The ANC and Allied O r g a n i s a t i o n s

D e s i re for re c o n c i l i a t i o n

12. For others, amnesty applications re p resented a commitment to reconciliation. Mr Frans Ting Ting Masango [AM7087/97] told the Amnesty Committee at the P retoria hearing on 8 June 1999:

We are all South Africans and the past should remain what it is, the past. There should be that reconciliation. We should go forwards with our lives and try to build together South Africa. That’s why I basically applied for amnesty.

13. At the same hearing, Mr Neo Potsane [AM7159/97] expressed himself thus:^{1 1 3}

Well I want to put it this way now, when this idea of Truth and Reconciliation now first came into this country and was in actual fact adopted, I’ve always supported it. I supported it because I felt we cannot stand at one place pointing fingers at one another, looking at the past as something that is – should dominate our lives … I felt that was the opportunity that I will never let … pass me. I had to jump in and actually now also extend my hand of friendship to the victims or the people that suffered because of my actions in pursuit of democracy and I’m happy today that I’m here, sitting here explaining my actions so that you know, other people can understand why I did those things.

14. Some operatives expressed a wish to take responsibility for their actions, particularly towards their victims. In Pretoria on 14 June 1999, Mr Lazarus Chikane told the Amnesty Committee:

My motive for being here is to actually show that the family finally knows who actually was part of the activities of eliminating their brother, their parent, their father and for that reason, I felt motivated to come here, simply because it w o u l d n ’t have been fair on them not to know who actually carried out this attack on their father. For that reason I feel that because there was no (indistinct), there was no investigation, or suspicion against me, it really touched me deeply, to have to come out and expose myself, to say I was part of that type of activity.

113 Mr Masango and Mr Potsane applied for and were granted amnesty for the killing of Mr David Lukhele, f o rmer minister of KaNgwane, in April 1986 [AC / 1 9 9 8 / 0 0 4 8 ; AC / 1 9 9 9 / 0 2 5 7 ; AC / 2 0 0 0 / 1 4 2 ] . They and two others had been convicted of the killing and sentenced to death, but their sentences had been commuted to twenty-five years’ imprisonment on appeal. The four were released in the early 1990s in terms of a deal struck between the ANC and the former go v e r n m e n t .

V O L U M E 6 S E C T I O N 3 C H A P T E R 2 P A G E 2 6 7

Criminal and civil action

1. Many ANC members and MK operatives had already served prison terms and even spent periods on death row for the offences for which they sought amnesty. Some who had received indemnity from criminal prosecution during the early 1990s wished to avoid or prevent possible civil claims that might be bro u g h t against them.
2. Some who had already faced convictions and punishment expressed a desire to have their criminal re c o rds expunged, although many applicants appeare d u n a w a re of this dimension of the amnesty pro c e s s .
3. Although few amnesty applicants for MK actions in the period 1960 to 1989 appear to have been motivated by fear of prosecution, political violence between 1990 and 1994 was the subject of ongoing prosecutions during the life of the Commission and provided a genuine incentive for amnesty applications. A number of ANC members had been sentenced to prison terms in the post-1994 period for incidents relating mainly to SDU activities or the political conflict in KwaZulu and Natal, and made amnesty applications as sentenced prisoners. W h e re charges were pending or trials were in pro g ress, cases were suspended pending the outcome of their amnesty applications.

P roblems experienced by MK operatives applying for amnesty

18. The dissolution of MK as an organised formation and the disintegration of its networks made it difficult to trace operatives. The Commission’s founding Act, the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, Act 34 of 1995 (the Act) re q u i red individual applications, and MK operatives were faced with making the d i fficult decision of whether or not to apply for amnesty – separated as they w e re from their former comrades, operating without structures of any kind and trained in a culture of underg round work and secre c y.

MR LALLA: What you must take into account, that now we were at home, there was no Umkhonto we Sizwe, there was no structure, there was no command and control. We are now left on our own to pick up the pieces. How do I have responsibility of an individual when the structure legally has folded? (Durban hearing, 4 April 2000.) A D V O C ATE BOSMAN: And do you know whether anybody else in that group had applied for amnesty at all for this incident? MR MDLULWA: I don’t know, because we are all over South Africa, we are not communicating with each other. (Johannesburg hearing, 22 May 2000.) MR BUHALI: When the thing of the TRC started, first I was not fully briefed as to what is going to happen considering the TRC, and when I made the application I had not met my Commander then because I did not know his addre s s . (Johannesburg hearing, 13 July 2000.)

Low levels of civilian applications

19. By far the greatest number of casualties inside South Africa arose out of violent community conflicts into which ordinary residents were mobilised or drawn. This category was not reflected in amnesty applications from any side of the conflict, including that of the ANC and its allies.

Poor re p resentation of SDU applications

1. Although SDU members applied in large numbers, these applications did not, in the view of the Commission, adequately reflect the full scope of SDU activity. One of the reasons for this was because SDU activity continued in certain are a s after the cut-off date for applications.
2. In one significant case, the local ANC political leadership in Tokoza, which had had a strong relationship with the SDUs in the area, threw its weight into pro m o t i n g amnesty applications. Meetings were held and questions answered. Assistance was p rovided with completing forms. As a result, approximately 200 SDU members fro m Tokoza applied for amnesty for very serious violations. Most had never been charg e d for these offences and were motivated by an appeal to their sense of political duty and the national imperative for reconciliation. The Tokoza SDU case points to the merit and feasibility of political parties investing energy at local level.

Low levels of applications in KwaZulu/Natal

1. As with the IFP, the scale of the violence in KwaZulu/Natal is not reflected in the volume of amnesty applications from the ANC in this region. Here again, the vast majority of incidents were inter-civilian.
2. It is possible that political developments after 1994 may also have played a role in inhibiting applications. In the immediate post-1994 era, the national ANC strategy for ending the bloodshed in KwaZulu-Natal was one of incorporation and appeasement of the IFP and a reluctance to inflame the still-simmering

conflict. This period of rapprochement resulted in a tendency to draw a veil of silence over the bloody past and a tacit agreement to suspend blame. A c c o rding to the ANC:

The apartheid counter-insurgency machinery inserted itself into the IFP and, as it carried out its murderous campaign, cloaked itself in IFP colours, whereas the genuine leaders and members of the IFP had nothing to do with planning or car

1 1 4

rying out any acts of violence originally conceived of by themselves.

1. The ‘special case’ character of the region is also reflected in ongoing suggestions for a special amnesty for KwaZulu/Natal matters, possibly a ‘blanket amnesty’ for perpetrators in that re g i o n .
2. M o re o v e r, as the majority of the KwaZulu/Natal ANC applicants were in jail at the time of making their amnesty applications, they suff e red from the same serious problems faced by all applicants in prison, primarily a lack of legal advice. Although some prisoner applicants were assisted to some extent by the ANC, and the ANC leadership visited prisoners in an effort to facilitate their amnesty applications, this collective political advice did not adequately substitute for individual legal advice.
3. One of the consequences of this was that applicants were unable to obtain clarity on what acts or incidents to apply for. Thus an applicant might list only a single incident where a number of related offences should have been specified. For example, one applicant, Mr Skhumbuzo Chris Masondo [AM4183/96] believed he had only to apply for offences for which he had been convicted and he later spoke about many other offences at the hearing. These latter matters were excluded by the Amnesty Committee.
4. Another applicant testified about how helpless prisoners felt when faced with applying for amnesty:

MR LAX: But you did understand that you were supposed to tell the full truth when you filled out this application? MR MSANI: Yes, I did explain initially that in jail the brain doesn’t function properly when we are in jail. We are like children when we are in jail. The brain

114 Submission of the African National Congress to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in reply to Section 30[2] of Act 34 of 1996, on the T R C, ‘ Findings On The African National Congress’, October 1998, point 28.3, submitted by Thenjiwe Mthintso.

V O L U M E 6 S E C T I O N 3 C H A P T E R 2 P A G E 2 7 0

is actually sort of disturbed to a certain extent when you are in jail. ( P i e t e rmaritzburg hearing, 23 November 1998.)

28. Another problem was that many perpetrators involved in the same incident were s c a t t e red throughout the country in diff e rent prisons and were unable to contact one another. This tended to discourage applications, as applicants feared implicating others.

‘Declaration of Responsibility’

29. In line with the ANC’s position that its leadership accepted full political and moral responsibility for the actions of its members, large numbers of National Executive Committee (NEC)^{1 1 5} members and those involved in ANC hierarc h i e s submitted collective amnesty applications to the Commission. These were framed in a general ANC ‘Declaration of Responsibility’. The declaration reads as follows:

We, the applicants, having at various times between 1 March 1960 and 10 May 1994, as indicated below been members and leaders of the African National C o n g ress (hereinafter re f e r red to as the ANC), elected and/or appointed to serv e in various structures including its highest organ, the National Executive Committee, do hereby make the following declaration:

During the said period, the ANC played the foremost role in the leadership of

the struggle of the masses of our people for the end of the hateful system of

apartheid, appropriately dubbed a crime against humanity by the intern a t i o n a l

c o m m u n i t y.

In the course of our people’s struggle, with the intent to induce the apartheid g o v e rnment of the National Party to abandon apartheid with its concomitant violent re p ression, and with the intent to achieve, bring about and promote fundamental political, social and economic changes in the Republic, the ANC, inter alia, established its military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe, through which it prosecuted an armed struggle.

At all material times, Umkhonto we Sizwe operated under the political authority, d i rection and leadership of the ANC.

Due to its peculiar circumstances, and the attacks mounted upon it by its a d v e r s a ry, the apartheid government, the ANC established various organs at

115 The highest elected body of the A N C.

various times such as the RC, PMC and a security organ NAT which at all material times also operated under its authority, direction and leadership.^{1 1 6} D u e to the circumstances which prevailed in the townships, in the early 1990s as a result of third force activities, the leadership of the ANC established and, in some instances encouraged the establishment of self-defence units (SDUs), which played a critical role in the defence of defenceless communities.

In the event, and to the extent that any of the activities of any of the above-mentioned institutions and structures including the SDUs could in any manner whatsoever be regarded as the kinds of acts or omissions or offences envisaged in the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, we collectively take full responsibility there f o re applying for amnesty in respect thereof.. [AM5780/97.]

1. The ‘Declaration’ applicants did not specify particular acts but attempted to take collective responsibility for actions that may have resulted in gross human rights violations either by the ANC’s military operatives or by the SDUs.
2. Although initially granted amnesty by the Amnesty Committee, these amnesties w e re subsequently overturned in the Supreme Court. The applications were c o n s i d e red again by the Amnesty Committee and were refused. The Committee found that the applications did not comply with the re q u i rements of the Act as they did not specify particular acts, omissions or offences.

116 See list of Acronyms in this volume.

Security force targets

1. A large number of amnesty applications related to attacks on police, military personnel and buildings.¹²⁵ The bomb outside the Johannesburg Magistrate’s court was planned and authorised by Siphiwe Nyanda, then head of the Transvaal military machinery and chairperson of the Swaziland Regional Politico-Military Council (RPMC). Nyanda decided to plant a mini-limpet mine in order to lure members of the South African Police (SAP) to the chosen area. A larger bomb placed in a car nearby would then be detonated by means of a remote control device. Four police officers were killed in the explosion and several others were injure d , including a few civilians.^{1 2 6}
2. Mr Heinrich Johannes Grosskopf [AM5917/97], a young white man from an Afrikaans background, left South Africa in early 1986 to join the ANC in exile. While in Lusaka, he was recruited to Special Operations. About six months were spent planning his infiltration, target and means of attack. Ultimately, the S A D F ’s Witwatersrand Command was selected as the target. Mr Gro s s k o p f gave his evidence at a hearing in Johannesburg on 20 November 2000:

124 See Volume Tw o, Chapter Tw o, page 146. 125 See, for example A M 5 3 0 3 / 9 7 ,A M 7 1 6 4 / 9 7 ,A M 5 2 9 3 / 9 7 . 126 A M 7 5 0 0 / 9 7 ,A M 5 3 0 3 / 9 7 ,A M 5 3 1 3 / 9 7 .

V O L U M E 6 S E C T I O N 3 C H A P T E R 2 P A G E 2 7 8

A great amount of thought and planning went into considering the political content and consequences of an attack on this military headquarters in central Johannesburg. … The object of the operation was to attack military personnel inside Wits Command by blast damage to the building. The intention was there-f o re not to attack sentries or military personnel or civilians for that matter outside the command, the intention was to bring the car bomb into actual contact with the Wits Command building so that the effect of the explosion would be maximised.

1. They decided to plant a bomb in a car with an automatic gearbox that would be able to move itself up to Wits Command without a driver before the bomb e x p l o d e d .
2. No one was killed in the blast, but about sixty-eight people were injured. G rosskopf subsequently travelled to MK military headquarters in Lusaka where he reported back to his superiors and was debriefed by MK personnel. G rosskopf, Aboobaker Ismail and Johannes Mnisi were granted amnesty for the attack [AC/2000/248; AC/2001/003].
3. A number of applications related to skirmishes in which security force personnel and MK members were injured or killed¹²⁷ or sabotage attacks on security forc e buildings and personnel.

Attacks on black security forces

60. Black security force personnel were prime targets for attack. The fact that they lived in the townships meant that they brought the apartheid regime onto home g round, making them extremely dangerous to local residents. They were seen as the enemy within. Many MK attacks on security force personnel took place while they were off duty, often while they were at home with their families. Of the sixty-one MK attacks on the security forces in 1986, twenty-three (ro u g h l y one third) were on the homes of police officers, and resulted in four deaths and nine injuries.^{1 2 8}

127 See, for example, A M 5 2 9 8 / 9 7 . 128 See, for example, AM 7193/97, A M 6 2 0 7 / 9 7 A M 5 3 0 5 / 9 7 ,A M 6 0 5 9 / 9 7 .

V O L U M E 6 S E C T I O N 3 C H A P T E R 2 P A G E 2 7 9

Attacks on collaborators with apartheid political structures

1. T h e re were many attacks on the homes of people involved with the tripartite parliamentary elections and other structures that were re g a rded as illegitimate. For example, four of the five attacks carried out in 1986 and 1987 by Mr Ve l a p h i Dlamini, a local MK operative in Soweto [AM3887/96; AC/1999/0317], targ e t e d male and female councillors. Family members, children and visitors were sometimes casualties of these attacks.
2. The most common forms of attack were grenades thrown at or into houses at night, sometimes accompanied by shooting. Limpet mines were also occasionally used. MK applicants tended to describe such attacks as ‘intimidation’ rather than as attempted assassinations.

MS MTA N G A: Mr Ndlovu, when you got your instructions were you told what was the intention? Was the intention just to throw the hand grenade and kill people or to just throw it? MR NDLOVU: O k a y. My answer will be twofold. One, carrying an order you do what you’re told but the intention was not to kill. But there was a likelihood that somebody could actually die, knowing the kind of weapon that I’ve used. MS MTA N G A: How were you going to ensure that no one was killed? MR NDLOVU: I was not going to ensure when a person gets killed or not. The point I’m trying to make here, knowing the nature or the type of weapon that I used, somebody could have died but that was not the intention, to kill a person. (Mr Hluphela Morris Ndlovu, Pretoria hearing, 14 June 1999.)

63. Eight of the thirty-three limpet mine sabotage operations carried out by the Ahmed Timol MK unit were on the homes of persons associated with local or parliamentary government structures such as the Pre s i d e n t ’s Council and the Management Committees. The limpet mines were timed so that they would explode outside houses between midnight and 04h00. No injuries or deaths resulted. Amnesty applicant Jameel Chand [AM7026/97] stated that:

It was only after our Commander (Prakash Napier) had received confirm a t i o n that we would carry out the action. The unit always carried out the attacks between 11pm and 4am. We would also monitor the scene of the intended action. The limpet would be placed in a location that would not cause injury or death. If explosion did not take place within the time it was scheduled to have we would contact the police and inform them of the device. We would also do dummy runs and evaluate afterwards. (Amnesty granted in chambers.)

1. The killing of homeland politician Mr David Lukhele¹²⁹ p rovides an example of the assassination of a civilian politician that was approved by MHQ. Lukhele was a p rominent leader in the KaNgwane homeland and was perceived as supporting the proposed incorporation of this homeland into Swaziland, a move fierc e l y resisted by many residents. For this he was re g a rded as a collaborator and members of the Elimination Unit identified him as a possible target.
2. They sought and received approval from MHQ in Lusaka and, on 6 June 1986, Mr Neo Griffiths Potsane entered Mr Lukhele’s home in Mamelodi township and opened fire with an AK47, killing him, while Mr Obed Jabu Masina waited outside. The shots also killed Lukhele’s sister, Ms Elizabeth Busisiwe Dludlu, and i n j u red Lukhele’s wife.

Attacks in public places

1. MK operatives detonated explosives in public places where civilians were p resent and died. Amnesty applications were received for a number of the most well-known ‘public place’ bombs. The applicants put forward a range of explanations for these attacks.
2. In the case of the Durban Why Not/Magoo’s Bar bomb^{1 3 0}, the Benoni Wimpy B a r^{1 3 1} bomb and the bomb detonated near the Juicy Lucy restaurant in P retoria, applicants explained that their intelligence and reconnaissance had led them to believe that security force members frequented these places. Despite the fact that no or very few security force members were injured in these attacks, the applicants continued to hold the view that the venues were appropriate targets. The Amnesty Committee accepted that the operatives had acted ‘in good faith’ although they pointed out that, in re t rospect, their intelligence had been faulty or simply wrong. Amnesty was granted in these cases [AC/2001/128; AC/1999/294].
3. Applicants in respect of two car bombs detonated in public places explained that these were placed outside the offices of security force structures: the South African Air Force headquarters in Pretoria and the Security Branch off i c e s in Witbank. The civilians killed or injured were not the intended target. Similarly, the ANC landmine campaign was aimed at security force patrols even though the casualties were overwhelmingly civilian.

129 AC / 1 9 9 8 / 0 0 4 8 ; AC / 1 9 9 9 / 0 2 5 7 ; AC / 2 0 0 0 / 1 4 2 . 130 A M 7 0 3 2 / 9 7 ,A M 7 1 3 9 / 9 7 ,A M 7 6 7 9 / 9 7 ,A M 7 0 9 6 / 9 7 ,A M 4 0 2 8 / 9 6 ,A M 4 0 2 6 / 9 6 . 131 A M 5 3 0 0 / 9 7 ,A M 5 7 2 5 / 9 7 ,A M 5 3 0 1 / 9 7 ,A M 4 3 5 1 / 9 7 .

V O L U M E 6 S E C T I O N 3 C H A P T E R 2 P A G E 2 8 1

69. Amnesty applicants for the Ellis Park stadium car bomb^{1 3 2} and the bomb at the Wild Coast Casino^{1 3 3} in the Transkei explained that these were intended to send messages to the white community and the Transkei homeland re s p e c t i v e l y re g a rding the futility of apartheid. Similarly, a number of facilities such as s e g regated ‘whites only’ bus stops were apparently selected in order to highlight apartheid discrimination.

Bombs outside security force offices

70. Car bombs were detonated outside buildings housing security force offices. The

o ffices were located in the busy central areas of towns, in buildings shared by other civilian offices. Thus, although the intended targets were members of the security forces, the casualties were predominantly civilian passers-by. A c c o rding to Mr Aboobaker Ismail, testifying at the hearing on the Churc h S t reet bombing (Pretoria, 4 May 1998):

If we were to accept that nobody would be killed at any stage, then we wouldn’t have executed the armed struggle. You often found that the security forces themselves had based themselves in civilian areas and the choice then is always ‘do you attack them or not’?

71. The car bomb that exploded outside the headquarters of the South African Air F o rce in Pretoria became known as the ‘Church Street bomb’. The explosion claimed more casualties than any other single MK attack, killing nineteen people, including the two MK operatives themselves, and injuring more than 200 people. Three persons applied for and were granted amnesty for aspects of this operation: Mr Aboobaker Ismail, Mr Johannes Mnisi (MK Victor Molefe) and Ms Hélène Passtoors [AC/2001/003 and AC/2001/023].

Landmine campaign

72. Landmine operations began in late 1985 under the overall command of MHQ and were approved by ANC President Oliver Tambo. In terms of ANC policy, only anti-tank landmines were approved for use; anti-personnel mines were specifically excluded. The targets were military personnel, both regular and combat

132 The explosive, w h i ch was detonated outside the stadium on 2 July 1988 using a remote control dev i c e, k i l l e d two spectators as they were leaving a rugby match . Th i r t y - s even others sustained minor and major injuries. Fo u r operatives from MK’s Special Operations unit, including its commander, were granted amnesty [AC / 2 0 0 1 / 1 6 1 ] .

133 Two people were killed and several others injured in the explosion on 18 April 1986. Three MK operatives were granted amnesty [AC/99/0181 and AC / 2 0 0 0 / 2 4 0 ] .

units made up of farmers in the militarised border zones near Swaziland,

Zimbabwe and Botswana. The landmines were placed mainly in the bord e r

a reas by operatives sent in via these countries.

1. The campaign was halted by the ANC in late 1987 due to the high number of civilian casualties. According to police re c o rds, at least twenty-one landm i n e s w e re detonated, causing twenty deaths. Only one of those killed was a member of the security forces. The others were civilians, divided more or less equally between black and white. Nineteen security force members were injured during the campaign as against forty civilians, of whom twenty-nine were black and eleven were white. Three landmines were placed in the We s t e rn Transvaal, thirteen in the Eastern Transvaal and twenty-five in the Northern Transvaal. A further twenty landmines were discovered and defused.
2. Two batches of amnesty applications were received and granted in respect of the landmine campaign. The first was from two members of the command s t r u c t u re based in Swaziland, Mr Siphiwe Nyanda [AM6231/97] and Mr Solly Shoke [AM5303/97] and one of their operatives, Mr Dick Mkhonto [AM5304/97], who planted landmines in the Eastern Transvaal and applied for amnesty for at least seven incidents. The second batch was from three operatives who laid landmines in the Messina area in the Northern Transvaal in November 1985, resulting in eight explosions: Mr Mzondeleli Nondula [AM7275/97], Mr Mthetheleli Mncube [AM5829/97] and Mr Jabulani Mbuli [AM6046/97]. All were granted amnesty [AC/2000/111; AC/1999/0054, and AC/2001/093]. No applications were received with re g a rd to the three incidents in the We s t e rn Tr a n s v a a l or the handful of landmines placed in the Northern Transvaal in 1986 and 1987.
3. Mr Dick Mkhonto, one of the operatives involved in placing the landmines, spoke of careful reconnaissance at the White River hearing on 2 May 1999:

After the reconnaissance we found that that place was only used by the military

and the police and there were no inhabitants around that area. The only people

who were using that road, it was used for logistical supply for the people who

w e re in the border, who are working around the fence of Swaziland and South

Africa. Then it was taken into consideration that there were no civilians who are

using those roads. We have stayed there for three days reconnoitring that place.

76. Despite this reconnaissance, the landmine was detonated by a vehicle driven by black civilians on 28 March 1987. Four of them were killed and the fifth was injured.

7 7 . In a landmine incident^{1 3 4} on 15 December 1985, the Van Eck and De Nysschen families were on holiday on their game farm in the Messina area when their vehicle detonated a landmine. Four children, aged between three and nine years, and two women were killed in the blast. Mr Johannes Frederick van Eck and his eighteen-month-old baby boy, Mr de Nysschen and his daughter survived this ordeal, although they were seriously wounded.

78. The former head of the ANC’s military intelligence, Mr Ronnie Kasrils, initially a p p l i e d^{1 3 5} for amnesty for the provision of:

maps of border areas and the farm and security network. Instructions were given on reconnaissance methods and planning and on the collecting of data. When farm labourers and civilians were killed and injured in some of these explosions, MK Commanders, myself included, visited these areas with instructions to our operatives to exercise greater caution and be stricter with their reconnaissance. In the end these operations were called off. During this period I was working mainly with Paul Dikaledi (deceased) and Julius Maliba (deceased). (Hearing, 24 July 2000.)

ANC violations against its members outside South Africa

79. Although the Commission received significant information from the ANC through its submissions, its own commission reports and certain internal files, it received very few individual amnesty applications in respect of ANC violations against its own members outside South Africa. Twenty-one persons in all applied for incidents outside South Africa’s borders. These applications came primarily from members of the ANC’s Security Department (NAT) and camp commanders. Nine applications were later withdrawn. The remaining twelve applications covered nineteen incidents involving various offences against persons suspected of infiltration or defection in Angola (seven incidents); Zambia (nine); Mozambique (one); Botswana (one), and Swaziland (one). The incidents included four killings, three cases of negligence that contributed to deaths, one attempted killing, three abductions and twelve cases of assault of persons in the ANC’s custody. Amnesty was granted to all twelve applicants in respect of all nineteen incidents.

134 Three MK operatives were granted amnesty [AC / 2 0 0 1 / 0 9 3 ] .

135 When the applicant’s legal counsel argued that the applicant was not in a position to identify particular incidents in respect of which he would qualify for amnesty, his application was struck off the roll.

V O L U M E 6 S E C T I O N 3 C H A P T E R 2 P A G E 2 8 4

1. The four killings are: the assassination of suspected defector Mr Sipho Ngema¹³⁶ in 1988 in Swaziland; the killing of suspected defector Mr Monde Mpatheni^{1 3 7} after he and Mr Joe Mamasela were abducted in Botswana in 1981; the execution of Mr Thabo Naphatli Mokudubete (MK Rufus)^{1 3 8} in Viana camp in 1984, and the killing of an unknown ANC member called ‘Shorty’^{1 3 9} in 1981 in Zambia.
2. Two members of the ANC’s Security Department applied for amnesty for the deaths of three prisoners in their custody. According to the applicants, their negligence may have contributed to the deaths, and the applications described some of the dire conditions under which prisoners were held. Mr Thabo John Sphambo [AM5097/97; AC/2000/149] was granted amnesty for negligence contributing to the death of Mr Eric Pharasi in 1981 at Quibaxe, also known as Camp 13.^{1 4 0}
3. S i m i l a r l y, Mr Mzwandile Alpheus Damoyi [AM6303/97; AC/2000/149], a camp commander at Camp 32, applied for and was granted amnesty for the deaths of Mr Zaba Madledza and Mr Edward Masuku in 1984 and 1985. Madledza and Masuku were both inmates at the camp.
4. Amnesty applications were also made for several cases of beating during i n t e r ro g a t i o n .^{1 4 1}
5. Mr Moruti Edmond Noosi (MK Stanley) [AM6307/97] was granted amnesty for an assault on Mr Don Sipho Mashele (MK Ben Maseko) in the early 1980s. Noosi was a senior member of the administration of Camp 32 where Mashele was being held. Noosi admitted that assault was not permitted in terms of ANC camp re g u l a t i o n s .

136 A M 6 4 0 3 / 9 7 . 137 A M 5 2 9 4 / 9 7 ,A M 5 2 9 7 / 9 7 . 138 A M 7 0 5 8 / 9 7 . 139 AM3592/96 TE Mfalapitsa. 140 The A N C ’s confidential submission lists a Motlalentoa Pharasi (MK Elick Mabuza) who ‘died as a result of

excessively harsh treatment after committing breaches of discipline’ in 1981. 141 A M 5 0 9 5 / 9 7 ,A M 3 5 9 2 / 9 7 ,A M 5 1 0 0 / 9 7 ,A M 5 2 9 5 / 9 7 .

Offensive armed actions

1. Some applications for armed actions apply to the period January to August 1990, before the suspension of armed struggle. There a f t e r, certain MK operatives engaged in armed actions on their own initiative, often based on what they described as the ‘command initiative’ delegated to MK operatives. Although the bulk of MK applications relate to the activities of SDUs, a small number relate to incidents undertaken at the initiative of MK operatives. On the whole, these were ‘own missions’, unauthorised by the ANC. They include assassinations, armed ro b b e r y, skirmishes with security forces, internal clashes and the possession and p rovision of firearms, ammunition and explosives.
2. On 25 May 1993, the ANC Youth League (ANCYL) and the Congress of South African Students (COSAS) organised a march to the Bophuthatswana Consulate in Kimberley in the Northern Cape to hand over memoranda of protest to the Consulate and the SAP. As the marchers began to disperse, one of the pro t e s t e r s t h rew a hand grenade at the building. It bounced back towards the crowd and exploded, killing ANC marcher Mr Ezekial Mokone and wounding up to forty others.
3. N o r t h e rn Cape Regional MK Commander Khululekani Lawrence Mbatha [AM3363/96] and ANCYL member Walter Smiles [AM3365/96] applied for amnesty for the incident. Mr Sipho Moses Mbaqa [AM0010/96] and Mr Nkosinathi Darlington Nkohla [AM0013/96], who were convicted of the attack, also applied for amnesty although they denied involvement in the incident.
4. Mbatha told the Amnesty Committee that he had instructed Smiles to throw the grenade. He said that as commander he had discretionary powers to act in c i rcumstances where no direct instructions from the civilian leadership (fro m whom he took instructions) could be obtained, and that he had acted within the scope of his express or implied authority.
5. This operation was contrary to the ANC’s suspension of armed struggle. It was not committed in the execution of an order on behalf of or with the approval of his organisation. On the contrary, the local ANC leaders under whose authority he fell conceded that he had given an assurance to the local Peace C o m m i t t e e^{1 5 1} that the march would be a peaceful event. Indeed, the gre n a d e was thrown while the local chairperson of the ANCYL was asking marchers to disperse peacefully.

1. 1 3 7 . Thus Mbatha acted contrary to the express undertakings given by his organisation. Any bona fide belief that he was acting within the scope of his authority was further contradicted by his behaviour after the event. He did not report to his leaders about the event which, had it been carried out within the policy of the
2. o rganisation, would surely have been approved by them.
1. 1 3 8 . The Amnesty Committee found the evidence of Walter Smiles to be contradictory and unreliable. Both he and Mbatha were denied amnesty [AC/2000/053 and AC/2000/241]. Mbaqa and Nkohla were also refused amnesty as they maintained that they had not committed any offence or delict and thus fell outside the ambit of the re q u i rements of the Act.

Robberies

1. The transition period (1990 to 1994) was a difficult time for many MK operatives. In exile, the ANC had provided basic necessities and provisions and supplies for operational purposes. Back home, MK structures dissolved, MK operatives dispersed and the old support base fell away.
2. In testimony before the Commission, it emerged that while robbery remained contrary to ANC policy, the ANC turned something of a blind eye to acts of ro b b e r y for operational purposes – that is, robberies to secure weapons or money for logistics.
3. For example, a senior MK operative, Mr Japie Aaron Mkhwanazi [AM6215/97] deployed an MK operative to establish an SDU to counter the IFP-aligned ‘Black Cats’ gang in Ermelo in the Transvaal. At the Ermelo hearing on 28 August 1998 he testified that he was aware that the operative had engaged in armed robberies:

151 Peace Committees were established across South Africa during the early 1990s to monitor political protests and state action and ensure liaison between the various groups involved so as to avoid violent confrontations.

V O L U M E 6 S E C T I O N 3 C H A P T E R 2 P A G E 2 9 9

I know that that is not the policy of the ANC; but the situation under which we lived at the time was that we had no alternative … The instruction that I gave was that he [MH Gushu] should form and arm the self-defence units. It was t h e re f o re up to him to take the necessary steps as to how the self-defence units should be armed and that’s what decision he took: armed robbery.

142. Mr VL Dlamini, an MK operative who was active in SDUs in the Transvaal, concurre d :

T h e re is no policy [supporting] robbery in the ANC but with regards to the needs of the units on the ground you would try to raise funds in any way. Even then the leaders would not expressly give you authority to involve yourself in robberies but would only say that whatever you do you should not compromise the movement … (Johannesburg hearing, 30 September 1999.)

1. The security forces were the most obvious and popular targets for such robberies, although private persons and businesses were also targeted for vehicles and money. As a result, there were several amnesty applications for acts of robbery by both MK and SDU personnel, some of which resulted in injuries and deaths.
2. Mr Pumlani Kubukeli [AM5180/97], an MK operative deployed in Umtata in the Transkei, was tasked with the training and provisioning of new recruits. Due to budgetary constraints, it was decided that alternative means of obtaining the requisite finance should be employed. Kubukeli and two others robbed the Engcobo Wiers Cash and Carry store. There were no injuries or damage. The three were later arrested, convicted and sentenced to prison terms for armed ro b b e r y.
3. On 17 August 1992, four ANC members, including at least two MK members, shot and killed Mr André de Villiers outside his farmhouse in Addo, Port Elizabeth. Mr de Villiers was due to testify at the forthcoming inquest into the killing of activist Mathew Goniwe and others. Mr Thamsanqa Oliver Mali [AM0124/96] asserted that they had been told by Chris Hani to use their own initiative to acquire arms.
1. The robbery went wrong and Mr de Villiers was fatally wounded and other family members were fired at. A few days later the group was arrested and eventually sentenced to long prison terms. The leader of the group, Mr Xolani Ncinane, died in prison; another member escaped. The remaining two, Mali and Mr Lindile John Stemela [AM0125/96], applied for amnesty. Mali was granted
2. amnesty; Stemela, who was not an MK member but a recent SDU recruit, was refused amnesty [AC/1999/0234].
4. The ANC distanced itself to some extent from their application. At the Port Elizabeth hearing on 19 January 1999, ANC re p resentative Thembisi Mbatha told the Commission that:

Our investigation with our Port Elizabeth office could not establish that a meeting between SDUs and the late comrade Chris Hani was held in early 1992. S e c o n d l y, it is sad that the name of Chris Hani, because he is not there to answer for himself, should be used to support the amnesty applications. According to our comrades in Port Elizabeth, the motive for the incident was a rmed robbery and not political at all. We have unfortunately not been able to trace the Xholani Tjebilisa to which they refer as their commander.

148. A more common form of robbery was to attack police or police stations in order to secure weapons. Mr Moses Vuyani Mamani [AM6141/97] was part of a gro u p of four MK operatives who attacked and robbed the Frankfort police station in the Ciskei on 12 August 1992 in order to acquire weapons. One police officer was shot and wounded in the attack. Mr Mamani was granted amnesty [AC/1999/0354].

Skirmishes with police

1. Skirmishes with police usually occurred when operatives were in possession of weapons and wished to avoid arrest or were being pursued by police.
2. Mr Wilson Mokotjo Sebiloane [AM1701/96], a former COSAS activist, left South Africa to join the ANC in 1986. On 25 May 1991, one month after his re t u rn fro m exile, his vehicle was pulled over by the police. Fearing arrest, he attempted to shoot his way out, injuring both police officers. He was captured, convicted and sentenced to 13 years’ imprisonment. Sebiloane was granted amnesty [ A C / 1 9 9 7 / 0 0 3 5 ] .

Possession and distribution of arms and ammunition

151. Thirteen applicants applied for amnesty for the possession of arms and ammunition, while another seventeen applied for the infiltration and supply of arms.

Shell House shooting

1. Perhaps the best-known case involving ANC trained personnel in this period was the shooting outside the ANC headquarters at Shell House and its off i c e s at Lancet Hall in Johannesburg on 28 March 1994. The event, in which IFP m a rchers were shot dead by ANC security guards, took place one month before the first democratic elections of April 1994.
2. Ten ANC security personnel applied for amnesty for the Shell House shooting, and three applied for the shooting outside the Lancet Hall offices. Two of the latter subsequently withdrew their applications.
3. Although it is clear that the applicants believed that they were under attack, the Amnesty Committee found no evidence of an attack on Shell House by the IFP m a rchers. Objective ballistic and medical evidence indicates that the shooting was without justification as most of the deceased were shot after they had turn e d back. The applicants admitted that they might have shot at the marchers as they w e re running away. All eleven applicants were granted amnesty [AC/2000/142].

SELF-DEFENCE UNITS 1990–1994

Lines of command and operational practices

1. SDUs were by no means a homogeneous category. Rather they reflected the character of local political developments in particular townships and the diversity of the conflicts they engaged in.
2. In most cases, SDUs had some form of contact with ANC structures, albeit in an ad hoc and unstructured way. Some existed in areas where there were no s t rong ANC branches that could provide political leadership. Some of these were led by MK operatives who had re t u rned from exile and faced strong pre s s u re to initiate and train SDUs. Such MK operatives were unlikely to be high-level ANC p e r s o n n e l .
3. Some – notably the Tokoza SDUs and some of the KwaZulu and Natal SDUs – worked closely with the ANC’s political structures. Regular meetings and liaison took place between the ANC branch and the SDU commanders. In many instances the local political ANC structure might even have initiated the formation of the SDU and was able to play a monitoring and disciplinary role. Yet even in these cases, the political link with the ANC was primarily local rather than regional. It was the local ANC branch that played the supervisory role, and the quality of that supervision depended largely upon the quality of leadership and political maturity of the branch leadership. More o v e r, the existence of such political control did not lessen the ferocity of the conflicts or the offensive character of the attacks carried out by the SDUs. Thus, despite political contro l , the Tokoza SDUs engaged in extreme forms of violence.
4. A third version of SDUs may have re g a rded itself as part of the ANC but, in reality, had little structural or political connection with the organisation. Such S D U s

152 See, for example, A M 5 5 9 4 / 9 7 .

tended to be established by local communities through civic org a n i s a t i o n s , s t reet committees or mass meetings. These SDUs might borrow the language and sometimes the structure of more formal ANC SDUs, using terms such as ‘ o rders’ and designations such as ‘commander’. Such SDUs were particularly evident in the informal settlements in and around townships. Incidents associated with these SDUs tended to be characterised by spontaneous crowd activity and violent collective action. The weaponry involved was often unsophisticated.

Types of violations

167. The SDU amnesty applications cover a very wide range of offences and attacks on a range of targets. Each region had its own particular features. The off e n c e s applied for fall into the following broad categories.

Clashes with the PA C

204. While clashes with the IFP dominate the picture in the 1990s, there were also several serious outbreaks of conflict between the ANC and PAC – mainly between the youth organisations linked to these bodies, COSAS and the ANCYL on the one hand, and the Pan Africanist Student Organisation (PASO) on the other. This conflict manifested itself in the Eastern Cape, Transkei and PWV townships.

2 0 5 . In Fort Beaufort in the Eastern Cape, conflict broke out between PASO and COSAS, spilling over into the community. There were attacks on both ANC and PAC members. On 21 February 1993, a large crowd of ANCYL supporters, including Mr Thobani Makrosi [AM0362/96], abducted two women, Ms Nomsa Mpangiso and Ms Nomangwana Mandita. Ms Mandita was later found dead in a s t reet, partially burnt, with a motor vehicle tyre around her neck and a larg e bloody stone near her head. Medical evidence indicated that she had been set alight while she was alive and had sustained serious head wounds. Ms Mpangiso, who was pregnant, managed to escape. Makrosi was granted amnesty for his role in the abduction of the two women [AC/1997/0022].^{1 5 5}

155 See also A M 3 1 2 5 / 9 6 .

Clashes in the homelands

1. Rank and file ANC membership, particularly youth, clashed with the traditional authorities and their political structures in the former homelands, particularly in the Ciskei and Bophuthatswana, which resisted free ANC political activity and t h reatened to oppose participation in the 1994 democratic elections.
2. Amnesty applications were received in respect of two attacks on suspected African Democratic Movement (ADM) members in the Ciskei. On 26 April 1993, the ANCYL resolved to kill 51-year-old Ms Nohombile Ntombazembi Mphambani, in the belief that she was an ADM member recruiting others to the party in order to attack the ANC. The following day, a group of over 100 youths chased Ms Mphambani and two of her teenage children towards the fore s t . When they caught Ms Mphambani she pleaded for her life, begging for forg i v eness and promising to join the ANC. At its East London hearing on 18 Marc h 1997, the Amnesty Committee heard that her pleas had failed:

MR MPHAMBANE: We continued to throw stones at her. She fell on the ground.

The others arrived. She was already on the ground. They continued to throw

stones at her. Some were beating her on the head with canes. After that when

we were sure that she died we left as the ‘comrades’, we left her body there .

We saw her children on the way. They asked if we’d killed their mother. We told

them that we’d killed her and we then proceeded to ask which side they

belonged to. The daughter then said she is an ANC member. Then she was

asked to sing one song of the struggle. She sang.

1. Seven youth were convicted for the killing. At their hearing the amnesty applicants spoke with remorse about their actions. They were granted amnesty and released from prison.^{1 5 6}
2. ANC supporters in Bophuthatswana, another homeland ruled by conservative traditional authorities, faced a similarly restrictive political environment post1990. Two members of the Bafokeng Action Committee and the ANC, Mr Boy Diale [AM0081/96] and Mr Christopher Makgale [AM0080/96], applied for amnesty for the killing of the tribal chairman, Mr Glad Mokgatle, in the Bafokeng district on 29 October 1990.

156 Mzwimhle Elvis Bam [AM0101/96], Sakhumzi Bheqezi [AM0105/96], Andile Namathe Gola [AM0106/96], Dumisani Ernest Mbhebe [AM0102/96], Ndumiso Mdyogolo [AM0103/96], Sikhumbuzo Victor Mphambani [AM0104/96] and Mvuyisi Raymond Ngwendu [AM0100/96].

V O L U M E 6 S E C T I O N 3 C H A P T E R 2 P A G E 3 1 8

1. The Amnesty Committee heard testimony on the political and immediate context of the killing. In 1990, the former Bophuthatswana was caught up in struggles to destroy the homeland government of Mr Lucas Mangope and his political re p resentatives. Mangope’s appointment of Glad Mokgatle as tribal chairperson was bitterly opposed by the Bafokeng, whose rightful leader had been forc e d into exile. A group of people, including the two applicants, decided in a tribal meeting to kidnap Mokgatle and wrest from him the keys of the Phokeng Civic C e n t re from where the tribe’s affairs were administered. It was during this attempt that he was killed.
2. Members of the Bafokeng tribe, including the sons of Glad Mokgatle, testified in support of the amnesty application. They argued that amnesty would foster reconciliation and unity in their community. The two were granted amnesty [ A C / 1 9 9 6 / 0 0 0 1 ] .

Incidents arising from national protest action called by the ANC

212. Several amnesty applications were received in respect of incidents in response to national events or campaigns called by the ANC. For example, the two-day national strike on 3 and 4 August 1992 during the campaign of ‘rolling mass action’ called by the Tripartite Alliance^{1 5 7} saw widespread pro t e s t .^{1 5 8} In one incident, two ANC members were granted amnesty for an arson attack on a building society in Ciskei and seven others for an arson attack in King William’s To w n , E a s t e rn Cape.

Action in the wake of the assassination of Chris Hani

213. The wave of protest and violence that followed the assassination of Chris Hani in April 1993 resulted in large numbers of convictions for public violence, arson and other violence. Amnesty applications were granted for acts of public violence committed by ordinary ANC members at this time.

157 ANC /SACP /COSAT U.

158 After the collapse of the negotiations process following the Boipatong massacre, the ANC alliance embarke d on a campaign of ‘rolling mass action’ in an attempt to bring pressure on the National Party to revise its nego t i a ting positions and stop the violence.

V O L U M E 6 S E C T I O N 3 C H A P T E R 2 P A G E 3 1 9

I n t roduction and findings

1. KwaZulu and Natal has been selected as a case study for a number of reasons. First, the violence in KwaZulu was more extreme and widespread than in any other part of the country. Second, the conflict that had begun between the UDF, the unions and Inkatha in the 1980s had, by the 1990s, spread far beyond the urban townships into the rural villages, homesteads and kraals of the re g i o n . T h i rd, Inkatha was virtually synonymous with the KwaZulu government and, em e rging in the 1990s as the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), opposed the positions taken by the ANC throughout the negotiations process. Hence the hostilities continued unabated throughout the early 1990s.
2. The ANC was also an active participant in the conflict, as reflected in the amnesty applications relating to this region. The scale of the violence drew in ANC members at every level: some as active participants in the conflict, some as refugees, others as peacemakers. At a local level, where conflicts erupted in urban townships and rural kraals and villages scattered across the remote hills of the region, there was no possibility of remaining outside the fray. For many, fight or flight became the only options. Self-defence units, made up primarily of young local men, mushroomed in these areas.

Statistics

216. One hundred ANC-linked persons applied for amnesty in respect of seventy-two incidents consisting of 200 separate acts that took place in the KwaZulu and Natal areas in the 1990 to 1994 period. They include fifty civilian ANC members or supporters, twenty MK operatives (including three senior ANC regional leaders) and thirty SDU members. Applications were made primarily by people who were in custody or facing prosecution.

217. The 200 acts included:

218. Of these one hundred applications, ninety-three involved hearable matters involving gross human rights violations, while seven were dealt with administratively in chambers. These seven non-hearables involved primarily the illegal possession of arms and ammunition, and were all granted. Of the applications that involved hearings, sixty-eight were granted. Twenty-two were refused. A further three were partially granted and partially refused.

S t r u c t u res of the ANC and the nature of the conflicts

2 1 9 . Evidence from applicants suggests that ANC branch structures in KwaZulu/Natal, as elsewhere, played a mixed role re g a rding the activities of the SDUs. Branches could be and were used to launch attacks in the name of the ANC, but many SDUs appear to have had little or no relationship with their local branch, if indeed t h e re was one. SDUs also emerged in areas where no ANC branches existed.

1. Not one amnesty applicant said that s/he had received authorisation from the ANC regional leadership for these attacks. Several, however, claimed authorisation by their ANC branch or local ANC leader. Regional leadership played a ro l e in the provision of weapons and the training of SDUs.
2. In one of the most direct cases of ANC authorisation at branch level, SDU member Khetha Mpilo Khuzwayo [AM6175/97; AC/2000/004] was granted amnesty for the assassination of Mr Eliakim Makhosi Mthembu and the attempted killing of Mr Amos Sibiya at Mankwanyaneni Reserve, Empangeni, on 3 May 1994. The attack took place between the elections of 27 April and the inauguration of Nelson Mandela as President on 10 May.
3. Mr Khuzwayo and five other SDU members set themselves up beside a road and opened fire on Mthembu’s vehicle as he drove by. Mr Sibiya, a passenger, managed to escape. At the Johannesburg hearing on 15 November 1999, Mr Khuzwayo told the Amnesty Committee that he had been given a hit list by his ANC branch chairperson.

159 Unspecified – in other words, the victim was not identified.

MR KHUZWAY O: After the training, I received a list of people who were supposed to be killed because they were destabilising the ANC campaign which was geared towards the 1994 election. I was informed that by the time the elections come, these people should have been re m o v e d . MS LOONAT: Who gave you this list? MR KHUZWAY O: From Shadrack, the chairperson of the ANC at the time. MS LOONAT: B e f o re we proceed with this list, did you always receive instructions only from Shadrack or from other people to commit these attacks on the IFP members? MR KHUZWAY O: Shadrack, as the chairperson of the area, was the one re s p o nsible for giving reports to the ANC office and he would also give us feedback on the information he had received from the ANC office. MS LOONAT: How did you get the information from Shadrack? Was it given p e r s o n a l l y, or did you have rallies, or how was it communicated to you? MR KHUZWAY O: I was not alone, but everyone who had been trained intern a l l y received a list of people who should be targeted and killed.

1. Historical fiefdoms and allegiances in KwaZulu and Natal made it impossible for residents to remain neutral. People’s identities were tied to where they lived, to their families, their clans and to local authority figures such as i n d u n a s^{1 6 0} and chiefs.
2. This confluence of place and political allegiance could have fatal consequences, as simply being found or seen in the wrong area could result in death. On 28 September 1991, Ms Thembi Victoria Mzquso Mthembu, an ANC supporter, was a p p a rently seen in the HRH compound hostel in Greytown. Because the compound was an IFP bastion, she was assaulted and stabbed to death by ANC members who suspected her of collaboration with the IFP. Three ANC supporters were granted amnesty for the killing [AC/2000/017].
3. The conflict also threw up old rivalries. In some cases, the roots of conflict were found in clashes between extended families. Traditional structures featured pro m i n e n t l y

160 Local headmen.

in incidents described by amnesty applicants. While chiefs, indunas and other such traditional structures were more common to the IFP, in some cases chiefs were ANC supporters, or diff e rent members of a chief’s family supported diff e rent parties.

2 2 6. Mr Celinhlanhla Zenith Mzimela [AM0435/96], the son of an ailing IFP-supporting chief, was an ANC supporter. In 1990, one of his brothers, also an ANC supporter, was killed by local IFP members, including a Mr Gumede, councillor to his f a t h e r. The dead man was the rightful heir and was killed in order to prevent his succession to the chieftainship, to clear the way for an IFP-supporting bro t h e r, Mr Booi Mzimela.

1. In February 1992, Gumede and his people struck again, killing another of the b rothers, also an ANC supporter and next in line to the chieftainship.
2. CZ Mzimela then decided to act. He and another brother went to Mr Gumede’s house and shot him dead while he was washing. Mzimela was granted amnesty for the killing [AC/1997/0037].
3. This case raises one of the difficult issues that the Amnesty Committee had to deal with in respect of KwaZulu Natal applications in particular – that of personal revenge. In terms of the amnesty criteria, revenge does not qualify as a political objective, and yet it emerged that many incidents occurred in response to previous acts of violence against a perpetrator or his family members. The Amnesty Committee noted, however, that while personal revenge was a feature of the conflicts in the region, the issue had to be seen against the wider backdrop of political conflict and the cycle of violence that gripped villages and townships during this period. Revenge, personal and political, was part of the fabric and momentum of the conflict and could not be separated out from it.
4. In the urban areas, several incidents were connected with crime, migrancy and labour disputes. Some incidents also intersected with other running disputes, such as access to land, or economic conflicts that acquired a political dimension, such as taxi conflicts. In some cases, however, victims disputed the political dimensions of the incidents, arguing that the conflict was simply a faction fight arising from local disputes such as demarcation problems.

2 3 1 . Many ANC applicants in KwaZulu and Natal acknowledged the gap between the A N C ’s organisational national policies and the imperatives of the violent situation in which they lived at local level. Thus:

MR MSANI: It was not the ANC’s aim that we should kill people. But it was the situation that forced us to fight IFP. Any ANC member, bottom or up, knew that if you are ANC, you shouldn’t attack your political opponent, but because of the situation, we were forced to kill each other, IFP and ANC, because a lot of people w e re killed, it was the situation that forced us to do that. (Durban hearing, 24 November 1998.) MR LUTHULI: It wasn’t my organisation which sent me to kill him, but it was the situation in that area. (Caprivi hearings at Johannesburg and KwaZulu-Natal, 7 April 1998 to 14 September 1998.) MR NCOKWA N E: I know that the ANC does not kill, but we killed because we w e re forced by the situation, where we were being killed without a place where we could voice this out. (Hearing at Durban, 29 April 1999.) MR MAT J E L E: Since it was twenty days before the elections of 1994, the first elections of this country, the honourable President of the African National C o n g ress, your organisation, President Mandela and other respectable leaders, they were passing information that people should not resort to violence, that was the policy of the ANC, isn’t that so sir? MR SIMA: Yes, that is so. But people at grassroots did not actually take it that that should be the case, they were actually perpetrating violence. (Hearing at P i e t e rmaritzburg, 3 February 1999.)

1. Most ANC perpetrators were themselves victims of the conflict. Several had lost members of their families in the violence. They were often refugees, having been violently evicted from areas, their homes and property destroyed. Some had narrowly escaped death themselves. These applicants repeatedly described the failure of the security forces and the judicial system to take steps against the IFP or other perpetrators. As a consequence of the failure and betrayal by state structures, applicants took up arms in the belief that they were compelled to do so to secure and protect their own lives and pro p e r t y. This ‘right to self defence’ did not re q u i re ANC policy appro v a l .
1. Applicants also interpreted many attacks as defensive, even if they involved
1. o ffensive means, such as launching an attack on the homestead of an IFP m e m b e r. They argued that a particular killing or attack was self-defence, in
2. o rder to halt the source of ongoing attacks on themselves.

1. Several applicants applied for incidents in which they were in fact victims of attacks. The attack on COSATU regional chairperson Muntukayise Bhekuyise Ntuli [AM5201/97] by members of the IFP Esikhawini hit squad on 26 August 1992 is a case in point (see below).
2. Many applicants displayed deep re g ret and remorse for their involvement in the conflict between the ANC and IFP in the region and explained their actions in terms of the situation that prevailed at the time. They spoke of a yearning for re c o n c i l i a t i o n .

MR MZIMELA: Mrs Gumede, I respect you very much. I just want to say how deeply hurt and re g retful I am because you have lost your husband and a friend. That was not my aim to just kill your husband. It was the situation that forced me to behave in the manner that I did. … I wish to express my sincere apologies to you. I thank this honourable Commission for having granted me the chance to a d d ress Mrs Gumede. (Hearing at Pietermaritzburg, 22 May 2000.) MR HLENGWA: I would like to say to the family and the relatives of Mbeko that I am here today to apologise to them for my actions, and I took the law in my hands, and I’m asking them to please forgive me. It was because of the situation at Umgababa. IFP and ANC were in conflict. Even our minds were not working v e ry well. There f o re I would please like them to forgive me. (Hearing at P i e t e rmaritzburg, 1 February 1999.)

236. In particular, conflicts that had divided families showed evidence of healing re l a t i o n s h i p s .

ADV MPSHE: What is the relationship between yourself now and Becker P h o s w a ’s family? MR PHOSWA: I do not know very much, because I am still in prison, but my brothers who are outside and my children, they are saying they have a peaceful relationship. They even visit each other and live together. ADV MPSHE: And I can take it that you are also in a position to, if you are released, if you meet them to go back to them and to get engaged in some kind of reconciliation with them? You pre p a red to do that? MR PHOSWA: Yes, I will have to continue where they are from now. I also wanted to add Indaba Zimboeza Phoswa came twice to me in prison. We shake, we shook hands and he said, he asked for forgiveness that his son has killed my son and that we were also affected by the political situation and this what cre a t e d this. This was not supposed to have happened and that he is sorry about it. We shook hands and he also gave me money and food. (Hearing at P i e t e rmaritzburg, 30 July 1997.)

237. The father of one of the victims responded to Mr Phoswa:

ADV MPSHE: N o w, how did you, how did the death of your son affect you, if it did affect you? MR MTHEMBU: This hurt me a lot, because he was about to be married, but I blame the political situation, because before this political activity in the area, we w e re living in peace. There was not an IFP or ANC, it was a peaceful situation. T h e re f o re, I blame politics and the organisations which had caused the death of my son. ADV MPSHE: Mr Mthembu, part of the mandate of the Truth Commission is to foster reconciliation particularly between or amongst people who have been torn apart by politics. Do you understand? MR MTHEMBU: That is corre c t . ADV MPSHE: N o w, what is your view about this re c o n c i l i a t i o n ? MR MTHEMBU: I knew that we were not enemies. It was only the politics which infiltrated the area and at the moment, I will say, we have reconciled in the are a . People at Patene and Richmond have reconciled and even at Gengeshe and I would like to see peace in this area, because we are not enemies, but the organisations made us to be enemies. Although I lost my son I will still think we should be reconciled. ADV MPSHE: The two applicants, whose evidence you listened to today, they a re before this committee, particularly, for amnesty and they are also asking for forgiveness. What is your attitude towards that? MR MTHEMBU: I do forgive them, because I knew we were not enemies. It was politics that caused the animosity in the whole world and even today when we talk to them, they are so nice to us and they also wish for reconciliation. MR WILLS: I have no questions. I would just like to express my great respect for the witness at this stage. JUDGE WILSON: Mr Mthembu, I would like to express the view of the committee, that we sympathise with you in your very tragic loss and we admire this forgiving approach that you have adopted and respect you for the honesty that you have shown in coming to tell us all what your feelings are today. We would like to thank you very much for all you have done here. (Hearing at Pietermaritzburg, 30 July 1997.)

Types of violations