MR WILLS: Thank you Mr Chairperson. I would just like to record that in view of a development in terms of which we require information from the Department of Justice, we have all agreed to change the order of proceedings and we will be leading Mr Phillips in his application presently, so I call Mr Phillips to the stand. Thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: Yes, thank you. What page is the application on?
MR WILLS: Page 17.
CHAIRPERSON: Page 70?
MR LAX: 17.
CHAIRPERSON: Oh, 17.
IAN MUNRO PHILLIPS: (sworn states)
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Mr Wills?
EXAMINATION BY MR WILLS: Thank you Mr Chairperson. Dr Phillips, you have been a member of the ANC since what date?
MR PHILLIPS: I became a signed up member in 1990.
MR WILLS: And from that date, in what capacity have you acted in the ANC?
MR PHILLIPS: I was elected to the Branch, the Executive Branch, the Executive Committee of the Durban Central Branch before being elected to the Regional Executive Committee in Southern Natal at the end of that year, 1990.
I served on the REC for the duration and with a break in 1993 until 1994.
MR WILLS: You are also an academic at the University of Natal in Durban?
MR PHILLIPS: During that stage, yes, until 1994.
MR WILLS: And what was your field of expertise?
MR PHILLIPS: I trained as a historian, but I taught in political studies, concentrating on South, Southern Africa and Soviet studies, from 1987 through to 1994 at the UND.
MR WILLS: When you talk about being a member of the Regional Executive Committee, that is of the Southern Natal region of the ANC?
MR PHILLIPS: Correct.
MR WILLS: And the offices that housed the Southern Natal region at the time, they were in Durban?
MR PHILLIPS: That is correct.
MR WILLS: What is your present occupation?
MR PHILLIPS: I am Special Advisor to the Minister of Public Works, who is sitting on my right.
MR WILLS: I refer you to page, sorry, you applied for amnesty in terms of the prescribed form and you attested to this on the 10th of May 1997 at Durban?
MR PHILLIPS: That is correct.
MR WILLS: Do you confirm the contents of this affidavit?
MR PHILLIPS: Yes, indeed.
MR WILLS: In this affidavit you apply for amnesty in respect of the facilitation of the establishment and supporting of SDU's, in particular through communicating information between military and political leadership from time to time.
MR PHILLIPS: That is right.
MR WILLS: What time span are we talking about here?
MR PHILLIPS: We are talking about the period from 1991 sort of late 1990, 1991 all the way through to 1993.
MR WILLS: The end of 1993?
MR PHILLIPS: Well, the end of 1993, but we must understand that even within that time scale, the facilitation processes were different. I mean for example there was a planning period.
And then in 1993, things were wound down in terms of the ANC involvement in SDU activities. So, that is the time span but there is different forms of participation during that.
MR WILLS: Well, let's start with your participation in the formation of SDU's. Can you explain to the Committee in as much detail as you can remember, what that participation was?
MR PHILLIPS: Well, first of all we, as was noted earlier in earlier evidence, SDU's have been in existence within communities in kwaZulu Natal for some considerable time from the 1980's onwards.
With the unbanning of the ANC and SACP and MK, it was the task of an interim group to re-establish open public branches of the ANC in these various communities. It wasn't simply a case of ANC branches just popping up everywhere, they had to be organised in a particular way.
At that particular time and there was considerable violence in the immediate aftermath in kwaZulu Natal of Nelson Mandela's release, in a number of townships for example, there was some confrontations between people, at that time it was considerably shaky, the atmosphere in the country and of course negotiations hadn't quite started in any real earnest at that stage.
But as a result of these developments, and continuing pressures on the ANC leadership, not only here but nationally as well, the preparatory work that went towards the ANC's Consultative Conference that was held at NASREC in December of 1990, indicated that the issues of self defence and ANC's response to self defence, would have to become clarified.
That Conference, to cut a long story short, took a resolution that it was the ANC's responsibility and through the ANC, MK had a responsibility to participate and to help and assist communities when they were under attack, to develop their self defence capabilities.
The ANC took the responsible position that self defence was of such a sensitive and serious nature, that it had to be coordinated, it had to be organised and it had to be disciplined, precisely to ensure that it didn't, that communities didn't run amok, or that self defence didn't perpetuate if you like, a spiral of violence or anything like that.
With those decisions in the December 1990 conference, Headquarters, National Executive Committee made some preparations in terms of guidelines in how to establish these things, how to establish the contacts and the support of the ANC and MK for SDU activities, self defence activity.
And these were all confirmed in the National Consultative Conference, the 48th I think it was, in July of 1991. So for all intents and purposes, at an organised level, the ANC in Southern Natal as we already heard, became involved with self defence activities, SDU's in many of the communities from 1991 onwards.
MR WILLS: I am particularly interested in your involvement, your personal involvement. If you can just explain that in detail to the Committee?
MR PHILLIPS: During that formative period, as you know members of MK and the ANC from outside, were returning home and during the course of a number of meetings and things, I had had meetings with Chris Hani over a period of time and he had indicated to me that he wished me to take over control if you like, or to facilitate and establish communication links between whatever structures were going to be set up in the Southern Natal region and the designated people in Johannesburg at Shell House, the ANC Headquarters, military Headquarters in particular.
As a result of that, I was put in touch with individuals, Calvin Khan at military Headquarters and in this particular region, with the establishment of the relevant structures of MK in our region in 1991, I was put into contact with Mandla Sithole, comrade Mandla, this Sithole here.
Likewise during that particular period, as has been indicated earlier, being on the REC I was involved in REC work of a normal nature, political education and otherwise and in that particular environment, was able to come into contact with a number of communities and to ascertain even independently and individually the necessity for self defence in this particular province.
MR WILLS: You have heard the evidence of Mr Radebe in relation to the procurement of arms. Can you explain to the Committee what your role was in that regard?
MR PHILLIPS: Mr Radebe has referred to the first consignment of weapons which came into the province through a vehicle.
I was not involved in that particular consignment if you like, because that was taking place right at the very beginning of the particular process, establishing the linkages here within Southern Natal. However, as soon as that had been up and running, I was given the task as I indicated, to establish the communication links. Essentially I think there are two principles that need to be kept in mind, the conditions of the time, although formally legal, the ANC and MK and the prevailing atmosphere in kwaZulu Natal forced us to still adapt to underground forms of work, in other words, you couldn't communicate publicly or by adverts in the press or something like that.
It was done with the principles of military combat work in mind, secrecy. Those were operated on the basis of the need to know principle, ie in terms of information, it doesn't really matter how high up in the organisation you are, you will only be allowed to know information and should know information, that is pertinent to your particular role in a particular position.
The other is that you had to establish structures that preserve that secrecy. Those structures mean that I as a member of an REC, given a particular task or function by Chris, comrade Chris Hani, means that I would know who my immediate superior was in the line of function, and I would also know who my immediate whatever it is, (indistinct) further down the line would be.
However, I would not necessarily know and I ought not to know in fact, the identities of people further down the chain so that if in the circumstances of somebody being caught somewhere, that individual doesn't actually, or is not prejudiced by information that you don't know, because the experience and these methods of work, are not there by choice or desires for conspiracy and this type of nonsense. They are there for the very real reason that, and they arose in the ANC in particular I understand, during the course of the 1960's, when the South African regime at that stage, employed vicious forms of torture against people and got information out of people through those means.
You can only get information out of people, if they had it. So it is much better in actual fact to keep levels of information as limited as possible. In a practical sense, the principles would operate if there was to be a consignment of weapons or we were to be informed that there was going to be weapons available from a DLB for distribution to SDU's in Southern Natal, I would either have a personal communication through phone or whatever, from MHQ which would say something along the line, I cannot remember precisely these things of course, something along the lines of hallo comrade, tell you friend that the presents have arrived, or something like that.
I would then be able to communicate to Mandla that good news, the presents have arrived.
MR WILLS: Just for the record, Mandla being Mr Sithole?
MR PHILLIPS: Mr - sorry Mr Sithole. These formalities are a bit beyond me at times and this isn't a court, so I feel a little bit more ...
CHAIRPERSON: This is not a court and we have tried to be a lot less formal than a court.
MR PHILLIPS: Thank you. Essentially what would happen was it is one thing to be told that the presents have arrived, you've got to find out where they are.
In that situation, because I was at the University, you had free access to telephones, faxes, goodness knows what else, and I would be told, well, expect a fax, and I would toddle along to the fax room, and sure enough there would be a fax and on that fax would most probably be a diagram of some sort.
That diagram prepared in a particular way, would have the form of a map. I wouldn't necessarily know or understand what that map said, but it would be because of the particular way in which it had been drawn.
That map would then be handed on to Mandla, who as a military person, trained in those particular interpretative ways, would understand what that map meant. What he did with it, would actually be his particular business. Most of the time, communication would take place on that basis.
I would understand that this was a consignment of arms or ammunition or whatever it was that was in the particular DLB or Dead Drop, and that is how it would be done.
Comrade Jeff has indicated earlier the circumstances of how vehicles could be used as DLB's. Again information would come through, but I think the other thing to indicate is that (a) no written records of transactions of this nature were made or kept, because it was unnecessary. Most of the communication was verbal between myself and MHQ and occasionally comrade Chris would pass through the region, and we would chat and he would indicate a few things of progress, but similarly the simple fact was that given the structure of the ANC, we would have, well we had a Regional Headquarters based in Durban and in that Headquarters would be offices for the Women's League, the Youth League and obviously for Umkhonto weSizwe because MK as we know, was the League of an up and coming and legitimate force during that period.
CHAIRPERSON: Just one point Dr Phillips, you said that you didn't keep written records of transactions. Mr Radebe when he gave evidence, said that at the end of the day when weapons were retrieved, about 90% of the weapons that were issued, they got back again to hand over to the military, the new Defence Force, National Defence Force.
I don't know whether you would know, but would there be a record kept somewhere, not necessarily in Southern Natal region, but somewhere, as to how many weapons, what there nature, the type of weapons, etc that were delivered to Southern Natal and if three AK47's went to Umkababa and two went to Inanda or whatever, would there be that sort of record somewhere in the MK offices, either at Headquarters or in Natal?
MR PHILLIPS: Okay, first of all my comment about no written records, referred specifically to the nature of the communication, ie I don't have any copies of the maps left, that type of thing.
Secondly, from my recollection of comrade Jeff's testimony, he sort of estimated that 85% or thereabouts as a rough estimate of what may have gone back. Inside that DLB there may have been an indication of what was there, but of course people can count how ever many, whether records were kept of that nature from military Headquarters, I don't know.
I wouldn't know to what extent there was an audit done within military structures here, in terms again of keeping a record of this is going to that place, because again part of the problem I suspect, is that we are dealing with the situation of great mobility.
You've got a random process and the other problem of course is the least or fewer pieces of paper you have floating around with that type of information, the better.
CHAIRPERSON: One would imagine probably the Ordinance Section at Headquarters knew how many left?
MR PHILLIPS: Yes, I would imagine so and I am also aware that for example, when the final audits were done for the retrieval of weaponry and the hand over to the SANDF formally, after the election process, that was all coordinated by military Headquarters.
We didn't have an audit role to play in that as Southern Natal.
MR WILLS: Mr Radebe in his evidence indicated the method of conveyance of these weapons was by vehicles, but you got involved on a more frequent basis after that and it wasn't only the usage of these vehicles.
Can you just explain in as much detail as you can recall, the methods through which the weapons were delivered to various places?
MR PHILLIPS: Okay. Well of course I wouldn't have direct knowledge necessarily of the actual dispersal of the weapons themselves, except the communication of information as to where they were.
I was aware during that particular time that I think quite a sizeable proportion of the weaponry that was used by SDU's or that MK operatives linked to SDU's got access to, came from established DLB's in the province, within the whole province of Natal, which had been established during the course of the armed struggle, during the 1970's and 1980's.
MR WILLS: You must remember that you are dealing with non-military people here. Just to explain in layman's terms, the DLB would be a form of an arms cache and some of these were static places that were established in various parts of the region, is that correct?
MR PHILLIPS: Yes. Dead Letter Box is a generic term that refers to a secure place where things can be left to be picked up by other people. In other words, it could be a note, it could be a letter, it could be an AK, it could be a grenade, and of course it doesn't necessarily - it is not necessarily a letter box, it could be a whole in a tree, it could be a cupboard, it could be a hidden compartment in a vehicle itself, so that it doesn't necessarily have to be mobile, it could be a drain pipe, it could be any of those things.
During the 1970's and 1980's, again it has become common knowledge, with the steady intensification of the armed struggle against the regime, a number of infiltrations occurred of both people and weaponry from ANC MK.
Very frequently you would actually infiltrate personnel, knowing that there would be a cache of arms somewhere that had been hidden in a DLB, information about that DLB of course would be controlled by central ordinance operating outside of the country at that time.
When MK came back to the country, of course that information came with them so that they would know where established DLB's were, established caches of arms of whatever nature. They would know what was in those things.
I also am aware through conversation and since then, of course that some of these DLB's done exist, or didn't exist later when they went to look for them, because a new housing development had gone up on the empty piece of veld or whatever.
But for the most part, these in the 1980's, would still be retrievable. In the, when information said the presents are there, it doesn't mean that they are on all occasions have been brought into the province, it would just be, that would be the time that we would receive that information, say in January 1992 or whatever, there is something that you can find, and this particular document will lead you to it.
There is no indication that that was a new DLB that had been established, it could very well be a very old one.
MR WILLS: So you would get the notification through various means that the presents had arrived, and you would communicate that with Mr Sithole?
MR PHILLIPS: Correct.
MR WILLS: And that would be your sole function in that regard?
MR PHILLIPS: In that regard of communicating the information, yes.
MR WILLS: You wouldn't know for example what Mr Sithole did with the firearms?
MR PHILLIPS: I was very aware that Mr Sithole would have distributed them further down the line to wherever they were needed. I wouldn't necessarily know to whom they went at a particular time, but again as has become clear, all the way down the line the same principles of need to know and where you go, are operating.
Between Mr Sithole and myself, the communication was extremely simple because we were working at the same office.
MR WILLS: You wouldn't yourself, actually see the firearms, you didn't come into contact with the firearms?
MR PHILLIPS: No, not in that particular method, no.
MR WILLS: As I understand the method, it was also a two way communication. Communities would through the channels request certain armourments, is that correct?
MR PHILLIPS: Yes, the way comrade Chris phrased to me in one of the discussions at the beginning, explaining how the thing was supposed to work, indicated that I was to communicate with military Headquarters, not only to receive information but when requirements were needed here, when a need arose for whatever reason, I would use the same channel of communication to make a request, in other words present a shopping list or whatever to MHQ in that way.
So, it was a toing and froing if you like, of information.
MR WILLS: Can you explain to the Committee what your role was in regard to the training or political education of SDU's?
MR PHILLIPS: When I served on the first REC, we had a whole range of titles and things, but one of my functions was to perform political education role for the ANC generally.
However, it was identified, because at that same time I was a member of a structure called the Military Research Group which was an ANC/MK aligned NGO, if you like, operated in Johannesburg, which was part and parcel of the ANC's negotiations around the military transition and military transformations that would need to be taken.
It was identified that with my knowledge of that particular area and the political education experience, I would be used from time to time, quite frequently as it became clear in the 1990's, to deal directly with communities on the issues of self defence, the policies of the organisation, how the ANC perceived self defence in the overall strategy that we had, multiprong strategy that we had to try and secure democracy in the country.
So mostly and again because teaching at the University, my time was taken up mostly during the day, a great deal of our work, was conducted at night or in the evenings and that type of thing.
Comrade Jeff has already referred to the frequent formal meetings, conferences, workshops that were organised by the Regional ANC on an ongoing basis during this period, but besides those, there was frequent contact, not only of individual REC members with different branches of the ANC, but ourselves, myself and Mandla used to travel around very, very frequently or if we were accompanying comrade Jeff, while comrade Jeff is addressing a particular function or meeting on this particular level, we would be having a discussion with other people in turn, trying to instill the types of discipline and organisational skills that were necessary in those areas.
The major difficulty if I may just add, was - if I can make a comparison with the benign atmosphere of the University lecture hall, it is wonderful to have the time to prepare your lectures and to present them to a class of students, who themselves are allegedly, or have allegedly prepared for that particular class and conduct lessons in that manner. When we were conducting political education in the Region in Southern Natal, we were doing it on the hoof, there was absolutely no time for the types of deep thinking and seminaring and workshopping that can go on because these were communities under fire and so time was of the essence, and frequently, perhaps the message that we needed to put across, wasn't put across as clearly as it could have been in those circumstances.
MR WILLS: Are you in a position to indicate to the Committee how many consignments of arms that you were involved with in the manner, in the sense that you communicated the information through to Mr Sithole?
MR PHILLIPS: It is very difficult to assess, things were done in a very irregular manner in terms of time. There would be lulls and then there would be very busy periods.
I think the, if I think in terms of the number of notices or messages and things like that, anything between 25, 30 indications would have come through, but again, I remember very distinctly the pressures, there were times that it was quite frequent, but we weren't ever able to indicate precisely. The important thing was getting the goodies, not necessarily keeping a record of them.
MR WILLS: You say on page 4 of your amnesty application and I am referring specifically to paragraph 10(b), that all actions were politically motivated aimed to enable communities under attack in kwaZulu Natal to defend themselves.
Self defence against an armed enemy was a justifiable response as a part of continuing struggle at the time of negotiations in order to secure inter alia free political activity.
Would you like to expand on that at all?
MR PHILLIPS: Yes. I think the members of the Committee will know and it is common knowledge that State sponsored counter-revolutionary violence in the South African context in the last couple of years, has undertaken a number of different phases.
They have all, all those different types of violence, however, have had a particular effect, and that effect and particular purpose, was to deny free political activity to all those organisations which I would argue the ANC was primary, all those organisations that opposed fundamentally, the structures of the apartheid State.
Now, our experience here from 1983 onwards in the province, had been and it has become clearer over the last couple of months and years as well, but the violence ranged against us at that time, took on the appearance frequently of inter-political violence between organisations or members of organisations, ANC, IFP, etc.
However, from a very early time in the 1990's, around 1990, 1991, assessment and analysis of the type of violence and the type of activity that was taking place in this province, indicated that there was some other activity going on beneath it, that things were not quite what they appeared to be.
At that time, I remember distinctly, the ANC and comrades here were aware that the major sources of insecurity to communities, the major sources of attack against communities, were actually fermented and organised and perpetrated by elements from within the Security Forces of the State.
We would include within those particular definitions of SAP and SADF, particular activities of organised hitsquads. Nasty individuals and units from within the kwaZulu police who have become implicated in a whole range of activities.
The reality for communities on the ground, was that structures of authority, whether they were of the kwaZulu government or of the South African government, structures of authority were actually perpetrators of atrocities and violence against many communities.
What happened and what became clear as evidence of things like Operation Marion or Operation Katson from the Eastern Cape made evident, was that the Pretoria government and instruments of the securocrats, were using other political forces such as the IFP from time to time, for their own particular purposes, and they were doing that in the traditions of counter-insurgency warfare.
Essentially what that meant in this province, as I think has become evidently clear, is that even in areas which were poverty stricken with scarce resources, it was very easy to foment problems between members of communities, based on political affiliation.
That was an issue that we had to address and as comrade Jeff has indicated, there were numerous attempts to foment peace structures between the various political organisations which ran hot and cold from time to time, during this particular period. In essence we found it extremely difficult to establish ANC structures within kwaZulu Natal.
Southern Natal, we got off comparatively lightly compared to Northern Natal, where it was a clear fact that the ANC had to operate underground. Even after 1990 in Northern Natal, because of the threats and attacks on organisers, individuals who were identified within communities as being either ANC members or organisers or MK, became targets and became victims very frequently.
The number of assaults that took place on meetings, constantly we would find that when the ANC as a legal political organisation, wished to have a meeting in a hall, the local authority in charge of that particular area, would refuse permission to have that meeting.
Funerals were attacked, vigils were attacks, and so on and so forth. It wasn't only free political activity that was denied. What increasingly became obvious, that people were not being allowed to live their lives as normal citizens.
Education was disrupted. We know of the Pietermaritzburg war for example, the seven day war, which was one of the more dramatic examples of the type of mobile warfare that was going on. That created a situation in which the province became awash with large number of refugees, displaced people who had nowhere to go, nowhere to live, and in those circumstances, we faced a completely uphill battle as to what to do with this.
It was clear that the responsible authority, which was the State, was not doing its task, and the ANC at a national level, continually took the issue, even of kwaZulu Natal violence to the then President De Klerk and it is a matter of public record, that the De Klerk government did absolutely nothing to intervene in the particular circumstances of violence here.
In those circumstances, and it builds dramatically during 1992 and then 1993 at the beginning, those circumstances as comrade Jeff has indicated, created a situation in which a political organisation such as the ANC, had to take the responsibility, not only politically but also in a more active manner to assist communities to defend themselves.
It was not a decision that was taken lightly. I was part of the discussions at various conferences about that, and I can testify to the tension and the atmosphere of those meetings, when those resolutions were decided upon. They were not taken with glee, they were not taken with eagerness, it was taken as a result of serious consideration that this has to be done to prevent the further genocide of people in this particular province.
MR WILLS: You have indicated that you dealt with certain people at MHQ, can you just let us know who those people are?
MR PHILLIPS: Besides the leadership of comrade Chris Hani and comrade Ronnie Kasrils, whom we interacted with regularly, the person I dealt with directly was comrade Calvin Khan who I understand as the Committee or Commission would know, his activities through the name of Riaz Saludi, which is his proper name, but of course I would know other people at MK Headquarters, including Siphiwe Nyanda and others, because of the general interaction, because the point is that SDU activities was one element of many aspects of ANC work that we actually had to encounter.
There was this constant interaction, so yes, we knew most of the people, but in terms of SDU activity, it would have been comrade Chris primarily and then comrade Calvin at MHQ.
MR WILLS: Further down the line, would you be aware of any of the persons in respect of whom Mr Sithole was interacting?
MR PHILLIPS: I didn't know at that stage the identities of people, who were fulfilling particular functions, that were actually being organised by comrade Mandla, but obviously when one goes out into the communities and things, and you are dealing with issues of this nature, I would be introduced and I would meet comrade Jabu or whatever.
Now whether Jabu was the person's proper name or not, I would have absolutely no idea, most probably not. It wasn't necessary for me to know the full ID's and CV's of the people that I am giving political education classes to. It would be a case of being able to recognise people visually, rather than in terms of a name or an identity.
MR WILLS: And in respect of your role in the procurement of firearms and ammunition in the province, you have never been arrested or prosecuted?
MR PHILLIPS: No.
MR WILLS: Thank you Mr Chairperson.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR WILLS
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Wills. Mr Hewitt, do you have any questions to ask Dr Phillips?
MR HEWITT: Mr Chairman, I have no interest in this applicant.
NO CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR HEWITT
CHAIRPERSON: Ms Thabete, do you have any questions?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS THABETE: A few Mr Chairman. Dr Phillips, I realise in your application, page 2 of your application, page 18 of the bundle, at 9(a), the acts for which you are applying amnesty for, you haven't filled anything, what would you say you applying amnesty for?
MR PHILLIPS: All right, first of all, quite frankly, I found this application form a little bit of a mind boggling experience. It is not clear.
I think more importantly, we need to understand that at the time that the TRC was constituted, and the processes of application and amnesty application were being asked for, there was a great deal of confusion out there as to what constituted an applicable offence and what didn't.
MS THABETE: Okay.
MR PHILLIPS: For our part, for my part as an individual, I did not consider any of my participation with anything to do with the ANC, including SDU, as criminal in the sense of being something that I should be ashamed of in any particular manner.
However, it was important and it became clear during those particular years, that we as a political organisation and in my capacity as an REC member, I fulfilled a political leadership position at a certain level. We did take certain actions, which allowed operators on the ground, to conduct self defence.
In some of those instances, self defence was conducted which led to casualties either through death or whatever. In that sense, we were unable and I was unable to say that I was completely cut off from that particular situation.
It is imperative and the ANC has never been shy, which is one of the reasons quite frankly why the ANC almost solely amongst political parties, has wholeheartedly supported the processes of the TRC and participated in its work in a voluntary manner. We believe that it is important for the organisation and people in leadership positions, to take responsibility for the policies that we adopted and also for the way in which those policies were implemented because the two go hand in hand.
In terms of specific acts that I, criminal acts, I don't know of any, but we thought and I thought at that particular time and on advice of other people and lawyers within the ANC as well, that what better way to actually address these issues, than through the amnesty process itself and to do it in that particular manner.
MS THABETE: I was not suggesting in any way that you should specify what criminal offences you have done, obviously we understand it was all under a political context, but what I wanted to know is, what would you say you are applying amnesty for in this situation, because you have told us the background, you have told us what you have done.
Briefly, what would you say you are applying amnesty for? Is it for the establishment of SDU's, is it for the communication that you were involved in? That is what I am trying to ascertain.
Or, are you applying for, you are taking general responsibility for whatever happened? That is what I am trying to ascertain from you?
MR PHILLIPS: Well, at one level there is general responsibility, but of course you don't get amnesty for general responsibility.
MS THABETE: Exactly.
MR PHILLIPS: But the point is, here we were dealing with what formally during those days, would have been classified as unlicensed firearms, unlawful possession of arms, etc, etc, the trafficking in those things, and for those particular acts, yes, obviously I would suggest that that is what I am applying for amnesty and for the facilitation of other people getting those goodies at the end of the day for whatever purpose they would have used them for.
In the sense that I don't know, I am not a lawyer by any means, but in terms of accessories after facts and all of these funny things, maybe that comes into it as well.
MS THABETE: My last question to you is, did you at any stage have any direct dealings with the SDU's in communities?
MR PHILLIPS: How would you, what do you mean by direct?
MS THABETE: Maybe you gave an instruction, maybe you supervised certain actions that were taking place there, maybe you at some stage got instructions to do something in the communities where SDU's were? Weren't you involved in something like that?
MR PHILLIPS: The only instruction if you can call it an instruction, was the constant plea to SDU's and communities to defend themselves and to do it to the best of their ability.
But that is not a cause as saying to here is a particular SDU, you are in a particular situation, now go and attack that house. There is no instruction of that particular nature because I think as has also been indicated, we've got to understand very clearly the nature of how the SDU's operated.
The SDU's are not military formations in the same way that I would classify MK Units as. MK Units are soldiers, SDU's are not soldiers in that sense. Soldiers can be part of SDU's, but more important the whole rational of the SDU is for that SDU in a community to be able to identify the people that it needs to act against and the actions that they need to take.
That is their job, it doesn't come from me from Durban, going into Port Shepstone or Gamuleke and saying your job is to attack that person. I am not from there. The identification of those comes from the root source, but the justification for that is something that we could actually provide.
MS THABETE: So are you saying to me you wouldn't get instructions of how the communities or the SDU's were supposed to defend themselves against whoever was attacking them.
They were just given an instruction that defend yourself in whichever way you deem fit, is that what you are saying to me?
MR PHILLIPS: Yes, the training of members in the practical elements of self defence, the responsibility of the trained people, the MK people who would necessarily be linked to them, so how they actually go about that and the instruction in which way to point the rifle etc, that responsibility not necessarily mine, however, what our job was to say that when you are undergoing that training, remember that in your mind, this is the purpose for which you are undergoing this training.
This is how you need to conduct yourself as best as possible in that situation.
Defence must be done with the intention of defence only. Don't think that you are going to be part of an SDU and then you are going to use the same skills to go and rob banks. That would be - so it is that general sort of level, but the actual practical thing, that is somebody else's responsibility and would have fallen officially in terms of ANC policy, to the MK contingent, that was linked to and provided for the assistance of training of that nature to the SDU's.
MS THABETE: Can you give us an illustration or an example of your involvement in the communication links from the stage where someone telephones you and say go and collect a letter at a fax, can you just give us one example where this happened? A practical example?
MR PHILLIPS: I remember at a particular time, immediately following the record of understanding that was signed between the ANC and the National Party which was viciously rejected by the IFP at the time, there was a massive surge of violence in a number of communities, including around here, but particularly down in the South Coast area.
And at that stage something happened, resources dried up. There had also been a great deal of police activity, I recall confiscations and that type of thing, and Mandla had come to me and indicated that we need something.
My reference was straight through to MHQ, this is by the end of September 1992 or something like that, to indicate that help, we need some weapons, things are actually in a sensitive and difficult position, can you do something?
I can't remember specifically, but it must have been about two or three days later, the call came through to say we have been able to do something, here is the communication, it is coming through. I passed that straight on to Mandla, and that was it.
But I mean, these again by saying that there was no written record, I don't have a diary that actually notes these things in any particular manner, but the - I suppose the point I am making ultimately is that the acquisition of weapons in my own mind and recollection, were distinctly related to particular periods of very intense conflicts in certain communities.
That was - and ammunition in particular.
MS THABETE: I asked you this question because I needed a practical example of what you were telling us generally. Maybe my last question is you say you were dealing with Mr Sithole. Was he responsible for the whole region of KZN or the southern region or also the northern region because in his application it looks like he was also very much involved in the northern part of KZN?
MR PHILLIPS: Well, Mandla's official position with MK as confirmed by the little message from General Nyanda to the Chairperson of the Region, was as an MK officer within Southern Natal.
That doesn't mean to say that there is a wall around Southern Natal and the other regions, but at an operational level as an MK operative, he is responsibilities were Southern Natal. From his application, the other stuff, there is different time periods and whatever, but I am sure Mandla would be able to talk about that.
MS THABETE: Yes, okay. Thank you, no further questions.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS THABETE
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Ms Thabete. Mr Wills, do you have any re-examination?
MR WILLS: No re-examination Mr Chairman.
NO RE-EXAMINATION BY MR WILLS
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Sibanyoni, do you have any questions to ask Dr Phillips?
MR SIBANYONI: Just one question Mr Chairperson. Dr Phillips, maybe to kick on the questions which were asked by Ms Thabete, suppose this Committee is satisfied with the evidence you have given to it, etc, in your own words, what would you say the Committee should give you amnesty for?
MR PHILLIPS: Amnesty for dealing unlawfully in weapons of a particular nature at that time, that is all I would be able to suggest.
MR SIBANYONI: Thank you. That is my only question.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you Mr Sibanyoni. Mr Lax, do you have any questions?
MR LAX: Just one quick question Mr Chairperson. Dr Phillips, you spoke of being involved in classes and political education and so on, one understands that your life wasn't made up of this kind of work alone. You have indicated that you were involved in a whole range of activities, of which this work was just a facet.
But you would visit areas and so on, and in the process of that, requests would be made. Did you - what I am trying to understand is, you'd obviously come back to your office with Mandla sometimes, perhaps with Mr Radebe, did you sit down and try and do an assessment of what these needs were and how you might meet those or do an analysis of the information that was coming in?
Clearly there must have been some need to debrief that intelligence, if I could put it in that sense?
MR PHILLIPS: Yes, absolutely. I think you can divide it into two categories as well. One incident I remember particularly, I think it was the 2nd of December 1992, where another comrade who was at the University and myself, called to investigate a massacre that had occurred in Bambai. We went to Bambai, midmorning, the incident had apparently taken place in the very early morning, four or five o'clock, however the bodies were, about eight or nine bodies of people, mainly women and children, were laying where they had been shot.
It hadn't been removed, because the police were waiting for the SABC TV cameras to arrive first, so they told us. In that particular instance in Bambai, was a very specific case, the members of the community who spoke to us, as an official ANC delegation, we were joined by other comrades, indicated quite clearly who the perpetrators were, where they were, and they were still across the little valley which separates Bambai from the IFP settlement at that stage.
The request was very simple, here is the evidence, we have been telling you for months and months that we are under attack, do something.
In that very personal thing, I can come back to the office and the evidence is very clear to me, yes, something needs to be done, and I can make a direct recommendation to comrade Mandla by saying we need to get something for that community so that it can defend itself in future. It is very, very, absolutely necessary.
However, there would be other instances where less directly involved with a particular incident. You would get in the course of meetings wherever, (indistinct), Umkababa, whatever, again people and appeals would be made from the floor, in a public meeting that we need assistance, we are being massacred.
From the position of an REC member, we have got direct links into the ANC structures of those particular areas. When you come back as a political leader, obviously you need to address the intelligence structures and the military structures and say it seems to me that something is required in this particular area, what needs to be done?
The military side of things, the people involved in the SDU's, the people who know what type of things are needed to counteract the type of attack that is being waged against you, they are the ones that can come up with a more proper assessment of what is required in terms of arms and ammunition in an area.
When that decision is taken or assessed, and they of course do their own assessments, I am merely an instrument of communicating that request north, I do not have a veto power on it, and I would never have exercised a veto power on it either simply because I didn't think it was necessary in a particular area.
If a legitimate structure operated by comrade Mandla indicated to me we need weapons for a particular area, I would take that message as soon as I possibly could, to military Headquarters.
MR LAX: Okay. Just the very last aspect of that, when you passed on those messages, were they in code, did they refer to a specific area necessarily? What I am trying to understand is, how would military HQ know that they had to activate a Dead Letter Box near Macubeni for example as opposed to say Sindumbele, or something like that and how were you able to communicate?
MR PHILLIPS: Well, there would be no indication to military Headquarters where the arms were necessary. All that military Headquarters needed from us, was a request that we needed particular arms.
Again the structure is created in such a way that comrades who were functioning within the SDU structures and facilitating the establishment and arming, from military Headquarters all the way down, are comrades who were specifically chosen for those tasks. It is not a random or a democratic vote, who is going to be involved in these things.
There is an enormous amount of trust and faith put in the calibre and the integrity of people involved in those structures. As comrade Jeff has indicated with regard to comrade Mandla, I have faith in this particular comrade to come with the correct ideas, based on the policy, as I know him and that type of thing. That is the one thing.
The second is, I presume if you've got a problem in Port Shepstone, and you are directed to a DLB near Port Shepstone, you can say thank goodness, we can get the things quicker, however, if by some other stroke of fortune, MHQ directs to you a DLB that is north of Phoenix, and you've got to get it all the way down the South Coast, that provides the local MK people or whoever is transporting the stuff, with certain logistical problems which they are trained to overcome.
There is no necessary linkage between where a DLB is physically located and where the arms will ultimately be used. It is a case of which DLB is accessible and of course what determines that accessibility is a military Headquarters prerogative, not mine.
MR LAX: That answers my questions, thank you.
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you. Do you have any questions arising Mr Wills?
FURTHER EXAMINATION BY MR WILLS: Just one quick, brief matter, thank you Mr Chairperson. It would seem as well that the person who would be responsible for determining where the firearms would end up, would be the person on the ground, in this case Mr Sithole, it wouldn't be necessary for the military Headquarters to know?
MR PHILLIPS: Absolutely. And of course Mr Sithole would be making those decisions based on the assessments that he and ANC comrades have made and in terms of the general guidelines of policy. It is not something that he plucks out of the ether.
MR WILLS: Thank you Mr Chairperson.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR WILLS
CHAIRPERSON: Mr Hewitt, I take it you don't have any matters arising?
MR HEWITT: No thank you Mr Chairman.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MR HEWITT
CHAIRPERSON: Ms Thabete?
MS THABETE: No Mr Chairman.
NO FURTHER QUESTIONS BY MS THABETE
CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very much Dr Phillips, that concludes your testimony. I see it is now passed one o'clock, would this be a convenient time I think to take the lunch adjournment and then if you could just keep us informed as to what the position is relating to Mr Sithole's situation which you have alluded to after the tea adjournment.
WITNESS EXCUSED
MR WILLS: Thank you Mr Chairperson.
CHAIRPERSON: We will now adjourn for lunch. We will start depending on what happens to Mr Sithole's position, situation, as close to two o'clock as possible.
COMMITTEE ADJOURNS
