Right-Wing Gro u p s

The Flagstaff police station attack

71. Four AWB members and three IFP members launched an attack on the Flagstaff police station in the Eastern Cape on 6 March 1994, with the intention of stealing

236 In terms of Section 29 of the A c t , witnesses and alleged perpetrators could be subpoenaed in order to ‘ e s t a blish the fate or whereabouts of victims’ and the identity of those responsible for human rights violations.

237 The initial cut-off date for amnesty applications was 14 December 1996. This was, h o w ev e r, extended to 10 May 1997.

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arms for use by IFP self-protection units (SPUs).^{2 3 8} AWB members Harry Simon J a rdine [AM6178/97] and Andrew Howell [AM5961/97], AWB/IFP member Morton Christie [AM6610/97] and IFP members Christo Brand [AM6422/97] and James Mkhazwa Zulu [AM5864/97] applied for amnesty for the incident. Before the start of the hearing, Mr Zulu was killed in a violent altercation and his application could not be proceeded with.

1. The applicants testified before the Committee that AWB Commander Patrick Pedlar and Mr Robin Shoesmith, an IFP SPU member, requested that they attack the Flagstaff station on a Sunday when it was thought that there would be only one SAP officer on duty. However, unbeknown to the applicants, the police were tipped off about the attack, allegedly by Pedlar himself. R e i n f o rcements were sent to the police station and what had been foreseen as an easy robbery turned into a shoot-out. The police officer on duty, Mr B a rnabas Jaggers, died in the attack and officers Wele Edmund Nyanguna and Mzingizi Abednego Mkhondweni were injured. The applicants managed to get away with a vehicle, arms and ammunition and a trunk containing R140 in cash.
2. Mr Jardine testified that, at the time, the AWB was preparing for war because the ANC was going to take over the country. In this volatile political climate, the AWB co-operated with the IFP because they shared ‘a common enemy’ in the ANC/SACP alliance. Working with the IFP would strengthen the might of the AWB in the south coastal areas of KwaZulu/Natal (Durban hearing, April 1998).
3. Mr Howell testified before the Committee that the IFP and the AWB shared the same belief in the self-determination of their people. Working together to combat the ANC’s rise to power would strengthen the AW B ’s aim of achieving a B o e re s t a a t (Durban hearing, April 1998).
4. Mr Christie testified that he had been instructed by AWB General Nick Fourie^{2 3 9} to assist the IFP in any way possible.

MR CHRISTIE: … I see in the news and what-not, the IFP or Zulus, as such, had marched with other right-wingers in other parts of the country. So, our objective was, obviously, to assist the IFP. You know, they not having the benefit of military training as what we’ve had and, of course, the ANC having benefit of military training from overseas, the IFP are left with no military training. I was instructed

238 See Chapter Three in this section. 239 Nick Fourie was killed about a week after this event when AWB forces invaded Bophuthatswana.

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on that regard that we should assist the IFP in any way possible. (Durban hearing, 24 April 1998.)

1. Although he authorised the attack, Fourie was not involved in planning it. He did, however, warn Christie to proceed with caution and to be wary of local AWB Commander Patrick Pedlar, who was thought to be an informer for the Security Branch.
2. All five applicants were convicted of the ro b b e r y, the killing of Mr Barnabas Jaggers and the attempted killing of Mr Wele Edmund Nyanguna and Mr Mzingizi Abednego Mkhondweni. Their sentencing in the matter was delayed pending the outcome of their amnesty applications. The surviving victims, Mr Nyanguna and Mr Mkhondweni, opposed their applications on the grounds that the applicants did not disclose who actually wounded them and killed Mr Jaggers.
3. The Amnesty Committee found that the operation was associated with a political objective committed in the course of the conflicts of the past and that the relevant facts relating to the particular offenses had been disclosed, bearing in mind the circumstances prevailing that night. Amnesty was granted the four applicants [AC/1998/0015].

The Seychelles Restaurant attack

7 9 . In February 1994, the same IFP and AWB members conspired to carry out an attack on the Seychelles Restaurant at Port Shepstone. Mr Morton Christie, Mr Harry Jardine and Mr Andrew Howell applied for amnesty for the arson attack that destroyed the restaurant. They testified before the Amnesty Committee that the restaurant was a known meeting place for ANC supporters.

1. At the hearing on the Flagstaff police station attack, the applicants revealed that they had conspired to bomb the Port Shepstone offices of the NP and the ANC on the same day as the Seychelles Restaurant attack, but had abandoned these plans because of the commotion caused in the town by the bombing of the restaurant. No casualties or injuries were reported after the bombing.
2. Amnesty was granted to the applicants for the attack on the restaurant, for the conspiracy to attack the NP and ANC offices and for preparing and being in possession of explosives, on the basis that the relevant facts had been disc l o s e d

and that the offences were associated with a political objective committed in the course of the conflicts of the past [AC/1999/0183, 0184, 0185].

The testimony of Clive Derby-Lewis

1. The Committee found that Mr Clive Derby-Lewis was a seasoned politician steeped in conservative politics who had been popular in Afrikaner right-wing c i rcles at the time of the incident. He was an English-speaking South African with a distinguished military background. He had been one of the founder members of the Conservative Party (CP) which had been launched in February 1982, had re p resented the party in Parliament during the period May 1987 to September 1989 and had served on the Pre s i d e n t ’s Council from September 1989 until the assassination.
2. Right-wing organisations were convinced that the political reforms of the early 1990s would result in the destruction of the Afrikaner’s culture, values and way of life. It was in this context that Derby-Lewis and Walus plotted the assassination of Mr Hani. Their hope was that the followers of Mr Hani, many of them young people, would react to his assassination by causing widespread mayhem. This would create an opportunity for the security forces and the right wing to step in to re s t o re order and take over the government of the country.
3. They never obtained the express authority of the CP for the assassination, nor w e re they acting upon the instructions or orders of the CP. Derby-Lewis had engaged in a discussion with Dr Tre u rnicht who indicated that it would be justified to kill the anti-Christ in a situation of war. Derby-Lewis contended that his senior position in the CP gave him the necessary authority to take the decision to assassinate Mr Hani on behalf of the CP.
4. In the course of their discussions about the assassination, Derby-Lewis handed Walus a list of names and addresses. The evidence led was that Mrs Derby-Lewis had pre p a red it for the purpose of exposing the luxurious lifestyles of those on the list for newspaper articles she intended writing. Her intention was to embarrass those concerned because their lifestyles conflicted with the cause for which they stood.
5. Derby-Lewis instructed Walus to number the names on the list in sequence of their enmity towards the CP. In other words, he contended that the list was not n u m b e red for the purpose of eliminations; Mr Hani, the third on the list, was the only person identified for elimination.
6. It was agreed that Walus would shoot Mr Hani and that he would re c o n n o i t re the Hani home and determine the logistics for the execution of the plan. Derby-Lewis would obtain an unlicensed firearm with a silencer to be used in the a s s a s s i n a t i o n .
7. During March 1993, Derby-Lewis obtained an unlicensed firearm from an old acquaintance, Mr Faan Ve n t e r, and arranged for a silencer to be fitted to the f i rearm through a friend in Cape Town, Mr Keith Darre l .
8. On 6 April 1993, Walus had breakfast with Derby-Lewis and his wife. After b reakfast, Mrs Derby-Lewis left the house. Derby-Lewis handed the murd e r weapon, a Z88 pistol with a silencer and subsonic ammunition, to Wa l u s .
9. On 7 April 1993, Walus called again at Derby-Lewis’ house to enquire about the ammunition Derby-Lewis had said he would obtain for the pistol. Derby-Lewis had not yet managed to obtain the ammunition but instructed Walus to pro c e e d with the assassination, repeating that he would leave the detailed execution of the plan to Wa l u s .
10. Derby-Lewis testified that he was shocked when he heard about the assassination on 10 April 1993. He had not planned to assassinate Mr Hani over the Easter weekend and had indeed decided to postpone the assassination in order to give the matter further careful thought. Besides, he had not yet given Walus the ammunition. He concluded, there f o re, that someone other than Walus had been responsible for the assassination. However, he saw from the media reports the next day that it was indeed Walus who had killed Mr Hani. Derby-Lewis was a r rested at home on 17 April 1993.
11. At first, Derby-Lewis refused to co-operate with the police. It was only after he was detained in terms of section 29 of the Internal Security Act that, under prolonged interrogation and pre s s u re, he made certain statements. He gave false information, notably about the list of names, in order to protect innocent people including his wife. He was also untruthful when he told the police that he had last seen Walus in December 1992.
12. He also gave false information in the affidavit he made (dated 29 October 1993) in support of the application to reopen his case in the criminal trial. He testified that he did so because he believed that the political struggle was still continuing at that stage and that he had to explore every avenue to secure his re l e a s e .

The Testimony of Janusz Walus

1. The Committee found that Mr Janusz Walus was a member of both the CP and the AWB at the time of the incident. He was born in Poland and emigrated to South Africa in 1982 to escape the Communist regime in Poland. He chose South Africa because he believed that the Afrikaner would never succumb to Communism.
2. The Committee heard that Walus had a keen interest in South African politics and met Derby-Lewis and his wife in 1985. He participated in many CP activities with Derby-Lewis and formally joined the CP that year. In the same year, Walus met AWB leader Eugene Terre’Blanche and subsequently joined the AWB. He attended various AWB meetings during 1985 and 1986 and learnt of their resistance to NP policies and their fear that the NP would hand the country over to ‘Communists’.
3. Walus was granted South African citizenship in 1988 and was able to vote in the 1989 elections. Although the NP gave voters the assurance that the ANC or SACP would not be unbanned before the election, it unbanned them in February 1990. It then became clear to him that negotiations would involve the NP and ANC to the exclusion of opposition parties.
1. After the 1992 re f e rendum, the NP government reneged on its undertaking to consult the electorate before any constitutional amendments were effected. It then became clear to the CP that democratic channels were blocked. Wa l u s f e a red that Mr Hani would take over the country as he was a popular leader in the SACP and saw himself being subjected to the Communist regime from which he
2. had escaped in Poland. This made him apprehensive to the extent that ‘he vowed to do something to try and stop the handing over of his country to a Communist ruler’. It was at this stage that Walus began holding numerous detailed discussions with Derby-Lewis about solutions to the deteriorating political situation. Wa l u s re g a rded Derby-Lewis as one of the policy makers of the CP and relied on him to provide direction. In one of these discussions (February 1993) Derby-Lewis handed him the list of names and they decided that Mr Hani should be shot.
4. On 10 April 1993, after reconnoitring the Hani home, Walus saw Mr Hani get into a vehicle. He ascertained that Mr Hani had no bodyguards with him. He followed the vehicle to the local shopping centre. Mr Hani went inside and later re t u rned with a newspaper. Walus decided that this was an ideal opportunity to execute the order and drove to the Hani home where he awaited Mr Hani’s re t u rn. After Mr Hani had pulled into the driveway, Walus approached and fire d two shots at him. After Mr Hani had fallen down, Walus shot him twice behind the ear at close range. Walus left the scene in his vehicle. He was stopped by the police soon after the incident and was found in possession of the Z88 pistol, w h e reupon he was arre s t e d .
5. During his detention, Walus was at first not pre p a red to give any statements to the police. After prolonged interrogation and after being given alcohol by the police, he began co-operating. He was also misled into believing that some members of the interrogation team were members of right-wing political org a n isations who had infiltrated the security police. Walus disputed the contents of certain statements the police alleged he had made while in detention and which form part of the re c o rd. He denied having said some of the things ascribed to him in these statements and indicated that the police had amended the statements to suit their own purposes.

The Testimony of Gaye Derby-Lewis

1. Mrs Gaye Derby-Lewis’ testimony before the Committee concerning her role prior to the assassination coincided largely with that of her husband. She had not been involved in the plot to kill Mr Hani and was totally unaware of the plans. The list of names found in the possession of Walus was pre p a red at her instance by a journalist friend, Mr Arthur Kemp. She intended to use it to write a series of newspaper articles exposing the luxurious lifestyles of those identified on the list. This would have embarrassed them because it would expose their ‘gravy train’ lifestyles, which were at odds with the cause they re p re s e n t e d .
2. Mrs Derby-Lewis had also left the list in the Cape Town office of Dr Hartzenberg for his use in his speeches in Parliament. He never made use of it and the list was re t u rned to her. She testified that she was unaware of the fact that her husband had given the list to Wa l u s .
3. She confirmed having had breakfast with her husband and Walus at her home on 6 April 1993, but testified that she had left while her husband and Wa l u s w e re still having a discussion.
4. She heard the news about Mr Hani’s assassination while she and her husband w e re visiting Mr Faan Venter on 10 April 1993. She was arrested on 21 April 1993 and placed under section 29 detention. She was subsequently charg e d and acquitted. She gave false testimony at the trial on the question as to whether her husband had told her on 12 April 1993 that he had given the list to Wa l u s .
5. A substantial part of her testimony before the Amnesty Committee was devoted to her detention and treatment at the hands of the police.
1. While in police detention, Mrs Derby-Lewis wrote and signed a number of statements. She personally typed one of the hand-written statements to help the police sergeant who was charged with doing the typing. Despite this, she a rgued that she had been unduly influenced to make these statements and that they had not been freely and voluntarily made for the following re a s o n s :
2. a She was not warned in terms of the Judges’ Rules. However, under cro s s examination on behalf of the police officers, she conceded that it was possible that she had been warn e d .
6. Under cross-examination on behalf of the police officers, Derby-Lewis conceded that those parts of the video re c o rding of her questioning which were put to her showed that her conversation with Deetlefs was quite civilised. They also showed her fully participating in the discussion. She then indicated that Deetlefs had threatened her during those parts of the conversation that were not on the tape. She praised the police and said she would like to join the police force, but said this was meant as a joke.
7. She also confirmed that Deetlefs’ attitude did not, at any stage, lead to her telling an untruth and agreed that he did not compel her to tell any untruths. She said that she ‘stuck to her guns’ and spoke the truth.
8. When re f e r red to a portion of the video re c o rding where she says she had slept for twelve hours, she conceded that sleep deprivation did not play a role when she signed some of her statements on 24 April 1993.
9. Under cross-examination, she conceded that De Waal was reasonably civil t o w a rds her. On most occasions when he questioned her, there was a female police officer present. He helped her to obtain some personal items and to attend to other personal matters. On one occasion, she told De Waal that she did not wish to do a ‘pointing out’, which he accepted.
10. Mrs Derby-Lewis saw her personal doctor in April 1993, some days after Deetlefs had concluded his interrogation. Although only the District Surg e o n was present, she failed to tell her doctor about her maltreatment or that she had been compelled to make false statements. When she was asked under cro s s

b	She was denied access to a legal re p resentative and was at times falsely
	told that her attorney was on his way.
c	She was threatened with section 29 detention.
d	She was badly treated by Captain Deetlefs who was insulting towards her
	and threatened her with long-term imprisonment. She had a personal fear of
	Deetlefs and complained that he was intoxicated.
e	Sleep deprivation contributed towards her writing false statements.
f	Mr de Waal made her change her statement and write various untruths. He
	would come to her after she had written a statement and inform her that
	Colonel Van Niekerk was not happy with what she had written. She would
	then amend her statement accord i n g l y.

examination to explain the meaning of, ‘I am sure it is going to be used in court’, words she uses on the video, she declined to do so. She testified that she really did not know what these words meant because she had used them while she was being held under section 29 detention.

The Decision of the Amnesty Committee

1 6 1 . In arriving at a decision, the Committee had to isolate several issues for consideration.

a	We re the applicants acting bona fide on behalf of or in support of the CP in
	furtherance of a political struggle by the CP against the ANC/SACP alliance,
	as re q u i red by section 20 (2)(a) of the Act?
b	We re the applicants acting bona fide as employees or members of the CP in
	the course and scope of their duties and within the scope of their express
	or implied authority in furtherance of a political struggle with the ANC/SACP
	alliance, as re q u i red by section 20(2)(d) of the Act?
c	Did the applicants have reasonable grounds for believing that they were
	acting in the course and scope of their duties and within the scope of their
	e x p ress or implied authority as re q u i red by section 20(2)(f) of the Act?
d	Did the applicants make a full disclosure of all relevant facts as re q u i red by
	section 20(1)(c) of the Act with specific re f e rence to:
e	the purpose for which the list of names was compiled;
f	the purpose for which names were prioritised on the list;
g	the purpose for which the Z88 pistol was obtained and fitted with a silencer;
h	whether Walus was acting upon orders from Derby-Lewis in assassinating
	Mr Hani;
i	the role played by Mrs Derby-Lewis in the killing and whether she had
	advance knowledge of the assassination?

1. The Amnesty Committee devoted time to two further issues: the weight to be attached to statements that Derby-Lewis and Walus made while in detention and the question of a wider conspiracy to kill Mr Hani. Although the Committee was not persuaded that the applicants’ versions detracted from the weight of these statements, it made an assessment of the applicants’ evidence without having re g a rd to these statements. Furthermore, although there were compelling a rguments in favour of the conclusion that there was a wider conspiracy to kill Mr Hani, the Committee found that the evidence did not conclusively establish this fact.
2. The Committee found that it was common cause that the applicants were not acting on the express authority or orders of the CP, which party they purported to re p resent in assassinating Mr Hani. The CP had never adopted, pro p a g a t e d or espoused a policy of violence or the assassination of political opponents.
3. Various newspaper reports immediately after the assassination evidence the CP l e a d e r s h i p ’s disapproval of the incident and their rejection of murder as a political tool. The arrest of Mrs Derby-Lewis came as a shock to them. They had denied earlier that Walus was a listed CP member. In fact, during a television interview on 20 April 1993, the acting leader of the CP, Dr Ferdi Hartzenberg , unequivocally distanced the CP from violence and reiterated the commitment of the CP to non-violent, democratic means of pursuing its aims. He expre s s l y denied that the statements made by CP leaders amounted to tacit approval of violence, or that the CP had ever planned violence on an offensive basis. R a t h e r, the CP was looking at means to defend its followers from the violence that was taking place.
4. In testifying before the Committee, Dr Hartzenberg also denied that the objective which the applicants pursued, namely to cause chaos and re v o l u t i o n in the country, formed part of CP policy. He testified further that it was not CP policy to eliminate opposition political leaders. The CP had never been aware of the planning of the assassination and only became aware of it after the event. It never approved, ratified or condoned the assassination. In an apparent concession of this fact, the applicants submitted in their written argument that it was not a legal re q u i rement that the CP should have been aware of or expre s s l y a p p roved the assassination. It was merely re q u i red that the CP should have benefited from the assassination.
5. The applicants also relied on the dictionary definition of the Afrikaans term ‘ten behoewe van’ which is the equivalent of the term ‘on behalf of’ used in section 20(2)(a). According to the definition, the term means ‘tot voordeel van’ (to the benefit of). The applicants failed to specify what benefit allegedly accrued to the CP following to the assassination. On the contrary, the evidence before the Committee did not show that any benefit had accrued to the CP.
6. Those who objected to the applications submitted in their written argument that the words ‘on behalf of’ in the context of section 20(2)(a) were used in the narro w sense as referring to someone who is mandated or authorised to act by an

o rganisation. Any other interpretation, and particularly the wider meaning suggested by the applicants, would lead to absurd results. They illustrated such a b s u rdity by referring to the example of bank robbers claiming to be acting on behalf of a liberation movement because their actions were crippling the economy and thus benefiting the struggle of the liberation movement.

1. Taking into account the submissions of the objectors, the Committee noted that subsection 20(2)(a) of the Act did not cover perpetrators who acted contrary to the stated policies of the organisation which they purported to re p resent. The Committee was there f o re not satisfied that the applicants had acted on behalf of or in support of the CP in assassinating Mr Hani.
2. The Committee accepted that the applicants clearly and subjectively believed that they were acting against a political opponent. The objective facts supported this belief, in particular the fact that Mr Hani was re g a rded as such by the CP and the right wing. However, this factor, while relevant, was insufficient on its own to render the application successful.
3. The Committee found that it was clear that the applicants had not been acting within the course and scope of their duties or on express authority from the CP. The clear evidence of Dr Hartzenberg negated any claim that the public utterances of the CP leadership constituted implied authority for the assassination. The Committee found that it would have been futile for the applicants to rely on such a claim, given the fact that they were both active CP members, acquainted with the party structures and constitution as well as the policy of non-violence. Mr Derby-Lewis, in particular, was part of the CP leadership and national decision-making structure and could not reasonably rely on the utterances of his colleagues to support his claim that they had implied authority from the CP for the assassination. His discussions with Dr Tre u rnicht about killing the ‘anti-Christ’ could hardly amount to authority or an instruction to commit the assassination. To his knowledge, Dr Tre u rnicht had no power in terms of the CP constitution to bind the CP without the necessary mandate, especially in so radical an undertaking as the assassination of a high-profile political opponent.
4. The Committee found the inference that the public speeches and statements relied upon by the applicants amounted to a call for armed struggle or violence to be unfounded. These were no more than predictions or warnings that the CP might adopt a course of violence in the future .
5. Nor did the random explosions and acts of violence re f e r red to by the applicants support their argument. None of these acts were committed by or on behalf of the CP. Indeed, Mr Koos Botha was repudiated by the CP during October 1992 for causing an explosion at the Hillview School. The basis of this repudiation was that the speeches of Dr Tre u rnicht could not be interpreted as a call for violence.
6. The Committee was satisfied that the applicants were not acting within the scope of any implied authority from the CP in assassinating Mr Hani. The applications accordingly failed to comply with the re q u i rements of section 20(2)(d).
7. The Committee was not satisfied that the applicants had any reasonable g rounds for believing that they were acting within the course and scope of their duties. The applications accordingly failed to comply with the re q u i rement of section 20(2)(f).
8. In determining whether the applicants had made full disclosure, the Committee gave consideration to the purpose of the list of names. The applicants testified that Mrs Derby-Lewis had pre p a red the list of names for innocuous reasons and that Derby-Lewis had decided to use it for a totally diff e rent purpose. The Committee found that the reason Mrs Derby-Lewis gave for requiring the addresses of the persons on the list was unconvincing. Her explanation that she needed addre s s e s in order to arrange interviews makes little sense in view of her concession that t h e re was no likelihood of Mr Hani giving her an interview in his home.
9. The Committee found that the names constituted a hit list compiled for the purpose of planning assassinations. The evidence of the applicants that the list was to assist them to communicate confidentially was wholly unconvincing and the Committee found their version to be untrue in this re g a rd .
10. On the question of the murder weapon, Mr Derby-Lewis told the Committee that he had acquired the Z88 pistol in order to protect his family. The silencer was fitted so that he could practice at home without disturbing his neighbours. The silencer would also give him a strategic advantage during an attack upon his home. Derby-Lewis thus contended that the original reason for obtaining the f i rearm was unrelated to the subsequent assassination of Mr Hani. It was pure l y fortuitous that he was in possession of an unlicensed firearm fitted with a silencer at a time when Walus was looking for an appropriate murder weapon to execute the assassination.
11. The Committee had no hesitation in rejecting Derby-Lewis’ evidence in this re g a rd. His explanation for fitting a silencer to the unlicensed firearm was inhere n t l y i m p robable and his explanation of the reason for obtaining the firearm was clearly false. It was particularly significant that he obtained a weapon that was perfectly suited for the purposes of the assassination fairly soon before the incident and at about the time when the applicants agreed that Mr Hani should be shot. The Z88 pistol was clearly obtained for the express purpose of assassinating Mr Hani.
12. The Committee gave its attention to whether Walus had acted on the instruction of Derby-Lewis in executing the attack. Walus initially stated in his application that he had acted alone in planning and executing the assassination. Subsequently, his application was amended to indicate that he had acted on the instructions of Derby-Lewis, but that they had jointly planned the assassination.
13. The Committee found that it was clear from the re c o rd that Walus was not acting as a mere functionary. He had a clear understanding of the political situation and was active in right-wing politics. He was clearly activated by his personal d e s i re to stop the ‘Communists’ from taking over the country. He participated fully in political discussions and in hatching the plot to assassinate Mr Hani. He was under no duress or coercion and executed the plan as he deemed fit. Indeed, Derby-Lewis indicated that he was taken by surprise by the timing of the assassination.
14. In any event, Walus’ own testimony is contradictory on the issue of orders. It is also contradicted by the testimony of Derby-Lewis, whose evidence was that the applicants were acting as co-conspirators who had jointly taken the decision to assassinate Mr Hani.
15. As an active CP member, Walus would have been aware that the CP has constitutionally established decision-making structures and that Derby-Lewis had no power to order him to commit murd e r, particularly in the light of the CP’s policy of non-violence. There was no suggestion that he was ever pre v i o u s l y

o rd e red by the CP to commit any unlawful acts, let alone murd e r. More o v e r, he failed to raise the alleged order to assassinate Mr Hani with any person in authority or with any governing structure in the CP.

183. In the circumstances, the Committee was satisfied that Walus was a coconspirator and that he was not merely acting on orders from Derby-Lewis.

A c c o rd i n g l y, the Committee rejected the argument raised on behalf of Walus in this respect. The Committee judged that this was an afterthought and was resorted to in an attempt to enhance Walus’ chances of receiving amnesty by curing deficiencies in the original application, and to bring the application within the ambit of the provisions of the Act, particularly section 20(3)(e).

1 8 4 . In summary, the Committee found that the applicants had failed to make a full d i s c l o s u re in respect of any of the relevant and material issues and was not satisfied that they had complied with the re q u i rements of the Act, in particular the provisions of section 20(2)(a) thereof. Amnesty was refused [AC/1999/0172].

Legal challenge

1. A full bench of the High Court sat to review an application from the applicants challenging the decision of the Amnesty Committee. The Court considered all the evidence that had been presented before the Committee, as well as the a rguments by all the parties, and analysed the various provisions of section 20 of the Act in detail.
2. In summary, the Court’s main findings were that the Amnesty Committee had c o r rectly rejected the applicants’ contention that they had acted on behalf of the CP, subjectively believing that their conduct would advance the cause of their party. Further, the Court endorsed the finding of the Committee that the applicants had not acted in the course and scope of their duties as members of the CP, as is re q u i red by section 20(2)(d) of the Act, as assassination was never one of Derby-Lewis’ duties as a senior member of the CP. It followed that Derby-Lewis could not have shared a non-existent duty with Walus; nor could he have delegated part of it to Walus. It followed that assassination never formed part of Walus’ duties either.
3. The Court found that Walus was in a diff e rent position as a rank and file member and was entitled to assume that Derby-Lewis had authority to speak on behalf of the CP. In his original application, Walus stated that, ‘he had acted alone in the planning and commission of the deed’. Under cro s s - e x a m i n a t i o n , he said that this was not true. Walus later amended his amnesty application to incorporate Derby-Lewis as his accomplice, which he then insisted was the truth. Walus’ version was that he believed that his assignment was an ord e r f rom Derby-Lewis, given as a result of his senior position in the CP. This claim, the Court found, lacked objective cre d i b i l i t y.
4. The Court found that the Amnesty Committee was correct in rejecting the applicants’ evidence in respect of obtaining of the pistol and the silencer and the purpose of the list of names as improbable, contradictory and lacking in c a n d o u r.
5. The Full Bench dismissed the application with costs.

The Putco bus attack – Duffs Road, Durban

1. Members of the Orde Boerevolk Mr David Petrus Botha [AM 0057/96], Mr Adriaan Smuts [AM 0056/96] and Mr Eugene Marais [AM 0054/96] applied for amnesty for an attack on a bus full of black commuters in Duffs Road, Durban on 9 October 1990, in which seven people were killed. The three applicants w e re all convicted on seven counts of murder and twenty-seven counts of attempted murder and were sentenced to death on 13 September 1991. This sentence was subsequently commuted to thirty years’ imprisonment.
2. Botha told the Committee that the attack was in retaliation for an incident which had taken place earlier in the day, in which PAC and APLA supporters wearing PAC T-shirts had randomly attacked white people on Durban’s beachfro n t , killing one elderly person and injuring several others.

MR BOTHA: I was under the impression that the campaign of terror by the PA C against Whites had now commenced, and since we had already declared war against the National Party, and as a result of this attack, I as cell leader felt that we should launch a counter-attack to prove to the government of the day, and to show to it that the road it was following was full of danger and that incidents of this kind would increase in fre q u e n c y.

Our purpose was also to show to the PAC and its communist allies that attacks of this kind would not be tolerated, and that we would take counter- m e a s u res in a very forceful way.

And I also felt that the counter-attack should take place in Durban where the attack from the PAC had taken place in the morning and I felt that the attack by the PAC and the counter-attack should be seen in context, and I think we succeeded in this, because in the Sunday Tr i b u n e of the 14th of October 1990 – in which i n t e rviews had been conducted with passengers in a bus from where the attack was launched – it said that they believed that the attack had been launched by

Boers as a result of the PAC attack that morning on White people at the beach

front. (Durban review hearing, December 2000.)

1. Botha and the two other members of his cell, Smuts and Marais, travelled down f rom Richards Bay to Durban, arriving after 20h00 on the night of the 9 October. Upon arrival, they drove around the bus terminus area and, observing that the s t reets were very quiet, decided to attack a minibus taxi that passed them. The minibus was full of passengers. They followed the vehicle as it travelled fro m the centre of Durban to KwaMashu but, when it turned off into a densely populated area, the applicants decided to abort the planned attack.
2. They re t u rned to the highway and stopped at a garage for something to drink. They then observed a Putco bus full of people driving in the direction of KwaMashu. Botha decided that they would attack the bus and accordingly gave the instruction. He was driving the car as they set out to follow the bus in the d i rection of the Duffs Road off - r a m p .

MR BOTHA: We overtook the bus and I told my colleagues to fire in the dire ction of the bus. We used automatic attack rifles to fire at the bus as we passed the bus – as we overtook it. Immediately after the attack we re t u rned to Richards Bay. (Durban review hearing, December 2000.)

194. On the following day, Botha contacted the SABC and, on behalf of the Orde B o e revolk, claimed responsibility for the attack on the bus. He testified before the Amnesty Committee:

I don’t know whether the person I spoke to took me seriously, but he was fooling around and asked me to furnish my name and address. I then put down the phone and then contacted the news office of the Natal Mercury. I spoke to somebody in the news office there. I told them that I was a member of the Orde B o e revolk and that we accepted responsibility for the previous night’s attack, and I also furnished the reasons why we launched the attack. There was no report in any of the papers the next day regarding this incident and I re a l i s e d that there was a state of emergency at the time in Natal and I suspected that either the security police of the government or both had probably suppre s s e d news of this kind.

I once again contacted the Natal Mercury offices, spoke to the same re p o r t e r and told him that I was aware of the fact that news of this kind would norm a l l y be suppressed by the government and I threatened that, unless the news was published and unless they mentioned that the attack had been launched by the Orde Boerevolk and mentioned our reasons for doing so, unless this was published, I would launch a similar attack. (Durban review hearing, December 2000.)

195. The Committee accepted that the Orde Boerevolk was a recognised political

o rganisation involved in a political struggle with the previous government and other political organisations. It also found that their acts were associated with a political objective.

1. In reaching a decision, the Committee distinguished between the roles played by Botha on the one hand and Smuts and Marais on the other, on the gro u n d s that Smuts and Marais were Botha’s subordinates and were under orders to carry out the attack as members of the O r d e. Botha had not received any ord e r or instructions to carry out the attack; nor did his actions carry the approval of any of his superiors or of the org a n i s a t i o n .
2. Botha was refused and Smuts and Marais were granted amnesty for the incident. Botha was, however, granted amnesty for the unlawful possession of f i rearms and ammunition [AC/1997/0053].
3. David Petrus Botha submitted an application for the review of the Committee’s refusal to grant him amnesty. The presiding judge, Mr Justice Smit, found that the Amnesty Committee had:
4. The Court set aside the refusal of amnesty and re f e r red the matter back to the Committee to hear further evidence.
5. The applicant appeared before the Committee again in December 2000 and adduced the evidence of the leader of the Orde Boerevolk, Mr Pieter Rudolph. Rudolph said that he would not have authorised the attack if he had been asked to do so and that, in any event, he would have had no way of communicating with his supporters as he had been in detention at the time.
6. The Committee subsequently refused amnesty to Botha on the same basis as b e f o re, namely that he had had no authority from his political organisation to launch an attack on innocent and unarmed civilians.

a	failed to consider properly whether Botha’s conduct had not in fact
	complied with the re q u i rements of the Act as to whether the ‘act, omission
	or offence was committed in the execution of an order of, or on behalf of, or
	with the approval of, the organisation, institution, liberation movement or
	body of which the person who committed the act was a member, an agent
	or supporter’;
b	lost sight of the fact that the provisions of section 20(3)(e) were merely
	criteria to be applied to determine whether an act was committed with a
	political objective and not re q u i rements necessary for the granting or
	refusal of amnesty.

The killing of George Mkomane

1. AWB member, Mr Hendrik Johannes Slippers [AM 1002/96] applied for amnesty for the abduction and killing of Mr George Mkomane in Belfast in the Eastern Transvaal on 13 February 1991. For these offences, Mr Slippers was sentenced to two years and twelve years.
2. Mr Slippers testified before the Amnesty Committee that, at an AWB meeting held in November 1990, his Commander AWB Commandant Volshenk had instructed members to implement a policy of ‘white-by-night’. This amounted to the re-implementation of the curfew laws of the apartheid era, which pro h i b i t e d blacks from being in so-called ‘white areas’ without a permit after 21h00. Blacks present in white townships after 21h00 should be told to leave and, if they refused, should be removed by force if necessary. The Committee re c e i v e d a ffidavits from Brigadier Kloppers and John Wayne Rautenbach confirming the policy and the instructions to carry it out.
3. Mr Slippers testified that the instruction he re c e i v e d :

… fitted in with my political objectives, namely the protection of whites, the i n t e rests of whites and I believed that the action would serve to intimidate people of other colours or other races in the country and also put a stop to blacks taking over in this country. I believed that these kind of actions would put a stop to the political changes in the country, it would either stop it or slow them down. (Nelspruit hearing, 7 May 1997.)

1. He testified that, on the night in question, he and four other AWB members in Belfast were driving around trying to enforce the ‘white-by-night’ policy in the town. Although they had been drinking before they went on patrol, he testified
2. that he had not been drunk and knew at all times what he was doing and that the intake of alcohol did not influence his judgment.
1. They saw the deceased, George Nkomane, walking in the street, confronted him and loaded him onto the bakkie against his will. Their intention was to drive out of town and to ‘off-load’ him on the way to the black township. On the way, the deceased protested, saying that he intended to re t u rn to the ‘white’ township of Belfast. The applicant and one of the other members then assaulted Nkomane then deposited him outside the township. At this stage, Mr Nkomane began running back towards the white are a .
2. The group pursued him, caught him and the applicant assaulted him by fisting him until he fell down. The applicant’s co-accused then kicked him and jumped on him. The applicant testified that they had had no intention of assaulting Mr Nkomane but that things went wrong, an argument ensued and, as a result of the deceased’s protest against the abduction, the brutal assault followed. He realised afterwards that he should have foreseen that the assault could have resulted in the death of Mr Nkomane.
3. The Court that tried the case had found that there was no direct intent to kill, but that the applicant was guilty on the basis of dolus eventualis. The Court found further that the offence was politically coloured. However, the applicant testified, he pleaded guilty at his trial and handed in a statement in which he did not reveal the full facts about the AW B ’s involvement as it seemed politically i n a p p ropriate to do so at the time.
4. Slippers expressed his remorse to the Committee:

If I was ever to have planned to kill anybody, I would rather have shot the person or stabbed the person and gone and hid that person’s body in a safe place. My actions were in accordance with the instruction issued by the AWB and the e n t i re incident took a different course to that planned.

After this incident, I and my ex-wife suffered various attacks in retaliation to this action which were launched by the Black community against us. After court sittings, mini buses would turn up at our house and the house; our vehicle and our caravan would be stoned and damaged, and the grass on my property and other things were also set alight.

On the 26th of March 1991, a month and thirteen days after the incident, I lost my wife in a car accident. The collision was caused by a black man who drove into the passenger side of my vehicle. At that stage, I also experienced the mise ry and the loss which was experienced by the families of the deceased in the loss of a loved one. In spite of the fact that I am serving a ten-year prison term for my action, I regarded the loss of my wife as a far greater punishment and also saw it as part of my punishment for my action against the deceased. I suddenly realised what it was to be a single parent with two children. I now re a l i s e the senselessness of my action and the unnecessity of the attack. I am also very remorseful about the death of the deceased and the grief which it caused his family and his community. I now realise how important harmonious racial re l ationships are in our country and I will do everything in my power to ensure harmony amongst the races. (Nelspruit hearing, 7 May 1997.)

1. Mr Slippers was granted amnesty for the abduction of Mr George Mkomane but was refused amnesty for the killing. In the view of the Amnesty Committee, the killing of the deceased constituted an act grossly out of proportion with the stated objective of the AWB, which was to keep blacks out of the town after 21h00. The killing of the deceased was not, there f o re, seen as an act associated with a political objective.
2. M o re o v e r, the Committee found that the contention that the deceased was killed because he provoked an argument, that he strongly protested against being driven out of town and that he actually tried to run back into town when he was so close to a black township is so highly improbable that it can safely be rejected as false.
3. In reaching its decision, the Committee said:

How could the deceased dare argue and protest against three belligerent trouble seekers? How could he dare do so in the destitution of a cemetery when he had not done so in the relative safety of a town, albeit a not-so-friendly one? How could he dare provoke an argument when he had already been assaulted b e f o re being off-loaded at the cemetery? Why should the deceased be so obstinate in the face of such hostility and elect to run back into town when he could have run into a nearby black township? How could he hope to outrun a bakkie back to exactly the same situation which had invoked the wrath of his attackers? In any event, even if what the applicant has said were true, it would not change the fact that their conduct was grossly out of proportion to the objective sought to be achieved.

It is noteworthy that the applicant did not attempt to say that the killing was in accordance with the policy of the AWB. On his own version, the killing was not part of the plan and, if his version is correct, then the deceased became obstinate and pertinaciously attempted to go back into town, it means they killed him simply because he would not listen. At that level, there would be nothing political about the murder.

F u r t h e rm o re the applicant’s motivation that the ultimate objective of the AW B

was to intimidate black people and discourage them in their quest for political

take over becomes senseless when one considers that, had the applicant had

his way, the killing as well as the reasons therefor would have re m a i n e d

unknown. While a surviving victim of abduction would be able to warn other

black people to stay out of the town, a dead one would obviously not be able to

do so. This is a further indication that no political objective was being pursued

at the time of the actual killing [AC/1997/0069]

213. A dissenting decision on the matter was handed down by Amnesty Committee member Chris de Jager. In the light of the Committee finding that the abduction was an act associated with a political objective committed within the course of the conflicts of the past, Advocate de Jager found that:

[T]he question then arises whether the murder which flowed from the abduction, would also fall within the same ambit. It was argued on behalf of the applicant that the two offences were interrelated and cannot be totally separated from each other. The assault was carried out in order to make the abduction from the white area effective and to prevent the deceased from carrying out his intention to negate the white-by-night policy of the AWB. The applicant averred that it was carried out to intimidate blacks into slowing down the process of change or stopping it completely. He also stated that his action (to remove blacks from the white townships) was to prove that the whites were taking a stand against change and also to show the government that they were not satisfied with what was taking place in the country at the time. When the person was picked up, it never occurred to him that the person could be seriously or fatally injured, but the whole operation went wrong when the deceased told them that he would re t u rn to the white area and an argument followed resulting in assaults and the deceased running back towards the town. It was submitted on behalf of the applicant that the assault could not be separated from the abduction, and that the assault itself and its consequences were there f o re associated with the original political objective.

The Committee previously had occasion to hear how an abduction with no intent to kill, ultimately got out of hand and lead to the intentional killing of the victim. The Committee then found that the ultimate killing, although carried out because of a fear for arrest, was interlinked and should not be separated from the political motivated abduction.

In the present application, things … got out of hand after the victim refused to leave the white township and started to run back towards it. Contrary to the p revious applications, they didn’t intend to kill him, but they should have foreseen that that could be the result of the assault that followed. Seeing, however, that the one offence flowed out of the other and the one being interlinked with the other, the one cannot be seen as totally separated from the politically motivated abduction.

I am of the opinion that amnesty should be granted as applied for. [ A C / 1 9 9 7 / 0 0 6 9 . ]

Killing of an unknown black person

1. AWB supporter Mr Ve rnon Vosloo [AM1003/96] was refused amnesty for stabbing an unknown black victim to death in Johannesburg on 10 May 1992. The deceased was identified neither at the hearing nor during the course of Mr Vo s l o o ’s murder trial – which resulted in his conviction and sentencing to fifteen years’ imprisonment.
2. Mr Vosloo told the Committee that he had grown up in the south of J o h a n n e s b u rg where the majority of people were ‘conservative’. He had re g a rded black people in general as ‘the opposition party’. Mr Vosloo said he was not a re g i s t e red member of any political organisation, although he had strong sympathies with the AW B .
3. He said that:

As long as Black people did not come into conflict with me, and as long as their ways and goals were not enforced on me, I did not have any problems with that, but I did not want any interference with myself from them. …[F]rom time to time, we were in conflict… There was enmity in the sense that I didn’t want them to be in control of my life. (Johannesburg hearing, 7 April 1997.)

217. At around 22h00 on the night of 10 May 1992, Vosloo was standing next to the road in a residential area and in front of a shopping complex in South Hills, J o h a n n e s b u rg, having a few drinks with friends. They saw a black person walking on the other side of the road and Vosloo took a knife from the boot of his car and followed the man for about thirty or forty metres before grabbing him f rom behind and stabbing him in the chest and all over the body. He said he did not know the victim at all and that the victim had done nothing to provoke the a t t a c k .

MR VOSLOO: He didn’t do to anything to me; he walked past. He walked past and I saw him as the person who could possibly govern me some day. (Johannesburg hearing, 7 April 1997.)

1. Vosloo testified that he attacked and killed the man because he was afraid that, in the then political climate, he would not have a say in anything at the end of the day. The Afrikaner felt threatened and could not allow blacks to take over the country without resisting in some way.
2. He testified further that, although he had believed at the time that he had done the right thing, he was sorry today about what he had done: ‘I took the life of an innocent person and it is something which no rational person will do.’ He said that if he had been sober on that occasion, he wouldn’t have done this as, ‘any rational person would certainly have found other ways of resisting’. The liquor had given him ‘the false courage to act in accordance with that which I felt so s t rongly’ (Johannesburg hearing, 7 April 1997).
3. Vosloo testified that he had been aware of the negotiations taking place at Kempton Park at the time and was afraid of a black take-over from the National Party-led government. He was aware that the AWB had threatened to take up arms to protect itself against the rule of others. However, he had not considere d e n rolling with a commando:

MR VOSLOO: I am a solitary person; I see things very individualistically. I understand things in my own view and I act in those terms. If things continued in that d i rection and if I was forced to join such a action group, I might have, but I would still have pre f e r red to act on my own and do things in my own way. (Johannesburg hearing, 7 April 1997.)

1. Killing an unknown black person was, in his view, a contribution to the Afrikaner resistance movement. He never attended meetings of the AWB or any other similar organisation but kept up-to-date with their policies and activities by watching television and associating with people who were more dire c t l y
2. involved. He testified that during 1992 he had become uncertain about the political situation in the country and feared that he would not have a voice in the changing South Africa. He had a growing feeling that something should be done about the situation, which he saw as advancing rapidly towards black majority rule.
1. The Committee found that the act committed by Vosloo amounted to no more than a purely criminal deed and he was denied amnesty [AC/1997/0026].

The Rodora roadblock killings

1. Four people, including two children aged nine and thirteen, were killed by an AWB gang which set up a roadblock at the ‘Rodora crossing’ outside Ventersdorp on 12 December 1993. Nine members of the AWB applied for amnesty for the incident: Phillipus Cornelius Kloppers [AM4627/97], Deon Martin [AM4621/97], Andre Francois Visser [AM4571/97], Marius Etienne Vi s s e r [AM7003/97], Petrus Matthews [AM4624/97], Carel Hendrik Meiring [AM7002/97], Gerhardus Johannes Diedrichs [AM6662/97], Frederick Jacobus Badenhorst [AM7004/97] and Marthinus Lodewikes van der Schyff [AM5435/97].
2. After mounting a roadblock, the applicants searched several cars for weapons they wanted to confiscate for their ‘war’. The occupants of two cars were assaulted and later shot. An ear of one of the victims was cut off to show their c o m m a n d e r, AWB General Japie Oelofse, allegedly at his request. Oelofse did not appear in person and did not formally oppose the applications but, thro u g h his Counsel, disassociated himself from all the killings, attempted killings and the severed ear.
3. The applicants (with the exception of Diederichs who was convicted of culpable homicide) were convicted of the four murders and six attempted murders and sentenced in the Supreme Court. Some of the applicants were also convicted on charges of assault and/or theft, arising from the theft of a leather jacket, radio cassettes and equipment taken from the victims’ cars. With the exception Van der Schyff, who did not apply for amnesty for theft, all the applicants applied for amnesty in respect of all the offences of which they were convicted.
4. Two AWB members, Mr Myburgh and Brigadier Kriel, testified on behalf of the applicants. Neither had first-hand knowledge of the incident or the ord e r s allegedly given by Oelofse.
5. All but one of the applicants testified that they were engaged in an official AWB operation on the orders of the General Staff of the AWB and General Japie Oelofse, as conveyed to them by Kloppers at the roadhouse where they had g a t h e red prior to the incident.^{2 4 2} They testified that Kloppers had told them that they were to go out and ‘work’ that night, as the countrywide revolution was to start that particular evening.
6. Kloppers told them that Oelofse wanted them to identify targets, exercise hard options and that he wanted to see ‘lyke’ (dead bodies). They proceeded to various places where alcohol was consumed and eventually went to Martin’s place. Only on the way and in response to a suggestion to go to the township, did Kloppers communicate to them that Oelofse had ord e red the setting up of a ro a d b l o c k .
7. A c c o rding to the applicants, the victims were ord e red out of their cars and told to sit on an embankment on the side of the road. They were then questioned by Martin as to their political affiliations and asked particularly whether they were members of the ANC, which the AWB re g a rded as its enemy. The applicants testified that they did not notice that there were children in the group.
8. The applicants testified that, while members of the group were being questioned by Martin, Kloppers would ‘lightly tap’ them on the head in order to encourage them to co-operate. Some members of the group allegedly admitted that they were supporters of the ANC and, according to Martin’s testimony, after a small group of the applicants had assembled (including Martins, Matthews, Kloppers, Marius Visser and Badenhorst), they decided to shoot the victims.
9. T h ree of the applicants, namely Andre Vi s s e r, Diederichs and Meiring, did not participate in the decision to shoot or the shooting itself. Van der Schyff testified that he participated in the shooting but did not form part of the group taking the decision. Martin fired the command shot and most of the others followed suit. Andre Vi s s e r, Matthews, Diederichs and Meiring then jumped into a car and fled the scene of the shooting.
10. Kloppers called out that they should all assemble at the City Hall and ord e red Martin to cut off the ear of one of the victims so it could be taken to General

242 Save for Van der Sch y f f, whose evidence differed in some material respects from that of the others.

Oelofse. Various items were taken. The empty shells were removed from the scene, the vehicles of the victims were set alight and the rest of the applicants left the scene there a f t e r.

1. Van der Schyff testified that no mention had been made of the planned shooting at any time prior to the setting up of the road block and that his first knowledge of the shooting came after the first shots had been fired at the scene. He further testified that no mention had been made of the revolution or of the fact that Oelofse wanted to see dead bodies. Their purpose was to search for weapons. He was not part of the group that had decided on the shooting. He did, however, f i re shots in the direction of the group because he had received a message that Kloppers had ord e red the shooting of the victims.
2. The applicants conceded that they had consumed alcoholic liquor in varying quantities prior to and on the way to the spot where the roadblock was set up. They also testified that, on their way to the scene of the incident, they harassed two black people and assaulted an unknown black man, during which incident some of the applicants engaged in some frivolous fun amongst themselves.

2 3 5 . The applications were opposed by surviving victims and relatives of the deceased.

1. The Committee found that, in broad outline, the evidence given by the victims confirmed the applicants’ version as to the course of the events at the scene of the shootings. There were, however, some material diff e rences in respect of questioning of the victims. According to the surviving victims, Martins and Kloppers had questioned the victims in a far more aggressive manner than they had led the Committee to believe and none of the victims had admitted that they were members or supporters of the ANC.
2. In considering the evidence, the Committee accepted that the setting up of the roadblock was in line with general AWB policy and that the prime objective of the exercise had been to obtain weapons in this manner. The Committee did not, however, accept that it was AWB policy to kill people at roadblocks. The applicants had all the necessary equipment to carry out the designated operation, which was carried out with some precision until the shooting took place.
1. The Committee found that Martin had taken the initiative in ‘questioning’ the victims, in calling together the group when the decision was taken to shoot and in firing the commanding shot. He knew that the group was exceeding the
2. bounds of its mandate and that it was he and Kloppers who had made the decision to shoot. There had been no reason to shoot the victims. The victims had had no firearms or other weapons; they did not admit to being members of the ANC; nor did they offer any substantial resistance to the treatment that was meted out to them. Martin’s application for amnesty was accordingly re f u s e d [ A C / 1 9 9 9 / 0 0 4 5 ] .
3. The Committee also refused the applications of those other members of the g roup who were in a position to question the reasons for the decision to shoot [ A C / 1 9 9 9 / 0 0 4 5 ] .
4. A n d re Vi s s e r, Van der Schyff, Dietrichs and Meiring – who were not in the group and who did not receive direct orders – could not be said to have known or to have been in a position to establish the reasons for the decision. They nevertheless associated themselves with the eents by accompanying others in circ u m s t a n c e s w h e re it might become necessary to shoot. With the exception of Van der S c h y ff, these applications also failed [AC/1999/0045].

2 4 1 . The Committee was of the opinion that Van der Schyff, the fifth applicant, made full disclosure of the relevant facts. He had acted on the instruction of Kloppers, conveyed to him by a member of the group. Although his evidence was found to be unsatisfactory in all respects, it was not such as to bar him from being granted amnesty. He was accordingly granted amnesty for assault, possession of firearms and ammunition and for the four murders and six attempted murd e r s committed at the Rodora Crossing near Ventersdorp on 12 December 1993 [ A C / 1 9 9 9 / 0 0 4 5 ] .

Ventersdorp incident

242. On 9 August 1991, an open confrontation between members of the AWB and State President FW de Klerk occurred at Ventersdorp in the Transvaal when the NP planned a political meeting in a town the CP re g a rded as a CP constituency. A c c o rding to the AWB, advertisements for the meeting limited attendance to NP supporters only. The AWB insisted that its supporters be permitted to attend as they wished to discuss certain burning issues with the President. The AW B mobilised some 2 000 of its supporters who gathered in the town. A confro n t a t i o n with the police ensued and three AWB members were killed and fifty-eight people i n j u red. Almost the entire AWB leadership was arrested on charges of public violence .

AWB leaders, Mr Eugene Te r r re’Blanche [AM7994/97] and Mr Petrus Johannes

‘Piet Skiet’ Rudolph [AM6329/97] applied for amnesty for the incident.

243. Both applicants testified that they had been key figures although they had had no personal involvement in the various incidents that which took place during the violent confrontation with the police. Both averred that the State President and members of the security forces charged with the keeping of law and order at the time of the incident were the proximate causes of the ensuing violence, and they applied to the Committee to subpoena Mr de Klerk as a witness.

R U D O L P H: What I told, or wanted to tell Mr de Klerk that evening was exactly what I have just told you, and that is that we did not go there to fight for or against apartheid and to demonstrate against apartheid, but simply for our f reedom. Mr de Klerk chose to destroy us. He employed his forces there and thought well to set the police on us in an unbridled manner. (Klerksdorp hearing, 10 May 1999.)

1. The application was refused on the grounds that the Amnesty Committee did not re g a rd Mr de Klerk as a necessary or essential witness to enable the Committee to arrive at a decision.
2. The Committee also did not deem it necessary to make a finding as to the p roximate cause of the public violence. All the Committee needed to consider was whether the applicants complied with the formal re q u i rements of the Act, whether the acts were committed with a political objective as re q u i red by the Act and whether the applicants had made a full disclosure of all relevant facts with re g a rd to their participation.
3. Mr Rudolph testified that he, together with Mr Te r re’Blanche, had been at the f o re f ront of the procession of armed AWB members as they marched to the meeting in Ventersdorp. He testified he was arrested before the major part of the confrontation with the police took place. During this fracas, a number of people were killed and injured. Rudolph himself sustained minor injuries.
4. Rudolph testified that he was fully aware of the high political tension that p revailed and that he had forseen that conflict would arise from the actions that they re g a rded as the exercise of their democratic right. The demonstrators were intent on conveying their political sentiments to the leaders of the govern m e n t of the time.
5. Mr Te r re’Blanche likewise testified that he appreciated and knew of the high political tension and foresaw the possibility of conflict. He and his followers re g a rded the government at the time as a weak one – as a government without principle to whom they could not trust the governance of the country. He and his organisation were in favour of a v o l k s t a a t for the Afrikaner and were prep a red to fight for it, even outside the law.
6. The Committee considered the evidence of the two applicants and all the

relevant documentation and was satisfied that the acts were committed with a political objective in the course of the political struggle of the time and that the applicants had made a full and proper disclosure of their role in the incident. Amnesty was accordingly granted to Mr Rudolph and Mr Te r re’Blanche for the

o ffence of public violence in Ventersdorp on 9 August 1991 [AC/1999/0221].

Attacks in the Lowveld

1. CP members, Mr Jan Petrus Kruger [AM2734/96], Mr Daniel Benjamin Snyders [AM0073/96] and Marthinus Christoffel Ras [AM2735/96] applied for amnesty for a series of sabotage attacks in Lowveld during 1991 and 1992, including:
2. An explosion at the Sabie Magistrate’s Court on 20 December 1991 in which Kruger and Ras argued that they had acted on the instructions of a member of To e k o m s g e s p rek leadership, Mr Douw Steyn, conveyed to them by Snyders. The explosives used were manufactured by Snyders. The buildings were damaged but no deaths or injuries resulted from the explosion. The applicants were facing a c h a rge of sabotage pursuant to this incident at the time of their amnesty hearing.
3. An explosion at the Lowveld High School in Nelspruit on 1 January 1992 in which Kruger and Ras again argued that they had acted on the instructions of Douw Steyn as conveyed by Snyders. The building was damaged. The applicants were facing a charge of sabotage for the incident at the time of their amnesty hearing.
4. An explosion at the Nelspruit Agricultural Colleged during the period 14 to 15 M a rch 1992, causing damage to the pro p e r t y. The attack was launched on the instructions of Douw Steyn. Snyders manufactured the explosives and gave them to another member of To e k o m s g e s p rek who executed the actual attack. Snyders was facing criminal charges as well as a civil claim for the incident.
5. An explosion at the Lowveld High School on 16 March 1992, after a gardener at the school discovered and handled an explosive device found in the grounds of the premises. The gard e n e r, Mr Chashasa Andries Sithole, was killed in the explosion and another person, Mrs Sophie Mashaba, was injured. Snyders had planted explosive devices at the school during the period 14 to 15 March 1992, with the intention that they detonate simultaneously with explosives placed at Nelspruit Agricultural College. All reasonable steps were taken to avoid any loss of life or injuries in the operation. The explosives were primed to detonate at 03h00 when no one would be present on the school premises. Unbeknownst to Snyders and due to some defect in the detonator, the devices did not explode s i m u l t a n e o u s l y. Snyders and his colleagues were shocked at the death and injury that resulted. He expressed remorse at the consequences of the explosion. Snyders said he had acted on the instructions of Douw Steyn in placing the explosives at the school. He was facing various criminal charges including m u rder and attempted murder as well as a civil claim for the incident.
6. Subsequent to the arrest of applicants, the police discovered various arms caches on farms in the vicinity of Nelspruit and Sabie. One of the farms belonged to Kruger. Various charges were brought against the applicants as a result. The arms and explosives in question had been stockpiled on the instructions of the leadership of To e k o m s g e s p rek in accordance with its policy of p reparing for armed resistance against the political reforms introduced by the NP government at the time.
7. None of the implicated parties, including Douw Steyn, appeared at the hearing. Only one of the interested parties submitted an affidavit which, to some extent, p rovided the political context for the incidents and supported the subjective political beliefs of the applicants.
8. The Amnesty Committee was satisfied that the applicants made a full disclosure of all facts relevant to the applications. The Committee accepted that the applicants had acted on the orders of one of their superiors within To e k o m s g e s p re k and that the attacks fell within the policy of that organisation at the time. Although membership and the activities of To e k o m s g e s p rek were secret, the Committee was satisfied that, even if not widely known, it was a publicly known political organisation, independent of the CP, whose policies did not include the kind of offensive, violent actions undertaken by the applicants.
1. Insofar as the death of Mr Sithole and the injuries of Mrs Mashaba were c o n c e rned, the Committee took into account that all reasonable steps had been
2. taken to avoid this kind of consequence. In the context of what was patently a political act, the unfortunate death and injury were aberrations which could not reasonably have been avoided. The Committee accepted that the attack was aimed solely at state pro p e r t y, which was seen as re p resenting the applicants’ political foes.
9. Amnesty was granted to Daniel Snyders, Jan Kruger and Marthinus Ras in respect of the respective offences set out in the charge sheet [AC/2000/121].

Explosion in Bronkhorstspruit

1. Two BWB members from Cullinan, Mr Leo Hendrik Froneman [AM0395/96] and Mr Pieter Johannes Harmse [AM3275/96], also a commander in the BRL, were jointly convicted for an exposion at an Indian business complex in B ronkhorstspruit on 17 September 1993. One police off i c e r, Mr Abraham Labuschagne, died in the explosion and six people were injured. Froneman was convicted of culpable homicide for which he was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment. Harmse was convicted of murd e r, attempted murd e r, the unlawful possession of explosives and malicious damage to property and was sentenced to an effective eighteen years.
2. The bomb was homemade and one of a series made by the BWB cell. The BWB planned a coup d’état and a part of their plan entailed interrupting the country’s power supply. During the amnesty hearing, the applicants handed in a video of a BWB meeting held in 1993, in which it was said that the party would declare war against the government which, ‘wanted to hand the country over to the ANC/SACP alliance’. At other meetings, members were instructed to collect explosives and create chaos in their own areas.
1. Harmse told the Committee that, in September 1993, he received a telephone call from the BRL informing him that the war had started. He had been warn e d at meetings to expect such a message. He instructed Froneman to choose a t a rget that would involve Muslims, which is why the Indian Shopping Centre at
2. B ronkhorstspruit was selected. They set about preparing the bomb and at 03h00 the following morning they set off to plant it.
3. The trial judge and the regional magistrate who convicted the two applicants re g a rded the incident as political. Under cross-examination, Fro n e m a n explained that he had selected the target because he believed that the majority of Indians were Muslims and ANC supporters. By attacking this target, they would show the government and others that the BWB was intent on taking their country back by force if necessary. In doing what he did, he was carrying out

o rders given to him through Harmse.

276. The Amnesty Committee was satisfied that the applicants did what they did in the belief that they were acting on instructions given to them by the BWB, a publicly known organisation, and that the act was done in furtherance of the policies of that organisation. They were granted amnesty [AC/1998/0039].

September 1993–February 1994

1. AWB member Mr Nicolaas Willem de Jongh [AM3375/96] was granted amnesty for two bomb attacks in the Eastern Cape during August 1993.
2. De Jongh, who held the rank of Commandant in the AWB, assisted two other members of that organisation to bomb two premises. The first bombing took place during the night of 13 August 1993 at the premises of Mr Wiseman Zitembile Sana in Queenstown; the second occurred on the night of 14 August 1993 at the premises of Mr Johnson Dumile Sateni in Hofmeyr in the Eastern Cape. The bombings caused damage to both properties but did not result in any bodily injury. The Committee found that both bombings were executed in support of the AWB with a political objective associated with the conflicts of the past. Amnesty was granted [AC/1998/0029].
1. An AWB colonel, MrJan Cornelius Labuschagne [AM3671/96], claimed responsibility for a series of explosions he carried out with other members: Mr Daniel Wilhelm van der Watt [AM3674/96], Mr Andries Stefanus Kriel [AM2893/96] and Mr Johannes Jacobus Botes [AM3672/96] between September 1993 and February 1994. They placed more than twenty explosive devices on railway tracks, power stations and in black townships to disrupt the
2. i n f r a s t r u c t u re and gain publicity for the right wing’s anti-election cause. A number of people were injure d .
3. In October 1993, Andries Stefanus Kriel, a brigadier in the AWB and deputy leader of the Vo l k s f ront in the Northern Free State, instructed AWB Colonel Jan C o rnelius Labuschagne to form a cell of operatives in order to participate in a t e r ror campaign to be conducted by the Vo l k s f ro n t .
4. Labuschagne formed a cell consisting of himself, Johannes Jacobus Roos Botes and Daniel Wilhelm van der Watt, both members of the AWB and the Vo l k s f ront. They underwent a short period of training in the manufacture, handling and use of explosives in the Bothaville are a .
5. The bombing campaign commenced on 9 November 1993 and lasted until 7 February 1994. During that period they placed twenty-one bombs at diff e re n t t a rgets, including Welkom, We s s e l b ron, Potchefstroom, Orkney, Vi l j o e n s k ro o n , Hoopstad, Bothaville, Stilfontein, Kroonstad, Leeudoringstad and Vi e r f o n t e i n . Nineteen of these exploded. The other two (at Welkom and at Leeudoringstad) did not detonate. All the bombs were homemade. Eleven of the targets were railway lines, three were power installations, four were black residential are a s , two were business premises and one was a farm school.
6. Nobody was killed in the bombings. However, a number of people were injured, including Mrs M Bayo, Mr Seipata Mokadatlo (both at We s s e l s b ron), Mr Stephen Semelo, Mr Andries Semelo, Mrs Ramorakane and Ms Marg a re t Malinga (all at Vi l j o e n s k roon). The bombings caused damage to both private and state pro p e r t y.
7. Labuschagne told the Committee it was not their intention to kill or injure people, although they realised that people might be killed or injured by their actions. He said they took steps to minimise the prospect of this by setting the bombs to explode late at night.
8. All the applicants were facing charges relating to their training, all the bombings as well at the illegal possession of firearms and explosives. Their trial had been postponed pending the outcome of their applications.
1. Labuschagne accepted equal responsibility with the other applicants for all the incidents on the basis that he was their leader and had given them the instruc-
2. tions to carry out the bombing campaign. All the applicants ceased being members of the AWB during the course of the bombing campaign, but continued with the campaign as members of the Vo l k s f ro n t .
9. The Committee was satisfied that the applicants acted at all relevant times in furtherance of the policies of the Vo l k s f ront and that the offences committed by them were acts associated with a political objective committed during the course of the conflicts of the past. There was nothing to suggest that the applicants committed the offences for personal gain or out personal malice, ill-will or spite directed against their victims. Satisfied that the applicants had made full disclosure of all relevant facts and that their applications complied with the re q u i re m e n t s of the Act, they were all granted amnesty in respect of the incidents for which they each made application [AC/1999/0001].

21 April 1994

288. On 21 April 1994, the office of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) in Hoopstad was bombed, causing considerable damage. Freedom Front (FF) and BKA member Mr Eduard Pieter Roux [AM 5661/97] was granted amnesty for the attack. Roux was also convicted of sabotaging power installations. There was no loss of life [AC/1998/0097].

23 April 1994

1. The Devon Radar complex, an Airforce base in the Secunda area in the Transvaal, was attacked and robbed on the night of the 23 April 1994. A police g u a rd, Sergeant Steven Frederich Terblanche, was shot dead and robbed of his f i rearm. BWB member Mr Okkert Anthonie de Meillon [AM4570/97] and AW B members Mr Edmund William Holder [AM5610/97] and Mr Willem Johannes van Zyl [AM5611/97] applied for amnesty for the attack.
2. Okkert de Meillon was convicted of murder and robbery with aggravating c i rcumstances and sentenced to an effective fifteen years’ imprisonment. On 5 November 1996, Edmund Holder and Willem van Zyl were jointly tried in a separate trial and convicted on similar charges. Van Zyl was also convicted of the unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition. They were sentenced to e ffective imprisonment of ten and eight years re s p e c t i v e l y.
3. All the applicants, as well as Constable Andre Renier Swart who was in the company of the deceased victim at the time, testified at the hearing.

2 9 2 . The Amnesty Committee heard from the applicants that right-wing organisations took various steps to pre p a re for an attack on whites on the 27th April 1994, the day of the election. Members of right-wing organisations were ord e red to obtain appropriate firearms to ward off the attack. Because the ‘enemy’ would be armed with automatic weapons, they believed that the anticipated attack could only be effectively warded off if the right wing was armed with automatic w e a p o n s .

1. On the day of the incident, the applicants armed themselves and drove to an army building in Pretoria city centre. The building was guarded by armed g u a rds. This plan was foiled as they were totally outnumbered by the guard s . A c c o rding to Holder and Van Zyl, De Meillon had suggested they attack the g u a rds for the purpose of making propaganda. This they refused to do. They testified that by then it had become clear to them that De Meillon was a fanatic.
2. Driving home in the direction of Secunda, De Meillon re m e m b e red an Airforce base at Devon where he had done a part of his military service in 1992. They decided to go there. Holder and Van Zyl testified that they intended to re c o n-n o i t re the base in preparation for an arms ro b b e r y.
3. Led by De Meillon, the applicants entered the guardhouse at the Devon base without first ascertaining who was inside. It became apparent that the guardhouse was occupied by members of the police. De Meillon ord e red the police to hand over their weapons. However, although both police officers were armed with their service pistols, there were no automatic weapons in the guardhouse.
4. In the course of disarming the deceased victim, a scuffle ensued between him and De Meillon. Shots were fired and De Meillon was wounded and Serg e a n t Terblanche killed. De Meillon took the deceased victim’s service pistol and ran to the vehicle followed by Holder. They drove to Secunda where De Meillon obtained medical assistance and was later arrested in hospital. Van Zyl kept possession of the deceased’s pistol for a few days, whereafter he took it apart and threw it into a dam. Holder and Van Zyl were also subsequently arre s t e d .
1. The Committee found that the attack on the deceased fell outside the orders or authority given to the applicants to obtain automatic weapons for the purposes
2. of their respective political organisations. De Meillon had taken the initiative in the mission and ord e red the others to assist.
5. De Meillon testified that, to his mind, the mission was unsuccessful. Had he known that the base was occupied by the SAP, he would not have embarked upon the operation at Devon. The Committee found that Holder and Van Zyl’s testimony as to the purpose of their visit to the base was true. It would have been reckless to decide to attack the base for automatic weapons without reconnoitring the target first. They would have had no idea whether they would find the weapons they were looking for or what kind of resistance they would meet. They obviously went to the base to see what the situation was there, as testified to by Holder and Van Zyl.
6. The Committee found that the attack on the guardhouse was clearly a result of impulsive, overhasty and haphazard actions on the part of De Meillon.

3 0 0 . The Committee noted that another important factor was the fact that the pistol of the deceased was subsequently disposed of without being used for any of the purposes of the political organisations in question. This was further indication of the fact that attacking and robbing the deceased of his pistol fell outside any mandate or order given. The applicants testified that the order had been to obtain automatic weapons.

301. The Committee found that the killing of the deceased in all of the circumstances of the case was disproportionate to any conceivable objective pursued by the applicants. The Committee was not satisfied that the incident constituted an act associated with a political objective in terms of the re q u i rements of the Act and the applications were refused [AC/1999/0014].

24 and 25 April 1994

1. A number of people were killed on 24 and 25 April 1994 when eleven members of an AWB cell went on a bombing spree. The targets were mainly taxi ranks serving black commuters. The eleven were part of a group of twenty-six found guilty on ninety-six counts of pre-election bombings, murder and damage to p ro p e r t y. Altogether twenty people died and forty-six were injure d .
2. Nine applicants claimed responsibility for a number of diff e rent actions during this period.
3. Mr Etienne Jacobus le Roux [AM6467/97] and Mr Johan Wilhelm du Plessis [AM6480/907] were granted amnesty for violations arising from an explosion in B ree Street, Johannesburg on 24 April 1994. The explosion killed seven people: Mr Jostine Makho Buthelezi, Mr Makomene Alfred Matsepane, Mr Goodman Dumisani Ludidi, Ms Gloria Thoko Fani, Ms Susan Ann Keane, Mr Peter Lester Malcolm Ryland and an unidentified man. At least thirteen other people were i n j u red in the attack. The applicants were also granted amnesty for malicious injury to property and the unlawful possession of explosive devices and material [ A C / 1 9 9 9 / 0 3 4 2 ] .
4. Le Roux and Du Plessis were granted amnesty for violations arising from an explosion at Jan Smuts Airport, Johannesburg on election day, 27 April 1994, in which at least ten people were injured. They were also granted amnesty for malicious injury to property and the unlawful possession of explosive devices and material [AC/1999/0342].
5. Mr Etienne le Roux, Mr Jan Bastiaan de Wet [AM6466/97], Mr Johannes Abraham Vlok [AM7888/97] and MrJohan du Plessis were granted amnesty for violations arising from a bomb explosion on the corner of Odendaal and Vi c t o r i a S t reets in Germiston, Transvaal on 25 April 1994. Ten people were killed by the bomb: Mr Phillip Nelaphi Nkosi, Mr Mbulawa Jonathan Skosana, Mr Lucas Shemane Bokaba, Ms Gloria Khoza, Mr Fickson Mlala, Mr Mbereyeni Marc u s Siminza, Mr Paul Etere Ontory, Mr Thulani Buthelezi and Ms Thoko Rose Sithole. At least seven other people were injured in the explosion. The applicants were also granted amnesty for malicious injury to property and the unlawful possession of explosive devices and material [AC/1999/0342].
6. Mr Johan du Plessis, Mr Abraham Christoffel ‘Abie’ Fourie [AM6478/97], Mr Johannes Andries ‘JJ’ Venter [AM6577/97], Mr Jacobus Petrus Nel [AM6469/97], Mr Petrus Paulus Steyn [AM6479/97] and Mr Gerhardus Daniel ‘Gert’ Fourie [AM6468/97] were granted amnesty for violations resulting fro m :
7. An explosion on 25 April 1994 on the corner of Blood Street and 7th Avenue in P retoria. The explosion killed three people: Ms Joyce Baloyi, Mr Samuel Masemola and unidentified man. At least four other people were injure d ;
8. An explosion at Westonaria on 25 April 1994. The explosion killed five people: Mr James Ncube, Mr Alfred Dayele, Mr Peter Mogoshe, Mr Phillip Plaatjies and Mr Alex Maziba
9. An explosion on 25 April 1994 at a taxi rank on the corner of Third and Park S t reets in Randfontein, Transvaal. The explosion injured at least six people;
10. The unlawful possession of explosive devices and materials at the Springfontein Farm in Rustenburg between 22 and 27 April 1994.
11. Mr Jan de Wet, Mr Johannes Vlok and Mr Johan du Plessis were granted amnesty for the unlawful possession of explosive devices and materials at the Koesterfontein Farm in Krugersdorp between 22 and 27 April 1994.
12. Mr Etienne le Roux, Mr Jan de Wet and Mr Johan du Plessis were granted amnesty for the theft of a motor vehicle at Randfontein on 25 April 1994.

27 April 1994

1. On election day, the 27th April 1994, two AWB members travelling in a vehicle on the R28 road between Westonaria and Randfontein on the West Rand, opened fire at a minibus taxi killing the taxi’s driver, Mr Viyani Papiyana, and injuring a passenger, Mr Godfrey Papiyana.
2. AWB members, Mr James Wheeler [AM 2084/96] and Mr Cornelius Rudolph Pyper [AM5179/97] were serving fifteen-year jail sentences for the attack when they were granted amnesty. The Amnesty Committee accepted that the applicants believed themselves to be under orders from the AWB and were under the impression that other members would be committing acts of violence in

o rder to cause chaos and disrupt the elections.

1. The applicants testified before the Amnesty Committee that they had consumed alcohol and discussed politics and ways to disrupt the election. They decided on a course of action, allegedly based on the orders of a fellow AWB member, Mr de Bruyn, whom they believed to have some authority in the org a n i s a t i o n .
2. Both applicants testified that their sole motivation in committing the crime was political and that their immediate aim was to cause chaos which would lead to the disruption of the elections. They believed that many other supporters of the AWB would be participating in the uprising and that the cumulative effect their of actions would have a significant impact on the political events of the day. They both denied that the consumption of alcohol was the driving force of their actions.
3. The surviving victim and those members of the victims’ family who opposed the application said they believed the applicants had committed the offences in their personal capacities out of ill-will, malice or spite while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. There was also insufficient evidence to find that the applicants were members or supporters of the AWB; that they acted on behalf of or under orders from the AWB or within their duties as members of that org a n i s ation. It was suggested that this was a spontaneous and poorly planned attack on a taxi that was not in the vicinity of a polling station.
4. The Committee was satisfied that the applicants could at least have been seen as supporters of the AWB and believed themselves to be members.

3 2 0 . The Committee accepted the uncontradicted evidence that the AWB pro p a g a t e d the use of violence to resist the ANC winning the election and that it called upon its members to pre p a re themselves for a state of war. The applicants had believed that the revolution had begun before consuming liquor on the day in question. Drunkenness could not there f o re have been the root cause of their actions, though the consumption of liquor could have provided them with false courage and was the reason for the sloppy planning and preparation of the attack. Both the applicants stated that they knew what they were doing. The fact that the first applicant drove the vehicle without mishap and that the second applicant accurately aimed the shot he fired indicates that they were not so drunk as to eliminate their belief that they were acting in support of the AW B . The fact that the AWB never admitted its involvement in the applicants’ crimes did not obviate the applicants’ subjective belief that they were acting in support of AWB when they committed the act.

1. The Amnesty Committee accepted that the applicants were under the i m p ression that other members of the AWB would, that day, commit acts of violence in order to cause chaos and so disrupt the elections. They gained this i m p ression after having heard the report of the bombings on the East Rand and after their discussion with Du Bruyn. They only learnt after the event that, save for the bombings on the East Rand, they had acted in isolation. They testified that they decided to shoot a black man as they were of the opinion that the vast majority of black people were supporters of the ANC. Their intention was to commit an act of terror which, together with other such acts committed by other members of the AWB, would instil fear and result in chaos and anarc h y and so disrupt the elections.
2. In this context, despite the tragic consequences and futility of their actions, the Committee concluded that the violation was not disproportionate to the political objective they were pursuing. The attack was found to be associated with a political objective committed in the course of the conflict of the past and amnesty was granted to the applicants [AC/1998/0032].