parte Minister of Justice in Re Rek v Pillay 1945, AD 653, the Watermeyer Chief Justice at 667-8, Chairperson:

And we would submit, also of protection, not only encouragement. And this deals really with the issue which I touched on earlier, Chairperson, it's the political issue which is of importance here. I may refer you, Chairperson, to Swanepoel v Minister of Veiligheid en Sekuriteit 1999 (4) SALR 549T, to which his Lordship, Mr Justice van Dyk at 553 stated this, he said:

And he deals with the evidence and he says:

He's got a substantive right to it. That is the state of our authority at the moment, Chairperson.

And there's State v Rossouw, per Hoekstra J, before he became Judge of Appeal, 1873(4) 608 SWA, which also deals with the issue. The Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act deals with it, Chairperson, Section 202. And I don't want to belabour the matter, Chairperson. Perhaps I should only refer you to Sefadi's case if I may. It's The State v Sefadi, it's an important matter 1995(1) SALR 433 and we would refer you to what Marnovick(?), Acting Judge, said at 441, with reference to British authorities, Chairperson. And perhaps I can just read to you an extract. He says:

And we think the principle of the rule applies to a case where a witness is asked if he himself is an informer, which was the case there. But he deals with all the authorities, Manovick does, and he comes to the conclusion that over 50 years the rules has been established of the right of an informer to protection of his identity.

Chairperson, what you're asked now is to breach that rule of 50 years, where there is no real grounds placed before you as to why you should do that. And we would submit that, Chairperson, you would refuse to do so.

CHAIRPERSON: Is that all, Mr Visser?

MR VISSER: Yes, Chairperson. I would ask you not to allow Mr Berger to ask question or to ask the witness to respond to questions which would divulge the identity of former informers.

MR BERGER: Chairperson, might I reply?

CHAIRPERSON: You had a chance to ...

JUDGE MOTATA: Are you controverting the rules? He had to reply, you had to answer. Haven't you answered?

MR BERGER: Was that a reply, it sounded more like an argument in-chief.

CHAIRPERSON: Is there any other of the representatives wanting to contribute to this debate?

MR COETSER: No, I have no relevant comment, thank you.

MR CORNELIUS: Neither have I, Mr Chair.

ADV STEENKAMP: Me neither, Mr Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: We've been confronted with the issue of whether in this hearing, a witness has to divulge or disclose the identity of an informer on whose information he allegedly relies for his application. We don't intend to give a long judgment, unless at a later stage this is requested, but the ruling of the majority of this Panel is that the witness is NOT OBLIGED to answer the question.

MR VISSER: As it please you, Mr Chairman.

MR BERGER: As it pleases the Committee.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Berger, continue.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BERGER: (cont)

Thank you, Chairperson.

Mr Pretorius, in relation to the informers who you relied upon, the ones who infiltrated the four MK members referred to at the bottom of 213 and the top of 213, can you tell the Committee how many informers there were. I'm not asking for identities ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I think you ...(indistinct) I don't want to refer to this process again. Mr Pretorius, can you answer the question please.

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, it is the three persons that I have already mentioned there, RS282, 276 and R103 primarily who worked on the four deceased persons.

CHAIRPERSON: What were their names?

MR PRETORIUS: The first one was Freddie Baloyi, that's RS282, and then it was Isaac Mazibuku, RS276, and then R103, Cecilia Maake, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Mr Pretorius, the whole argument before the lunch adjournment was in relation to the informers who are still alive, so I'm asking how many other informants were there?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, if I may state it as follows. There could have been at least two or three other informers as well that had reported on the specific four persons, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And those two or three others are still alive?

MR PRETORIUS: I believe so and I hope so, Chairperson. I do not have contact with them.

MR BERGER: Now Tim Williams, according to the information that you received, what was he involved in?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, he was very active in all aspects of MK activities, this was from the instruction giving that "this person should receive instant training", it was giving instructions like "take these handgrenades to South Africa, establish underground MK cell structures in South Africa, recruit new members for MK cell structures in South Africa." And then he was also involved in the general intelligence collection, about which the MK members needed, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Of the persons that were injured and/or killed in this incident, do I understand your evidence that only Mnyele, you dealt only with Mnyele?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And it was only on Mnyele that you gave information that contributed to his death.

MR PRETORIUS: That was on the person, Chairperson, and then I gave information with regard to other facilities.

CHAIRPERSON: What other facilities did you contribute to?

MR PRETORIUS: These were firstly, the facilities where Mr Tim Williams stayed, unfortunately I cannot recall the addresses off the top of my head, then the address where Urial Abrahams lived and Muff Anderson, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: It was the same house, wasn't it?

MR PRETORIUS: No, it was another house.

MR MALAN: I beg your pardon, Urial Anderson and Muff Anderson is the same house?

MR PRETORIUS: That's the same house.

MR MALAN: Yes, but Williams was another house?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, that's another house.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct - no microphone)

MR PRETORIUS: I beg your pardon, I misunderstood you there, Chairperson.

And then with regard to the Mnyele incident, Chairperson, the Tami Mnyele incident, there were two houses in issue, the first house was the house where Rona Segale physically lived in. That is the house, as I've already said, that could not be found and the second house I know for a fact was the house where Tami Mnyele was killed, Chairperson. So those are the houses that I supplied information about, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: I beg your pardon, just to pick it up from there, it was four targets that you gave information on?

MR PRETORIUS: That were used, that's correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Thank you, Chairperson.

Mr Pretorius, I want to come back to the question I was asking. So Tim Williams you had information on, he was a highly active member of MK, active in planning and carrying out, or facilitating operations against South Africa?

MR PRETORIUS: Correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Patrick Ricketts?

MR PRETORIUS: Patrick Thomas Ricketts, exactly the same, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Also a highly trained MK ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: He said it's the same.

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, Chairperson. He was also in the terrorist album, listed as a terrorist.

MR BERGER: Well you know Mr Pretorius, being in the terrorist album you didn't have to be involved in any acts of violence, or do you disagree with that?

MR PRETORIUS: I accept that if you say it, but I just that in further support, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: You see, I'm concerned with the information that you received and the information that you relied upon.

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, today no-one can take me on about that, RS282 was with Mr Tim Williams and Mr Patrick Thomas Ricketts, over a period of months. Information came in that was verified, that was confirmed, as Mr Loots and Mr Steyn said, by other divisions. The Army confirmed it, National Intelligence confirmed it. So they were trained MK terrorists, Chairperson. And I am sure that if the Committee had Mr Williams here, he could also testify that he was military trained.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Pretorius, will we not use that descrip-tion, because the police can also be accused of using the same tactics.

MR PRETORIUS: I beg your pardon, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Christian Lungile Pepane?

MR PRETORIUS: Correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: You also had specific information from your informants on him, and what was the extent of that information?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, once again the same as the previous two persons.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Berger, what value has this evidence got, I mean it's not one of your clients and it's not one of the people whom this witness says he gave information about to be killed?

MR BERGER: Well Chairperson, I don't want to reveal exactly where I'm going, but ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

MR BERGER: It will become apparent very, very shortly. I just want to establish - and Riaz Saloojee as well, also a high ranking MK official?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, with regard to Mr Riaz Saloojee, MK Calvin Khan, I can take it a little bit further, that I can recall he was the father and the founder of the so-called, if I may call it and describe it as such, that was known to as the "Handgrenade Units" that operated in Soweto or in the Witwatersrand area. He was attached to MK Ordinance. That is where arms were the issue, military warfare arms, Chairperson. And we know already at that stage they were links to MK Special Operations, if I may describe it as such, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Okay. Now when you refer in your amnesty application, you refer continually to "die vermelde MK lede", if you have a look at the top of page 214, do you see you refer to:

MR PRETORIUS: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: When you refer to "die vermelde MK lede", can I take it that you are referring to these four members, Williams, Ricketts, Pepane and Saloojee?

MR PRETORIUS: Correct, Chairperson, when I drew up the report I referred to them, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And then again in the next paragraph:

you're referring to those four?

MR PRETORIUS: Correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And again at the bottom of page 214:

MR PRETORIUS: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: So would it be correct then to say that these four MK members were your primary targets?

MR PRETORIUS: It was some of the priority targets, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: No, no.

MR PRETORIUS: No, it was not only these four, it was some of them, that is why I have already said at an earlier stage that I should have used the words "amongst others" in here, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Well in fact he did say "onder andere". If you look at page 213, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: But you see, that's why I asked you the question, that when you were referring in 214 to "die vermelde MK lede", were you referring to those four and you said yes.

MR PRETORIUS: That's correct, Chairperson, but as I've already said ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: What problem does that present?

MR BERGER: If I can just proceed. My point Mr Pretorius is, why have you not mentioned any other people by name? Why have you not mentioned people who you say you gave information on, who were also involved in MK activities? For example, ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Who were also priority listed?

MR BERGER: Yes.

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, an easy answer from my side is that I think my legal representative, Mr Wagener, will testify to this, when we initially - I'm just mentioning it, when we drew up these applications it was to me personally under severe stressful circumstances, I had to list everything, acts where I was involved. As you have already seen, you see this is incident number 4, I did not have all the facts available to me at that time. I want to say that this was done very quickly under stressful circumstances. This statement was drawn up by myself to place the application on record and I believed and I was under the impression that I would get the opportunity during a hearing like today, to give all the particulars. It was impossible for me at that stage during the time that I had to put it in writing.

CHAIRPERSON: I can believe that. Carry on.

He believed that he would be able to clear up everything today.

MR BERGER: Well one of the people that you say you had specific information on was Tami Mnyele.

MR PRETORIUS: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Not only him, you also say you had specific information on his wife, Rona Segale..

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: So much so that you say that:

MR PRETORIUS: Correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And because of the pressure under which you were labouring - was she a target by the way?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, I've already stated so, Chairperson, she was a primary target.

MR BERGER: And because of the pressure that you were under in getting your amnesty application in on time, you didn't mention her.

MR PRETORIUS: Correct, Chairperson, but it was not purposefully omitted.

MR BERGER: And Tami Mnyele was also a target.

MR PRETORIUS: A secondary target, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Well you know, when the bullet hits you it doesn't matter if you're a primary target or a secondary target.

MR PRETORIUS: I think that is what we from the police's side tried to say here, Chairperson, that the houses were targets and unfortunately the Army executed the operation. And as I have told you previously, it is so that other persons are shot dead because of their coincidental presence there. But Mr Tami Mnyele, as I have already said in my evidence, was not only an artist, he was involved in MK activities along with his wife and the persons that I mentioned here, amongst others, Freddie Baloyi, who was present in the house when Tami Mnyele was present where instant crash courses were given to him and where arms were given to him. So Mr Tami Mnyele, according to the information at that stage available to me, was that he was involved directly or indirectly with MK.

MR BERGER: So then why wasn't he a target, a primary target?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, as I have said, he was a secondary target. The houses were targets, not persons.

MR BERGER: But then Rona Segale was also a secondary target?

MR PRETORIUS: Her house was a primary target, as I've already said, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And his house was a primary target?

MR PRETORIUS: That is the second house. I do not know whether that was his house where he was shot dead, Chairperson. That house where he shot dead for the second time - oh, I beg your pardon, where he was shot dead.

MR BERGER: I don't understand your evidence, I really don't understand your evidence. We've heard that the buildings, targets were identified according to buildings.

MR PRETORIUS: Correct.

MR BERGER: And linked to buildings were the people that were expected to be found in those buildings. The buildings were blown up because either they were used for specific activities, or they stored weapons, or certain key people lived there. Now you say that the house where Rona Segale lived was a primary target.

MR PRETORIUS: Correct, Chairperson

MR BERGER: Because Rona Segale was a target.

MR PRETORIUS: Correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: The house where Tami Mnyele lived ...(intervention)

MR PRETORIUS: Was also a target.

MR BERGER: Because Tami Mnyele lived there.

MR PRETORIUS: I did not say that, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Why was it a target?

MR PRETORIUS: I said that he was shot dead there. I cannot recall who was the person that was supposed to live there. May I just ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: No, answer the question. Why was the house where he was killed, why was that a target?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, one of the MK members about whom information was given was supposed to live at that house or came there, and I've also said that Mr Tami Mnyele visited that house. That is what I'm trying to explain to you. This was one of the problems of the intelligence people why initially they decided on the houses. We said ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: We know that, Mr Pretorius, we only want to know why that house where Tami lived, why was that a target.

MR PRETORIUS: Tami Mnyele visited that house, that I know, but Mr Tami Mnyele was a secondary target in Rona Segale's house.

CHAIRPERSON: So why was that house blown up, or do you not know?

MR PRETORIUS: I cannot from the top of my head recall who was the chief suspect ... because that is what we tried to tell you ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: No, no, listen carefully. We know there were various reasons why a house was identified as a target. The house where Tami was eventually shot, why was that identified as a target, what happened there, who lived there that could have been a secondary target? Or what is the position?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, if I recall correctly then I know it was one of the houses because this house - if I can give a description as I can recall it, this house where Mr Mnyele was shot dead, as the crow flies from the Oasis Motel, it was directly north. This was one of the houses that we knew a person like Lambert Maloyi, the MK Chief of Operations, if he came into Botswana and he saw people at the Oasis Motel, he went to this house and he stayed over at this house because he did not want the persons meeting him at the Oasis Motel, to know exactly where he lives, but coincidentally we knew through the agents that we had there that this was one of the places where Mr Lambert Maloyi, Chief of MK Operations came.

MR MALAN: Mr Pretorius, initially you said that you supplied information about four targets, amongst others, the house where Tami Mnyele was shot, the information that you gave, except that Maloyi went there, what other information did you give about that?

MR PRETORIUS: Sir, I know for a fact that Tim Williams and Christian Pepane, at that stage he was MK Jeff, they also used that house to give crash courses to recruits from South Africa.

MR MALAN: Thank you, Mr Berger.

MR BERGER: Which house was that?

MR PRETORIUS: That is the house where Mr Tami Mnyele was shot dead.

MR BERGER: Yes, which house?

MR MALAN: He's already said he doesn't know what the address is, it was due north of Oasis.

MR PRETORIUS: Sir, I do not think that - that was the problem with that area, if I can describe it, at that stage it was a typical squatter camp development, there were no straight roads with numbers and street names and so forth, the people literally found a tree and built a house next to the tree and the following neighbour found a tree and he built a house. So there were no straight streets.

MR BERGER: But how do you know where Tami Mnyele was killed?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, as I've already told you, Special Forces afterwards supplied photos to us at Soweto, of deceased persons and we did the identification of Tami Mnyele, that he was in that house. So I knew which house it was at that stage and I saw the photo of Tami Mnyele and after I showed to the informers they said that that was Tami Mnyele. That is how I knew for a fact that Tami Mnyele was killed in that house.

MR MALAN: I beg your pardon, so you actually found him in the wrong house when the Army reported to you?

MR PRETORIUS: Mr Stiff also said in his book ... (interven-tion)

MR MALAN: But I'm asking you, I don't want to know what Mr Stiff says. Are you saying that you recognised the house as the one which you gave information about?

MR PRETORIUS: And when the photo ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: And Mnyele was coincidentally shot dead there, coincidentally as far as you're concerned?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Thank you, Mr Berger.

MR BERGER: Thank you, Mr Malan.

You say that in Rona Segale's house there were two targets, primarily Rona Segale and secondarily, Tami Mnyele?

MR PRETORIUS: Correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Do you agree with the evidence that we've heard previously, that if X living in a house was a target because of his or her MK activities, but it was known to you that Y lived with X and Y was not a target, because he or she did not, was not involved in MK activities, do you agree with the evidence that that house was then removed from the list of targets?

MR PRETORIUS: I think I've already said that, Chairperson, that when we were at the Speskop meeting those types of targets were removed from the initial figure or number that was placed on the boards.

MR BERGER: So the answer is "yes"?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes.

MR BERGER: So therefore, both Tami Mnyele and Rona Segale were targets in the proper sense of the word, because that house was going to be hit and both of them were going to be killed.

MR PRETORIUS: Correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And that was on the basis of information that you supplied to ...(intervention)

MR PRETORIUS: And was confirmed by the other intelligence communities, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Well, Mr Pretorius, you're applying for amnesty for things you did, so I'm asking you about the information you supplied.

MR PRETORIUS: I say, Chairperson, I gave the information, as well as other people. I don't know if that's a mistake, but I'm saying that I gave it but there were also other people.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

MR PRETORIUS: My contribution, Chairperson, as I have already said the information that we collected over months and with the newest information that was available to us with regard to Rona Segale, firstly the house, Rona Segale and Tami Mnyele, I supplied.

MR MALAN: I think your question whether that emanated from the information that he gave and his response was simply: "Yes, but there were also other reports which confirmed that. It was checked, it was not unconfirmed information." But he accepts it, it's just that it wasn't the only source of information related to those targets, as I understood him.

MR BERGER: And that wasn't my question, whether it was the only.

MR MALAN: You question was, and I made an Afrikaans note here, that: "The houses were attacked because of the information that you supplied", and he said: "Yes, but not only on my information, also on other information."

MR BERGER: Now Themba Duke Machobane, you said you did not give through any information in relation to Themba Machobane, is that right?

MR PRETORIUS: Correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: But you knew about the existence of Themba Machobane before the attack.

MR PRETORIUS: Correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: From reports that you had read.

MR PRETORIUS: Correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And after the attack, did you - you were shown photographs of the deceased, including Themba Machobane?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, what I did say was that I can recall the picture of Mr Mnyele. I know there were other photos, but I cannot tell you in all honesty today who the other persons' photos were that I saw.

MR BERGER: So the only photograph that you remember seeing ...(intervention)

MR PRETORIUS: Which was positively identified.

CHAIRPERSON: That he recognised was that of Mnyele.

MR BERGER: Well recognised through your informers.

MR PRETORIUS: And by means of the photos that were available in our files, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Okay. And then in relation to Mr Dick Mtsweni you said you also had - you knew about him, but you never submitted any information in relation to him.

MR PRETORIUS: Not with regard to the attack, no Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And the same for Mr Cecil Pahle.

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, if I recall correctly I said with regard to Mr George Pahle I may have known some more and I can recall that ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: The point is you did not give information which led to this attack.

MR PRETORIUS: That's correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: About George.

MR PRETORIUS: Correct, Chairperson.

REGTER MOTATA: "En u het net baie notas gesien van George."

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, that's quite correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And the same for Lindi Pahle, you never gave through any information.

MR PRETORIUS: No, Chairperson, I only of her.

MR BERGER: So the only people that you gave through any information on, in relation to this attack, was Tim Williams, Patrick Ricketts, Christian Lungile Pepane, Riaz Saloojee, Tami Mnyele and Rona Segale?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, there were others as well, other persons that I can recall today that were involved ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

MR PRETORIUS: No, initially and the Sir asked not to mention the names.

MR BERGER: No, I'd like you please to name the other people.

MR PRETORIUS: One of the persons was Mr Barry Gilder. I want to say that he was on the priority list, number 1. The reason for this, that I knew well, is that Mr Barry Gilder was confused with MK Rashied, Ismail, Aboobaker. He was a very prominent person, he was the MK Special Operations Comman-der ...(intervention)

MR BERGER: Mr Pretorius, I assume that the people that you - from what you've already told us, I assume that the people that you gave information about and names forward, were all highly trained MK operatives.

MR PRETORIUS: That's correct.

MR BERGER: Alright, so if you can just name the people. It's Barry Gilder ...

MR PRETORIUS: Barry Gilder, Muff Anderson, Urial Abrahams, Lambert Maloyi, who I mentioned earlier, MK Chief of Operations and Sadi Puhle. That was not our subject, Sadi Pule, but we also had a quite reasonable amount of information that we gave for this operation, Chairperson. So those were the persons.

MR BERGER: You see, because now we have to go a little bit broader than the four targets that you originally spoke about, because I assume there were more than four targets that could be sourced back to you, amongst other people.

MR PRETORIUS: May I just clear that up quickly, Chairperson. The Solidarity News Service, I automatically gave information about that, because that was the front or the cover that MK Military Intelligence used for Mr Barry Gilder for years, so Solidarity News Service I connected to Mr Barry Gilder. That was the information. And then the ANC House was well known, any person who worked in Botswana, who worked in the intelligence field in Botswana, automatically gave information and confirmation about ANC House.

MR BERGER: That's the ANC Head Office?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, that is the ANC offices in ...

MR BERGER: The two houses next to one another?

MR PRETORIUS: Correct, yes.

MR BERGER: So in fact, there were six targets, if I'm correct, there was the house where Urial Abrahams and Muff Anderson were supposed to be?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Tim Williams was in a second house?

MR PRETORIUS: Correct.

MR BERGER: Then there was the two houses, the one where Tami Mnyele was killed and the other one where Rona Segale was supposed to be killed, right?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: That's four. Five is the SNS offices?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes.

MR BERGER: Six is the ANC Headquarters?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Have I left anyone out? Where was - well let me ask you this, Lambert Maloyi was ...

MR PRETORIUS: As I've already said, Chairperson, this was the house right opposite the Oasis, but quite a way from there. That is where Mr Mnyele was shot dead.

MR BERGER: So that's six targets?

MR PRETORIUS: Maybe there might be a seventh one, Sir, that was where Sadi Puhle was. I told that you initially it was not our target, but I know from Soweto's side and myself and Mr Coetzee contributed in an affirmative manner towards MK Sadi's activities with MK. And I think that is it, I do not think there is anything else.

MR BERGER: Okay. If I'm correct, then of all the people that you identified as targets, whether primary or secondary, the only person to be killed was Tami Mnyele?

MR PRETORIUS: It would appear so, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: I heard Mr Wagener whispering Urial Abrahams, he's very much alive. He wasn't killed.

MR PRETORIUS: I agree, Mr Urial Abrahams is still alive.

MR BERGER: What I want to ask you is why in your amnesty application when you were asked to give the names of the deceased, page 221, why did you say: "Unknown"?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, that is ...(intervention)

MR BERGER: It's paragraph 9(b) and (c). Unfortunately the question is not there, but if you look for example, at page 227, 9(b) reads:

that's the question for 9(b) and 9(c):

and so on. Now I'm asking in relation specifically to Tami Mnyele, because you targeted him, or you knew he was a target, you were shown photographs that he was killed, it was verified that he died, if all of that information that you've told us is correct, how could you have forgotten his name?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, that may be a technical fault or a fault from my side, that I did not mention that specific name. But if I may explain, I did not have all the names and I think I was advised in this manner that I should either say persons that were killed or could be injured, because I did not have all the names. I did not have any ulterior motives by leaving out any names. I can tell you that in all honesty.

MR BERGER: Mr Pretorius, you could have said as you said elsewhere, you could have said: "Amongst others, Mr Tami Mnyele", because this was the one name that must have stuck in your mind.

MR PRETORIUS: No that is probably so, I could have done that. Today I cannot tell you, but this is the only explanation that I can forward. I did not try to mislead anyone here.

MR BERGER: Of course that's assuming you had all of this information on Tami Mnyele.

MR PRETORIUS: No Chairperson, with regard to Tami Mnyele, Chairperson, I've already said I know him from '79 already, as a suspect of the Security Branch. So there is no doubt with regard to his activities, in my mind, what he involved himself with.

MR BERGER: Okay. Now Urial Abrahams was a target, Muff Anderson was a target.

MR PRETORIUS: Yes.

MR BERGER: They lived in a house in ...(intervention)

MR MALAN: Sorry, is the evidence not that Muff Anderson wasn't there, that she's already been arrested by the time of the raid?

MR BERGER: Well that's the evidence from Mr Peter Stiff, it's not the evidence from Mr Pretorius.

MR PRETORIUS: Yes I can also not say whether she was arrested or not, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: In fact, if my information is correct, Muff Anderson had been arrested and prosecuted, she's been defended by Adv Bizos, she's been acquitted and that was all before the raid, so she was no longer under arrest.

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, it was very short. I can recall something like that, that she was arrested, but I cannot recall that during the attack she was in detention, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct - no microphone)

MR PRETORIUS: I think we would have known it at that stage, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Especially if she was in the Botswana jail.

MR PRETORIUS: I think Mr Loots and Mr Steyn would have known about it, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Do you have any knowledge of allegations that surfaced around that time about Muff Anderson and others being linked to the KGB?

MR PRETORIUS: Not to my recollection, no.

MR BERGER: And as a result of that they were kicked out of Botswana.

MR PRETORIUS: I cannot comment on that, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Your information was that Muff Anderson and Urial Abrahams were living in that house, the house that was attacked.

MR PRETORIUS: Correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And this was information that you were getting directly from your informers.

MR PRETORIUS: Amongst others, from my informers, yes Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Your informers must then have been telling you that Mike Hamlyn was also living in that house.

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, as I have already said, up until this specific attack I never knew of the existence of Mr Mike Hamlyn.

MR BERGER: But now didn't any of your operatives, your informers, get so close to Muff Anderson and Urial Abrahams that they must have seen who they were living with?

CHAIRPERSON: Well he's already said he didn't, he'd ...(indistinct). For whatever reason that may be.

MR BERGER: Alright, let me rephrase the question.

In order for you to get the information that you got on Urial Abrahams and Muff Anderson, is it correct that your informers interacted with them in Gaberone?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, if I may explain how information worked and how ANC/MK worked, it was that they knew that these persons that they visited there came from South Africa, because they needed them. They were under the impression that they were loyal ANC/MK supporters.

CHAIRPERSON: To make a long story short, it would appear from what has been put to you, that Hamlyn lived at Urial's house.

MR PRETORIUS: I cannot deny that.

CHAIRPERSON: But listen. And what you found out of Urial and the others was through your informers.

MR PRETORIUS: Correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: I think the question is aimed to find out why, can you give a reason if Hamlyn was there, why you were not informed about it.

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, what these MK operatives did was that they were very sharp because they knew they were there for the purposes of planning acts of terror. People who came from South Africa, they don't take him the first day to his house, but when they do take him to the house they made quite sure that there were no other persons there that could see who was the person. It was two members, they didn't want the person from South Africa seeing the other people who were there and from their side, and they wanted to prevent, as I've said that the person could go, if he was arrested then he would be able to tell what's going on there. And for those periods we realised that it was only them that were at home, and that is why sometimes we sent people in like Mr Olifant to certain addresses to make one hundred percent sure whether the persons were living there or whether there were other people all living there. That's the long answer, unfortunately.

MR MALAN: Mr Pretorius, the short answer is that you are speculating, you do not know why the informants never said anything or saw anything of Hamlyn.

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, that's the only speculation. If I can state it as such.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Berger, I hope that answered quite a few of your questions.

MR BERGER: Not only did you have informants interacting with Urial Abrahams and Muff Anderson, but you also had informants observing the houses at random times, am I right?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, like Mr Olifant will tell you, it is so, he was sent, but Botswana was a hot place at that stage, any observation, when we refer to five minutes of observation and at the longest, a day ...(intervention)

MR BERGER: Yes, but you were gathering intelligence on these houses and who was visiting these houses and these people, you were gathering this intelligence over a period of months.

MR PRETORIUS: Yes.

MR BERGER: And not once did the name of Mike Hamlyn pop up?

MR PRETORIUS: Never, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Again if you would look at page 215, going through your application, in the first paragraph you refer to "vermelding van MK lede", in the second you talk about Calvin Khan, who is Riaz Saloojee, and then in the last paragraph you say:

That would be against the four "onder andere"?

MR PRETORIUS: No Chairperson, as I say, maybe I referred here to those four persons whereas I've already said, amongst others these four persons should have been added.

MR BERGER: You say:

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, that's correct.

MR BERGER: And who was the person at Security Headquarters that had to okay this operation?

MR PRETORIUS: That was Gen Coetzee, as we have already heard, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: That's Gen Johan Coetzee?

MR PRETORIUS: I'm not sure.

MR BERGER: Are you referring to the Commissioner of Police?

MR PRETORIUS: They were both Coetzee's at that stage, I'm not sure who was the Commanding General at that stage of Security Head Office. It could have been Johan Coetzee or what's the other one ...

MR BERGER: Well I don't know, I'm asking you, who are you referring to when you say such an operation had to be ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Berger, he was informed at that meeting that it had to be cleared by the Head of the Security Police, whoever that may have been. I mean it's factual, if it's so important we can ...(indistinct)

MR BERGER: Who are you referring to when you talk about, or who was being referred to when they spoke about Security Head Office?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, that is the Commanding General, and that was one of the General Coetzees.

MR BERGER: Would that be the General who was in charge of ...(intervention)

MR PRETORIUS: Who later became the Commissioner of Police.

MR BERGER: Yes, that's Gen Johan Coetzee.

MR PRETORIUS: Johan Coetzee, yes Chairperson. And the Commissioner was the other General Coetzee.

MR BERGER: But you see at that stage Gen Johan Coetzee was already the Commissioner of Police, that's why I ask you.

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, as I have already said, at that stage I was a young Lieutenant ...(intervention)

MR BERGER: Are you referring to whoever was the person in charge of the Security Branch, at Headquarters?

MR PRETORIUS: The General who was in command there, yes, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: That would have been Gen Stan Schutte.

MR PRETORIUS: I know about Gen Stan Schutte, it he says so, then I'll accept it. If that's the truth, yes, then I'll accept it.

MR BERGER: And second-in-command was Gen Johan van der Merwe.

MR PRETORIUS: I would accept that, Chairperson, I won't dispute it.

MR BERGER: It seems like you knew more about Tami Mnyele than you knew about your people in charge.

MR PRETORIUS: Unfortunately that was my work, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Sometimes it's better not know your boss.

MR BERGER: Now if you look at the top of page 216, you say that you and Lieut-Col Coetzee were then instructed to infiltrate "die MK lede en hul" units.

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, that's correct.

MR BERGER: Do you know the names of the people in those units who were infiltrated?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, I think earlier I gave a comprehensive list of the persons, but if you want me to I will repeat it again.

MR BERGER: No, no, I don't want you to repeat names, but I understood that the members of MK who you are referring to are the four and the others that you've now mentioned.

MR PRETORIUS: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: But then the units go beyond them.

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, that may be so, as I've already said, these were the prominent persons that I can recall, there may have been other names of persons who were also involved in here, but these were the names that I could recall after all these years, that I know as a fact. These were the persons about whom Soweto could supply further information.

MR BERGER: Okay. If you turn over the page to 217, you're now dealing with the meeting where the target list was reduced to 12. Are you with me?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes.

MR BERGER: Now this is the meeting that you put, you say it was two and a half weeks before the attack.

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And you say that that meeting was probably after the meeting that Loots and Steyn attended at Headquarters.

MR PRETORIUS: Correct, Chairperson, that's an inference that I make.

MR BERGER: If you just let me ask the question then you can answer it. You never attended that meeting that Loots and Steyn attended at Headquarters.

MR PRETORIUS: No, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And you didn't receive any feedback from that meeting either, am I right?

MR PRETORIUS: No, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: So then how can you make the inference that the one meeting was before or after the other, how do you know?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, as I have said, after I had listened to what the evidence was here, it would sound to me as if - that is what I said.

MR BERGER: Yes, but why? That's what I'm asking you.

MR PRETORIUS: Because I can indicate to you here, after I drew up the statement I have the number 30 in my head, when we arrived at the meeting at Speskop and Mr Loots referred to 29, and that gives me the picture that Loots and Steyn and Commandant Charl Naude handed in a list at Head Office and thereafter the list of those 29 persons appeared on the notice boards at Speskop, and that is why I say it sounds to me as if this was ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct - no microphone) and then it was brought down.

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, then it was brought down, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: You said 29 persons.

MR PRETORIUS: Correct, Chairperson.

MR MALAN: Just now you testified that these were targets, houses and that there were more names. So once again, this is confusing, was the 30 buildings with names attached to them?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, that's correct.

MR MALAN: Or were all the names in total, 30?

MR PRETORIUS: No, it was 30 facilities, it was facilities and if there was a vehicle involved, then the vehicle was also mentioned here.

MR MALAN: I'm just asking you because Mr Loots became confused and confused us with buildings and names and it's confusing.

MR PRETORIUS: I apologise if I did that, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: You say at 217:

and then you list five points which would appear to be the final guidelines for deciding whether or not a target should remain on the list. And it appears to me that the overriding consideration was whether or not the facility could in some way be linked to MK operations. Would that be fair?

MR PRETORIUS: That is also correct if he states it that way, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And the people who were expected to be found in those facilities, again, could be linked to being involved in either planning or carrying out MK operations in South Africa.

MR PRETORIUS: Correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And by this stage all targets, which included children, women who were not involved in MK activities, local inhabitants who were not involved in MK activities, or any other person who was not involved in MK activities, all those targets had by now been excluded?

MR PRETORIUS: Correct, Chairperson, of which we had information. Those were removed.

MR BERGER: Yes. And really you say this information - but we know from your evidence now, or we've heard, I should say, from your evidence and others, that this information was constantly checked and re-checked and there were checks and balances between the different intelligence agencies.

MR PRETORIUS: That's correct, Chairperson, where it was humanly possible to collect updated information. I think the impression that is being created now, Chairperson, is that we could just walk into a house and look quickly who is in the house. That was really not the case, I can assure you. Where confirmation was obtained, it was under severely dangerous and difficult circumstances. In many instances it was an issue of just driving past the house to see if a specific vehicle was still parked there.

MR BERGER: Yes, but - and I know you didn't give specific information on this, but you seem to have been quite highly placed, so I'll ask you this question. Take, for example, Mr Dick Mtsweni, if the evidence shows, as I put to you it will, but assume for present purposes that this was a man, 70-odd years of age, a grandfather, living with his wife, his granddaughter, in the house and then there was also a young boy living in the house at the time of the attack, now assume that this man had been living in that house for a number of months, was not changing as other operatives would want to do, sleeping on one house one night and another house another night, he slept in the same house with his wife, with his granddaughter, that kind of information could not have slipped all these intelligence agencies that were keeping Dick Mtsweni under observation, under surveillance, am I right?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, unfortunately I cannot comment on that statement. As I have told you, I did not work on Mr Mtsweni and his family, I have knowledge of this person.

JUDGE MOTATA: ...(inaudible)

MR PRETORIUS: I understand - if it's an example, I agree with him Chairperson, then I agree one hundred percent with him, then someone slipped up here, I do agree.

MR BERGER: You see, because you go on and you say that there were final target developments:

The impression I get from your amnesty application is that there was constant updating of intelligence in relation to all of the final targets which had been selected.

MR PRETORIUS: As I have already said Chairperson, that is correct. Firstly, yes that is correct. If once again I could explain that Special Forces just about every day ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: You just agreed with what is said now, so where are we going to now?

MR BERGER: So would you agree with me that if the evidence shows at the end that a whole number of people were killed, who ought, on the criteria that we've heard, who ought not to have been killed, that it won't be a question of one person making a slip-up, it will be a question of something else far bigger?

CHAIRPERSON: Why don't you put it to him, it was something else?

MR BERGER: Well I want to ask you, if the evidence does show that at the end, what would you make of it?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, I can only speak about those facilities which I referred to with those persons, that I know that that information was factually correct, it was verified, confirmed, but I ... (intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: But Mr Pretorius, before we tread in wet water here, you must keep in mind that you are applying for amnesty with regard to certain charges. I'm not certain what those charges are, whether it's all of them or some of them, I'm not certain, I'm sure that during the hearing somebody will inform me, the question here is an introduction to determine to what you connect your activities. Do you understand?

MR PRETORIUS: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And you keep yourself to the charges about which you gave information.

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, that is why there in the last paragraph when the learned person said that I did not indicate any names, I ask for all the persons that were killed, for the conspiracy where I was involved in and the planning where I was involved. Therefore I am not only asking for specific persons. If I created that impression, then I do apologise, that was not my intention. But there is a difference between information, as I've said, that I can say I know about, it was the information that came from my side. If I shared that with Soweto, what I gave there was factually correct. With regard to the other information ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, I think you've answered the question.

MR BERGER: You see, Mr Pretorius, what I want to suggest to you is that your intelligence gathering was not as up to date as you want the Committee to believe.

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, I can assure you Soweto's intelligence was up to date, and I speak on behalf of Soweto. I can only speak on behalf of Soweto and on behalf of myself with regard to where the intelligence is concerned.

MR BERGER: You see, because if your information was up to date, you would have known that Mike Hamlyn was living in the house that you targeted because Urial Abrahams and Muff Anderson lived there.

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, as I've already told you, I did not know that a person like Mike Hamlyn lived there, I was not aware of it.

CHAIRPERSON: But you admitted to that already and it's on that basis that the statement is made to you that your intelligence was not as good as you thought it was, because the fact of the matter is that Hamlyn was also there.

MR PRETORIUS: I accept that, Chairperson. This comes back to the argument that perhaps at that stage I believed that the intelligence that we had available to us was the freshest, the best, the newest and so forth.

MR BERGER: Well perhaps the reason for all of these people being killed in the raid and the targets, the people that you were aiming at, for example, Riaz Saloojee, Tim Williams, Ricketts, Pepane, the reason that other people got killed is because whilst you may have been targeting MK people, you didn't care if other people got caught in the crossfire.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, with great respect, on what basis is this question put to this witness, who wasn't in Botswana, who didn't participate in the attack, he made no decisions in regard to it.

MR BERGER: I'll tell you what the basis is, the basis is that - take the case of Mr Hamlyn, who lived in the same house where Muff Anderson and Urial Abrahams had lived, Mr Pretorius says he had no information on Mike Hamlyn and he doesn't know why he was killed, he doesn't know, but that house that was targeted was targeted because of information that came from Mr Pretorius and maybe other people. So I'm putting certain scenarios to this witness for his comment, he can deny it, he can deal with it, he can choose to ignore it. The possible scenarios are, one, that the information was not up to date. Two, that the information was up to date and houses were targeted regardless of whether innocent people got caught up in the crossfire or not. And three, the third possibility that I want to put, is that it wasn't only MK people who were targeted and that anyone who had any link to the ANC, whether it was military or political, was considered a legitimate target for the raid.

Now Mr Pretorius, you can tell me that those three scenarios are nonsense, I'll move on, but I want to put them to you for your comment.

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, with regard to the Mike Hamlyn facility where I said Muff Anderson and Urial Abrahams lived and worked from and operated from and received people from abroad at, was according to us a legitimate target. For some or other reason, as it would appear today, it was from Soweto's side, from the police' side, from the Security Force's side who did not know that Mr Hamlyn lived there, that he was there coincidentally. But as I have already said, Chairperson, we foresaw because in many instances and in amnesty application there were innocent persons killed. I am sure that not even in one of those instances did the planners purposefully go out to kill that innocent person.

I can testify to that on behalf of Gen Liebenberg, who that day stood up and said, as I've already said, if there are children and if there are women who cannot be connected to MK, he doesn't want to know anything about that target. And I think from the Security Force's side, all possible steps were taken to ensure that there was no loss, killing or injury to any innocent persons, Chairperson. More than that, I do not know what they could have done.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Berger, you've got your answer, can you move on.

MR BERGER: Yes, Chairperson.

So Mr Pretorius, I take it then that it's your evidence, besides the women and children that you've mentioned, any man, never mind if it was a man or a woman, any person who was not involved in MK activities was excluded as a target of the raid?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, I do not know of a specific person or the person that was there that - let us say Mr X, who was a political figure and he was only removed. Once again it was about the facility, was the facility used by MK? Did MK people come there? Who was it? These people.

MR BERGER: Yes, but Mr Pretorius, sorry to interrupt you, but if in that facility there was somebody who was not an MK operative, then - we've already come to the point where that facility was ruled of account.

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, if I may answer this question as follows. I think that was the reason why this attack took place after one in the morning, because we knew it's logical, your neighbour comes to borrow a cup of sugar from you at night, he might come and watch TV at your place because you have a television, and it was decided that this attack should take place late at night so that the risk could be minimised that there could be persons coincidentally present there, like this person who might want to borrow some sugar. I think that is the reason why that attack took place so late at night.

MR BERGER: Then let me ask you this, because this will really cut to the bone. If in a particular target house you had information that there were people who were ANC members who were not involved in military work ...(intervention)

MR PRETORIUS: I don't think there was ...

MR BERGER: No hand on, let me finish. ... then that target house would have been excluded as a target for the raid.

MR PRETORIUS: Definitely, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And if those ANC members were involved in political work but not military work, again that house would have been excluded as a target of the raid, correct?

MR PRETORIUS: Definitely, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Thank you, Mr Pretorius.

CHAIRPERSON: Are you finished?

MR BERGER: No, I'm not finished, because that was the point I was trying to get at for a long time.

MR MALAN: Maybe next time ask the question that way, Mr Berger.

MR BERGER: Unfortunately, Mr Malan, it doesn't work like that.

MR MALAN: Well I find it extremely difficult to get to what your question was, I didn't know what you were leading at, but thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: Gentlemen, I want to finish at half past four, for the week. So let's ...

MR BERGER: Do you know who was in charge of the Forces on the ground, who was actually in Botswana, in charge?

MR PRETORIUS: Chairperson, I want to say no, but I doubt whether there was one singular overhead Commander.

MR BERGER: Mr Hills was in charge from outside.

MR PRETORIUS: He was in command of the total operation inside and outside, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: You said that there were two handgrenades, am I right? Two handgrenades recovered.

MR PRETORIUS: I did not mention a figure, Chairperson, I said there were handgrenades.

MR BERGER: From where?

MR PRETORIUS: From one of the targets, it could be that there was more than one place where handgrenades came from.

MR BERGER: From which targets?

MR PRETORIUS: I cannot recall which ones, they were numbered 1 to 12 or 1 to 10.

MR BERGER: Mr Pretorius, are you still of the view that no so-called innocent people, in other words no people who were not involved in MK work, were killed in the raid?

MR PRETORIUS: I never said, Chairperson, that innocent persons were killed Chairperson, that is not what I said.

CHAIRPERSON: But listen to the question. The question is, are you convinced that those that were killed, as I understand the question, are the only ones who were involved in MK?

MR PRETORIUS: That is not what I said, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: He says he didn't say it.

MR PRETORIUS: That is not what I said at all.

MR MALAN: His statement was that no-one was targeted, not killed.

MR BERGER: No, Mr Malan, the question was, your perception - my learned friend asked him:

MR MALAN: That's referring to the houses.

MR PRETORIUS: The targets, yes.

MR MALAN: To the physical targets. The targets became the buildings. Individuals were associated, secondary and whatever they said. But really, that was clear.

MR PRETORIUS: Yes.

MR VISSER: We're not suggesting that Peter Mofoka, at the age of 6, was an MK member or the little girl that was injured, Chairperson, we never suggested that.

MR BERGER: I've got no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Steenkamp.

ADV STEENKAMP: No questions.

NO QUESTIONS BY ADV STEENKAMP

RE-EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Just one question.

Did you take any decisions, Mr Pretorius, with regard to which targets had to be attacked in the final instance?

MR PRETORIUS: No, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

MR MALAN: No questions, thanks.

MR PRETORIUS: Thank you, Sir.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, we're very anxious about your announcement that you want to adjourn this afternoon and we're going to try and finish our witnesses, because it would be a great hardship if they have to come back, but if we can't finish them this afternoon, Chairperson, is there any real reason why we can't continue with the matter tomorrow?

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

MR VISSER: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

MR VISSER: Yes, but just in case something does go wrong for my clients I'm going to call out of order, Mr de Jager now, because he can't come back Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

MR VISSER: I'm calling Mr de Jager. He prefers to speak Afrikaans, he's prepared to take the oath, Chairperson.

LODEWIKUS DE JAGER: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr de Jager, you are an application in this matter and you request amnesty for any unlawful offence or delict which might flow from the attack on the 14th of June 1985, in Botswana.

MR DE JAGER: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Your application appears in volume 1 on page 89. Do you confirm the contents of your amnesty application which you submitted at the TRC, as correct, according to your knowledge and subject of course to the evidence that you will give here today?

MR DE JAGER: That's correct.

MR VISSER: You studied a document called General Background, are there parts of that document that you cannot confirm and that you do not have direct knowledge and experience of?

MR DE JAGER: No, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And do you then request that that document be incorporated in your evidence?

MR DE JAGER: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: We have heard what the situation was that you were a Commander in command of Coetzee and Pretorius, at the Intelligence Division of Soweto's Security Branch of the Police.

MR DE JAGER: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And that your direct Commander was Brigadier Muller.

MR DE JAGER: That's correct.

MR VISSER: He is deceased now.

MR DE JAGER: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Mr de Jager, I do not want to waste too much time with you, with reference to page 91 where you deal with these events, can you once again confirm that that was evidence of your memory of this incident?

MR DE JAGER: That's correct.

MR VISSER: Can you confirm what Pretorius and Coetzee did with regard to the collection of information and the conveyance of such information, took place under your instructions?

MR DE JAGER: That's correct.

MR VISSER: Did you report to Muller?

MR DE JAGER: That is correct.

MR VISSER: And did it have his approval and authorisation?

MR DE JAGER: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Can you briefly summarise for the Committee what you say in your amnesty application.

MR DE JAGER: I will do that gladly. In January 1985 I arrived at Soweto, a threat analysis was done with regard to the collection of information and it was quite clear that Botswana, that the infiltration escalated from there and then internally there was an escalation with regard to ANC activities.

I spoke to Pretorius and Coetzee, among others, and gave instruction that our intelligence capacities had to be expanded in Botswana.

MR VISSER: And was that sharpened successfully?

MR DE JAGER: Yes, that's correct Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Did you at some stage, or were there any court directed actions because of this information of persons who were arrested, who came from Botswana with arms, propaganda and so forth?

MR DE JAGER: Although I cannot recall any specific instances, it was undoubtedly so. It was dealt with by the Sowetan Security Branch, because of information which we supplied.

MR VISSER: Were you at some stage asked to attend a meeting at Speskop?

MR DE JAGER: That's correct, Chairperson, under the instruction of Muller.

MR VISSER: And did you hear from there to what you refer to as a witch-hunt operation, but an operation in Botswana that was planned?

MR DE JAGER: Yes, it was confirmed there for me, although previously during conversations at West Transvaal, I had the impression that such operations were in the planning phases or in the concentration phases.

MR VISSER: Very well. Were requests directed to you for further intelligence?

MR DE JAGER: The intelligence gathering liaison part of the Soweto Intelligence Unit, I delegated to Pretorius, who directly liaised with operatives from the South African Defence Force, Special Forces, and it was my instruction to give my full co-operation to them.

MR VISSER: Do you in your position work with case studies, or was that left to Pretorius and Coetzee to just bring reports to you?

MR DE JAGER: It was left to them and from time to time they reported to me.

MR VISSER: You have listened to the evidence of Pretorius.

MR DE JAGER: Yes, I have.

MR VISSER: Is there anything in his evidence with regard to the meetings and the intelligence gathering, that what happened afterwards, that you do not agree with?

MR DE JAGER: No.

MR VISSER: Was it your conviction that what you did was expected to be done by you, given the circumstances of the time?

MR DE JAGER: That is correct.

MR VISSER: Were you at Nietverdiendt during the attack in Botswana?

MR DE JAGER: Yes, I was.

MR VISSER: Were you in the operations tent?

MR DE JAGER: No, Col Hills did not want us there.

MR VISSER: And do you have any knowledge of what exactly which persons was killed or injured there and what properties were damaged?

MR DE JAGER: No.

MR VISSER: We know now that it was an out and out an Army operation.

MR DE JAGER: That is correct, yes.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Chairperson.

MR COETSER: I have no questions, thank you.

MR CORNELIUS: I have not questions, thank you Chair.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BERGER: Mr de Jager, what did you actually do in respect of which you seek amnesty?

MR DE JAGER: I was the Commanding Officer of the Intelligence operatives who supplied intelligence, that I believed certain target identifications were done based on this intelligence and which led to this attack and where persons were killed and property damaged, as well as that I supplied authority that Mr Manual could indeed assist and accompany the Army, and I gave approval for it. Although I received it from Brig Muller, I also accorded with it.

MR BERGER: Mr Manuel?

MR DE JAGER: Mr Manuel Olifant, I beg your pardon.

MR BERGER: So you gave instructions that information should be gathered, you didn't gather that information, you didn't process that information, that information was then made available ultimately, to the Defence Force, as a result of which they launched their attack?

MR DE JAGER: Ultimately, yes Sir.

MR BERGER: You had no part in processing that information?

MR DE JAGER: The procedure normally was that sources would be debriefed, the reports would be given to me, I would then peruse them, have them typed and I would, on some occasions, depending upon circumstances, I can't name the specific instances, I would then also speak to a source to clarify certain matters that might be unclear at that moment. Although I did not have a day to day active involvement in the debriefing and the intelligence gathering process, it was my responsibility.

MR BERGER: Yes, it fell under your command, but in relation to this raid, this attack on the 14th of June 1985, did you play any role other than being the Commanding Officer, did you analyse any of the information in relation to this raid? Did you make any changes in relation to that information in relation to this raid?

MR DE JAGER: No, I did not make any changes here, but I had insights to all the reports that were sent through to Western Transvaal, that I believe at the end of the day could have formed part of the memorandum which led to the attack.

MR BERGER: Did you exercise any discretion?

MR DE JAGER: No, not with regard to specific incidents, that I can recall at this stage.

CHAIRPERSON: So in other words, you are saying these reports were sent to West Transvaal?

MR DE JAGER: Honourable Chairperson, the usual process was that a day or two after it was ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: No, but the information that you are referring to now ...(intervention)

MR DE JAGER: Before this operation ...

CHAIRPERSON: ... how long before this operation?

MR DE JAGER: Approximately 14 to 21 days, maybe a month but definitely on a continual basis. Upon my arrival in Soweto there was already a process ongoing that information would be sent through to Western Transvaal.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you have any knowledge what information was used that was sent through? That was used by the persons who took that decision to launch this attack.

MR DE JAGER: I cannot say what specific reports they were, but it is my impression if I listen to the evidence here, that some of the information that was sent through would have been used.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you find out at any stage that this attack would be launched?

MR DE JAGER: With the meeting as Speskop it was clear to me that this operation was planned.

CHAIRPERSON: Was this the meeting 14 to 21 days before the time?

MR DE JAGER: Yes, in that vicinity.

MR BERGER: Well there are two meetings, 14 to 21 days before. Are you referring to the ...

MR DE JAGER: I refer to the one at Speskop.

MR BERGER: Oh, not the one at Head Office?

MR DE JAGER: No, not the one at Head Office, I was not at that level.

MR BERGER: You say in your amnesty application at page 94, that apparently the attack was decided upon for the 14th of June, because there was information that the ANC was planning a large-scale infiltration on the 16th of June, to launch attacks within South Africa.

MR DE JAGER: Chairperson, I believe this could only be an inference from myself, that it could not be a specific fact, that the ANC usually in the vicinity of 16th of June, because of the fact that it was Youth Day, they ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: But you put it here as a fact that there's reason for you to think that the 14th of June was specifically chosen.

MR DE JAGER: It would make sense because it was two days before the 16th of June.

CHAIRPERSON: Is this an inference you draw, or is there a specific reason?

MR DE JAGER: No, there is no factual reason, Chairperson, this is just an inference from my side.

MR BERGER: Will you just bear with me for a moment.

You see, the reason I ask you that question is because what you say here, you say that what you've got here at page 94 is pure speculation on your part because June 16, as we all know, was a very important day in the history of our country and you say that the ANC, traditionally, mounted attacks to commemorate June 16, 1976. So what you say here at page 94, you say is just speculation on that basis.

MR DE JAGER: Chairperson, I cannot pertinently recall any reports that said that the ANC would send through X amount of cadres for a specific action, a specific operation.

MR BERGER: Yes, and as I understood your earlier answer, you said just because it was June 16, you inferred that the attack was launched in June 14, to head of any attacks which might come on June 16.

MR DE JAGER: Where I sit now I would say that that was a logical inference.

MR BERGER: And that's all it was?

MR DE JAGER: Because of the lack of proper information to indicate that fact.

MR BERGER: Because you see, this author again, Stiff, at page 75, page 472 of his book, talks about the conference, I'm sure you know on the 14th of June 1985 the ANC, or the 15th of June the ANC gathered for a National Consultative Conference at Kabwe in Zambia and that was the first conference since the Morogoro Conference in 1969, you're familiar with that history?

MR DE JAGER: I have no reason to doubt that you're telling the truth, Sir, with all due respect. I presume it is there and I can't recall it ...(intervention)

MR BERGER: No, I thought you would have known that history, but anyway ... He goes on to say, he says:

So according to this author there was information. You say in your amnesty application, apparently this was the reason because as I read it, there was information, but you're now saying you had no such information.

MR DE JAGER: Mr Chairman, with all due respect, Sir, I cannot remember, this was 15/16 years ago. I cannot pertinently, absolutely say that I read a report to that effect.

If it is misleading what I said, then I have to apologise, I really cannot remember that I specifically received instructions to be involved because of the fact that government might have thought it might be a good idea to attack on the 14th. The final date for the attack was in any event certainly not determined by myself or any of the people that were working with me, it was a decision that was taken much higher up than our level. And if I might just add, intelligence was gathered, as it was mentioned frequently here before by more than once instance in the intelligence community. So in conclusion, I'd like to say that I'm sure it was not Soweto Intelligence only that might have caused this decision to be made.

MR MALAN: Mr Berger, if you will excuse me just briefly coming in here.

I made a note here in my documents beforehand and I placed a question mark there at that paragraph because if I can recall correctly, there was uproar in the country about the untimely raid just before the Kabwe Conference and then with regard to the decisions taken at Kabwe which upped the spiral of conflict anyway. So now you are saying that apparently, and apparently can be an inference, exactly what it says, or it could be based upon your memory, you cannot recall why you included this paragraph?

MR DE JAGER: No, not pertinently, Chairperson, that I can say that I read it in a specific report or that a pertinent source reported it. I am once again inclined to say that it was an inference from me, it would be part of disruptive action, because the date at that stage and the attack at that stage would have been a disruptive course of action.

MR MALAN: But if I listen to the cross-examination by Mr Coetser of the other witness and I listen to Mr Berger, and exactly the Army's role and possible role, and this was just shone down, I do not know what is following down, is it possible that this was indeed done to heighten the conflict? Because I think that is what the cross-examination indicates to me. Certainly that was the consequence, or ...

MR DE JAGER: I would have to speculate.

MR MALAN: Do you have any knowledge?

MR DE JAGER: Then I would say that it was not impossible, but I do not have specific knowledge that that was the purpose of it.

MR MALAN: Thank you, Mr Berger.

MR BERGER: Thank you, Mr Malan, because that's exactly where I was going.

Mr de Jager, you were in charge of the Soweto Security Branch, am I right?

MR DE JAGER: No, Brig Muller was, I was in charge of a small component, Sir.

MR BERGER: Gathering of intelligence?

MR DE JAGER: A part of that, yes.

MR BERGER: And as such I would expect you to be familiar with this history of 1985, and particularly the Kabwe Conference. You say you can't recall the Kabwe Conference?

MR DE JAGER: I recall the Kabwe Conference, but I cannot recall that I, before the conference per se, a day or two or three, was aware, that I certainly cannot remember. The Kabwe Conference is well known as far as the history of the ANC is concerned.

MR BERGER: And also the debate at the conference about blurring the distinction between hard targets and soft targets.

MR DE JAGER: I have read that and I'm sure I read it in Setchabas and other similar material, yes.

MR BERGER: Yes, indeed. And you'll also know that the delegates to that conference were greeted, when the conference opened that morning, they were greeted with the news of the massacre in Botswana.

MR DE JAGER: I would presume that to be so.

MR BERGER: And the reason I was saving these questions for you was because of what you say at page 94, isn't it possible that the raid, the attack was launched on the 14th of June, precisely to have that effect?

MR DE JAGER: It's not impossible, although I bear no specific knowledge, but I would regard it as not impossible.

MR BERGER: That the raid was timed at that point to coincident with the conference, to escalate the conflict between the ANC and the government.

MR DE JAGER: I would once again say it's not impossible, although I do not have any intelligence or information to the fact that it was in effect so, Sir.

CHAIRPERSON: It certainly would have been an ideal tactic, isn't it? In the circumstances.

MR DE JAGER: In retrospect, Mr Chairman, yes I think so.

CHAIRPERSON: Well at the thinking of the time.

MR DE JAGER: Ja.

CHAIRPERSON: It may not today have been the wisest thing to do, but the way feelings were at the time, it was a - it's more than just a possibility that that would have been the reason, isn't it? It would fall in line with the tactics employed at the time.

MR DE JAGER: I have to agree with you, Mr Chairman.

MR BERGER: Thank you, I have no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Re-examination?

MR VISSER: No re-examination, Chairperson.

JUDGE MOTATA: Just thinking quickly, that it could have - we remember that during those years, '85, there were many uprisings within the country.

MR DE JAGER: Certainly, Sir.

JUDGE MOTATA: That probably to divert even attention that people must now concentrate on Botswana, to divert that attention that was happening within the country. With hindsight again.

MR DE JAGER: With all due respect, I think witnesses have given evidence before this Commission and Committee in the last years that would point to certain unorthodox actions that might be construed as going to cause ...

JUDGE MOTATA: Thank you. Thank you, Mr de Jager.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, you're excused.

MR VISSER: When you say this witness might be excused, Chairperson, might he be fully excused? Thank you.

MR VISSER: I call Mr Coetzee, Chairperson. Thank you. His evidence is in bundle 1 at page 47. He speaks Afrikaans Chairperson, and has no objection to taking the oath.

PETRUS JOHANNES COETZEE: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Coetzee, you are an applicant in this matter and you request amnesty for the same aspects. Your amnesty application appears in bundle 1 from page 57 and following. You deal with this incident from page 62. Do you confirm the contents of your amnesty application that you had handed in at the TRC, as true and correct, to the best of your conscience and knowledge?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Did you study the document, "General Background to Amnesty Application", Exhibit A, and have you previously confirmed it with regard to your own experience and do you confirm it once again and do you ask that this be incorporated?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You have listened to the evidence of Mr de Jager and Mr Pretorius who today gave evidence, is that correct?

MR COETZEE: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Do you have any problems with the contents of their evidence?

MR COETZEE: No, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Do you then request that this be regarded, that Mr Pretorius’ evidence be regarded as your own evidence?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Is there anything - or may I just ask you as follows. Concerning the allegation of Mr Pretorius that certain RS agents and an R agent was killed, apparently in Zambia, he said that you have better knowledge of two of them being, and I refer to page 220 and 221 of volume 1, RS276, Constable Isaac Mazibuku and R103, Ms Cecilia Maake. Did you know those two persons?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Were they your agents and/or informers?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Can you tell us, Maake was an agent was she not?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Was the position - did I say Maake, I meant Mazibuku.

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And was Maake also an agent?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: But not a police officer?

MR COETZEE: No, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Mr Pretorius said that she was a contract worker.

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Did you speak to them, to those two persons after the Botswana raid of the 14th of June?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: What was the content of that conversation?

MR COETZEE: It was their continued infiltration programmes, the monitoring of the activities Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Were they afraid of the situation, what did they tell you?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson, there was always that psychosis present.

MR VISSER: Were you informed anything about their movements?

MR COETZEE: No, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Did they remain behind in Botswana, or did they leave there?

MR COETZEE: Later they went up North, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And did you received information later from other infiltrated informers as to what happened to them?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Can you briefly tell us what happened to them.

MR COETZEE: RS276, Chairperson, died in Quatro after being tortured as a result of torture and illnesses that he got there. R103 died in ...(intervention)

MR COETZEE: Mr Visser, I won't declare them dead on this evidence.

MR VISSER: ...(indistinct - no microphone)

What happened to R103?

MR COETZEE: R103 at some stage after torture was killed in Zambia.

MR VISSER: And would you have preferred that investigations be launched into the circumstances of their deaths?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Mr Coetzee, if we can return to your statement, and I refer you to page 71 where you deal with this incident and you go over to page 92, at the bottom of page 92 you refer to an operation at Speskop - oh I beg your pardon, I am at the wrong pages, I do apologise. Let us start from the beginning again and while we are starting at the beginning, let's do it properly. On page 49 to 50 you dealt with the underground cell structures and activities in Botswana and there you have given a whole list - oh, I beg your pardon, page 64, I do apologise, you give a whole list there of aspects that dealt with what your investigations entailed.

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: I do not want you to go through it, but is that still the evidence about the extent of what you investigated?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And then on page 51 you mentioned certain names of certain persons, were those the persons ... 65, did I say 51, I'm sorry, 65. I'm sorry Chairperson, it's late in the day.

MR MALAN: The page in the bundle is 65.

MR VISSER: I thought I am going crazy here.

Were these the persons that you were busy monitoring by means of your agents and informers?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And can we just go through that list. We have here Calvin Khan, Ricketts, that was not an MK name, this was his proper name?

MR COETZEE: That's correct.

MR VISSER: Tim Williams was also not an MK name, that was his proper name?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Billy Masetla?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: The current Minister of Law and Order.

MR BERGER: No, he's not.

MR VISSER: Okay.

The Director-General of Home Affairs. I would have failed this test completely, Chairperson.

That is also not an MK name, not so?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And then we have Pepane that you mention.

MR COETZEE: Yes.

MR VISSER: Rogers Nkadimeng who was the subject of another amnesty application that served before this Chairperson and Mr Malan?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Who was Sipho Dlamini?

MR COETZEE: He was an arrested SACTO trainee.

MR VISSER: Did he also go under another name?

MR COETZEE: It is possible, I do not know.

MR VISSER: And then we have Lambert Maloyi. It's spelt incorrectly, but it doesn't matter. And then Mnisi, which Mnisi was that?

MR COETZEE: The well-known Mnisi from Pretoria, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And what was his name?

MR COETZEE: I cannot recall his name any longer.

MR VISSER: Then he was not so well-known. Well you should know him, Chairperson, he applied as an applicant for amnesty in the whole ... Johannes Mnisi.

And Ben Zokwe?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: If we study Exhibit B, Mr Coetzee, the names that appear there, did you have any information of number 2 on that list?

MR COETZEE: No, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Mohammed Geer?

MR COETZEE: No, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Michael Frank Hamlyn?

MR COETZEE: No, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And number 4, a person by the name of Keso Pele?

MR COETZEE: No, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Number 5?

MR COETZEE: No, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: 6, Duke Machobane?

MR COETZEE: I have heard the name, yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: But you had no information about him?

MR COETZEE: No, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Joseph Malaza, number 7?

MR COETZEE: No, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Do you know anything about Peter Mofoka, it's apparently a six year old boy?

MR COETZEE: No, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Harry Tamsanqwa Mnyele?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: What do you know about him?

MR COETZEE: His activities as conveyed to the Committee by Col Pretorius.

MR VISSER: Was that also your knowledge?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And Dick Mtsweni?

MR COETZEE: I heard of him, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Nothing else?

MR COETZEE: Nothing else, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: We have already discussed Nkadimeng and George Pahle.

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: What did you know about him?

MR COETZEE: As once again told to the Committee by Col Pretorius, his involvement in the activities from Botswana.

MR VISSER: And then Lindi Pahle?

MR COETZEE: No, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And then the last person on this list of the ANC, Zondi, Mr Basil Zondi?

MR COETZEE: No, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, I believe that I have touched on everything. Yes, but probably just the following.

You were asked to convey information to Special Forces and you knew this was to be aimed at an attack in Botswana.

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And did you then supply such information and did you give instruction to Pretorius to also convey information?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: The information that you conveyed from Soweto, included more than just only the persons who were killed here, or the targets in this application?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Did you know that your information would be used for the attack and that persons would be killed and/or injured and that targets would be attacked?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And did you also foresee that innocent persons could be hit by this?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Chairperson.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR COETSER: Mr Coetzee, just one question. If one looks at your affidavit which you submitted, you do mention that at a stage there was a request that Mr Olifant accompany the military on this particular raid because of the fact that the military were unsure about the location of a particular house. You do not however, canvass what your discussion was with Mr Olifant in that regard. What Mr Olifant has describe in his two affidavits are that some time shortly before the raid in June '85, you called him into your office and asked him simply if he remembered the houses that he had observed. He confirmed this and you then told him that Anton Pretorius would be taking him somewhere where he would be practising and be briefed by members of the SADF concerning a mission in Botswana. Relying on your memory now, I know it may be difficult, but would you say that that was in essence the conversation which you had with Olifant, the briefing that you gave him?

MR COETZEE: I beg your pardon, Sir? Chairperson, I cannot hear him properly.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you ask Olifant to accompany the SADF to Botswana?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR COETSER: Mr Olifant has described in his affidavits the content of that discussion that you had with him, I've just read it out to you now. Can you deny that that was more-or-less what the discussion was about?

MR COETZEE: I accord, Chairperson.

MR COETSER: Then just one other aspect of your affidavit, you say at page 70 of bundle 1:

MR COETZEE: Those were the instructions, Chairperson.

MR COETSER: So I take it then that this was an assumption on your part as to what he actually did during the operation, based upon the request that you got from the military?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR COETSER: You don't in fact know exactly what the military asked him to do during the course of the operation?

MR COETZEE: I cannot comment, Chairperson.

MR COETSER: Thank you, I have no further questions.

MR CORNELIUS: I shall be brief, I've got no questions thank you, Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: Not so lucky hey?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BERGER: I'm waiting for Mr Cornelius to ask one question.

Mr Coetzee, are the Willie Coetzee from Ladybrand?

MR COETZEE: No, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Do you know about your namesake, Willie Coetzee?

MR COETZEE: No.

MR BERGER: Okay. Mr Coetzee, you say at page 67 that you attended a meeting and I assume this is the meeting at Speskop.

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And during this meeting - this is the one which would have been about two to two and a half weeks before the attack?

MR COETZEE: By approximation, Chairperson, I cannot recall the date.

MR BERGER: And you say there that:

Would it be correct to say that the debate was centred on MK and MK activities?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: You were not - you, and when I say you I mean the whole meeting, was not interested in political activities in Botswana, it was the military activities that were of concern?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And then you say, the third point:

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: The first point is, hadn't a decision already been taken at that point, that there was going to be an attack?

MR COETZEE: I cannot comment on that, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: I'm surprised ...

MR COETZEE: There was no authorisation at that stage for any cross-border actions, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Wasn't the purpose of that meeting to synthesise the list from 29 targets down to 12?

MR COETZEE: Chairperson, as it is stated, to draw up a priority list.

MR BERGER: For an attack that was about to be launched.

MR COETZEE: A proposed attack.

MR BERGER: Did you play any part in the drawing up of that priority list?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson, we gave our inputs.

MR BERGER: You personally, what was your contribution?

MR COETZEE: As given by the previous applicant, Col Pretorius, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Which was what?

MR COETZEE: The facilities in Botswana with the persons connected to those facilities, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: So the six or seven targets that Mr Pretorius spoke about, you confirm?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: The same people that he spoke about, you confirm?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: You listened to my cross-examination of Mr Pretorius?

MR COETZEE: Partially, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Is there anything that you'd want to add to the ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: If he says "gedeeltelik" he didn't listen to everything.

MR BERGER: Mr Coetzee, you nearly had a shortcut.

CHAIRPERSON: Were you present when he mentioned the names?

MR COETZEE: Yes, I was present.

CHAIRPERSON: Okay, you're back on your shortcut.

MR BERGER: Sorry, I missed that.

CHAIRPERSON: He says he was present when the names were dealt with, so that section of Mr Pretorius' evidence he did listen to.

MR BERGER: You confirm that the only person who was ultimately killed, whose name was put forward by you, and when I say you it's you and Mr Pretorius, was Tami Mnyele.

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And you confirm what Mr Pretorius said about being shown a photograph of the late Tami Mnyele and being told by one or more of the informers that that was Tami Mnyele who died?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And that was shortly after the attack?

MR COETZEE: Yes, I cannot recall the dates though Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And what is your reason for failing to mention the name of Tami Mnyele at the bottom of page 70, top of page 71 of bundle 1?

MR COETZEE: Chairperson, I will answer it. We were under tremendous pressure, we had to process these things, we had to compile it, we were alone, we had to go in for legal consultation and I ascribe it to that, that I made these mistakes.

MR BERGER: You were under ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I assume that that pressure did not allow you to mention any name? The question is, you applied for amnesty with regard to what and whom, and when you filled in this form there was so much pressure that you could not recall a single name or address, do I understand you correctly? I'm not saying you are lying, but do I understand you correctly?

MR COETZEE: There was no ulterior motive in omitting anything, Chairperson. Secondly, Chairperson, the pressure and thirdly, at that stage one did not have all the data any longer and as time went along the data was recalled in the memory, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Mr Coetzee, listen to your answer. You've just told the Committee that you confirm the evidence that the only person who you gave information on who was ultimately killed, was Tami Mnyele, immediately after the attack or shortly after the attack you saw a photograph of the late Tami Mnyele, he was identified to you as Tami Mnyele. Now you can't say that this is information which came subsequent to the handing in of your amnesty application, so we can leave that bit out. You were under so much pressure - start at page 62, look at the detail that you give from 62 all the way through to page 70, lots and lots of detail. You give a whole list of 11 names at page 65, of all the people that you kept under surveillance and yet when you are asked a simple question, to give the names of any of the deceased, you say at the bottom of page 70:

and then at the top of page 71, when you are asked for the names you say:

MR COETZEE: That is an administrative - I ascribe that to an administrative omission and the pressure, because there was no ulterior motives. I could have informed the Commission and I would have referred to these aspects.

MR BERGER: You see what I want to put to you is, maybe you didn't have all the information on Tami Mnyele that you now claim to have had.

MR COETZEE: I do not agree, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Because if you had had that information you would remembered his name, you would have put it in.

MR COETZEE: I shall ascribe it, Chairperson, to an administrative omission and the pressure.

MR BERGER: That "druk" that you talk about was self-created "druk".

MR COETZEE: At that stage we were no longer members of the Force and we had to process these things ourselves and we had to type it ourselves and from a legal point we still had to consult with our legal representatives, and Chairperson, we handed up quite a document.

MR BERGER: According to your knowledge the purpose of the attack and the purpose of the information for which you supplied information, was to destroy the capacity of MK in Gaberone to launch attacks against South Africa.

MR COETZEE: I would say so, Chairperson, to disrupt the structures, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Thank you, I have no further questions.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

MR VISSER: Alright, Chairperson, I have no re-examination, thank you.

MR MALAN: No questions, thank you.

JUDGE MOTATA: Mr Coetzee, during the monitoring process leading up to the raid in Botswana, was Mr Mnyele also monitored?

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson.

JUDGE MOTATA: Because I'm following up on the question asked by Berger, you have named people on page 65, which you monitored, but I don't see his name there either, you've now monitored several people but you haven't mentioned a Tami Mnyele, that alone to say that he was one of the people who died whom you monitored.

MR COETZEE: Yes, Chairperson, I should have said "amongst others" as Col Pretorius indicated, that was a mistake from my side. And then I can also add Johnson, other names Chairperson, these were the primary persons.

JUDGE MOTATA: But was Tami Mnyele not important in this regard because he was killed and you were shown his photograph?

MR COETZEE: Yes at that stage Chairperson, it was his wife.

JUDGE MOTATA: Thank you Chairperson, I have no further questions. Thank you, Mr Coetzee.

MR MALAN: I have no questions.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, you're excused.

MR VISSER: Mr Chairman, I believe, unless I've lost count, the last of my witnesses is Mr Meyer. He's also willing to take

the oath without objection, and he wishes to speak Afrikaans, Chairperson.

JOHANNES CHRISTOFFEL MEYER: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR VISSER: Mr Meyer, we cannot recall, I would have to ask you, you are an applicant in this matter and you request amnesty with all the other applicants for any offence or delict committed by you with regard to this attack in Botswana in 1985, is that correct?

MR MEYER: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: You have already previously appeared before this Chairperson and Mr Malan, and given evidence.

MR MEYER: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And on that occasion a letter from a doctor, Dr Jacobs, was handed up, is that correct?

MR MEYER: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: That was Exhibit C. Chairperson, I cannot recall which application it was.

Can you perhaps recall?

MR MEYER: It was the weapons cache point in Krugersdorp.

MR VISSER: Thank you. And now I will give the document to my learned friend, Chairperson. The reason why we do not have copies - let us embarrass ourselves for a moment here, is because we recall that we handed it in, but we can make copies available and hand it to everyone.

CHAIRPERSON: I will explain it to my colleague here. The most important thing is that it gets to Mr Berger.

MR VISSER: We do have two, we will certainly give you one and then of course Mr Berger and then in order to save time, Mr Meyer, I would just like to say that at some point in time, the 15th of April, you had a heart attack ...

MR MEYER: No, it was not a heart attack, it was a blockage in the arteries.

MR VISSER: And you were resuscitated afterwards.

MR MEYER: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And this has left you with a limited memory.

MR MEYER: That's correct.

MR VISSER: Do you now request the Amnesty Committee to consider this when they listen to your evidence?

MR MEYER: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Mr Meyer, in 1985, were you attached to the Intelligence Unit of the Security Branch of Soweto?

MR MEYER: That is correct.

MR VISSER: What was your rank then?

MR MEYER: I was a Warrant Officer then.

MR VISSER: You have completed an application which you handed up to the TRC, which can be found on page 168 and following, of volume 1, is that correct?

MR MEYER: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: The information contained in there, is that true and correct according to the best of your knowledge?

MR MEYER: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And you have previously studied the background document to amnesty applications and confirmed it, do you once again do so?

MR MEYER: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Mr Meyer, you deal with this particular incident from page 175 and you have just said that you were attached to the Intelligence Unit, were the previous two witnesses your seniors?

MR MEYER: Yes, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And did you do whatever you did under the instruction of one or both of them?

MR MEYER: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Did you do what your task was? What did your duties entail?

MR MEYER: Just before that I arrived at Soweto, in February/March of 1985, where I was under the command of the then Lieut Coetzee.

MR VISSER: And what were your duties?

MR MEYER: To obtain intelligence ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

MR VISSER: No I don't want to lead him too much, Chairperson, but if you could help ...

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Meyer, you know what the application is about?

MR MEYER: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: What was your part, as you realised it, in this incident?

MR MEYER: My part Chairperson in this incident was that there was certain information with regard to facilities which I had to collect, I attended meetings and I was present that day at Nietverdiendt at the operational room.

CHAIRPERSON: What did you do there?

MR MEYER: We were there only in an auxiliary capacity with regard to questions that may be asked.

CHAIRPERSON: Did you know what was going on?

MR MEYER: Yes, I knew.

MR VISSER: Perhaps if I can just add.

Did you know that at any stage information that you promoted through your senior officers to Special Forces, would be used for an attack in Botswana?

MR MEYER: I knew, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: And did you reconcile yourself with that?

MR MEYER: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Can you today recall any name that you specifically collected information about, that was promoted to Special Forces and that was one of the people that was killed or injured in this action?

MR MEYER: I know about Anderson.

MR VISSER: What did you know about him?

MR MEYER: I knew she was involved with the ANC in Botswana.

MR VISSER: Did some of your sources monitor her?

MR MEYER: That's correct.

MR VISSER: And did you put that information in reports?

MR MEYER: That's correct.

MR VISSER: What were those activities?

MR MEYER: If I recall correctly she was involved in training, instant training, and she was also involved in the underground structures.

MR VISSER: Did you know what the address was where she lived?

MR MEYER: I cannot recall.

MR VISSER: If there is evidence now that she lived with MK Abrahams and with Mike Hamlyn, which was previously the house of Marius and Jeannette Schoon, can you deny that?

MR MEYER: No, I know about Abrahams but I do not recall the other name, Mike Hamlyn.

MR VISSER: Is there any other persons that you can recall that you promoted, whose names you promoted?

MR MEYER: Not at this stage, Chairperson.

MR VISSER: Were you present at the meeting at Speskop where Gen Kat Liebenberg was present?

MR MEYER: I cannot recall correctly, Chairperson, but I was at a meeting at Speskop, I do not know whether this was the same meeting.

MR VISSER: Was there more than one meeting?

MR MEYER: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: But you cannot say you attended the meeting when this attack was discussed?

MR MEYER: No, I know at some stage I can recall that certain questions were asked with regard to the facilities themselves. It could be.

CHAIRPERSON: But you cannot say?

MR MEYER: No, I cannot say.

MR VISSER: Thank you, Chairperson.

MR COETSER: I have no questions, thank you.

MR CORNELIUS: I have no questions.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BERGER: Thank you, Chair-person.

Mr Meyer, the medical certificate that I have here says that as a result of the fact that your heart stopped ...(inaudible) memory.

MR MEYER: That's what the letter says, yes Sir.

MR BERGER: Yes, that's what the letter says, but is that what happened?

MR MEYER: I am not entirely certain what happened, but that is how I have the story, that is what happened.

MR BERGER: You mean you can't recall if you lost your memory or not?

MR MEYER: No, I can't. There was a time that I didn't know of anything.

MR BERGER: But this incident happened last year, in April of last year, and when you submitted your amnesty application you didn't suffer from any loss of memory.

MR MEYER: No, not that I am aware of Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Ah, well this is impossible. Okay, let me do it this way. When you submitted your amnesty application you didn't mention the names of any people who were killed during the attack.

MR MEYER: Correct.

MR BERGER: You can see that at page 187 and 188. So can we take it that at the time you submitted your amnesty application you had no knowledge of the names of any people who were killed during the attack?

MR MEYER: It must have been, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And so, does it follow that you never gave forward any information which was ultimately used by the SADF, of ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: I think in all fairness, Mr Berger, he never submitted to these decision makers any information which was used in determining who should be killed and who should not be killed. If we can put it that way.

MR BERGER: Well I'm trying to be fair, that's why I'm not asking ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct - no microphone)

MR VISSER: Yes, except for the house in which Muff Anderson lived, Chairperson, that's the one that he says that he did promote to them.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(indistinct - no microphone) Mr Visser, I'm not say that he didn't give any information, he supplied information that was in a dossier of some sort, in the normal route of his employment, but he never attended any meeting that he can remember, where he submitted any information which was relied upon.

MR VISSER: That's absolutely correct.

MR MEYER: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Mr Meyer, is that so?

MR MEYER: Yes, Sir.

MR BERGER: So for example, the name Tami Mnyele, that doesn't ring any bells for you?

MR MEYER: Not at all, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: The way things are now I don't think anything is going to ring a bell ...(inaudible)

MR BERGER: Well that's not absolutely so because you do remember Muff Anderson.

MR MEYER: Yes, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And you do remember that Muff Anderson is a woman.

MR MEYER: Correct.

MR BERGER: And you do remember gathering information on Muff Anderson and the house where she was living.

MR MEYER: Correct, Chairperson. There were various houses about which we gathered information.

MR BERGER: And would I be correct to say that you never went yourself to Botswana, you relied on informants to give you this information?

MR MEYER: Correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And your informants, were they amongst the three who we've spoken about who died, or were there others?

MR MEYER: I am not entirely certain, I cannot recall properly how many informers I had at that stage, but in approximately February I arrived in Soweto, so the possibility of one informer that we used there, but I'm not entirely certain of what information he gave.

MR BERGER: For how long were you gathering intelligence on Muff Anderson and the house where she was living?

MR MEYER: If I can work it out roughly, it was approximately six or seven months, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

MR MEYER: Yes, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And it could at the most be four months?

MR MEYER: Yes that's correct, I beg your pardon, yes probably three months.

MR BERGER: So from February when you arrived in Soweto, from February until June, you were gathering information on Muff Anderson.

MR MEYER: I will state it differently, I was involved with information that was collected, but not necessarily that I collected it myself.

MR BERGER: No, I accept that. As well as Urial Abrahams?

MR MEYER: That is also correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And you knew that they lived in the same house.

MR MEYER: I'm not sure.

CHAIRPERSON: Do you have any knowledge or do you know of any reason why you were not informed about a person who lived with those two persons?

MR MEYER: No, Chairperson, I have no reason except ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: You would have expected your informer to say that there was another man living there?

MR MEYER: That's correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: And he does this, that and the other.

MR MEYER: That's correct, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: But you do not recall that?

MR MEYER: No, I cannot recall the name Chairperson, but the informers or agents gave us that information we would have known about it.

CHAIRPERSON: And Mr Berger says that there will be witnesses that say that.

MR BERGER: That's why we want to know who the informers are, so we can ask them. But be that as it may. The name Mike Hamlyn doesn't ring any bells and the fact that there was someone else living in the house where Muff Anderson lived and Urial Abrahams lived, that also doesn't ring any bells?

MR MEYER: Not at all, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And as far as all the other people that we've spoken about in this hearing, people who died in the attack, none of those names ring any bells for you?

MR MEYER: Not at all, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: Just one final question, Mr Meyer. You say you were in the operational room at Nietverdiendt.

MR MEYER: Chairperson, maybe I stated it incorrectly, I was there but not necessarily in the operational room.

MR BERGER: Yes, but as I understand the evidence, all the policemen were kicked out of the rooms.

MR MEYER: That's right.

MR BERGER: You said you were there to help with information.

MR MEYER: That was impression as well, Chairperson, during the incident.

MR BERGER: No, during. But you didn't give any information?

MR MEYER: No not at all, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: In fact you did nothing but just stand and watch?

MR MEYER: Stand around.

MR BERGER: Or sit and watch.

MR MEYER: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: So to that extent you did not even contribute to the operation there, because you were not even allowed?

MR MEYER: No, I was not allowed.

MR BERGER: And that applies to all the policemen who were present, or not?

MR MEYER: Yes, according to my knowledge all the police officers were not allowed to go in, Chairperson, because we could not do anything.

MR MALAN: May I just ask a follow-up here because I couldn't understand the reason why a person at the level of applicant Steyn would not have been allowed there.

Could this have something to do with the involvement of the police with regard to the cross-border attack? Maybe I should have asked Steyn, maybe you're the wrong person to ask this. Do you know why you were outside?

MR MEYER: No, I do not know.

MR VISSER: Well I must just say, Chairperson, that Steyn testified that he and Loots were allowed and in fact, Pretorius confirmed that.

MR MALAN: Yes I recall that now, sorry. Thank you.

MR BERGER: But they were not part of the operation? Perhaps one could ask Gen van der Merwe those kind of questions, he might be able to help.

JUDGE MOTATA: ...(inaudible) police never even partook in the party.

MR BERGER: No, the party was before - according to Stiff, the party was before the operation.

JUDGE MOTATA: ...(inaudible)

MR BERGER: He wasn't there.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

MR BERGER: I've got no further questions.

ADV STEENKAMP: No questions, thank you.

MR VISSER: No re-examination, thank you Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Very well, you are excused.

MR MEYER: Thank you very much, Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: I beg leave to call Mr McPherson.

JOHN LOUIS McPHERSON: (sworn states)

EXAMINATION BY MR CORNELIUS: Thank you.

Mr McPherson, you have ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Cornelius, you can skip all the introduction, it's contained in his statement, you can get onto the facts of the matter.

MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

These documents before the Committee are before you, is that correct?

MR McPHERSON: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: You confirm the political motivation and you confirm your political career as stated in the document, is that correct?

MR McPHERSON: That's correct, Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: You were also tasked, as the evidence has been led here, to collect information and to obtain information from sources, is that correct?

MR McPHERSON: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: You were Chief of the Africa Desk, is that correct?

MR McPHERSON: That's correct.

MR CORNELIUS: Briefly, what were your duties?

MR McPHERSON: My task was to monitor all ANC/SACP and PAC activities in Africa, and I particularly worked and concentrated on the ANC's activities.

CHAIRPERSON: This was over a course of time?

MR McPHERSON: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Were you involved in any way in the preparation for this attack?

MR McPHERSON: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: How so?

MR CORNELIUS: Your direct Commander was Maj Craig Williamson, as it appears from your statement, is that correct?

MR McPHERSON: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: You received an instruction from him, what was the nature of the instruction?

MR McPHERSON: Maj Craig Williamson called me in one morning and told me that he received instruction from Brig Stadler that I and my unit at the Africa Desk, should take all information that came to our availability and promote this through to Western Transvaal Division, as well as Special Forces, as well as DCC, Directorate of Covert Collections.

MR CORNELIUS: That was all information with regard to intelligence in Botswana?

MR McPHERSON: That's correct.

MR CORNELIUS: Do you know why this was asked?

MR McPHERSON: Yes Chairperson, he told me that a raid was planned in Gaberone, Botswana, and that I should specifically concentrate on that.

MR CORNELIUS: Very well. You have heard the evidence of Mr Anton Pretorius, were you also at the Special Forces meeting?

MR McPHERSON: I attended several Special Forces meetings.

MR CORNELIUS: And you conveyed all the information, did you identify targets?

MR McPHERSON: Chairperson, I only submitted two, the one was the front that the ANC ran under the name Solidarity News Service, and the other one was Barry Gilder, he was involved in the intelligence collection for the ANC, and performed a certain task there in Gaberone.

MR CORNELIUS: Were those the only targets that you identified?

MR McPHERSON: Yes, those were the only two I gave.

MR CORNELIUS: At a stage, I see according to your evidence you went to Cape Town, under whose instruction was that?

MR McPHERSON: What happened Chairperson, was that Craig Williams contacted me and told me that he or Brig Stadler were not available for a meeting in Cape Town, at Min Gen Magnus Malan, and the late Min Louis le Grange and that I along with Special Forces and DCC, should fly to Cape Town, and the DCC person will make a submission ...(intervention)

MR CORNELIUS: Very well, we shall get to that. You then flew to Cape Town. I see in your statement you say that you flew along with Capt Kallie Steyn, are you sure about that?

MR McPHERSON: Chairperson, now that I think back ...

MR CORNELIUS: Yes?

CHAIRPERSON: Was Mr Magnus Malan notified?

ADV STEENKAMP: Yes, Mr Chairman, indeed he was given notice.

MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Chair. You are not certain about Kallie Steyn?

MR McPHERSON: That is correct.

MR CORNELIUS: You then arrived in Cape Town, did you then attend a meeting?

MR McPHERSON: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: Who was present at that meeting?

MR McPHERSON: It was in the Hendrik Verwoerd building, because during that time the parliament was in sitting in the Cape, and present was Gen Malan and then the late Louis le Grange and Gen Kat Liebenberg, that I can recall now, and there were, I cannot recall exactly who was the Colonel from DCC who did the submission.

MR CORNELIUS: Submissions were done then, were targets identified?

MR McPHERSON: At that stage there were 18 targets identified. The briefing was done by means of transparents and an overhead projector, which were shown to the Ministers and then ...(break in tape) who lived there and which vehicles, for example, were used.

MR CORNELIUS: Were the targets accepted?

MR McPHERSON: The Minister asked many questions with regard to the targets, specifically whether Botswana persons or other citizens from other countries lived in these houses, and systematically they started whittling away some of these targets and they also specifically asked whether there were targets with children, and I then gave some input with regard to my target, Barry Gilder and his wife. At that stage they had two very young children, I think it was a daughter and a son with red curly hair, and they were immediately removed from the list.

MR CORNELIUS: And then the target was removed?

MR McPHERSON: Yes.

MR CORNELIUS: And the Solidarity News Service, did that remain as a target?

MR McPHERSON: Yes, it remained as a target.

MR CORNELIUS: And in hindsight, it was attacked?

MR McPHERSON: Yes, it was attacked.

CHAIRPERSON: Was there anyone on the list of deceased that appeared on the list that you had before the Minister, that was attacked?

MR McPHERSON: Chairperson, do you know, this was so far back and I have studied that list and personally I cannot recall any of those names.

CHAIRPERSON: You did see it?

MR McPHERSON: I have seen it, yes.

MR CORNELIUS: You say you cannot identify the names on there?

MR McPHERSON: Not at all.

MR CORNELIUS: And after the meeting you went back to Pretoria.

MR McPHERSON: That's correct.

MR CORNELIUS: Did you monitor the attack?

MR McPHERSON: Yes, that is correct Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: There was evidence already that everyone listened to Special Forces on radios.

MR McPHERSON: Yes, what happened was that we who were involved, went to Speskop, there was a large operational tent, approximately as large as half of this church hall and there were speakers, loudspeakers, and when they went in after one, we heard that feedback was given. But as somebody else has testified here, it was code language and so forth, we only knew when it started and it lasted approximately 20 minutes and then it was over.

MR CORNELIUS: And the following day everything appeared in the newspapers?

MR McPHERSON: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: Did you see some of the documentation that they confiscated?

MR McPHERSON: That's correct.

MR CORNELIUS: And did you study it?

MR McPHERSON: Yes, I went through it, that which was relevant to Solidarity News Service.

MR CORNELIUS: Your target?

MR McPHERSON: Yes.

MR CORNELIUS: Did you participate in the operation and did you reconcile yourself with the operation?

MR McPHERSON: That is correct, Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: You knew that persons could be killed and possibly innocent persons would be killed.

MR McPHERSON: Yes, that's correct Chairperson.

MR CORNELIUS: And you request amnesty as in the concluding paragraph in your amnesty application and the whole raid in Botswana, and all delicts which might flow from it.

MR McPHERSON: Yes, that's correct.

MR CORNELIUS: Thank you, Chairperson.

MR COETSER: I have no questions.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, Visser on record, I have no questions thank you.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BERGER: Thank you, Chairperson.

Mr McPherson, I have a recollection that you were involved in Stratcom, is that right?

MR McPHERSON: Yes, that is absolutely correct. I think you questioned me at the last Commission hearings.

MR BERGER: Yes, I thought that you gave evidence about that. Very briefly put, that was a mechanism devised by the former regime for putting out false information into the media for public consumption.

MR McPHERSON: That was one of their objectives, yes.

MR BERGER: And you say that you direct head was Craig Williamson?

MR McPHERSON: Correct, Chairperson.

MR BERGER: And he was also known to put false information into the media for public consumption, is that correct?

MR McPHERSON: Yes, I think the last time when you questioned him, that report with regard to Ruth First's death ...

MR BERGER: That was one such example?

MR McPHERSON: Yes, that was an example where it was admitted that the information was false.

MR BERGER: At the press conference after this raid, the Botswana raid, that press conference was addressed by Stadler and Williamson?

MR McPHERSON: That's correct.

MR BERGER: And a whole lot of information was released for the public media.

MR McPHERSON: Definitely.

MR BERGER: And how much of that information was false?

MR McPHERSON: The only place where I was involved, I and my Africa staff, we did the preparation of the targets, these were placards which we made, addresses, the description of the facility, photos of the individuals ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr McPherson, the question is, how many of those statements ...

MR McPHERSON: I'm just doing this by way of an introduction. We identified targets briefly and then I did read those reports, and the whole preparation of Brig Stadler's report was aimed to give a factual version. So just looking at it, I cannot say whether this is a propaganda report. And as I have said, with regard to Craig and the Brigadier's media statements, I did not play a role there, they prepared those themselves, and I think on the Sunday evening they were on the 8 o'clock news, the TV news.

MR BERGER: Well then I take it you wouldn't be in a position to say how much false information was contained in their press release?

MR McPHERSON: No.

MR BERGER: Do you have a copy of their press release? Not the newspaper report, their press release.

MR McPHERSON: No, I do not have it with me. I never kept it, I have just read the newspaper reports.

MR BERGER: You were also involved in intelligence gathering at Headquarters level of the Security Branch, is that right?

MR McPHERSON: Yes, that is so.

MR BERGER: So you would have known, I take it, that the ANC was planning to hold a National Consultative Conference somewhere in Africa, starting on the 16th or thereabouts, the 16th of June 1985?

MR McPHERSON: Yes, that was, I think it was in June in Kabwe. Kabwe's is close to Lusaka in Zambia, I had an informer there, who lived there.

MR BERGER: You had an informer at the conference?

MR McPHERSON: Yes.

MR BERGER: I suppose I'm not allowed to ask you who that informer was.

MR McPHERSON: I think he's deceased.

MR BERGER: So you knew shortly before the 16th that there was going to be this National Consultative Conference, where it was going to be and that it was going to be attended by all the bigwigs in MK and the ANC?

MR McPHERSON: That is correct, yes. I think Oliver Tambo was also there.

CHAIRPERSON: And that the strategy of MK was going to be revisited and discussed there. Did you know that?

MR McPHERSON: That MK was?

CHAIRPERSON: That the strategy of MK was going to be revisited on that day.

MR McPHERSON: Yes, that's right, because what they do, every fourth year they had such a meeting and then they do the MK restructuring and they do the political and the foreign policies and the internal policies. That's done through different committees there.

MR BERGER: Well besides the fact of a four-yearly review, this was the first National Consultative Conference of the ANC since the 1969 conference in Morogoro, did you know that?

MR McPHERSON: Yes.

MR BERGER: You knew that at the time?

MR McPHERSON: Yes, yes, because I had to prepare for the meeting, okay.

MR BERGER: You had to prepare for a meeting?

MR McPHERSON: I had to prepare my source that attended, for the meeting.

MR BERGER: So you had to tell your ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Not only ANC members prepared for the meeting.

MR BERGER: So if it was known to you, then I take it that this information was known to the Security Branch Headquarters and everyone in a leadership position?

MR McPHERSON: It was known to the whole intelligence community. So it's National Intelligence, Military Intelligence and the Security Branch of the Police.

MR BERGER: Did it occur to you that at the time of the raid, most of the people who were being targeted by the attack, or in the attack, were likely to be at the conference in Kabwe?

MR McPHERSON: Yes now that I think about it. At that specific day and time I did not think about it, I saw the two incidents as separate, one was preparation for the attack and the other one was preparation for the attendance of the meeting. I saw it as separate, but look, it did have a disruptive action, that meeting.

MR BERGER: It did have such an effect?

MR McPHERSON: Yes, because now I have heard this afternoon that the congress persons were shocked to hear that some of their cadres had been shot dead by the Army.

MR BERGER: Not only shocked, but angered and that influence the tenor of the debate at that conference. You must have known that at the time as well, from your delegate?

MR McPHERSON: Yes, I think the feedback indeed indicated that.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

MR BERGER: Just shows how democratic the ANC was then as well.

Mr McPherson, you say that you conducted reconnaissance of different safehouses, this is at page 268 of volume 1, you personally - because I know that you have given evidence before about you personally going up to Botswana.

MR McPHERSON: Yes, I've been in Botswana, I can't tell you how many times, because I had a policeman fully based in Gaberone amongst the ANC, and I had another source also permanently based in Gaberone. So I had to visit them at least once a month to give them instructions and to debrief them.

MR BERGER: Alright. And which houses did you do reconnaissance on?

MR McPHERSON: Well if you ask which houses, in Tlokweng, some of the cadres stayed there ...(intervention)

MR BERGER: Can you link them to people?

MR McPHERSON: You know it's so long ago that if I have to link it, it was the different divisions which say: "Listen, we've got a suspect and he stays at that and that address", then I'll go out and I'll photograph the address and send the photographs to them.

MR BERGER: Let me ask you this, can you recall the names of any people who were on the list of targets? Now I know targets were identified by buildings, but attached to them were names, can you remember the names of any people who were on the list?

MR McPHERSON: Not at the moment, except my own that I had put on, Barry Gilder and his wife.

MR BERGER: And the SNS offices?

MR McPHERSON: And the SNS, that's correct. I photographed the SNS offices. I think two weeks before the raid I went to the actual offices and made sure exactly where it is situated, which office it is and so forth and so forth.

MR BERGER: Okay. But besides Barry Gilder, no other people you can recall?

MR McPHERSON: No. I probably photographed the ANC Head Office and I had other places in Broadhurst, but if you ask me now exactly who, I won't be able to tell you.

MR BERGER: Alright. Now your meeting with Magnus Malan in Cape Town, and Louis le Grange, was that meeting before or after the Speskop meeting?

MR McPHERSON: I think the meeting with Speskop was - yes, I think in May and the meeting of - I've looked at my diary and it looks like the Cape Town meeting with the Minister was on the 4th of June. So that's ten days before the attack.

MR BERGER: So the Speskop meeting is the one that all the previous witnesses have been testifying to, the one that was two to two and a half weeks before the attack?

MR McPHERSON: Yes, yes.

MR BERGER: Subsequent to that you then went down to Cape Town and met with the two Ministers?

MR McPHERSON: Yes.

MR BERGER: And you say that at that stage, in Cape Town on the 4th of June 1985, there were 18 targets that were being discussed?

MR McPHERSON: Ja, it was also a surprise to me, but in-between there the Directorate Covert Collections, must have had another discussion amongst themselves with Speskop, with the Special Forces, to determine which places would be easily hit and which would be difficult to hit, because they would have had to concentrate in a certain area, and then they decided to take some of the targets away.

MR BERGER: No you see, because the evidence we've heard thusfar is that by Speskop, by the time of the Speskop meeting, or immediately after the Speskop, the targets had been reduced to twelve.

MR McPHERSON: Yes, it was brought down to - it was more than 10, it was approximately 10 to 12.

MR BERGER: But then subsequent to that you went to Cape Town and all of a sudden there are 18 targets, do you see my problem?

MR McPHERSON: I think perhaps ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Don't guess, can you explain?

MR McPHERSON: Very well, can I say what I think, following from what I've heard here?

CHAIRPERSON: Very well, yes.

MR McPHERSON: I think the target is 10, because 10 were hit, it remains in people's heads and that is why they refer to the Speskop meeting that came down to 10, but there it was finalised with the Minister there to 10, 10 or 12.

MR BERGER: Well if you have a look at page 268 - I'm sorry, my copy has been cut on the left-hand side. It says:

MR McPHERSON: To 12.

MR BERGER: 12.

So it was Magnus Malan, you say, who cut the list down to 12?

MR McPHERSON: Yes, well Gen Kat Liebenberg, you know, they had a discussion there and between the Army personnel and Minister Magnus, they brought it down to 10.

MR BERGER: 10 or 12?

MR McPHERSON: To 12, ja to 12. Sorry, to 12.

MR BERGER: And those 12 were the 12 targets that were attacked?

MR McPHERSON: Because Special Forces were ...(intervention)

MR BERGER: That were to be attacked. We know that one wasn't.

MR McPHERSON: Yes, because the Head of Special Forces was there, so he now would know what to instruct his men when they had to go in.

MR BERGER: And who is that person?

MR McPHERSON: Gen Kat Liebenberg. He's late now.

MR BERGER: I still don't understand, but perhaps you don't have information to assist. I don't understand how the list could have been decreased from 29 to 12 at Speskop and then popped up to 18 and down again to 12 in Cape Town. But you don't have any specific information?

MR McPHERSON: I don't have - I'm not very sure about what exactly happened at Speskop.

MR BERGER: Even though you were there?

MR McPHERSON: I was.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr McPherson, are you able to tell us why the list was increased? No?

MR McPHERSON: I have no idea.

MR BERGER: And you say that the final decision to exclude 6 targets, to go from 18 to 12, was because amongst those targets there were people who ...(intervention)

MR McPHERSON: There were still Botswana people ...

MR BERGER: Hang on. ... there were people who were not considered legitimate targets for attack.

MR McPHERSON: Yes.

MR BERGER: There were people who were not involved in MK activities.

MR McPHERSON: Exactly.

MR MALAN: I think he did say specifically Botswana or permanent children.

MR BERGER: That's what he says and I'm asking him whether that was the reason that they were excluded.

MR MALAN: I'm just not sure whether you're broadening the category in the way you've framed your question, people who were not legitimate targets. I think we're on the same page.

MR BERGER: When you say you followed the progress of the attack, that was also from Nietverdiendt?

MR McPHERSON: No, no, the messages from Nietverdiendt was relayed straight to Speskop in Pretoria, the Special Forces operational room.

MR BERGER: And who was there monitoring the progress of the attack?

MR McPHERSON: I think Gen Kat Liebenberg was there and Alfie Saag, yes.

MR BERGER: Why were you there?

MR McPHERSON: I was part of the operation.

MR BERGER: Was Craig Williamson also there?

MR McPHERSON: I think he came later that evening, yes. I think he came around. I and some of my staff of the Africa Desk were there.

MR BERGER: And Johan Coetzee, was he also there?

MR McPHERSON: No.

MR BERGER: Johan van der Merwe?

MR McPHERSON: No.

MR BERGER: Barry Gilder you say was a target initially, because of his MK activities?

MR McPHERSON: Yes, he was involved with the SNS, the Solidarity News Service they used for propaganda purposes. They presented a bulletin, I think on a monthly basis, and other leaflets and propaganda material. And then Barry Gilder at his home he a computer, sources of the ANC that had to bring in information came to his home or met secretly and the information he obtained he put on floppy disk and coded it and then this was taken by courier to the Lusaka Head Office, where it was decoded. So that was an intelligence, part of the ANC Intelligence structure from Botswana.

MR BERGER: No. I've drawn a clear distinction in my questions throughout between political activities of the ANC and military activities of the ANC, and until now the answers have been consistent, that political activities were not targeted in this attack, it was only military activities that were being targeted in this attack. Do you confirm that?

MR McPHERSON: Yes.

MR BERGER: So then why was Barry Gilder considered a target?

MR McPHERSON: I think he was also a member of the Special Operations section ...(intervention)

MR BERGER: Of MK?

MR McPHERSON: Of MK, yes.

MR BERGER: Okay. But despite that, he was excluded because of the presence of his wife and children?

MR McPHERSON: Actually the two children.

MR BERGER: Thank you, I have no further questions.

ADV STEENKAMP: No questions, thank you Mr Chair.

MR CORNELIUS: No re-examination, thanks.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr McPherson, you're excused.

MR McPHERSON: Thank you very much.

CHAIRPERSON: We now come to the stage where we have one more applicant left, but we can't proceed with him. Mr Visser, have you to any other witnesses to call?

MR VISSER: No Chairperson, we don't intend leading any further witnesses.

MR CORNELIUS: I don't have, thank you Chair.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

MR BERGER: I have many witnesses that I intend calling.

CHAIRPERSON: ...(inaudible)

MR BERGER: I estimate that my witnesses are going to take about three days.

CHAIRPERSON: Three days?

MR BERGER: Yes.

CHAIRPERSON: How many have you got?

MR BERGER: Chairperson, I can't give you a specific number, but I'm looking between five and ten.

CHAIRPERSON: Okay. I just want to point out to you, or remind you about the Act says. If they're going to testify on the merits, you can call as many as you think you need to, but if they're going to be called as victims just to come and say certain things then maybe you've got to get representative witnesses, instead of calling everybody.

MR BERGER: No Chairperson, I'm not intending to lead witnesses like the witnesses were lead in the Maseru raid, I intend leading on the merits. It may only be around five.

CHAIRPERSON: I'm told that with the pressures on the TRC to finish their work, we're going to have to get a date that suits most. We all are just going to have to fall in with that, and I'm asking all the representatives, is it acceptable that we liaise with representatives' offices to determine that date and not having to re-serve notices and all that? Are we all happy about that? Well in due course then the office will contact the various offices.

MR VISSER: Chairperson, just before you rise, may I just draw attention to a decision that was taken on the 6th of February of last year, during the meeting which was held - I can't remember whether my learned friend was there, but where Justice Wilson presided and Mr Malan was present and one of the important decisions that were taken there was in regard to victims who wished to oppose and who wished to present evidence, as well as all other persons, statements in writing have to be prepared and given to the other side well in advance, so as in order not to surprise those people, so as to cut down on possible postponements. And in this case it seem imminent that that must happen, Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Have you got any objections to that, Mr Berger?

MR BERGER: I have no objections, subject to the proviso that my learned friend will know that a lot of the evidence that he led during this week was not contained in the amnesty applications and he expanded a lot, subject to the rider that we can expand, the essential points of the evidence will be contained in the statements.

CHAIRPERSON: Well I think that's the understanding, it has to be.

MR BERGER: I have no objection.

CHAIRPERSON: Will you people just meet and if you can, work out time limits and whatever.

MR BERGER: Yes, we'll do that.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, this matter is adjourned till some future date.