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TRC Final Report
Page Number (Original) 229
Paragraph Numbers 110 to 116
Findings on the Inkatha Freedom Party
110 As stated above, gross violations of human rights occurred in all the homelands. In some, like Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, Transkei and KwaZulu, they occurred on a vast scale. There is, however, one significant difference between KwaZulu and the other three. In the latter, the perpetrators were almost invariably members of the homeland security forces. This was not the case in KwaZulu. Whilst the KwaZulu homeland’s security arm, the KZP, committed large numbers of human rights violations, a far larger number of violations was committed by members, supporters and office-bearers of the IFP itself. It is for this reason that the IFP has been singled out for special attention.
111 The IFP was the only one of the various homeland political parties to develop a substantial mass base, and whereas in other homelands it was the governments and their security forces that dominated the political landscape, in KwaZulu it was Inkatha, renamed in 1990 to the Inkatha Freedom Party. The IFP dominated the KwaZulu government – both its executive and its bureaucracy – to the extent that the government and the IFP became interchangeable concepts. The organisation effectively ruled KwaZulu as a one-party state. It further used KwaZulu government resources and finances to fund its party political activities as well as actions constituting gross violations of the human rights of non-Inkatha persons.
112 Both South African government officials and IFP politicians regularly failed to distinguish between the KwaZulu government and the IFP. Vice Admiral Andries Putter, former chief of staff intelligence of the SADF told the Commission:
As far as I can remember, I never myself drew a distinction between Inkatha and the KwaZulu government. In practice … I did not realise that one could distinguish between Inkatha and the KwaZulu government. It was basically the same organisation.
113 Former IFP National Council member, Mr Walter Felgate, told the Commission:
The interests of Inkatha and the KwaZulu government were indistinguishable. There was never a conflict of interest. I can bring to mind no conflict between Inkatha and the KLA (KwaZulu Legislative Assembly) on any matter of principle, any matter of strategy. They were just one amalgam with operating bases and nexuses of people.
114 A former member of a KZP hit squad, now serving a number of life sentences for murder, told the Commission:
There was no difference between the KwaZulu Police, the IFP and the KwaZulu government. In my opinion they were one entity. I received instructions [to kill people] from Captain Langeni (KZP), Mr MZ Khumalo (KwaZulu government) and [Mr Daluxolo] Luthuli (IFP).
115 As early as 1982, Inkatha began to foster the concept of paramilitary training, particularly among its youth movement. This led to a process by which violence became institutionalised in KwaZulu, with the result that Inkatha supporters turned inexorably to violence and militaristic methods. In the period after July 1990, IFP violence spread to other regions, particularly the Transvaal. The Commission received evidence from thousands of people about attacks and massacres perpetrated by IFP supporters over the twelve-year period from April 1983, the date of the killing of Mr Msizi Dube by hired Inkatha hit-men, to the 1994 pre-election killing by an IFP headman of seven members of the Independent Electoral Commission for handing out pamphlets on how to vote.
116 These included:
a the killing by Inkatha members in Hambanathi of members of the Hambanathi Residents Association in August 1983;
b the killing of UDF supporters from 1983–89 by members of the Inkathasupporting Chesterville ‘A Team’ vigilante group;
c the killing of four students at the University of Zululand in October 1983 (the so-called Ngoye massacre) by some 500 Inkatha Youth Brigade members;
d the killing of fourteen people by Inkatha supporters at the Umlazi Cinema memorial service for Victoria Mxenge in August 1985;
e the establishment in early 1986 of a covert, offensive paramilitary unit trained, armed and paid by Military Intelligence, and their deployment throughout KwaZulu until September 1990, during which the ‘Caprivi trainees’ killed large numbers of people and permanently altered the political landscape in the areas in which they were deployed (see separate finding below);
f the December 1988 joint Inkatha-SAP operation in Trust Feeds which resulted in the death of eleven people;
g the killing of over 100 people and the destruction of 3 000 houses in the March 1990 armed incursion by IFP supporters into the Edenvale area near Pietermaritzburg in what is referred to as the Seven Day War (see finding in regional profile, Volume Three);
h the killing of thirty-four people in two armed attacks by IFP supporters in Bruntville township, Mooi River, in November and December 1990;
i the deployment of a joint KZP-IFP hit squad in Esikhawini township in 1990, and the resultant killing of over 100 people (see separate finding below);
j the deployment of the IFP-based ‘Black Cats’ hit squad in Wesselton and Ermelo in 1990, and the resultant killing of large numbers of people;
k the Sebokeng massacres of July and September 1990, in which seventy-seven people in all were killed by Inkatha supporters;
l the Alexandra night vigil massacre of March 1991, in which fifteen people were killed by Inkatha supporters;
m the Swanieville massacre of May 1991, in which twenty-seven people were killed by Inkatha supporters;
n The Boipatong massacre of June 1992, in which forty-five people were killed by armed groups which included Inkatha supporters;
o the Phola Park and Kathlehong massacres in August 1990, in which forty people were killed by Inkatha supporters;
p the Sebokeng massacre of January 1991, in which forty-five people were killed by IFP supporters;
q the joint IFP/AWB attack and killing at the Flagstaff police station in 1993;
r the 1994 pre-election killings by an IFP Youth League leader in A Section, KwaMashu and an Inkatha headman in Ndwedwe.