Amnesty Hearings

CHAIRPERSON: Morning everybody. I'm told Mr Wessels, that you're going to be proceeding with the cross-examination of Mr Barnard.

FERDINAND BARNARD: (s.u.o.)

MR BARNARD: Thank you, Chairperson. Mr Chairperson, just before I continue there is something that I'd like to rectify if it is possible, that I testified about it before. I received information over the weekend that indicated that that which I said was not quite the truth, or that it did not happen exactly like I said it happened. Can I just explain this to you in short.

It is with regard to the applications that the CCB brought to me under my detention under Section 29, and I said that the funds for them were given in cash to Calla Botha, and I testified about it and I was under the impression that that's how it worked, but after certain discussions with my father telephonically, I found out that it did not work like that.

The money was given to Scholtz and Botha, an attorney's firm from Florida and they contacted my father and told him that the costs have been covered. Additional to this, R4 000 was given to Brenda Mills, my girlfriend whom I shared a house with and they provided her with that amount of money every month. There were certain enquiries made about what her costs were and what she needed. It was approximately R4 000 that they gave to her every month. This was given by a firm Weavind and Weavind, situated in Pretoria. They handed over the cash to my father who then wrote out cheques to Brenda Mills, not to make it traceable and this was a Werner Burchill from the attorney's firm Weavind and Weavind. That's all that I'd like to say concerning this.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Barnard. Mr Wessels.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR WESSELS: (Cont)

Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Mr Barnard, after the shooting incident of Dr Webster, did you contact Lafras Luitingh and make an appointment with him?

MR BARNARD: Yes, that is correct.

MR WESSELS: Where was this appointment made?

MR BARNARD: It occurred at the Hyperama in Florida.

MR WESSELS: Where in the Hyperama?

MR BARNARD: In the parking lot.

MR WESSELS: I see. And you took Mr Botha with you?

MR BARNARD: That is correct, yes.

MR WESSELS: What did you tell him? What did you say to him, where must he hide or what must he do?

MR BARNARD: Mr Botha remained in my vehicle, I left my vehicle and went to Mr Luitingh's vehicle.

MR WESSELS: Did Mr Luitingh see where you came from?

MR BARNARD: I do not know, I cannot recall. He did not say anything about it.

MR WESSELS: Would he have been able to see Mr Botha?

MR BARNARD: It was a very busy parking lot, I cannot specifically recall what happened on that specific day and what the circumstances were, but I do not think that he would have been satisfied with it, because I assume he would not have been satisfied with it and he never mentioned anything to me about it.

MR WESSELS: Why did you take Mr Botha with you?

MR BARNARD: Because he was involved with me and I discussed the matter with him that I'm going to go and see Mr Luitingh and I wanted him to monitor the meeting between the two of us, because in the past I've heard a story where the CCB will send you to do a job and then afterwards they'd kill you. I did not think it would happen there, but I did take him with, I do not deny that.

MR WESSELS: So the purpose why you took him with was so that he can monitor or observe your contact with Mr Luitingh?

MR BARNARD: Yes, and also for my own safety.

MR WESSELS: Why for your own safety?

MR BARNARD: Sir, I just killed Dr Webster from a moving vehicle and the same thing can happen to me.

MR WESSELS: But did you think that they will shoot you in the parking lot?

MR BARNARD: I did not consider it very strongly, but it was a possibility.

MR WESSELS: And how would Mr Botha then have assisted you?

MR BARNARD: Mr Botha is a trained man or a person, he can see what's going on and if there's a problem he could have acted, he could have assisted me.

MR WESSELS: I see. And you say that you and Mr Botha drove in your vehicle and parked in the parking lot.

MR BARNARD: That is correct.

MR WESSELS: Did you have an arrangement with Mr Luitingh about where exactly you'd meet him?

MR BARNARD: Yes, Sir, we had a fixed point where we would always meet. We divided the parking lot into sectors, we would say: "I'll meet you at number one or I'll meet you at number 2" and he said: "Meet me at number one ... If you're on the one side you cannot see the other side of the Hyperama, so we met at point number one, I parked my vehicle and I walked to him there where he waited for me.

MR WESSELS: How far were you from him?

MR BARNARD: It's very difficult to recall, maybe 15 to 20 metres.

MR WESSELS: Were there other people in other vehicles between your two vehicles?

MR BARNARD: That is correct, yes.

MR WESSELS: Mr Barnard, you made two Section 29 statements.

MR BARNARD: I think it was three. One of them dealt with, that I made a High Court application and I stopped it halfway and withdrew it and certain pressure was placed on me to do it and I explained it at a later stage, but I also made a short statement that said that I did not want to continue with the application and I wanted to withdraw it.

MR WESSELS: In bundle B, Mr Chairperson, there are two statements which I'd like to refer to. The one was made on the 22nd of November and the other one on the 6th of December. This appears on page 141 and 99, the two last pages of the statements. The first statement begins on page 100 and the other one on page 82.

Now in your second statement you made mention of the fact that all the allegations in the first statement are not correct, is that correct?

MR BARNARD: Yes, that is correct.

MR LAX: Sorry Mr Wessels to interrupt you, there's another statement at page 82 of the bundle.

MR WESSELS: That's the one to which I referred.

MR LAX: Sorry, I thought it was 182 that you referred to. I beg your pardon.

MR WESSELS: Why did you in the first statement not give the correct version?

MR BARNARD: Sir, it's very obvious, I'm arrested by the police, I'm creating a story, I'm trying to get the police to think that I gave them possible correct information and that I have to get myself out of this situation.

MR WESSELS: And in your second statement you said now that the allegations that you made in the first statement are not correct and you are now making this statement and these are the correct facts.

MR BARNARD: It was once again not the truth.

MR WESSELS: Why did you not then make use of that opportunity to tell the truth?

MR BARNARD: Because I was still detained and I wanted to get out of there an as the police got information I realised the people are still putting pressure on me and I realised that they were getting more and more information and I wanted to give them things that seemed to be the truth and I wanted to get out of the situation, I wanted to con them.

MR WESSELS: Mr Barnard, in your evidence-in-chief you mentioned various people by name and you insulted some of the politicians.

MR BARNARD: That's correct, yes.

MR WESSELS: Was this part of the reconciliation process that you went through or was there another reason why you spoke about these people in this way?

MR BARNARD: No Chairperson, the reason why I did this was because I had no respect for them and I hated myself and I could not believe that I received instructions from people like Danie Phaal. He was the Head of the CCB, who came to me and told me exactly what I must do, but when he saw something that could possibly be a conviction or a charge against him, he drove to the Attorney-General to make a statement. And these are the same people who are recces who kill hundreds of people and even if it's a greenpeace overall that they find, they'll still run to the Attorney-General to testify against their comrades.

It was these people who were our recces. If tomorrow he ends up in a war situation and to protect our loved ones, then I'd say Sir, that person who is the big recce guy would sell us out for a tin of bully-beef. I have got no respect for them. The same counts for the politicians.

It's not about getting out of jail now or prison, I just want them to recognise me. I want them to say, "yes I know this person", as Siphiwe Nyanda did. Where's the threat? There's no more threat for these people, but they are still not doing it. The Bible says you have to forgive seventy times seven. I feel about it in this way, Kevin Woods and Eugene de Kock feel the same way, but they still deny it. We did everything on our own. Eugene de Kock took 18 people and attacked Lesotho. And the morning I woke up and I threw names in a hat and I pulled it out and I thought I'll kill David Webster today. It doesn't work like that and that is why I feel like this.

MR WESSELS: Mr Chairman, some of the documents that I required I'm told that I'm not going to get, I'm not entitled to it, so the others I will get in due course. I may or may not wish to cross-examine further once I've received those documents. At this stage, that concludes my cross-examination.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR WESSELS

CHAIRPERSON: You're just reserving your right to put further questions after you've seen certain documents. Yes, thank you, Mr Wessels. Mr Bizos, do you have any questions that you'd like to put?

MR BIZOS: Yes, Mr Chairman, but I would like clarity, with respect, documents help the Committee in its task to ascertain the truth. If my learned friend is aware of documents which he says he was told he was unable to get, I think that they may be serving the interests of truth if he discloses to us who have a real and substantial interest in the truth coming out, what documents they are, who has them and why do they claim that Mr Wessels or the Committee are not entitled to them. It is not a matter that we can leave in the air, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Wessels?

MR WESSELS: Yes Mr Chairman, I'm quite prepared to disclose that. I asked Mr van Eck acting for Calla Botha, for a copy of Calla Botha's statement and he informed ...(intervention)

CHAIRPERSON: Is that the third statement that you mentioned?

MR WESSELS: That is the statement made to the Attorney-General, apparently last year or before that. I'm told that apparently I'm not entitled to get that, the Attorney-General gave some instruction that I should not be forwarded an opportunity to peruse the statement.

MR VAN ECK: Mr Chairman, if I can come in at this point here. Mr Wessels approached me, I've indicated that Mr Botha made a statement to the Director of Public Prosecutions some time ago regarding the shooting of Dr Webster. I've taken this matter up again this morning with my instructing attorney, Mr Coetzee who is sitting here next to me, with Dr Pretorius of Pretoria, he has taken it up with his boss, Mr Sonn and we've been instructed that there's an investigation still pending, going on in that regard, and that they are not prepared to give permission that any of those documents at this stage may be released or disclosed to Mr Wessels, because according to them he's got no interest in that and there's still an investigation going on in that regard.

So I've informed Mr Wessels this morning that I've received instructions from Dr Pretorius after ...(no microphone) in this regard and on that basis we can not disclose those documents at this stage at all.

MR BIZOS: We will accept that, Mr Chairman. I believe that the Attorney-General has, the privilege rests with him, not with the witness, if I remember the cases correctly, in not disclosing the statement. If that is all, then I will not take the matter any further, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr Bizos, you can proceed with your questioning of Mr Barnard.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BIZOS: Thank you, Mr Chairman.

Could you please have a look at bundle A, page 204, that's your application for amnesty, Mr Barnard. Now are you on page 204, Mr Barnard?

MR BARNARD: I am Sir.

MR BIZOS: You can answer the questions in Afrikaans.

MR BARNARD: I do understand that, thank you.

MR BIZOS: Now I see that your address given on that page is C/o David H Botha du Plessis, are those the same attorneys that are acting for Mr Wouter Basson, Mr Leon Maree and Staal Burger in these proceedings?

MR BARNARD: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: Now try and remember as best you can, who drew your application for amnesty.

MR BARNARD: I think it was Mr Pietie du Plessis, the person sitting next to me, from the firm that you just mentioned.

MR BIZOS: The person acting for the other three persons that I have mentioned?

MR BARNARD: That is correct, yes, Mr du Plessis is also my instructing attorney for the Advocate Mr Fanie Coetzee, who is representing me in these hearings.

MR BIZOS: I see yes. How did you come to Mr du Plessis, was it on your own initiative or did one or other of your fellow policemen from, originally from Brixton, arrange that for you?

MR BARNARD: Mr Chairperson, during my detention under Section 29, they appointed a legal team, I had no control over this. After my release from the Section 29 detention and the Harms Commission that followed on that, the situation continued, people were appointed to me. It was not Mr du Plessis them. Then at a certain stage, I cannot exactly recall, that was approximately before the Webster post-mortem inquest took place, I had a discussion with Mr Calla Botha, who then told me that I must get away from those people because the organisation's controlling them. He then introduced Mr Pietie du Plessis to me and I then decided to work with him from them on.

MR BIZOS: Which organisation was controlling which lawyers?

MR BARNARD: The CCB appointed the former legal teams under Mr Hennie Goosen, Pierre Botha and Jenna Scholtz who were the instructing attorneys for the Harms Commission. They were people who were appointed and who were under control. That's how I understood it.

MR BIZOS: Did you ever pay those original attorneys or Mr du Plessis personally, did you pay any one of them before you made your application for amnesty?

MR BARNARD: No, Sir, I have never paid any legal costs, apart from my criminal case where I made use of the Law Council.

MR BIZOS: Yes, that was for the Webster killing.

MR BARNARD: No, Sir.

MR BIZOS: For what criminal case?

MR BARNARD: Please repeat, I lost the thread of the story.

MR BIZOS: You said that you paid, or you had counsel on a different basis for your criminal case, which criminal case are you referring to?

MR BARNARD: Mr Chairperson, I'm referring to the 34 charges from the High Court, for which I'm now serving a sentence. Amongst others, the Webster incident, all the political incidents and the non-political incidents that took place.

MR BIZOS: Now when you decided to apply for amnesty, I see that your application was filed on the 30th of September '97, was that a decision which you took on your own, or did you take it in consultation with the other people that applied for amnesty?

MR BARNARD: Sir, I think I was under detention and that was probably the last day on which I could execute this application and I decided to do it myself.

MR BIZOS: Did you know that the others who have applied for amnesty here were making applications for amnesty?

MR BARNARD: I assumed so, yes. I did not see them while I was locked up, but I assumed that they did make certain submissions or applications. And I think I was informed about it at a certain stage.

MR BIZOS: I do not wish to embarrass you by your early activities whilst at Brixton, but save for the purpose or really informing the Committee of how the Brixton Police covered the tracks for one another, did you do that?

MR BARNARD: Mr Chairperson, I was never involved in the Brixton Murder and Robbery Unit, although I worked closely with some of the members there. I was attached to the SANAB branch, the Narcotics Branch. I never worked or physically worked at the Brixton Murder and Robbery Unit, but in the environment in which I worked and I moved, especially if you were somebody who was involved in shooting incidents. It's almost like an exclusive club, everything is covered up, documents are manipulated, pocket book entries are manipulated, log book entries for vehicles are manipulated.

If there's a shooting incident and we have information that, for example, people are going to bring somebody to commit a crime, we will arrange it that the right officer is working, so that he can come out. So we are covering for each other, we did cover for each other.

MR BIZOS: Was there a spirit of one for all and all for one?

MR BARNARD: That is correct, Mr Bizos, particularly with reference to the exclusive club. You know in any specialist unit within the police there is a limited number of members who could be described as hardliners, people who would not hesitate to shoot or do the thing that needed to be done and particularly among those persons, that attitude would have been of application, yes.

MR BIZOS: And were there regular meetings in this exclusive club as to how you should defeat the ends of justice by altering evidence, by hiding evidence, by altering occurrence books, by even putting guns in the possession, in the hands of the deceased in order to justify claims of self-defence?

MR BARNARD: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: Now by the time the bubble burst shortly before the Harms Commission, was your arrest a complete surprise to you or were you expecting it?

MR BARNARD: Are your referring to the Section 29 arrest? Sir, there a preamble to my arrest under Section 29. I followed the matter in the press pertaining to Aitchison, because I was involved in his recruitment and when it spilled over to Brixton and when the investigative team under Jumbo Smit came over to South Africa, he originally had information. A police officer had tipped me off about an investigative team at Brixton, and then at a certain stage I was traced by means of this false pager and I was called in for the first time for interrogation at Brixton Murder and Robbery.

I resisted the interrogation, I denied everything. I was asked if I knew anybody by the name of Joe Verster and I denied this and then I was asked to return to Brixton at a later stage, because they wanted some or other explanation from me for some or other General. This never took place, but there was definitely a preamble. It wasn't a complete surprise to me, I knew that they were investigating me and that I was a suspect and that there was a connection between South Africa and South West Africa.

MR BIZOS: When you had this forewarning and it became apparent to you that investigating officers had some knowledge, however sparse or imperfect it may have been, did you get in touch with the other people applying for amnesty in this case, in order to agree on a united front, so to speak, as to what you would say in order to protect one another?

MR BARNARD: Chairperson, I made a report to Calla Botha and he took it to his cell region, to Staal Burger and the others. I never sat with them, although Calla Botha and I discussed the incident, the Webster incident because we had been involved in these things together. I made a report to him and he went to Staal Burger, and what they discussed there is unknown to me.

MR BIZOS: Well did you discuss with Mr Calla Botha anything as to how, if the investigation was taken further or if there was an order for your detention, what it was that you were to say, what you were to disclose and what you were to bury, as far as you and Calla Botha and Staal Burger and others were concerned?

MR BARNARD: Chairperson, I assumed that the thing would be stopped at a higher level, that was the feedback that was given to me, that the matter would be taken to the highest level, that it would be taken to the Generals level and that it would be stopped there. I thought that that would happen, but on the contrary, when I went to Brixton upon the second occasion and a General was supposed to question me, as I was told, they said to me, no, the people have gone to Pretoria and it's not necessary anymore and I truly believed that the CCB had managed to stop the matter on a higher level.

MR BIZOS: So that what they meant is that it would go as high as the Generals, was that to implicate the Generals or to get the Generals to cover your back?

MR BARNARD: To get the Generals to cover our backs, and mine.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Bizos.

So Mr Barnard, is your answer to Mr Bizos' question that you and Mr Botha didn't make up a story as such, to enable you to say the same thing in the event of being arrested?

MR BARNARD: No, we definitely did it, from the beginning we said that we denied everything and that we didn't know anything. We also did that.

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct - no microphone) with Mr van Zyl?

MR BARNARD: That is correct, yes.

MR BIZOS: Did you get in touch with Mr van Zyl, in order that you may present a common front?

MR BARNARD: No, I had faith in the organisation, that they do what they promised us they would do, that they would indeed squash the matter. I didn't go to everyone that I had been involved with and try to work out a cover story with them. I knew that if Mr Botha reported it and if I was pulled in for questioning by Brixton, it would be brought to the attention of Mr Slang van Zyl, by nature of the situation.

MR BIZOS: Now if you had had such an opportunity to discuss it with Mr van Zyl, would you have agreed to present a common version at that time?

MR BARNARD: Yes, I'm certain that we would have done so.

MR BIZOS: Yes. And insofar as there are material differences between Mr van Zyl's version in the Section 29 statements made by him, and versions made in your Section 29 statements, is that ascribed because you did not have an opportunity or because you thought that the matter would be squashed, you didn't meet in order to present a common version?

MR BARNARD: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: Now I want to deal with the suggestion that has been made to you that you were a loose cannon, that you were not employed by the CCB, that you made up this story or implicating CCB people recently in order to make friends in high places and get some benefit out of your giving evidence in the manner in which you did in this case. Now let me try and deal with that suggestion in some detail by asking you a number of questions. Firstly, your application was filed in '97.

MR BARNARD: That is correct, Sir.

MR BIZOS: This when you were in detention.

MR BARNARD: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: Shortly after your arrest on a number or criminal charges.

MR BARNARD: Correct.

MR BIZOS: And on page 2 of that application, on page 205, could you please turn to that.

MR BARNARD: I have it yes.

MR BIZOS: "

If you are/were an officer/and office bearer/employee of the State or any former State, or you are/were a member of any former State, State department/division."

That's quite a twister, but I think it's meaning is clear despite all the strokes. Now your answer to that is:

"SADF (Special Forces), CCB DKI"

MR BARNARD: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: And then

(b) State capacity and period in which you were in the service of the State or former State, or served in the Security Forces, if applicable and Force number, if any."

and then your answer is:

"SA Defence Force. Relevant period 1988 to 1989, either as a member or employed for specific purposes."

MR BARNARD: Yes, I see that.

MR BIZOS: Is that the truth?

MR BARNARD: It is the truth.

MR BIZOS: Now this was before - well it hasn't been suggested to you that you wanted to make friends in high places at that stage or you were being untruthful at that stage.

MR BARNARD: No, it wasn't.

MR BIZOS: But let us turn to some of the details of what really happened in fact, in order that the Committee may decide on the evidence, whether or not you were an employee of the State, either on a permanent or what we call on ad hoc or piecemeal basis. May I just return on what Mr Kahanovitz reminds me. Mr du Plessis, did he draw this document?

MR BARNARD: The amnesty application?

MR BIZOS: Yes.

MR BARNARD: Yes, I'm assuming so.

CHAIRPERSON: The handwriting that appears there, is that yours?

MR BARNARD: It is Mr du Plessis' handwriting.

MR BIZOS: And was Mr du Plessis a stranger to your doings or had you taken him into your confidence in at least your conditions of employment and the basis upon which you did things? Did he know that from a long association with you?

MR BARNARD: No, Mr du Plessis was aware that I had been a member of the CCB and DCC at the relevant times, as I stated. Not Mr Verster's version, but my version.

MR BIZOS: Yes. And it was on the basis of that which you no doubt confirmed at the time that you were in detention, by signing under oath that that was the truth?

MR BARNARD: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: And Mr du Plessis acted for the other CCB members at that time.

MR BARNARD: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: So he had their information to back up your claim presumably that you were connected with the CCB?

MR BARNARD: I'm assuming so.

MR BIZOS: Alright. You were not challenged in any way by our learned friend Mr Wessels, that you were regularly paid a salary, do you confirm that it was a salary?

MR BARNARD: It was definitely a salary.

MR BIZOS: Whose money were you getting?

MR BARNARD: Defence Force money. It came from the Defence Force. My own money that I worked for.

MR BIZOS: Now let us just have a categorical statement, if you would. From when to when were you getting R4 000 a month as a salary?

MR BARNARD: Chairperson, I received this salary from my time of joining the CCB, which was officially June 1988, it continued until my Section 29 detention which was late in 1989. I cannot recall the precise date, but it was towards the end of 1989. And only during the weekend when my memory was refreshed by telephonically consulting with my parents, I heard of the R4 000 per month which was paid out to Brenda Mills, because my father wrote out cheques to give to her. He is prepared to testify about it here and the record regarding the cheques is available if the Committee wishes to consult it.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Barnard, do you know for how many payments, for how long Brenda Mills got paid in such a manner, R4 000 a month?

MR BARNARD: Chairperson, I was under Section 29 for approximately three months and twenty one days, so it would have been for that duration of time. And as I have already testified, after my discharge I was asked what my needs or requirements were and I think that it was approximately R6 000 that I compiled a list of and I was told that I could obtain R12 000 the following day with which I was supposed to go on holiday, and this money also came from the CCB.

MR BIZOS: We also know that you received various bonuses. Now I'm not going to ask you to estimate the amount that you received in bonuses because you have given detailed evidence of the approximate amounts that you received from time to time and that we will add them up for the purposes of argument, so you don't have to worry about the amount. But whose money did you get as bonuses?

MR BARNARD: From the Defence Force, from the CCB.

MR BIZOS: And you were given how much? If I recall, R30 000 for a motor car?

MR BARNARD: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: We have heard from Mr van Zyl that he received a similar amount, was that as far as you know, the upper limit that a member or associate member of the CCB was entitled to for a motor car?

MR BARNARD: That is correct. May I just confirm? In terms of discussions with Mr Calla Botha, that he received a similar amount, Mr Calla Botha, and that I was also told at that time that I could purchase a more expensive vehicle. However, R30,000 would be the amount that the company would provide and I would have to be responsible for the deficit if I wanted to purchase a more expensive vehicle than that for which the funds that they made available to me allowed for.

MR BIZOS: And whatever label that they may want to put on you, did you feel that you were treated in a substantially similar manner as the other members of the CCB?

MR BARNARD: Sir, with regard to employment benefits, salary, medical benefits, policies, annuities, in that fashion yes, but with the exception of my handling after I was incorporated into the organisation, they dealt with me differently, I didn't for example undergo the courses that they had, it wasn't necessary, the CCB knew what they wanted with me. But with regard to my recruitment by Mr Joe Verster, I cannot understand that people are still trying to prove that I was an unconscious member, because wouldn't that have been the mother of all security breaches if Joe Verster had recruited me in contravention of all the rules and regulations? I enjoyed all the salary benefits and everything else, we discussed this with each other. Calla Botha and I saw each other on a daily basis, we discussed these matters. I saw that the was driving a car, I saw that he had a pager and I had all these things as well. We shared the same benefits. That is how it worked, precisely the same as all the other members.

MR BIZOS: Now was there any discussion amongst your fellow CCB members that Mr Verster and/or Mr van Zyl or others may have wanted to use you as the hitman for matters which they may not have wanted to put through the system, so to speak, and particularly behind the back of Gen Joubert in the first instance and Gen Webb, thereafter?

MR BARNARD: Chairperson, it was never discussed as such, although I believe that Mr Calla Botha and I would have speculated regarding it and I believe firmly today that that is precisely what occurred. I have no doubt about it although I do not have any factual basis upon which to base this, but in light of everything that occurred and everything that happened to me, I am convinced this is exactly what occurred.

MR BIZOS: What was there that Mr Verster might have been referring to or knew that you may have been able to give evidence in order, to use a euphemism, to fix the General?

MR BARNARD: I deduced that Mr Verster wanted me to make an insinuation or an allegation during these proceedings that I had received the Webster instruction from Gen Webb, which was not the truth. His words to me were: "Fuck the General up, fuck him up."

MR BIZOS: Now you were asked why you didn't speak about Webster, the other crimes that you committed at the time that you applied for amnesty.

MR BARNARD: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: And particularly in relation to the Webster killing, what is it that prevented you from applying for amnesty for that, because we'll work on the assumption that our learned friend, Mr Wessels is correct when he says it would have been an appropriate case for you to apply for amnesty? Why didn't you do it?

MR BARNARD: I didn't know what evidence the State possessed during my arrest, which persons would say that I made unlawful admissions, I didn't know what was going on with regard to that. Furthermore, I didn't trust anybody because I found myself in a situation where I was locked up. The same persons who provided hundreds of thousands of rands for my defence with, for example, the inquiries and the post-mortem inquiries into Dr Webster's death, were not available or accessible anymore.

I knew that I was being handled in a unique way. I had no substantiation for any disclosure made in an amnesty application. With regard to Lafras Luitingh and Joe Verster there was a typical CCB conspiracy against me after Joe had walked the whole way with me. You will remember that I was contacted by means of Mr Luitingh and I was brought to the Braamfontein Protea Hotel and a document was shown to me and the effect of the words which were typed on that page were that he denied any knowledge or involvement of or in the matter. He pointed at it with his finger and told me that that was his attitude.

All of those things built up to the time that I was arrested. All along everyone denied everything and all of a sudden Joe Verster and the others incriminated me during the post-mortem inquest. I didn't have someone in the system, such as Calla Botha or Slang van Zyl who could support me. They were always with me on a one on one basis.

I had a background of crime, I had been in prison, so I was discredited to a great extent. And if I were to disclose or expose everything in an amnesty application, all the Defence Force had to do was to deny it, which is what they did. Theuns Kruger said: "I don't know what the man's talking about, come and look at my office, I'm an auditor, look at my books" and there I would be and then there would be allegations and incriminations against me and the chances were very good that they would turn around and testify against me again if charges were brought against me.

I had absolutely no substantiation. I didn't have a rigid proforma which could substantiate my presentation or the approval or the budget that I received, there were no signatures. I was handled in a unique way and that made me afraid and uncertain because I could see that I was standing alone.

MR BIZOS: Yes, we understand that. I want to ask you a few more questions about the inquest in which his Lordship, Mr Justice Stegman held the inquest into the Webster killing. You're aware, I read it out here, that Judge Stegman said that, going through the evidence of the CCB people was trying to unravel a difficult puzzle, because you were careful to make the plausible denial, that is, admit only the things that may be proved patently and deny involvement. Would you agree with that assessment of the whole lot of you, by Judge Stegman, as to how you misled him?

MR BARNARD: That is correct, I would agree with that, yes.

MR BIZOS: Now you were asked why you didn't apply for amnesty for Webster, working on the assumption of the correctness of your evidence that you did it on the orders of Verster, did anything come out in those discussions as to why Verster would not apply for amnesty for the killing of Webster?

MR BARNARD: I cannot give any facts which would explain why Mr Verster did not apply, except from within my own personal opinion on him. He is so rigid in this thoughts that it is clear to me that they would not admit to anything that was going on in South Africa, except that which was know. For example, the Athlone bomb and the baboon incident, that which Slang van Zyl had already disclosed, they would admit to. I'm convinced within myself that other things must have taken place, I don't know exactly what, but what has been mentioned thusfar is merely the tip of the iceberg, that's for sure.

MR BIZOS: What reason did your colleagues in the CCB, do you believe, have in wanting to bypass Gen Webb?

MR BARNARD: Sir, I have spent much time thinking about that in my cell, I think that the CCB was highjacked from the inside by Joe Verster. I sat here and it was a revelation for me to see that Gen Webb had other duties and other activities except the CCB. He was the figurehead to me, but the CCB was actually Joe Verster. I think it turned into a monster where one person became so power hungry. If you play God for long enough you'll end up believing that you are God. And that is my personal opinion on what really happened here. However, I cannot substantiate my opinion with facts. I would say that Joe Verster highjacked the CCB from the inside and what the reason for that is, I don't know.

MR BIZOS: When you were recruited, were you informed that no life or attempt to take a life should be made without the authority of the Chairman, be it Gen Joubert or Gen Webb?

MR BARNARD: Mr Bizos, they never put it to me that directly in the beginning. At a later stage I became aware from discussions with Calla Botha, that things were submitted to the Chairperson. I wasn't completely involved regarding the length of the line and where it ran to, I knew I had to go through my Co-ordinator and through Joe Verster. What happened on the higher levels, I thought that there would be submissions but no-one told me specifically that everything had to be approved by the General. As I have told you, to me it was that Joe Verster was the CCB, if he said to kill a man, then I would kill him.

MR BIZOS: Remind us what Mr Verster said to his Lordship, Mr Justice Stegman about the killing of Webster and you.

MR BARNARD: Chairperson, I was not present when Mr Verster gave evidence, so I don't know, all I know is that he incriminated me. But I'm not certain, I don't know.

MR BIZOS: And were you present when Mr Luitingh gave evidence in the inquest?

MR BARNARD: No, I was not present with Mr Verster, Mr Luitingh or Mr Botes' evidence.

MR BIZOS: Was there any reason why you were excluded?

MR BARNARD: Chairperson, I'm speaking under correction but if I recall correctly, especially with regard to Mr Verster, it was as such that I was not permitted to be present while he gave evidence. I was under the impression that Mr Verster was in disguise and if he wasn't in disguise, they managed to smuggle him in and out of the court in some or other way. I was not allowed to see him and I think that the court was also evacuated during his evidence.

MR BIZOS: He gave evidence in camera.

MR BARNARD: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: He gave evidence under disguise at the Harms Commission.

MR BARNARD: Yes, that I know for a fact.

MR BIZOS: His identity was protected at all costs.

MR BARNARD: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: Now was there any attempt by anyone to suggest to you what you should say and what you should not say at the Webster inquest?

MR BARNARD: I did not have contact with the persons from the CCB anymore, so I simply did what came naturally and denied everything, because the only guideline that was given to me regarding the attitude of the organisation was that Joe Verster was in the hotel room, in the Braamfontein Protea Hotel, when he showed me what his attitude was. He pointed with his finger to the section of the page that stated that he denied everything regarding the Webster incident. So at all relevant times, I was under the impression that the CCB would deny everything regarding Webster.

MR BIZOS: Now you were asked whether you had cleared your use of Mr Calla Botha to help you with the murder of Dr Webster, from what had gone on before, did you think that anyone would have any objection to your using Mr Calla Botha for the purpose which you did?

MR BARNARD: I didn't really think about it in that way, the man was also a member of the organisation and I assumed that they did the same work that we did and I wanted to take someone with me who I could trust. I didn't think that there would be an objection, but I didn't go ahead and volunteer the information as such.

MR BIZOS: Was it only yourself that you wanted to protect by not disclosing that you had killed Webster, or did your close relationship with Mr Botha influence you in any way?

MR BARNARD: The fact remains that I wanted to protect Calla Botha at all costs.

MR BIZOS: Now you were also cross-examined as to your weapon of choice in order to kill Dr Webster and that you used your own shotgun which you modified in relation to length, in the manner in which you described. What number pellets did you use for the killing of Webster?

MR BARNARD: I cannot recall anymore today, it was either SG or SSG.

MR BIZOS: Those are heavy duty pellets, there are between 16 and 18 in the package are there not?

MR BARNARD: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: And at close range there are as lethal as any bullet.

MR BARNARD: I would say that it would be more effective than a bullet. If one shot someone from close enough it would have the effect of firing six or eight shots with a 9mm at a person, because the pellets in the casement were almost as big as the size of a 9mm bullet head.

MR BIZOS: And is a shotgun an advantageous weapon from the point of view of detection, as compared to bullets?

MR BARNARD: I don't really understand.

MR BIZOS: Can forensic experts ...(intervention)

MR BARNARD: Are you referring to the ballistics?

MR BIZOS: Yes.

MR BARNARD: One would not be able to connect ballistically if a shotgun was used, it's much more beneficial to use that sort of firearm than using a handgun or a hand firearm or any other type of gun.

MR BIZOS: Yes, the pellets, be they in the body of the deceased or on the motor car or in the near vicinity, could never be connected with any particular shotgun.

MR BARNARD: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: Unlike the other firearms that assassins use.

MR BARNARD: That is correct.

CHAIRPERSON: Was that one of the reason why you chose a shotgun, or not?

MR BARNARD: No, the reason why I used it was because I would be firing at close range and I wanted one shot to go off, not a variety of shots. If it had to take place during the day or something like that, the sound of the single shot would be the same as a car backfiring. And there was no opposition from Mr Verster and the others when I suggested that I wanted to use a shotgun.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr Bizos.

Did you use both barrels simultaneously?

MR BARNARD: No, I only fired one shot.

MR BIZOS: I want to now turn to your instructions to Mr van Zyl, in relation to Mr Omar's attempted murder. Now you're aware that Mr van Zyl says that you received instructions only to monitor Mr Omar, what is your categorical answer in relation to that?

MR BARNARD: It is false. My express instruction from the very first moment when I went to discuss the incident with Mr van Zyl, I knew without any doubt that I was being tasked to murder Mr Omar, not to monitor him but to murder him. I was told that there were gangsters and other people in the Cape who were not performing. This is before I left Johannesburg to go to Cape Town, the information was already known to me. So from the very first day that I was approached I knew that I would be responsible for the killing of Adv Omar. There was absolutely no doubt in my mind about that.

MR BIZOS: When were you given the weapon?

MR BARNARD: Chairperson, I was instructed to fly to Cape Town, which I did, I booked into the hotel there. Mr van Zyl joined me at a certain point. There was a meeting with Peaches Gordon and there was another meeting which was arranged for later in the evening, where all three of us were present. It was me, Peaches Gordon and Mr van Zyl. And upon this occasion Peaches Gordon took out a flat box which looked like a chocolate box and he gave the firearm to me, in the presence of Mr Slang van Zyl.

MR BIZOS: Did that firearm come out of the possession of Peaches?

MR BARNARD: It came from the possession of Peaches and upon Slang van Zyl's instruction he handed it over to me in the presence of Slang van Zyl.

MR BIZOS: What was the make of the firearm that you were given and what peculiarities did it have?

MR BARNARD: It was a Makarov pistol, a Russian manufactured Makarov with a silencer.

MR BIZOS: And you are absolutely certain that it came from Peaches' possession?

MR BARNARD: I have no doubt about that.

MR BIZOS: You heard the evidence of Mr van Zyl, that the Makarov that he had given Peaches was left with Peaches with instructions that he, Peaches, should destroy it, what do you say about that evidence?

MR BARNARD: The last time I spoke to Slang van Zyl at the Woodstock Holiday Inn, he told me that, or I told him that I didn't want to shoot because there was a woman with Adv Omar, and I told him that I wasn't prepared to continue on this basis, that it was like playing Russian roulette, hanging around there all the time in a stolen vehicle day after day, in a place where I stuck out like a sore thumb, and until there was specific pinpointed information regarding a meeting with Mr Omar, or any place where Mr Omar would be, I was not prepared to continue with the operation. At that point I handed back the weapon with the silencer that I had in my possession, to Mr van Zyl. I don't know what he did with it, but I really cannot imagine that Mr van Zyl would have given it back to Peaches Gordon to destroy, because that wouldn't make any sense. I cannot understand why he says that.

MR BIZOS: Well you must also take it into the context of Mr van Zyl's evidence, who denies that he ever gave you the gun or that he instructed you to kill Adv Omar, at any stage.

MR BARNARD: That is correct, his evidence was when it came to the allegation that I had the Makarov with the silencer and Brenda Mills' allegation, Mr van Zyl said the Lord only knows, but it isn't only the Lord that knows, Mr van Zyl and I know where I go the Makarov from.

MR BIZOS: When we were here during the June/July hearing, did you have friendly discussions with Mr van Zyl, in and around the hearing room or did he visit you during the adjournments where you kept apart by your guards?

MR BARNARD: Sir, what happened was that Mr van Zyl did not really want to meet with me in the first sitting, in the second sitting things changed. I think the cross-examination started worrying him and then he went to some trouble to go up to me and meet me and greet me. That made me feel a bit uncomfortable, but I wasn't quite sure what he was planning because it only happened afterwards, so I did talk to him. I think it was the third sitting when he came to me to greet me, I told him to fuck off because he's a two-face. It was the morning here when I was here the first time. And there's a reason why I did this.

MR BIZOS: Did you ever ask him why at your trial apparently in your favour where you were charged with the attempted murder of Adv Omar, his evidence was that you did not give him a Makarov or he did not instruct you to attempt to kill Adv Omar? Did you ever ask Van Zyl why he had departed from the truth before his Lordship, Mr Justice Els?

MR BARNARD: No, I did not ask him. I had no contact him at that stage.

MR BIZOS: You were in custody.

MR BARNARD: Yes, I was in custody and I saw Mr van Zyl the morning he walked in and as I told you, he was cold and calculated, he went to the box and gave me 10 years. He did not want to do me any favours. He stuck with the statement of 1988, where he said he made all the revelations or disclosures. It was with that statement of that time that he did not want to veer off from that. I was already in maximum prison, there was no access to me by him.

MR BIZOS: In relation to this strongly stated suggestion that other people got packages but you because you were differently treated, did not get a package because you were not a CCB member, how did it come about that you joined a new organisation after the supposed dissolution of the CCB? Please give us some detail, because I don't believe that anyone has canvassed this in any detail. Was it or was it not a payoff?

MR BARNARD: Mr Chairperson, I see it as a payoff because what happened was that I returned from holiday but I had an instruction to go and see Witkop Badenhorst, to phone him at a specific number. Upon my return I spoke to him, it was a C30 vehicle phone, and there was an arrangement made that I would see him at Adv Hennie Coetzee's offices or Hennie Goosen's office in Pretoria. An arrangement was made and I saw him there and at that same time he had some litigation of a private nature in his offices and with my first interview with Witkop Badenhorst he told me that people will contact me and will then appoint me at Military Intelligence. You can probably see it as a payoff, I haven't thought of it in that way, but I was transferred from one Defence Force organisation to another in a period of two weeks. It was an internal transfer.

MR BIZOS: With what benefits in the new position?

MR BARNARD: I was told from the beginning that I will be dealt with in a covert nature, because of the background of the CCB and the media coverage that I've already enjoyed at that stage. I became a bit frustrated so I wrote them a slightly sarcastic letter where I said I'm not willing to do this work, to be treated as an informer, I wanted to know what my tasks were and what my benefits were. I had a girlfriend who was pregnant, I wanted to make a career of this. I thought of it in a very serious light. They then appointed me as an agent and then at a later stage as a chief agent.

MR BIZOS: To do what?

MR BARNARD: Mr Chairperson, initially it was about collecting information, but people once very strongly requested me to sharpen my criminal contacts. They concentrated on the MK which ran together with the criminal world. They systematically changed it into a dirty tricks department, as I described in my evidence-in-chief.

MR BIZOS: Did the dirty tricks include killings?

MR BARNARD: Mr Chairperson, yes, but I was not directly involved in any of the murders, but I do have knowledge of two which I did not mention in my evidence-in-chief. If you want me to, I can mention what I know about it, I had indirect involvement in one of them, apart from the Francis incident where I was directly instructions.

MR BIZOS: Which are the two?

MR BARNARD: Chairperson, the one was Jan Shoba who was a PAC/APLA Commander. What happened there was that it was during the time of the Waverley House, and in one of my co-ordinating sessions there was a computer printout, Mr Jan Shoba's name was on it and there was another brochure from a Hancock person, I cannot recall the rest of the details. I received certain tasks. I had to go through all this documentation, it was about their movements in and out of the country. It was the normal information from an intelligence computer.

Three days later I read Die Beeld and then I saw Jan Shoba was killed in Atteridgeville in a drive-by shooting, I think it was an AK47, and just after I read it, because I thought here I'm sitting the documents and this was a burning issue then and now suddenly this person is killed, I read his name in the newspapers. Half an hour later Eugene de Kock and his whole team of askaris arrived and some of these members arrived at the Waverley House and I could see that they did not sleep, they were unshaven, they worked right through the night. I called Mr de Kock to the side and I asked him if they killed him and he said no, he did not know of it. I did not think he'd say yes. I told him: "Yes, well I received this documentation and now I see in the newspaper that this persons was killed, tell me if you were involved or not". He said no, he just went to go and burn a house. But Rieg Verster did admit to me at a later stage that they killed him, that he was personally involved, I do not in what capacity, but that they killed him.

Then there was another incident and if you want me to I will describe it to you.

MR BIZOS: Yes, please let's have it.

MR BARNARD: Mr Chairperson, I was contacted one evening at approximately 2 o'clock in the morning by Mr Verster, not Joe Verster, Rieg Verster, I was told to go to a specific point close to the Ultra City where he'd meet me, from there we drove. It was on the Morula Sun road. I had to go and steal a vehicle. What happened was that they killed a person who was a double-agent. He was in possession of a bakkie or pick-up which can be traced back to the DCC. It was a bakkie that he was issued with. They killed him and what happened was that he was outside of the vehicle when he was shot and in some way or another he threw away the keys and they could not find it in the dark and I was then contacted to remove the vehicle. I took the pick-up and I drove behind them up to Oom Gert se Gat, where it was stored and the vehicles were used in abductions and it was also stored at that house.

There was a basement where you could pull the vehicles in. Nobody gave me the person's name, but they told me that he was a double-agent that was eliminated. There was also blood against the vehicle and also a bullet hole in the bodywork.

CHAIRPERSON: Sorry Mr Bizos, if I could just ask a question before it slips my mind.

When you were employed or worked for the DCC, did you receive a monthly salary?

MR BARNARD: Yes, I received a fixed salary and hundred percent medical coverage.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos referred you to your amnesty application earlier on, on page 205, and your answer to one of the questions was that you worked for the South African Defence Force during the period '88 to '89, either as a member or employed for specific purposes, what did you mean by "or employed for specific purposes" when answering that question?

MR BARNARD: Sir, that was because I was treated in a unique way, I was employed for this type of work. People recruited me right from the beginning to kill people. The establishment of an information network was not the issue, they employed me to kill people and I accept that they used me as a hitman to do that kind of work.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Bizos.

MR BIZOS: Whilst we are dealing with the DCC, how did your benefits differ from the benefits you were getting from the CCB?

MR BARNARD: Mr Chairperson, I received a basic salary, I had hundred percent medical coverage. I was not provided with a vehicle because I had a vehicle. What happened was that the system that I built up snowballed so quickly that the operational costs grew a lot and when I was appointed as a chief agent I received an increase in salary and even my Colonel who handled me at that stage, it astonished him that I got so much money. And this came from Witkop Badenhorst himself, because they increased my salary with approximately R3 000 a month, but that's how it went.

MR BIZOS: What was Mr Badenhorst's position at the time? Was he a General?

MR BARNARD: Yes, he was a General, he was Head of the Military Intelligence and somebody in a very powerful position. If he spoke people jumped.

MR BIZOS: He didn't pay you his own money?

MR BARNARD: I beg your pardon?

MR BIZOS: He didn't pay you his own money?

MR BARNARD: No, it was Defence Force money.

MR BIZOS: Did anyone ever ask you to return the car that you had bought with the R30 000 that was given to you by the CCB, whilst you were on DCC business?

MR BARNARD: No, Sir. At the end of the day I traded that vehicle in and bought a new one. Nobody ever asked me for it back.

MR BIZOS: Did you have a credit card?

MR BARNARD: No, Sir.

MR BIZOS: Were there others that had a credit card?

MR BARNARD: At DCC they did work with credit cards left right and centre, but I myself did not work with it. They received specific cards that were issued to people. Some of them, I got the impression that they were limitless, the credit on them that is.

MR BIZOS: Were you with people on DCC where cards were used?

MR BARNARD: Yes. Mr Geoff Price, another Frans, Rieg Verster, they all used the cards.

MR BIZOS: Yes. Did you know that the discovery of the DCC came about as a result of the use of the credit card by the Goldstone Commission's investigators in Pietermaritzburg? Were you involved in any way in Pietermaritzburg?

MR BARNARD: Sir, Mr Eugene Riley, the former member of the Narcotics Unit in Johannesburg, I recruited him. He was appointed on a trial basis and later he was appointed on a permanent basis as an agent. He resorted under me but he had his own establishment, his own financial structure, etcetera, and from that there was certain information concerning weapons from a Mozambique citizen. It was either the ANC or MK, I'm not quite sure, that they stored these weapons in Natal. An excursion was arranged where Eugene Riley and his informant and also Frans, a senior member from DCC, and various other people then came to Pietermaritzburg to work on that information.

MR BIZOS: Is that what led to the appointment of the Steyn Commission and the forced resignation of the 23 Generals?

MR BARNARD: I assume so, yes, because there was a raid on the ARAQ offices, which would then be the Head Office of the DCC, they found a document that I wrote and that whole document is a dirty tricks document concerning the framing of MK into criminal situations or circumstances, and you can dirty somebody's hands by planting something at a specific place or framing them, and because of that Judge Goldstone made a press release which enjoyed international coverage and I agreed to a press interview where I denied everything on behalf of the Defence Force. I asked my Advocate concerning that document, because it would support my evidence here. I attempted to get hold of that document where I gave the layout of the dirty tricks department, what plans we had, but I could not get hold of it. It would have supported me in what I'm saying now.

MR BIZOS: Did your activities cease after the resignation of the 23 Generals?

MR BARNARD: Yes approximately the same time, maybe a bit before that, but it's around that time.

MR BIZOS: There's one other I want to ask you. Were there askaris used in the DCC operations?

MR BARNARD: Yes, Sir, there were askaris used. There was close co-operation between DCC and Mr Eugene de Kock them at Vlakplaas. Myself and Mr Eugene de Kock were personal friends, we interacted on a social basis and at a certain stage when Vlakplaas was down-scaling and they worked on the political aspects. Mr de Kock knew things were changing and he came to me with his askaris and his top operators and he offered them to me and I then took them in. Mr Henry van der Westhuizen who also used agents, he was the specialist in the ANC, the Anti-propaganda Unit, but we did not recruit askaris ourselves as Vlakplaas did it, we got them in other places but there were some who worked with us, yes.

MR BIZOS: Now were these askaris used in order to disrupt the election process?

MR BARNARD: The election process in '94? I heard about it ...(intervention)

MR BIZOS: Or the period leading up to it.

MR BARNARD: Yes Sir, I was involved in it myself.

MR BIZOS: Please tell us about that and on whose orders you did that.

MR BARNARD: What happened was that we took askaris and I recruit criminal elements, like from Soweto/Eldorado Park, Ennerdale, etcetera. I recruited criminal elements to disrupt mass actions and marches, I recruited them to commit criminal offences. If they participated in these marches, then the government or the Defence Force would then give it a lot of media coverage. They would run down a street, damage vehicles, break shop windows. I personally paid these criminal elements.

Maybe you can recall that there were such allegations in the media and on television that the ANC held a march and people ran down the streets and people robbed shops and people were injured, and I paid those, half before and half afterwards. I think in two of those incidents, as I just explained it to you, we decided to stage a false one and this was done to strengthen the Defence Force hand in terms of actions in the Coloured areas, concerning roadblocks, house to house searches, etcetera. Then we entered false information into the system, it was given to the media, in that we received information that, for example members of the ANC who were involved in these marches will hijack white women, take them to black areas to rape them. We'd already built up a background with regards to the criminal elements in these marches.

And then you'd recall that it was given a lot of media coverage, helicopters were used, an operational office was set up and manned by a General, they held roadblocks, the did block searches, house to house searches because of this, and it was all a campaign against the ANC. It was just before the elections.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos, when it's convenient, when you get to the end of a theme we'll take the short tea adjournment.

MR BIZOS: ...(indistinct - no microphone) the askaris.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR BIZOS: Now you and Mr de Kock had access to AK47s, did you not?

MR BARNARD: That's correct, yes.

MR BIZOS: And were these AK47s given to the various askaris that you had recruited?

MR BARNARD: Mr Chairperson, when I took over some of the askaris from Mr de Kock, specially two of them who had AK47s, I did not take it off them but I did not hand it out, but if they'd asked me I would have given one.

MR BIZOS: Now we know that hundreds of people were killed on trains, what do you know about that, Mr Barnard?

MR BARNARD: Mr Chairperson, I've only got limited knowledge concerning that, except that at a certain stage Vlakplaas members told me that they handed over weapons to the Zulus at the hostels, to commit those crimes. At a certain stage I was at the Three Sister Restaurant in Hillbrow with Chappies Kloppers, who then testified at a later stage against De Kock and Willie Nortje, and then Chappies Kloppers told me that they had to go and deliver a certain amount of weapons, I think it was in Tokoza, and I had to accompany them, but I was then busy with something else. It was not that I was scared to accompany them, I did these things every day, but I had something else going, so I could not accompany them. It was the same with the Boipatong massacre, a days few before that they also told me that they were handed over a large amount of weapons by Vlakplaas members and that will be used where the Zulus or the ANC will attack people, and I assumed it was for the Boipatong massacre, although I cannot prove this. But it was only a few days before the event.

MR BIZOS: It may be convenient, Mr Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. We'll take the short tea adjournment now for approximately 20 minutes.

COMMITTEE ADJOURNS

ON RESUMPTION

FERDINAND BARNARD: (s.u.o.)

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Bizos.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR BIZOS: (Cont)

In the CCB and the DCC that you took part in, what was the attitude in relation to killing innocent people, if it served the purpose of the organisation?

MR BARNARD: Sir, I can answer as follows. If someone presented a threat to the organisation or the government of the day, he could be killed. Mark Francis was killed with the exclusive purpose to silence him because he was about to expose the scene in Johannesburg.

MR BIZOS: What I have in mind is that, for instance those who were mandated to kill, whether the Security Police, the CCB or the last organisation that you worked for. Let us take the Ribeiro killing for instance. There has been no suggestion that Mrs Ribeiro was in any way connected, but it would appear that if you were a hitman and you had to kill, you might as well kill the witness as well.

MR BARNARD: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: Whether the witness was involved or not.

MR BARNARD: It is precisely as I testified during my evidence with regard to the Adv Omar incident, I was asked why I didn't floor the woman as well.

MR BIZOS: Would that have been, killing Mrs Omar, would that have been in accordance with the way in which you would achieve the objectives of the CCB?

MR BARNARD: Correct. In the same breath I can tell you that with regard to my evidence regarding the Webster incident, when the vehicle behind us kept on approaching, I prepared myself to fire at that vehicle, and ten to one it would have been a completely innocent person in that vehicle who had absolutely nothing to do with politics. I was prepared to kill him if need be.

MR BIZOS: We had other examples, for instance in the Goniwe killings, one of the four in the car was on the finding, an innocent passenger, you couldn't kill the three and leave the - within their own idea of innocence and guilt, you couldn't kill the guilty and leave the innocent alive, because the whole game would have been up. So killing innocent people was not something contrary to the way in which the CCB did its killings.

MR BARNARD: I agree with you.

MR BIZOS: Now with that in mind, were you surprised that Van Zyl told you why didn't you kill her?

MR BARNARD: No, I wasn't surprised.

MR BIZOS: What did you say to him?

MR BARNARD: I told him that I didn't do it that way and that I wasn't prepared to do it that way. I had a personal problem with doing it that way.

MR BIZOS: What was the driving force against it?

MR BARNARD: Chairperson, I was raised in such a way that women and children should be respected, and after the incident with Dr Webster took place, the thing that upset me the most wasn't the fact that I had shot Dr Webster dead, what upset me the most was to see what Ms Maggie Friedman had experienced in the press and personally as I saw her. I cannot explain to you what it feels like to sit during a Commission of Inquiry and to sit with a post-mortem inquest and not be able to look that women in the eye. The fact that she was present makes it more humiliating for me. The process of shooting someone in the presence of his or her loved one, it was a cowardly act, it was not the same as the Special Task Force in the Police, who did penetration actions and knew exactly who would be in a building that they were about to penetrate. To shoot a man in the presence of his loved one was cowardly, it is not something that made me feel good, it upset me. The aspect pertaining to Maggie Friedman, I began drinking uncontrollably after that incident, morning, noon and night, after I had seen that she was present, because I did not physically see her during the incident.

MR BIZOS: In some of these cases it has been said that it's unfortunate if people get killed in the crossfire, now I don't know apt an expression that is where there's only one side that's doing the shooting, but was it used as a justification, this expression: "Well you get caught in the crossfire", if you killed innocent people standing by?

MR BARNARD: Yes, I assume that it would be put down to part of the war that we were waging, it was justifiable.

MR BIZOS: Now with that background I want ask you questions, having regard to your knowledge of how the CCB worked. From your understanding, if people actually or on false information given, were responsible in the mind of Verster or of Van Zyl, of putting bombs at the Magistrate's Court, at the post office and if they thought that they were going to plant other bombs in which people would have been killed, how did you expect the CCB, from what you knew, to deal with such people?

MR BARNARD: Chairperson, to quote the motto of the CCB, it would be to disrupt them on the maximum level and to kill them. It was the same thing with Bishop Tutu, we could just as well have played knock-knock or thrown stones on the rook, we could have blown down the tyres of the security guard's bicycle, that really would have disrupted and upset Bishop Tutu. It doesn't make any sense, if these persons were identified as terrorists, if an activist such as Dr Webster could be shot dead, then so more could stricter action be taken against those who were planting bombs, for example. They would have been killed.

MR BIZOS: The fact that there was information that it was a whole committee that was going to meet at the Early Learning Centre, within the practice of the CCB, would the killing of 10/12 people on this committee, possibly the night watchman that was there, other people that may have been there, would that have been a deterrent affect on the CCB to blowing people up?

MR BARNARD: No, it wouldn't Sir, to my understanding.

MR BIZOS: Now please tell us precisely, insofar as you are able to, what Van Zyl said to you about the Early Learning Centre.

MR BARNARD: I contacted Mr van Zyl that morning and informed him regarding the Lubowski incident that I'd viewed on TV, and he told me that I should speak to him later that day in the hotel where I was booked into in Woodstock, the Holiday Inn. He told me that the bomb which had exploded towards the end of August had been his project and that it had successfully been completed in certain aspects but not in others. I asked him to explain and he said that the objective had been to kill all the occupants or to maim all the occupants in the hall and that the project had not been successfully completed because the remote control device was faulty and by the time it had been repaired and activated, most of the people had left the meeting hall. That is what he told me. And that it had been an order from the very top. He also stated that he had attached either 4 pounds or 4 kilograms worth of nails to the bomb with masking tape, in order to produce a better shrapnel effect.

MR BIZOS: That he had added to it?

MR BARNARD: That he had done it.

MR BIZOS: And you then told us that you discussed this with Calla Botha.

MR BARNARD: At a later stage, I cannot recall when, I had contact with Mr Calla Botha and I discussed it with him.

MR BIZOS: Now you told us that he differed with Van Zyl in his report to you, to what extent was the report different?

MR BARNARD: Mr Botha was upset, he was indignant, he said that he didn't know why that man was saying such things, he said that he was living in a dream world, he said that he, Mr Botha, had personally inspected the bomb, that he was the last one to view the bomb, that he doesn't know how he was implicated in the whole matter and that it was possible to teach a monkey to activate the button in ten seconds. He also denied the aspect of the nails. He also denied that the people had to be killed, he stated emphatically that on the contrary, the direct instruction had been that no-one should be killed. I myself was not involved in the bomb incident. If I could give you the details of what exactly was said, I would. Mr Botha denied it, but Mr Slang van Zyl looked very serious when he told me all the details. I don't know why this is.

MR BIZOS: Did Mr Calla Botha express any reluctance to being involved in that operation?

MR BARNARD: I wouldn't say that he was reluctant, but when I made this report regarding the nails to him, he said that he didn't know why they involved him in the first place, because it wasn't his project, that he was working independently, but they needed him when they wanted to use him, that was when he would be good enough for them to use. He said that one could teach a chimpanzee in ten minutes to activate the button which would detonate the bomb. That was his attitude.

MR BIZOS: You've heard the evidence of Gen Webb, Mr Verster and Van Zyl, that this was merely to frighten people.

MR BARNARD: That is correct, I heard it.

MR BIZOS: How consistent is that with the way in which the CCB did its business?

MR BARNARD: It's not consistent at all, it's inconsistent. To my mind.

MR BIZOS: Let us turn to the operation, Apie as it's referred to in the papers. Now you have given evidence to the effect that you were told by Van Zyl that this was the third step of five which would have led to the death of Archbishop Tutu's son.

MR BARNARD: That is correct, yes.

MR BIZOS: In the statement that you made at the time you were detained in terms of Section 29 before the Harms Commission, you mention that fact as well.

MR BARNARD: That is correct.

MR BIZOS: In your dealings with Van Zyl after that, did he ever deny it or did he ever tell you how did you come to say this?

MR BARNARD: No, he didn't, I was never confronted with it. In my Section 29 statement, if I recall correctly, I also concealed Mr van Zyl's identity in that it would come from someone else, I created a fictional person by the name of Dirk, who was actually Mr van Zyl in reality, but with my second Section 29 statement I stipulated that it was indeed Mr van Zyl and not this Dirk that I'd referred to.

MR BIZOS: So that when you mentioned it the first time you attempted to ...(intervention)

MR BARNARD: To cover for Van Zyl.

MR BIZOS: To cover for Van Zyl.

MR BARNARD: That's correct, yes.

MR BIZOS: But in your second statement you came out with it.

MR BARNARD: That's correct yes, Sir.

MR BIZOS: That too was said before you are alleged to have given unfavourable evidence towards people in order to make friends in high places.

MR BARNARD: Yes Sir, I think my attitude towards that remark is clearly on record.

MR BIZOS: The Members of the Committee and particularly the Chairman, has asked why were you treated differently and there are one or two questions that I want to ask you about that, Mr Barnard. What was Luitingh's job as far as you were concerned?

MR BARNARD: Mr Luitingh had other duties that I was not involved in, but his work with regard to me was to act as my Co-ordinator. All my information went into the system via him and I received my tasks from him as well.

MR BIZOS: And that's the man that you got most instructions from and that's the man where you got most of the bonus money from.

MR BARNARD: That's correct yes, Sir.

MR BIZOS: Can you explain, if you can, why a Region 6 was not chosen for that purpose but apparently someone who was under the direct control of Mr Verster?

MR BARNARD: For what purpose is that, Sir?

MR BIZOS: Why were you handled by a person who had direct access to Mr Verster and not by one of the people that was a member of Region 6?

MR BARNARD: I think that's obvious, in order to establish a cut-off point. You must remember that Verster and Luitingh at no stage were aware of the fact that I knew their identities, according to them there was an absolute watertight cut-off point, that being themselves. I had a pager of one David Klopper, with which I contacted Lafras Luitingh. I knew him as Louis Yssel and I had a pager by which I contacted him, which was registered in the name of David Klopper. I believe it was to establish a cut-off point. And I think that is also the reason why I was handled in such isolation, as an individual unit, I alone.

MR BIZOS: Why, if you were going to be merely a hitman, why were you not treated like Peaches or Hardien?

MR BARNARD: I don't know, I cannot explain it. I don't know if they were looking for someone who would be a conscious member, but would function on his own, given my background. I had a police background, I knew how to circumvent investigations, I knew how to get out of situations. I'd managed to get out of many tight spots in my lifetime and it was well known.

MR BIZOS: You've mentioned Badenhorst as running the DCC, was he the only person in DCC that you came across, or were there others?

MR BARNARD: No, at a certain stage I also had liaison with Brig Tol Botha, he was the Head of DCC, but Gen Witkop Badenhorst was the overall Commander of Military Intelligence. Military Intelligence, viewed in general, had various branches and some of the branches were overt, others were covert and underground structures, but Brig Tolletjie Botha was generally in command, then there were Col At Nel and Geoffrey Price who was a Major, and as I've already stated there was Col Gerrie Borman, and Rich Verster.

MR BIZOS: Do you know whether Aitchison is still alive?

MR BARNARD: No, but I doubt it, I myself doubt whether he is still alive.

MR BIZOS: Why would that be?

MR BARNARD: I just think so, because I never heard from him again. At a time I saw, a few years ago, that he was still making statements in the media and in the press, that he even spoke to the foreign media at one point. I recall seeing an interview that he had with Dirk Coetzee, during which it was said that he was also tasked to kill Dirk Coetzee and then he just became quiet, I never heard anything else of him.

MR BIZOS: He wasn't a person to keep quiet about things.

MR BARNARD: No, after his release, on the contrary he set press interviews, he was the sort of man who would do anything for money. If the press paid him, he would tell them a lie.

MR BIZOS: And how did Peaches come to be killed?

MR BARNARD: I don't know, I followed the story in the papers and I saw that he had been killed. I must just say that the CCB was very unhappy with him, due to the revelations that he made, and in particular, Mr Slang van Zyl, because Slang van Zyl and I discussed it at one point. Peaches Gordon came to point me out while I was in Section 29 detention, he slapped me on the shoulder and pointed me out and identified me in Brixton, so I wasn't very happy with him either. There was a lot of sensitivity surrounding the fact that he led Slang van Zyl around by the nose with regard to work that he didn't do and money that he took from him. I'm not saying that Mr van Zyl has something to do with it, what I am trying to say is that he, Mr van Zyl, was very unhappy with Peaches Gordon.

MR BIZOS: Mr Chairman, I have no more questions at this stage, but we would like to reserve any further cross-examination that, or examination as a result of anything that may emerge when our learned friend Mr Wessels has another opportunity.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR BIZOS

CHAIRPERSON: Yes thank you, Mr Bizos. Mr Hockey, do you have any questions you'd like to put to the applicant?

MR HOCKEY: I don't have any questions in addition to that asked by Mr Bizos, so thank you Mr Chairman.

NO QUESTIONS BY MR HOCKEY

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Rheede, do you have any questions that you would like to put?

MR RHEEDE: None, Mr Chairman.

NO QUESTIONS BY MR RHEEDE

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Martini, you indicated earlier that you would be reserving any rights to put questions, do you wish to put questions at all?

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR MARTINI: Thank you, Chairperson, just one question.

Mr Barnard, just flowing from what Mr Bizos asked you, I just want to understand your evidence, if it's correct. In your Section 29 statement, the '89 statement, November '89, you created this fictitious person, Dirk, is that correct?

MR BARNARD: That is correct, Sir.

MR MARTINI: And I take it that was designed to protect Mr Slang van Zyl?

MR BARNARD: That is correct, and also to create as much confusion as possible, to give the police without really giving them anything at all.

MR MARTINI: Yes, yes, but on the issue of the "vyf punt plan", you original said it was Dirk.

MR BARNARD: That is correct.

MR MARTINI: Because you said in your evidence that Mr van Zyl told you this was part of a five point plan, correct?

MR BARNARD: That is correct, Dirk does not exist. He never existed.

MR MARTINI: Correct. So at that point in time you created this surely to protect Mr van Zyl on the issue of the Apie.

MR BARNARD: That is correct.

MR MARTINI: Then are we to assume you then made another statement, December '89, correct?

MR BARNARD: I assume so.

MR MARTINI: And there you said you wanted to correct certain falsehoods that you'd made previously, correct?

MR BARNARD: That is correct.

MR MARTINI: Well you say you "neem so aan", if you just check bundle B, I thought Mr Bizos dealt with that with you, if you can look at page 99 of bundle B, Mr Barnard. Do you have it?

MR BARNARD: Yes I do, thank you.

MR MARTINI: You see that statement's dated the 6th of December 89, correct? Page 99, bundle B.

MR LAX: In fact the later statement comes before the first statement, the earlier statement.

MR MARTINI: Sir, I don't want you to assume, I want you just to tell us if it's correct.

MR BARNARD: Could you please put the question again.

MR MARTINI: Do you agree with me that at page 99, bundle B, that statement is dated 6th of December '89?

MR BARNARD: That is correct.

MR MARTINI: Now the first statement where you dealt with Dirk, where you created the fictitious person, where you said Dirk told you about this five point plan, was done in November '89, correct?

MR BARNARD: That is correct.

MR MARTINI: Now in December '89, I take it then you no longer wanted to protect Mr van Zyl.

MR BARNARD: I exposed him, if I recall correctly.

MR MARTINI: Correct, that's my point. Well that's what you say, you say well he even identified ...(indistinct). In your statement, if you look at 93

"I did it once again to protect Slang"

MR BARNARD: Yes, I can see that.

MR MARTINI: So can we accept that in your second statement, December '89, you then wanted to expose Mr van Zyl?

MR BARNARD: Yes I did expose him, but my second statement also contained lies, but this is the truth.

MR MARTINI: Ja, but what I'm putting to you is, you've now corrected it, you said: "Look, there was no such a person as Van Zyl, it was Dirk", now comes a month later you now want to expose him, because you now identify him, correct?

MR BARNARD: That's correct.

MR MARTINI: Because you wanted to expose him. You went as far as now identifying Mr van Zyl.

MR BARNARD: That's correct.

MR MARTINI: Thank you, no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR MARTINI

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. At this stage, unless anybody's got any further questions, that concludes your testimony.

MS COLERIDGE: Chairperson?

CHAIRPERSON: Oh sorry, there was no intention Ms Coleridge. Please go ahead and ask questions.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS COLERIDGE: Thank you, Chairperson, just a few questions I'd like to ask Mr Barnard in relation to the Webster incident.

Mr Barnard, did you contact Mr Verster after the Webster incident? Did you make a report to him?

MR BARNARD: No, I only reported to Lafras Luitingh when I contacted him and he didn't get back to me directly. I finally managed to get hold of him two to three days later and upon our meeting I reported to him and also wanted to know if damage control was necessary. I was worried about the press and media coverage of the incident.

MS COLERIDGE: And then in relation to Calla Botha, at which stage did Mr Verster know of Calla Botha's involvement in the Webster incident?

MR BARNARD: I cannot say specifically when it became known or when it was reported, but possibly on the morning of my meeting with Lafras Luitingh, I could have disclosed Calla Botha's involvement in the incident to him. I cannot remember precisely. I've spent much time thinking about it, unfortunately I cannot answer you precisely.

MS COLERIDGE: And did Mr Calla Botha at any stage inform you that he had told Joe Verster of his involvement in the Webster incident?

MR BARNARD: I don't know if he reported to Joe Verster, but at a certain stage he disclosed the facts to his Co-ordinator and his regional management.

MS COLERIDGE: Is that Wouter ...(intervention)

MR BARNARD: That is Wouter Basson and Staal Burger. Although I cannot say whether it was both of them or only one of them, but he did report it to his cell. There was a stage where he would have had to report it.

MS COLERIDGE: Was this immediately after the incident, or was it a long while after the incident? Do you have any recollection?

MR BARNARD: I have no idea when it was.

MS COLERIDGE: And then just after your Section 29, after your detention, you said you made calculations that your needs were about R6 000, but instead you received R12 000, did you actually request the R12 000 or the R6 000?

MR BARNARD: No, what happened was that I was supposed to compile a list of my requirements which totalled an amount of R6 000 and then the attorneys contacted me later that afternoon and told me to come to their offices the following morning and that they had received R12 000. I wouldn't say that it was an instruction but it was suggested to me that I should go on holiday with the rest of the money, and I did so.

MS COLERIDGE: And then Mr Slang van Zyl used your services, how did the two of you make that connection? Did he know that you belonged to the CCB?

MR BARNARD: I think I said so to Mr van Zyl, but our original contact was at the Johannesburg SAP Rugby Club where I had been a member many years previously. We ran into each other there. His wife at that stage, introduced us to each other because I knew her when she was a State Prosecutor and I was a Detective. The two of them later got married. She introduced us and then upon various occasions I telephoned Mr van Zyl and we met in a restaurant eventually and I told him that there could be possible ways in which we could compliment each other. Among others, I told him that much of the CCB's information was updated. He agreed with me. And we also discussed in general.

MS COLERIDGE: So he was never aware of the fact that you worked for the CCB?

MR BARNARD: I think I put it to him.

MS COLERIDGE: At which stage was this?

MR BARNARD: When we had that meeting in the restaurant.

MS COLERIDGE: And then just your instruction with regards to the Lubowski incident, what was your instruction basically, was it just to monitor?

MR BARNARD: From Mr van Zyl?

MS COLERIDGE: Correct.

MR BARNARD: The internal story with regard to Adv Lubowski was only monitoring. As I've testified, at a certain stage I went and felt Mr Lubowski's door myself, because I had worked on him in South West Africa and I was made aware that there was a project which was aimed at killing him and I thought that I should do so while I was busy. I saw him going out to the parking lot later that night, I thought that he would make a good opportunity target, but I never had such an instruction. That is what I reported to Mr van Zyl. He didn't want me to proceed with it.

MS COLERIDGE: Thank you Chairperson, I've no further questions.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS COLERIDGE

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Lax do you have any questions you'd like to ask?

MR LAX: Thanks, Chairperson.

Mr Barnard, in answer to questions from both Mr Wessels and Mr Bizos, you indicated that apart from the monies from the sale of your house, no other monies of your own were used in any representation of you in any of the legal fora that you've been involved in, is that correct?

MR BARNARD: Yes, apart from the legal counsel who assisted me in my criminal trial. All other investigations, the Harms Commission, the Goldstone Commission, the Webster Post-mortem Inquest, they all paid for it.

MR LAX: I just wanted to be clear where the money for the sale of your house actually went to, which defence was that?

MR BARNARD: Mr Chairperson, it was a robbery charge, a diamond robbery in Klerksdorp. I paid for it privately. It had nothing to do with the Defence Force or anything else, and I paid it to that attorney's firm who acted on my behalf in that case.

MR LAX: Now what was your basic at DCC? You told us that you got an increase, but what was your basic?

MR BARNARD: It's difficult to recall but I would say it was approximately R3 500 as a starting salary and then with operational costs.

MR LAX: Okay. Now I want to take you back to your amnesty application form and in particular page 208, your answer to paragraph 11(b). The question is with regard to who gave you orders, etcetera, etcetera, and in 11(a) you say

"Execution of order and with the approval of the Security Forces involved"

and then with regard to the particulars of such, you say:

"Mr Abram Slang van Zyl"

MR BARNARD: That's correct, yes.

MR LAX: Why didn't you mention anyone higher than Mr van Zyl, at that stage?

MR BARNARD: Sir, I also testified and I was under the impression that Mr van Zyl applied me and that he told that he did not inform anybody else about my involvement in this incident. If I was disinformed concerning this, I do not know. If it was truly the case, I do not know, but I was under the impression that Mr van Zyl never told anyone else about my involvement.

MR LAX: And then finally, with regard to the matter of Boipatong itself, you indicated that some days before that you had knowledge that certain weapons were delivered. You said you got this information at the Three Sisters Restaurant.

MR BARNARD: That is correct, from the Vlakplaas members, but I cannot say that it was used for Boipatong, because I do not know. What I'm saying is that I made an inference, because there were Zulus involved in the Boipatong and I read about this later in the media, that these weapons had to be delivered for Zulus. I made the inference that it could have possibly played a role. If it was true, I do not know, I've got no facts to substantiate it.

MR LAX: Is it correct that what you were told was that the weapons were just being delivered to some Zulus, you didn't know exactly which ones, which ...(intervention)

MR BARNARD: To a Zulu hostel in Tokoza.

MR LAX: in Tokoza?

MR BARNARD: To Tokoza, in the East.

MR LAX: Thank you, no further questions Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Sibanyoni, do you have any questions you'd like to put?

MR SIBANYONI: Only one Mr Chairperson.

Mr Barnard, if a person will say to you you are involving people higher than Slang van Zyl, for example Joe Verster, because of the fact that you are bitter, they didn't help you, what would be your comment?

MR BARNARD: Sorry, I didn't understand your question now Sir.

MR SIBANYONI: If a person may allege that you are involving people like Joe Verster of having given you instructions, for the reason that after your arrest now they are not helping you, what would be your response to that?

MR BARNARD: No, Sir, that is far from the truth. If I wanted to incriminate Joe Verster, I could have done it a day after my arrest, when I was arrested. I was also offered 204 indemnity by the Attorney-General and they say: "If you tell us where your instructions came from, if you play with us, if you make a full disclosure, we will give you indemnity with the Attorney and the investigative team's office. I did not want to give my co-operation, I refused to incriminate anybody else, and since then the Attorney-General's staff and the Attorney-General, Mr Pretorius himself, came to visit me for seventeen times in prison and up until when I started telling the truth here, I did not make any statements. Apart from the fact that I was suffering in C-Max, apart from the fact that I was suffering under the circumstances, I was detained under circumstances, I thought if I make a statement here I will be out of C-Max in a normal jail where I can practise, exercise and play pool and play darts like other people do in jails, and I stuck with what I believed in and I decided not to do it until I came here and explained about Mrs Omar who came to me and I started telling the truth. This what happened with her made me tell the truth here. It's not about incriminating Joe Verster, I said at various opportunities I do not want anybody else to end up in jail and I realised that the evidence that I'm giving here cannot be given in a criminal case. If I wanted to incriminate Joe Verster, I could have worsened it, I could have made more allegations, I could have made a this thick statement that would have shocked the Attorney-General. I do not have to go through all of it again, it's not about that.

MR SIBANYONI: And lastly, if a person will say you have told lies on various occasions before, as a result it would risky to accept what you are saying, what would be your response?

MR BARNARD: Sir, I admitted under oath again today that for 12 years I've been lying. If my evidence will be accepted now, I cannot say. All that I'm saying is that anybody with a little bit of intelligence can see that I've denied that I had anything to do with the Webster incident, I've denied all involvement. I did it to protect the government of the day, to protect the Defence Force and to protect myself. For me the situation is now applicable, the game's over, I do not have to do it anymore. I cannot tell you how I feel after I reconciled with Mrs Omar and after I got rid of all the rubbish, I feel like somebody that was healed from cancer. I'm very satisfied that I did the right thing now.

MR SIBANYONI: You confirm that there's no better truth than you have told before this Committee?

MR BARNARD: Sir, I think a few men can come here and follow my example. I was against the TRC process about telling the truth, you could get anybody else who was more rigid than me in my thoughts, maybe Joe Verster, but I cannot tell you how strongly I would tell others to come and tell the truth here, if they still have the opportunity, after what happened to me here. It is a day and night difference in what I'm feeling now. I know I will go back to my cell. From day one when I decided to give evidence here I did not make myself popular with some of my comrades. It's not about getting amnesty for three-quarters of the things that I was charged with and found guilty of. I cannot get amnesty and I also did not apply for them in terms of the Act and the description of the Act, but it's not about that, it's about reconciliation and suddenly it became really important and what happened here made it important. I agree with you a hundred percent and I cannot tell anybody else to come here.

I was confused at one stage and Mr Calla Botha came to me and I consulted with him and I said to him I do want to do this, but I've got something in me that is very strong and I do not want to testify against anybody else, I do not want to send them to jail. It's still there, it's not gone. I do not want them to open the doors in the morning in C-Max and there's 45 of us standing in a row, it's also not reconciliation. I do not want to send anyone else to jail. I do not want Joe Verster to go to jail, even for one day. Today it's about reconciliation and peace of mind.

MR SIBANYONI: Thank you, Mr Chairperson.

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Barnard, you told us that when you first heard of the Webster operation, in the same breath an operation against Mr Jay Naidoo was contemplated, but that priority must be given to the Webster operation and you then successfully carried out the Webster operation. Was there any follow-up regarding the Jay Naidoo operation? Was it mentioned again, anything?

MR BARNARD: Mr Chairperson, I recruited a source at the Wits University who had a lot of access and who attended certain meetings where Jay Naidoo was involved. He also had access to these meetings. I tasked this person and after approximately a week or ten days he brought back information with regard to an address being the address of Mr Jay Naidoo, 93 Hopkins Street, Yeoville, but I did not do a follow-up afterwards or I was not tasked on it any further. I had to lie low and I could have been used abroad.

CHAIRPERSON: You also told us that in 1984 you were sentenced to an effective 6 year term of imprisonment, you got 20 years but an effective 6 year term for two murders and that you were released towards the end of '87, on parole.

MR BARNARD: That's correct.

CHAIRPERSON: And then also from you narrative it's quite clear that very shortly after your arrest you seriously got involved in crime in the Johannesburg underworld, you ran brothels, you dealt with drugs, you consumed drugs yourself, you were involved in assaults and robberies and all sorts of criminal activities. Was your parole officer just inefficient or had some arrangement been made to keep him off your back? How did you manage to do all this without your parole officer knowing about it?

MR BARNARD: Mr Chairperson, I saw the parole officer once every two weeks and afterwards once a month, but I never informed the parole officer that I changed careers. I still had the same telephone numbers, so I misled them concerning this. And then concerning the criminal involvement and the involvement with drugs, it started over a longer period of time, because I was tasked by the system to have contact with these criminals every day and it was a systematic change that happened.

After I was released from prison I was 31 years old and I was so fit and I got a place in the first team in the Roodepoort rugby team and as I became more and more involved in it and I had to prove myself and where people tested me I went overboard. I still cannot believe that I ended up where I did, because I did not take any substances my whole life and then ... There's no-one here who can say I drank a single beer until I became 32, and then suddenly I became a full-on alcoholic and drug addict. It is something that happened to me and that is why I want to become the way I was before.

That is why in C-Max, C-Max did what two rehabilitation centres could not do. I am fit, I live a healthy life and I feel there's a big step towards healing, in that I came here to tell the truth and made a full disclosure. It's not even important if you believe me or not, for myself it's important.

CHAIRPERSON: And then lastly, when you were being questioned by Mr Bizos, correct me if I'm wrong, but my recollection is that you said that when you were here, I think it was in the July session of the hearings, when Verster approached you, spoke to you and said that you must, to use the euphemism used by Mr Bizos, "fix the General" ...(intervention)

MR BARNARD: That was the first sitting.

CHAIRPERSON: The first sitting. And then you were asked well why did you think he said that to you and you said you thought that he wanted you to implicate Gen Webb in the Webster operation, is that correct?

MR BARNARD: That is correct, yes.

CHAIRPERSON: Now why would he have thought that at that stage, because even at that stage you had not made up your mind to come and give the evidence that you have here, and that he was denying the Webster operation and you were denying it, so why did you think that he wanted you now to implicate Webb? How could you have done that?

MR BARNARD: Without implicating myself?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes.

MR BARNARD: Mr Chairperson, this is what I believe today, that's what I meant. At that stage I not necessarily believed that. Their versions differed concerning instructions that they gave, but the thing is that we did not agree, myself and Verster. They told me I was like the mafia, I was very staunch. I told Calla Botha that it seems as if Joe Verster's worrying about what I'm going to say here, because now Verster is in a position, he has to go through a cross-examination and he doesn't know what I'm going to say, two weeks later I'm going to come to the front and this is what happened now, I received an instruction from him, and I wanted to pacify him. I went to Calla Botha and told him: "Go to Verster and tell him I will not testify anything about Webster, I will tell this Commission to go to hell" and Calla Botha returned to me and he was very disgusted. He said: "You were so staunch with this guy and he said you can do what you want to". But then he probably thought about it because the next day, after there was an adjournment and they did not take me away, Mr Verster came to sit next to me and then he said to me: no he's received my message and thank you very much and he's got a lot of respect for me, etcetera, but I have to fuck up the General, and he told me to fuck up the General. Immediately afterwards, after Gen Webb came to sit next to me I asked Gen Webb, after I reported to him I will say I did not get the instruction from him because I did not, I got it from Verster, and he told me that he never gave the instruction. And that's how it happened.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes thank you. Are there any questions arising out of questions that have been put by Members of the Panel? Mr Wessels?

FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR WESSELS: ... some questions at this stage about it, before I've looked at the documents, to save time.

Mr Barnard, you say that you told Gen Webb at that stage that you will not talk about Webster and that you will not incriminate him in it.

MR BARNARD: Yes, I told him I will not testify about Webster that I received the instruction from you, because I did not get the instruction from you. I wanted to calm him.

MR WESSELS: Did you suggest to him that Joe Verster would then have suggested to you to involve Webb in the Webster case?

MR BARNARD: No, I cannot say that.

MR WESSELS: Now Mr Barnard, you say as you are sitting here now, that you are of the opinion that Verster wanted you to incriminate Webb in the Webster incident.

MR BARNARD: Yes, that is what I think today.

MR WESSELS: But if it is so, then it would mean that you will have to come and say that you were involved, you received an instruction. You could not come forward and say that the instruction came directly from Gen Webb, because everybody knew that you did not act in that way. So by incriminating Webb in the Webster case, you also had to incriminate Verster.

MR BARNARD: That is possibly true, yes.

MR WESSELS: Then how can any rational person think that you could incriminate Webb and not incriminate Verster?

MR BARNARD: You are now talking about a rational person, I do not think Mr Verster's a rational person.

MR WESSELS: Yes Mr Barnard, maybe you are making inferences too quickly, which is not founded on anything.

MR WESSELS: Mr Barnard, what did you hear about the weapons that were provided to Zulus just before the Boipatong massacre?

MR BARNARD: Sir, they just told this to me. I cannot really connect it to the Boipatong massacre. The only reason why I'm saying is that, and I have got no facts to substantiate it, because Vlakplaas members were present and they told me that they had to go and pick up weapons and they had to take these weapons to Tokoza in the East Rand and hand it over to the Zulus. Because I was aware of sensitive connections with the Zulus, amongst others, with Themba Khoza and Vlakplaas. I also had an IFP member that handled him who was a former Vlakplaas member and I do not recall specifically why he did not go with them, but they left there to go and pick up weapons and to take it to Tokoza in the East Rand to a hostel where they had to drop it off. Afterwards I heard of the Boipatong massacre in the media and I never ... and I'm also stating it that those weapons were used, it's an inference that I drew.

MR WESSELS: You see Mr Barnard, this is the problem I have with your evidence, you mention an incident and create this impression that certain people were involved in it, for example, that Vlakplaas was involved in the Boipatong massacre on this basis, without having substantiated facts. You are speculating.

MR BARNARD: If I am speculating, then I will say I'm speculating. Like I've already put to you, if there are facts to substantiate it and if somebody told me something directly, I will put it like that.

MR WESSELS: I will put it to you that when you testified about Boipatong in the first place you did not make it very clear that you were speculating about it, like you are doing now.

MR BARNARD: That was intentionally. I've got no problem in accepting it.

MR WESSELS: The criminal elements that you got to commit crimes, you say - was this before the elections in 1994?

MR BARNARD: Yes, it was.

MR WESSELS: And did they indeed commit crimes?

MR BARNARD: Yes, they did.

MR WESSELS: Were you gave them specific instructions about things they had to do?

MR BARNARD: Yes, it was broad instructions, they had to damage vehicles, where the people marched people had to be assaulted, they had to damage shop windows. I gave a specific instructions that where possible they had to target whites, they had to highjack their vehicles and drive with these vehicles to the black townships. We wanted to create a psychosis of fear which will then strengthen the Defence Force in that they can act on that.

MR WESSELS: And did this indeed work?

MR BARNARD: Well the instruction concerning the physical highjacking of people did not happen, but there were reports in the media and it was placed in front of the ANC and certain trade unions who held these marches, that the criminal element in the march had no political connection. There were such reports in the newspapers, where shops damaged, people were injured, vehicles were damaged, etcetera.

MR WESSELS: You did not go back to these elements at a later stage to find out from them if they did execute these instructions?

MR BARNARD: Yes, I did, I gave them half of the money before and the other half at a later stage, or afterwards.

MR WESSELS: Yes they wanted to get paid?

MR BARNARD: Yes, it came from the government.

MR WESSELS: And specifically did they report to you, what did they do?

MR BARNARD: Just what I just told you. They damaged vehicles, they damaged shop windows, they assaulted people.

MR WESSELS: Can you just give us more details concerning this?

MR BARNARD: No, I cannot.

MR WESSELS: Like a specific incident or incidents?

MR BARNARD: I did not do research on what shop windows were kicked out, etcetera.

MR WESSELS: I'm not asking you if you did research, I'm asking you if you - what they told you, what A, B and C told you what they did?

MR BARNARD: I spoke to the leaders of the groups, they were the people with whom I liaised. He said he sent people in, they kicked vehicles, as the march passed they kicked out shop windows as my instructions were put to him. People who worked in Stratcom took that information, gave it to the media. There was media coverage, television coverage, radio coverage, it was in the newspaper. I saw it myself.

MR WESSELS: Was this a DCC instruction?

MR BARNARD: Yes, it was.

MR WESSELS: Why didn't you lead this evidence in your evidence-in-chief when you testified about the CCB and the DCC's involvement?

MR BARNARD: Mr Chairperson, if you will recall you stopped me and said that we have to shorten the DCC's involvement because the investigation in front of you is not about the DCC. I have made a statement to my attorney, where all these incidents are mentioned and he led me according to that statement.

MR WESSELS: When did you go to the DCC?

MR BARNARD: Two weeks after I was released from Section 29 detention, I went on leave for two weeks and there was then a process of two or three weeks where they recruited me, or the transfer from the one to the other.

MR WESSELS: When was this?

MR BARNARD: Sir, I cannot tell you. I was released five days before Mr Mandela's release under Section 29, I think two weeks later I left on leave and approximately two weeks later I returned and I had the meeting with Witkop Badenhorst and then I joined the Military Intelligence.

MR WESSELS: Was this then in the middle of February 1989?

MR BARNARD: Yes, I think so.

MR WESSELS: In other words you started at DCC at the end of February 1990.

MR BARNARD: I assume so, yes. I cannot specifically recall, but it was shortly after I returned from leave. There was a period of time where things had to be established and I could then be applied.

MR WESSELS: And up until that date you say you were a member of the CCB?

MR BARNARD: Yes I was a member of the CCB up until my release under Section 29 and then the attorneys who acted on behalf of the CCB, told me that the CCB was going to be disbanded and I accepted it.

MR WESSELS: Then I'm just wondering why you say in your amnesty application on page 205 in bundle A, in paragraph (b) that

"In the South African Defence Force for the relevant period 1988 to 1989, either as a member or employed for specific purposes."

MR BARNARD: That is the relevant period.

MR WESSELS: What is the relevant period?

MR BARNARD: The period that covers the amnesty application, then I went over to DCC. Are you trying to say that I did not belong to the DCC?

MR WESSELS: Mr Barnard, you went over to the DCC at the end of February, my questions is why is it restricted to 1989?

MR BARNARD: No Sir, because this amnesty application is about the CCB's involvement.

CHAIRPERSON: I think what Mr Wessels is getting at is, if you mention just the period 1988 to 1989 in paragraph 8(b), why make any mention at all of DKI or DCC in 8(a), if that is not relevant to the period relating to the incidents?

MR BARNARD: I cannot give an explanation, no. I do not know.

MR WESSELS: You do not know who paid in the money at the attorneys for the procedures?

MR BARNARD: Are you talking about the court applications or after my release?

MR WESSELS: Yes.

MR BARNARD: I cannot say who paid it in, the attorneys contacted my father and said that the organisation provided funds and that he had to act as the front and he had to bring the application.

MR WESSELS: I've got no further questions at this stage.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR WESSELS

MR BARNARD: I would just like to say that these incidents, the Dullah Omar and Desmond Tutu incidents, this is what I applied for and it's the relevant period between 1988 and '89, while I was a member of the CCB.

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, but the ...(indistinct - no microphone) of the DCC has got nothing to do with those two incidents.

MR BARNARD: I understand that, yes.

MR WESSELS: Can I just comment on that comment?

CHAIRPERSON: Yes, certainly.

FURTHER CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR WESSELS: These incidents did not take place in 1988, but it took place in 1989.

MR BARNARD: That is correct, yes.

MR WESSELS: Thank you.

NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR WESSELS

CHAIRPERSON: Any further questions arising out of the Panel's questions? Mr Coetzee, I was going to ask you about re-examination after Mr Barnard's possible recall, but if you have any at this stage, in case he's not recalled after Mr Wessels has seen the documents, do you have any re-examination?

MR COETZEE: Sir, I do not have re-examination at this stage, but however I will reserve that right, depending on what comes out.

NO RE-EXAMINATION BY MR COETZEE

CHAIRPERSON: Mr Barnard, that then concludes your testimony, however you heard that Mr Wessels will be referring to certain documents and that he has reserved the right to put further questions to you. So it may well be that you'll be recalled again to answer questions put to you, but if that doesn't happen then this is the end of your evidence. Thank you.

MR BARNARD: I understand that, thank you Chairman.

CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.

WITNESS EXCUSED