TRC Final Report

Volume 5

Chapter 6

Volume FIVE Chapter SIX

Findings and Conclusions

■ INTRODUCTION

1 The Promotion of National Reconciliation and Unity Act (the Act) was a contested piece of legislation. Its protracted passage through cabinet and Parliament and its final form mirror the many different interests, fears and perspectives in South African society (see further Volume One).

2 The new government settled on a compromise. Focusing not only on those violations committed by the former state, the Act chose instead to focus on violations committed by all parties to the conflict. It eschewed notions of vengeance or retribution, and instead created a mechanism for the granting of amnesty for politically motivated actions, providing full individual disclosure was made.

3 It is the view of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (the Commission) that the spirit of generosity and reconciliation enshrined in the founding Act was not matched by those at whom it was mainly directed. Despite amnesty provisions extending to criminal and civil charges, the white community often seemed either indifferent or plainly hostile to the work of the Commission, and certain media appear to have actively sought to sustain this indifference and hostility. With rare individual exceptions, the response of the former state, its leaders, institutions and the predominant organs of civil society of that era, was to hedge and obfuscate. Few grasped the olive branch of full disclosure.

4 Even where political leaders and institutional spokespersons of the former state claimed to take full responsibility for the actions of the past, these sometimes seemed to take the form of ritualised platitudes rather than genuine expressions of remorse. Often, it seemed to the Commission, there was no real appreciation of the enormity of the violations of which these leaders and those under them were accused, or of the massive degree of hurt and pain their actions had caused.

5 In making its findings, the Commission drew on a wide range of evidence. Apart from over 21 000 statements on violations of human rights, it considered the evidence contained in numerous submissions, amnesty applications and other documents to which it had access.

Submissions to the Commission

6 Political parties, institutions and sectors were asked to make submissions to the Commission about their role in the conflict and their motives and perspectives.

7 A number of party leaders, some prominent past politicians, and representatives of institutions of the former state – the South African Police (SAP) and the South African Defence Force (SADF) – made submissions to the Commission. The usefulness of these submissions varied widely, but they were generally disappointing and did little to further the work of the Commission. Frequently, they consisted of little more than recitations of the policies under which these groups operated and often unconvincing apologies for excesses committed.

8 The appearance before the Commission of former President FW de Klerk as spokesperson of the National Party (NP) perspective was a particular disappointment to the Commission. As one who had done so much to turn the tide of South African history, his evasiveness and unwillingness candidly to acknowledge the full burden of the NP’s responsibility seemed to the Commission to be a missed opportunity to take the reconciliation process forward.

9 Other former NP leaders were, however, more forthcoming. Former Foreign Minister ‘Pik’ Botha submitted responses to the Commission’s questions that were rich in detail, while former Ministers Roelf Meyer and Leon Wessels frankly acknowledged the wrongs of the former ruling party’s past. Mr Wessels cast doubt on the argument by members of the former cabinet and State Security Council (SSC) that they had been unaware of the excesses of the security forces. Wessels concluded with an apology rare in its eloquence and sincerity:

I am now more convinced than ever that apartheid was a terrible mistake that blighted our land. South Africans did not listen to the laughing and the crying of each other. I am sorry that I had been so hard of hearing for so long.

10 While some members of the former state displayed half-heartedness and reluctance to make full disclosure, others seemed intent on obstructing the work of the Commission. In this respect, the Commission refers particularly to former State President PW Botha.